THE  MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


OF 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD 

i 

IN  THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  STATES 
1SG1  TO  18G5 


INCLUDING  A  BRIEF  PERSONAL  SKETCH  AND  A 

NARRATIVE  OF  HIS  SERVICES  IN  THE 

WAR  WITH  MEXICO,  1840-8 


ALFRED   ROMAN 


FORMERLY  COLONEL  OF  THE   18TII  LOUISIANA  VOLUNTEERS,  AFTERWARDS  AIDE-DE-CAMP 
AND   INSPECTOR-GENERAL   ON   THE   STAFF   OF   GENERAL    BEAUREGARD 


IN  TWO   VOLUMES.— Vol.  I. 


generals  only  who  have  never  commanded 
armies  in  the  field  have  not  committed  errors" 

NAPOLEON  AT  ST.  HELENA 


NEW    YORK 
HARPER     &     BROTHERS,    FRANKLIN     SQUARE 

1  884 


,.lf 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1883,  by 

HARPER    &    BROTHERS, 
In  the   Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


All  rights  reserved. 


PREFACE. 


Tins  work,  written  from  notes  and  documents  authenticated 
by  me,  furnishes  a  correct  account  of  my  military  services  and 
conduct  prior  to  and  during  the  recent  war  between  the  States. 
It  is  offered  as  a  guide  to  the  future  historian  of  that  momentous 
period. 

In  developing  the  truth  of  history,  and  fortifying  it  with  evi 
dence  beyond  dispute,  I  desire  to  express  my  appreciation  of  the 
earnest,  able,  and  judicial  manner  in  which  the  author  has  per 
formed  his  arduous  undertaking;  and  I  fully  endorse  all  his 
statements  and  comments,  excepting  only  such  encomiums  as  he 
has  thought  proper  to  bestow  upon  me. 

To  General  Thomas  Jordan,  formerly  my  Chief  of  Staff,  and 
to  Mr.  W.  J.  Marrin,  of  Xew  York,  I  am  indebted  for  valuable 
assistance  in  the  obtaining  of  many  facts  and  data ;  also  to  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  R.  X.  Scott,  U.  S.  A.,  in  charge,  at  Washington,  of 
the  publication  office  of  the  War  Records  of  1861-C5,and  to  Gen 
eral  Marcus  J.  Wright,  agent  of  the  War  Department  in  the  col 
lection  of  Confederate  Records,  for  copies  of  important  papers 
furnished  by  them. 

G.  T.  EEAUEEGAKD. 


268739 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  I. 


BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF  GENERAL  BEAUREGARD Page  1 


CHAPTER  I. 

Major  Beauregard  appointed  Superintendent  of  the  United  States  Military 
Academy. — His  Determination  to  Resign  should  Louisiana  Withdraw 
from  the  Union. — Takes  Command  at  West  Point,  but  is  immediately  Re 
lieved. — Returns  to  New  Orleans. — Is  Offered  the  Rank  of  Colonel  of 
Engineers  and  Artillery  in  the  Louisiana  State  Forces. — Declines. — Plan 
to  Obstruct  River  near  Forts. — Floating  Rooms. — Is  Summoned  to  Mont 
gomery  by  President  Davis. — Ordered  to  Charleston,  S.  C.,  to  Assume 
Command  and  Direct  Operations  against  Fort  Sumter K> 


CHAPTER  II. 

Description  of  Charleston. — General  Beaurcgard'a  Arrival. — Cursory  Sketch  of 
the  Condition  of  the  Public  Mind  in  the  South. — The  Hon.  Robert  Barn- 
well  Rhett. — One  Sentiment  and  One  Resolve  animating  South  Carolin 
ians. — South  Carolina  Commissioners  to  Washington. — Failure  of  Nego 
tiations. — Major  Anderson  Evacuates  Fort  Moultrie  and  Occupies  Fort 
Sumter. — Hoisting  of  Palmetto  Flags. — Steamer  Star  of  the  West. — Gov 
ernor  Pickens  Summons  Major  Anderson  to  Surrender  the  Fort. — He  De 
clines,  but  Refers  the  Matter  to  Washington. — Mr.  Buchanan  Refuses  to 
Withdraw  Federal  Garrison. — All  Eyes  Centred  on  South  Carolina. — 
System  and  Plan  of  Operations  Adopted  by  General  Bcauregard. — More 
Troops  Volunteer  than  arc  Needed 23 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Confederate  States  Commissioners. — Their  Correspondence  with  Mr.  Sew- 
ard. — How  they  were  Deceived. — Mr.  Lincoln's  Sectional  Views. — Letter 
of  Major  Anderson  to  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  United  States  Arm)'. — 
On  Whom  must  Rest  the  Responsibility  for  the  War. — Mr.  Buchanan's 
Wavering  Policy. — General  Bcauregard  Distrusts  the  Good  Faith  of  the 
Federal  Authorities.— His  Plan  to  Reduce  Fort  Sumter.— Detached  Bat 
teries. — Floating  and  Iron-clad  Batteries. — Fort  Sumter's  Supplies  Cut 


viii  CONTENTS. 

Off.  —  Druminond  Lights.  —  Stearn  Harbor-boats.  —  Enfilade  or  Masked 
Battery. — Mr.  Chew. — His  Message  to  General  Beauregard. — Secretary  of 
"War  Apprised  of  Same. — His  Answer  to  Telegram. — Blakely  Rifled  Gun. 
— By  Whom  Sent. — General  Beauregard  Demands  the  Surrender  of  Fort 
Sumter.  —  Major  Anderson  Declines. —  Fire  Opened  on  the  Fort  April 
12th. Page  31 

CHAPTER  IV. 

General  Beauregard  Makes  no  Material  Changes  in  the  Distribution  of  Forces 
in  Charleston. — Brigadier-General  Simons  in  Command  of  Morris  Island. 
— Brigadier- General  Dunovant  of  Sullivan's  Island. — Tone  of  Troops. — 
The  First  Shell  Fired  from  Fort  Johnson. — The  Only  Motive  Actuating 
the  South. — At  5  A.  jr.,  April  12th,  every  Battery  in  Full  Play. — Sumter 
Responds  at  7  o'clock. — How  our  Guns  were  Served. — Engagement  Con 
tinued  until  Nightfall. — Firing  Kept  up  all  Night  by  our  Batteries. — 
No  Response  from  Sumter. — Conduct  of  the  Federal  Fleet. — Fort  Re-opens 
Fire  on  the  Morning  of  the  13th. — Burning  of  Barracks. — Sumter  still 
Firing. — Our  Troops  Cheer  the  Garrison. — General  Beauregard  Offers  As 
sistance  to  Major  Anderson,  who  Declines. — Hoisting  of  the  White  Flag. 
—Terms  of  Surrender. — Accident  during  the  Salute  of  the  Flag. — Evac 
uation. — Our  Troops  Enter  the  Fort,  April  14th. — Hoisting  of  Confederate 
and  Palmetto  Flags , 41 

CHAPTER  V. 

Condition  of  Fort  Sumter  after  the  Bombardment. — Repairs  Begun  at  Once. — 
Mustering  of  South  Carolina  Volunteers. — Bonham's  Brigade. — General 
Beauregard  makes  a  Reconnoissance  of  the  South  Carolina  Coast. — Rec 
ommends  Works  at  Stono,  the  Two  Edistos,  and  Georgetown. — Declines 
Ad  vising  Plan  of  Defence  for  Port  Royal  Harbor. — Yields  under  Pressure, 
but  Predicts  the  Result. — Receives  Congratulations  upon  the  Reduction 
of  Sumter. — Vote  of  Thanks  of  Congress. — Resolutions  of  the  General 
Assembly  of  South  Carolina. — General  Beauregard  is  Called  to  Montgom 
ery. — The  President  Wishes  him  to  Assist  General  Bragg  atPensacola. — He 
Declines. — His  Reasons  therefor. — Deputation  from  New  Orleans  Asking 
his  Transfer  to  Louisiana. — The  President  Sends  him  Back  to  Charleston. 
— Propositions  of  the  House  of  John  Frazer  &  Co.,  relative  to  Purchase 
of  Steamers.  —  Comments  thereon. — General  Beauregard  Advocates  the 
Plan.  —  Government  Declines  Moving  in  the  Matter.  —  Silence  of  Mr. 
Davis's  Book  about  it. — General  Beauregard  Ordered  to  Richmond. — Re 
grets  of  Carolinians  at  his  Departure. — Letter  of  Governor  Pickens....  49 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Secession  of  Virginia. — Confederate  Troops  Sent  to  her  Assistance. — Arrival  of 
General  Beauregard  in  Richmond. — He  Assumes  Command  at  Manassas. — 


CONTENTS.  i^- 
Position  of  our  Forces.— His  Proclamation  and  the  Reasons  for  it.— Site  of 
"  Camp  Pickens." — His  Letter  to  President  Davis.  —  Our  Deficiencies. — 
Mismanagement  in  Quartermaster's  and  Commissary's  Departments. — How 
he  could  have  Procured  Transportation. — Manufacture  of  Cartridges. — Se 
cret  Service  with  Washington Page  63 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Position  of  Troops  in  Northern  Virginia.  —  General  Beauregard  Advocates 
Concentration,  June  12th. — Letter  to  that  Effect  to  President  Davis. — An 
swer  Declining. — General  Beauregard  Suggests  a  Junction  with  General 
Holmes. — Again  Refused. — Division  of  General  Beauregard's  Forces  into 
Brigades,  20th  June. — Begins  Forward  Movement. — Instructions  to  Brig 
ade  Commanders. — Reconnoissanccs  Made  at  the  End  of  June. — McDow 
ell's  Strength. — General  Beauregard's  Anxieties. — His  Letter  to  Senator 
Wigfall.  —  Submits  another  Plan  of  Operations  to  the  President,  July 
llth...  .  70 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

General  Beauregard  again  Urging  Concentration. — Colonels  Preston  and  Chest 
nut  sent  to  Richmond,  to  Explain  Plan. — Report  of  Colonel  Chestnut. — 
The  President  Disapproves  the  Proposed  Campaign. — Letter  of  General 
Beauregard  to  General  Johnston. — Comments  upon  Mr.  Davis's  Refusal. — 
General  McDowell  Ordered  to  Advance. — Strong  Demonstration  against 
General  Bonham. — General  Beauregard's  Telegram  to  the  President. — 
General  Johnston  Ordered  to  Make  Junction  if  Practicable. — Action  of 
Bull  Run.— What  Major  Barnard,  U.  S.  E.,  Says  of  It.— Repulse  of  the 
Enemy. — War  Department  Inclined  to  Withdraw  Order  to  General  John 
ston. — General  Beauregard  Disregards  the  Suggestion 84 

CHAPTER   IX. 

Battle  of  Manassas. — General  J.  E.  Johnston  Assumes  Command,  but  General 
Beauregard  Directs  Operations  and  Fights  the  Battle. — Superiority  of 
Numbers  Against  us. — Deeds  of  Heroism. — Enemy  Completely  Routed. — 
Ordnance  and  Supplies  Captured. — Ours  and  Enemy's  Losses. — Strength 
of  General  McDowell's  Armv. — The  Verdict  of  History. ..  ..  96 


CHAPTER  X. 

President  Davis  and  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  Discuss  the  Propriety 
of  Pursuing  the  Enemy  during  the  Night  following  the  Battle. — Error  of 
Mr.  Davis  as  to  the  Order  he  Wrote. — On  the  22d  General  Beauregard  As 
signs  his  Troops  to  New  Positions. — The  President  Confers  the  Rank  of 
General  on  General  Beauregard,  subject  to  the  Approval  of  Congress. — On 


CONTENTS. 

the  25th,  Address  Issued  to  Troops  by  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard. 
— Organization  of  General  Beauregard's  Army  into  Brigades. — Impossi 
bility  of  any  Military  Movement  of  Importance,  and  Why.— Army  With 
out  Transportation  and  Without  Subsistence. — Colonel  Northrop  Appoints 
Major  W.  B.  Blair  as  Chief  Commissary  of  the  Army. — General  Beauregard 
Informs  the  President  of  the  Actual  State  of  Affairs. — Colonel  Lee  to  the 
President. — General  Beauregard  to  Colonels  Chestnut  and  Miles. — His 
Telegram  to  Colonel  Myers. — Answer  of  President  Davis. — General  Beau- 
regard's  Reply. — Colonel  Myers  alleges  Ignorance  of  Want  of  Transporta 
tion  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. — General  Beaurcgard's  Answer. — Cause 
of  the  Failure  of  the  Campaign. — Effect  of  General  Beauregard's  Letter 
upon  Congress. — An  Apparent  Improvement  in  Commissary  and  Quarter 
master  Departments. — General  Beauregard  Complains  again  on  the  23d 
of  August. — No  Action  Taken. — Suggests  Removal  of  Colonel  Northrop. 
— The  President  believes  in  his  Efficiency,  and  Upholds  him. — Fifteen 
and  Twenty  Days'  Rations  asked  for  by  General  Beauregard Page  114 


CHAPTER  XI. 

General  Beauregard  Suggests  a  Forward  Movement. — Not  Approved  by  Gen 
eral  Johnston. — Sanitary  Measures. — Deficiency  in  Light  Artillery. — In 
structions  to  Colonel  Stuart.  —  Mason's  and  Munson's  Hills.  —  General 
Beauregard  Proposes  to  Hold  Them. — General  Johnston  of  a  Different 
Opinion. — Popularity  of  General  Beauregard. — He  Establishes  His  Head 
quarters  at  Fairfax  Court-House. — Proposes  Another  Plan  Involving  De 
cisive  Battle.  —  General  Johnston  Deems  it  Better  not  to  Hazard  the 
Movement. — Organization  of  the  Forces  into  Divisions. — General  Beaure 
gard  Advises  that  the  Army  be  Placed  Under  One  Head. — President 
Davis  Invited  to  a  Conference  at  Fairfax  Court-Housc. — Scheme  of  Oper 
ations  Submitted.  —  Generals  Johnston  and  G.  W.  Smith  Approve  it. — 
Troops  in  Splendid  Fighting  Condition. — The  President  Objects.  —  No 
Reinforcements  can  be  Furnished,  and  no  Arms  in  the  Country. — Review 
of  Mr.  Davis's  Remarks  on  the  Subject. — He  Proposes  a  Plan  for  Opera 
tions  Across  the  Potomac. — The  Commanding  Generals  do  not  Consider 
it  Feasible...  .  131 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Signal  Rockets  and  Signal  Telegraph. — General  Beauregard  Advises  Coast 
Defenses  at  New  Orleans,  Mobile,  Galvcston,  and  Berwick  Bay,  and  Calls 
Attention  to  the  Exposure  of  Port  Royal. — Counsels  General  Lovell  Con 
cerning  River  Obstructions  between  Forts  St.  Philip  and  Jackson. — General 
Johnston  Orders  the  Troops  into  Winter  Quarters. — Our  Lines  Formed  at 
Centreville. — Drainsville  and  Ball's  Bluff. — General  Beauregard  Proposes 
to  Intercept  General  Stone's  Retreat,  and  also  Suggests  Resolute  Attack 
against  McClellan's  Right. — Unfriendly  Correspondence  Between  War 


CONTENTS.  xi 

Department  and  General  Beauregard.  —  Uncourteous  Language  of  Mr. 
Benjamin. — General  Beauregard  Exposes  the  Ignorance  of  the  Acting 
Secretary  of  War. — Controversy  in  the  Press  about  General  Beauregard's 
Report  of  Battle  of  Manassas.— His  Letter  to  the  Editors  of  Richmond 
"Whig. — The  President  Accuses  General  Beauregard  of  Attempting  to  Ex 
alt  Himself  at  His  Expense. — He  Upholds  Mr.  Benjamin  and  Condemns 
General  Beauregard. — Dignity  and  Forbearance  of  the  Latter.. ..Page  152 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Creation  of  the  Department  of  Northern  Virginia. — Distribution  of  New 
Confederate  Battle  Flags. — Debate  in  Congress  about  the  Action  of  the 
President  with  Regard  to  General  Beauregard's  Report  of  the  Battle 
of  Manassas. — Telegram  of  the  lion.  James  L.  Kemper  Concerning  it. — 
General  Beauregard's  Answer. — Letter  of  Colonel  Pryor  on  the  Same 
Subject. — Commentaries  on  the  Executive  Endorsement. — Governor  Moore 
Forwards  Resolutions  of  Louisiana  Legislature,  Congratulating  General 
Beauregard. — Circular  to  Division  Commanders  about  Leaves  of  Absence. 
— Congress  Passes  an  Act  in  Regard  to  the  Matter. — Its  Effect. — General 
Beauregard's  Plan  of  Recruitment 170 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

The  Part  taken  by  General  Johnston  in  the  Battle  of  Manassas. — He  Assumes 
no  Direct  Responsibility,  and,  though  Superior  in  Rank,  desires  General 
Beauregard  to  Exercise  Full  Command. — President  Davis  did  not  Plan 
the  Campaign;  Ordered  Concentration  at  the  Last  Moment;  Arrived  on 
the  Battle-field  after  the  Enemy  had  been  Routed. — Pursuit  Ordered  and 
Begun,  but  Checked  in  Consequence  of  False  Alarm. — Advance  on  Wash 
ington  made  Impossible  by  Want  of  Transportation  and  Subsistence..  191 

CHAPTER   XV. 

Colonel  Pryor,  of  the  Military  Committee  of  Congress,  Visits  General  Beaure 
gard  at  Centreville,  to  Propose  his  Transfer  to  the  West. — General  Beau- 
regard  finally  Yields  to  the  Wishes  of  Congress  and  the  Executive. — 
He  Parts  with  his  Army  on  the  2d  of  February,  and  on  the  4th  Arrives 
at  Bowling  Green. — Interview  with  General  A.  S.  Johnston. — Succinct 
Review  of  the  Latter's  Situation. — Ignorance  of  the  War  Department  with 
Reference  to  his  Forces. — General  Beauregard  Desires  to  go  Back  to  his 
Army  in  Virginia. — General  Johnston  urges  Him  to  Stay  and  Assume 
Command  at  Columbus. — Inspection  of  the  Works  at  Bowling  Green. — 
What  General  Beauregard  Thinks  of  Them. — He  Suggests  Concentration 
at  Henry  and  Donelson  to  Force  a  Battle  upon  Grant. — General  Johnston 
Fears  the  Kisk  of  such  a  Movement,  and  Adheres  to  his  own  Plan  of  Op 
erations. — Fall  of  Fort  Henry. — Conference  at  Bowling  Green. — Memo 
randum  of  General  Johnston's  Plan  of  the  Campaign. — His  and  General 


xii  CONTENTS. 

Folk's  Army  to  Operate  on  Divergent  Lines. — Evacuation  of  Bowling 
Green. — General  Beauregard  Asks  for  Specific  Instructions. — Letter  to 
Colonel  Pryor. — Fall  of  Fort  Donelson. — Its  Effect  upon  the  Country. — 
Criticism  of  General  Johnston's  Strategy Page  210 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

General  Beauregard  Telegraphs  for  Instructions  after  the  Fall  of  Donelson. — 
General  Johnston's  Answer. — Colonel  Jordan's  Report  of  the  Situation  at 
Columbus. — General  Beauregard  Calls  General  Polk  to  Jackson,  Tennessee, 
for  Conference. — Opinion  of  the  Latter  as  to  the  Strength  of  Columbus. — 
He  Concurs,  however,  in  General  Beauregard's  Views. — Evacuation  of  Co 
lumbus  Authorized  by  the  War  Department. — General  Beauregard's  De 
tailed  Instructions  to  that  Effect. — Defects  in  River  Defences  at  Columbus. 
— Governor  Harris  of  Tennessee. — General  Johnston  Retreating  towards 
Stevenson,  along  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad. — His  Letter  of 
February  18th  to  the  War  Department. — Depression  of  the  People. — Gent- 
eral  Beauregard  Resolves  to  Replenish  the  Army. — Makes  Use  of  the  Dis 
cretion  given  him  by  General  Johnston. — His  Plan  of  Operations. — Be 
lieves  Success  Depends  upon  Offensive  Movement  on  Our  Part. — Calls 
upon  the  Governors  of  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  and  Tennessee; 
and  also  upon  Generals  Van  Dora,  Bragg,  and  Lovell,  for  Immediate  As 
sistance.  —  Sixty  and  Ninety  Days  Troops.  —  The  War  Department  not 
Favorable  to  the  Method  Proposed,  but  Finally  Gives  its  Assent. — General 
Johnston  Requested  by  General  Beauregard  to  Change  his  Line  of  Retreat 
and  Turn  towards  Decatur,  so  as  to  Co-operate  with  him. — General  John 
ston  Accedes  to  his  Request 232 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

Evacuation  of  Columbus. — How  the  Enemy  Discovered  It. — Loss  of  Ordnance 
Stores,  Anchors,  and  Torpedoes. — Island  No.  10. — Difficulty  in  Placing 
Guns  in  Position. — Federal  Gunboats  might  have  Passed  Unhindered. — 
Small  Garrison  under  Colonel  Gantt  Reinforced  by  General  McCown  with 
Part  of  the  Garrison  of  Columbus. — Defences  at  New  Madrid  to  be  held  un 
til  the  Completion  of  the  Works  at  Fort  Pillow. — Remainder  of  General 
Polk's  Forces  Assembled  upon  Humboldt. — Preparations  for  an  Offensive 
Movement  by  the  Enemy. — Danger  of  Isolation  for  General  Johnston. — 
General  Beauregard's  Letter  to  him.— The  Great  Battle  of  the  Controversy 
to  be  Fought  at  or  near  Corinth. — General  Johnston  accedes  to  General 
Beauregard's  request,  and  Begins  a  Movement  to  Join  him. — General 
Beauregard  Assumes  Command. — Arrival  of  General  Bragg's  Forces  at 
Corinth.— Corinth  the  Chief  Point  of  Concentration,  as  Originally  De 
cided  upon. — General  Beauregard  Appeals  to  the  War  Department  for 
the  General  Officers  Promised  him. — Their  Services  Greatly  Needed. — 
Unwillingness  and  Apathy  of  the  War  Department 245 


CONTENTS.  xiii 

CHAPTER  XVIIL 

General  Beauregard  Orders  the  Collection  of  Grain  and  Provisions,  and  Es 
tablishes  Depots  of  Supplies.— His  Appeal  to  the  People  to  Procure  Met 
al  for  the  Casting  of  Cannon.— Warning  Preparations  of  the  Enemy.— 
Arrival  of  Federal  Divisions  at  Savannah. — General  Sherman's  Attempt 
ed  Raid  to  Destroy  the  Railroad. — Burning  of  Small  Bridge  near  Bethel 
Station. — General  Pope  Before  New  Madrid. — The  Place  Abandoned. — 
General  Beauregard's  Instructions  to  General  McCown. — General  Mackall 
Relieves  him. — Bombardment  of  Island  Xo.  10. — What  might  have  been 
the  Result  had  the  Enemy  Disembarked  at  once  at  Pittsburg  Landing. — 
The  Troops  we  had  to  Oppose  Them. — What  General  Johnston  Thought 
of  Bolivar  as  a  Base  of  Operation.  —  Recommends  it  as  more  Advanta 
geous  than  Corinth. — Why  General  Beauregard  Preferred  Corinth. — He 
Presses  Concentration  there,  as  soon  as  the  Intentions  of  the  Enemy  be 
come  Sufficiently  Developed. — Success  of  his  Plan. — Co-operation  of  the 
Governors  of  Adjacent  States. — Troops  Poorly  Armed  and  Equipped. — 
The  Enemy  begins  Lauding  at  Pittsburg. — Arrival  of  Hurlbut's,  Prcntiss's, 
McClernand's,  and  the  Two  Wallaces'  Divisions. — Force  of  the  Army  Op 
posing  us. — General  Buell. — His  Slow  Advance  on  Nashville. — Is  at  Last 
Aroused  by  Order  to  Unite  his  Forces  with  those  of  General  Grant. — 
Aggregate  of  Buell's  Forces  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. — Our  only  Hope 
for  Success  was  to  Strike  a  Sudden  Blow  before  the  Junction  of  Bucll 
and  Grant Page  254 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

Arrival  of  General  Johnston  at  Corinth. — Position  of  his  Troops  on  the  27th 
of  March. — Offers  to  Turn  Over  Command  of  the  Army  to  General  Beau- 
regard,  who  Declines.  —  General  Beauregard  L'rges  an  Early  Offensive 
Movement  against  the  Enemy,  and  Gives  his  Views  as  to  Plan  of  Organ 
izing  the  Forces. — General  Johnston  Authorizes  him  to  Complete  the 
Organization  already  Begun. — General  Orders  of  March  29th. — Reasons 
why  the  Army  was  Formed  into  Small  Corps. — General  Beauregard  De 
sirous  of  Moving  against  the  Enemy  on  the  1st  of  April. — Why  it  was 
not  clone.  —  On  the  2d,  General  Cheatham  Reports  a  Strong  Federal 
Force  Threatening  his  Front, — General  Beauregard  Advises  an  Immedi 
ate  Advance. — General  Johnston  Yields. — General  Jordan's  Statement  of 
his  Interview  with  General  Johnston  on  that  Occasion. — Special  Orders 
No.  8,  otherwise  called  "Order  of  March  and  Battle.'' — By  Whom  Sug 
gested  and  by  Whom  Written. — General  Beauregard  Explains  the  Order 
to  Corps  Commanders. — Tardiness  of  the  First  Corps  in  Marching  from 
Corinth. — Our  Forces  in  Position  for  Battle  on  the  Afternoon  of  the  5th ; 
Too  Late  to  Commence  Action  on  that  Day. — Generals  Hardec  and  Bragg 
Request  General  Beauregard  to  Ride  in  Front  of  their  Lines. — General 
Johnston  Calls  General  Beauregard  and  the  Corps  Commanders  in  an  In 
formal  Council. — General  Beauregard  Believes  the  Object  of  the  Movement 


Xiv  CONTENTS. 

Foiled  by  the  Tardiness  of  Troops  in  Arriving  on  the  Battle-field. — Al 
ludes  to  Noisy  Demonstrations  on  the  March,  and  to  the  Probability  of 
Buell's  Junction,  and  Advises  to  Change  Aggressive  Movement  into  a  Re- 
connoissance  in  Force. — General  Johnston  Decides  Otherwise,  and  Orders 
Preparations  for  an  Attack  at  Dawn  next  Day. — Description  of  the  Field 
of  Shiloh. — Strength  of  the  Federal  Forces. — What  General  Sherman  Tes 
tified  to. — We  Form  into  Three  Lines  of  Battle. — Our  Effective  Strength. 
— Carelessness  and  Oversight  of  the  Federal  Commanders. — They  are 
not  Aroused  by  the  many  Sounds  in  their  Front,  and  are  Taken  by  Sur 
prise Page  265 

CHAPTER  XX. 

Battle  of  Shiloh. —  Varied  Incidents  and  Events  of  the  First  Day. —  Enemy 
Taken  by  Surprise. — His  Lines  Driven  in. — Entire  Forces  Engaged  on  Both 
Sides. — Triumphant  Advance  of  our  Troops. — General  Johnston  in  Com 
mand  of  the  Right  and  Centre. — General  Beauregard  of  the  Left  and  Re 
serves. — Allurements  of  the  Enemy's  Camps. — Straggling  Begins  among 
our  Troops. — Death  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. — General  Beauregard  As 
sumes  Command  and  Renews  the  Attack  all  along  the  Line. — Enemy  again 
Forced  to  Fall  Back  and  Abandon  other  Camps. — Evidence  of  Exhaustion 
among  the  Troops. — Straggling  Increasing. — General  Beauregard 's  Efforts 
to  Check  it. — Collects  Stragglers  and  Pushes  them  Forward. — Battle  still 
Raging. — Capture  of  General  Prentiss  and  of  his  Command. — Our  Troops 
Reach  the  Tennessee  River. —  Colonel  Webster's  Batteries. —  Arrival  of 
Ammen's  Brigade,  Nelson's  Division,  of  BuelVs  Army. — Its  Inspiriting 
Effect  upon  the  Enemy. — The  Gunboats. — Intrepidity  of  our  Troops. — 
Their  Brilliant  but  Ineffectual  Charges. — Firing  Gradually  Slackens,  as 
the  Day  Declines. — At  Dusk  General  Beauregard  Orders  Arrest  of  Conflict. 
—  Troops  Ordered  to  Bivouac  for  the  Night,  and  be  in  Readiness  for 
Offensive  Movement  next  Day. — Storm  during  the  Night. — Arrival  of  the 
Whole  of  Buell's  Army. — Gunboats  Keep  up  an  Incessant  Shelling....  283 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

Difficulty  of  Collecting  and  Organizing  Commands  during  Night  of  the  6th. — 
Firing  Resumed  Early  next  Morning. — Nelson's  Brigades  Cross  the  Ten 
nessee. — Positions  Taken  by  the  Federals.— Chalmers's  Brigade  and  a 
Mixed  Command  Force  Back  Nelson's  Advance. — At  8  A.  M.  the  Confed 
erates  are  Driven  Back  with  the  Loss  of  a  Battery. — They  Regain  the 
Position  and  Battery  at  9.  —  Critical  Situation  of*  Ammen's  Brigade. — 
New  Position  Assumed  by  the  Confederates. — Crittenden's  Division  En 
gaged. — Absence  of  General  Polk  from  the  Field. — His  Timely  Arrival  at 
10.30. — His  Charge  with  Cheatham's  Brigade. — Organization  of  Federal 
Army  during  the  Night  of  the  6th. — Inaction  of  General  Sherman  on  the 
Morning  of  the  7th. — General  Breckinridge  Ordered  Forward. — Enemy 
Driven  Back  on  our  Whole  Line. — Advance  of  Federal  Right  Wing. — 


CONTEXTS.  xv 

Its  Repulse.— At  1  r.  M.  Euemy  on  our  Left  Reinforced.— General  Bragg 
Calls  for  Assistance.  —  General  Bcauregard  in  Person  Leads  the  18th 
Louisiana  and  Other  Troops  to  his  Aid.— Predetermination  of  General 
Bcauregard  to  Withdraw  from  the  Battle-field.— Couriers  sent  to  Corinth 
to  Inquire  about  General  Van  Dora.— Preparations  for  Retreat.— Guns  and 
Colors  Captured  by  Confederates  on  the  Gth.— Slow  and  Orderly  With 
drawal  of  Confederate  Forces. — Inability  of  the  Enemy  to  Follow. — 
Rcconuoissance  of  General  Sherman  on  the  Morning  of  the  8th. — Con 
federates  not  Disorganized. — Their  Loss  During  the  Battle. — Computa 
tion  of  Numbers  Engaged  on  Both  Sides. — Federal  Loss Page  308 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

Commentaries  on  the  Battle  of  Shiloli :  I.  Why  Generals  Johnston  and  Beau- 
regard  did  not  Sooner  Move  the  Army  from  Corinth. — II.  Their  Reasons 
for  Forming  their  Lines  of  Battle  as  they  did.  —  III.  Why  the  Con 
federate  Attack  was  Made  Chiefly  on  the  Enemy's  Right,  and  not  on 
his  Entire  Front.—  IV.  Demonstration  of  the  Fact  that  the  Confederate- 
Attack  took  the  Enemy  Completely  by  Surprise. — V.  General  Beau- 
regard's  Opinion  and  Criticism  of  General  Sherman's  Tactics  during  the 
Battle. — VL  Refutation  of  the  Charge  that  the  Confederate  Troops  were 
Withdrawn  too  soon  from  the  Battle-field  on  the  Evening  of  the  Gth. — 
Comparison  Drawn  by  Mr.  Davis  between  General  A.  S.  Johnston  and 
Marshal  Turcnrie. — VII.  General  Bcauregard's  Opinion  as  to  the  Fight 
ing  of  the  Confederates  during  the  Battle  of  the  7th. — VIII.  Correction 
of  the  Absurd  Story  that  General  Bcauregard  did  not  Leave  his  Am 
bulance  during  the  First  Day  of  the  Battle,  and,  when  Informed  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  Death,  "  Quietly  Remained  where  he  was,  Waiting  the 
Issue  of  Events'' :&<; 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

General  Bcauregard's  Insistancc  on  the  Evacuation  of  Columbus. — Docu 
ments  Relating  to  the  Matter. — General  McCown  to  be  put  in  Command 
of  Madrid  Bend. — He  is  Called  by  General  Bcaurcgard  to  Jackson  for 
Instructions. — He  Repairs  to  Madrid  Bend.  —  Dispositions  Made  for 
its  Defence.  —  Commodore  Hollins  to  Co-operate  with  Land  Forces. — 
Number  of  Troops  under  General  McCown. — Arrival  of  General  Pope  on 
the  28th  of  February  in  Front  of  New  Madrid. — Colonel  Plummcr  Estab 
lishes  a  Battery  on  the  River. — Apprehensions  of  General  McCown. — Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  Despatch  to  General  Cooper. — General  McCown  Exhib 
its  still  Greater  Anxiety. — General  Beauregard  Doubts  General  McCown's 
Capacity. — Successful  Evacuation  of  Columbus. — Attack  Commenced  on 
New  Madrid  March  12th. — Conference  of  General  McCown  with  Commo 
dore  Hollins  on  the  13th,  and  Evacuation  of  Forts. — General  Beauregard 
Applies  for  General  Mackall. — Garrison  of  New  Madrid  Transferred  to 
Opposite  Bank  of  River  and  Island  No.  10. — General  Bcauregard  Orders 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

all  Surplus  Guns,  Supplies,  and  Boats  to  Fort  Pillow. — Fall  of  Island  No. 
10  on  the  7th  of  April. — General  Pope's  Forces  Transported  to  Vicinity 
of  Fort  Pillow. — General  Pope  Ordered  to  Pittsburg  Landing. — Want  of 
Capacity  of  Commodore  Hollins.  —  General  Beauregard's  Various  Tele 
grams  and  Orders. — He  Detains  General  Villepigue  in  Command  of  Fort 
Pillow. — Instructions  to  Captain  Harris. — Surrender  of  New  Orleans. — 
Bombardment  of  Fort  Pillow. — The  Montgomery  Hams. — General  Beau- 
regard  has  Steam  Rani  Arkansas  Completed,  Equipped,  and  Manned. — 
History  of  the  Arkansas. — Tribute  to  Captain  Isaac  Brown  and  Crew. — 
Prisoners  with  Smallpox  Sent  to  Fort  Pillow. — What  Became  of  Them. — 
Letter  to  General  Villepigue,  May  28th. — He  is  Directed  by  General 
Beauregard  to  Prepare  for  Withdrawing  his  Troops  from  Fort  Pillow. — 
Fort  Evacuated  1st  of  June. — Responsibility  of  Various  Movements  Left 
to  General  Beauregard Page  352 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

Troops  Resume  their  Former  Positions  after  the  Battle  of  Shiloh. — General 
Breckinridge  Forms  the  Rear  Guard. — General  Beauregard  Recommends 
General  Bragg  for  Promotion. — Preliminary  Report  Sent  by  General  Beau- 
regard,  April  llth,  to  the  War  Department, — Difficulty  of  Obtaining  Re 
ports  of  Corps  Commanders. — Their  Reports  sent  Directly  to  the  War  De 
partment. — Inaccuracies  Resulting  Therefrom. — General  Beauregard  Pro 
poses  an  Exchange  of  Prisoners. — General  Pope  Gives  no  Satisfactory  An 
swer. — General  Van  Dorn's  Forces  Reach  Memphis  on  the  llth. — Despatch 
of  the  12th  to  General  Smith. — A  Diversion  Movement  Determined  upon 
by  General  Beauregard. — Captain  John  Morgan. — He  is  Sent  by  General 
Beauregard  into  Middle  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. —  Efforts  to  Force 
Buell's  Return  to  those  States. — Location  of  General  Van  Dorn's  Forces 
at  Corinth ;  of  Generals  Bragg's,  Polk's,  and  Breckinridge's. — Bad  Wa 
ter. — Mismanagement  of  Commissary  Department. — Necessity  of  With 
drawing  from  Corinth. — Tupelo  Selected  for  next  Defensive  Position. — 
General  Beauregard  Resolves  to  Construct  Defensive  Works  Around 
Vicksburg. — General  Pope  Takes  Farmington. — Confederate  Attack. — 
Federal  Retreat. — On  the  25th  General  Beauregard  Calls  a  Council  of 
War.— Evacuation  of  Corinth  Resolved  Upon. — General  Beauregard's  In 
structions  to  his  Corps  Commanders. — Dispositions  Taken  to  Deceive 
the  Enemy. — Retreat  Successfully  Accomplished. — False  Despatches  of 
the  Enemy.  —  Correct  Account  by  Correspondents.  —  General  Force  in 
Error. — Retreat  Considered  Masterly. — Dissatisfaction  of  the  War  Depart 
ment. — Interrogatories  Sent  by  President  Davis. — 'General  Beauregard's 
Answer....  ..  376 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

General  Beauregard  is  at  Tupelo  on  the  7th  of  June.— The  Main  Body  of  his 
Army  Arrives  on  the  9th. — Telegrams  Sent  by  him  to  Various  Points. — His 


CONTENTS.  xvii 

Communication  to  General  Cooper. — He  Places  Colonel  Forrest  in  Com 
mand  of  the  Cavalry  Regiments  in  Middle  Tennessee. — General  Beaure 
gard's  Ill-health.— He  is  urged  by  his  Physicians  to  Take  a  Short  Rest.— He 
Finally  Consents. — Order  Sent  to  General  Bragg  from  Richmond. — General 
Beauregard's  Despatch  to  General  Cooper,  June  14th. — His  Letter  to  the 
AVar  Department,  June  15th. — General  Beauregard  gives  Temporary  Com 
mand  of  his  Department  to  General  Bragg,  and  Leaves  Tupelo  on  the 
17th. — General  Bragg  Notifies  the  Government  of  the  Fact. — President 
Davis  Removes  General  Beauregard,  and  Gives  Permanent  Command  of 
his  Army  and  Department  to  General  Bragg. — Comments  on  President 
Davis. — General  Bragg's  Despatch  to  General  Beauregard. — His  Reply. — 
Mr.  Randolph's  Telegram. — General  Beauregard's  Letter  to  General  Coop 
er. — Misstatements  Contained  in  President  Davis's  Book. — Public  Sympa 
thy  with  General  Beauregard. — General  Bragg's  Letter  to  Mr.  Forsyth. — 
His  Letter  to  General  Beauregard. — Answer  to  the  Same. — General  Beau- 
regard's  Plan  of  Operations  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. — Interview  of 
the  Hon.  Thomas  J.  Semmes  and  Edward  Sparrow  with  President  Davis, 
September  13th. — Petition  of  Senators  and  Representatives  for  General 
Beauregard's  Restoration  to  his  Command. — President  Davis's  Refusal. — 
Notes  of  the  Interview,  by  Mr.  Semmes. — Comments  upon  President  Davis 
in  Connection  with  these  Events. — Successful  Result  of  Military  Opera 
tions  from  Bowling  Green  to  the  Retreat  to  Tupelo Page  400 

APPENDICES 421 

I.-B 


BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

OF 

GENERAL  BEAUREGARD 


BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

OP 

GENERAL   BEAUREGARD. 


THE  greatest  boon  that  can  be  bestowed  upon  a  people  is  the 
adequate  setting  forth  of  the  history  of  their  illustrious  men. 
The  achievements  of  these,  duly  recorded,  stand  forth  as  beacon- 
lights  to  guide  coming  generations;  and  as  a  just  appreciation  of 
greatness  indicates  worth  in  a  people,  and  points  to  future  ad 
vancement  on  their  part,  so  surely  does  indifference  to  merited 
renown  denote  popular  degeneracy  and  decay. 

We  therefore  welcome  every  honestly  meant  publication  con 
cerning  the  struggle  of  the  South  for  independence — a  struggle 
replete  with  acts  of  heroic  valor,  and  resplendent  with  examples 
of  self-sacrifice,  fortitude,  and  virtue. 

Few,  even  now,  are  the  remaining  leaders  of  the  great  contest 
through  which  we  have  passed ;  and,  as  time  goes  on,  gradually 
diminishing  their  number,  the  day  approaches  when  nothing  will 
be  left  of  them  except  a  memory.  They  must  die,  but  the  grand 
principles  they  strove,  at  so  great  cost,  to  maintain  must  not  be 
buried  with  them.  The  Southern  people,  shackled  by  years  of 
poverty  and  political  helplessness,  and  circumscribed  as  they  are 
in  their  sphere  of  action,  cannot  forget  the  teachings  which,  to 
them  and  to  their  posterity,  embody  the  true  meaning  of  our 
institutions. 

In  recording  the  causes  for  which  the  South  armed  and  sent  to 
the  field  her  manhood  and  her  youth,  and  in  holding  up  before 
the  public  mind  the  great  ability  of  some  of  her  leaders,  the 
devotion  of  all,  we  not  only  perform  a  sacred  duty  to  our  coun 
try  and  those  who  will  come  after  us,  but  mark  out  the  way  for 
them  to  that  peace,  liberty,  and  prosperity  which  we  failed  to  at 
tain  for  ourselves. 
L— 1 


2  BIOGEArmCAL  SKETCH  OF 

It  is  in  furtherance  of  these  views  that  the  following  biograph 
ical  sketch  is  offered,  of  one  of  the  most  patriotic,  skilful,  far- 
seeing  and  heroic  chieftains  of  the  Confederate  army ;  whose 
military  career  and  successes  have  called  forth  the  admiration  of 
Europe  as  well  as  of  America,  and  of  whom  Louisiana,  his  native 
State,  is — and  well  may  be — fondly  proud. 

Pierre  Gustavo  Ton  taut-Beau  regard  was  born  in  the  parish  of 
St.  Bernard,  near  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  State  of  Louisiana, 
on  theSSth  of  May,  181 8." 

The  earliest  authentic  records  of  his  family,  one  of  the  oldest 
and  most  illustrious  of  Louisiana,  go  back  to  the  year  1290,  or 
about  that  time,  when  Tider,  surnamed  the  Young,  at  the  early  age 
of  eighteen,  headed  a  party  of  Welsh  in  revolt  against  Edward  L. 
then  King  of  England.  Overcome,  and  his  followers  dispersed, 
Tider  took  refuge  in  France,  where  he  was  presented  to  Philip 
IV.,  surnamed  the  Fair,  and  cordially  welcomed  to  his  court.  He 
there  married  Mademoiselle  de  Lafayette,  maid  of  honor  to  Ma 
dame  Marguerite,  sister  of  Philip. 

War  was  then  raging  between  France  and  England,  and  was 
only  appeased  by  the  marriage  of  King  Edward  with  Marguerite 
of  France. 

Tider  and  his  wife  followed  the  new  queen  to  England ;  but 
never  were  the  suspicions  and  animosity  of  Edward  against  his 
former  rebellious  subject  allayed.  By  the  queen's  entreaties  Ed 
ward  was  induced  to  assign  Tider  to  a  government  post  in  Sain- 
tonge,  then  part  of  the  British  possessions  on  the  Continent;  but 
soon  afterwards  he  revoked  his  royal  favor,  and  Tider  was  again 
compelled  to  seek  shelter  in  France,  where  he  lived,  with  his  wife 
and  children,  on  a  pension  left  them  by  the  dead  queen.  lie  died 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Tours,  at  the  age  of  forty-one. 

His  eldest  son,  Marc,  returned  to  Saintonge,  and  there  endeav 
ored  to  recover  some  of  his  father's  property,  in  which  he  only 
partially  succeeded.  Having,  through  powerful  influences,  ob 
tained  a  position  under  the  English  crown,  and  being  desirous 
of  propitiating  the  king,  to  whom  the  name  of  Tider  was  still 
odious,  he  changed  it  into  Toutank.  Gradually  the  letter  "k" 
was  dropped,  and  the  letter  "t"  substituted  in  its  place;  thus 
transforming  the  old  Celtic  "Toutank"  into  the  Gallic  "Toutant," 

During  three  centuries,  the  family  bore,  unaltered,  the  name 
of  Toutant. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  3 

Towards  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century  the  last  male  de 
scendant  of  the  Toutants  died,  leaving  an  only  daughter,  who 
married  Sienr  Paix  de  Beauregard  —  hence  the  family  name  of 
Toutant  de  Beauregard.*  At  what  time  the  particle  "de"  was 
abandoned  and  the  hyphen  resorted  to  instead,  is  not  known. 

Jacques  Ton tant-Beau regard  was  the  first  of  the  name  who 
came  from  France  to  Louisiana,  under  Louis  XIV.,  as  "  Com 
mandant"  of  a  flotilla,  the  purpose  of  which  was  to  bring  assist 
ance  to  the  colony,  and  carry  back  timber  for  naval  constructions. 
So  thoroughly  did  he  succeed  in  his  enterprise  in  this  connection 
that  he  was,  on  his  return  to  France,  decorated  with  the  Cross 
of  Saint  Louis. 

He  finally  settled  in  Louisiana;  and  there  married  Miss  Mag- 
deleine  Cartier.  Three  sons  were  born  to  them,  one  of  whom, 
Louis  Toutant-Bcauregard,  was,  in  his  turn,  united  to  Miss  Vic- 
toire  Ducros,  the  daughter  of  a  respected  planter  of  the  parish  of 
St.  Bernard,  near  New  Orleans,  who  had  honorably  filled  several 
offices  of  trust  under  the  French  and  Spanish  governments  of 
Louisiana.  They  had  one  daughter  and  two  sons,  the  younger 
of  whom,  Jacques  Toutant -Beauregard,  married,  in  1808,  Miss 
Ilelenc  Judith  de  Reggio.  Several  children  were  the  issue  of 
their  union;  the  third  being  Pierre  Gustavo  Toutant -Beaure 
gard,  the  Confederate  general  and  Southern  patriot,  whose  biog 
raphy  forms  the  subject  of  this  memoir. 

General  Beanregard's  maternal  ancestry  is  even  more  illustri 
ous,  he  being  a  descendant  of  the  Dukes  of  Eeggio  and  Modena, 
and,  consequently,  of  the  House  of  Este.  His  great-grandfather, 
Francois  Marie,  Chevalier  de  Reggio  (akin  to  the  reigning  duke) 
accompanied  his  friend,  the  Duke  of  Richelieu,  to  the  siege  of 
Bergen-op-Zoom,  and  there  so  distinguished  himself  that  he  was 
given  a  captaincy  in  the  French  army  by  Louis  XV.,  and  was, 
shortly  thereafter,  sent  to  the  colony  of  Louisiana,  with  his  com 
mand.  When  Louisiana  became  part  of  the  Spanish  possessions, 
the  Chevalier  de  Reggio  was  made  Alfcrcz  Heal,  or,  in  other 
words,  Royal  Standard-bearer,  and  First  Justiciary  of  the  estates 
and  property  of  the  crown.  He  was  nearly  related  to  the  Mar 
quis  de  Vaudrenil,  seventh  Colonial  Governor  of  Louisiana.  Of 
his  marriage  with  Miss  Fleuriau,  two  sons  were  born,  the  younger 

*  From  records  still  extant  in  the  Beauregard  family. 


4;  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH   OE 

of  whom,  Louis  Emmanuel,  Chevalier  de  Reggio,  married  Miss 
Louise  Judith  Olivier  de  Yezin.  The  mother  of  General  Beau- 
regard — Ilelene  Judith  de  Eeggio — was  the  issue  of  this  last  mar 
riage. 

When  scarcely  more  than  eight  years  of  age,  young  Beauregard 
was  sent  to  a  primary  school  kept  by  Mr.  Y.  Deboucliel,  near  New 
Orleans,  where  could  then  be  found  many  of  the  sons  of  the  best 
families  of  Louisiana.  Being  of  studious  habits,  modest  in  his 
demeanor,  ever  fair  in  his  dealings  with  comrades  as  well  as  with 
teachers,  he  soon  became  very  popular  with  both,  and  always 
merited  and  obtained  the  highest  marks  of  approbation.  He  was 
of  a  retiring  disposition,  but,  withal,  of  great  firmness  and  decision 
of  character.  His  dominant  trait,  even  at  that  early  age,  was  a 
passion  for  all  that  pertained  to  the  military  life — a  forecast  of 
his  future  career.  The  sight  of  a  passing  soldier,  the  beating 
of  a  drum,  would  so  excite  and  carry  him  away,  that  for  the 
pleasure  of  following  either  or  both  he  would  forget  everything 
—parental  admonitions,  boyish  playmates,  and  even  hunger;  and 
many  a  long  day  was  thus  spent,  to  the  great  anxiety  of  all  at 
home. 

Several  curious  anecdotes  of  his  childhood,  illustrative  of  his 
independent  daring,  are  preserved  in  his  family,  and  are  well 
worth  recording.  We  mention  two  of  them. 

When  a  little  boy  about  nine  years  old,  he  was  spending  a  day 
at  the  house  of  one  of  his  aunts,  in  the  neighborhood  of  his  fa 
ther's  estate,  where  had  assembled  several  relatives  and  many  com 
rades  of  his  own  age.  Among  the  gentlemen  present  was  one 
noted  for  his  raillery  and  love  of  teasing.  On  that  occasion  he 
had  taken  young  Beauregard  to  task,  and  was  attempting  to  make 
a  target  of  him  for  the  amusement  of  the  others.  While  this  gen 
tleman  was  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  his  practical  jokes,  young 
Beauregard,  his  patience  being  thoroughly  exhausted,  suddenly 
seized  a  stick  that  lay  near  at  hand,  and  so  violently  and  rapidly 
assaulted  his  tormentor,  that  he  forced  him  in  self-defence  to  make 
an  inglorious  retreat  to  an  outhouse  close  by.  His  little  enemy 
at  once  mounted  guard  over  the  building,  refusing  to  release  his 
prisoner  until  the  latter  had  fully  apologized  to  him. 

The  other  incident  is  still  more  peculiar,  and  relates  to  Beaure- 
gard's  uncommon  —  perhaps  uncontrollable  —  taste  for  military 
things. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  5 

A  resident  teacher  of  the  household,  attracted  by  the  boy's 
steady,  orderly  habits,  and  most  earnest  attention  during  family 
prayers,  had  taken  charge  of  his  spiritual  training,  and  had  so  well 
succeeded  in  her  pleasing  task,  that,  at  the  early  age  of  ten  and  a 
half  years,  he  was  considered  sufficiently  prepared  to  go  through 
that  most  beautiful  and  touching  ceremony,  in  the  Catholic  Church, 
the  children's  First  Communion.  The  appointed  day  had  arrived. 
Young  Beauregard,  his  mother,  his  elder  brother,  and  the  teacher 
were  seated  in  one  of  the  front  pews  of  the  old  St.  Louis  Cathe 
dral,  awaiting  the  solemn  moment  when  the  young  communicant 
was  to  approach  and  kneel  at  the  altar.  That  moment  at  last  came. 
His  mother  touched  him  on  the  shoulder,  to  admonish  him  that  it 
was  time  to  walk  up  the  aisle.  The  child  obediently  rose,  deeply 
imbued  with  the  solemnity  of  the  scene,  and  stepped  reverently 
forward  as  directed.  Just  then,  and  when  he  had  already  walked 
half-way  to  the  altar,  the  roll  of  a  drum,  as  a  perverse  fate  would 
have  it,  resounded  through  the  cathedral.  Young  Beauregard 
stopped,  hesitated,  looked  toward  the  family  pew,  where  anxious 
eyes  kept  urging  him  forward.  Again  the  roll  of  the  drum  was 
heard,  more  distinct  and  prolonged.  Hesitation  vanished  at  once. 
The  little  boy,  fairly  turning  his  back  on  the  altar,  dashed  through 
the  church  and  disappeared  at  the  door,  to  the  utter  horror  and 
dismay  of  his  loving  relatives.  Xo  stronger  proof  than  this  could 
be  given  of  the  bent  of  his  character.  His  calling  for  a  military 
career  was  there  clearly  manifested.  It  may  not  be  considered  out 
of  place  to  add  that  he  made  his  First  Communion  two  years  later, 
no  drum  then  beating  to  interrupt  the  ceremony. 

At  the  age  of  eleven  he  was  taken  to  the  city  of  New  York, 
where  he  remained  four  years,  under  the  firm  and  wise  tuition  of 
the  Messieurs  Peugnct,  retired  oflicers  of  the  French  army,  who 
had  both  seen  service  under  Napoleon  I. — the  elder  as  Captain 
of  Cavalry,  the  younger  as  Captain  of  Engineers.  They  were  ex 
iles  from  France,  on  account  of  the  active  part  taken  by  them  in 
the  "  Carbonari "  trouble,  so  much  commented  upon  at  the  time. 
Then  and  there  it  was  that,  under  quasi -military  training,  his 
taste  for  a  soldier's  career  was  confirmed,  and  that,  living  amidst 
an  English-speaking  population,  he  grew  so  thoroughly  familiar 
with  the  English  language  as  to  make  of  it,  so  to  speak,  his  adop 
ted  mother-tongue. 

Though  he  knows  the  French  language  and  speaks  it  perfectly, 


6  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF 

as  do  all  Louisiairians  of  liis  origin  and  time  of  life,  still,  most  of 
his  correspondence  is  conducted,  and  all  his  private  as  well  as 
official  writings  are  made,  in  English. 

At  sixteen  he  entered,  as  a  cadet,  the  United  States  Military 
Academy  at  West  Point.  His  parents,  who  had  for  several  years 
persistently  opposed  his  wish  to  obtain  an  appointment  there,  had 
finally  yielded,  overcome  by  his  pertinacious  entreaties.  Here 
really  began  his  brilliant  career.  Highly  impressed  with  the  no 
bleness  and  importance  of  the  profession  he  had  embraced,  he  de 
voted  himself  with  ardent  zeal  and  untiring  perseverance  to  his 
multitudinous  studies,  and  went  through  his  four  years'  course 
with  no  less  distinction  than  success.  He  was  graduated  July  1st, 
1838,  being  second  in  a  class  of  forty-five,  and  on  July  7th  of  the 
same  year  was  appointed  Second  Lieutenant  in  the  United  States 
Engineers.  Generals  Hardee,  Wayne,  Ed.  Johnson,  Reynolds, 
Stevenson,  Trapier,  and  Sibley,  of  the  Confederate  army,  and  Mc 
Dowell,  A.  T.  Smith,  Granger,  Barney,  and  McKinstry,  of  the  Fed 
eral  army,  were  classmates  of  his,  and  were  graduated  at  the  same 
time. 

His  life  was  uneventful  from  that  date  to  the  year  1846-47,  when, 
according  to  plans  drawn  up  by  Captain  J.  G.  Barnard,  U.  S.  En 
gineers,  and  himself,  he  directed  the  fortification  works  at  the  city 
of  Tampico.  In  the  month  of  March,  1847,  he  joined  the  expedi 
tion  under  Major-General  Scott,  against  the  city  of  Mexico.  He 
distinguished  himself  at  the  siege  of  Yera  Cruz,  in  several  bold 
reconnoissances  before  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo,  and  also  in 
most  of  the  engagements  in  the  valley  of  Mexico. 

The  strongest  proof  of  his  merit — one  that  gave  a  forecast  of 
his  great  strategic  and  engineering  powers — was  exhibited  during 
the  Mexican  war,  at  a  council  of  general  officers,  held  at  Piedad, 
September  llth,  1847,  after  the  disastrous  assault  on  the  fortified 
positions  of  Molino  del  Key.  The  attack  on  the  city  of  Mexico, 
and  the  best  mode  of  effecting  its  capture,  were  the  main  subjects 
under  discussion.  Lieutenant  Beauregard,  in  opposition  to  most 
of  the  general  officers  there  present,  and  contrary  to  the  views  of 
all  his  comrades  of  the  engineer  corps,  advocated  an  attack  by 
the  western  approaches  of  Mexico.  His  suggestion,  though  very 
much  combated  at  first  and  nearly  discarded,  was  finally  adopted, 
with  what  successful  result  is  now  a  matter  of  history.  Soon 
after  this  episode — on  September  13th — Beauregard  was  twice 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  7 

wounded  in  the  brilliant  assault  on  the  Garita  de  Belen,  where 
so  much  dash  was  displayed  by  the  American  troops. 

On  the  expiration  of  the  Mexican  war,  when  Major  Beauregard 
returned  to  his  home  in  Kew  Orleans,  General  Totten,  as  chief  of 
the  Engineer  Department,  forwarded  him  the  following  copy  of  Gen 
eral  Orders,  publishing  the  brevets  he  had  won  on  the  field  of  battle  : 

1.  "  For  gallant  and  meritorious  behavior  in  the  battles  of  Contreras  and 
Churulusco,  Mexico,  August  20th,  1847,  to  be  Captain  by  brevet.   To  date  from 
August  20th,  1847." 

2.  "  For  gallant  and  meritorious  conduct  in  the  battle  of  Chapultepcc,  Mex^ 
ico,  September  13th,  1847,  to  be  Major  by  brevet.     To  date  from  September 
13th,  1847." 

And  General  Totten  added  : 

•;  It  affords  the  department  high  satisfaction  to  communicate  to  you  the  well- 
earned  reward  of  your  efforts  on  the  fields  of  Mexico." 

In  order  to  show  the  high  estimation  in  which  Major  Beaure 
gard  was  held,  and  the  impression  his  eminent  services  had  pro 
duced  upon  his  superior  officers  and  comrades  in  arms,  we  here 
insert  the  following  letters,  written  with  a  view  to  dissuade  him 
from  his  reported  intention  of  resigning  from  the  service,  in  the 
year  1S5G,  during  the  lull  in  military  allairs  which  followed  the 
close  of  the  Mexican  war  : 

"  NEW  YORK,  Dec.  9/7*,  185G. 
"  Major  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  U.  S.  Engineers : 

"  My  dear  Sir, — I  am  much  concerned  to  learn  that  you  think  of  leaving 
the  army,  after  acquiring,  at  an  early  age,  so  much  distinction  in  it,  for  sci 
ence  and  high  gallantry  in  the  field.  Your  brilliant  services  in  Mexico,  no 
body  who  witnessed  them  can  ever  forget.  They  bind  the  affections  of  the 
army  to  you,  and  ought,  perhaps,  to  bind  you  to  us.  If  you  go  abroad,  you 
give  up  that  connection  at  some  hazard.  My  best  wishes,  however,  will  ever 
accompany  my  gallant  young  friend  wherever  he  may  go. 

u  "WIXFIELD  SCOTT." 

The  second  letter  is  from  General  Pcrsifer  F.  Smith,  under  whom 
Major  Beauregard  had  often  served  in  Mexico.  We  extract  from 
it  the  following  passage  : 

"  I  assure  you,  my  dear  Beauregard,  that  I  look  upon  your  quitting  our  ser 
vice  as  the  greatest  calamity  that  can  befall  the  army  and  the  country.  Let 
me  assure  you  with  sincerity,  that  I  know  no  officer  left  behind  who  can  re 
place  you  if  we  get  into  an  important  war." 

"Whether  it  was  owing  to  these  remonstrances,  or  for  some  other 
cause,  that  Major  Beauregard  altered  his  determination,  we  are  un- 


8  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF 

able  to  state ;  but  lie  did  not  leave  the  service  ;  and  from  1853  to 
the  latter  part  of  1861  remained  in  charge  of  what  was  then  called 
"  the  Mississippi  and  Lake  Defences  in  Louisiana."  He  was  also 
at  that  time  superintending'  the  building  of  the  United  States  cus 
tom-house  at  New  Orleans. 

On  the  20th  of  November,  1860,  he  was  appointed  to  the  high 
position  of  Superintendent  of  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point, 
but,  owing  to  complicated  events  then  darkening  more  and  more 
our  political  horizon,  and  of  which  it  is  not  now  our  purpose  to 
speak,  he  only  filled  the  position  during  a  few  days.  He  resigned 
his  commission  in  the  army  of  the  United  States  in  February, 
1861;  and  on  the  1st  of  March  of  that  year  entered  the  Confed 
erate  service,  with  the  rank  of  brigadier-general. 

From  that  eventful  period  to  the  close  of  the  war  he  was  ever 
in  the  van — active,  self-sacrificing,  vigilant,  and  bold.  He  displayed 
great  forethought  in  his  extensive  views.  He  was  masterly  in  his 
manner  of  handling  troops  and  of  leading  them  on  to  victory  on 
the  battle-field ;  and  his  record  of  strategic  ability  and  engineering 
skill  has  made  him  immortal  in  the  annals  of  war.  Had  more 
of  his  farsighted  suggestions  been  heeded,  the  cause  for  which  he 
fought  would  not,  perhaps,  be  known  to-day  under  the  mournful 
—though,  to  us,  erroneous — appellation  of  "  the  Lost  Cause." 

His  defense  of  the  city  and  harbor  of  Charleston — unquestion 
ably  the  most  scientific,  complete,  and  perfect  of  all  defences  de 
vised  during  the  war — has  been  partially  comprehended  and  ap 
preciated  among  military  engineers  in  Europe  and  at  the  North. 

When  we  consider  with  what  scant  and  utterly  inadequate  re 
sources  General  Bcauregard  held,  for  nearly  two  years,  over  three 
hundred  miles  of  most  vulnerable  coast,  against  formidable  and 
always  menacing  land  and  naval  forces  ;  when  we  bear  in  mind 
the  repulse  from  Charleston  on  April  7th,  1863,  of  Admiral  Du- 
pont's  fleet  of  ironclads  and  monitors,  supported  by  General  Hunt 
er's  army ;  when  we  mark  the  prolonged  resistance  made  by  a 
handful  of  men,  in  the  works  on  Morris  Island,  against  the  com 
bined  land  and  naval  batteries  of  General  Gillmore  and  Admiral 
Dahlgren  ;  the  assault  and  repulse  of  June  10th,  1863  ;  the  defeat 
of  the  former's  forces  in  an  attack  on  the  lines  of  James  Island,  on 
July  16th,  1863;  the  masterly  and  really  wonderful  evacuation  of 
Battery  Wagner  and  Morris  Island,  after  the  enemy's  approaches 
had  reached  the  ditch  of  the  former  work ;  when  we  remember 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  <) 

the  holding  of  Fort  Sumtcr,  in  Augnst,  1863,  under  the  most  ter 
rible  bombardment  on  record,  while  its  guns  were  all  dismounted 
and  the  work  was  battered  into  a  mass  of  ruins ;  the  successful  re 
moval  during  that  period  of  all  the  heavy  artillery,  of  30,000 
pounds  of  powder,  and  hundreds  of  loaded  shells,  from  the  endan 
gered  magazines ;  then  the  permanent  holding  of  the  dismantled 
wreck  with  an  infantry  guard,  and  the  guns  of  James'  and  Sulli 
van's  Islands  covering  the  approach  by  boats ;  the  defiant,  un- 
huslicd  boom,  morning  and  evening,  of  the  gallant  little  gun — the 
only  one — purposely  left  in  the  fort  to  salute  its  unconquered  flag  ; 
we  are  struck  with  wonder  and  admiration,  and  we  cannot  but  rec 
ognize  the  rare  ability  of  the  commander,  the  unsurpassed  forti 
tude  and  gallantry  of  the  troops  under  him. 

Our  object  is  not,  at  present,  to  mention  at  any  length  General 
Beauregard's  many  military  services  and  victories.  This  interest 
ing,  important,  and  instructive  part  of  the  history  of  his  military 
career  is  contained  in  the  following  pages,  written  from  authen 
ticated  notes  and  documents,  vouched  for  and  furnished  by 
General  Beauregard  himself,  and  to  which  this  is  but  an  intro 
duction. 

When,  after  voluntarily  assisting  General  J.  E.  Johnston,  dur 
ing  the  last  days  of  the  war,  he  surrendered  with  that  distinguished 
officer,  in  April,  1805,  at  Greensboro',  North  Carolina,  he  addressed 
the  following  touching  note  to  the  members  of  his  staff: 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  etc.,  etc., 
GREENSBORO',  X.  C.,  April  27M,  13G5. 

"To  my  Personal  and  General  Staff, — Events  having  brought  to  an  end  the 
struggle  for  the  independence  of  our  country,  in  which  we  have  been  engaged 
together,  now  for  four  years,  my  relations  with  niy  staff  must  also  terminate. 
The  hour  is  at  hand  when  I  must  bid  each  and  all  of  you  farewell,  and  a  God 
speed  to  your  homes. 

'•The  day  was,  when  I  was  confident  that  this  parting  would  be  under  far 
different  and  the  most  auspicious  circumstances — at  a  moment  when  a  happv 
and  independent  people  would  be  ready,  on  all  sides,  to  welcome  you  to  your 
respective  communities  —  but  circumstances,  which  neither  the  courage,  the 
endurance,  nor  the  patriotism  of  our  armies  could  overcome,  have  turned  my 
brightest  anticipations,  my  highest  hopes,  into  bitter  disappointment,  in  which 
you  must  all  share. 

"You  have  served  me,  personally,  with  unvarying  zeal,  and,  officially,  with 
intelligence,  and  advantage  to  the  public  service. 

"I  go  from  among  you  with  profound  regret.  My  good  wishes  will  ever 
attend  you,  and  your  future  careers  will  always  be  of  interest  to  me/1 


10  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF 

Iii  1866,  war  being  imminent  between  Turkey  and  the  Danu- 
bian  principalities,  the  chief  command  of  the  Roumanian  Army 
was  offered  to  General  Beauregard ;  and  in  1869,  a  similar  position 
in  the  army  of  the  Khedive  of  Egypt  was  also  tendered  him. 
He  declined  both  offers. 

Since  the  war  he  has  resided  permanently  in  his  native  State, 
where  he  has  been  the  president  of  two  important  railroad  com 
panies,  lie  is  now  Adjutant-General  of  the  State  of  Louisiana. 

Wherever  met — in  the  streets  of  New  Orleans  or  elsewhere, 
in  his  native  State  or  out  of  it  —  General  Beauregard  is  always 
greeted  with  great  cordiality  and  marks  of  the  highest  regard. 
Louisiana,  as  we  have  said,  is  proud  of  him.  She  knows  that  none 
of  her  sons  has  loved  her  more,  or  has  done  so  much  to  protect 
her  from  the  far-reaching  grasp  of  centralized  despotism  which  at 
one  time  seemed  to  threaten  her.  lie  is  now  the  identical  con 
stitutional  State-rights  Democrat  he  was  before  the  war,  and 
though  he  takes  no  active  part  in  politics,  never  neglects  the  per 
formance  of  any  of  his  civic  duties  when  circumstances  require  it. 

General  Beauregard  has  been  twice  married.  By  his  first  wife, 
Miss  Laure  Marie  Yillere,  great-granddaughter  of  the  Chevalier 
de  Yillere,  he  had  two  sons  and  one  daughter — all  three  living 
and  residing  with  or  near  him  in  the  State  of  Louisiana.  He  was 
but  shortly  married  to  his  second  wife,  Miss  Caroline  Deslondes, 
daughter  of  one  of  the  prominent  planters  of  the  state,  when  he 
was  unexpectedly  ordered  to  the  command  of  Charleston,  South 
Carolina,  at  the  very  outbreak  of  the  war.  On  his  return  home, 
in  1865,  he  was  for  the  second  time  a  widower,  and  had  been  for 
more  than  a  year.  He  had  borne  his  affliction  not  only  like  a 
Christian  but  with  all  the  fortitude  of  a  soldier,  none  but  his  own 
military  family  being  able  to  detect  any  sign  of  grief  in  the 
countenance  of  the  bereaved  husband. 

General  Beauregard  is  now  (1883)  sixty-five  years  of  age,  but 
few  men  of  forty  are  so  active  as  he,  so  alert,  so  full  of  life  and 
vigor.  Those  who  note  his  elastic  military  step,  upright  bearing, 
and  quick  yet  thoughtful  eye,  feel  well  assured  that,  should  occa 
sion  require  it,  he  could  again  serve  his  country  with  energy  and 
capacity  equal,  if  not  superior,  to  that  displayed  in  the  past.  The 
only  effect  upon  him  of  additional  years  since  the  war  seems  to 
have  been  further  to  develop  and  strengthen  his  powers  by  bring 
ing  to  him  additional  knowledge  and  experience. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  H 

lie  appears  to  us  now  to  be  precisely  the  same  as  when,  on 
the  second  day  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  he  led,  flag  in  hand,  one 
of  the  charges  of  the  18th  Louisiana  regiment.  A  hail-storm  of 
minie-  balls  was  then  pouring  into  that  gallant  corps.  One  of 
his  staff,  expostulating  with  him,  and  almost  rebuking  his  too-rash 
exposure  of  his  person,  he  said :  "  At  such  moments  as  these,  the 
order  must  not  be  ' go?  but  'follow!''  And  he  still  tightly 
grasped  the  battle-flag.  The  whole  man  is  portrayed  in  this  brief 
sentence.  His  words  were  ever  few  at  headquarters  or  on  the 
field,  but  terse  and  to  the  point.  One  could  read,  by  the  flash  of 
his  eyes,  that  he  meant  what  he  said. 

If,  as  we  firmly  believe,  traits  of  character,  scope  of  mind,  even 
tastes  and  prejudices,  can  be  transmitted  from  generation  to  gene 
ration,  we  can  understand  how  and  why  Pierre  Gustavo  Toutant 
Beauregard  displayed  the  capacity  for  command  and  the  inspiring 
influence  which  so  distinguished  him  during  our  four  years'  war, 
when  we  glance  back  over  the  long  line  of  his  ancestors,  where 
love  of  liberty  and  soldierly  qualities  were  so  conspicuous.  We 
very  much  mistake,  or  there  is  still  a  goodly  current  of  the  Celtic 
Tider's  blood  running  through  General  Beauregard's  veins,  and 
the  high-toned  chivalric  courtesy,  coupled  with  irreproachable  in 
tegrity,  so  remarkable  in  him,  must  certainly  be  derived  from  the 
stately  old  Dukes  of  Reggio  and  Modena,  the  heads  of  the  House 
of  Este. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 

OF 

GENERAL  BEAUREGARD 


MILITARY    OPERATIONS 


OF 


GENERAL    BEAUEEGARD. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Major  Beaurcgard  appointed  Superintendent  of  the  United  States  Military 
Academy.— His  Determination  to  Resign  should  Louisiana  Withdraw 
from  the  Union.— Takes  Command  at  West  Point,  but  is  immediately  Re 
lieved. — Returns  to  New  Orleans. — Is  Offered  the  Rank  of  Colonel  of 
Engineers  and  Artillery  in  the  Louisiana  State  Forces. — Declines. — Plan 
to  Obstruct  River  near  Forts.— Floating  Booms.— Is  Summoned  to  Mont 
gomery  by  President  Davis. — Ordered  to  Charleston,  S.  C.,  to  Assume 
Command  and  Direct  Operations  against  Fort  Sumter. 

WHILE  in  charge  of  the  military  defences  of  Louisiana,  and  of 
the  construction  of  the  New  Orleans  custom-bouse,  in  the  fall  of 
1SCO,  General  Beaurcgard,  then  brevet  Major  of  United  States 
Engineers,  received  the  following  order  from  Washington  : 

"  Special  Order.  No.  238. 

'-  WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  November  8th,  18GO. 

"  By  direction  of  the  President,  brevet  Major  Peter  G.  T.  Beaurcgard,  Corps 
of  Engineers,  is  appointed  superintendent  of  the  Military  Academy,  and  will 
relieve  the  present  superintendent  at  the  close  of  the  approaching  semi-annual 
examination  of  cadets. 
"  By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"  S.  COOPER,  Adjutant-General."' 

This  was  not  only  an  honorable  position,  much  coveted,  and 
justly  so,  in  the  army,  but  it  was  also  a  highly  responsible  one,  to 
which  none  but  officers  of  the  Engineer  Corps  of  acknowledged 
merit  had,  up  to  that  time,  been  appointed.  Yet,  under  existing 
circumstances,  to  Major  Beauregard  it  had  more  than  one  objec 
tion.  Mr.  Lincoln  had  just  been  elected  President  of  the  United 


14  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

States,  and  would,  four  months  later,  be  duly  inaugurated  as  such. 
Rumors  and  speculations  as  to  the  inevitable  disruption  of  the 
Union  and  its  probable  consequences  prevailed  everywhere,  and 
kept  the  public  mind  in  a  state  of  feverish  suspense  and  anxiety. 
Flattering,  therefore,  as  was  to  Major  Beauregard  the  appointment 
thus  tendered  him  by  the  War  Department,  it  was  with  no  feigned 
reluctance  that  he  began  closing  his  official  accounts,  preparatory 
to  transferring  the  works  under  him  to  his  successor  in  office. 
Though  never  taking  a  very  active  part  in  politics,  he  was  strongly 
imbued  witli  the  constitutional  doctrine  of  States'  Eights  and 
State  Sovereignty,  and  considered,  as  did  the  great  mass  of  his 
Southern  countrymen,  that  his  allegiance  was  primarily  due  to  his 
own  State.  With  these  views,  and  under  such  circumstances,  it 
was  but  natural  he  should  feel  anxious  in  leaving  Louisiana, 
while  public  opinion  had  not  yet  established  its  level,  and  the 
South  was  still  uncertain  as  to  the  proper  step  to  pursue  in  vin 
dication  of  its  imperilled  rights.  However  —  and  happen  what 
might — there  was  but  one  course  open  to  him,  and  his  deter 
mination  was  taken  at  once:  to  stand  by  his  State,  and  share  its 
destiny,  for  weal  or  woe. 

Towards  the  latter  part  of  December  of  that  year  he  left  New 
Orleans  for  West  Point,  stopping  on  his  way  in  Washington,  to 
ascertain,  if  he  could,  what  shape  future  events  would  probably 
assume. 

Several  Southern  States  had  already  called  their  people  in  con 
ventions,  to  determine  what  measures  should  be  adopted  in  view 
•of  the  exigencies  of  the  hour.  South  Carolina  had  passed  her  Or 
dinance  of  Secession.  Mississippi  soon  followed.  So  did  Florida 
and  Alabama.  Louisiana,  it  was  thought  by  her  congressional 
delegation,  would  not  hesitate  much  longer.  Deeply  convinced 
that  such  would  be  the  result,  Major  Beauregard  made  it  a  point 
at  once  to  apprise  General  Totten,  chief  of  the  Engineer  Corps  at 
Washington,  of  his  resolution  to  resign  his  commission  in  the 
United  States  army  should  his  State  retire  from  the  Union,  thus 
giving  the  department  full  opportunity  to  rescind  the  order  as 
signing  him  to  West  Point,  and  to  take  such  other  step  in  the  mat 
ter  as  might  be  thought  proper.  He  repaired  to  General  Totten's 
office,  and,  by  a  strange  coincidence,  found  him  busily  engaged  in 
examining  fortification  drawings,  which  were  no  other  than  those 
of  the  defences  of  Charleston.  He  was  studying  and  endeavoring 


GENERAL   BEAUBEGAUD.  15 

to  describe  the  circles  of  fire  of  Forts  Sumter  and  Moultric.  At 
Major  Beauregard's  avowal,  General  Totten  expressed  both  sur 
prise  and  pain,  and  used  every  endeavor  to  dissuade  him — we  need 
not  add,  without  success.  Major  Beatiregard  then  went  to  the 
headquarters  of  General  Scott,  to  inform  him  also  of  his  intended 
resignation  ;  but  failed  to  find  the  general,  as  he  was  temporarily 
absent  from  Washington. 

Major  Beauregard  had  been  authorized  by  General  Totten,  so 
anxious  was  the  latter  to  retain  him  in  the  service,  to  defer  assum 
ing  command  at  West  Point  until  after  the  close  of  the  January 
examinations  ;  and,  in  the  meantime,  having  nothing  to  detain 
him  in  Washington,  he  left  for  Xew  York,  to  await  further  devel 
opments. 

In  New  York  he  met  several  army  friends,  among  others,  Cap 
tain  G.  W.  Smith,  ex-officer  of  Engineers,  then  acting  as  Street 
Commissioner  of  the  great  northern  metropolis,  and  Captain 
Mansfield  Lovell.  The  absorbing  topic  of  the  day  was  necessarily 
brought  forward  and  earnestly  discussed.  Major  Beauregard  in 
formed  them  of  his  intention  to  follow  his  State  should  it  secede. 
They  approved  of  his  proposed  course,  and  declared  that  they 
would  act  in  the  same  manner,  were  they  similarly  situated. 

Major  Beauregard  had  been  only  a  few  days  in  command  at 
West  Point,  when  the  new  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Holt,  through 
animosity  to  Mr.  Slidell,  it  was  said,  and  perhaps  because  he  had 
no  faith  in  Major  Beauregard's  Union  sympathies,  peremptorily 
remanded  him  to  his  former  station  in  New  Orleans.  Xo  order 
could  have  been  more  acceptable  to  him,  and  he  hastened  to  obey  it. 

Passing  through  the  city  of  Xcw  York,  on  his  way  South,  he 
received  a  telegram  from  Governor  Moore,  of  Louisiana,  inform 
ing  him  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  State  from  the  Union,  and  re 
questing  his  immediate  return.  He  readily  complied,  and  took 
passage  on  a  steamer  leaving  the  next  da}r  for  Xew  Orleans.  Upon 
reaching  her  wharf  he  found  it  crowded  with  people,  very  much 
excited,  who  had  collected  there  to  see  the  steamer  Star  of  the 
West,  just  returned  from  off  Charleston,  with  two  or  three  shot- 
holes  in  her  hull  and  chimney-stack.  He  went  on  board  and  was 
entertained  by  her  captain  with  a  graphic  account  of  the  hot  re 
ception  the  South  Carolina  authorities  had  given  him.  Major 
Beauregard  had  little  idea,  then,  that  in  less  than  two  months  he 
would  be  constructing  additional  batteries  in  the  harbor  of 


1(3  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

Charleston,  to  protect  it  more  effectually  from  access  by  vessels  at 
tempting  to  carry  reinforcements  and  supplies  to  Fort  Sumter. 

Upon  his  arrival  at  New  Orleans,  Governor  Moore  furnished 
him  with  a  copy  of  the  Ordinance  of  Secession,  and  informed  him 
that  his  services  were  required  to  complete  the  defences  to  the  ap 
proaches  of  the  city,  which  were  already  in  full  possession  of  the 
State  authorities.  His  answer  was  that  he  could  not  do  so  until  he  had 
formally  resigned  his  commission  in  the  United  States  service.  This 
he  did  that  day,  and  then  joined,  as  a  private,  the  battalion  of  Or 
leans  Guards,  composed  of  the  elite  of  the  Creole  population  of 
the  city  of  New  Orleans.  This  command  had  just  been  organized 
by  Colonel  Numa  Augustin,  than  whom  no  better  citizen  soldier 
was  known,  in  the  volunteer  service  of  the  State. 

The  excitement  and  enthusiasm  of  the  people  of  Louisiana  and 
of  New  Orleans,  especially,  were  intense.  The  shrill  sound  of  the 
fife,  the  beating  of  drums,  squad  drills  at  street  corners  and  in  pub 
lic  avenues,  and  an  ever-increasing  military  spirit  greeted  one  at 
every  step.  New  Orleans  had  been  transformed  into  a  garrison 
town. 

All  who  met  Major  Beauregard  on  the  streets,  friends  and  even 
strangers,  would  shake  him  warmly  by  the  hand,  expressing  the 
hope  that  he  would  be  with  them  in  the  hour  of  trial,  should  such 
hour  ever  come. 

The  general  impression  appeared  to  be  that  the  ruling  party  of 
the  Northern  States  would  not  oppose  the  peaceable  withdrawal 
of  the  Southern  States  from  the  Union,  by  making  war  on  them. 
During  his  short  sojourn  at  the  North  Major  Beauregard  had 
seen  and  heard  enough  to  make  him  doubt  that  such  would  be  the 
result,  and  it  became  a  matter  of  conscience  for  him  to  dispel  the 
illusions  of  his  too-hopeful  fellow-citizens. 

The  people  of  the  State  of  Louisiana,  in  convention  assembled, 
after  full  discussion  by  their  ablest  and  best  men,  reached  the  con 
clusion  that  secession  had  become  a  necessity  and  was  the  only 
course  to  be  pursued.  The  State  called  upon  her  sons  for  assist 
ance,  and,  as  one  of  them,  Major  Beauregard  responded;  though, 
after  having  been  twenty-two  years  in  the  United  States  arai}^  two 
of  these  spent  in  a  short  but  glorious  foreign  war,  where  friendships 
had  been  created  and  cemented  with  blood,  it  was  not  to  be  ex 
pected  that  he  should,  without  reluctance,  dissever  ties  that  had 
thus  lasted  through  youth  to  mature  manhood. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  17 

Shortly  after  his  return  to  Xew  Orleans,  the  General  Assembly 
passed  a  law  organizing  the  Louisiana  State  forces.  General  Brax- 
ton  Bragg  was  appointed  Brigadier-General,  and  Major  Beaure- 
gard  was  offered  the  position  of  Colonel  of  Engineers  and  Artil 
lery.  This  he  declined,  notwithstanding  urgent  appeals  from 
many  friends.  He  felt — and  rightly  so — that  some  injustice  had 
been  done  him  in  assigning  him  to  a  secondary  position.  He  was 
a  native  of  the  State,  who  had  just  resigned  an  important  position 
in  the  United  States  army,  while  General  Bragg  had  been  out  of 
the  service  for  several  years,  and  had  but  recently  become  a  resi 
dent  of  Louisiana.  His  object,  however,  being  to  aid  in  the  de 
fence  of  his  country,  he  openly  declared  his  readiness  to  serve  with 
or  under  General  Bragg,  and  to  put  at  his  disposal  whatever  of 
professional  knowledge  and  experience  he  might  possess.  But  he 
refused  all  military  rank  in  the  State  army. 

Major  Beauregard  was  convinced  that  the  most  important  of  all 
the  avenues  of  approach  to  New  Orleans  was  the  Mississippi 
River;  and  that,  to  guard  it  properly  against  invasion,  must  be 
the  one  grand  object  in  view  on  the  part  of  the  State  authorities. 
lie  therefore  advised  Governor  Moore  and  the  Military  Board  to 
arm  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip  with  the  heaviest  guns  procura 
ble,  and  suggested  the  following  plan  for  so  doing:  1st,  to  remove 
the  largest  pieces  already  there,  from  the  rear  to  the  front  or  river 
faces  of  the  forts ;  2d,  to  transfer  to  them  the  heavy  guns  of  both 
Fort  Pike,  on  the  Ivigolets,  and  Fort  Macomb,  on  the  Chef  Men- 
teur — which  were  works  of  inferior  order,  not  likely  to  be  put  in 
action  at  all  against  a  fleet  threatening  the  city. 

Major  Beauregard  also  drew  up,  and  furnished  to  the  State  au 
thorities,  the  plans  and  estimates  for  two  distinct  river  obstruc 
tions,  to  be  placed  between  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  and  to  be 
there  used,  together  or  separately,  according  to  the  exigency  of  the 
case.  The  first  was  a  floating  boom  consisting  of  two  parts,  formed 
of  long  timbers  twelve  inches  square,  solidly  bound  together  in 
sections  of  four  timbers,  each  section  to  be  connected  with  another 
by  means  of  strong  iron  chains.  One  half  of  the  boom  was  to  be 
well  anchored  in  the  river,  from  the  shore  at  Fort  Jackson,  and  in 
clined  downward  as  it  reached  the  middle  of  the  stream.  The 
other  half  was  to  be  anchored  from  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river 
near  Fort  St.  Philip,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  to  have  its  shore  ex 
tremity  made  fast.  To  its  outer  and  movable  end  was  to  be  at- 
L— 2 


18  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

tacbed  a  strong  wire  rope  connected  with  a  steam-engine,  rendered 
secure  by  a  bombproof,  on  the  Fort  Jackson  side.  The  rope, 
worked  by  the  engine,  would  close  or  open  the  boom,  as  circum 
stances  might  require,  for  the  passage  of  friendly  vessels  or  of  ac 
cumulated  drift-wood. 

The  second  boom  was  to  consist  of  about  five  barges  or  flat- 
boats,  properly  constructed  so  as  to  support  one  or  more  heavy 
chains  or  wire-ropes,  stretched  from  shore  to  shore,  between  the 
two  forts,  and  above  the  floating  boom.  The  estimate  for  this 
obstruction  was  about  §90,000,  and  for  the  other  about  one  half 
less.  Both  were  to  be  illuminated  at  night  with  Drummond 
lights,  placed  in  bombproofs  on  each  side  of  the  river,  and  the 
stream  was  to  be  patrolled  by  boats  as  far  down  as  prudence 
would  permit. 

Had  these  floating  booms  been  constructed  and  kept  in  work 
ing  order  until  required  for  effectual  use  it  is  beyond  all  doubt 
that  they  would  have  obstructed  the  passage  of  the  Federal  fleet 
in  April,  1SG2.  Detaining  the  vessels  under  the  fire  of  the  forts, 
they  would  have  afforded  sufficient  time  to  them  to  do  their 
work,  and  to  the  city  to  prepare  for  a  vigorous  defence,  if  not 
for  a  triumphant  resistance. 

Somewhat  later,  Major  Beauregard  had  occasion  to  offer  a  few 
suggestions  to  the  Military  Board,  in  a  short  memoir,  wherein,  after 
giving  his  general  views  as  to  the  defence  of  the  different  ap 
proaches  to  New  Orleans,  he  again  directed  attention  to  the  para 
mount  necessity  of  the  floating  booms  already  spoken  of.  He 
received  the  thanks  of  Governor  Moore  for  his  valuable  infor 
mation,  of  the  importance  of  which  the  governor  was  well  aware, 
but  the  Military  Board,  to  whom  all  such  matters  were  specially 
referred,  and  on  whose  knowledge  of  them  the  State  Executive  so 
fully  relied,  failed  to  see  the  extent  of  the  result  aimed  at,  and, 
as  was  often  the  case  during  the  war,  the  opportunity  was 
allowed  to  slip  by ;  and  the  consequences,  which  might  have  been 
averted,  advanced  unhindered  to  their  calamitous  end. 

On  the  22d  of  February,  1861,  Major  Beauregard  received  a 
despatch  from  the  Hon.  L.  P.  Walker,  Secretary  of  War  of  the 
Confederate  government,  informing  him  that  his  immediate 
presence  at  Montgomery  was  requested  by  President  Davis.  He 
made  all  possible  haste  to  leave  ]Srew  Orleans,  thinking  he  might 
be  away  for  two  or  three  weeks  at  the  utmost — he  was  absent 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGARD.  19 

more  tlian  four  years.  The  hope  of  Major  Beauregard  was, 
that  he  might  be  permanently  stationed  in  Louisiana,  with  all 
the  sea-coast  of  which,  and  the  approaches  to  the  city  of  New 
Orleans,  he  was  known  to  be  so  thoroughly  familiar ;  irrespective 
of  his  very  natural  wish  to  be  able,  in  case  of  need,  to  fight  in  and 
for  his  native  State. 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that,  just  at  that  time,  few  per 
sons  in  either  section  of  the  country  really  believed  that  the 
issues  would  be  settled  by  force  of  arms.  The  South  "  will  not 
be  rash  enough  to  attempt  to  retire  from  the  Union,"  was  the 
general  opinion  entertained  at  the  North.  The  North  "  will  not 
make  war  to  drag  the  Southern  States  unwillingly  back,"  was  the 
prevailing  sentiment  in  the  South. 

This  delusion  is  easily  accounted  for  when  we  consider,  not 
merely  the  principles  set  forth  in  the  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence,  and  the  voluntary  formation  of  the  Union,  by  the  States, 
but  also  the  views  expressed  by  many  of  the  most  prominent  men 
of  the  North.  We  do  not  allude  to  the  extravagant  expressions 
repeated  for  many  years  by  leaders  in  the  abolition  phalanx,  pro 
fessing  hatred  of  the  Union;  nor  even  to  the  sentiments  of  dis 
regard  for  it,  uttered,  during  the  same  period,  by  influential  mem 
bers  in  the  Republican  party,  even  on  the  floor  of  Congress;  but 
to  the  immediate  declarations  of  that  time,  such  as  the  sober 
statement  in  the  New  York  Tribune,  then  the  principal  organ  of 
the  dominant  party  at  the  North,  that  the  revolution  of  the 
Colonies  was  a  precedent  for  the  secession  of  the  States,  and  that 
both  stood  equally  on  the  same  principle  of  the  right  of  a  people 
to  self-government.  Even  General  Scott,  as  one  of  the  alterna 
tives  of  action,  had  counselled  the  mild  measure  of  allowing  "the 
erring  sisters  "  to  "  go  in  peace." 

It  was  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  many  persons  could  not  be 
made  to  believe  in  such  a  war,  until,  after  their  eyes  had  seen  the 
flashes  and  their  ears  had  heard  the  sounds  of  the  guns  fired  at 
Sumter.  the  United  States  government  called  for  75,000  troops 
with  which  to  reduce  the  Southern  people  to  obedience. 

Major  Beauregard  arrived  at  Montgomery  on  the  2Cth  of  Feb 
ruary,  and  on  the  same  day  called  on  the  Secretary  of  War. 
"Just  in  time,'1  said  the  latter,  while  courteously  extending  his 
hand,  "  to  assist  me  out  of  a  great  dilemma."  lie  was  estimating 
the  weight  and  cost  of  pieces  of  ordnance  of  different  calibers, 


20  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

Major  Beau  regard  cheerfully  gave  him  what  assistance  he  could, 
and  took  the  liberty  to  suggest  the  advisability  of  procuring,  as 
soon  as  possible,  the  different  heads  of  bureaus  whom  the  secre 
tary  needed,  to  relieve  him  of  all  such  annoying  details.  Mr. 
Walker  thereupon  authorized  Major  Beauregard  to  telegraph  at 
once  to  several  of  his  friends  of  the  old  service,  who  in  his  opin 
ion  might  be  fitted  for  these  positions.  Thus  it  was  that  the  as 
sistance  of  Colonel  Gorgas,  as  Chief  of  Ordnance,  was  eventually 
procured.  Though  a  Northern  man  by  birth,  Colonel  Gorgas  had 
married  in  the  South,  and  was  entirely  identified  in  feeling  and 
interest  with  that  section.  He  proved  to  be  a  meritorious  officer, 
whose  services  \vere  of  value  to  the  cause.  Messages  were  also 
sent  to  Captains  G.  W.  Smith  and  Mansfield  Lovell,  then  in  New 
York,  advising  them  to  repair  immediately  to  Montgomery,  where 
their  presence  was  needed.  Owing  to  circumstances  beyond  their 
control,  those  officers  did  not  arrive  and  report  for  duty  until  after 
the  battle  of  Manassas. 

Major  Beauregard  then  presented  himself  to  Mr.  Davis,  who 
received  him  with  great  kindness,  and  asked  him  many  questions 
as  to  the  temper  of  the  people  and  the  condition  of  affairs,  at 
New  Orleans  and  Mobile.  His  answer  was,  that  now  that  seces 
sion  was  an  accomplished  fact  on  the  part  of  Louisiana  as  well  as 
of  Alabama,  their  people  were  fast  becoming  unanimous  as  to  the 
measure,  which,  at  first,  had  been  looked  upon  with  hesitation  and 
apprehension ;  that  business  was  mostly  suspended  in  the  cities 
of  New  Orleans  and  Mobile,  but  that  everybody  seemed  hopeful 
of  the  future,  whether  we  should  remain  permanently  separated, 
or  should  re-enter  the  Union  with  sufficient  guarantees  against 
further  encroachments  on  our  rights. 

The  President  then  asked  him  what  knowledge  he  had  of  the 
defences  around  Charleston,  and  of  the  best  mode  of  taking  Fort 
Sumter,  in  the  event  of  its  being  necessary  to  resort  to  force 
against  it.  He  read  to  Major  Beauregard  a  letter  he  had  just 
received  from  Governor  Pickens,  of  South  Carolina,  describing 
the  condition  of  affairs  there,  and  asking  that  an  officer  of  experi 
ence  should  be  sent  to  take  charge  of  the  operations  then  going 
on,  and,  if  necessary,  to  assume  command  of  the  State  troops 
there  assembled.  The  president  showed  him  also  a  communica 
tion  from  Major  W.  H.  C.  Whiting,  an  ex-officer  of  United  States 
Engineers,  then  in  the  service  of  the  State  of  Georgia,  who  had 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  21 

been  sent  to  Charleston  to  inspect  the  works  being  constructed 
against  Fort  Sumter,  and  advise  such  changes  and  improvements 
as  his  professional  experience  might  suggest.  Major  Whiting,  in 
this  paper,  expressed  his  disapproval  of  almost  all  that  had  been 
done  in  the  way  of  locating  and  constructing  batteries,  and  gave 
an  alarming  description  of  the  condition  of  affairs  there. 

Major  Beauregard  having  with  him  a  map  of  Charleston,  given 
him  that  day  by  Major  W.  II.  Chase,  ex-officer  of  Engineers,  ex 
plained  to  the  President  what  should,  in  his  opinion,  be  done  to 
prevent  assistance  by  sea  to  Fort  Sumter,  and  to  force  its  sur 
render,  if  necessary.  The  matter  was  thoroughly  examined  and 
discussed  until  a  late  hour  in  the  night. 

The  next  afternoon  Major  Beauregard  was  accosted  by  some 
members  of  the  convention  from  South  Carolina  and  Georgia, 
who  informed  him  that  he  had  just  been  appointed  first  Brigadier- 
General  in  the  provisional  army  of  the  Confederate  States;  and 
that  he  would  be  sent  to  assume  command  at  Charleston,  and  di 
rect  operations  there  against  Fort  Sumter.  This  news  took  Ma 
jor  Beauregard  completely  by  surprise.  lie  neither  desired  nor 
expected  such  an  honor.  He  feared  it  might  keep  him  away  for 
an  indefinite  period  from  Xew  Orleans,  whither  he  was  anxious 
to  return,  for  private  as  well  as  public  reasons.  lie  knew  little 
of  the  defences  of  Charleston,  and  was  not  familiar  with  its  peo 
ple  ;  whereas  he  was  thoroughly  acquainted  with  those  of  !Xew 
Orleans;  and,  although  perfectly  willing  to  serve  the  Confeder 
acy  to  the  utmost  of  his  ability,  wherever  sent,  he  thought  his 
services  were  first  due  to  the  defence  and  protection  of  his  own 
State.  There  was  another  impediment,  though,  under  the  circum 
stances,  of  much  less  gravity.  His  resignation  from  the  United 
States  army,  dated  and  forwarded  February  Sth,  1SG1,  had  not  yet 
been,  to  his  knowledge,  accepted  ;  and  still  regardful  of  the  strict 
observance  of  rules  and  regulations  to  which  he  had  been  trained, 
he  was  disinclined  to  take  up  arms  against  the  United  States  flag 
until  officially  relieved  from  his  fealty  to  it.  This  he  explained 
to  President  Davis,  who,  after  urging  his  acceptance  of  the  po 
sition  offered,  and  promising  that  he  should  if  necessary,  be  sent 
back  to  Xew  Orleans,  suggested  that  he  should  at  once  telegraph 
to  the  War  Department  in  Washington,  and  be  set  at  rest  on  this 
point.  He  did  so — for  communications  between  all  sections  of 
the  country  were  still  free — and  the  next  day  received  formal  in- 


22  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

formation  of  the  acceptance  of  his  resignation  by  President  Bu 
chanan. 

Upon  his  informing  Mr.  Davis  of  the  fact,  the  latter  instructed 
him  to  repair  at  once  to  Charleston,  there  to  report  to  Governor 
Pickens,  and  to  take  command  of  the  State  troops,  should  the 
South  Carolina  authorities  so  desire — the  troops  then  assembled  at 
or  near  Charleston  not  having  yet  regularly  entered  the  Confed 
erate  service. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGABD.  23 


CHAPTER   II. 

Description  of  Charleston. — General  BcaurcgarcVs  Arrival. — Cursory  Sketch  of 
the  Condition  of  the  Public  Mind  in  the  South. — The  Hon.  Robert  Barn- 
Tvell  Ilhctt. — One  Sentiment  and  One  Resolve  animating  South  Carolin 
ians. — South  Carolina  Commissioners  to  Washington. — Failure  of  Nego 
tiations. — Major  Anderson  Evacuates  Fort  Moultrie  and  Occupies  Fort 
Sumtcr. — Hoisting  of  Palmetto  Flags. — Steamer  Star  of  the  West. — Gov 
ernor  Pickens  Summons  Major  Anderson  to  Surrender  the  Fort. — He  De 
clines,  but  Refers  the  Matter  to  Washington. — Mr.  Buchanan  Refuses  to 
Withdraw  Federal  Garrison. — All  Eyes  Centred  on  South  Carolina. — 
System  and  Plan  of  Operations  Adopted  by  General  Bcaurcgard. — More 
Troops  Volunteer  than  are  Needed. 

SEVEN  miles  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  and  looking  out  upon  it 
to  the  southeast,  stands  the  city  of  Charleston,  built  at  the  conflu 
ence  of  the  Ashley  and  Cooper  rivers.  It  is  on  a  tongue  of  tin- 
mainland,  consisting  of  gray  sandy  soil,  and  extends  southward, 
tapering  in  width  from  two  miles  to  half  a  mile.  Here  the  Ash 
ley  turns  from  the  west  and  sweeps  around,  to  mingle  its  waters 
•with  those  of  the  Cooper,  whose  principal  current  passes  close 
along  the  east  or  sea- front  of  the  city.  A  marshy  mud-flat, 
called  Shutc's  Folly  Island,  rises  east  of  Charleston  on  the  further 
side  of  this  branch  of  Cooper  River,  and  beyond  it  is  the  sand-strip 
and  beach  of  Sullivan's  Island.  The  lesser  stream  of  Cooper  River, 
flowing  to  the  north  and  east  of  Shute's  Folly,  passes  the  main 
land  at  Haddrell's  Point  and  Mount  Pleasant,  and  off  the  western 
extremity  of  Sullivan's  Island  unites  with  the  other  waters  of  the 
bay.  South  of  Charleston,  across  the  water,  lies  James  Island, 
with  its  uplands  extending  about  two  and  a  half  miles  down  the 
harbor.  It  is  separated  by  a  marsh  and  creek  from  the  low  white 
sand-bank  of  Morris  Island.  On  account  of  the  flatness  of  the 
country,  the  waters  ebb  and  flowr  many  miles  up  the  Ashley  and 
Cooper  rivers,  with  a  mean  tide  of  seven  feet  at  the  city.  Thus 
constituted,  the  harbor  of  Charleston  averages  two  miles  in  width, 
and  forms  a  beautiful  sheet  of  water. 

Out  in  the  bay,  three  miles  from  the  city,  stands  Fort  Sumter. 
It  is  built  on  a  shoal  just  south  of  the  main  channel,  which  it  is 


24:  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

intended  to  command,  and  is  a  mile  from  Fort  Moultrie,  which 
lies  to  the  northeast,  across  the  entrance,  on  Sullivan's  Island.  It 
is  thirteen  hundred  yards  from  Morris  Island,  which  lies  to  the 
south-southeast ;  iifteen  hundred  yards  from  Fort  Johnson,  which 
stands  to  the  southwest,  on  James  Island,  and  two  miles  from 
Castle  Pinckney,  on  Shute's  Folly,  which  lies  to  the  northwest. 
Fort  Sumter  is — or  was,  at  the  time  of  which  we  are  writing — a 
pentagonal  work  of  formidable  strength,  built  for  mounting  one 
hundred  and  forty  pieces.  The  height  of  its  walls,  from  the 
water's  edge  to  the  parapets,  is  sixty  feet ;  the  fort  is  divided  into 
three  tiers,  two  of  which — the  lower  ones — were  casemated,  and 
the  upper  en  barbette.  With  its  commodious  officers'  quarters, 
its  barracks,  mess-rooms,  magazines,  and  hot-shot  furnaces,  it  had 
been  considered  one  of  the  best-built  forts  under  the  control  of 
the  United  States  government,  and  did  honor  to  the  ability  of  the 
engineers  who  designed  and  executed  its  construction. 

Fort  Moultrie  was  a  low  brick  work,  without  casemates,  but 
with  terre-pleins  for  batteries  en  barbette,  the  principal  of  which 
were  "the  sea  battery,"  facing  southeast,  and  "the  Sumter  bat 
tery,"  facing  southwest. 

Fort  Johnson  was  an  antiquated  and  dilapidated  work,  that  had 
been  abandoned.  Castle  Pinckney,  opposite  the  city,  across  Coop 
er  River,  was  an  old-fashioned,  half-moon  fortification  of  brick,  with 
one  row  of  casemates  for  small  ordnance  and  a  terre-plein  above. 

In  1860,  Charleston  contained  about  fifty  thousand  inhabitants. 
Besides  its  commercial  importance,  it  was  the  residence  of  many 
intelligent  and  educated  planters,  cultivating  rice  in  the  malarial 
tide-swamps,  and  sea-island  cotton  along  the  rich  coast  region  of 
the  "low  country."  It  was  the  centre  of  the  factorage  business 
of  the  State,  of  the  supply  market,  of  banking  and  exchange.  It 
was  also  headquarters  in  matters  of  church  and  school,  society  and 
politics.  The  town  was  old  and  respectable -looking,  evidently; 
built  for  personal  convenience,  not  for  show;  and  its  people  spent 
their  money  in  substantial  good -living  within  doors,  rather  than 
in  outward  display.  With  many  churches  and  public  schools,  no 
private  palaces  and  few  brown-stone  fronts  were  visible;  but  its' 
separate  dwellings  of  brick  and  of  wood,  with  their  enclosed 
gardens  and  luxuriant  shrubbery,  unique  rows  of  rooms  accessible 
to  the  sea  breeze,  with  tiers  of  spacious  piazzas,  gave  it  an  air  of 
exclusive  individuality  and  solid  comfort. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  25 

General  Beauregard  arrived  in  Charleston  on  the  1st  of  March, 
1S61,  and  immediately  repaired  to  Governor  Pickens's  headquar 
ters,  which  were  then  established  at  the  Charleston  Hotel.  Gover 
nor  Pickens  was  found  in  earnest  consultation  with  eminent  citizens 
of  the  Palmetto  State.  A  hearty  welcome  was  extended  to  the 
Confederate  commander,  whose  arrival  from  Montgomery  had 
been  announced  in  advance  of  time,  and  was  anxiously  awaited 
by  all. 

Governor  Pickens  proposed  to  put  General  Beauregard  in  com 
mand  without  delay,  but  his  offer  was  declined  ;  General  Beaure 
gard  preferring  first  to  acquaint  himself  thoroughly  with  the 
forces  collected  in  and  around  Charleston,  the  sites  of  the  various 
batteries  then  in  course  of  erection,  and  the  available  resources  in 
ordnance. 

A  retrospective  glance  over  the  causes  which  induced  the  course 
adopted  by  South  Carolina  and  the  Southern  States,  and  a  cursory 
sketch  of  the  condition  of  the  public  mind  at  that  juncture,  can 
not  fail  to  be  of  interest  to  the  reader. 

The  State  of  South  Carolina  was  the  first  to  dissever  the  ties 
that  bound  her  to  the  Union.  She  was  actuated,  in  so  doing,  not 
by  motives  of  profit,  of  ambition,  or  love  of  strife,  but  by  princi 
ple,  and  a  sense  of  right  to  control  her  own  destiny,  and  escape  the 
ruin  she  foresaw  in  falling  under  the  rule  of  a  hostile  sectional 
party,  regardless  of  the  limitations  of  the  Constitution,  which  alone 
gave  security  to  the  minority  in  the  South. 

Time  and  again  had  the  South,  in  a  spirit  of  unwise  concilia 
tion,  yielded  to  unconstitutional  encroachments,  knowing  them  to 
be  such,  but  with  no  better  result  than  to  increase  this  aggression 
upon  her  rights. 

The  bond  of  union  —  namely,  the  Constitution — was  virtually 
broken.  The  antagonistic  relations  of  the  two  sections  had  culmi 
nated  in  the  election  of  a  President  believed  to  be  unfriendly  to 
the  States  of  the  South.  It  was  thought  that,  as  a  speedy  sequel, 
the  South  would  be  excluded  from  the  common  territory ;  that 
the  guarantees  of  the  Constitution  would  no  longer  exist ;  that  the 
Southern  States  would  lose  the  power  of  self-government,  and  Fed 
eral  authority  predominate  over  all. 

To  have  acquiesced  passively  in  such  a  new  order  of  things, 
whereby  the  Government  of  the  United  States  was  no  longer  the 
government  of  confederated  republics,  but  of  a  consolidated  De- 


90  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

mocracy,  would  have  been  lending  a  hand  to  despotism.  This, 
South  Carolina  would  not  do.  By  such  an  act  she  would  have  be 
lied  her  past  history,  and  condemned  that  noble  struggle  for  lib 
erty,  as  a  result  of  which  the  American  colonies  had  been  acknowl 
edged  by  Great  Britain  and  the  world  to  be  "  free,  sovereign,  and 
independent  States." 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  hopes  of  South  Carolina,  when, 
on  the  20th  of  December,  1860,  she  dissolved  her  connection  with 
the  Union,  she  had  no  certainty  that  her  Southern  sister  States 
would  follow  the  course  she  had  thought  proper  to  adopt.  She 
acted  alone,  impelled  by  her  own  sense  of  duty,  of  independence 
and  self-respect,  as  a  sovereign. 

Her  example,  and  the  tone  of  her  leading  men,  foremost  among 
whom  stood  that  profound  statesman,  the  late  Robert  Barn  well 
Rhett — the  friend  and  successor  of  John  C.  Calhoun — had  no  small 
influence  in  determining  the  subsequent  withdrawal  of  the  other 
States  of  the  South.  The  weight  of  Northern  hostility  had  been 
felt  by  each  and  all ;  and  the  decisive  action  of  any  one  of  them 
was  more  than  sufficient  to  kindle  the  latent  fires  of  self-preserva 
tion  by  disunion. 

At  the  time  of  which  we  are  now  writing,  and  no  matter  what 
may  have  been  the  previous  divergence  of  opinions  among  the 
leaders  of  that  gallant  State,  there  was  but  one  feeling,  one  senti 
ment,  and  one  resolve  animating  every  South  Carolina  heart :  to 
retake  possession,  at  any  cost,  of  the  arsenals,  forts,  and  other  pub 
lic  property  then  in  the  hands  of  the  Federal  authorities,  and  to 
assume  and  exercise  all  the  rights  appertaining  to  a  free  and  inde 
pendent  commonwealth. 

The  object  of  her  Commissioners  in  "Washington,  as  shown  by 
their  official  correspondence  with  President  Buchanan,  was  to  ob 
tain  a  just,  honorable,  and  peaceable  settlement  of  the  question  at 
issue  between  South  Carolina  and  the  Federal  Government. 

"  We  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  you,"  wrote  these  Commis 
sioners  to  the  President,  "a  copy  of  the  full  powers  from  the  con 
vention  of  the  people  of  South  Carolina,  under  which  we  are  au 
thorized  to  treat  with  the  government  of  the  United  States  for  the 
delivery  of  the  forts,  magazines,  lighthouses,  and  other  real  estate, 
with  their  appurtenances,  within  the  limits  of  South  Carolina,  and 
also  for  the  apportionment  of  the  public  debt,  and  for  a  division 
of  all  other  property  held  by  the  government  of  the  United  States 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  07 

as  agent  of  the  confederated  States,  of  which  South  Carolina  was 
recently  a  member ;  and  generally  to  negotiate  as  to  all  other 
measures  and  arrangements  proper  to  be  made  and  adopted  in  the 
existing  relation  of  the  parties,  and  for  the  continuance  of  peace 
and  amity  between  this  commonwealth  and  the  government  at 
Washington."  * 

These  negotiations  failed. 

The  removal  of  the  United  States  garrison,  on  the  25th  of  De 
cember,  I860,  from  Fort  Moultrie  to  Fort  Sumter — the  gun  car 
riages  of  the  former  work  having  been  fired  and  the  guns  injured 
by  the  retiring  troops — whatever  may  have  been  its  cause,  or  by 
whomsoever  suggested,  was  the  h'rst  overt  act  of  war,  and  the  real 
beirinninir  of  hostilities  between  the  two  sections.  That  it  was 

o  o 

due  to  the  action  of  a  United  States  officer  and  representative  of 
the  Federal  government,  is  beyond  doubt.  The  question,  whether 
he  obeyed  orders  or  acted  on  his  own  responsibility,  in  nowise  af 
fects  the  fact. 

All  hesitation  and  all  illusions,  on  the  part  of  the  South'  Carolina 
authorities,  were,  from  that  moment,  swept  aside;  and,  as  a  logical 
sequence,  on  the  day  following,  the  Palmetto  State  flag  was  raised 
over  smoking  Moultrie,  and  over  the  other  defences  of  the  harbor, 
Sumter  excepted.  The  South  Carolina  Commissioners  retired  from 
Washington  and  returned  home,  having  had  the  full  assurance 
from  President  Buchanan  that  he  would  not  remand  Major  An 
derson  to  Fort  Moultrie,  withdraw  the  United  States  troops  from 
Fort  Sumter,  or  give  up  the  latter  to  the  State  authorities. 

Vigorous  preparations  for  the  coming  struggle  were  now  begun 
by  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  with  entire  unanimity  and  a  most 
admirable  spirit  among  her  people.  Works  were  thrown  up,  and 
batteries  constructed,  at  various  points  of  the  harbor,  where  it  was 
thought  they  could  best  defend  the  city,  and  cut  off  outside  com 
munications  with  Fort  Sumter. 

These  precautionary  measures  were  taken  none  too  soon.  At 
dawn  on  the  9th  of  January,  the  steamer  Star  of  the  West,  with 
a  reinforcement  of  several  hundred  men,  and  supplies  of  food 
and  ammunition  for  Sumter,  appeared  off  the  bar  of  Charleston 


*  Sec  letter  dated  Washington,  Dec.  28th,  I860,  of  Messrs.  R.  "W.  Barnwcll, 
J.  II.  Adams,  and  James  L.  Orr,  South  Carolina  Commissioners,  to  President 
Buchanan. 


28  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

harbor.  She  entered  Ship  Channel,  and  was  rapidly  approaching 
when  a  shot  was  fired  across  her  bow  from  a  battery  on  Morris 
Island,  as  a  signal  to  heave  to.  Disregarding  this  warning,  she 
hoisted  the  United  States  flag  and  boldly  continued  her  course. 
Five  rounds  were  then  fired  at  her  in  quick  succession,  two  of 
which  took  effect.  At  the  sixth  discharge  she  rounded  to,  low 
ered  her  flag,  and  steamed  out  of  the  harbor.  Fort  Moultrie  had 
also  opened  fire  on  her. 

Events  now  followed  one  another  in  rapid  succession.  Major 
Anderson,  demanding  to  know  of  Governor  Pickens  whether  or 
not  he  had  authorized  the  firing  on  a  transport  bearing  the  United 
States  flag,  was  answered  in  the  affirmative.  Soon  afterwards  Gov 
ernor  Pickens  formally  summoned  Major  Anderson  to  surrender 
Fort  Sumter  to  the  State  authorities.  This  Major  Anderson  re 
fused  to  do,  but  offered  to  refer  the  matter  to  his  government,  at 
Washington. 

As  a  proof  of  the  conciliatory  spirit  still  animating  both  the  peo 
ple  and  the  authorities  of  South  Carolina,  Governor  Pickens  ac 
ceded  to  this  request,  and  the  Honorable  Isaac  W.  Hayne  was  ac 
cordingly  sent  to  Washington,  with  power  to  act  in  the  premises. 
Protracted  negotiations  ensued,  but  brought  about  no  satisfactory 
result,  the  answer  of  Mr.  Holt,  the  new  Secretary  of  War,  leaving 
but  little  hope  of  an  amicable  settlement. 

Thus,  under  these  perplexing  circumstances,  with  an  earnest 
desire  for  peace,  but  with  insufficient  courage  to  avow  and  pro 
mote  it,  Mr.  Buchanan's  administration  came  to  a  close.  Congress 
had  been  as  irresolute  as  the  President  himself,  and  had  taken  no 
step  to  avoid  the  impending  danger  of  collision. 

In  the  meantime,  other  Southern  States,  to  wit,  Mississippi, 
Florida,  Alabama,  Georgia,  Louisiana,  and  Texas,  had  severed  their 
connection  with  the  Federal  Government,  and  linking  their  des 
tinies  with  that  of  South  Carolina,  had  regularly  organized,  at 
Montgomery,  the  Provisional  Government  of  the  Confederate 
States  of  America. 

All  eyes  were  now  fixed  upon  the  Palmetto  State,  the  pivot 
around  which  turned  the  fortunes  of  the  South,  in  this  grand  ef 
fort  for  constitutional  liberty  which  was  about  to  be  made.  To 
her  honor  be  it  said,  she  proved  worthy  of  the  leadership  which 
fate  had  confided  to  her  hands.  Her  State  troops  and  volunteers 
answered  with  more  than  alacrity  to  the  call  of  the  constituted 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  29 

authorities,  and  poured  in  from  every  district,  eager  to  be  counted 
among  the  first  to  strike  a  blow  in  defence  of  the  cause  in  which 
their  lives — and  more  than  their  lives — were  now  enlisted.  The 
difficulty  among  the  officers  was,  not  to  elevate  the  morale  of  these 
patriotic  freemen,  or  prepare  them  for  the  dangers  they  were  about 
to  encounter,  but  to  restrain  their  ardor,  and  maintain  them  within 
the  bounds  of  prudence  and  moderation. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  in  South  Carolina,  and  such  the 
tone  of  the  public  mind  in  the  city  of  Charleston,  when  General 
Beauregard  arrived  there. 

Having  made  a  thorough  inspection  of  all  the  works,  he  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  a  great  deal  still  remained  to  be  done  by  way 
of  preparation  for  active  measures  against  Fort  Sumter. 

The  system  and  plan  of  operations  which  had  been  adopted 
seemed  to  be  to  concentrate  all  the  available  guns  and  mortars  at 
two  points,  namely  :  Fort  Moultrie,  on  Sullivan's  Island,  and 
Cumming's  Point,  on  Morris  Island,  where  a  few  guns  and  about 
half  a  dozen  mortars  of  heavy  caliber  were  being  put  in  position. 
Battery  "Star  of  the  West" — so  called,  from  its  repulse  of  the 
steamer  of  that  name — contained  four  24-pounders,  which  enfiladed 
the  main  south  channel,  known  as  the  Morris  Island  Channel. 

General  Beauregard  determined  to  alter  that  system,  but  gradu 
ally  and  cautiously,  so  as  not  to  dampen  the  ardor,  or  touch  the 
pride,  of  the  gallant  and  sensitive  gentlemen  who  had  left  their 
comfortable  homes,  at  the  call  of  their  State,  to  vindicate  its  honor 
and  assert  its  rights.  They  had  endured,  for  weeks,  the  privations 
and  exposures  of  a  soldier's  life,  on  bleak  islands,  where  it  was 
impossible,  at  times,  to  see  objects  at  a  greater  distance  than  a  few 
yards,  because  of  the  sand  drifts  created  by  the  northers,  prevalent 
on  the  coast  at  that  season  of  the  year. 

General  Beauregard  noted,  with  feelings  of  admiration,  an  old 
gentleman,  standing  sentry  at  one  of  the  camps  on  the  island,  who 
had  organized,  armed,  and  equipped  a  whole  company  of  infantry 
at  his  own  expense,  and  had  placed  it  under  the  command  of  his 
youngest  brother.  This  had  been  his  contribution  to  his  country's 
cause  ;  and,  deeming  it  insufficient,  he  had  also  offered  his  services 
and  his  life,  as  a  private  in  his  own  company. 

Among  the  privates  there  assembled  for  duty  were  planters  and 
sons  of  planters,  some  of  them  the  wealthiest  men  of  South  Caro 
lina,  diligently  working,  side  by  side  with  their  slaves.  Not  a 


30  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

word  of  complaint  from  any  of  them  did  General  Beauregard  hear 
during  his  inspection  tour,  except,  perhaps,  against  the  long  delay 
in  attacking  Fort  Sumter.  Numerous  were  the  plans — each  "  infal 
lible  " — suggested  by  these  high-spirited  gentlemen,  for  taking  the 
formidable  work  which  loomed  tip  majestic  and  defiant  in  the  dis 
tance,  like  a  mountain  risen  from  the  sea,  its  barbette  guns  grimly 
crowning  its  summit. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  31 


CHAPTER  III. 

The  Confederate  States  Commissioners. — Their  Correspondence  \vith  Mr.  Sew- 
ard. — How  they  were  Deceived. — Mr.  Lincoln's  Sectional  Views. — Letter 
of  Miijor  Anderson  to  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  United  States  Army. — 
On  Whom  must  Rest  the  Responsibility  for  the  War. — Mr.  Buchanan's 
Wavering  Policy. — General  Beaurcgard  Distrusts  the  Good  Faith  of  the 
Federal  Authorities. — His  Plan  to  Reduce  Fort  Sumter. — Detached  Bat 
teries. — Floating  and  Iron-clad  Batteries. — Fort  Sumter's  Supplies  Cut 
Off.  —  Drummond  Lights.  —  Steam  Harbor-boats.  —  Enfilade  or  Masked 
Battery. — Mr.  Chew. — His  Message  to  General  Beaurcgard. — Secretary  of 
War  Apprised  of  Same. — His  Answer  to  Telegram. — Blakely  Rifled  Gun. 
— By  Whom  Sent. — General  Bcauregard  Demands  the  Surrender  of  Fort 
Sumter. — Major  Anderson  Declines. — Fire  Opened  on  the  Fort  April  12th. 

THE  Confederate  States  Commissioners — Messrs.  John  Forsyth 
of  Alabama,  M.  J.  Crawford  of  Georgia,  and  A.  13.  Koinan  of  Lou 
isiana — with  proposals  from  their  government,  were  sent  to  "Wash 
ington  after  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln  as  President.  They 
were  instructed  "  to  make  to  the  government  of  the  United  States 
overtures  for  the  opening  of  negotiations,  assuring  that  govern 
ment  that  the  President,  Congress,  and  people  of  the  Confederate 
States  earnestly  desire  a  peaceful  solution  of  these  great  questions, 
and  that  it  is  neither  their  interest  nor  their  wish  to  make  any  de 
mand  that  is  not  founded  in  strictest  justice,  nor  to  do  any  act  to 
injure  their  late  confederates."" 

It  was  hoped  that  these  commissioners,  representing  an  organ 
ized  government,  perfect  in  all  its  parts,  and  clothed  with  powers 
by  seven  sovereign  States,  would  be  deemed  entitled  to  greater 
consideration,  and  might  accomplish  more  than  the  commissioners 
sent  by  South  Carolina  alone  had  been  able  to  do. 

13 ut  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  advisers  assumed  very  formal  ground, 
and  declined  all  official  intercourse  with  representatives  of  "  rebel 
lious  States."  They  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  "  irregular 

*  Sec  letter  of  Southern  Commissioners  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  "  Rebellion  Record/' 
vol.  i.  p.  42. 


32  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

negotiations,  having  in  view  new  and  untried  relations  with  agen 
cies  unknown  to,  and  acting  in  derogation  of,  the  Constitution 
and  the  laws."* 

The  correspondence  of  the  Southern  Commissioners  with  Mr. 
Seward  attests  this.  The  interesting  particulars  added  thereto  by 
the  Honorable  John  A.  Campbell,  late  Associate-Justice  of  the  Su 
preme  Court  of  the  United  States,  show  that  not  only  were  the 
conciliatory  proposals  tendered  to  the  Federal  government  by  the 
Confederate  States  treated  with  uncourteous  disregard,  but  that  a 
covert  attempt  at  provisioning  and  reinforcing  Fort  Sumter  was 
being  made,  pending  the  delay  to  which  our  commissioners  were 
subjected  in  Washington,  while  unofficial  but  positive  assurances 
were  given  them  of  an  early  evacuation  of  that  fort. 

So  many  despatches  and  letters,  public  and  private,  had  been 
forwarded  to  the  South  by  influential  Southern  statesmen  then  in 
Washington,  to  the  effect  that,  despite  heavy  outside  pressure,  the 
President  could  be  induced  to  settle  the  question  at  issue  with 
out  a  resort  to  arms,  if  sufficient  time  were  allowed  him,  that  up 
to  the  very  last  hour  the  Confederate  authorities  at  Montgomery, 
and  many  high  officials  in  Charleston,  really  hoped  that  the  Fed 
eral  troops  would  yet  be  withdrawn  from  Sumter,  and  the  im 
pending  danger  of  war  be  averted.  General  Crawford,  United 
States  Army,  in  his  essay,  "  The  First  Shot  Against  the  Flag," 
speaking  of  this  impression,  says  distinctly,  "and  they  had  at  one 
time  reason  for  the  belief."f  General  Doubleday  expresses  him 
self  with  no  less  certainty  when  he  states  that  "Anderson  now 
had  no  doubt  that  we  would  be  withdrawn,  and  the  papers  all 
gave  out  the  same  idea."$ 

"Not  until  Captain  G.  V.  Fox,  of  the  United  States  Navy,  had 
obtained  introduction  into  Sumter,  under  the  plea  of  "pacific  pur 
poses,"  though  in  reality  to  concert  a  plan  for  its  reinforcement ; 
not  until  Colonel  Lamon,  representing  himself  as  a  confidential 
agent  of  President  Lincoln,  had  gained  access  to  the  fort,  under 
the  pretence  of  arranging  matters  for  the  removal  of  the  troops, 
but  "in  reality  to  confer  with  Major  Anderson,  and  ascertain  the 
amount  of  provisions  on  hand  ;"§  not  until,  on  the  8th  of  April, 

*  Mr.  Scward's  reply  to  the  Southern  Commissioners. 

t  "Annals  of  the  War,"  p.  324. 

J  General  Doubleday 's  "  Reminiscences  of  Suinter  and  Moultrie,"  p.  133. 

§  Ibid.  p.  134. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  33 

Mr.  Chew,  from  the  State  Department  at  Washington,  had  noti 
fied  both  Governor  Pickens  and  General  Beauregard  "that  the 
government  intended  to  provision  Fort  Sumter  peaceably,  if  pos 
sible,  forcibly,  if  necessary ;"  not  until  then  was  the  last  expecta 
tion  of  an  amicable  settlement  of  our  difficulties  dismissed  from 
the  minds  of  those  who,  though  vigorously  preparing  for  war, 
cherished  none  the  less  the  delusive  hope  of  peace. 

It  was  rumored  at  the  time,  and  has  been  repeated  since  by 
General  Crawford,  that  Mr.  Chew,  after  delivering  his  message  to 
the  South  Carolina  authorities,  "  barely  escaped  from  the  city  of 
Charleston  without  molestation."  This  is  an  error.  Mr.  Chew, 
who  was  an  intelligent  man,  no  doubt  felt  the  very  equivocal  nat 
ure  of  his  mission  at  such  a  juncture,  and  did  manifest  symptoms 
of  anxiety  for  his  personal  safety ;  but  General  Beauregard  and 
Governor  Pickens  gave  him  at  once  most  positive  assurances  that 
he  had  no  reason  to  fear  any  act  of  violence  from  the  people  of 
Charleston.  "  The  crowd  you  see  around  this  building,''  General 
Beauregard  told  him,  "  shows  the  eagerness  of  the  people  to  be 
informed  of  the  news  you  bear  us,  and  nothing  more.  You  may 
go  among  them,  repeat  what  you  have  here  said,  and  not  a  word 
of  insult  will  be  offered  you."  To  make  assurance  doubly  sure, 
however,  and  to  appease  the  apparent  nervousness  of  Mr.  Lincoln's 
messenger,  he  was  escorted  to  the  railroad  depot  by  aids  of  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  and  Governor  Pickens,  and  left  Charleston  un 
molested,  and  as  freely  as  he  had  entered  it.  The  only  thing  he 
could  have  complained  of — though  we  have  no  evidence  that  he 
ever  did — is,  that  his  telegrams  to  Mr.  Lincoln  never  reached 
their  destination,  and  that  his  return  journey  was  unusually  pro 
tracted.  The  explanation  of  these  facts  is  that  General  Beau- 
regard,  who  considered  himself  justified  in  making  use  of  every 
rightful  stratagem  of  war,  arrested  Mr.  Chew's  telegrams,  and 
purposely  delayed  some  of  the  trains  that  took  him  back  to  Wash 
ington. 

Major  Anderson's  letter  to  Colonel  L.  Thomas,  Adjutant-Gen 
eral  United  States  Army,  dated  April  Sth,  1SG1,  and  the  telegrams 
from  Messrs.  Crawford,  Roman,  and  Forsyth,  from  Washington, 
establish  the  fact  that  the  object  of  the  Federal  government  in 
delaying  its  final  answer  to  the  Southern  Commissioners  was  to 
gain  time  for  the  reinforcement  of  Sumter  before  it  could  be  re 
duced  by  the  South  Carolina  troops  under  General  Beauregard. 
L— 3 


31  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  Major  Anderson's  letter.  It 
explains  itself,  and  clears  him  from  all  participation  in  that  act 
of  duplicity : 

"FORT  SUMTER,  S.  C.,  April  8th,  1801. 
"  To  Colonel  L.  THOMAS,  etc. : 

"  Colonel,—*  *  *  *  *  *  * 

I  had  the  honor  to  receive  by  yesterday's  mail  the  letter  of  the  Honorable 
Secretary  of  War,  dated  April  4th,  and  confess  that  what  he  here  states  sur 
prises  me  very  greatly,  following,  as  it  does,  and  contradicting  so  positively, 
the  assurance  Mr.  Crawford  telegraphed  he  was  '  authorized '  to  make.  I  trust 
that  this  matter  will  be  at  once  put  in  a  correct  light,  as  a  movement  made 
now,  when  the  South  has  been  erroneously  informed  that  none  such  would  be 
attempted,  would  produce  most  disastrous  results  throughout  our  country. 
It  is,  of  course,  now  too  late  for  me  to  give  any  advice  in  reference  to  the  pro 
posed  scheme  of  Captain  Fox.  I  fear  that  its  result  cannot  fail  to  be  disas 
trous  to  all  concerned.  Even  with  his  boat  at  our  walls,  the  loss  of  life  (as  I 
think  I  mentioned  to  Mr.  Fox)  in  unloading  her  will  more  than  pay  for  the 
good  to  be  accomplished  by  the  expedition,  which  keeps  us,  if  I  can  maintain 
possession  of  this  work,  out  of  position,  surrounded  by  strong  works,  which 
must  be  carried  to  make  this  fort  of  the  least  value  to  the  United  States  gov 
ernment. 

"  We  have  not  oil  enough  to  keep  a  light  in  the  lantern  for  one  night.  The 
boats  will  have  to,  therefore,  rely  at  night  entirely  upon  other  marks.  I  ought 
to  have  been  informed  that  this  expedition  was  to  come.  Colonel  Lamou's 
remark  convinced  me  that  the  idea,  merely  hinted  at  to  me  by  Captain  Fox, 
would  not  be  carried  out. 

"  We  shall  strive  to  do  our  duty,  though  I  frankly  say  that  my  heart  is  not 
in  this  war,  which,  I  see,  is  to  be  thus  commenced.  That  God  will  still  avert 
it,  and  cause  us  to  resort  to  pacific  means  to  maintain  our  rights,  is  my  ardent 
prayer. 

"  I  am,  Colonel,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  EGBERT  ANDERSON,  Major  1st  Artillery  commanding/' 

These  three  most  significant  telegrams  are  from  our  commis 
sioners  : 

1.  "  WASHINGTON,  April  5th,  1861. 

"Hon.  ROBERT  TOOMBS,  etc., Montgomery,  Ala. : 

"  The  movement  of  troops  and  preparation  on  board  of  vessels  of  war,  of 
which  you  have  already  been  apprised,  are  continued  with  the  greatest  activ 
ity.  An  important  move,  requiring  a  formidable  military  and  naval  force,  is 
certainly  on  foot.  The  statement  that  this  armament  is  intended  for  St.  Do- 
rningo  may  be  a  mere  ruse. 

"We  are,  however,  credibly  informed  that  Commodore  Stringham,  who 
takes  charge  of  the  squadron,  sails  for  St.  Domingo. 

"  Having  no  confidence  in  the  administration,  we  say,  be  ever  on  your  guard. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  35 

Glad  to  hear  that  you  are  ready.     The  notice  promised  us  will  come  at  the 
last  moment,  if  the  fleet  be  intended  for  our  waters. 

"  CRAWFORD. 

"  ROMAN. 

"  FORSYTH.'' 

2.  "AprilGtJi,l8Gl. 
"  Hon.  ROBERT  TOOMBS,  Secretary,  etc.,  Montgomery,  Ala. : 

"  No  change  in  the  activity  of  the  warlike  armaments  mentioned  yesterday. 
The  rumor  that  they  are  destined  against  Pickcns,  and  perhaps  Sumter,  is 
getting  every  day  stronger.  We  know  nothing  positive  on  the  subject,  but 
advise  equal  activity  on  your  part  to  receive  them  if  they  come.  "We  have 
not  yet  been  notified  of  the  movement,  but  the  notification  may  come  when 
they  are  ready  to  start. 

"  CRAWFORD. 

"  FORSYTH. 

"ROMAN." 

3.  "  WASHINGTON,  April  lltli,  1SG1. 
"  General  G.  T.  BEAFREGARD  : 

"The  Tribune  of  to-day  declares  the  main  object  of  the  expedition  to  be  the.1 
relief  of  Sumter,  and  that  a  force  will  be  landed  which  will  overcome  all  op 
position.  "  ROMAN. 

"  CRAWFORD. 

"  FORSYTII." 

The  correspondence  between  General  Scott  and  Captain  Fox, 
the  communication  of  Secretary  Cameron  to  the  latter,  the  letters 
of  President  Lincoln  to  the  same  and  to  Lieutenant  D.  D.  Porter, 
come  as  corroborating  evidence  of  the  preconcerted  determination 
of  the  Federal  authorities  to  dupe  the  Southern  people  and  their 
representatives  in  Washington. 

The  justice  and  impartial  logic  of  history  will  establish,  beyond 
the  possibility  of  a  doubt,  that  the  Southern  Commissioners,  in 
their  parting  communication  to  Mr.  Seward,  dated  April  9th,  1861, 
were  fully  justified  in  using  the  following  dignified  and  truthful 
language : 

O  e7> 

"  Your  refusal  to  entertain  these  overtures  for  a  peaceful  solution,  the  active 
naval  and  military  preparations  of  this  government,  and  a  formal  notice  to  the 
commanding  general  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston, 
that  the  President  intends  to  provision  Fort  Sumter  by  forcible  means,  if  nec 
essary,  are  viewed  by  the  undersigned,  and  can  only  be  received  by  the  world, 
as  a  declaration  of  war  against  the  Confederate  States;  for  the  President  of 
the  United  States  knows  that  Fort  Sumter  cannot  be  provisioned  without  the 
effusion  of  blood.'' 


36  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

Among  the  few  persons,  in  Charleston  and  elsewhere,  who,  from 
the  first,  doubted  the  purpose  of  the  Federal  authorities,  and  never 
believed  in  any  good  coming  from  the  unaccountable  delays  in  the 
negotiations  at  Washington,  was  General  Beauregard,  Charleston's 
popular  commander.  t 

He  had  lost  no  time  in  pushing  forward,  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
the  plan  of  attack  he  had  adopted  immediately  after  his  arrival. 
That  plan  was  to  form  a  circle  of  fire,  by  distributing  all  his  avail 
able  guns  and  mortars  around  a  circumference  of  which  Fort 
Sumter  should  be  the  centre.  To  accomplish  this  he  had  three  of 
the  six  mortars  about  to  be  put  in  position  at  Cummings's  Point 
removed  to  the  Trapier  Battery  on  Morris  Island.  They  were 
10 -inch  mortars.  The  three  others  (8 -inch)  he  left  where  they 
had  been  originally  mounted.  "With  his  usual  prompt  decision 
and  remarkable  activity,  he  asked  and  obtained  from  Savan 
nah  and  Pensacola  other  mortars  which  he  knew  were  there,  and 
distributed  them  as  follows:  three  in  Fort  Johnson,  on  James 
Island;  one  in  Castle  Pinckney,  an  inner  defence  in  the  harbor; 
two  in  Christ  Church  parish,  near  Mount  Pleasant;  and  three  on 
Sullivan's  Island,  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Moultrie. 

All  his  mortars  were  now  placed  in  proper  positions,  and  in 
accord  with  the  principles  of  gunnery  ;  that  is  to  say,  near  enough 
to  Fort  Sumter  to  do  it  the  greatest  possible  damage,  and  yet  far 
enough  away  to  be  almost  beyond  range  of  its  fire,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  three  8-inch  mortars  at  Cummings's  Point,  already 
referred  to,  winch  were  of  but  slight  value  or  importance. 

The  merlons  and  traverses  at  Fort  Moultrie  and  the  batteries 
near  it,  as  originally  constructed  by  the  officers  in  charge,  were  to 
tally  inadequate  to  the  purpose  for  which  they  were  intended. 
lie  had  them  rebuilt  of  a  much  larger  size  and  greater  solidity. 
He  also  located  his  gun-batteries  with  the  utmost  care,  endeav 
oring  to  enfilade  the  barbette  guns  of  Sumter,  so  as  to  disable 
them,  should  the  emergency  arise. 

It  was  on  the  Morris  Island  shore  that  General  Beauregard  first 
applied  his  plan  of  detached  batteries  for  the  defence  of  channels 
and  rivers.  Close  observation  had  shown  him  that  batteries  thus 
constructed  and  armed  with  a  few  guns  each,  well  protected  by 
heavy  traverses  and  merlons,  were  much  more  efficacious  than 
would  be  a  single  large  work,  having  all  the  guns  concentrated  in 
it,  without  these  protections.  When  a  fort  is  attacked  by  a  fieet, 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  37 

its  exposed  barbette  guns  are  soon  disabled  and  tlie  gunners  driven 
to  cover ;  whereas,  in  detached  batteries,  which  mutually  support 
each  other,  those  not  immediately  under  lire  can  be  worked  at 
leisure  and  with  accuracy.  One  gun  ashore,  well  protected,  is 
equivalent  to  many  guns  afloat,  and  the  advantage  is  certain  to  be 
on  the  side  of  the  fire  of  the  detached  batteries,  especially  when 
guarded  against  a  land  attack  by  a  proper  supporting  force. 

Captain  John  Randolph  Hamilton,  of  Charleston,  an  ex-officer 
of  the  United  States  navy,  had  constructed  a  floating  battery, 
originally  of  rough  materials,  and  so  clumpy  and  ungainly  in  ap 
pearance  as  to  be  criticised  by  those  who  first  examined  it. 
General  Beauregard  being  directly  applied  to  by  the  inventor, 
and  approving  of  his  design,  procured  for  him  the  iron  plating 
necessary  for  the  completion  of  his  work.  Early  in  April  it  was 
ready  for  use,  and  was  removed  to  the  western  extremity  of 
Sullivan's  Island,  where  it  was  placed  in  position,  so  as  to  deliver 
a  destructive  fire  upon  the  postern  entrance  of  the  fort  facing 
the  city,  a  point  which  could  not  be  effectively  bombarded  from 
any  other  battery. 

An  iron-clad  land  battery  was  also  constructed,  at  that  time, 
by  C.  H.  Stevens,  of  Charleston,  who  afterwards  became  a  briga 
dier-general  in  the  Confederate  army,  and  was  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga.  It  consisted  of  heavy  timbers  overlaid  with 
railroad  iron,  so  fitted  together  as  to  present  a  smooth  inclined 
surface,  to  be  properly  greased  when  ready  for  action.  Its  heavy 
guns,  three  in  number,  were  fired  through  embrasures  supplied 
with  strong  iron  shutters.  General  Beauregard  likewise  approved 
of  Mr.  Stevens's  plan,  and  added  to  it  such  suggestions  as  his 
engineering  experience  justified.  This  battery  was  erected  at 
Cummings's  Point,  only  thirteen  hundred  yards  from  Fort  Sumter. 

Both  Captain  Hamilton's  and  Mr.  Steven's  batteries  proved 
the  wisdom  of  their  inventors,  and  fully  met  General  Beaure- 
gard's  expectations.  They  were,  in  fact,  the  first  experiments 
from  which  sprang  all  iron-clad  war  vessels  and  land  batteries  in 
the  United  States,  and  to  them  may  be  attributed  most  of  the 
important  changes  and  improvements  since  made  in  naval  archi 
tecture  and  armaments. 

"  On  the  Gth  of  April,"  says  General  Donbleday,  in  his  "  Remi 
niscences,"  "  Beauregard  restricted  our  marketing  to  two  days  in 
the  week.  On  the  7th  it  was  wholly  cut  off,  and  we  noticed 


38  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

gangs  of  negroes  hard  at  work  strengthening  the  defences  on 
Morris  Island.  .  .  .  Anderson  was  greatly  troubled  at  the  failure 
of  all  his  plans  to  keep  the  peace.  .  .  .  The  rebels  knew,  and  per 
haps  he  knew,  that  on  the  6th  and  7th  of  April  a  number  of 
naval  vessels  had  left  New  York  and  Norfolk  under  sealed  orders. 
Their  destination  could  hardly  'be  doubted." 

The  orders  cutting  off  the  supplies,  alluded  to  by  General  Dou- 
bleday,  were  issued  and  rigidly  enforced  by  General  Beauregard, 
whose  object  was  not  only  to  prevent  the  fort  from  receiving 
supplies  of  provisions,  but  also  to  prevent  the  purchase  of  oil, 
without  which  no  signals  could  be  made  to  the  expected  fleet; 
moreover,  without  oil,  the  wheels  and  chassis  of  Major  Anderson's 
guns,  then  clogged  by  the  sand  drifts  in  the  work,  could  not  be 
kept  in  proper  order  for  immediate  effective  use. 

To  guard  further  against  the  entrance  of  the  Federal  fleet, 
which  might  be  effected  during;  a  dark  ni^ht,  despite  the  vigilance 

O  O  O         s  X  o 

of  our  channel  batteries,  General  Beauregard  determined  to  use 
two  large  Drurnmond  lights,  one  on  Morris  Island,  the  other  on 
Sullivan's  Island,  at  points  specially  selected,  in  order  to  illumi 
nate  the  channels  leading  to  Fort  Sumter,  and  thereby  facilitate 
the  firing  of  the  Morris  Island  beach  batteries  and  other  works 
bearing;  on  the  outer  harbor.  He  had  ordered  and  received  these 

O 

valuable  lights  from  ]Srew  York,  and  having  placed  them  in  bomb- 
proofs,  so  constructed  as  to  insure  their  usefulness  and  safety, 
intrusted  them  to  the  care  of  Professor  Lewis  li.  Gibbes,  of  the 
Charleston  College. 

In  connection  with  these  two  Drummond  lights,  and  as  an  ad 
ditional  safeguard,  Captain  Ilartsteiri,  a  distinguished  ex-officer  of 
the  United  States  navy,  was  placed  in  command  of  the  steam 
harbor  boats,  and  detailed  to  watch  the  various  channel  entrances, 
with  orders,  should  he  discover  vessels  attempting  to  approach 
Fort  Sumter,  to  throw  up  signal  rockets,  as  a  warning  to  the 
batteries  and  the  Drummond  lights,  and  then  to  steam  slowly  in, 
after  hoisting  a  light  of  special  color,  by  which  his  vessels  could 
be  distinguished  from  those  of  the  enemy.  This  duty,  at  times 
very  harassing,  was  performed  by  him  and  his  officers  and  men, 
with  unremitting  zeal  and  energy. 

Another  object — and  an  important  one — still  remained  to  bo 
accomplished :  some  of  the  barbette  guns  of  Sumter,  on  the  land- 
face  fronting  the  city,  could  not  be  effectively  reached  by  the 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGAKD.  39 

batteries  thus  far  erected.  General  Beauregard,  therefore,  in 
order  to  perfect  his  line  of  attack  and  also  to  prevent  a  landing 
of  any  reinforcement  at  the  postern  gate  of  the  fort,  constructed 
a  masked  battery  of  four  guns  at  the  west  end  of  Sullivan's 
Island,  in  rear  of  a  small  summer  residence  abandoned  by  its 
owners.  It  proved  to  be,  says  General  Doubleday,  in  his  "  Remi 
niscences,"  page  140,  a  formidable  work  "  which  effectually  en- 
ii laded  two  rows  of  our  upper  tier  of  guns  en  ~barbettc,  and  took  a 
third  tier  in  reverse.  It  was  a  sad  surprise  to  us,  for  we  had  our 
heaviest  metal  there." 

Immediately  after  the  delivery  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  message  by 
Mr.  Chew,  General  Beauregard  sent  the  following  despatch  to 
the  Secretary  of  A\rar,  at  Montgomery  : 

"  CHARLESTON,  April  8th,  18G1. 
"  To  L.  P.  WALKER  : 

"Dear  /SVr, — An  authorized  messenger  from  Mr.  Lincoln  has  just  informed 
Governor  Pickcus  and  myself  that  provisions  will  be  sent  to  Fort  Sumter, 
'  peaceably  if  they  can,  forcibly  if  they  must.' 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.'' 

To  this  the  Secretary  of  War  replied : 

"  MONTGOMERY,  April  Wt/t,  1SG1. 
"  To  General  BEAUREGARD,  Charleston : 

"If  you  have  no  doubt  of  the  authorized  character  of  the  agent  who  com 
municated  to  you  the  intention  of  the  Washington  government  to  supply  Fort 
SMimter  by  force,  you  will  at  once  demand  its  evacuation;  and  if  this  is  re 
fused,  proceed  in  such  a  manner  as  you  may  determine  to  reduce  it. 

"L.  P.WALKER." 

General  Beauregard  was  ready.  lie  had  displayed  untiring 
energy  in  his  preparations,  and  had  been  most  zealously  and 
effectively  assisted  by  the  South  Carolina  authorities  and  the 
officers  and  men  under  him.  One  thing  only  remained  to  be  at 
tended  to,  and  that  was  the  placing  in  position  of  a  small  Blake- 
ly  rilled  gun,  the  first  ever  used  in  America,  which  had  just  ar 
rived  from  England — an  unexpected  present  to  the  State  from 
Charles  K.  Prioleau,  of  Charleston,  a  partner  in  the  Liverpool 
branch  of  the  firm  of  John  Frazer  &  Co.  It  arrived  off  the  har 
bor  on  the  day  before  the  order  from  Montgomery  was  received, 
and  delayed  its  execution  for  twenty-four  hours. 

At  two  o'clock  P.  M.,  April  llth,  General  Beauregard,  through 


40  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

his  aids,  Captain  S.  D.  Lee,  Colonel  James  Chestnut,  Jr.,  and 
Lieutenant  A.  E.  Chisolm,  made  a  formal  demand  for  the  imme 
diate  surrender  of  Fort  Surater.  The  terms  offered  were :  "  to 
transport  Major  Anderson  and  his  command  to  any  port  in  the 
United  States  he  might  select ;  to  allow  him  to  move  out  of  the 
fort  with  company  arms  and  property,  and  all  private  property ; 
and  to  salute  his  flag  on  lowering  it."* 

General  Beauregard's  despatch,  forwarded,  on  the  same  day  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  was  as  follows : 

"  CHARLESTON,  April  llth,  1861. 
"  To  L.  P.  WALKER  : 

"Major  Anderson  replied:  'I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  communication,  demanding  the  evacuation  of  this  fort,  and  to  say, 
in  reply  thereto,  that  it  is  a  demand  with  which  I  regret  that  my  sense  of 
honor  and  of  my  obligation  to  my  government  prevent  my  compliance.'  He 
adds,  verbally :  '  I  will  await  the  first  shot,  and  if  you  do  not  batter  us  to 
pieces,  we  will  be  starved  out  in  a  few  days.'  Answer. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

The  answer  came  in  all  haste.     It  was  as  follows : 

"  MONTGOMERY,  April  llth,  1861. 
"  To  General  BEAUREGARD,  Charleston : 

"  We  do  not  desire  needlessly  to  bombard  Fort  Sumtcr.  If  Major  Anderson 
will  state  the  time  at  which,  as  indicated  by  him,  he  will  evacuate,  and  agree 
that  in  the  meantime  he  will  not  use  his  guns  against  us,  unless  ours  should 
be  employed  against  Fort  Surnter,  you  are  authorized  thus  to  avoid  the  effu 
sion  of  blood.  If  this,  or  its  equivalent,  be  refused,  reduce  the  fort  as  your 
judgment  decides  to  be  the  most  practicable. 

"L.P.WALKER.r 

The  substance  of  these  instructions  was  immediately  forwarded 
to  the  fort,  by  General  Beauregard's  aids,  accompanied  by  Colonel 
Roger  A.  Pry  or,  of  Virginia.  But  Major  Anderson,  as  the  official 
despatch  has  it,  "would  not  consent."  In  consequence  of  which, 
after  timely  notice  had  been  given  to  him  in  General  Beauregard's 
name,  on  April  12th,  at  4.30  A.  M.,  "We  opened  fire." 

*  General  Beauregard's  Report  of  the  Bombardment  of  Sumter. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD. 


CHAPTER  IY. 

General  Beauregard  Makes  no  Material  Changes  ill  the  Distribution  of  Forces 
in  Charleston. — Brigadier-General  Simons  in  Command  of  Morris  Island. 
— Brigadier- General  Dunovant  of  Sullivan's  Island. — Tone  of  Troops. — 
The  First  Shell  Fired  from  Fort  Johnson. — The  Only  Motive  Actuating 
the  South.— At  5  A.  M.,  April  12th,  every  Battery  in  Full  Play.— Smnter 
Responds  at  7  o'clock. — How  our  Guns  were  Served. — Engagement  Con 
tinued  until  Nightfall. — Firing  Kept  up  all  Night  by  our  Batteries. — 
No  Response  from  Sumtcr. — Conduct  of  the  Federal  Fleet. — Fort  Re-opens 
Fire  on  the  Morning  of  the  13th.— Burning  of  Barracks.— Sumtcr  still 
Firing. — Our  Troops  Cheer  the  Garrison. — General  Beauregard  Offers  As 
sistance  to  Major  Anderson,  who  Declines. — Hoisting  of  the  White  Flag. 
—Terms  of  Surrender. — Accident  during  the  Salute  of  the  Flag.— Evac 
uation. — Our  Troops  Enter  the  Fort,  April  14th. — Hoisting  of  Confederate 
and  Palmetto  Flags. 

ON  assuming  command  of  Charleston,  General  Beauregard  made 
no  material  change  in  the  distribution  and  location  of  the  forces 
he  found  there,  and  maintained  the  organization  previously  adopt 
ed  by  the  South  Carolina  State  authorities. 

Brigadier  -  General  James  Simons  was  therefore  left  in   com- 

O 

maud  of  Morris  Island,  all  the  batteries  of  which  had  been  placed 
under  the  immediate  charge  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  G.  De  Saus- 
surc  of  the  Second  Artillery  Battalion.  lie  was  assisted,  at  the 
Trapier  Batter}7,  by  Captain  King,  of  the  Marion  Artillery,  and, 
later,  by  Captain  Russell,  of  the  Smnter  Guards.  Next  to  the 
Trapier  Battery,  and  closer  to  Sumter,  was  the  Stevens  or  Iron 
Battery,  of  which  special  mention  has  already  been  made.  Then 
came  the  Cummings's  Point  battery,  at  a  distance  of  only  thir 
teen  hundred  yards  from  Fort  Sumter.  To  it  had  been  attached 
the  rifled  Blakely  gun,  just  received  from  England.  Both  of  these 
were  held  by  the  Palmetto  Guard,  and  commanded  by  Major 
Stevens,  of  the  Citadel  Academy;  Captain  Cuthbert  having  spe 
cial  charge  of  the  Iron  Batter}7,  and  Captain  Thomas  of  the  Blakely 
gun.  Besides  the  above-mentioned  works,  there  could  also  be  seen 
a  long  line  of  detached  batteries,  guarding  the  entrance  of  Ship 
Channel,  and  extending  along  the  whole  Morris  Island  beach.  They 


42  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

were  manned  by  detachments  taken  from  Gregg's  regiment,  and 
from  both  the  German  and  the  Columbia  Artillery,  under  Colonel 
Lamar,  Major  "Warley,  and  Captains  linger,  Nohrden,  and  Green. 

Sullivan's  Island  was  under  Brigadier-General  R.  G.  M.  Duno- 
vant;  and  the  command  of  all  its  batteries  had  been  assigned  to 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Ripley,  of  the  First  Artillery  Battalion.  Cap 
tain  Ransom  Calhoun  was  stationed  at  Fort  Moultrie,  and  Captain 
Hallonquist  at  the  "  Enfilade  "  or  masked  battery.  They  were  as 
sisted  by  Lieutenants  Wagner,  Rhett,  Yates,  Valentine,  Mitchel, 
and  Parker.  Captain  Butler  was  on  duty  at  the  mortar  battery, 
east  of  Fort  Moultrie.  Captain  J.  R.  Hamilton  commanded  his 
own  floating  battery  and  the  Dahlgren  gun.  Captain  Martin  was 
at  the  Mount  Pleasant  mortars ;  Captain  George  S.  Thomas  at 
Fort  Johnson  ;  and  Castle  Pinckney  had  been  placed  under  the 
charge  of  an  officer  whose  name  we  have  not  been  able  to  procure. 

A  few  days  previous  to  the  bombardment,  the  general  com 
manding  had  announced,  in  general  orders,  the  names  of  the  of 
ficers  composing  his  staff.  They  were  Major  D.  R.  Jones,  Assis 
tant-Adjutant-General,  Captain  S.  D.  Lee,  Captain  S.  Ferguson, 
Lieutenant  Sydney  Legare — of  the  Regular  staff  ;  Messrs.  John  L. 
Manning,  James  Chestnut,  Jr.,  William  Porcher  Miles,  J.  A.  Gon- 
zales,  and  A.  R.  Chisolm,  and  Colonels  L.  T.  Wigfall,  of  Texas,  and 
Roger  A.  Pryor,  of  Virginia — of  the  Volunteer  staff. 

Though  the  opening  of  hostilities  had,  for  the  last  two  days, 
been  almost  hourly  expected  by  officers  and  men  of  the  various 
commands,  and  by  the  whole  population  of  the  city  of  Charleston, 
still,  so  good  was  the  tone  of  the  troops,  so  confident  of  the  result 
were  the  non-combatants,  that  when  the  last  message  of  the  com 
manding  general  had  been  delivered,  notifying  Major  Anderson 
that  fire  would  open  on  him  in  an  hour's  time,  quiet,  order,  and 
discipline  reigned  throughout  the  city  and  harbor. 

The  peaceful  stillness  of  the  night  was  suddenly  broken  just 
before  dawn.  From  Fort  Johnson's  mortar  battery,  at  4.30  A.  M., 
April  12th,  1SG1,  issued  the  first — and,  as  many  thought,  the  too- 
long-deferrcd — signal  shell  of  the  war.  It  was  fired,  not  by  Mr. 
Edmund  Ruffin,  of  Virginia,  as  has  been  erroneously  believed,  but 
by  Captain  George  S.  James,  of  South  Carolina,  to  whom  Lieu 
tenant  Stephen  D.  Lee  issued  the  order.  It  sped  aloft,  describ 
ing  its  peculiar  arc  of  fire,  and,  bursting  over  Fort  Sumter,  fell, 
with  crashing  noise,  in  the  very  centre  of  the  parade. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  4.3 

Thus  was  "Koveille"  sounded  in  Charleston  and  its  harbor  on 
tliis  eventful  morning.  In  an  instant  all  was  bustle  and  activity. 
Xot  an  absentee  was  reported  at  roll-call.  The  citizens  poured 
down  to  the  battery  and  the  wharves,  and  women  and  children 
crowded  each  window  of  the  houses  overlooking  the  sea — rapt 
spectators  of  the  scene.  At  ten  minutes  before  five  o'clock,  all 
the  batteries  and  mortars  which  encircled  the  grim  fortress  were 
in  full  play  against  it. 

Hound  after  round  had  already  been  fired  ;  and  yet,  for  nearly 
two  hours,  not  a  shot  in  response  had  come  from  Fort  S unite*. 
Had  Major  Anderson  been  taken  by  surprise  ?  Or  was  it  that, 
certain  of  his  ability  to  pass  unscathed  through  the  onslaught  thus 
made  upon  him,  it  mattered  not  how  soon  or  how  late  he  commit 
ted  his  flag  in  the  war  "in  which  his  heart  was  not"?  At  last, 
however,  near  seven  o'clock,  the  United  States  flag  having  pre 
viously  been  raised,  the  sound  of  a  gun,  not  ours,  was  distinctly 
heard.  Sumter  had  taken  up  the  gage  of  battle,  and  Cummings's 
Point  had  first  attracted  its  attention.  It  was  almost  a  relief  to 
our  troops — for  gallantry  ever  admires  gallantry,  and  a  worthy  foe 
disdains  one  who  makes  no  resistance. 

The  action  was  now  general,  and  was  so  maintained  throughout 
the  day,  with  vigor  on  both  sides.  Our  guns  were  served  with 
admirable  spirit,  and  the  accuracy  of  our  range  was  made  evident 
by  the  clouds  of  dust  that  flew  as  our  balls  struck  the  fort,  and 
by  the  indentations  hollowed  in  its  walls.  The  precision  with 
which  solid  shot  and  shells  were  thrown  from  our  batteries,  main 
ly  Fort  Moultrie,  was  such  that  the  enemy  was  soon  compelled  to 
abandon  the  use  of  his  barbette  guns,  several  of  which  had  been 
dismounted  in  the  early  part  of  the  bombardment. 

The  iron-clad  battery  at  Cummings's  Point,  Fort  Moultrie  prop 
er,  and  that  end  of  Sullivan's  Island  where  the  floating  battery, 
the  Dahlgren  gun,  and  the  enfilade  or  masked  battery  had  been 
placed,  were  the  points  which  attracted  Major  Anderson's  heavi 
est  firing.  No  better  proof  could  he  have  given  ns  of  the  effects 
of  our  lire  on  his  fort.  An  occasional  shot  only  was  aimed  at  Fort 
Johnson,  as  if  to  remind  the  battery  there  that  the  explosion  of 
its  first  shell  was  not  yet  forgiven.  Captain  Butler's  mortar  bat 
tery,  east  of  Moultrie,  had  also  a  share  of  the  enemy's  wrath. 

The  engagement  was  continued  with  unceasing  vigor  until  night 
fall,  although  Sumtcr's  fire  had  evidently  slackened  before  that 


4:4:  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

time,  and  was  then  confined  to  its  casemated  guns.  General  Dou- 
bleday,  U.  S.  A.,  in  his  "  Keminiscences,"  p.  154,  speaking  of  the 
first  day's  bombardment,  says  :  "  They  had  a  great  advantage  over 
us,  as  their  fire  was  concentrated  on  the  fort,  which  was  in  the 
centre  of  the  circle,  while  ours  was  diffused  over  the  circumfer 
ence.  Their  missiles  were  exceedingly  destructive  to  the  upper 
exposed  portion  of  the  work,  but  no  essential  injury  wras  done  to 
the  lower  casemates  which  sheltered  us." 

Noted  among  our  mortar  batteries — all  so  well  served — was  the 
Trapier  Battery,  whose  skilful  firing  had  become  the  subject  of 
much  admiration  among  officers  and  men.  Almost  every  shell  it 
threw,  from  the  first  to  the  last,  reached  its  aim  with  relentless 
effect.  The  Stevens  Iron  Battery,  the  destruction  of  which  the 
guns  of  Sumter  sought  to  accomplish,  paid  but  little  attention  to 
the  fierce  opening  attack  made  upon  it,  and  received  no  serious 
impression  on  its  iron-coated  surface ;  while  the  south  and  south 
west  faces  of  Sumter  bore  visible  signs  of  its  own  effectiveness. 
The  floating  battery  was  not  far  behind  in  destructive  usefulness. 
It  proved  of  equal  invulnerability,  and  left  telling  marks  of  its 
battering  powers. 

During  the  whole  night  which  followed,  in  spite  of  rain  and 
darkness,  our  batteries  continued  playing  upon  the  fort  with  un 
varying  effect,  but  the  shots  were  fired  at  longer  intervals,  in  obe 
dience  to  orders.  ~No  response  was  made.  General  Doubleday,  in 
his  work  already  quoted,  admits  the  fact.  lie  says  :  "  We  did  not 
return  the  fire,  having  no  ammunition  to  waste."  And  General 
Crawford,  in  his  "  First  Shot  against  the  Flag,"  *  makes  the  fol 
lowing  statement :  "  During  the  night  of  the  12th,  the  accurate 
range  of  the  mortars  lodged  a  shell  in  the  parade,  or  about  the 
work,  at  intervals  of  fifteen  minutes.  It  was  estimated  that  over 
twenty-five  hundred  shot  and  shell  struck  the  fort  during  the  first 
twenty-four  hours." 

It  was  expected  that  the  Federal  fleet,  alluded  to  by  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  special  messenger  to  Governor  Pickens  and  General  Beaure- 
gard,  would  arrive  that  night,  and  might  attempt  to  throw  troops, 
ammunition,  and  supplies  into  Fort  Sumter.  To  guard  against 
such  an  untoward  event,  the  keenest  watchfulness  was  observed 
at  our  beach  batteries  and  by  the  forces  on  Morris  and  Sullivan's 

*  "  Annals  of  the  War,"  p.  328. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD.  45 

islands.  The  details  of  men  at  the  Drummond  lights  were  also 
on  the  alert,  and  ready  at  a  moment's  notice  to  illuminate  the  chan 
nels  ;  while  Captain  Ilartstein,  with  his  cruising  vessels,  actively 
patrolled  the  outer  harbor.  The  fleet  arrived  on  the  morning  of 
the  13th,  an  hour  or  two  after  the  action  had  been  renewed,  and 
remained  spectators  off  the  bar. 

Very  early  on  that  morning  all  our  batteries  re -opened  on 
the  enemy,  who  responded  with  vigor  for  a  while,  concentrating 
his  fire  almost  exclusively  on  Fort  Moultrie.  The  presence  of  the 
fleet  outside  the  bar,  now  visible  to  all,  no  doubt  inspired  both 
officers  and  men  of  the  garrison  with  additional  courage  and  a  re 
newed  spirit  of  endurance. 

General  Crawford,  in  his  above -quoted  essay,  says:  ''Major 
Anderson  was  directed,  if  possible,  to  hold  out  until  the  12th  of 
April,  when  the  expedition  would  go  forward,  and,  finding  his 
'flag  flying,'  an  effort  would  be  made  to  provision  him,  and  to 
reinforce  him,  if  resisted/' 

Major  Anderson,  with  his  ofiicers  and  men,  followed  the  in 
structions  received.  They  did  hold  out;  their  flag  was  "  flying" 
on  the  12th  of  April,  and  again  on  the  13th ;  and  they  were  fight 
ing  in  all  earnest.  Tho  fleet  outside  thought  proper,  nevertheless, 
to  abstain  from  all  participation  in  the  engagement. 

"By  morning,"  says  General  Crawford,  "the  fleet  sent  to  our 
assistance  appeared  off  the  bar,  but  did  not  enter."  f  And  General 
Doubleday  adds,  in  his  characteristic  manner:  "After  the  event 
much  obloquy  was  thrown  upon  the  navy,  because  it  did  not  come 
in  and  engage  the  numerous  batteries  and  forts,  and  open  for  it 
self  a  way  to  Charleston  ;  but  this  course  would  probably  have  re 
sulted  in  the  sinking  of  every  vessel."  ^ 

At  about  8  o'clock  A.  M.,  in  the  thickest  of  the  bombardment, 
a  thin  smoke  was  observable,  curling  up  from  Fort  Sumter.  It 
grew  denser  and  denser  as  it  steadily  rose  in  the  air ;  and  it  soon 
became  apparent  that  the  barracks  of  the  fort  had  been  set  on  fire 
by  forty  rounds  of  red-hot  shot,  thrown  from  an  8-inch  Colum- 
biad  at  Fort  Moultrie,  by  a  detachment  of  Company  B,  under 
Lieutenant  Alfred  Rhett.  This  sight  increased  the  vigor  of  our 
attack  ;  both  officers  and  men  feeling  now  that  the  garrison  would 


Annals  of  the  War,"  p.  325.  f  Ibid.  p.  329. 

I  General  Doublcday's  "Reminiscences,"  p.  150. 


46  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

soon  be  brought  to  terms.  In  spite,  however,  of  this  new  and  ter 
rible  element  against  which  it  had  to  contend,  the  fort  still  re 
sponded  to  the  lire  of  our  batteries,  though  at  long  and  irregular 
intervals  only. 

Appreciating  the  critical  position  of  the  enemy,  and  carried 
away  by  their  own  enthusiasm,  our  troops,  mounting  the  parapets 
in  their  front,  cheered  Major  Anderson  at  each  successive  discharge 
that  came  from  the  fort,  deriding  and  hooting,  the  while,  what  to 
them  seemed  the  timorous  inaction  of  the  fleet  outside  the. bar. 

Matters  had  evidently  reached  a  crisis  for  the  men  within  the 
walls  of  Sumter.  Fearing  that  some  terrible  calamity  might  be 
fall  them,  and  being  informed  that  the  United  States  flag  no  long 
er  floated  over  the  fort,  General  Beauregard  immediately  de 
spatched  three  of  his  aids  with  offers  of  assistance  to  Major  Ander 
son,  wrho  thanked  him  for  his  courtesy,  but  declined  to  accept  aid. 
Before  General  Beaurcgard's  aids  could  get  to  the  fort,  the  United 
States  flag,  which  had  not  been  hauled  down,  as  we  supposed,  but 
had  fallen  from  the  effects  of  a  shot,  was  hoisted  anew.  It  did  not 
fly  long,  howrever,  but  was  soon  lowered,  and  a  white  flag  substitu 
ted  for  it.  The  contest  was  over.  Major  Anderson  had  acknowl 
edged  his  defeat. 

Now  occurred  an  incident  which  was  in  no  way  surprising,  be 
ing  the  natural  result  of  inexperience  in  military  matters  and  a 
lack  of  discipline,  among  some  of  the  officers  commanding  the 
various  points  around  the  harbor.  Seeing  the  fall  of  the  flag,  and 
the  fort  in  flames,  Brigadier-general  Simons,  actuated  by  the  best 
of  motives,  but  without  authority  from  the  commanding  general, 
allowed  Colonel  Wigfall  to  cross  from  Cummings's  Point  to  Sum 
ter  in  a  row-boat,  to  ascertain  whether  the  absence  of  the  flag  over 
the  fort  indicated  a  desire  to  surrender.  The  proximity  of  Morris 
Island  to  Sumter  enabled  him  to  reach  the  fort  before  the  aids, 
who  had  been  sent  directly  from  general  headquarters,  could  do  so. 

A  short  interview  took  place  between  Colonel  Wigfall  and 
Major  Anderson,  during  which  a  demand  of  surrender  was  made 
by  the  former  and  acceded  to  by  the  latter,  but  upon  terms  not 
clearly  defined  between  them. 

We  deem  it  best  to  transcribe  the  very  words  made  use  of  by 
General  Beauregard,  in  his  "Final  Report  of  Operations  against 
Sumter,"  as  forwarded  April  27th,  1861,  to  the  Hon.  L.  P.  Walker, 
Secretary  of  War  at  Montgomery,  Alabama  : 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  47 

-  'J Major  Anderson  understood  him  [Colonel  Wigfall]  as  offering  the  same  con 
ditions  on  the  part  of  General  Beauregard  as  had  been  tendered  him  oix/thc 
llth  instant,*  while  Colonel  Wigfall's  impression  was  that  Major  Anderson 
unconditionally  surrendered,  trusting  to  the  generosity  of  General  Beauregard 
to  offer  such  terms  as  would  be  honorable  and  acceptable  to  both  parties. 
Meanwhile,  before  these  circumstances  had  been  reported  to  me,  and,  in  fact, 
soon  after  the  aids  I  had  despatched  with  the  offer  of  assistance  had  set  out  on 
their  mission,  hearing  that  a  white  flag  was  flying  over  the  fort,  I  sent  Major 
Jones,  chief  of  my  staff,  and  some  other  aids,  with  substantially  the  same  prop 
osition  I  had  made  to  Major  Anderson  on  the  llth  instant,  excepting  the 
privilege  of  saluting  his  flag.     Major  Anderson  replied  that  '  it  would  be  ex 
ceedingly  gratifying  to  him,  as  well  as  to  his  command,  to  be  permitted  to 
salute  their  flag,  having  so  gallantly  defended  the  fort  under  such  trying  cir 
cumstances,  and  hoped  that  General  Beauregard  would  not  refuse  it,  as  such 
a  privilege  was  not  unusual.'     He  furthermore  said  '  he  would  not  urge  the 
point,  but  would  prefer  to  refer  the  matter  again  to  General  Beauregard.' 

*******  * 

"  I  very  cheerfully  agreed  to  allow  the  salute  as  an  honorable  testimony  of 
the  gallantry  and  fortitude  with  which  Major  Anderson  and  his  command 
had  defended  their  post,  and  I  informed  Major  Anderson  of  my  decision 
about  half-past  seven  o'clock,  P.M.,  through  Major  Jones,  my  chief  of  staff."1 

A  melancholy  occurrence  took  place  during  the  salute  of  the 
United  States  flag — the  death  of  one  of  the  garrison,  who  had  his 
right  arm  blown  off  and  was  almost  instantaneously  killed,  by 
the  premature  discharge  of  the  piece  he  was  loading.  A  spark, 
also,  it  was  alleged,  having  "  dropped  on  a  pile  of  cartridges  below, 
exploded  them  all,"  f  and  severely  wounded  five  other  men. 

AVhile  final  arrangements  were  being  made  for  the  withdrawal 
of  the  garrison,  and  before  it  was  effected,  the  general  command 
ing,  who  had  twice  attempted,  but  in  vain,  to  assist  Major  Ander 
son  in  quenching  the  lire  in  the  fort,  ordered  a  company  of  Regu 
lars  with  two  lire-engines  from  Sullivan's  Island,  to  repair  to  Fort 
Sumter,  to  put  out  the  conflagration  which,  not  entirely  subdued, 
had  broken  out  afresh.  This  was  a  harder  task  than  was  at  iirst 
supposed.  The  two  engines  proved  insufficient,  and  others  had  to 
be  brought  from  Charleston,  with  additional  firemen.  It  was  only 
towards  dawn  that  the  fire  was  at  last  brought  under  control,  and 
the  powder-magazine  secured  from  explosion. 

Owing  to  unavoidable  delays  resulting  from  the  state  of  confu- 

*  See  Chapter  III.,  pp.  40,  41 ;  also  Report  of  General  Beauregard,  in  Appen 
dix  to  this  chapter. 

t  Gen.  Doubleday's  k>  Rcminisccnses,"  p.  171. 


48  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

sion  existing  in  the  fort,  its  formal  transfer  to  our  troops  did  not 
take  place  until  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  Sunday,  the  11-th 
of  April.  At  that  hour  Major  Anderson  and  his  command 
inarched  out  of  the  work,  and  we  entered  it,  taking  final  possession. 
Then  it  was,  that,  amid  deafening  cheers  and  with  an  enthusiastic 
salute  from  the  guns  of  all  the  batteries  around  the  harbor,  the 
Confederate  and  the  Palmetto  flags  were  hoisted  side  by  side,  on 
the  damaged  ramparts  of  the  fort.  To  Captain  Hallonquist,  of 
the  1st  Artillery  Regulars,  with  his  worthy  Lieutenants  Rhett, 
Mitchel,  and  Blake,  and  to  the  gallant  Captain  Cuthbert,  with  his 
Lieutenants,  Brownfield,  Holmes,  and  Buist,  was  confided  the 
keeping  of  Fort  Suinter,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ripley  as  com 
mander,  and  the  Regulars  remained  there. 

General  Beauregard  was  not  present  at  this  imposing  ceremony. 
Prompted  by  the  feeling  of  delicacy  which  so  distinguishes  all 
his  social  and  official  relations,  he  abstained  from  meeting  Major 
Anderson,  his  former  friend  and  professor,  now  his  defeated  foe, 
lest  his  presence,  at  such  a  juncture,  might  add  to  the  distress  and 
natural  mortification  of  a  gallant  officer. 

Not  until  the  steamer  Isabel,  which  was  placed  at  the  disposal 
of  Major  Anderson,  had  conveyed  him  and  his  command  to  the 
Federal  fleet,  riding  at  anchor  outside  the  bar,  did  General  Beaure 
gard  enter  the  fort,  which,  in  obedience  to  orders  from  his  govern 
ment,  he  had  successfully  reduced. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  49 


CHAPTEE   Y. 

Condition  of  Fort  Sumtcr  after  the  Bombardment.— Repairs  Begun  at  Once.— 
Mustering  of  South  Carolina  Volunteers. — Bonham's  Brigade. — General 
Bcauregard  makes  a  Reconnoissance  of  the  South  Carolina  Coast.— Rec 
ommends  Works  at  Stono,  the  Two  Edistos,  and  Georgetown. — Declines 
Advising  Plan  of  Defence  for  Port  Royal  Harbor. — Yields  under  Pressure, 
but  Predicts  the  Result. — Receives  Congratulations  upon  the  Reduction 
of  Sumter. — Vote  of  Thanks  of  Congress. — Resolutions  of  the  General 
Assembly  of  South  Carolina.— General  Beauregard  is  Called  to  Montgom 
ery. — The  President  Wishes  him  to  Assist  General  Bragg  atPensacola. — lie 
Declines. — His  Reasons  therefor. — Deputation  from  New  Orleans  Asking 
his  Transfer  to  Louisiana. — The  President  Sends  him  Back  to  Charleston. 
— Propositions  of  the  House  of  John  Frazer  &  Co.,  relative  to  Purchase 
of  Steamers.  —  Comments  thereon.  —  General  Beauregard  Advocates  the 
Plan.  —  Government  Declines  Moving  in  the  Matter. — Silence  of  Mr. 
Davis's  Book  about  it. — General  Beauregard  Ordered  to  Richmond. — Re 
grets  of  Carolinians  at  his  Departure. — Letter  of  Governor  Pickens. 

"WHAT  with  the  burning  of  its  quarters,  the  injury  inflicted  on 
its  walls,  and  the  shattered  condition  of  its  parade  and  parapets, 
where  dismounted  guns,  broken  carriages  and  chassis,  fragments 
of  shell  and  shot,  lay  scattered  on  all  sides — Fort  Sumter,  when 
our  troops  inarched  into  it,  presented  a  picture  of  desolation  and 
ruin.  One  could  well  understand,  upon  viewing  it  then,  how  im 
possible  it  would  have  been  for  Major  Anderson  and  his  command 
to  hold  out  more  than  a  few  hours  longer.  Suffocation  and  an  en 
dangered  magazine,  if  not  starvation,  and,  above  all,  the  firing 
from  Moultrie  and  other  batteries,  must  soon  have  destroyed  the 
entire  garrison.  "With  or  without  the  assistance  of  the  fleet,  a  sur 
render  was  a  foregone  conclusion. 

The  triumph  of  our  arms,  so  complete  and — through  the  kindly 
protection  of  Providence — so  bloodless,  was  solemnly  celebrated 
in  several  of  the  ancient  churches  of  Charleston ;  and  a  Te  Dcum 
was  sung,  with  great  pomp,  in  the  beautiful  cathedral,  on  the  Sun 
day  next  following  this  opening  scene  of  the  war. 

General  Beauregard,  in  orders  issued  on  the  day  after  the  surren 
der,  congratulated  his  troops  on  "  the  brilliant  success  which  had 
L— \ 


50  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

crowned  their  gallantry."  Commenting  upon  the  terms  granted 
to  Major  Anderson  and  his  command,  he  said :  "  And  to  show 
our  magnanimity  to  the  gallant  defenders,  who  were  only  execut 
ing  the  orders  of  their  government,  they  will  be  allowed  to  evacu 
ate  upon  the  same  terms  which  were  offered  to  them  before  the 
bombardment  commenced."  He  concluded  as  follows  :  "  The  gen 
eral  is  highly  gratified  to  state  that  the  troops,  by  their  labor, 
privations,  arid  endurance  at  the  batteries  and  at  other  posts,  have 
exhibited  the  highest  characteristics  of  tried  soldiers." 

And  now  began  in  earnest,  without  the  loss  of  a  day,  the  re 
pairs,  which  amounted  almost  to  the  rebuilding  of  Fort  Su inter. 
With  zeal  and  energy  this  work  was  done ;  and  in  less  than  three 
weeks  no  vestige  of  the  former  injuries  remained.  The  broken 
chassis  and  carriages  had  been  replaced,  the  barracks  rebuilt — one 
story  in  height  instead  of  two,  as  formerly — and  the  walls  restored 
to  their  previous  condition. 

Meanwhile  General  Beauregard  went  on  with  the  organization  and 
discipline  of  the  troops  called  by  South  Carolina,  which  were  grad 
ually  mustered  into  the  Provisional  Army  of  the  Confederate  States. 

Early  in  May,  a  brigade  of  four  regiments  of  South  Carolina 
volunteers  was  organized,  under  Brigadier-General  Bonharn.  It 
consisted  of  the  1st  South  Carolina  Volunteers,  Colonel  Gregg ; 
the  2d  South  Carolina  Volunteers,  Colonel  Kershaw ;  the  3d  South 
Carolina  Volunteers,  Colonel  Williams  ;  and  the  8th  South  Caro 
lina  Volunteers,  Colonel  Cash.  That  brigade,  made  up  of  the  flow 
er  of  Carolina's  chivalry,  was  sent  to  Virginia,  by  order  of  the 
War  Department,  the  "  Old  Dominion  "  having,  on  the  17th  of 
April — four  days  after  the  fall  of  Suinter — joined  her  fate  to  that 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 

One  of  the  regiments  of  Bonham's  brigade  (Gregg's)  had  been 
sent  in  advance  to  Norfolk.  Its  mission  was  to  take  possession 
of  the  navy -yard  and  protect  all  public  property  there.  This 
was  a  judicious  movement.  The  many  cannon  and  mortars,  and 
the  ammunition  stored  at  Norfolk,  were  of  the  greatest  value  to 
the  Confederacy,  then  almost  entirely  destitute  of  such  important 
supplies.  The  whole  brigade  was  soon  afterwards  concentrated  at 
Manassas  Junction,  in  the  Department  of  Alexandria,  or  "  the  Alex 
andria  line,"  as  it  was  also  called,  the  command  of  which  devolved 
upon  General  Bonham.  lie  remained  there  until  relieved,  on  the 
1st  of  June,  by  General  Beauregard. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  51 

As  soon  as  lie  could  be  spared  from  Charleston,  General  Beau- 
regard  made  a  thorough  reconnoissance  of  the  South  Carolina 

o  o 

coast,  from  Charleston  to  Port  Eoyal.  This  he  did  at  the  special 
request  of  Governor  Pickens,  the  object  being  the  adoption  of  a 
system  of  defence  to  be  carried  out  at  the  earliest  moment  prac 
ticable. 

On  his  return  he  prepared  a  memoir,  wherein  he  recommended 
the  erection  of  several  important  works  at  the  mouths  of  the  Stono 
and  the  two  Edistos,  and  at  Georgetown ;  but  declined  advising 
any  for  the  entrance  of  Port  Royal  harbor.  He  was  of  opinion 
that  field-works  located  on  the  ends  of  the  islands  which  closed 
the  harbor  could  not  protect  it,  for  the  reason  that  the  distance 
between  the  islands  was  too  great.  Some  light  works  he  did  rec 
ommend,  however,  at  the  inner  end  of  Port  Royal,  to  guard  that 
part  of  the  coast  and  prevent  a  landing  of  the  enemy,  which  might 
result  in  the  destruction  of  the  Charleston  and  Savannah  Railroad. 
But  upon  the  earnest  and  reiterated  request  of  Governor  Pickens, 
and  other  eminent  citizens,  whose  zeal  and  efforts  were  untiring, 
General  Beauregard  finally  yielded,  and  drew  out  a  plan  for  the 
defence  of  Port  Royal,  with  the  distinct  requirement,  however, 
that  the  field-works  proposed  in  the  plan  should  be  armed  with 
the  heaviest  ordnance,  chiefly  10-inch  and  rifled  guns,  and  that  a 
steel-clad  floating  battery,  with  a  similar  armament,  should  be 
moored  midway  between  the  two  field-works.  His  explanation 
was,  that  while  the  harbors  of  New  York,  Boston,  Philadelphia, 
Charleston,  Savannah,  and  Xew  Orleans — the  entrances  to  which 
are  from  half  a  mile  to  one  and  a  quarter  miles  broad — require 
strongly  cascmated  forts,  armed  with  several  hundred  guns  of 
heavy  caliber,  it  could  not  be  expected  that  Port  Royal  harbor, 
with  an  entrance  nearly  three  miles  wide  and  twenty-six  feet  deep, 
could  be  effectively  protected  by  small,  hastily  constructed  field- 
works,  inadequately  armed. 

What  General  Beauregard  had  predicted  was  unfortunately 
realized.  In  the  autumn  of  that  year  the  enemy's  powerful  fleet, 
the  acquisition  and  fitting-out  of  which  had  cost,  according  to 
jSTorthcrn  accounts,  more  than  four  millions  of  dollars,  entered 
Port  Royal  harbor  and  reduced  its  isolated  works,  after  a  short 
but  gallant  resistance  on  the  part  of  their  overpowered  garrisons. 
This  event  cast  a  gloom,  for  a  while,  over  the  new-born  Southern 
Confederacy. 


52  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

General  Beauregard,  now  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  topogra 
phy  of  Charleston  and  the  surrounding  country,  understood  how 
important  it  was  to  guard  the  Stono.  He  saw  at  a  glance  that, 
should  the  enemy  land  a  sufficient  force  on  James  Island,  the  city 
of  Charleston  could  easily  be  turned  by  way  of  that  river.  To 
avert  such  a  danger,  he  had  a  strong  field-work  erected  on  Battery 
Island,  that  being  the  lowest  point  of  dry  land  before  reaching 
the  salt  marshes  which  extend  in  an  unbroken  field  on  each  side 
of  the  stream.  This  work,  although  small,  occupied  a  command 
ing  position,  which  no  hostile  craft  could  approach  unseen.  Tow 
ards  the  latter  part  of  May  it  was  completed  and  ready  for  ser 
vice. 

From  various  quarters  messages  of  congratulation  poured  in  to 
General  Beauregard,  upon  the  brilliant  success  he  had  achieved. 
The  first  in  date  was  a  telegram  from  President  Davis,  which  read 
as  follows : 

"  MONTGOMERY,  April  13^,  1861. 
"  To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  Thanks  for  your  achievement  and  for  your  courtesy  to  the  garrison  of  Surn- 
ter.  If  occasion  offers,  tender  my  friendly  remembrance  to  Major  Anderson. 

"JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

Then,  from  the  Secretary  of  War : 

"  MONTGOMERY,  April  13th,  1861. 
"  To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  Accept  my  congratulations.  You  have  won  your  spurs.  How  many  guns 
can  you  spare  for  Pensacola  ? 

"L.  P.  WALKER." 

The  next  communication  was  from  one  whose  attitude  towards 
the  administration  already  indicated  the  influence  he  would  soon 

exercise  over  it : 

"MONTGOMERY,  April  1G*A,  1861. 

"  My  dear  General, — In  the  midst  of  the  eclat  of  your  glorious  triumph  you 
will,  no  doubt,  value  but  little  the  tribute  of  a  poor  civilian  who  knows  noth 
ing  of  war ;  but  I  cannot  refrain  from  joining  in  the  general  voice  of  your  fel 
low-citizens,  and  congratulating  you  on  the  signal  success  which  has  crowned 
the  first  blow  stricken  in  defence  of  our  rights.  Louisiana  is  proud  of  her  son, 
and  I  am  Louisianian,  heart  and  soul. 

******** 

"  Renewing  my  cordial  greetings,  and  envying  your  delight  at  accomplish 
ing  such  a  result  as  you  have,  without  the  loss  of  one  man, 
"  I  am  your  friend  and  servant, 

"  J.  P.  BENJAMIN." 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  53 

From  Louisiana  came  words  of  enthusiastic  rejoicing.  New 
Orleans,  especially,  was  lavish  in  her  praise. 

The  Confederate  Congress  tendered  the  following  vote  of  thanks 
to  General  Beauregard  and  the  troops  under  him : 

"No.  103.— A  resolution  of  thanks  to  Brigadier-General  G.  T.  Beauregard. 
and  the  army  under  his  command  for  their  conduct  in  the  affair  of  Fort 
Sumter. 

"  Be  it  unanimously  resolved,  by  the  Congress  of  the  Confederate  States  of 
America,  That  the  thanks  of  the  people  of  the  Confederate  States  are  due,  and 
through  this  Congress  are  hereby  tendered,  to  Brigadier-General  G.  T.  Beau- 
regard  and  the  officers,  military  and  naval,  under  his  command,  and  to  the 
gallant  troops  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  for  the  skill,  fortitude,  and  cour 
age  by  which  they  reduced,  and  caused  the  surrender  of,  Fort  Sumter,  in  the 
harbor  of  Charleston,  on  the  12th  and  13th  days  of  April,  1861.  And  the 
commendation  of  Congress  is  also  hereby  declared  of  the  generosity  manifest 
ed  by  their  conduct  towards  a  brave  and  vanquished  foe. 

"7><?  it  further  resolved,  That  a  copy  of  this  resolution  be  communicated  by 
the  President  to  General  Beauregard,  and  through  him  to  the  army  then  under 
his  command. 

"  Approved  May  4*7/,  18G1." 

South  Carolina  almost  adopted  General  Beauregard  as  one  of 
her  own  sons.  The  Legislature  of  that  State,  at  its  first  session 
after  the  fall  of  Sumter,  unanimously  passed  a  resolution,  the  prin 
cipal  part  of  which  is  given  below : 

"  IN  GENERAL  ASSEMBLY,  S.  C., 
November  ZSth,  1861. 

u  Resolved j  That  the  General  Assembly  of  South  Carolina,  in  grateful  recog 
nition  of  the  distinguished  sen-ices  of  General  G.  T.  Beauregard  in  the  cause 
of  Southern  independence,  hereby  tender  to  him  the  privilege  of  sending  two 
pupils  to  be  educated  at  the  military  schools  of  this  State,  etc. 

"  Resolved,  That  his  excellency  the  governor  be  requested  to  communicate 
the  foregoing  to  General  G.  T.  Beauregard." 

Governor  Pickens,  than  whom  none  valued  more  the  worth  of 
"the  great  Creole,"  as  General  Beauregard  was  then  called, cheer 
fully  performed  the  pleasant  duty  assigned  him ;  and  General 
Beauregard,  then  in  another  field  of  action,  gratefully  accepted  the 
proffered  honor.  His  younger  son,  Henry  T.  Beauregard,  and  his 
nephew,  James  T.  Proctor,  were  accordingly  sent  to  the  Military 
Academy  of  South  Carolina,  and  there  enjoyed  all  the  privileges  of 
State  cadets.  The  former  remained  two  years  at  the  academy  and 
the  latter  one  year,  when  they  joined  South  Carolina  regiments,  and 


5i  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

served,  though  mere  boys,  to  the  end  of  the  war.  Young  Proctor, 
after  promotion  to  a  lieutenancy  for  gallant  conduct  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  was  wounded  and  lost  a  foot  at  the  battle  of  Chancellors- 
ville.  Governor  Pickens  also  presented  a  commission  as  first  lieu 
tenant  in  the  1st  South  Carolina  Battalion  of  Light  Artillery  to 
the  general's  elder  son,  Rene  T.  Beauregard,  who  was  promoted, 
first  captain  and  then  major  of  that  command.  lie  had  previously 
served  as  a  private  in  the  Washington  Artillery,  from  !N~ew  Or 
leans,  whose  record  throughout  the  war  was  surpassed  by  that  of 
no  other  organization. 

About  the  5th  of  May  General  Beauregard  received  a  telegram 
from  the  Secretary  of  War,  requiring  his  immediate  presence  at 
the  seat  of  government.  On  his  arrival  at  Montgomery  he  was 
informed  that  the  President  desired  to  send  him  to  Pensacola,  to 
co-operate  with  General  Bragg,  and  assist  him  in  the  execution  of 
a  plan — much  thought  of  at  the  time — the  main  object  of  which 
was  the  taking  of  Fort  Pickens. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  no  sooner  had  the  State  of  Alaba 
ma  withdrawn  from  the  Union  than  the  Federal  forces  stationed 
at  Pensacola,  in  imitation  of  Major  Anderson,  evacuated  Fort  Bar 
rancas,  on  the  mainland,  to  occupy  Fort  Pickens,  on  Santa  Rosa  Isl 
and — a  much  stronger,  and  in  every  way  a  more  inaccessible,  work. 

The  fort  being  in  Confederate  waters,  the  authorities  at  Mont 
gomery  feared  that  its  occupancy  by  the  enemy  would  imply 
weakness  on  the  part  of  our  government,  and  might  possibly 
shake  the  confidence  of  the  people.  It  had,  therefore,  been  deter 
mined  to  pursue  a  course  towards  Fort  Pickens  similar  to  that 
which  had  been  so  successfully  adopted  against  Fort  Sumter. 
Hence  the  desire  for  the  services  and  experience  of  him  who,  after 
thirty-three  hours  of  bombardment,  had  forced  the  surrender  of 
Major  Anderson  and  his  command. 

During  a  long  conference  held  with  President  Davis  and  the 
Secretary  of  War,  General  Beauregard  stated  his  several  objec 
tions  to  being  sent  to  Pensacola.  In  the  first  place,  General 
Bragg,  not  having  sought  his  assistance,  might  perhaps  be  offended 
at  such  apparent  interference,  and  ask  to  be  relieved  from  his  com 
mand,  which  would  occasion  no  small  annoyance  to  General  Beau- 
regard,  and  be  very  detrimental  to  the  cause.  In  the  second 
place,  he  was  strongly  of  opinion  that  there  was  no  advantage  to 
be  gained  by  taking  possession  of  Fort  Pickens ;  that  to  hold  it 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGABD.  55 

would  necessitate  the  employment  of  more  troops  than  we  could 
well  spare  at  the  time,  and  that  it  was  not  in  ports  and  harbors, 
but  in  the  field,  that  the  battles  upon  which  hung  the  fate  of 
the  Confederacy  must  be  fought.  He  thought  it  wiser  to  leave 
the  disadvantage  of  garrisoning  the  fort  upon  the  enemy,  than 
to  take  the  task  upon  ourselves.  He  maintained,  furthermore, 
that,  as  we  had  yet  no  navj-,  and  no  commerce  with  the  ex 
terior  world,  Pensacola  harbor  could  be  of  no  use  to  us  at  this 
juncture;  and  that,  should  we  occupy  Fort  Pickens,  we  would,  in 
all  likelihood,  be  forced,  ere  long,  to  withdraw  our  troops  from  it, 
to  employ  them  more  usefully  in  other  parts  of  the  Confederacy. 
He  suggested  that,  meanwhile,  a  school  of  military  practice  and 
instruction  should  be  established  at  Pensacola,  under  General 
Bragg,  where  all  raw  troops  might  be  organized  and  properly  pre 
pared,  before  being  forwarded  to  their  ultimate  destination.  Gen 
eral  JJcauregaixTs  reasons  finally  prevailed,  and  he  was  sent  back 
to  Charleston,  the  news  from  Washington  indicating  a  general 
war,  and  a  strong  determination  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  gov 
ernment  to  retake  possession  of  Fort  Sumter. 

A  deputation  of  gentlemen  from  New  Orleans  had  recently  ar 
rived  from  that  city,  to  direct  the  President's  attention  to  its 
unprotected  condition.  They  urgently  requested  that  General 
Beauregard  should  be  sent  thither  at  once,  to  take  command  and 
organize  a  system  of  defence,  which,  they  were  convinced,  none 
could  do  so  well  as  himself.  He  would  have  gladly  accepted  such 
an  order — so  many  ties  were  drawing  him  back  to  Louisiana — but 
the  President  deemed  his  presence  imperatively  necessary  at 
Charleston,  then  the  most  threatened  point  of  the  Confederacy, 
and  therefore  persisted  in  his  former  determination. 

While  journeying  from  Charleston  to  Montgomery,  General 
Beauregard  met  Mr.  AV.  L.  Trenholm,  whose  father,  George  A. 
Trenholm,*  was  a  partner  in  the  great  firm  of  John  Frazcr  & 
Co.,  of  Charleston  and  Liverpool.  This  gentleman,  as  he  in 
formed  General  Beauregard,  was  the  bearer  of  important  propo 
sitions  from  the  English  branch  of  their  house  to  the  Confederate 
government,  for  the  purchase  of  ten  large  and  powerful  steamers, 
then  just  built  in  England  for  the  East  India  Company,  which,  no 
longer  needing  them,  was  desirous  of  finding  a  purchaser ;  the  ships 

*  The  Hon.  George  A.  Trenholm  was  appointed  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
after  the  resignation  of  Mr.  Memminger. 


56  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

were  to  be  properly  manned  and  fitted  out,  and  sent  to  the  Con 
federate  States,  thence  to  export  enough  cotton  to  pay  for  them, 
and  as  much  more  as  should  be  required  to  provide  for  the  arma 
ment  and  equipment  of  our  forces.  Such  a  plan,  it  was  thought 
by  the  Frazer  house,  could  be  easily  carried  out.  The  United 
States  government  would  require  time  to  collect  and  rendezvous 
its  fleet,  the  inadequacy  of  which  was  well  known;  and  no  fear 
need,  therefore,  be  entertained  of  its  ability,  at  that  time,  to  en 
force  a  blockade  of  the  Southern  ports :  an  effective  blockade 
could  be  prevented.  After  a  certain  number  of  voyages  with 
large  cargoes  of  cotton,  for  the  purposes  already  mentioned,  these 
steamers  might  be  converted  into  cruisers,  and  employed  to  im 
pede  and  destroy  Northern  commerce. 

General  Beauregard,  thoroughly  impressed  with  the  incalculable 
benefits  to  be  derived  from  the  adoption  of  such  a  project,  prom 
ised  Mr.  Trenholm  to  use  his  utmost  endeavors  in  furtherance 
of  the  measures  that  gentleman  was  sent  to  advocate.  In  a  let 
ter  to  General  Beauregard,  dated  Charleston,  18th  September, 
1878,  Mr.  Trenholm  says:  "This  I  remember  well,  that  you 
warmly  supported  the  proposition,  and  used  your  influence  in 
aid  of  its  being  brought  before  the  cabinet,  which  was  accom 
plished."  But  neither  General  Beauregard's  earnest  advice,  nor 
the  strong  and  cogent  reasons  given  by  Mr.  Trenholm,  were  of 
any  avail.  The  Confederate  government,  under  the  erroneous 
belief  that  the  war  would  be  a  short  one,*  declined  entertaining 
the  proposals  made  to  it.  "  No  discussion  took  place  in  my  pres 
ence,"  says  Mr.  Trenholm,  in  the  letter  already  alluded  to,  "but 
from  questions  put  to  me,  I  have  always  been  under  the  impression 
that  few,  if  any,  of  those  present "  (meaning  the  President  and  mem 
bers  of  the  cabinet)  "realized  at  all  the  scope  and  importance  of 
the  measures  laid  before  them."  Thus  was  closed  upon  the  Con 
federacy  a  door  —  then  wide  open — through  which  might  have 
entered  that  material  assistance,  those  sinews  of  war,  the  want  of 
which  all  the  heroism  of  our  troops  and  the  endurance  and  self- 
sacrifice  of  our  people  could  not  remedy. 

General  Beauregard  believed — and  expressed  the  opinion  at  the 
time — that  we  were  engaged  in  a  long  and  terrible  war ;  and  he 
earnestly  wished  to  see  the  country  prepared  accordingly.  He  was 

*  A  member  of  the  cabinet  had  given  it  as  his  opinion,  on  that  occasion, 
that  the  war  would  not  last  over  ninety  days. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  57 

therefore  most  anxious  that  Mr.  Trenliolm's  proposals  should  be 
accepted.  Four  large  and  powerful  steamers,  and  six  smaller  ones, 
but  "  scarcely  inferior  for  the  required  purpose  " — as  these  were 
represented  to  be — placed  under  the  command  of  such  officers  as 
Sernmes,  Maffitt,  Brown,  Taylor,  Jones,  linger,  Hartstein,  Hamil 
ton,  Pegram,  and  Ileid,  during  the  first  year  of  the  war,  would  not 
only  have  raised  the  attempted  blockade,  but  would  have  driven 
the  commerce  of  the  United  States  from  all  the  seas  of  the  globe. 
This  was  abundantly  proved  by  the  exploits  of  the  Sumtcr  and 
Alabama,  the  results  of  which  were  so  keenly  felt  by  the  North, 
that  England,  irresponsible  though  she  was,  paid,  at  a  later  date, 
the  penalty  of  Admiral  Scmmcs's  achievements. 

In  his  "Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government/'  Mr. 
Davis  has  not  even  alluded  to  the  facts  we  have  just  related.  lie 
states,  however,  that  as  early  as  February,  1SG1,  "the  third  day 
after  my  inauguration  at  Montgomery,''  he  had  directed  Cap 
tain  (afterwards  Admiral)  Semmes,  as  agent  of  the  Confederate 
States,  to  proceed  north  in  order  not  only  to  purchase  "  arms, 
ammunition,  and  machinery,"  but  also  "to  seek  for  vessels  which 
would  serve  for  naval  purposes."  He  farther  states  that  Captain 
Semmes  was  unsuccessful  in  his  errand,  and,  on  his  return,  re 
ported  "  that  he  could  not  find  any  vessels  which  in  his  judgment 
were,  or  could  be  made,  available  for  our  uses."  For  that  reason, 
and  for  the  additional  reason,  says  Mr.  Davis,  that  "  the  Southern 
officers  of  the  navy  who  were  in  command  of  United  States  ves 
sels  abroad,"  before  resigning  their  commissions  to  join  their  re 
spective  States,  invariably  "  brought  the  vessels  they  commanded 
into  the  ports  of  the  North,"  thereby  depriving  us  of  "our  share 
of  the  navy  we  had  contributed  to  build,"  and  allowing  it  to  be 
"  employed  to  assail  us,"  we  were  left  "  without  the  accessories 
needful  for  the  rapid  supply  of  naval  vessels."  * 

This  is  proof  conclusive  that  Mr.  Davis  himself  had  some  con 
ception  of  the  importance  of  procuring  war-vessels  for  the  Con 
federacy;  though  the  attempt  to  purchase  them  in  the  enemy's 
country,  was,  under  the  circumstances,  a  strange  proceeding,  to  say 
the  least  of  it.  And  yet,  two  months  later,  that  is,  in  the  early  part 
of  May,  when,  to  use  Mr.  Prioleau's  expression,  "  a  fleet  of  armed 
vessels  "  was  offered  him,  for  the  service  of  the  Confederacy,  with 


Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government;'  vol.  i.  pp.  311,  313,  314. 


58  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

an  opportunity  to  procure  an  unlimited  supply  of  arms  and  am 
munition,  not  to  speak  of  provisions  and  accoutrements  for  the 
impending  struggle,  which  he  thought  would  be  "long  and 
bloody,"  *  Mr.  Davis  hardly  considered  the  proposition  at  all,  and 
discarded  it  as  being  impracticable  and  unworthy  of  his  attention. 

Mr.  Davis  goes  on  to  say :  "  While  attempting  whatever  was 
practicable  at  home,  we  sent  a  competent,  well-deserving  officer 
of  the  navy  to  England,  to  obtain  there  and  elsewhere,  by  pur 
chase  or  by  building,  vessels  which  could  be  transformed  into  ships 
of  war."  f 

"When  was  this  done  ?  Mr.  Davis  is  reticent  upon  that  point ; 
and,  despite  his  statement  that  "  these  efforts  and  their  results  will 
be  noticed  more  fully  hereafter,"  nowhere  in  his  book  is  to  be 
found  any  additional  information  upon  the  subject.  True,  Mr. 
Davis  says,  further  on,  "At  the  commencement  of  the  war  the 
Confederacy  was  not  only  without  a  navy,  all  the  naval  vessels 
possessed  by  the  States  having  been,  as  explained  elsewhere,  left 
in  the  hands  of  our  enemies;  but  worse  than  this  was  the  fact 
that  ship-building  had  been  almost  exclusively  done  in  the  North 
ern  States,  so  that  we  had  no  means  of  acquiring  equality  in  naval 
power."  $ 

This,  instead  of  showing  what  were  the  efforts  of  our  govern 
ment  to  procure  war-vessels  for  the  South,  shows,  on  the  contrary, 
how  great  was  the  folly,  how  disastrous  to  our  interests  the  non- 
acceptance  of  the  contract  almost  effected,  in  London,  by  the 
house  of  John  Frazer  &  Co. 

And  Mr.  Davis  says  also :  "  It  has  been  shown  that  among  the 
first  acts  of  the  Confederate  administration  was  the  effort  to  buy 
ships  which  could  be  used  to  naval  purposes."  §  This  can  only  re 
fer  to  Captain  Semmes's  mission  North,  in  the  latter  part  of  Febru 
ary,  1SG1,  and  relates,  not  to  what  was  done  in  Europe,  not  to  the 
reasons  for  rejecting  the  Trenholm  proposal,  but  merely  to  what 
was  unsuccessfully  attempted  on  our  side  of  the  water. 

The  impression  Mr.  Davis  seems  anxious  to  convey  is,  that  his 
efforts  to  procure  war-vessels  in  Europe  were  made  shortly  after 
his  inauguration  as  President,  and  as  soon  as  he  had  discovered 
that  none  could  be  purchased  at  the  North.  From  this,  and  with 

*  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  230. 

t  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  314.  J  Ibid.  vol.  ii.  p.  240.  §  Ibid.  vol.  ii.  p.  245. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  59 

the  facts  bore  submitted,  it  seems  clear  that,  if  Mr.  Davis  sent  an 
agent  to  purchase  war-vessels  in  Europe,  it  must  have  been  at  a 
later  period,  and  when  the  opportunity  to  get  such  vessels,  from 
England  and  elsewhere,  had  already  been  allowed  to  slip  by.  For 
lie  certainly  cannot  deny  that,  in  May,  1SG1,  a  fleet  of  ten  East 
India  steamers  was  offered  the  Confederate  government,  in  Mont 
gomery,  through  Mr.  W.  L.  Trenholm,  speaking  in  the  name  and 
by  the  authority  of  the  house  of  John  Frazer  &  Co.  Admitting 
that,  as  he  must,  how  is  it  possible  that  he  could  have  rejected  the 
Trenholm  offer — as  he  unquestionably  did — if  at  that  time  he  had 
a  naval  oilicer  in  Europe,  sent  thither  to  effect  the  identical  pur 
chase  he  then  declined  ?  Was  it  that  our  government  could  not 
have  accepted  any  such  proposal,  except  through  the  medium  of 
the  agent  already  alluded  to  ?  Why  not,  then,  have  referred  the 
house  of  John  Frazer  &  Co.  to  him,  or  him  to  that  house? 

Mr.  Prioleau,  one  of  the  firm  of  John  Frazer  &  Co.,  of  Liver 
pool,  through  whose  hands  had  passed  the  negotiations  relative  to 
the  purchase  of  these  vessels,  wrote  to  General  Beaurcgard  the 
following  letter  on  the  subject.  It  confirms  the  extracts  from 
Mr.  Trenholm's  letter,  as  given  above;  and  adds  so  much  interest 
to  the  point  under  consideration,  that  we  feel  justified  in  submit 
ting  it  without  curtailment. 

"  BRUGES,  September  ZWi,  18SO. 

"  J/y  dear  General, — The  facts  -with  reference  to  the  proposed  fleet  of  armed 
vessels  for  the  service  of  the  Confederacy  were  briefly  as  follows : 

"I  had,  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  struggle,  been  more  impressed  with 
the  vital  importance  of  the  seaports  than  with  anything  else.  I  regarded 
them  as  the  lungs  of  the  country,  which,  once  really  closed,  asphyxia  must  fol 
low.  I  therefore  took  an  early  occasion  to  go  to  London  to  see  what  could 
be  had  in  the  shape  of  vessels  fit  to  take  and  keep  the  sea,  for  a  lengthened 
period,  and  strong  enough  to  carry  an  armament  which  would  render  them 
efficient  war-vessels,  or,  at  all  events,  equal  to  cope  with  those  of  the  enemy 
engaged  in  the  blockade  of  the  coast. 

'k  I  was  fortunate  in  finding  exactly  what  was  wanted.  A  fleet  of  first-class 
East-Indiamen  was  lying  there  idle,  under  circumstances  of  a  financial  nature 
which  made  them  available  to  a  buyer  at  less  than  half  their  cost.  They  had 
been  built  with  a  view  of  being  armed  if  required,  and  also  to  be  used  as 
transports  for  troops,  as  well  as  to  carry  valuable  cargoes  and  treasure  in  time 
of  peace.  Four  of  them  were  vessels  of  great  size  and  power,  and  of  the  very 
first  class,  and  there  were  six  others  which,  although  smaller,  were  scarcely  in 
ferior  for  the  required  purpose.  Having,  with  the  assistance  of  an  expert, 
thoroughly  inspected  them  all,  I  at  once  entered  into  negotiations  for  their 
purchase,  and  having  secured  them  for  the  reply  of  the  Confederate  author!- 


60  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

ties,  I  submitted  the  proposal,  in  a  letter  to  the  Hon.  G.  A.  Trenholm,  who  re 
ferred  it,  as  I  believe,*  to  Montgomery.  The  total  cost  of  buying,  arming,  and 
fitting-out  the  ten  ships  \vas  estimated  at  two  millions  of  pounds,  to  put  the 
fleet  on  the  coast  ready  for  action ;  a  sum  which  would  have  been  covered  by 
forty  thousand  bales  of  cotton,  out  of  the  three  or  four  millions  of  bales  which 
the  government  had,  at  that  time,  under  their  hand,  and  which  would  not 
have  cost  them,  at  Qd.  in  their  own  currency,  more  than  two  millions  of  dollars. 
There  would  have  been  little  or  no  difficulty  in  getting  the  ships  to  sea.  The 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act  had  not  then — and,  indeed,  never  has  been — authorita 
tively  interpreted  to  mean  that  a  neutral  may  not  sell  an  unarmed  ship  to  a 
belligerent :  all  that  wras  required  was  commercial  caution  and  coolness,  and 
naval  skill  and  address ;  all  these  were  at  hand,  and  there  is  no  room  for  rea 
sonable  doubt  that,  within  six  months  at  farthest  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
offer  being  received  on  this  side,  the  fleet  would  have  appeared  off  Boston  and 
swept  the  coast  thence  to  the  Gulf,  an  achievement  which  would  have  com 
pelled  the  prompt  recognition  of  our  government  on  this  side,  and  the  speedy 
triumph  of  our  cause.  I  have  always  understood  that  the  proposition  was 
considered  and  rejected,  by  the  Confederate  government,  but  I  never  had  any 
communication  from  them  on  the  subject.  Although  much  disappointed  at  this 
result,  so  convinced  was  I  of  the  value  of  the  ships  that  I  determined  to  retain 
my  hold  upon  them  as  long  as  possible,  to  prevent  their  being  sold  elsewhere, 
and  in  hope  that  other  counsels  would  prevail  at  home  before  it  was  too  late. 
By  means  of  negotiations  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  detail  here,  I  did  succeed 
in  retaining  control  of  them  until  the  occurrence  of  the  '  Trent  outrage ;' 
when  the  British  government,  requiring  immediately  ships  of  this  class  for 
transportation  of  troops  and  war-material  to  Canada,  the  owners  broke  off 
the  negotiations  with  me,  and  got  the  ships,  or  many  of  them,  employed  in 
this  service,  in  which  they  remained  until  there  was  no  further  need  of  them. 

"  This  is  a  correct  and  simple  statement  of  the  facts  which  are  (as  far  as  re 
gards  this  side  of  the  water)  necessarily  known  better  to  myself  than  to  any 
other  living  person,  and  concerning  which  my  memory  is  perfectly  clear  and 
reliable.  It  occupied  my  mind  almost  exclusively  for  some  time,  and  I  built 
the  highest  hopes  upon  the  success  of  the  scheme.  It  is  true  many  of  the  ships 
were  of  too  great  draught  of  water  to  enter  some  of  our  ports,  but  that  was  a 
matter  of  comparatively  little  importance.  What  was  wanted,  in  my  view,  was 
the  moral  effect  which  would  have  been  produced  everywhere  by  such  a 
blow  as  could  have  been  struck  by  even  half  of  the  whole  number;  an  effect 
which  I  have  always,  and  will  always  believe,  would  have  gone  very  far  tow 
ards  determining,  if  it  had  not  entirely  reversed,  the  result  of  the  struggle. 

"  I  am,  dear  General, 

"  Yours  very  truly, 

"  C.  K.  PIUOLEAU. 

"  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

*  The  proposal  was  referred,  as  we  have  seen,  through  Mr.  W.  L.  Trenholm. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  61 

We  ask  the  reader  to  pause  here,  and  reflect  upon  the  stupen 
dous  consequences  that  might  have  followed  the  adoption  of  the 
scheme  proposed  by  the  house  of  John  Frazer  &  Co. 

This  was  the  first  of  a  long  series  of  irremediable  errors  com 
mitted  by  the  administration,  through  which,  despite  the  right 
eousness  of  our  cause,  the  enthusiasm  of  our  people,  the  splendid 
fighting  capacity  of  our  armies,  and  all  the  many  other  chances  in 
our  favor,  the  Confederacy  was  finally  overwhelmed.  The  silence 
Mr.  Davis  maintains  in  his  book,  as  to  the  grave  and  most  impor 
tant  proposition  made  to  him  through  Mr.  "W.  L.  Trenholm,  is, 
indeed,  extraordinary,  and  shows  conclusively  that  he  could  have 
given  no  satisfactory  explanation  of  it  to  the  public. 

To  show  how  completely  our  government  was  deluded,  at  that 
time,  as  to  the  tendency  of  public  events  staring  us  in  the  face, 
and  how  little  it  expected  a  "long  and  bloody  war"  with  the 
North,  General  Bcauregard  relates  that,  soon  after  the  fall  of 
Sumter,  one  Major  lluse — a  gentleman  in  every  sense  of  the  word 
— came  to  the  city  of  Charleston,  from  Montgomery,  with  a  pass 
from  the  Secretary  of  AVrar,  authorizing  him  to  leave  for  Europe, 
on  what  he  termed  "a  secret  mission.''  He  confidentially  in 
formed  General  Beauregard  that  he  was  empowered  to  purchase 
ten  thousand  Enfield  rifles  for  the  Confederate  "War  Department. 
On  his  being  asked  whether  he  had  not  made  an  error  in  the  mini- 

C? 

ber,  so  insignificantly  small  did  it  appear,  he  replied :  "  No,  those 
were  all  he  had  been  instructed  to  buy."  "  "Why,"  said  General 
Beau  regard,  "  I  could  have  ordered  them  at  once  through  the 

O  Zj 

house  of  John  Frazer  &  Co.,  without  the  necessity  of  sending  a  spe 
cial  messenger  to  Europe  on  such  a  trifling  errand.''  A  few  months 
later,  at  Manassas,  General  Toombs  confirmed  the  statement  of 
Major  lluse.  He  was  present  as  a  member  of  the  cabinet,  when 
the  proposal  about  the  purchase  of  the  rifles  was  made.  "  The 
original  number  proposed,"  said  General  Toombs,  "  was  only 
eight  thousand"  It  was  at  his  suggestion  that  the  order  for  ten 
thousand  was  given. 

Mr.  Davis,  in  his  book,*  makes  mention  of  Major  lluse,  who, 
he  says,  was  "  the  officer  sent  to  Europe,  to  buy  in  the  market  as 
far  as  possible,  and  furthermore,  to  make  contracts  for  arms  and 
munitions  to  be  manufactured."  But  Mr.  Davis  does  not  state 

*  "Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  311. 


62  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

what  number  of  "arras"  Major  Huse  was  at  first  instructed  to  pur 
chase,  or  at  what  time  he  was  sent,  though  he  asserts  that  it  was 
"soon  after"  Captain  Semmes  had  left  for  the  North.  As  to  the 
first  point,  the  reader  has  nothing  further  to  learn  ;  Major  Huse's 
own  testimony,  corroborated  by  the  distinct  statement  of  Mr. 
Toornbs,  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  how  many  small  arms  (rifles)  were 
to  be  purchased,  at  that  time,  for  the  service  of  the  Confederacy. 
"With  regard  to  the  second  point,  we  positively  allege  that  it  was 
after  the  fall  of  Fort  Sumter — and  therefore  not  prior  to  the  13th 
of  April — that  Major  Huse  passed  through  Charleston,  on  his  way 
to  Europe. 

It  appears  from  Mr.  Davis's  book  that  Major  Huse  "found" 
but  "few  serviceable  arms  upon  the  market.  He,  however,  suc 
ceeded  in  making  contracts  for  the  manufacture  of  large  quanti 
ties,  being  in  advance  of  the  agents  sent  from  the  Northern  gov 
ernment  for  the  same  purpose."  This,  Mr.  Davis  evidently  thinks, 
was  wonderful  forethought,  and  a  great  display  of  energy,  on  the 
part  of  our  government ;  though  the  sequel  so  painfully  shows 
how  the  first  were  the  last  and  the  last  became  the  first. 

The  only  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  foregoing  passage  is, 
that  Major  Huse  was  written  to  by  his  government,  after  his  de 
parture  from  Charleston,  and  was  given  additional  instructions. 
Mr.  Davis,  after  reflection,  may  have  found  out  that  10,000  rifles 
would  scarcely  be  enough  for  the  armies  of  the  South. 

A  letter  of  Major  Huse  is  also  given  in  Mr.  Davis's  book,*  to 
show  how  false  was  "the  charge  made  early  in  the  war  that"  the 
President  "was  slow  in  securing  arms  and  munitions  of  war  from 
Europe."  This  letter  bears  date  December  30th,  1861 ;  that  is  to 
say,  at  least  eight  months  after  Major  Huse's  passage  through 
Charleston.  It  was  written  prior  to  the  final  settlement  of  the 
Trent  affair,  for  in  it  we  find  the  following  passage :  "  If  the  pris 
oners  are  given  up,  the  affair  will  result  in  great  inconvenience  to 
us  in  the  way  of  shipping  goods."  Major  Huse  had,  clearly,  no 
great  faith  in  the  mission  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  to  Eu 
rope,  and  considered  his  own  functions  as  of  infinitely  more  im 
portance  to  the  cause.  The  letter  states,  further,  that  Major  Huso 
had  steamer-loads  of  arms,  ammunition,  and  accoutrements,  in  di 
vers  warehouses  of  London,  but  that  he  could  make  no  shipments 


*  "Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  482. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  (53 

to  the  South,  because  of  his  having  to  fight  two  governments, 
"and  because  of  the  wharfingers'  orders  not  to  ship  or  deliver,  by 
land  or  water,  any  goods  marked  "W.  D.,  without  first  acquainting 
the  honorable  Board  of  Customs." 

It  seems  to  us,  after  carefully  examining  the  whole  of  Major 
Huso's  letter,  not  that  the  charge  made  against  Mr.  Davis,  of 
slowness  in  procuring  arms  from  Europe,  was  untrue,  but  that 
his  agent  there,  whatever  may  have  been  his  merit  otherwise, 
was  totally  unequal  to  the  task  assigned  him.  Had  the  orders  to 
purchase  arms,  ammunition,  etc.,  for  the  Confederacy  been  con 
fided  to  the  house  of  John  Frazcr  &  Co.,  who  had  power,  influ 
ence,  and  enterprise  enough  in  England,  even  to  purchase  ';  a 
fleet  of  armed  vessels,''  and  oiler  it  to  our  government — the 
Southern  armies,  at  that  time  and  all  through  the  war,  would  have 
been  as  thoroughly  and  as  promptly  armed  and  equipped  as  the 
Northern  armies ;  and  Mr.  Davis  would  have  had  no  cause  to  la 
ment  the  destitute  condition  of  our  men,  or  to  write  to  General  J. 
E.  Johnston,  in  September,  18(11 :  '•  One  ship-load  of  small  arms 
would  enable  me  to  answer  all  demands,  but  vainly  have  I  hoped 
and  waited."* 

In  the  selection  of  Major  Iltisc,  as  agent,  Mr.  Davis  seems  to 
have  been  pursued  by  the  same  evil  fate  which  almost  always 
caused  him  to  assign  men  of  inferior  ability  to  positions  requiring 
great  discernment  and  capacity.  Major  llusc  asserts  that  in  De 
cember,  1801,  he  was  incapable  of  shipping  arms  to  the  Confeder 
acy  ;  whereas  the  entire  country  knows  that,  in  1801,  there  exist 
ed  no  blockade  of  our  ports,  worthy  of  the  name,  and  that  block 
ade-runners,  throughout  the  years  18f>2,  18G3,  and  even  1S04-,  en 
tered  the  ports  of  Charleston  and  "Wilmington,  with  almost  un 
broken  regularity ;  that  provisions  and  stores  of  all  kinds  were 
thus  brought  in  by  private  individuals  and  commercial  firms;  and 
that  the  government — which,  it  seems,  had  succeeded  in  purchas 
ing  one  small  blockade-runner  of  its  ownf — could,  with  perhaps 
fewer  impediments  in  its  way,  have  done  likewise,  in  the  matter 
of  arms  and  ammunition.  And  here  we  might  bring  to  light  the 
contradiction  existing  between  Major  Iluse's  letter  and  the  asser 
tions  of  Mr.  Davis  on  the  same  subject :  If,  as  late  as  December 

*  "Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,1'  vol.  i.  p.  441. 
t  Ibid,  vol  i.  p.  470. 


6^  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

30th,  1861,*  no  arms  could  be  shipped  from  England,  what  are  we 
to  think  of  the  following  passage,  to  be  found  on  page  476  of  the 
first  volume  of  Mr.  Davis's  work :  "In  December,  1861,  arms  pur 
chased  abroad  began  to  come  in;  and  a  good  many  Enfield  rifles 
were  in  the  hands  of  the  troops  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh  "  ?  The 
query  now  is,  which  of  these  two  statements  is  the  correct  one? 
Mr.  Davis  vouches  for  both,  but  it  is  evident  that  both  cannot  be 
relied  upon. 

The  reader,  we  trust,  will  pardon  this  digression.  It  may  have 
caused  a  slight  deviation  from  our  main  subject,  but  has,  neverthe 
less,  a  close  relation  to  it. 

On  or  about  the  28th  of  May,  General  Beauregard  was  ordered 
to  meet  the  President  at  Richmond,  whither  the  seat  of  Confeder 
ate  government  was  being  transferred.  He  arrived  there  a  few 
days  after  the  receipt  of  the  order. 

All  along  the  railroad  line,  on  his  way  from  Charleston  to  Rich 
mond,  the  people  turned  out,  at  the  various  stations,  to  welcome 
him.  They  were  addressed  by  Attorney-General  Benjamin,  who 
happened  to  be  on  the  cars,  and  by  Governor  Manning,  of  South 
Carolina,  one  of  General  Beauregard's  volunteer  aids. 

At  Charleston,  officers  and  men,  and,  in  fact,  the  whole  popula 
tion  of  the  State,  had  expressed  their  deep  sense  of  regret  that  the 
public  service  should  require  his  transfer  to  another  department. 
Governor  Pickens,  in  a  letter  wishing  him  God  speed  in  his  new 
field  of  duty,  said  :  "Your  scientific  attainments,  your  ability  and 
your  incessant  labors,  have  been  of  great  advantage  to  our  State  ; 
and  I  return  you  my  thanks,  and  the  thanks  of  the  State,  for  the 
patriotic  zeal  and  distinguished  services  you  have  rendered  us  at  a 
critical  and  a  trying  time.  .  .  .  Wherever  you  go,  I  trust  that 
you  will  be  blessed,  and  crowned  with  the  honors  of  your  coun 
try." 

*  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  483. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  £5 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Secession  of  Virginia. — Confederate  Troops  Sent  to  her  Assistance. — Arrival  of 
General  Beauregard  in  Richmond. — lie  Assumes  Command  at  Manassas. — 
Position  of  our  Forces. — His  Proclamation  and  the  Reasons  for  it. — Site  of 
"Camp  Pickens." — His  Letter  to  President  Davis.  —  Our  Deficiencies. — 
Mismanagement  in  Quartermaster's  and  Commissary's  Departments. — How 
he  could  have  Procured  Transportation. — Manufacture  of  Cartridges. — Se 
cret  Service  with  Washington. 

NOT:  until  Fort  Sumtcr  had  surrendered  to  the  South  Carolina 
troops  under  General  Beanregard  ;  not  until  Mr.  Lincoln,  misap 
prehending  the  attitude  of  those  Southern  States  still  nominally 
belonging  to  the  Union,  had  made  his  requisition  on  them  for  their 
quota  of  men  to  aid  in  suppressing  the  "  Rebellion,"  did  Virginia, 
faithful  to  her  old-time  traditions,  openly  proclaim  her  adhesion 
to  the  Southern  cause,  and  assume  her  rightful  place  among  the 
seceded  States.  Hers  was  a  disinterested  step  ;  one  taken  with  a 
full  appreciation  of  the  inevitable  dangers  and  devastation  in  store 
for  her,  owing  to  her  geographical  position.  Her  hesitation  was 
but  another  instance  of  the  historic  firmness  and  deliberation 
which  had  always  characterized  her  official  acts,  and  it  was,  no 
doubt,  her  example  which  shortly  afterwards  determined  the  with 
drawal  of  Tennessee,  Arkansas,  and  Xorth  Carolina. 

Xo  sooner  had  Virginia's  voice,  through  her  assembled  con 
vention,  pronounced  her  severance  from  the  Xorth,  than  the  seven 
States  forming  the  Confederacy,  anxious  to  welcome  her  among 
them,  hurried  forward  to  her  support  a  portion  of  their  best  troops. 
As  a  natural  sequence  to  this  provident  measure,  it  followed  that 
the  most  experienced  and  successful  of  our  military  leaders  were 
selected  to  be  placed  at  the  head  of  such  commands.  Hence  the 
order  transferring  General  Beauregard  to  Virginia.  Pollard,  in 
his  work  entitled  "  Lee  and  his  Lieutenants,''  when  writing  on 
this  subject,  says :  ;;  Called  for  by  the  unanimous  voice  of  the 
Southern  people,  he  was  now  ordered  to  take  command  of  the  main 
portion  of  the  Confederate  army  in  northern  Virginia."  Pollard's 
I.— 5 


66  MILITARY   OPERATIONS    OF 

later  description  of  the  apprehension  and  flurry  existing  in  the 
Northern  mind,  concerning  General  Beauregard's  whereabouts,  is, 
indeed,  most  singular,  and  shows  the  appreciation  in  which  he  was 
held  by  our  enemies. 

Many  writers,  in  describing  the  traits  of  General  Beauregard's 
character,  have  commented  upon  his  very  retiring  disposition, 
amounting  almost  to  bashfulness,  which  forms  so  strong  a  contrast 
to  his  boldness  and  indomitable  spirit  in  the  field.  This  was  in 
stanced  upon  his  arrival  at  Richmond,  May  30th,  where  a  large 
concourse  of  people  awaited  him,  anxious  to  see  and  welcome  the 
Confederate  commander  who  had  already  drawn  upon  himself  the 
attention  and  admiration  of  the  whole  country.  A  carriage-and- 
four  was  in  readiness  at  the  Richmond  depot  to  convey  him  to 
the  apartments  which  had  been  prepared  for  him  at  the  Spots- 
wood  Hotel.  But  no  sooner  had  he  been  apprised  of  this  unex 
pected  honor — which,  though  gratifying,  interfered  with  his  de 
sire  for  privacy — than  he,  wishing  to  avoid  all  public  demonstra 
tion,  insisted  upon  taking  an  ordinary  carriage,  in  which,  with  one 
or  two  officers  of  his  staff,  he  quietly  drove  to  other  quarters. 

The  next  day,  May  31st,  he  called  on  President  Davis,  who  was 
in  conference  with  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  then  commanding  the 
Virginia  State  forces.  General  Lee  had  just  returned  from  Manas- 
sas,  about  twenty-seven  miles  below  Alexandria,  where  he  had  left 
Brigadier-General  Bonham,  of  South  Carolina,  with  some  five 
thousand  men  of  all  arms.  This  position  had  been  taken  at  the 
instance  of  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan,  of  the  Virginia  forces,  who, 
in  a  carefully  written  memoir  on  the  subject,  had  shown  the  im 
portance  of  at  once  occupying  Manassas  Junction,  to  prevent  its 
seizure,  and  the  severance  of  communication  by  rail  with  the  lower 
valley  of  Virginia. 

After  a  full  interchange  of  views,  which  lasted  several  hours,  it 
was  determined  that  General  Beauregard  should  leave  on  the  next 
morning  to  assume  command  at  Manassas,  whither  reinforcements 
would  be  forwarded  as  soon  as  obtained.  At  first  it  had  been  in 
tended  to  send  him  to  Norfolk,  but  General  Lee's  report  of  the 
condition  of  affairs  on  the  Alexandria  line,  and  the  probability  of 
an  early  advance  of  the  enemy  on  that  point,  caused  the  President 
to  change  his  mind. 

From  the  moment  General  Beauregard  had  left  New  Orleans, 
until  the  time  of  his  arrival  in  Richmond,  lie  had  been  so  unre- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  (57 

mittingly  occupied  with  public  affairs  as  to  preclude  all  attention 
to  his  personal  interests  and  even  his  military  outfit.  He  would 
have  willingly  remained  a  day  or  two  in  Richmond,  in  order  to 
prepare  himself  better  for  the  field  ;  but  the  juncture  was  consid 
ered  so  urgent  by  the  President  and  General  Lee,  that  no  such 
leisure  was  granted  him,  and  he  departed  at  once,  with  two  of  his 
aids,  leaving  other  members  of  his  staff,  including  his  adjutant,  to 
effect  such  arrangements  as  were  necessary.  He  left  Richmond 
on  the  1st  of  June,  and  reached  Manassas  the  same  night,  under 

the  following  orders : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  VIRGINIA  FORCES, 

RICHMOND,  VIRGINIA,  May  31sf,  18G1. 
"Special  Orders,  Xo.  149. 

"  General  P.  G.  T.  Bcauregard,  of  the  Confederate  States  aimy,  is  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  troops  on  the  Alexandria  line.  He  is  referred  to  the  or 
ders  heretofore  given  to  his  predecessors  in  that  command,  for  the  general  di 
rection  of  operations. 

"By  order  of  Major-General  Lee, 

"  II.  S.  GAIINETT,  Adjt.-Gcn/' 

We  copy  below  an  extract  from  the  orders  alluded  to,  as  given 
to  General  Beauregard's  predecessors,  and  transferred,  as  we  have 
seen,  to  himself : 

"  The  policy  of  the  State,  at  present,  is  strictly  defensive.  No  attack  or  prov 
ocation  for  attack  wiJJ  therefore  be  given,  but  every  attack  resisted  to  the 
extent  of  your  means.  Great  reliance  is  placed  on  your  discretion  and  judg 
ment  in  the  application  of  your  force,  and  I  must  urge  upon  you  the  impor 
tance  of  organizing  and  instructing  the  troops  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  pre 
paring  them  for  active  service.  For  this  purpose  it  will  be  necessary  to  post 
them  where  their  services  may  be  needed  and  •where  they  can  be  concentrated 
at  the  points  threatened.  The  Manassas  Junction  is  a  very  important  point 
on  your  line,  as  it  commands  the  communication  with  Harper's  Ferry,  and 
must  be  firmly  held.  Intrenchmcnts  at  that  point  would  add  to  its  security  ; 
and  in  connection  with  its  defence,  you  must  watch  the  approaches  from  ci 
ther  flank,  particularly  towards  Occoquan.  Alexandria,  in  its  front,  will  of 
course  claim  your  attention  as  the  first  point  of  attack,  and  as  soon  as  your 
force  is  sufficient,  in  your  opinion,  to  resist  successfully  its  occupation,  you  will 
so  dispose  it  as  to  effect  this  object,  if  possible,  without  appearing  to  threaten 
Washington  city.  The  navigation  of  the  Potomac  being  closed  to  us,  and  the 
United  States  armed  vessels  being  able  to  take  a  position  in  front  of  the  town, 
you  will  perceive  the  hazard  of  its  destruction  unless  your  measures  are  such 
as  to  prevent  it.  This  subject  being  one  of  great  delicacy,  is  left  to  your 
judgment.  The  railroad  communications  must  be  secured,  however,  and  their 
use  by  the  enemy  prevented.  .  .  . 

"R.  E.  LEE,  Mnj.-Gcn.  Comclg." 


68  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

That  such  instructions,  so  vague  as  a  whole,  and  yet  so  minute 
in  some  respects,  should  have  embarrassed  Brigadier-General  Bon- 
ham,  as  was  asserted,  is  not,  we  submit,  to  be  much  wondered  at. 
To  obey  them  implicitly  was  clearly  an  impossibility  under  the 
circumstances.  They  were  calculated  to  destroy  every  vestige  of 
discretion  on  the  part  of  the  commanding  general,  without  lessen 
ing,  in  any  way,  the  weight  of  his  responsibility.  That  General 
Lee  meant  well  in  adopting  such  a  programme  of  operations,  no 
one  who  knew  him  will  for  a  moment  question  ;  but  that  it  must 
have  puzzled,  to  no  inconsiderable  degree,  the  minds  of  most  of 
those  who  were  to  be  guided  by  it,  to  us  appears  no  less  evident. 
And  how,  more  than  a  month  after  the  withdrawal  of  Virginia 
from  the  Union,  a  State  Major -General  (for  such  was  General 
Lee  at  the  time),  and  not  the  Confederate  War  Department,  could 
have  given  instructions  and  issued  orders  to  Confederate  generals 
and  to  Confederate  troops,  is  more  than  we  can  well  understand. 
True,  the  Secretary  of  War,  with  a  view  to  avoid  confusion, 
had,  on  May  10th,  authorized  Major-General  Lee,  of  the  Virginia 
troops,  "  to  assume  the  control  of  the  forces  of  the  Confederate 
States  in  Virginia,  and  assign  them  to  such  duties  as  he  might  in 
dicate  ;"  but  that  authority  emanated  from  Montgomery,  while 
the  Confederate  government  was  still  there,  and  while  no  Con 
federate  general  officer  had,  as  yet,  been  sentt  to  Virginia.  This 
was  far  from  being  the  case  at  the  time  to  which  we  now  allude, 

O  f 

to  wit,  the  31st  of  May.  Brigadier-General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
Confederate  States  Army,  had,  then,  already  been  assigned  to 
duty  in  Virginia,  and,  furthermore,  the  Confederate  government 
itself  was  at  that  date  transferred  to  Richmond.  Even  the  Presi 
dent  was  there  in  person,  and  could  have  acted  with  all  authority 
had  he  chosen  to  do  so. 

The  measures  of  extreme  caution  suggested  in  General  Lee's 
instructions,  and  the  solicitude  manifested  to  soothe  the  ire  of  the 
North,  wTould  have  been  admirably  proper  if  the  orders  had  been 
issued  before  the  first  gun  was  fired  at  Sumter,  and  while  nego 
tiations  for  a  peaceful  solution  of  our  difficulties  were  still  pend 
ing.  But  in  May,  1SG1,  war  already  existed.  Virginia  was  threat- 
cried  by  three  Northern  armies,  the  immediate  advance  of  one  of 
which  was  then  almost  daily  expected.  Why  were  we  to  avoid 
"appearing"  even  to  threaten  the  enemy's  positions,  when  the  in 
vasion  of  our  soil  was  openly  declared  to  be  the  prime  object  act- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  09 

uating  the  hostile  forces  arrayed  against  us  ?  Orders  and  instruc 
tions  such  as  these  could  have  no  other  effect  than  to  depress  our 
people,  bewilder  our  commanders,  and  embolden  the  enemy. 

The  two  or  three  days  following  his  arrival  in  his  new  depart 
ment  were  spent  by  General  Beauregard  in  examining  the  troops 
and  the  various  positions  they  occupied,  at  and  in  advance  of  Ma- 
nassas.  He  then  assumed  command  in  the  following  orders : 

"  HEADQUARTER?,  DEP'T  OF  ALEX'A,  CAMP  PICKENS, 

JuncZd,  1801. 
"  New  Scries. 
"  General  Orders,  No.  1. 

"  In  obedience  to  Special  Orders,  No.  149,  from  Headquarters  Virginia  forces, 
Richmond,  dated  May  31st,  18G1,  assigning  me  to  the  command  of  the  troops 
on  the  Alexandria  line,  I  have  this  day  relieved  Brigadier-General  M.  L.  Bon- 
liam  of  said  command. 

"  All  orders  and  instructions  from  these  Headquarters  will  be  obeyed  ac 
cordingly. 

''The  Brigadier-General  Commanding  feels  assured  that  all  the  troops  under 
his  orders  will  display,  on  all  occasions,  the  discipline,  patience,  zeal,  and  gal 
lantry  of  their  forefathers,  when  defending,  like  ourselves,  their  sacred  rights 
and  liberties. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Brig. -Gen.  Comdg." 

The  troops  were  located  at  the  following  points:  one  regiment 
at  Mitchell's  Ford,  where  the  country  road,  from  Manassas  to  Cen- 
trcville,  crosses  Bull  Run,  at  a  point  midway  between  the  two. 
Another  regiment  was  stationed  at  Union  Mills  Ford,  not  far  from 
where  the  railroad  to  Alexandria  crosses  the  same  stream.  An 
other  regiment  was  placed  at  Centreville,  and  some  detached  com- 

C?  I 

panics  of  cavalry  and  infantry  were  in  the  vicinity  of  Fairfax 
Court-House,  about  six  miles  in  advance  of  Centreville.  The  re 
maining  forces  were  at  and  about  Manassas. 

The  enemy  was  then  engaged  in  collecting  a  large  force  in  front 
of  Washington  and  Alexandria,  with  its  advance  at  Falls  Church, 
half-way  to  Fairfax  Court-House,  and  it  was  currently  reported 
by  the  Northern  press  that  this  army,  under  Major-General  Mc 
Dowell,  would  soon  advance  on  Manassas,  on  its  way  to  Rich 
mond. 

General  Beauregard  was  not  satisfied  with  the  grounds  selected 
for  our  troops,  nor  with  the  condition  of  things  at  Camp  Pickens, 
Manassas.  There  was  no  running  water  near  enough  ;  the  plan  of 
works  was  too  extensive ;  the  fords  were  too  numerous  to  be  eas- 


70  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

ily  guarded  by  such  a  small  force  as  was  at  his  disposal.  These 
facts  and  observations  he  at  once  reported  to  the  President,  as 
may  be  seen  by  the  following  letter : 

"  DEP'T  OF  ALEXANDRIA,  VA.,  PROV'L  A.  C.  S., 

June  3d,  1861. 
"  To  his  Excellency  President  JEFFERSON  DAVIS,  Richmond,  Va. : 

"  Dear  Sir, — I  arrived  here  on  the  1st  at  2  p.  M.,  and  immediately  examined 
the  site  of  this  encampment  and  the  plans  of  its  proposed  defences.  The 
former  is  in  an  open  country,  traversed  by  good  roads  in  every  direction,  with 
out  any  strong  natural  features  for  the  purposes  of  defence,  and  without  run 
ning  water  nearer  than  three  miles,  except  a  few  small  springs  at  half  that 
distance.  The  plans  of  the  works  are  good,  but  too  extensive  to  be  finished 
in  less  than  two  or  three  weeks,  and  cannot  be  garrisoned  wTith  less  than  from 
three  to  four  thousand  men.  As  this  position  can  be  turned  in  every  direction 
by  an  enemy,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  railroads  intended  to  be  de 
fended  by  it,  it  becomes  a  question  whether  these  works  could  be  held  more 
than  a  few  days,  when  thus  isolated. 

"  I  have  reconnoitred  closely  several  of  the  fords  on  Bull  Run,  and  one  on 
Occoquan  Run  (about  three  miles  from  here),  which  offer  strong  natural  features 
of  defence,  but  they  are  so  numerous  and  far  apart,  that  only  a  much  larger 
force  than  I  have  here  at  my  command  (say  not  less  than  ten  to  fifteen  thou 
sand  men )  could  hope  to  defend  them  all,  against  a  well-organized  enemy 
of  about  20,000  men,  who  could  select  his  point  of  attack.  I  must  therefore 
either  be  reinforced  at  once,  as  I  have  not  more  than  about  six  thousand  ef 
fective  men;  or  I  must  be  prepared  to  retire  (upon  the  approach  of  the  enemy) 
in  the  direction  of  Richmond,  with  the  intention  of  arresting  him  whenever 
and  wherever  the  opportunity  presents  itself;  or  I  must  march  to  meet  him  at 
one  of  said  fords,  to  sell  our  lives  as  dearly  as  practicable. 

"  Badly  armed  and  badly  equipped  as  my  command  is  at  present  (several 
regiments  having  but  one  or  two  field  officers),  and  having  hardly  any  means 
of  transportation,  it  would  be  expecting  too  much,  that  I  could  meet  success 
fully  the  foe  who  is  preparing  to  attack  us  in  a  few  days,  with  all  the  advan 
tages  of  number,  arms,  and  discipline.  I  beg,  however,  to  remark,  that  my 
troops  are  not  only  willing,  but  anxious,  to  meet  the  enemies  of  our  coun 
try,  under  all  circumstances. 

"  I  remain,  dear  Sir,  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

From  what  precedes  it  is  easy  to  see  why  Bull  Run  did  not 
naturally  afford  a  strong  defensive  line.  In  fact,  the  ground  on 
the  Federal  side  of  the  run  commanded,  in  most  places,  the  ground 
occupied  by  the  Confederates.  Still,  Manassas  Junction,  as  a 
strategic  point,  was  one  of  superior  importance,  as  it  secured  com 
munication  with  the  valley  of  Virginia,  and  the  army  of  the  Shen- 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  71 

andoah,  under  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  at  Harper's  Ferry. 
Hence  General  Beau  regard's  determination  to  hold  it  at  all  haz 
ards  ;  and  he  began,  without  delay,  to  throw  up  works  around  it, 
so  as  to  make  it  a  depot  of  supplies  and  a  point  cTappui  for  ulte 
rior  operations.  But  it  was  with  great  difficulty  that,  at  this  pe 
riod,  work  on  the  fortifications  could  be  procured  from  the  troops, 
as  most  of  their  time  was  necessarily  taken  up  with  drills,  and 
manual  labor  was  in  itself  no  light  task  for  them,  composed,  as 
the  commands  generally  were,  of  young  men  of  good  position  at 
home,  who  had  responded  to  the  first  call  of  the  country,  many  of 
them  having  come  with  no  small  amount  of  luggage  and  even  with 
body-servants.  Their  answer  to  company  officers  was,  that  they 
were  there  to  fight,  and  not  to  handle  the  pick  and  shovel.  Ap 
preciating  such  a  feeling  in  men  of  their  position,  new  to  arduous 
duties  of  that  kind,  and  wishing  to  avoid  whatever  might  at  that 
moment  cause  disaffection,  General  Beauregard  abstained  from  em 
ploying  them  on  any  but  the  most  essential  works,  and  procured, 
as  far  as  possible,  negro  labor,  which  was  furnished  at  his  call,  by 
the  comparatively  small  number  of  slave-owners  of  the  Piedmont 
region  of  Virginia,  with  great  readiness. 

As  soon  as  new  regiments  arrived  they  were  armed  and  equip 
ped  as  well  as  the  means  at  hand  allowed,  and  at  once  drilled  and 
organized  into  brigades. 

This  organization  of  an  army,  out  of  troops  for  the  most  part 
wholly  undisciplined,  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  composed  of  a 
well-trained  militia,  superior  in  numbers  and  thoroughly  appointed, 
whose  threatened  advance  was  expected  at  every  moment,  apart 
from  being  in  itself  a  difficult  and  anxious  task,  was  beset  with 
obstacles  resulting  from  the  narrow  methods,  slowness,  and,  in 
some  respects,  unaccountable  mismanagement,  of  the  authorities 
at  Ilichmond. 

General  Beauregard's  attention  was  at  once  seriously  turned  to 
those  two  important  staff  departments,  the  Quartermaster's  and 
Commissary's,  which,  he  thought,  could  never  be  too  closely  at 
tended  to.  "  An  army  " — he  was  wont  to  say — "  without  means 
of  transportation  and  sustenance  is  like  a  ship  at  sea  without  spars 
or  canvas,  and  with  famine  on  board."  His  first  step  was  to  order 
the  collection  of  wagons  and  twenty-five  days'  rations  for  about 
twenty  thousand  men.  To  this  end  his  chief  quartermaster,  Ma 
jor  Cabell,  and  his  chief  commissary,  Captain  Fowle,  who  was  well 


72  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

acquainted  with  the  resources  of  that  region,  were  directed  to 
draw  all  their  supplies  of  forage,  grain,  and  provisions  from  the 
fertile  country  stretching  from  Manassas  to  the  Potomac,  as  far 
northwest  as  Leesburg,  so  as  to  exhaust  that  district  first,  and 
compel  the  enemy  to  carry  their  own  supplies  in  their  advance 
against  our  forces.  This  system,  which  would  have  left  all  the 
region  in  rear  of  us  with  resources  untouched,  to  meet  the  con 
tingency  of  a  forced  withdrawal  from  Manassas,  was  most  strenu 
ously  opposed  by  the  Commissary-General,  Colonel  Northrop.  In 
a  letter,  singularly  ill-tempered  and  discourteous,  that  functionary 
arraigned  General  Beauregard  for  "  thwarting  "  his  plans  for  main 
taining  the  army,  and  went  so  far  as  to  prohibit  Captain  Fowle 
from  obeying  the  orders  of  his  commanding  general.  Through 
this  vagary  the  provisions  drawn  from  the  vicinity  of  Manassas 
and  the  neighboring  counties  of  Loudon  and  Fauquier,  after  being 
carried,  directly,  from  General  Beauregard's  department  to  Rich 
mond,  were  thence  returned  to  the  chief  commissary  of  the  army 
of  Manassas,  for  distribution  to  the  troops,  and  as  there  were 
hardly  enough  cars  to  transport  the  men,  guns,  ammunition,  and 
other  material  to  the  army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  army  of  the 
Shenandoah,  which  received  its  ordnance  supplies  by  the  same 
railroad,  the  result  was  that  the  troops  at  Manassas  never  had  more 
than  two  or  three  days'  supplies  on  hand,  even  when  they  numbered 
no  more  than  fifteen  thousand  men.  This  almost  incredible  mis 
management,  so  hurtful  to  the  morale  and  efficiency  of  the  army, 
was  persisted  in,  notwithstanding  General  Beauregard's  earnest  re 
monstrances,  and  embarrassed  and  clogged  the  conduct  of  the  whole 

'  DO 

campaign. 

Captain  Fowle,  finding  that  the  army  could  not  be  supplied 
from  Richmond,  was  compelled  to  resort  to  the  system  ordered 
by  General  Beauregard ;  whereupon  he  was  summarily  supersed 
ed,  and  Colonel  E.  B.  Lee  appointed  in  his  stead.  This  last  offi 
cer,  it  may  be  added,  possessed  undoubted  merit,  and  by  his  pre 
vious  rank  in  the  commissariat  of  the  United  States  army,  was 
entitled  to  the  position  of  Commissary-General  of  the  Confederate 
States  army. 

With  such  facts  before  us,  and  others  that  we  shall  have  occa 
sion  to  notice  further  on,  the  following  eulogy  of  Colonel  Nor 
throp,  by  Mr.  Davis,  seems  unwarranted  and  altogether  out  of 
place:  "To  the  able  officer  then  at  the  head  of  the  Commissariat 


GENERAL  BEAUREGA11D.  73 

Department,  Colonel  L.  E.  Northrop,  much  credit  is  due  for  his 
well-directed  efforts  to  provide  both  for  immediate  and  prospec 
tive  wants."  * 

There  was  a  great  deficiency  also  in  the  means  of  transporta 
tion.  It  was  insufficient,  and  of  such  poor  quality  as  to  break 
down  even  in  ordinary  camp  service.  This  evil,  which  continued 
long  after  the  battle  of  Manassas,  was  partially  remedied  before 
that  event,  but  the  remedy  was  applied  independently  of  the  Quar 
termaster's  Department  at  Richmond.  That  department  having 
declared  itself  unable  to  procure  transportation  in  the  country, 
General  Beauregard  called  to  his  aid  Colonel  James  L.  Kemper 
(7th  Virginia  Volunteers),  whose  knowledge  of  the  resources  of 
that  portion  of  the  State  enabled  him  to  gather,  within  a  few 
days,  at  least  two  hundred  effective  wagons  and  teams.  Three 
times  that  number,  and  even  more,  could  easily  have  been  collect 
ed,  but  General  Beauresrard,  wishing  to  avoid  collision  with  the 

O  £?* 

views  of  the  administration  at  Richmond,  limited  Colonel  Kem- 
pcr  to  the  number  stated  above. 

On  the  5th  of  June,  upon  pressing  application  to  that  effect, 
General  Beauregard  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  people  of  the 
counties  of  London,  Fairfax,  and  Prince  William,  which  has  been 
much  commented  upon,  but,  outside  of  the  South,  where  the  facts 
were  known,  has  never  been  well  understood. 

The  reason  for  issuing  the  proclamation  was.  that  a  deputation 
of  citizens,  headed  by  a  prominent  lawyer  of  Alexandria,  who,  be 
fore  the  secession  of  Virginia,  was  noted  for  his  Union  sentiments, 
had  presented  a  formal  complaint,  of  very  grave  outrages  prac 
tised  on  the  people  by  Federal  troops. 

General  Beauregard,  believing  it  to  be  his  duty  to  take  imme 
diate  steps  in  the  matter,  appointed  a  commission  of  inquiry,  com 
posed  of  Colonels  Thomas  Jordan,  his  Adjutant- General,  and 
John  S.  Preston,  and  William  Porcher  Miles,  t  his  volunteer  aids, 
both  eminent  citizens  of  South  Carolina. 

That  committee,  after  careful  investigation  of  the  charges  made, 
reported  that  the  allegations  were  true.  Though  General  Mc 
Dowell  solicitously  repressed  all  acts  of  violence — which,  as  was 
afterwards  proved,  were  committed  then  only  by  marauding  par- 

*  "Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  315. 
t  William  Porcher  Miles  was  afterwards  Chairman  of  the  Military  Committee 
of  the  House  of  Representatives,  Confederate  Congress. 


7tt  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

ties  from  his  army — jet  the  facts  elicited  were  naturally  construed, 
at  the  time,  as  indicative  of  a  truculent  spirit  animating  a  large 
number  of  his  troops,  and  produced  the  deepest  indignation  among 
the  people  of  the  surrounding  country. 

This  proclamation  (others  similar  to  which,  in  substance,  were 
afterwards  issued  by  several  Confederate  officers,  including  General 
Lee)  was  drawn  up  by  the  gentleman  referred  to,  and,  after  some 
slight  modifications  by  the  members  of  the  commission,  through 
Colonel  Preston,  was  signed  and  published  by  General  Bean  regard 
in  his  name,  as  commander  of  the  army.  It  became  known  and 
was  criticised  in  the  Northern  papers  as  the  "  Beauty  and  Booty 
Proclamation  " — words  which  were  found  by  the  commission,  upon 
the  evidence  given,  to  have  been  loudly  used  by  the  marauding 
troops  whose  acts  of  violence  were  so  indignantly  denounced. 
Our  readers  no  doubt  remember  that  these  identical  words,  accom 
panying  like  conduct,  on  the  part  of  the  British  troops  at  New 
Orleans,  in  the  war  of  1812,  provoked  vehement  reprobation 
throughout  the  country.  However  true  it  might  be  to  say  that 
such  a  proclamation  would  have  better  fitted  many  subsequent 
phases  of  the  war,  yet,  with  charges  so  fully  substantiated  before 
the  commission  appointed  by  General  Beauregard,  no  one  can 
deny  that  the  measures  adopted  and  the  language  used  in  relation 
thereto  were  justifiable  and  imperatively  necessary. 

Besides  being  badly  armed  and  suffering  from  the  irregularity 
and  inefficiency  of  the  Quartermaster's  and  Commissary's  Depart 
ments,  the  troops  were  also  deficient  in  accoutrements,  particular 
ly  in  cartridges  and  cartridge-boxes,  and  were  lacking  in  proper 
camp  equipments.  Alarmed  at  the  delay  in  adequately  supplying 
his  forces  with  ammunition,  General  Beauregard  proposed  to  the 
government  to  establish  a  cartridge  factory  at  Manassas,  if  certain 
necessary  appliances  were  furnished  him;  which  was  not  done. 
His  letter  to  that  effect,  dated  Manassas  Junction,  June  23d,  con 
tained  the  following  passage : 

"  I  must  call  the  attention  of  the  department  to  the  great  deficiency  of  my 
command  in  ammunition— not  averaging  more  than  20  rounds  in  all  per  man. 
If  I  \vere  provided  with  the  necessary  materials,  moulds,  etc.,  I  think  I  could 
establish  here  a  cartridge  manufactory,  which  could  supply  all  our  wants  in 
that  respect. 

"  Could  not  a  similar  arrangement  Le  made  at  all  hospital  depots,  State 
arsenals,  penitentiaries,  etc.? 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  75 

"  To  go  into  battle,  each  soldier  ought  to  be  provided  with  at  least  40 
rounds  of  cartridges  and  not  less  than  60  rounds  in  reserve. 
"  I  remain,  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 
"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Brig.-Gen.  Comdg. 
"Hon.  L.  P.  WALKER,  Secretary  of  War,  Richmond,  Virginia." 

As  the  Confederate  troops  had  yet  no  uniform  proper,  it  was 
necessary  that  they  should  be  distinguished  from  the  enemy  by 
some  clearly  visible  mark.  To  meet  this  requirement,  a  few  days 
after  his  arrival  in  camp  General  Beauregard  asked  that  his  men 
should  be  provided  with  colored  scarfs,  to  be  worn,  in  battle,  from 
the  shoulder  to  the  waist,  suggesting  that  a  call  on  the  ladies  of 
Richmond  would  no  doubt  secure  their  prompt  supply,  as  the 
scarfs  might  be  made  of  any  material  of  the  proper  shade.  As 
many  of  the  regiments  were  then  without  Confederate  colors,  and 
the  blue  and  the  gray  uniforms  were  common  to  the  North  and 
the  South,  the  importance  of  this  matter,  particularly  in  the  event 
of  flank  and  rear  attacks,  was  urged  again  upon  the  President,  at 
a  later  period.  Although  the  expedient  was  as  simple  as  the  need 
was  great,  the  demand  was  complied  with  only  after  a  long  delay, 
and  then  with  so  imperfect  a  contrivance — a  sort  of  rosette,  to  be 
pinned  on  the  arm  or  breast — that  on  the  field  of  Manassas,  in  the 
critical  moment,  the  troops  themselves  were  confused  as  to  identi 
ty ;  and  when  the  rout  was  in  full  tide  the  pursuit  was  more  than 
once  checked  because  of  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  friends 
from  foes. 

During  this  period  a  thorough  secret -service  communication 
was  maintained  between  Washington  and  the  Confederate  head 
quarters  at  Manassas,  whereby  trustworthy  private  information 
was  received  through  cipher  despatches,  while  regular  files  of  all 
the  important  Northern  journals  reached  our  lines  in  the  same 
way  ;  those  from  New  York,  particularly,  rendering  unconscious 
assistance  to  our  cause. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTEE  VII. 

Position  of  Troops  in  Northern  Virginia. — General  Beaurcgartl  Advocates 
Concentration,  June  12th.— Letter  to  that  Effect  to  President  Davis.— An 
swer  Declining. — General  Beauregard  Suggests  a  Junction  with  General 
Holmes. — Again  Refused. — Division  of  General  Beauregard's  Forces  into 
Brigades,  20th  June. — Begins  Forward  Movement. — Instructions  to  Brig 
ade  Commanders. — Reconnoissances  Made  at  the  End  of  June. — McDow 
ell's  Strength. — General  Beauregard's  Anxieties. — His  Letter  to  Senator 
Wigfall. — Submits  another  Plan  of  Operations  to  the  President,  July 
llth. 

THE  Confederate  troops  in  northern  Virginia,  east  of  the  grand 
chain  of  the  Alleghanies,  now  formed  a  series  of  detached  com 
mands,  stretching  from  northwest  to  southeast  respectively,  under 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  General  Beanre 
gard,  at  Manassas,  and  General  Holmes,  at  Aquia  Creek ;  each 
outnumbered  by  confronting  forces,  excepting  General  Holmes's 
command,  whose  position  on  the  lower  Potomac  was  taken  only 
to  prevent  a  possible  landing  of  the  enemy  at  that  point. 

The  forces  in  front  of  General  Johnston  and  those  in  front  of 
Colonel  Eppa  Hunton,  commanding  a  battalion  at  Leesburg,  the 
western  extremity  of  the  Manassas  line,  were  still  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  Potomac. 

General  Beauregard,  appreciating  the  necessity  of  an  immediate 
concerted  system  between  these  independent  commands,  particu 
larly  between  his  own  and  the  considerable  forces  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  viewing  Manassas  as  the  most  important  strategic  point 
for  both  belligerents,  and  the  one  most  likely  to  attract  the  main 
effort  of  the  enemy,  which,  according  to  reports,  might  be  made 
at  any  moment,  had  determined  if  possible  to  reform  the  Confed 
erate  military  situation,  in  accordance  with  his  views  of  sound  pol 
icy.  His  plan,  as  the  following  letter  shows,  was  marked,  as  were 
all  his  military  plans,  by  the  leading  ideas  of  concentration  and  ag 
gression. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  77 

"  HEADQUARTERS  MANASSAS,  DEP'T  OF  VA., 

CAMP  PICKETS,  June  12th,  18G1. 
"To  His  Excellency  President  DAVIS  : 

"  Sir, — The  bearer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sam  Jones  of  the  Provisional  Army 
of  Virginia,  a  member  of  my  general  staff,  has  been  instructed  by  me  to  lay  be 
fore  your  Excellency  a  diagram,  with  my  views  relative  to  the  operations  of 
the  present  campaign  in  this  State,  which  should  be  acted  upon  at  once. 

i%  The  enemy  seem  to  be  taking  the  offensive  towards  Harper's  Ferry,  and  a 
few  days  hence  may  find  General  J.  E.  Johnston  in  such  a  critical  condition 
as  to  render  it  impossible  to  relieve  him.  If  he  were  ordered  to  abandon 
forthwith  his  present  position  and  concentrate  suddenly  his  forces  with  mine, 
guarding,  with  small  detachments,  all  the  passes  through  which  the  enemy 
might  follow  him,  we  could,  by  a  bold  and  rapid  movement  forward,  retake 
Arlington  Heights  and  Alexandria,  if  not  too  strongly  fortified  and  garri 
soned,  which  would  have  the  effect  of  recalling  all  the  enemy's  forces  from 
northern  Virginia,  for  the  protection  of  Washington.  But  should  General 
Johnston  be  unable  to  unite  his  forces  with  mine,  then  he  ought  to  be  instruct 
ed  to  retreat  at  the  proper  time  towards  Richmond,  through  the  valley  of 
Virginia,  checking  the  enemy  wherever  and  whenever  he  can.  When  com 
pelled  to  abandon  my  present  position,  I  will  fall  back  also  on  Richmond ; 
the  forces  along  the  lower  Potomac,  on  the  Peninsula,  and  at  Norfolk,  m:iy 
have  to  do  likewise.  Then,  acting  on  interior  lines,  from  Richmond  as  a  cen 
tre  (our  forces  being  increased  by  the  reserves  at  that  point),  we  could  crush, 
in  rapid  succession  and  in  detail,  the  several  columns  of  the  enemy,  which  I 
have  supposed  would  move  on  three  or  four  different  lines.  With  thirty-five 
thousand  men,  properly  handled,  I  have  not  the  least  doubt  that  we  could  an 
nihilate  fifty  thousand  of  the  enemy.  I  beg  and  entreat  that  a  concerted 
plan  of  operations  be  adopted  at  once  by  the  government,  for  its  different  col 
umns.  Otherwise,  we  will  be  assailed  in  detail  by  superior  forces,  and  will  be 
cut  off,  or  destroyed  entirely. 

"  Lieutenant-Colonel  Jones  will  present  my  views  more  in  detail  to  your  Ex 
cellency. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Brig-Gen.  Comdg." 

The  President  made  the  following  reply : 

"RICHMOND,  VA.,  June  13th,  1861. 

"My  dear  General, — Colonel  Jones  delivered  to  me  your  letter  of  the  12th 
instant,  and,  as  suggested  by  you,  I  conversed  with  him  of  the  matter  to 
which  it  related.  Your  information  may  be  more  accurate  than  we  possess,  in 
relation  to  the  purposes  of  the  enemy,  and  I  will  briefly  reply  to  you  on  the 
hypothesis  which  forms  the  basis  of  your  suggestions. 

"  If  the  enemy  commence  operations  by  attack  upon  Harper's  Ferry,  I  do  not 
perceive  why  General  Johnston  should  be  unable,  even  before  overwhelming 
numbers,  to  retire  behind  the  positions  where  the  enemy  would  approach  in 
reverse.  It  would  seem  to  me  not  unreasonable  to  expect  that,  before  he  reach 
es  Winchester,  the  terminus  of  the  railroad  in  his  possession,  the  people  of  the 


78  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

fertile  and  populous  valley  would  rise  in  mass  to  aid  him  in  repelling  the  in 
vader.  But  suppose  it  should  be  otherwise,  he  could  still,  by  retiring  to  the 
passes  of  the  Manassas  railroad  and  its  adjacent  mountains,  probably  check 
the  progress  of  the  enemy,  and  prevent  him  from  either  taking  possession  of 
the  valley,  or  passing  to  the  rear  of  your  position.  We  hope  soon  to  rein 
force  you  to  an  extent  equal  to  the  strength  you  require,  by  the  junction  of 
General  Johnston,  and  I  cannot  doubt  but  that  you  would  then  be  better  cir 
cumstanced  to  advance  upon  Alexandria  than  if  General  Johnston,  by  with 
drawing  from  the  valley,  had  left  the  enemy  the  power  to  pass  to  your  rear,  to 
cut  your  line  of  communication,  and  advance  to  attack  you  in  reverse,  while 
you  were  engaged  with  the  enemy  in  front. 

"  Concurring  fully  with  you  in  the  effect  which  would  be  produced  by  the 
possession  of  Arlington  Heights  and  Alexandria,  if  your  rear  is  at  the  same 
time  sufficiently  covered,  it  is  quite  clear  that  if  the  case  should  be  otherwise, 
your  possession,  if  acquired,  would  be  both  brief  and  fruitless. 

"  To  your  request  that  a  concerted  plan  of  operations  should  be  adopted,  I 
can  only  reply  that  the  present  position  and  unknown  purposes  of  the  enemy 
require  that  our  plan  should  have  many  alterations.  I  have  noted  your  con 
verging  lines  upon  Richmond,  and  it  can  hardly  be  necessary  to  remind  you 
that  we  have  not  at  this  time  the  transportation  which  wrould  enable  us  to 
move  upon  those  lines  as  described.  Should  the  fortune  of  war  render  it  nec 
essary  to  retire  our  advance  columns,  they  must  be  brought  mainly  upon  rail 
roads,  and  that  of  Harper's  Ferry  would  come  by  your  present  position.  It 
would,  therefore,  be  a  necessity  that  General  Johnston's  column  should  make 
a  junction  with  yours,  before  yours  retired ;  but  I  have  not  anticipated  the 
necessity  of  your  retreat,  and  have  struggled  to  increase  your  force,  and  look 
hopefully  forward  to  see  you  enabled  to  assume  the  offensive.  Had  I  been 
less  earnestly  engaged  in  providing  for  yours  and  other  commands,  I  should 
have  had  the  pleasure  of  visiting  you  before  this  date.  Four  regiments  have 
been  sent  forward,  neither  of  which  had  reached  you  at  the  elate  of  your  let 
ter  ;  and  you  will  soon  receive  further  reinforcements.  They  are  not  trained 
troops,  but  I  think  they  are  better  than  those  of  the  enemy,  and  the  capacity 
which  you  have  recently  exhibited,  successfully  to  fight  with  undisciplined 
citizens,  justifies  the  expectation  that  you  will  know  how  to  use  such  force  as 
we  are  able  to  furnish.  Very  truly  yours, 

"  JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

Still  persisting,  however,  in  liis  effort  to  make  use  of  all  possi 
ble  resources  in  meeting  the  imminent  crisis,  General  Beauregard, 
in  his  official  and  semi-official  correspondence  at  the  time,  suggest 
ed  that  the  troops  under  General  Holmes,  at  Aqnia  Creek,  at  least 
two  thousand  five  hundred  men,  with  two  batteries,  should  be  so 
posted  as  to  be  available  for  a  timely  junction  with  his  own 
forces.  General  Holmes  fully  concurred,  asserting  that  his  com 
mand,  as  then  disposed,  was  not  likely  to  be  of  any  military  use  ; 
but  the  siiir^estion  met  with  no  favor  at  Richmond. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  79 

On  the  18th,  having  begun  to  receive  from  Korfolk  the  naval 
guns  for  which  he  had  called,  to  arm  the  works  at  Manassas,  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  made  a  requisition  for  naval  officers  to  command 
those  batteries  and  drill  the  recruits.  They  came  with  a  number 
of  sailors,  bringing  their  gun-ropes,  blocks,  and  tackles,  and  in  their 
exercises  the  terms  "port"  and  "starboard,"  novel  in  the  field, 
were  used  as  familiarly  as  on  board  a  man-of-war.  Officers  and 
men  were  noticeable  for  their  zeal,  efficiency,  and  discipline. 

Meanwhile,  vigilant  observation  of  the  opposite  banks  of  the 
Potomac  was  kept  up  at  Leesburg,  an  important  place,  which  the 
enemy  might  strike  in  order  to  sever  the  communications  between 
Generals  Beauregard  and  Johnston ;  and  such  small  reinforce 
ments  as  could  be  spared  from  Manassas  were  sent  thither,  but 
without  artillery,  of  which  none  was  available. 

From  information  collected  in  his  front,  General  Johnston  was 
apprehensive  that  General  Patterson  would  move  to  attack  him, 
and  he  soon  abandoned  the  untenable  salient  position  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  held  by  him  unwillingly,  and  to  which  General  Patterson 
afterwards  crossed  on  the  2d  of  July.  General  Beauregard's 
views,  based  partly  on  reports  from  Washington,  were  that  Gen 
eral  Patterson's  movements  merely  simulated  the  offensive,  to 
hold  General  Johnston  in  check. 

About  the  20th  of  June,  General  Beau  regard,  having  organized 
his  forces  into  six  brigades,  began  a  forward  movement,  in  order 
to  protect  his  advanced  positions  at  Centreville,  Fairfax  Court- 
Ilonse,  and  Sangster's  Cross-roads,  "so  as  to  be  able" — as  he  wrote 
to  Colonel  Eppa  Ilunton — "  to  strike  a  blow  upon  the  enemy,  at 
a  moment's  notice,  which  he  hoped  they  would  long  remem 
ber."  His  advanced  forces,  three  brigades  of  three  regiments 
each,  occupied  a  triangle  as  follows:  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  on  Bull 
Run,  one  regiment ;  at  Centreville  and  another  point  half-way  to 
Germantown,  one  brigade;  at  Germantown  and  Fairfax  Court- 
House,  one  brigade,  with  a  light  battery ;  at  the  crossing  of  Brad- 
dock's  old  road  with  the  Fairfax  Court-House  and  Fairfax  Station 
roads,  one  regiment ;  and  at  Sangster's  Cross-roads,  one  battalion  : 
all  in  easy  and  short  communication  with  each  other  and  with 
headquarters.  Most  of  his  small  body  of  cavalry  was  with  the 
advance,  scouting  and  reconnoitring. 

In  view  of  coming  events,  General  Beauregard  now  assembled 
his  brigade  commanders,  and,  after  general  directions  to  all  of 


80  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

them,  gave  detailed  instructions  to  those  who  had  charge  of  the 
advanced  positions  (at  Fairfax  Court-House  and  Fairfax  Station) 
touching  their  respective  lines  of  retreat  on  Bull  Run,  in  case 
they  should  be  menaced  by  a  combined  serious  movement  of  the 
enemy  with  largely  superior  forces.  The  substance  of  those  in 
structions  was  embodied,  with  minute  details,  in  a  Special  Order, 
No.  100,  from  the  Adjutant-General's  office,  which  was  the  order 
literally  executed  on  the  17th  of  July.  This  is  one  of  the  most  re 
markable  instances  in  military  history,  of  an  order  providing  fully 
and  precisely,  nearly  a  month  in  advance,  for  all  the  exigencies  of 
a  strategic  movement,  remotely  contingent  upon  the  operations 
of  an  enemy.  General  Bonham,  upon  the  near  approach  of  the 
forces  confronting  him,  was  to  retire  slowly  on  Centreville,  by 
the  turnpike,  then  to  Mitchell's  Ford,  drawing  the  enemy  after 
him  to  that  point,  which  was  the  only  portion  of  General  Beaure- 
gard's  line  yet  fortified.  General  Ewell,  from  Sangster's  Cross 
roads  and  vicinity,  was  to  follow  the  line  of  the  railroad  over  a 
rather  rough  and  difficult  country  road  to  Union  Mills  Ford, 
where  the  position  was  naturally  strong  and  offered  good  cover 
to  his  men.  The  intermediate  fords,  McLean's  and  Blackburn's, 
were  at  that  time  occupied  by  Jones's  and  Longstreet's  brigades. 
Early 's  brigade,  which  had  been  watching  the  fords  of  the  Occo- 
quan  and  the  approaches  on  the  right,  was  now  held  in  reserve,  a 
short  distance  in  rear  of  Union  Mills  Ford,  to  act  according  to 
circumstances.  A  small  force  of  infantry  guarded  the  stone 
bridge,  on  the  extreme  left,  where  the  turnpike  from  Alexandria, 
through  Fairfax  Court-House  and  Centreville,  crosses  Bull  Run, 
on  its  way  to  Warrenton.  The  works,  armed  with  naval  guns, 
were  manned  by  the  seamen  already  alluded  to,  and  also  by  a 
force  of  the  State  militia,  which  Governor  Letcher  had  called  out, 
at  General  Beauregard's  request. 

During  the  latter  days  of  June  and  the  first  fortnight  of  July, 
thorough  reconnoissances  were  made  of  the  whole  region  of 
country  likely  to  become  the  theatre  of  war  in  that  quarter,  either 
for  a  defensive  or  offensive  campaign.  In  these  General  Beaure- 
gard  had  the  effective  aid  of  Colonel  "Williamson  and  Captains 
D.  B.  Harris  and  Walter  II.  Stevens,  of  the  Engineers.  And  it 
may  be  of  interest  to  mention  here,  that  the  reconnoissances  we 
speak  of  included  the  surroundings  of  Leesburg  and  the  passes 
westward^  as  well  as  the  entire  square  between  Difficult  Run,  the 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  81 

Potomac,  Goose  Creek,  and  Gum  Spring.  The  object  was  to 
facilitate  the  movement  of  troops  in  that  direction,  to  cross  the 
Potomac,  and  be  prepared  to  oppose  the  enemy,  should  he  at 
tempt  to  advance  by  that  way  so  as  to  reach  the  Manassas  Gap 
Railroad,  on  the  left  of  General  Beauregard's  position. 

In  one  of  these  reconnoissances,  made  in  force — Colonel  Maxey 
Gregg,  at  the  head  of  a  South  Carolina  regiment,  casually  encoun 
tered  a  Federal  command,  under  General  Schenck,  coming  into 
Vienna  Station,  on  a  train  of  cars.  A  shot  from  a  section  of 
Romper's  light  battery  brought  them  to  a  halt,  and,  after  a  few 
exchanges,  the  Federals  retired,  and  the  locomotive  escaped,  leav 
ing  the  cars,  which  were  burned.  This  was  the  first  hostile  meet 
ing,  excepting  the  brilliant  midnight  dash  of  Lieutenant  Tomp- 
kins  against  the  Confederate  outposts  at  Fairfax  Court-House. 

On  the  4th  of  July  the  Confederate  pickets,  well  in  advance  of 
Fairfax  Court-House,  captured  a  sergeant  and  a  private — the  latter 
a  Scotchman,  who  chanced  to  be  a  clerk  in  McDowell's  Adjutant- 
General's  office,  and  whose  duty  as  such  was  to  assist  in  making 
up  the  army  returns.  They  were  taking  a  ride  for  pleasure,  and, 
having  come  a  little  too  far,  were  picked  up  by  the  watchful 
cavalry.  The  Scotchman  at  once  stated  his  position,  and,  being 
sent  to  headquarters,  was  there  subjected  to  a  close  examination, 
in  which  he  spoke  freely,  and  appeared,  from  his  statements  on 
matters  already  known,  to  be  telling  the  truth.  Thus  was  Mc 
Dowell's  strength,  at  that  date,  pretty  accurately  ascertained  ;  and 
events  verified  the  correctness  of  the  information  thus  obtained. 

The  increasing  forces  of  McDowell,  the  clamor  of  the  Northern 
press  for  an  advance,  and  the  private  reports  from  Washington, 
all  now  indicated  an  early  attack  by  an  army  more  than  twice  the 
strength  of  ours  in  numbers.  And  General  Bcauregard,  in  the 
midst  of  his  various  solicitudes,  balked  in  his  endeavors  to  pro 
cure  the  needed  reinforcements,  and  grieved  also  at  his  unsuccess 
ful  attempts  to  induce  the  government  to  adopt  his  views,  wrote 
the  following  letter  to  his  friend,  Senator  Wigfall.  It  shows 
General  Beauregard's  unrelieved  anxiety,  and  his  determination, 
while  wishing  and  laboring  for  a  better  state  of  things,  to  make 
the  most  of  his  limited  means : 

"  MANASSAS  JUNCTION,  VA.,  July  StJi,  18G1. 
u  Colonel  WIGFALL  : 

"  My  dear  Colonel, — I  believe  we  are  about  to  be  attacked  by  the  enemy, 
I.— G 


82  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

who  has  been  increasing  his  forces  rapidly  in  the  last  few  days.  He  has 
doubtless  at  present,  on  this  side  of  the  Potomac,  at  least  30,000  men,  and 
probably  as  many  in.  or  about  Washington ;  and  I  am  informed  on  good  au 
thority  that  he  is  crossing  over  reinforcements  in  large  numbers  every  niglit, 
so  that  very  shortly  we  will  be  attacked,  probably  by  about  40,000  men  ! 
What  do  you  suppose  is  my  effective  force  to  resist  this  attack?  About 
15,000  effective  men !  How  can  it  be  expected  that  I  shall  be  able  to  main 
tain  my  ground  unless  reinforced  immediately  ?  I  am  determined  to  give  the 
enemy  battle  no  matter  at  what  odds  against  us ;  but  is  it  right  and  proper  to 
sacrifice  so  many  valuable  lives  (and  perhaps  our  cause)  without  the  least 
prospect  of  success  ?  But  I  hope  it  may  have  the  effect,  at  least,  of  delaying 
the  advance  of  the  enemy,  and  give  our  friends  time  to  come  to  the  rescue. 
I  have  to  apply  two  or  three  times  for  the  most  essential  things  required  here. 
To  obtain  anything  with  despatch,  I  have  to  send  a  special  messenger  to 
Richmond.  Is  this  the  way  to  direct  and  control  the  operations  of  an  army 
in  the  field  ?  Cannot  this  evil  be  remedied  ?  I  am  sure  it  could  be  if  properly 
represented  to  the  President. 

"  I  fear  General  Johnston  is  no  better  off  than  I  am ;  but  his  section  of 
country  is,  I  believe,  more  easily  defended,  being  wooded  and  mountainous. 
My  troops  are  in  fine  spirits  and  anxious  for  a  fight.  They  seem  to  have  the 
most  unbounded  confidence  in  me. 

"Oh,  that  I  had  the  genius  of  a  Napoleon, to  be  more  worthy  of  our  cause 
and  of  their  confidence ! 

"  If  I  could  only  get  the  enemy  to  attack  me,  as  I  am  trying  to  have  him  do, 
I  would  stake  my  reputation  on  the  handsomest  victory  that  could  be  hoped 
for.  Yours  very  truly, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

The  following  letter,  written  a  few  days  later,  is  also  of  particu 
lar  interest : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS  JUNCTION,  JulylWt,  1861. 
"  To  His  Excellency  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  : 

«  Sir, — I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  the  Field  Return  of  the  army 
under  my  command,  from  which  you  will  perceive  the  effective  force  at  my 
disposition  is  as  follows  :  Light  Artillery,  533,  with  27  pieces;  Cavalry,  1425  ; 
Foot  Artillery,  293 ;  and  Infantry,  16,150  ;  in  all  18,401  men  of  all  arms.  From 
this  must  be  deducted  the  command  of  Colonel  Hunton  at  Leesburg,  of  some 
445  men,  who  will  remain  in  position  there  until  the  enemy  shall  have  ad 
vanced  to  attack  my  outposts,  when  the  colonel  will  fall  back  and  unite  his 
force  with  that  of  Colonel  Cocke,  commanding  the  5th  Brigade  at  the  stone 
bridge  across  Bull  Run.  Colonel  Sloan's  regiment,  4th  South  Carolina  Vol 
unteers,  has  already  fallen  back  from  Lcesburg  to  Fry  ing-pan  Church,  prepara 
tory  to  a  junction  with  Colonel  Cocke,  at  Centreville. 

"I  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  enemy  will  begin  his  advance  from 
his  present  position,  at  or  about  Falls  Church,to-morrow  or  on  the  following  day. 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGAED.  83 

with  a  force  not  short  of  05,000  men,  supported  by  a  reserve  of  not  less  than 
15,000  infantry.  To  these  I  can  oppose  but  about  16,500,  reserving  about 
1500,  merely  for  camp  guards,  pickets,  and  the  garrison  of  the  intrenched 
camp  here.  In  consequence  of  this  great  disparity  in  numbers,  I  have  issued 
the  Special  Order  No.  100,  enclosed  herewith,  concentrating  my  troops,  in  the 
exigency,  on  the  naturally  strong  positions  enumerated  therein,  afforded  by 
Bull  Run,  in  the  hope  of  conducting  the  movement  so  as  to  induce  the  enemy 
to  offer  me  battle  in  front  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  where  his  numerical  superiority 
would  be  materially  counterbalanced  by  the  difficulties  of  the  ground  and  my 
previous  preparations  there  for  the  event.  But  I  am,  however,  inclined  to  be 
lieve  he  may  attempt  to  turn  my  left  flank,  by  a  movement  in  the  direction  ol 
Vienna,  Frying-pan  Church,  and,  possibly,  Gum  Spring,  and  thus  cut  off  John 
ston's  line  of  retreat  on  and  communications  with  this  place,  tia  the  Manassas 
(Jap  Railroad,  wkile  threatening  my  own  communications  with  Richmond  and 
depots  of  supply,  by  the  Alexandria  and  Orange  Railroad,  and  opening  his 
communications  with  the  Potomac  through  Leesburg  and  Edward's  Ferry. 

"  Of  course,  if  I  had  sufficient  force,  one  less  unequal  to  that  of  the  enemy, 
I  would  not  permit  him,  with  impunity,  to  attempt  so  dangerous  a  movement 
on  his  part;  but,  in  view  of  the  odds  against  me,  and  of  the  vital  importance 
at  this  juncture  of  avoiding  the  hazard  of  a  defeat,  which  would  open  to  the 
enemy  the  way  to  Richmond,  I  shall  act  with  extreme  caution.  If  forced,  how 
ever,  to  retire  before  an  overwhelming  force  by  another  route  than  the  railroad, 
my  line  of  retreat  can  be  taken  at  any  time  through  Brentsville  to  a  junction 
with  Brigadier-General  Holmes,  at  or  near  Frederieksburg,  whence  we  could 
operate  on  the  line  of  communication  of  the  enemy  on  their  advance,  so  as,  at 
least,  to  retard  him  by  the  way.  In  that  event,  if  deemed  expedient,  I  could 
leave  a  suitable  garrison  in  the  intrenchments  here,  to  occupy  him  and  retard 
his  advance  the  longer,  but  with  orders  to  spike  our  guns  and  follow  in  my 
rear  until  effecting  a  reunion  with  me.  In  presenting  the  foregoing  to  the 
consideration  of  your  Excellency,  I  wish  it  distinctly  understood,  however,  that 
if  the  enemy  should  offer  battle  on  the  line  of  Bull  Run,  I  shall  accept  it  for 
my  command,  against  whatsoever  odds  he  may  array  in  my  front. 
u  Respectfully,  Sir,  your  obedient  servant. 

"G.  T.  BEAUKEGAKD,  General  Commanding." 


S-i  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

General  Beanregarcl  again  Urging  Concentration. — Colonels  Preston  and  Chest 
nut  sent  to  Richmond,  to  Explain  Plan. — Report  of  Colonel  Chestnut. — 
The  President  Disapproves  the  Proposed  Campaign. — Letter  of  General 
Beauregard  to  General  Johnston. — Comments  upon  Mr.  Davis's  Refusal.—- 
General  McDowell  Ordered  to  Advance. — Strong  Demonstration  against 
General  Bonhani. — General  Beauregard's  Telegram  to* the  President. — 
General  Johnston  Ordered  to  Make  Junction  if  Practicable. — Action  of 
Bull  Run.— What  Major  Barnard,  U.  S.  E.,  Says  of  It.— Repulse  of  the 
Enemy. — War  Department  Inclined  to  Withdraw  Order  to  General  John 
ston. — General  Beauregard  Disregards  the  Suggestion. 

A  DAY  or  two  after  sending  to  the  President  the  communication 
given  at  the  end  of  the  preceding  chapter,  General  Beauregard, 
still  hoping  to  obtain  the  government's  assent  to  the  concentration 
of  our  forces,  in  view  of  the  impending  offensive  movement  of  the 
enemy,  despatched  to  Richmond  an  aide-de-camp,  Colonel  John  S. 
Preston,  of  South  Carolina,  a  gentleman  of  ability  and  much  per 
sonal  weight,  with  special  instructions  to  urge  the  absolute  and 
immediate  necessity  of  adopting  his  plan  of  operations. 

Ko  sooner  had  Colonel  Preston  left  Manassas,  than  General. 
Beauregard,  engrossed  with  the  all-absorbing  idea  of  concentra 
tion — and,  from  information  hourly  received,  certain  of  its  wisdom 
— felt  it  impossible  to  remain  passively  on  the  defensive,  while  he 
had  the  opportunity  of  dealing  a  series  of  aggressive  blows  on  the 
enemy,  likely  to  produce  decisive  results  favorable  to  the  Confeder 
ate  States.  He  therefore  enlarged  his  plan  of  campaign,  basing  it 
partly  upon  the  increased  strength  of  our  army,  and  sent  another 
of  his  aids,  Colonel  James  R.  Chestnut,  to  present  and  explain  it 
to  the  President.  A  memorandum,  written  by  General  (then 
Colonel)  Samuel  Jones,  under  General  Beauregard's  dictation,  and 
containing  the  substance  of  all  the  instructions  given  to  Colonel 
Chestnut,  had  been  handed  to  the  latter,  to  assist  his  memory,  and 
prevent  any  misconception  as  to  the  main  features  of  the  pro 
jected  campaign. 

It  is  well  for  the  truth  of  history,  that  these  precautionary  meas- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  85 

ures  were  taken  at  that  time ;  for,  as  will  be  seen  further  on  in  this 
work,  Mr.  Davis,  who  claims,  even  now,  "that  the  great  question 
of  uniting  the  two  armies  was  decided  at  Richmond,"  *  (which 
seems  to  mean  "decided  at  Richmond"  by  Mr.  Davis),  subse 
quently  denied  that  any  such  plan  had  ever  been  presented  to  him, 
and  that  his  alleged  refusal  to  approve  it  could,  in  no  manner  or 
form,  have  thwarted  General  Beauregard's  efforts  at  concentration. 
General  Beauregard's  anxiety  was  intense  while  awaiting  the  re 
turn  of  his  messengers.  He  knew  that  each  moment  was  of  vital 
importance,  and  that  the  fate  of  our  cause  hung  in  the  balance. 
First  came  telegrams  from  Colonels  Preston  and  Chestnut,  stating 
that  the  communication  was  before  the  President,  who  was  giving 
it  his  careful  consideration.!  On  the  ICth  of  July,  Colonel  Chest 
nut,  upon  his  return,  presented  his  official  report,  containing  a  de 
tailed  account  of  his  mission.  So  great  has  become  the  historical 
value  of  this  paper,  that  we  present  it  in  full  to  the  reader: 

'•  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

'•  MAXASSAS,  VA.,  July  1GM,  18G1. 
u  Brigadier-General  BEAUREGARD,  Commanding  Army  of  the  Potomac: 

"  Sir, — In  obedience  to  your  order,  I  proceeded  on  Sunday  last,  14th  instant, 
to  Richmond,  with  the  purpose  of  laying  before  the  President,  for  his  consid 
eration,  your  views  and  plans  for  the  combined  operation  of  the  two  armies 
under  the  commands  of  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  and  yourself  respectively. 
I  arrived  at  Richmond  at  3.30  on  the  same  day  I  left  your  quarters,  and  with 
out  delay  reported  to  the  President,  who,  although  sick  in  bed,  received  me 
with  great  kindness  and  cordiality.  After  stating  to  him  the  object  of  my 
visit,  he  appointed  an  hour  to  meet  him,  that  evening,  in  company  with  Gen 
eral  R.  E.  Lee,  and  Adjutant  and  Inspector  General  Cooper.  At  the  appointed 
time  the  President,  Generals  Lee  and  Cooper,  and  Colonel  Preston,  of  your 
staff,  met  me  in  private  conference.  Being  requested  by  the  President  to  lay 
before  those  present  the  subject-matter  with  which  I  was  charged,  I  submitted, 
on  your  part,  the  following  proposition  : 

"  That  the  Confederate  armies  were  in  front  of  the  enemy,  with  greatly  in 
ferior  forces  at  all  points ;  that  it  was  desirable,  by  uniting  a  portion  of  our 
forces,  to  outnumber  the  enemy  at  some  important  point ;  that  the  point  now 
occupied  by  you  was,  at  present,  in  reference  to  the  armies,  considered  the  most 
important.  I  stated  also  that  the  enemy  were  at  present  at  or  near  Falls 
Church,  with  eight  or  ten  thousand  men  on  the  Alexandria,  London,  and  Hamp 
shire  Railroad,  and  also  with  some  portion  of  his  forces  at  Springfield,  on  the 
Alexandria  and  Orange  Railroad,  with  every  indication  of  a  purpose  to  ad- 


*'"  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  347. 
t  See  Appendix  to  Chapter  VIII. 


86  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

vance  on  both  linos,  and  that  it  was  most  probable  the  enemy  would  threaten 
our  camps  at  Manassas  with  about  ten  thousand  men,  while  with  the  main 
body,  twenty  thousand  or  more,  would  advance  towards  Vienna,  Frying-pans, 
and  Pleasant  Valley  to  Hay  Market,  on  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  with  a 
view  to  cut  off  our  communications  with  General  Johnston.  To  accomplish  this, 
possession  would  be  taken  of  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge  at  Manassas,  Ashby's, 
and  Snicker's  Gaps.  He  would  then  endeavor  to  cut  off  your  communication 
with  Richmond  by  the  Alexandria  and  Orange  Railroad,  and  force  you  either 
to  fight  in  open  field,  with  greatly  inferior  numbers,  or  to  retire  towards  Fred- 
ericksburg  by  way  of  Breutsville  to  join  forces  with  General  Holmes,  or  to 
withdraw  from  the  intrenched  camp  and  retire  by  the  Alexandria  and  Orange 
Railroad,  before  the  enemy  could  reach  it. 

"Under  these  circumstances,  I  stated,  you  would  propose,  and  did  propose, 
that  General  Johnston  should,  with  the  bulk  of  his  forces,  say  twenty  thousand, 
unite  with  you,  leaving  from  three  to  five  thousand  men  to  guard  the  passes  of 
the  Blue  Ridge  and  to  hold  Patterson  in  check.  Then,  with  the  combined  forces 
of  General  Johnston  and  yourself,  you  would  move  rapidly  forward  on  Fairfax 
Court-IIousc,  establish  yourself  between  the  two  lines  of  the  enemy,  attack 
them  separately  with  larger  masses,  and  thus  exterminate  them  or  drive  them 
into  the  Potomac.  This  being  done,  General  Johnston,  with  ten  thousand  of  your 
forces  in  addition  to  his  own,  and  rallying,  as  he  went,  those  left  to  guard  the 
passes,  would  return  at  once  to  the  [valley  with]  superior  numbers,  sajr  thirty-five 
thousand,  to  attack  and  destroy  Patterson,  at  Winchester,  or  wherever  he  might 
be.  One  week  from  the  time  of  leaving  Winchester  would  be  sufficient  to  ac 
complish  all  this.  You  would  then  either  occupy  the  enemy's  works,  in  front 
of  Washington,  if  he  should  abandon  them,  or  fall  back  on  your  present  posi 
tion,  according  to  circumstances.  General  Johnston  having  disposed  of  Pat 
terson,  would  detach  a  sufficient  number  from  his  force  to  reinforce  Garnett, 
and  make  him  superior  to  McClellan.  Having  defeated  McClellan,  General 
Garnett  could  then  unite  with  Johnston,  and  the  two  cross  the  Potomac,  at  the 
nearest  point,  for  Maryland,  and,  arousing  the  people  as  they  proceeded,  march 
to  the  rear  of  Washington,  while  you  would  attack  it  in  front. 

"  To  these  propositions,  respectful  and  earnest  consideration  was  given  by 
thc  President  and  the  generals  I  have  mentioned.  The  scheme  was  con 
sidered  brilliant  and  comprehensive,  but,  to  its  adoption  at  this  time,  two  lead 
ing  objections  were  urged  by  the  President  and  by  General  Lee.  One  was 
that  General  Johnston's  force  was  not  now  sufficiently  strong  to  allow  of  the 
withdrawal  of  numbers  sufficient  to  effect  your  object,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
leave  enough  to  keep  Patterson  in  check  and  keep  him  from  coming  down 
upon  your  left;  and  the  other  and  main  objection  was,  that  the  enemy  was  as 
yet  too  close  to  their  cover  to  allow  the  reasonable  expectation  of  the  accom 
plishment  of  your  object;  that  they  would  immediately  fall  back  upon  their 
intrcnchments,  or,  being  so  close  to  their  large  reserves,  would  be  quickly  re 
inforced  in  numbers  sufficient  to  regain  the  superiority  of  numbers,  and  thus 
defeat  your  purpose.  That  the  combination  might  be  made  at  a  later  period, 
when  these  objections  would  be  removed  by  a  sufficient  increase  of  your  ar- 


GENERAL  BEAUUEGARD.  87 

raics,  and  by  the  lengthening  of  the  enemy's  lines,  and  increase  of  distance 
from  river,  and  reserves  for  quick  reinforcements. 

"  Respectfully  submitted, 

"  JAMES  CHESTNUT,  Vol.  A,  D.  C."1 

Before  commenting  upon  this  report,  and  to  illustrate — as  we 
think  we  should — the  character  of  the  military  administration  of 
the  Confederate  authorities,  the  following  unofficial  letter  of  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  to  General  Johnston  is  submitted  to  the  reader. 
It  was  written  on  the  day  before  Colonel  Chestnut  was  sent  to 
Richmond. 

UMANASSAS  JUNCTION,  VA.,  JufylStf,  1861. 
"  General  J.  E.  JOHNSTON  : 

"  My  dear  General, — I  write  in  haste.  What  a  pity  we  cannot  carry  into 
effect  the  following  plan  of  operations  :  That  you  should  leave  four  or  five  thou 
sand  men  to  guard  the  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  unite  the  mass  of  your 
troops  with  mine.  We  will  probably  have,  in  a  few  days,  about  forty  thousand 
men  to  operate  with.  This  force  would  enable  us  to  destroy  the  forces  of 
Generals  Scott  and  McDowell,  in  my  front.  Then  we  would  go  back  with  as 
many  men  as  necessary  to  attack  and  disperse  General  Patterson's  army,  before 
he  could  know  positively  what  had  become  of  you.  We  could  then  proceed 
to  General  McClcllan's  theatre  of  war,  and  treat  him  likewise,  after  which  we 
could  pass  over  into  Maryland,  to  operate  in  rear  of  Washington.  I  think 
this  whole  campaign  could  be  completed  brilliantly  in  from  fifteen  to  twenty- 
five  days.  Oh,  that  we  had  but  one  good  head  to  conduct  all  our  operations  ! 
We  are  laboring,  unfortunately,  under  the  disadvantage  of  having  about  seven 
armies  in  the  field,  under  as  many  independent  commanders,  which  is  contrary 
to  the  first  principles  of  the  art  of  war.  Wishing  you,  however,  ample  success 
in  your  operations,  I  remain,  Yours  very  truly, 

"  G.  T.  BKAUKEGARD." 

He  was  striking  at  every  door,  as  it  were;  for  he  believed  in 
his  plan,  and  felt  that  he  could  accomplish  it.  But  the  rigor  of 
military  usage — so  inexorable  at  times — compelled  him  to  seek  as 
sistance  and  support  from  those  whose  right  it  was  to  adopt  or  re 
ject  his  views.  A  high  tribunal,  composed  of  the  President,  Gen 
erals  Cooper  and  Lee,  took  upon  itself  to  check  and  render  barren 
the  strategic  powers  so  greatly  developed  in  General  Beauregard, 
and  in  which  the  immortal  Jackson  alone  is  acknowledged  to  have 
been  his  peer.  "Who  can  forget  that,  at  the  period  of  which  we 
write,  the  Confederate  commander  at  Manassas  was  looked  up  to 
as  the  first  and,  unquestionably,  the  most  promising  of  our  gen 
erals  '{  His  prestige  was  undeniable.  Success,  "the  criterion  of 
merit "  in  military  affairs,  had  already  built  up  for  him  a  reputa- 


88  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

tion  thus  far  unrivalled.  The  President  knew  this,  as  did  the  whole 
South  ;  as  did  even  the  North,  whose  apprehension  of  the  untiring 
activity  and  engineering  ability  of  General  Beauregard  was  a  se 
cret  to  none.  How  Mr.  Davis,  with  all  this  before  his  mind,  could 
have  assumed  the  responsibility  of  declining  so  far-sighted  and 
far-reaching  a  campaign  as  was  proposed  to  him,  is  more  than 
we  can  well  explain.  Eat,  exercising  the  right  which  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  what  then  transpired  affords  us,  we  assert  it  as  an 
incontrovertible  truth,  fully  proved  by  later  events,  that  the  Pres 
ident  of  the  Confederacy,  by  neglecting  to  compel  his  Quarter 
master-General  to  procure  the  transportation  which  could  have 
been  easily  procured,  more  than  a  month  before  the  battle  of  Ma- 
nassas ;  by  refusing,  as  early  as  the  13th  of  June,  to  assent  to  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  urgent  request  that  authority  should  be  given 
to  concentrate  our  forces  at  the  proper  moment,  at  Manassas  Junc 
tion  ;  by  again  refusing,  on  the  15th  of  July,  to  allow  him  to  exe 
cute  his  bold,  offensive  plans  against  the  enemy,  the  certain  re 
sult  of  which  would  have  been  the  taking  of  Washington ;  that 
the  President  of  the  Confederacy,  by  thus  persisting  in  these 
three  lamentable  errors,  lost  the  South  lier  independence.  We 
write  this  in  no  spirit  of  detraction.  But,  after  a  lapse  of  more 
than  twenty-two  years,  President  Davis  must  expect  to  stand  be 
fore  the  public  merely  on  the  merits  of  his  acts  and  omissions. 
Personal  friendships,  which  would  kindly  palliate  errors,  have  fad 
ed  away  or  disappeared.  The  tribunal  of  public  opinion,  occupied 
by  just  and  impartial  men,  will  study  the  events  of  which  we  are 
now  treating  by  the  light  of  truth  alone,  and,  in  seeking  for  the 
causes  of  our  failure,  will  unerringly  place  the  finger  on  Mr.  Da- 
vis's  want  of  foresight,  on  his  incapacity  to  appreciate  and  reward 
merit,  on  his  upholding  of  incompetent  men  in  offices  of  responsi 
bility  and  trust,  and,  above  all,  on  his  unwillingness  to  allow  others 
to  achieve  greatness.  The  words,  "  Z?etat,  dest  moi" — the  haugh 
ty  maxim  of  the  French  monarch — unconsciously,  perhaps,  to 
President  Davis,  but  not  the  less  fatally,  must  have  governed  his 
course  in  the  council-chamber  on  more  than  one  occasion.  His 
book,  now  before  the  public,  whatever  its  merits  in  other  respects 
may  be,  is  powerless  in  its  vain  attempt  to  cover  his  fatal  mis 
takes,  or  to  change  the  merciless  logic  of  facts  and  events. 

Before  leaving  Richmond,  Colonel  Chestnut  had  telegraphed  to 
General  Beauregard  that  his  recommendations  would  not  be  ap- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  89 

proved.  This  was  a  heavy  disappointment  to  him ;  but,  nothing 
daunted,  he  began  at  once  to  provide  for  the  possible  contingency 
of  being  compelled,  by  the  greatly  superior  force  of  the  enemy, 
to  retire  behind  the  Rappahannock.  lie  sent  one  of  his  engineers 
to  the  crossings  of  that  river,  with  orders  to  throw  up  such  field- 
works  as  would  command  them. 

Colonel  Chestnut  had  returned  deeply  impressed  by  the  views 
and  ideas  of  the  Richmond  authorities,  particularly  by  those  of 
General  Lee — to  wit,  that  the  army  should  fall  back  behind  the 
Rappahannock;  and,  not  wishing  to  move,  himself,  in  the  matter, 
endeavored  to  persuade  Adjutant-General  Jordan  to  urge  the  point 
upon  General  Beauregard  ;  which,  however,  the  former  positively 
declined  to  do. 

The  extension  of  McDowell's  pickets  had  now  interrupted  our 
"  underground  mail,"  between  Washington  and  Manassas ;  but  it 
had  fortunately  happened,  a  few  days  before,  that  a  gentleman, 
Mr.  D ,  formerly  a  clerk  in  one  of  the  departments  at  Wash 
ington,  was  introduced  at  headquarters  by  Colonel  Chestnut  as 
perfectly  trustworthy,  and  capable  of  performing  the  delicate  office 
of  communicating  with  the  friendly  agencies  we  had  managed  to 
establish  in  Washington,  lie  was  provided  with  a  paper,  having 
neither  signature  nor  address,  but  upon  which  was  written  the 
ciphered  message,  u  Trust  the  bearer,"  and  with  it  immediately 

despatched  to  the  residence  of  Mrs.  G ,  our  secret  emissary  in 

the  Federal  capital.  The  result  was  that,  at  about  8  o'clock  P.M., 
on  the  10th,  a  sealed  communication  was  received  at  headquarters, 
despatched  by  relays  from  General  Ilolmes's  picket  line,  near  East- 
port.  It  had  been  brought  that  morning  from  Washington,  to  a 

point  on  the  opposite  shore,  by  Mr.  1) ,  from  Mrs.  G ,  and 

announced,  in  cipher,  this  simple  but  important  piece  of  news: 
•"  McDowell  has  been  ordered  to  advance  to-night;*'  confirming 
General  Beauregard's  belief  as  to  the  intended  Federal  movement, 
which  was  otherwise  apparent  to  him. 

General  Bonham  was  at  once  informed  of  the  impending  event, 
and  directed  to  execute  his  retreat  on  the  appearance  of  the  ene 
my  in  force,  as  prescribed  by  the  order  of  the  20th  of  June,  un 
changed,  though  issued  nearly  a  month  previously.  Colonel  Rhodes, 
at  Fairfax  Station,  received  like  instructions  through  General 
Ewcll,  his  brigade  commander  ;  and,  in  view  of  the  exigency,  Col 
onel  J.  L.  Kemper,  whose  energy  and  efficiency  had  already  been 


90  MILITARY    OPERATIONS   OF 

tested,  was  again  detached  from  bis  command  and  sent  to  Fairfax 
Court-House,  to  provide  all  necessary  means  of  transportation. 

Daring  the  night  which  followed  (16th-17th  July),  General 
Beauregard  sent  an  urgent  request  to  Richmond  by  telegram, 
asking  that  Generals  Johnston  and  Holmes  be  now  ordered  to 
make  a  junction  with  him. 

He  also  published  General  Orders  No.  41,  announcing  to  his 
command  the  expected  advance  of  the  enemy,  and  expressing  his 
confidence  in  their  ability  to  drive  him  beyond  his  intrenched 
lines.  It  contained  the  names  of  his  general  and  personal  staff,* 
and  enjoined  obedience  to  all  orders  conveyed  through  them  to 
the  troops. 

The  news  of  the  enemy's  movement  was  true.  On  the  morn 
ing  of  the  17th  McDowell's  advance  was  reported  to  be  approach 
ing  ;  and  before  noon,  General  Bonham's  pickets  being  driven 
in,  he  began  his  retreat,  as  had  been  previously  agreed  upon. 

The  enemy  made  a  strong  demonstration  against  him,  and  sought 
to  strike  his  communication  with  Germantown,  which  was  very 
nearly  effected — General  Bonham's  rear  having  just  passed  through 
the  junction  of  the  two  roads  at  the  hamlet,  as  the  head  of  the 
Federal  column  came  within  sight.  He  retired  in  fine  order  to 
Centreville,  and  though  at  night  he  was  enveloped,  he  was  quiet 
ly  withdrawn  between  12  o'clock  and  daylight,  behind  Mitch 
ell's  Ford,  fully  carrying  out  the  detailed  instructions  of  the  gen 
eral  commanding.  Rhodes,  after  a  sharp  brush  with  the  enemy, 
fell  back  to  Union  Mills  Ford,  where  Ewell  was  in  command  of  the 
heaviest  brigade  of  the  army. 

The  enemy  had  no  sooner  attacked  General  Bonham's  line,  than 
General  Beauregard  forwarded  the  following  telegram  to  the 
President : 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  MANASSAS, 

July  Yith,  1861. 

"  The  enemy  has  assailed  my  outposts  in  heavy  force.  I  have  fallen  back 
on  the  line  of  Bull  Run  and  -will  make  a  stand  at  Mitchell's  Ford.  If  his  force 
is  overwhelming  I  shall  retire  to  the  Rappahannock  railroad  bridge,  saving  my 
command  for  defence  there  and  future  operations.  Please  inform  Johnston 
of  this,  via  Stanton,  and  also  Holmes.  Send  forward  any  reinforcements,  at 
the  earliest  possible  instant,  and  by  every  possible  means. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

To  which  the  President  answered  : 

*  See  Appendix  to  this  chapter. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  9! 

"  RICHMOND,  July  17^,  1861. 
"  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  We  are  making  all  efforts  to  reinforce  you.  Cannot  send  to  day,  but  after 
wards  they  will  go  regularly,  daily,  railroads  permitting.  Hampton's  Legion, 
McRae's  regiment,  and  two  battalions,  Mississippi  and  Alabama,  under  orders. 

"  JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

Later  in  the  day,  however,  Adjutant-General  Cooper  sent  this 
telegram : 

"RICHMOND,  July  17M,  1861. 
"  GENERAL  BEAUREGARD : 

"You  are  authorized  to  appropriate  the  North  Carolina  regiment  on  its 
route  to  General  Johnston.  If  possible,  send  to  General  Johnston  to  say  he 
has  been  informed  tia  Staunton  that  you  were  attacked,  and  that  he  will  join, 
you,  if  practicable,  with  his  effective  force,  sending  his  sick  and  baggage  to 
Culpcpper  Court-House,  by  rail  or  through  Warrenton. 

"  S.  COOPER,  Adj.-Gcnl." 

General  Beauregard,  though  gratified  that  such  an  order  had  ;;r 
last  been  given,  was  much  annoyed  at  the  thought  that  it  had  been 
too  long  delayed  to  effect  any  substantial  good.  lie  so  informed 
the  War  Department,  but  lost  no  time  in  communicating  with 
General  Johnston,  through  telegram  and  by  means  of  a  special 
messenger,  Colonel  Chisolm,  one  of  his  aids.  The  latter  was  in 
structed  to  say  to  General  Johnston  that  there  was  not  a  moment 
to  lose,  and  that  all  the  available  transportation  of  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad  would  be  in  waiting  at  Piedmont,  to  assist  in  con 
voying  his  troops.  Colonel  Chisolm  carried  also  a  proposition  that 
at  least  a  portion  of  General  Johnston's  forces  should  march  by 
the  way  of  Aldie,  so  as  to  assail  McDowell's  left  flank  and  rear, 
at  Centrevillc.  But,  for  reasons  General  Johnston  must  have 
thought  important,  based,  as  he  alleges,  on  the  difficulty  of  direct 
ing  the  movements  of  troops  so  distant  from  each  other.no  action 
was  taken  by  him  about  this  suggestion. 

The  feigned  resistance  and  retreat  from  Fairfax  Court-House, 
had  had  the  desired  effect  of  leading  the  enemy  to  believe  in  the 
abandonment  of  our  position  at  Manassas.  "We  had  expected  to 
encounter  the  enemy  at  Fairfax  Court-House,  seven  miles  this 
side  of  Centrevillc,"  says  Major  Barnard,  United  States  Engineer,* 
"and  our  three  right  columns  were  directed  to  co-operate,  on  that 
point.  We  entered  that  place  about  noon  of  the  17th,  finding 
the  intrenchments  abandoned,  and  every  sign  of  a  hasty  retreat." 

*Sec  his  book  entitled  "  The  C.  S.  A.  and  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run,"  p.  46. 


92  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

Hence  the  loud  exultation  of  the  Federal  troops,  and  the  predic 
tions,  in  the  Northern  journals,  of  the  certain  defeat  of  the  Con 
federate  array. 

On  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  the  18th,  the  enemy  was  re 
ported  advancing  on  Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's  Fords.  As  the 
former  was  the  only  point  even  partially  intrenched,  and  the  lat 
ter  had  natural  defensive  advantages,  General  Beauregard  was 
gratified  that  the  attack,  as  he  had  hoped,  was  made  there.  His 
line  now  extended  some  five  miles,  from  Union  Mills  Ford,  on 
the  right,  to  the  stone  bridge,  on  the  left,  as  follows:  at  Union 
Mills  Ford,  Swell's  brigade,  with  four  12-pounder  howitzers  and 
three  companies  of  Virginia  cavalry  ;  at  McLean's  Ford,  D.  R. 
Jones's  brigade,  with  two  brass  6-pounders  and  one  company  of 
cavalry ;  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  Longstreet's  brigade,  with  two  brass 
6-pounders  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  Bonham's  brigade,  with  Shields's 
and  Delaware  Kemper's  batteries,  and  six  companies  of  cavalry 
under  Colonel  Radford ;  in  the  rear  of  Island,  Ball's  and  Lewis's 
Fords,  Cocke's  brigade,  with  Latham's  battery  and  one  company 
of  cavalry ;  while  Evans's  demi-brigade,  with  four  6-pounders  and 
two  companies  of  cavalry,  held  the  left  flank,  and  protected  the 
stone-bridge  crossing.  Early's  brigade  stood  in  the  rear  of,  and 
as  support  to,  Ewell's. 

Bull  Run  is  a  small  stream  running  in  this  locality,  nearly  from 
west  to  east.  Its  banks,  for  the  most  part,  are  rocky  and  steep. 
The  country  on  either  side,  much  broken  and  wooded,  becomes 
gently  rolling  and  open  as  it  recedes  from  the  stream.  On  the 
northern  side  the  ground  is  much  the  higher  and  completely  com 
mands  the  southern  bank.  Roads  traverse  and  intersect  the  sur 
rounding  country  in  every  direction. 

About  noon,  the  enemy  opened  fire  in  front  of  Mitchell's  Ford, 
with  several  20-pounder  rifled  guns,  at  a  range  of  one  and  a  half 
miles,  to  which  we  had  no  means  of  replying,  with  any  effect. 
But  a  Federal  light  battery,  afterwards  sent  forward,  was  soon 
repulsed,  with  its  supporting  force,  by  Kemper's  battery,  which 
occupied  a  ridge  about  six  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  the  ford. 

Major  Barnard,  in  his  work  already  quoted,  speaking  of  the  un 
toward  incident  we  have  alluded  to,  says  (page  48) :  "We  had 
the  tables  turned  upon  us  by  a  sudden  and  rapid  discharge  from  a 
battery  near  the  ford,  invisible  except  by  the  smoke  of  its  guns." 
And  he  adds :  "  However,  our  20-pounders,  assisted  by  a  battery 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  93 

of  rifled  G-pounders,  proved  too  much  for  it,  and  we  soon  succeeded 
in  silencing  its  fire."  So  well  did  they  succeed,  that,  further  on, 
Major  Barnard  himself  is  compelled  to  use  the  following  language : 
"  This  ought  to  have  been  the  end  of  the  affair,  but  General  Tyler, 
. .  .  persisting  in  the  belief  that  the  enemy  would  run  whenever  men 
aced  by  serious  attack,  had  determined,  I  believe,  to  march  to 
Manassas  that  day.  Had  he  made  a  vigorous  charge  and  crossed 
the  stream  at  once,  it  is  quite  possible  .  .  .  that  he  might  have  suc 
ceeded."  Here,  Major  Barnard's  and  General  Tyler's  success  is 
evidently  dwindling  into  something  else.  He  proceeds  thus : 
"But  he  only  filed  his  brigade  down  to  the  stream,  drew  it  up 
parallel  to  the  other  shore,  and  opened  an  unmeaning  fusilade,  the 
results  of  which  were  all  in  favor  of  the  enemy,  and  before  which, 
overawed  rather  by  the  tremendous  volley  directed  at  them  than 
suffering  heavy  loss,  one  of  the  regiments  broke  in  confusion 
and  the  whole  force  retired.  This  foolish  affair  (called  by  the 
Confederates  the  battle  of  Bull  Hun,  they  applying  the  term 
Manassas  to  the  ensuing  battle  of  the  21st,  which  we  style  the 
battle  of  Bull  Hun),  had  a  marked  effect  upon  the  morale  of  our 
raw  troops." 

Here  we  fail  to  comprehend  Major  Barnard's  conclusions ;  that 
he  attempts  to  palliate  the  defeat  of  the  Federal  forces  on  that 
day,  by  calling  such  a  forward  movement  "  a  foolish  affair,"  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at.  and  for  this  reason  :  the  enemy's  attack  and  its 
result  could  only  have  been  termed  "  battle "  if  our  troops  had 
"  broken  in  confusion,"  instead  of  those  opposing  them.  Major 
Barnard  would  have  shown  better  grace,  however,  had  he  frankly 
admitted  that  attacking  columns,  which,  "overawed  by  the  tre 
mendous  volleys  directed  at  them,"  "break  in  confusion"  and 
retire  from  the  field — as  did  the  "whole  Federal  force  "on  that 
occasion — are  unquestionably  defeated. 

About  the  same  hour  (noon,  on  the  18th),  the  Federals  were  dis 
covered  advancing  also  in  strong  columns  of  infantry,  with  artillery 
and  cavalry,  on  Blackburn's  Ford,  near  which  General  Beauregard 
now  took  position.  Here  the  ground  on  the  northern  side  of  the 
Run,  after  a  narrow  level,  ascends  by  a  steep  slope  to  a  line  of 
heights  commanding  the  entire  southern  side,  which,  for  several 
hundred  yards,  is  almost  a  plain,  and  thence  rises  by  a  gentle  slope 
to  a  wooded  country,  undulating  back  to  Manassas.  After  a  half- 
hour's  cannonade  from  a  battery  of  rifled  guns,  the  column  of 


94  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

attack  (Richardson's  brigade),  over  three  thousand  strong,  with 
Sherman's  brigade  in  immediate  reserve,  appeared  over  the  brow 
of  the  height  which  covered  their  approach,  and  advanced  until 
they  were  but  a  hundred  yards  from  our  skirmishers,  who  were 
posted  among  the  trees  that  lined  the  southern  bank.  A  large 
portion  of  the  Federal  force  approached  through  the  woods,  near 
the  border  of  the  stream,  which  on  that  side  presented  a  thick  cover 
of  trees  and  undergrowth,  and  the  remainder  advanced  along  the 
road,  to  force  the  passage.  Longstreet  met  the  attack  with  about 
twelve  hundred  men,  of  the  1st,  17th,  and  llth  Virginia  Volun 
teers,  and,  after  quite  a  brisk  contest,  repulsed  the  opposing  forces. 
They  rallied  for  a  second  attack,  but  were  again  driven  back,  with 
the  aid  of  the  reserve  companies. 

Two  regiments  and  two  rifled  guns  from  Early's  brigade,  which 
had  been  brought  from  the  right  arid  held  at  even  supporting  dis 
tance  from  the  three  threatened  fords,  were  now  ordered  up.  The 
guns,  placed  in  position  under  concealment  of  the  trees  that 
fringed  the  stream,  directed  their  fire  by  the  sound  of  the  enemy's 
musketry,  already  active  in  a  third  attempt  to  force  the  crossing ; 
which  proved  as  unsuccessful  as  had  the  others.  One  of  the  at 
tacking  regiments  gave  way,  and  was  rallied  a  mile  and  a  half  to 
the  rear.  When  the  remaining  companies  of  Early's  brigade  were 
brought  forward,  and  his  five  additional  guns  were  placed  in  rear 
of  the  other  two — firing  wherever  the  glitter  of  bayonets  along  the 
slope  above  the  tree-tops  showed  the  Federals  to  be  thickest — the 
contest  soon  passed  into  an  artillery  duel,  which  lasted  until  the 
enemy  abandoned  his  ground,  in  full  retreat.  The  Confederate 
loss  was  but  sixty-eight  killed  and  wounded  ;  that  of  the  enemy 
seventy-three,  besides  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  stands  of  arms 
and  a  quantity  of  accoutrements. 

The  result  of  that  action  was  of  great  value  to  us,  as  it  gave  to 
our  army  the  prestige  of  success,  and  the  confidence  which  is  ever 
an  important  element  of  victory. 

General  Beauregard  at  once  reported  the  result  of  the  day  to 
Richmond ;  and  Mr.  Davis  telegraphed  back  an  expression  of  his 
gratification,  informing  General  Beauregard  also  that  a  regiment 
was  on  its  way  to  reinforce  him,  and  that  more  w^ould  go  as  soon 
as  possible. 

It  would  seem,  however,  that  this  first  stroke  of  good  fortune 
was  unduly  estimated  at  the  Confederate  capital ;  for  General 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  95 

Cooper,  on  the  following  day,  telegraphed,  saying  that  General 
Johnston  had  not  been  heard  from,  and  that,  if  the  enemy  had 
abandoned  an  immediate  attack,  and  General  Johnston  had  not 
yet  moved,  he  (General  Beauregard)  had  better  withdraw  his  call 
on  him,  as  the  enemy  was  advised,  at  Washington,  of  the  projected 
movement  of  Generals  Johnston  and  Holmes,  and  mi^ht  vary  his 

O  J 

plans  in  consequence.* 

How  can  this  telegram  be  made  to  tally  with  the  following  pas 
sage,  taken  from  Mr.  Davis's  book  ?  "  As  soon  as  I  became  satis- 
lied  that  Manassas  was  the  objective  point  of  the  enemy's  move 
ment,  I  wrote  to  General  Johnston,  urging  him  to  make  prepara 
tions  for  a  junction  with  General  Beauregard,"  etc.f  Was  he  no 
longer  "  satisfied,"  on  the  19th  of  July,  that  Manassas  was  the  en 
emy's  objective  point  \  If  he  was  not — as  we  are  inclined  to  believe 
is  the  case — the  fact  clearly  shows  how  little  he  knew  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  at  that  time;  if  he  was,  whv  was  he 
bent  upon  reconsidering  his  action  of  July  17th,  as  shown  by  his 
telegram  of  that  day,  to  General  Johnston  ? 

General  Beauregard  was  too  far-seeing,  and  had  made  too  many 
fruitless  attempts  to  force  the  concentration  which  was,  at  last,  to 
be  granted  him,  to  L»o  willing,  of  his  own  accord,  to  counter 
mand  the  long-delayed  order — contingent  though  it  was — forward 
ed  to  General  Johnston.  He  declined  to  act  upon  General  Coop 
er's  strange  suggestion.  Two  days  later  he  covered  the  Southern 
arms  with  glory,  and  won  for  himself  the  proud  and  immortal 
title  of  "  Hero  of  Manassas." 

*  Sec  Appendix  to  this  chapter.  f  Vol.  i.  pp.  345,  340. 


96  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Battle  of  Manassas. — General  J.  E.  Johnston  Assumes  Command,  but  General 
Beauregard  Directs  Operations  and  Fights  the  Battle. — Superiority  of 
Numbers  Against  us. — Deeds  of  Heroism. — Enemy  Completely  Routed. — 
Ordnance  and  Supplies  Captured. — Ours  and  Enemy's  Losses. — Strength 
of  General  McDowell's  Army. — The  Verdict  of  History. 

AFTEK  the  check  received  at  Bull  Run,  on  July  18th,  the  Fed 
eral  army  remained  inactive  throughout  the  19th  and  20th, 
except  in  efforts  to  reconnoitre  and  determine  the  Confederate 
position  and  the  best  point  for  penetrating  or  turning  it.  This 
prolonged  delay,  though  somewhat  unaccountable,  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  was,  certainly,  of  great  advantage  to  General  Beaure 
gard.  It  allowed  General  Holmes  to  reach  the  theatre  of  oper 
ations  in  time,  with  1265  infantry,  6  pieces  of  light  artillery,  and 
a  company  of  cavalry  of  90  men.  General  Johnston  also  arrived, 
about  noon  on  the  20th,  with  Jackson's  brigade,*  2611  strong,  a 
portion  of  Bee's  and  Bartow's  brigades  numbering  2732  bayonets, 
300  of  Stuart's  cavalry,  and  Irnboden's  and  Pendleton's  bat 
teries;  to  which  were  added  Barksdale's  13th  Mississippi  regi 
ment,  which  came  up  from  Lynchburg;  and  Hampton's  Legion, 
600  strong. 

General  Johnston  was  now  the  ranking  officer  at  Manassas ; 
nevertheless,  as  General  Beauregard  had  already  made  all  his 
plans  and  arrangements  for  the  maintenance  of  the  position,  of 
which  General  Johnston  was,  as  yet,  completely  uninformed,  he 
declined  assuming  the  responsibilities  of  the  command  until  after 
the  impending  battle,  but  offered  General  Beauregard  his  personal 
services  on  the  field,  which  were  cordially  accepted.  General 
Beauregard  thereupon  explained  his  plan  of  operations,  which 
was,agreed  to,  and  he  continued  his  active  preparations  for  the 
hourly  expected  conflict. 

The  question  about  to  be  tested  was,  whether  our  great  struggle 

*  This  brigade  reached  Manassas  Junction  the  evening  previous.  So  did, 
at  a  later  hour,  the  7th  and  8th  Georgia  regiments. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  97 

for  independence  should  win  life  and  honor,  or  fail  in  disaster 
and  ruin.  One  or  the  other  would  necessarily  be  the  fate  of  the 
Confederacy.  Heavy,  therefore,  was  the  responsibility  upon  the 
commander  who  stood  ready  to  meet  the  issue.  What  General 
Beauregard  had  urged  upon  the  government,  and  so  earnestly  de 
manded,  had  not  been  accorded ;  the  military  aspect  had  also 
changed  ;  and  he  was  now  forced  to  occupy  that  defensive  position 
which  he  had  tried  his  utmost  to  avoid.  But  McDowell's  appar 
ent  hesitation  in  his  forward  movement,  the  confidence  General 
Beauregard  had  in  his  troops  and  in  the  wisdom  of  his  order  of 
battle,  were  most  encouraging,  and  justified  him  in  looking  hope 
fully  and  fearlessly  to  the  result. 

Our  line  remained  the  same  as  on  the  18th,  except  as  modified 
by  the  distribution  of  the  newly  arrived  reinforcements.  Gen 
eral  Holmes' s  brigade,  the  2d  Tennessee  and  1st  Arkansas  regi 
ments  were  placed  in  rear  of  Ewell.  Early 's  brigade  was  shifted 
from  the  rear  of  Ewell  to  the  rear  of  Jones's  brigade ;  Longstreet 
was  supported  by  Bee's  and  Bartow's  brigades  (of  General  John 
ston's  forces),  posted  at  even  distance  in  rear  of  McLean's  and 
Blackburn's  Fords ;  and,  still  farther  in  the  rear,  was  Barksdale's 
Mississippi  regiment.  Bonham  was  supported  by  Jackson's  brig 
ade  (of  General  Johnston's  forces)  placed  at  even  distance  in  rear 
of  Blackburn's  and  Mitchell's  fords.  Ten  companies  of  infantry, 
two  of  cavalry,  and  a  battery  of  four  0-pounders,  under  Kogers, 
had  been  added  to  Cocke's  brigade,  which  covered  the  remaining 
fords  —  Island,  Ball's  and  Lewis's  —  extending  to  the  right  of 
Evans's  demi-brigade.  The  latter,  which  formed  a  part  of  Cocke's 
command,  held  the  stone  bridge,  and  covered  a  farm  ford,  about 
one  mile  above.  Hampton's  Legion  of  infantry,  which  had  reached 
the  army  that  morning  (20th),  was  at  once  thrown  forward  to  the 
Lewis  House,  as  a  support  to  any  troops  that  might  be  engaged 
in  that  quarter.  Two  companies  of  Radford's  cavalry  were  held 
in  reserve,  in  rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  and  Stuart's  (of  General 
Johnston's  forces) — some  three  hundred  men — occupied  the  level 
ground  in  rear,  from  Bonham's  to  Cocke's  brigades.  Five  pieces 
of  Walton's  battery  were  in  reserve  in  rear  of  Bee's  right,  and 
Pendleton's  in  rear  of  Bonham's  extreme  left. 

The  following  table  shows  the  composition  and  the  total  strength, 
in  men  and  guns,  of  the  Confederate  forces  assembled  on  the  morn- 
ing  of  the  21st,  awaiting  the  conflict : 
L— 7 


98  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

1.  The  Army  of  tho  Potomac,  including  the  garrison  at  Camp 

Pickens,  Manassas 21,833  &  29  guns. 

2.  The  Army  of  the  Shenandoah 6,000  &  20  guns. 

3.  General  Holmes's  forces 1,355  &    6  guns. 

In  all,  2~V88  &  55  guns'. 

One  peculiar  feature  of  the  theatre  of  operations  was  a  direct 
road  running  in  front  of  the  Confederate  positions,  from  the  ex 
treme  right  at  Union  Mills  Ford,  and  trending  off  to  Centrevillc. 
This  was  seized  upon,  and  entered  prominently  into  the  Confed 
erate  plan  of  battle,  as  drawn  up  on  the  night  of  the  20th.  That 
is  to  say,  Ewell,  from  the  extreme  right,  at  Union  Mills  Ford,  was 
to  advance  towards  Centreville  by  that  road,  and,  halting  about 
half -way,  await  communication  from  Jones,  who  was  to  move 
from  McLean's  Ford  and  place  himself  on  the  left  of  Ewell,  await 
ing  in  that  position  communication  from  Longstreet,  who,  by  a 
similar  advance  from  Blackburn's  Ford,  was  to  take  position  on 
the  left  of  Jones,  and  be  joined  on  his  own  left  by  Bonham,  from 
Mitchell's  Ford.  Ewell,  having  the  longest  march,  was  to  begin 

/  C3  cj  O 

the  movement,  and  each  brigade  was  to  be  followed  by  its  re 
serves.  The  several  commanders  were  instructed  in  the  object  of 
the  movement,  which  was  to  pivot  the  line  on  Mitchell's  Ford,  and 
by  a  rapid  and  vigorous  attack  on  McDowell's  left  flank  and  rear, 
at  Centreville,  rout  him  and  cut  off  his  retreat  on  Washington. 
"Sumler" — of  good  omen — was  given  as  a  watchword  to  the  troops. 
In  the  night,  scouts  posted  by  General  Beauregard's  orders  in 
front  of  Evans's  lines  brought  in  the  report  that  McDowell  was 
concentrating  at  Centreville  and  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike, 
leading  thence  to  the  stone  bridge.  As  General  Beauregard  be 
lieved  that  the  repulse  of  the  18th  would  deter  the  Federal  gen 
eral  from  another  attack  on  the  centre,  these  facts,  in  his  opinion, 
pointed  to  a  movement  against  the  left  flank.  In  reality,  Mc 
Dowell  had,  at  first,  intended  to  move  on  the  Confederate  right, 
in  anticipation  of  which,  as  the  most  probable  operation,  the 
strongest  Confederate  brigades  were  posted  in  that  quarter;  but 
the  result  of  further  reconnoissances,  made  with  more  minuteness 
by  the  enemy,  the  day  after  the  engagement  of  Bull  Run,  caused 
an  alteration  of  his  plans,  as  originally  adopted.  As  this  appar 
ent  new  disposition  of  McDowell's  forces  rather  favored  the  exe 
cution  of  the  Confederate  plan  of  battle,  no  change  was  made  by 
General  Beauregard  ;  but,  in  view  of  contingencies,  he  despatched 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGAED.  99 

orders,  by  daybreak,  to  every  command  in  the  lines,  to  be  ready 
to  move  at  a  moment's  notice. 

At  a  very  early  hour  in  the  morning  of  the  21st,  Hunter's  and 
Ileintzelman's  divisions  of  McDowell's  army,  over  sixteen  thousand 
strong,  moved  forward  from  Centreville  by  the  Warrenton  turn 
pike.  Striking  off  to  the  right,  about  half-way  between  Centreville 
and  the  stone  bridge,  they  made  a  circuit  through  a  difficult  forest, 
guided  by  the  trace  of  an  old  road,  to  the  Sudley  Springs  Ford, 
two  miles  above  the  stone  bridge,  with  the  design  of  flanking  the 
Confederate  left  and  taking  possession  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Rail 
road,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  advent  of  General  Johnston,  most  of 
whose  troops,  it  was  known,  had  not  yet  arrived.  Meanwhile, 
Tyler  moved  his  division  down  the  AVarrenton  turnpike  against 
the  stone  bridge,  held  by  the  Confederate  extreme  left,  under 
Colonel  Evans,  in  front  of  whom  he  immediately  deployed  a  por 
tion  of  his  force. 

About  5.30  A.  M.,  report  of  this  latter  demonstration  reached 
General  Beanregard,  who  thereupon  immediately  ordered  Colonel 
Evans,  and,  with  him,  General  Cocke,  to  watch  most  vigilantly  the 
movements  of  the  forces  confronting  them,  and,  if  attacked,  to 
maintain  their  position  at  all  hazards. 

The  surest  and  most  effective  method  of  relieving  our  left, 
General  Beanregard  thought,  was  by  a  rapid,  vigorous  attack  of 
our  right  wing  and  centre  on  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear,  at  Ccn- 
treville,  all  due  precautions  being  first  taken  against  the  advance 
of  any  reserves  from  the  direction  of  Washington.  This  pro 
posed  movement  he  submitted  to  General  Johnston,  who  fully 
approved  of  it,  and  orders  were  forthwith  issued  for  its  execution. 
General  Ewell  was  to  lead  the  movement,  followed  by  Jones, 
Longstreet,  and  Bonham,  with  their  respective  reserves.  Colonels 
Stuart  and  Had  ford  to  be  held  in  hand  and  brought  forward 
whenever  their  assistance  might  be  deemed  necessary. 

*/ 

The  enemy's  extended  line  of  skirmishers  was  now  visible  in 
front  of  Evans,  who  threw  forward  the  two  flank  companies  of 
the  4th  South  Carolina,  and  one  company  of  Wheat's  Louisi 
ana  battalion,  which  were  deployed  as  skirmishers  to  cover  his 
front.  An  occasional  scattering  fire  resulted,  and  for  more  than 
an  hour  did  the  two  confronting  forces  thus  face  one  another;  the 
main  body  of  the  enemy,  meanwhile,  cautiously  advancing  through 
the  forest,  to  take  our  forces  in  flank  and  rear. 


100  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

Colonel  Evans,  being  satisfied  that  the  movement  in  his  front 
was  merely  a  sham,  the  real  object  being  to  turn  his  left,  deter 
mined  (8.30  A.M.)  to  change  his  position  so  as  to  meet  the  enemy, 
and  he  accordingly  ordered  to  his  left  and  rear  six  companies 
of  Sloan's  4th  South  Carolina,  five  of  Wheat's  Louisiana  battal 
ion,  and  two  6-pounders  of  Latham's  battery — leaving  only  four 
of  Sloan's  companies  to  guard  the  stone  bridge :  General  Cocke 
being  first  informed  of  these  changes  and  of  the  reasons  necessi 
tating  them. 

Colonel  Evans  formed  his  line  some  four  hundred  yards  in  rear 
of  the  old  Pittsylvania  Mansion,  but  the  enemy  not  approaching 
by  that  road,  he  marched  across  the  fields  for  three  quarters  of  a 
mile,  and  took  position  mainly  on  the  Brentsville  road,  in  front  of 
what  was  soon  to  be  the  enemy's  line  of  battle.  There  he  waited, 
the  opposing  masses  drawing  nearer  and  nearer. 

We  now  quote  from  General  Beauregard's  official  report,  and 
will  continue  to  do  so  at  intervals  as  we  proceed : 

"  In  the  meantime,  about  7  o'clock  A.M.,  Jackson's  brigade,  with  Imboden's 
and  five  pieces  of  Walton's  battery,  had  been  sent  to  take  up  a  position  along 
Bull  Run  to  guard  the  interval  between  Cocke's  right  and  Bonhain's  left,  with 
orders  to  support  either  in  case  of  need — the  character  and  topographical 
features  of  the  ground  having  been  shown  to  General  Jackson  by  Captain  D. 
B.  Harris,  of  the  Engineers  of  this  army  corps. 

1 '  So  much  of  Bee's  and  Bartow's  brigades — now  united — as  had  arrived — 
some  two  thousand  eight  hundred  muskets — had  also  been  sent  forward  to 
the  support  of  the  position  of  the  stone  bridge. 

"Burnside's  brigade — which  here,  as  at  Fairfax  Court-House,  led  the  ad 
vance — at  about  9.45  A.M.  debouched  from  a  wood  in  sight  of  Evans's  posi 
tion,  some  five  hundred  yards  distant  from  Wheat's  battalion. 

"  He  immediately  threw  forward  his  skirmishers  in  force,  and  they  became 
engaged  with  Wheat's  command,  and  the  6-pounder  gun  under  Lieutenant 
Lcftwich." 

For  upwards  of  an  hour,  with  less  than  eight  hundred  men, 
Sloan's  companies  and  Wheat's  battalion  alone  intrepidly  resisted 
the  mass  of  three  thousand  five  hundred  bayonets  and  eight  pieces 
of  artillery,  including  the  strong  batter}7  of  six  13-pounder  rifled 
guns  of  the  2d  Ehode  Island  volunteers,  and  two  Dahlgren  how 
itzers.  At  the  urgent  call  of  Colonel  Evans,  General  Bee,  with 
his  gallant  command,  came  to  their  assistance.  lie  had  been 
averse  to  leaving  his  position,  which  was  the  true  one  for  the  occa 
sion,  and  had  strongly  advised  Colonel  Evans  to  fall  back  on  his 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  101 

line.  But  realizing  that,  if  not  supported,  such  a  small  force  would 
soon  be  crushed  by  the  overwhelming  numbers  opposed  to  it,  he 
threw  forward  his  entire  command  and  engaged  the  enemy  with 
surpassing  valor,  Imboden's  battery  playing  at  the  same  time  with 
telling  effect. 

O 

"  A  fierce  and  destructive  conflict  now  ensued  "  [says  General  Bcaurcgard]. 
"  The  fire  was  withering  oil  both  sides,  while  the  enemy  swept  our  short,  thin 
lines  with  their  numerous  artillery,  which,  according  to  their  official  reports,  at 
this  time  consisted  of  ten  rifled  guns  and  four  howitzers.  For  one  hour  did 
these  stout-hearted  men  of  the  blended  commands  of  Bee,  Evans,  and  Bar- 
tow  breast  an  uninterrupted  battle-storm,  animated  surely  by  something  more 
than  the  ordinary  courage  of  even  the  bravest  men  under  fire.  It  must  have 
been,  indeed,  the  inspiration  of  the  cause,  and  consciousness  of  the  great  stake 
at  issue,  which  thus  nerved  and  animated  one  and  all  to  stand  uuawed  and 
unshrinking  in  such  extremity." 

Two  brigades  of  Heintzelman's  division,  with  Ricketts's  light 
battery  of  six  10-poundcr  rifled  guns,  now  opened  fire  on  Imbo 
den's  command,  which  had  been  increased  by  two  rifled  pieces 
from  the  Washington  Artillery,  and  two  guns  from  Latham's  bat 
tery. 

Evans's  eleven  companies,  Bee's  and  Bartow's  four  regiments, 
two  companies  of  the  llth  Mississippi,  commanded  by  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Liddle,  and  six  pieces  under  Imboden  and  Richard 
son,  were  the  only  forces  we  had  to  confront  two  divisions  of  four 
strong  brigades,  of  which  seventeen  companies  were  regulars  of 
all  arms.  Despite  this  fearful  disparity  in  numbers  our  troops 
still  maintained  their  position,  constantly  breaking  and  shattering 
the  enemy's  ranks.  But  now  came  Sherman's  and  Keyes's  brigades 
of  Tyler's  division,  six  thousand  strong,  adding  number  to  num 
ber,  and  forcing  our  line  at  last  to  give  way,  though  only  when  or 
dered  to  do  so  by  the  heroic  Bee  himself. 

Our  losses  were  heavy  in  officers  and  men.  The  8th  Georgia 
and  the  4th  Alabama  suffered  terribly.  Colonels  Jones  and  Gar 
diner  were  dangerously  wounded ;  and  many  other  noble-hearted 
patriot  soldiers  there  fell,  killed  or  disabled,  under  the  murderous 
fire  directed  against  them. 

From  Generals  Johnston's  and  Beauregard's  headquarters,  which 
occupied  a  central  position  about  half  a  mile  to  the  rear  of  Mitch 
ell's  Ford,  could  be  distinctly  heard  the  clattering  roll  of  mus 
ketry  and  the  incessant  din  of  artillery,  bearing  witness  to  the 
heavy  onslaught  made  upon  us  on  the  left.  Anxiously,  but  con- 


102  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

fidently,  did  General  Beauregard  await  its  issue,  expectant,  the 
while,  that  similar  sounds  would  soon  be  audible  from  the  right 
and  centre  of  the  line.  Instead  of  which,  at  about  half -past  10 
A.M.,  a  messenger  came  from  General  Ewel],  with  the  disappoint 
ing  news  that  General  Beau  regard's  orders  to  him  for  his  advance 
upon  Centreville,  though  forwarded  quite  early  in  the  morning, 
had  not  yet  reached  him ;  but  that,  in  consequence  of  a  communi 
cation  from  General  D.  K.  Jones,  he  had  thrown  his  brigade  across 
the  stream  at  Union  Mills.  It  was  evidently  too  late  to  undertake 
the  projected  movement.  The  firing  appeared  to  be  still  increasing 
on  the  left,  while  it  would  have  taken  Generals  Ewell  and  Holmes 
from  two  to  three  hours  to  reach  the  position  first  assigned  to 
them.  Other  combinations  became  necessary,  and  were  immedi 
ately  resorted  to. 

"The  movement  of  the  right  and  centre"  [says  General  Beauregard,  in  his 
report],"  already  begun  by  Jones  and  Longstreet,  was  at  once  countermanded, 
with  the  sanction  of  General  Johnston,  and  we  arranged  to  meet  the  enemy 
on  the  field  upon  which  he  had  chosen  to  give  us  battle.  Under  these  cir 
cumstances,  our  reserves  not  already  in  movement  were  immediately  ordered 
up  to  support  our  left  flank,  namely,  Holrnes's  two  regiments,  a  battery  of  ar 
tillery  under  Captain  Lindsay  Walker,  of  six  guns,  and  Early's  brigade.  Two 
regiments  from  Bonham's  brigade,  with  Kemper's  four  6-pounders,  were  also 
called  for ;  and,  with  the  sanction  of  General  Johnston,  Generals  Ewell,  Jones 
(D.R.), Longstreet,  and  Bonhani  were  directed  to  make  a  demonstration  to  their 
several  fronts,  to  retain  and  engross  the  enemy's  reserves  and  forces  on  their 
flank,  and  at  and  around  Centreville.  Previously,  our  respective  chiefs  of 
staff,  Major  Rhett  and  Colonel  Jordan,  had  been  left  at  my  headquarters  to 
hasten  up  and  give  directions  to  any  troops  that  might  arrive  at  Mauassas." 

And  now,  these  orders  having  been  rapidly  despatched,  Gener 
als  Johnston  and  Beauregard  proceeded,  at  full  gallop,  to  the  im- 
diate  field  of  action,  where  they  arrived  just  as  the  forces  under 
Bee,  Bartow,  and  Evans  had  retired  to  a  wooded  ravine  in  rear  of 
the  Robinson  House,  south  of  the  stone  bridge — which  was  then 
gallantly  held  by  the  Hampton  Legion. 

At  this  critical  moment  disaster  stared  us  in  the  face.  Our  men 
seemed  to  have  accomplished  all  that  could  be  accomplished  against 
such  overpowering  numbers ;  and  depression,  added  to  exhaustion, 
was  about  to  destroy  their  over-taxed  endurance.  The  words  of 
the  brigade,  regiment,  and  company  commanders  were  drowned 
by  the  noise  and  confusion,  the  whizzing  of  balls  and  the  explosion 
of  shells.  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  rode  among  the 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGAHD.  103 

troops,  but  even  their  presence  was  unavailing;  when  it  occurred 
to  General  Beauregard  that  the  sight  of  their  regimental  colors, 
borne  to  the  front  by  their  officers,  would  instil  new  vigor  into 
the  men,  and  restore  confidence  and  order  among  them.  He  in 
structed  the  colonels  to  plant  their  colors  fifty  yards  in  advance, 
and  call  upon  their  troops  to  rally  on  them.  This  was  done,  and 
proved  a  complete  success.  Few,  if  any,  of  the  men  remained  be 
hind;  and  an  unbroken  line  of  battle  again  confronted  the  foe. 
It  was  just  before  the  execution  of  this  brilliant  device  of  General 
Beauregard's,  to  the  inspiriting  effect  of  which  may  be  attributed 
the  retrieved  fortune  of  the*  day,  that  General  Bee,  while  address 
ing  his  troops  and  urging  them  forward,  said  of  General  Jackson's 
brigade,  which  had  not  yet  been  engaged,  but  awaited,  unmoved, 
the  attack  of  the  enemy:  "Look  at  Jackson's  brigade;  it  stands 
there  like  a  stone  wall" — memorable  words,  that  consecrated  to 
fame  a  command  whose  invincibility  became  proverbial  under  the 
immortal  hero  who  first  led  it  into  battle. 

While  our  line  was  being  reformed,  and  with  a  view  to  strength 
ening  the  morale  of  the  troops,  both  General  Johnston  and  General 
Beauregard,  riding  abreast  with  the  color-bearer,  led  the  4th  Ala 
bama  on  the  field,  and  directly  engaged  it  with  the  enemy.  This 
gallant  regiment  had  lost  all  its  field-officers ;  seeing  which.  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  shortly  afterwards  intrusted  its  command  to  S.  E. 
Gist,  of  South  Carolina,  a  young  officer  who  had  already  attracted 
his  attention,  and  who  was  then  acting  as  volunteer  aide-de-camp  to 
General  Bee.  The  untiring  energy  and  cool  daring  of  both  Gen 
erals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  as  they  hurried  forth  to  the  points 
needing  their  presence,  produced  a  lasting  impression  on  officers 
and  men  who  witnessed  that  part  of  the  struggle. 

General  Jackson  had  already  moved  up  with  his  brigade  of 
five  Virginia  regiments,  and  taken  position  below  the  brim  of  the 
plateau,  to  the  left  of  the  ravine  where  stood  the  remnants  of  Bee's, 
Bartow's,  and  Evans's  commands.  With  him  were  Imboden's  bat 
tery  and  two  of  Stanard's  pieces,  supported  in  the  rear  by  I.  L. 
Preston's  and  Echolls's  regiments,  by  Harper's  on  the  right,  and  bv 
Allen's  and  Cummings's  on  the  left. 

It  was  now  clearly  demonstrated  that  upon  this  ground  was  the 
battle  to  be  fought.  The  enemy  had  forced  us  upon  it,  and  there 
all  our  available  forces  were  being  concentrated.  This  fact  once 
established,  it  became  evident  that  the  presence  of  both  Generals 


104:  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

Johnston  and  Beauregard  on  the  immediate  scene  of  operations, 
instead  of  being  of  advantage,  might  impede  prompt  action — often 
necessary — by  either  commander.  Moreover,  the  important  work 
of  pressing  forward  the  reserves  and  other  reinforcements  yet 
on  the  way  from  Winchester  was  a  subject  of  great  concern,  and 
could  not  be  attended  to  personally  by  the  general  in  actual  com 
mand.  For  these  reasons,  and  because,  by  mutual  consent,  the 
command  had  been  left  to  General  Beauregard,  who  had  planned 
the  battle  and  knew  every  inch  of  the  country  occupied  by  our 
troops,  it  was  agreed  that  he  should  remain  on  the  field  to  direct 
the  battle,  while  General  Johnston  should  withdraw  some  distance 
to  the  rear,  where  he  could  hurry  forward  the  forces  already  or 
dered  to  the  front,  and  indicate  the  positions  they  were  to  assume. 
General  Johnston  hesitated  before  complying  with  the  request 
that  this  arrangement  should  be  made,  but  finally  yielded,  and 
temporarily  established  himself  at  the  Lewis  House,  before  or  near 
which  most  of  the  forces  called  up  had  to  pass  on  their  way  to 
the  field. 

General  Beauregard  says,  in  his  report: 

"  As  General  Johnston  departed  for  the  Lewis  House,  Colonel  Bartow  re 
ported  to  me  with  the  remains  of  the  7th  Georgia  Volunteers — Gartrell's — 
which  I  ordered  him  to  post  on  the  left  of  Jackson's  line,  in  the  edge  of  a 
belt  of  pines  bordering  the  southeastern  rim  of  the  plateau,  on  which  the  bat 
tle  was  to  rage  so  fiercely. 

"  Colonel  William  Smith's  battalion  of  the  49th  Virginia  Volunteers,  having 
also  come  up,  by  my  orders,  I  placed  it  on  the  left  of  Gartrell's,  as  my  extreme 
left  at  the  time,  llepairing  then  to  the  right,  I  placed  Hampton's  Legion, 
which  had  suffered  greatly,  on  the  flank,  somewhat  to  the  rear  of  Harper's  regi 
ment,  and  also  the  seven  companies  of  the  8th  (Hunter's)  Virginia  regiment, 
which,  detached  from  Cocke's  brigade  by  my  orders  and  those  of  General  John 
ston,  had  opportunely  reached  the  ground.  These,  with  Harper's  regiment, 
constituted  a  reserve  to  protect  our  right  flank  from  an  advance  of  the  enemy 
from  the  quarter  of  the  stone  bridge,  and  served  as  a  support  for  the  line  of  bat 
tle,  which  was  formed  on  the  right  by  Bee's  and  Evans's  commands;  in  the 
centre  by  four  regiments  of  Jackson's  brigade,  with  Imbodens'  four  6-pound- 
ers,  Walton's  five  guns  (two  rifled),  two  guns  (one  rifled)  of  Stanard's,  and 
two  6-pounders  of  Rogcrs's  batteries,  under  Lieutenant  Heaton;  and  on  tin- 
left  by  Gartrell's  reduced  ranks  and  Colonel  Smith's  battalion,  subsequently 
reinforced  by  Faulkner's  2d  Mississippi,  and  by  another  regiment  of  the  Army 
of  the  Shenandoah,  just  arrived  upon  the  field,  the  Gth  (Fisher's)  North  Caro 
lina.  Confronting  the  enemy  at  this  time  my  forces  numbered,  at  most,  not 
more  than  six  thousand  five  hundred  infantry  and  artillerists,  with  but  thirteen 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  two  companies  (Carter's  and  Hoge's)  of  Stuart's  cavalry. 


GENERAL  BEAUHEGAKD.  105 

"  The  enemy's  force,  now  bearing  hotly  and  confidently  down  on  our  posi 
tion,  regiment  after  regiment  of  the  best-equipped  men  that  ever  took  the  field 
— according  to  their  own  history  of  the  day — was  formed  of  Colonels  Hunter's 
and  Heintzelman's  divisions,  Colonels  Sherman's  and  Reyes's  brigades  of  Tyler's 
division,  and  the  formidable  batteries  of  Ricketts,  Griffin,  and  Arnold's  Regu 
lars,  and  2d  Rhode  Island  and  two  Dahlgren  howitzers — a  force  of  over  twen 
ty  thousand  infantry,  seven  companies  of  regular  cavalry,  and  twenty-four 
pieces  of  improved  artillery.  At  the  same  time,  perilous  heavy  reserves  of  in 
fantry  and  artillery  hung  in  the  distance  around  the  stone  bridge,  Mitchell's, 
Blackburn's,  and  Union  Mills  Fords,  visibly  ready  to  fall  upon  us  at  any  mo 
ment  ;  and  I  was  also  assured  of  the  existence  of  other  heavy  corps  at  and 
around  Centreville,  and  elsewhere  within  convenient  supporting  distance." 

"While  posting  his  lines  fur  the  fierce  struggle  about  to  be  re 
newed,  General  Beanregard,  deeply  impressed  with  the  fearful 
odds  against  us,  exhorted  his  troops  to  stand  fast  for  their  homes 
and  the  cause  for  which  they  were  lighting.  Telling  them  that 
reinforcements  would  soon  arrive,  he  urged  them  on  to  "  victory 
or  death."  Ilis  words  were  few,  but  they  inspired  the  men,  who 
dashed  forward  with  re-awakened  ardor. 

The  enemy  had  now  taken  possession  of  the  plateau  which  Gen 
eral  Bee's  forces  had  occupied  in  the  morning,  and,  with  Eicketts's 
battery  of  six  rifled  guns  —  the  pride  of  the  Federal  army — and 
Griffin's  liurht  battery  of  regulars,  besides  others  already  men- 

O  «/  J 

tioned,  opened  a  most  destructive  fire  upon  our  advancing  col 
umns. 

The  plateau  of  which  we  speak,  enclosed  on  three  sides  by  small 
water-courses  emptying  into  Bull  Iltin,  rose  to  an  elevation  of 
one  hundred  feet  above  the  stream.  Its  crest  ran  obliquely  to 
Bull  Ilun,  and  to  the  Brentsville  and  turnpike  roads.  East  and 
west  of  its  brow  could  be  seen  an  unbroken  fringe  of  second- 

O 

growth  pines,  affording  most  excellent  shelter  for  our  sharpshoot 
ers,  who  skilfully  availed  themselves  of  it.  To  the  west  was  a 
broad  belt  of  oaks  extending  across  the  crest,  right  and  left  of 
the  Sudley  road,  where  regiments  of  both  armies  now  met  and 
hotly  contended  for  the  mastery. 

The  ground  occupied  by  our  guns  was  an  open  space  of  limited 
extent,  about  six  hundred  yards  from  the  Henry  House.  Here, 
thirteen  of  our  pieces,  mostly  6-pounders,  were  maintained  in  ac 
tion.  They  displayed  from  the  outset  such  skill  and  accnracj*  of 
aim  as  to  excite  the  terror  no  less  than  the  admiration  of  the  ene 
my.  The  advancing  columns  suffered  severely  from  the  fire  of 


106  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

this  artillery,  assisted  by  our  musketry  on  the  right,  and  part  of 
the  left,  whose  good  fortune  it  was  to  be  under  cover.  Regiment 
after  regiment  of  the  opposing  forces,  thrown  forward  to  dislodge 
us,  was  made  to  break  in  confusion,  never  completely  to  recover 
their  organization  on  that  field.  The  gallant  Stuart,  with  two 
companies  of  his  command,  by  a  sudden  rush  on  the  right  of  the 
enemy,  on  the  Brents ville-Sudley  road,  greatly  added  to  the  dis 
order  our  firing  had  caused.  But  still  fresh  Federal  troops  poured 
in  from  the  immediate  rear,  filling  up  their  broken  ranks  and  mak 
ing  it  plain  that  their  object  was  to  turn  our  position. 

At  2  r.  M.  General  Beauregard,  with  characteristic  promptitude, 
bringing  up  the  whole  right  of  his  line  except  the  reserves,  gave 
the  order  to  recover  the  plateau.  The  movement  was  executed 
with  determination  and  vigor.  It  was  a  bold  one,  and  such  as  the 
exigency  required.  Jackson's  brigade,  veteran-like  and  unwaver 
ing,  now  came  up  and  pierced  the  enemy's  centre,  successfully,  but 
not  without  heavy  loss.  With  equal  intrepidity  the  other  por 
tions  of  the  line  had  joined  in  the  onset,  which  proved  irresistible, 
and  the  lost  ground  was  once  more  ours.  The  enemy  being  strong 
ly  reinforced,  again  rallied,  however,  and,  by  weight  of  numbers, 
re-occupied  the  contested  plateau  and  stood  ready  to  resume  the 
attack. 

Between  2.30  and  3  r.  M.,  just  as  the  reinforcements  sent  for 
ward  by  General  Johnston  reached  the  field,  General  Beauregard 
—resolved  upon  dislodging  the  enemy — had  brought  up  his  en 
tire  line,  including  the  reserves,  wrhicli  he  led  in  person.  It  was 
a  general  attack,  shared  in  by  every  command  then  on  the  ground 
—Fisher's  North  Carolina,  which  had  just  arrived,  being  among 
them.  The  whole  open  space  was  taken  by  storm  and  swept  clear 
of  the  enemy,  and  the  plateau  around  the  Henry  and  Robinson 
Houses,  ever  memorable  in  history,  remained  finally  in  our  posses 
sion.  The  greater  part  of  Ricketts's  and  Griffin's  batteries  were 
captured,  with  a  flag  of  the  1st  Michigan  regiment,  Sackson's  bri 
gade.  Many  were  the  deeds  of  valor  accomplished  during  this 
part  of  the  day ;  but  many,  also,  the  irreparable  losses  the  Confed 
eracy  had  now  to  mourn.  The  heroic  Bee  fell,  mortally  wounded, 
at  the  head  of  the  4th  Alabama;  so  did  the  intrepid  Bartow,  while 
leading  the  7th  Georgia.  Colonel  Thomas,  of  General  Johnston's 
staff,  was  killed  ;  so  was  Colonel  Fisher,  whose  regiment — as  gal 
lant  as  its  leader — was  terribly  shattered. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  107 

Withers's  28th  regiment  of  Cocke's  brigade,  with  Hampton's 
Legion,  followed  the  charge,  and  captured  several  rifled  pieces, 
which  were  instantly  turned  against  the  enemy  with  effect. 

While  the  Federal  troops  had  been  driven  back  on  our  right, 
across  the  turnpike  and  beyond  Young's  Branch,  the  woods  on  our 
left  yet  swarmed  with  them.  Just  then  arrived,  most  opportunely, 
Kershaw's  2d  and  Cash's  8th  South  Carolina  regiments.  They 
were  led  through  the  oaks,  east  of  the  Sudlcy-Brentsville  road, 
where,  after  sweeping  the  enemy  before  them,  they  took  up  a 
commanding  position  on  the  west,  and  opened  a  galling  fire  upon 
those  commands — including  the  regular  infantry — which  had  ral 
lied  in  the  southwest  angle  of  the  plateau,  under  cover  of  a  strong 
Federal  brigade.  Kemper's  battery,  evolving  northward  by  the 
same  road,  joined  with  signal  effect  in  the  attack  on  the  enemy's 
rteht.  Preston's  38th  regiment  of  Cocke's  brigade  had  also  come 

o  o  o 

up.  It  encountered  some  Michigan  troops  on  the  way,  and  cap 
tured  Colonel  Wilcox,  their  brigade  commander. 

Our  army  had  received  another  important  reinforcement.  While 
these  stirring  events  were  taking  place  (3  P.M.)  part  of  Brigadier- 
General  Kirby  Smith's  command,  some  seventeen  hundred  infan 
try  of  Elzey's  brigade,  and  Beckham's  battery,  were  seen  hurrying 
to  the  field,  from  Camp  Pickens  (Manassas),  where  they  had  ar 
rived  by  rail,  two  or  three  hours  before.  General  Johnston  had 
directed  them  to  the  left  of  our  line,  where  he  thought  reinforce 
ments  were  most  needed.  Just  as  they  reached  their  position, 
south  of  the  Henry  House,  General  Smith  was  severely  wounded, 
and  compelled  to  retire  to  the  rear.  II is  place  was  filled  by 
Colonel  Elzey,  an  officer  of  merit,  who  displayed  great  discern 
ment  in  selecting  the  ground  for  the  battery  attached  to  his  com 
mand.  Its  accurate  firing,  under  Lieutenant  Beckham,  occasioned 
much  damage  to  the  Federal  right. 

Colonel  Early,  who  should  have  moved  up  with  his  command,  at 
noon,  did  not  receive  the  order  to  do  so  until  2  P.M.  He  appeared 
upon  the  field  just  after  Elzey,  with  Kemper's  7th  Virginia, 
Hay's  7th  Louisiana,  and  Barksdale's  13th  Mississippi.  He 
was  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  near  Chinn's  House,  fiankin"- 

o 

the  enemy's  right.  The  clouds  of  dust  raised  by  the  advance  of 
his  force,  in  a  direction  from  which  none  of  our  troops  were  ex 
pected  at  the  time,  had  caused  the  keenest  anxiety  to  General 
Beauregard,  who  thought  it  might  be  another  column  of  the 


108  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

enemy  threatening  to  turn  his  left.  There  being. then  no  breeze, 
the  flags,  hanging  heavily  to  their  staffs,  could  not  be  distinguished, 
even  through  field-glasses.  At  last,  and  as  General  Beauregard 
was  about  to  make  preparations  to  meet  this  new  foe,  a  propitious 
breath  of  air  spread  out  the  colors  of  one  of  the  advancing  regi 
ments — the  13th  Mississippi — at  that  time  so  similar  in  design 
to  the  United  States  flag.  To  the  intense  relief  of  all,  it  was  now 
ascertained  that  the  column  was  Early's  gallant  command,  hurry 
ing  on,  with  all  possible  speed,  towards  the  point  from  which  was 
heard  the  heaviest  firing. 

At  about  3.30  P.M.  the  enemy,  driven  back  on  their  left  and 
centre,  had  formed  a  line  of  battle  of  gigantic  proportions,  crescent- 
like  in  form,  from  the  old  Carter  Mansion  to  Chinn's  House. 
"  The  woods  and  fields  " — says  General  Beauregard — "  were  filled 
with  masses  of  infantry  and  carefully  preserved  cavalry.  It  was 
a  truly  magnificent  though  redoubtable  spectacle,  as  they  threw  for 
ward,  in  fine  style,  on  the  broad,  gentle  slope  of  the  ridge  occupied 
by  their  main  lines,  a  cloud  of  skirmishers,  preparatory  to  another 
attack. 

''But  as  Early  formed  his  line  and  Beckham's  pieces  played 
upon  the  right  of  the  enemy,  Elzey's  brigade,  Gibbon's  10th  Vir 
ginia,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Stuart's  1st  Maryland  and  Vaughn's  3d 
Tennessee  regiments,  and  Cash's  8th  and  Kershaw's  2d  South 
Carolina,  Withers's  13th  and  28th  Virginia,  advanced  in  an  irregu 
lar  line,  almost  simultaneously,  with  great  spirit,  from  their  several 
positions  upon  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  enemy  in  their  quarter 
of  the  field.  At  the  same  time,  too,  Early  resolutely  assailed  their 
right  flank  and  rear.  Under  this  combined  attack  the  enemy  was 
soon  forced,  first,  over  the  narrow  plateau  in  the  southern  angle, 
made  by  the  two  roads  so  often  mentioned,  into  a  patch  of  woods 
on  its  western  slope,  thence  over  Young's  Branch  and  the  turn 
pike  into  the  fields  of  the  Dogan  Farm,  and  rearward,  in  extreme 
disorder,  in  all  available  directions  towards  Bull  Run.  The  rout 
had  now  become  general  and  complete." 

As  soon  as  General  Beauregard  had  ascertained  that  final  vic 
tory  was  ours,  lie  ordered  all  the  forces  then  on  the  field  to  fol 
low  in  active  pursuit  upon  the  heels  of  the  enemy.  With  a  proud 
and  happy  feeling  of  elation  at  the  issue  of  the  day,  he  then  rode 
to  the  Lewis  House  to  inform  General  Johnston  of  the  glorious  re 
sult,  and,  as  had  been  agreed — the  battle  being  now  over — to  com- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  109 

mit  to  Lis  hands  the  command  of  our  united  forces.  The  inter 
view  was  a  short  one,  and  General  Beauregard,  anxious  to  reap  the 
full  benefit  of  the  victor}1,  hurried  to  the  front  to  press  the  pursuit. 

Early's  brigade,  with  the  19th  Virginia  regiment,  followed  the 
panic-stricken  fugitive  enemy.  Stuart  and  Beckham  had  also 
thrown  their  men  forward  along  the  road  by  which  the  flying  col 
umns  had  so  confidently  inarched  to  the  field  that  morning;  but 
the  prisoners  so  encumbered  their  way  as  to  force  them  soon  to 
give  up  the  pursuit.  Kershaw's,  AVithers's,  Preston's,  and  Cash's 
regiments,  Hampton's  Legion  and  Kemper's  battery,  attached  to 
Ivcrshaw,  rushed  forward  on  the  Warrenton  road,  by  the  stone 
bridge,  where  Kershaw's  command  captured  a  number  of  pieces 
of  artillery.  "  The  enemy,"  says  General  Beauregard  in  his  re 
port,  "having  opportunely  opened  a  way  for  them  through  the 
heavy  abattis  which  my  troops  had  made  on  the  west  side  of  the 
bridge,  several  days  before." 

The  pursuit  of  the  eneimT,  the  result  of  which  might  have  more 
than  doubled  the  importance  of  our  victory,  was  not  further  con 
tinued  that  evening.  A  false  report  which  had  reached  General 
Beauregard,  on  his  way  to  the  front,  necessitated  at  once  a  com 
plete  change  in  the  character  of  his  orders.  From  Manassas,  rid 
ing  at  full  speed,  had  come  a  messenger,  sent  to  General  Beaure 
gard  by  Major  Thomas  G.  Khctt,  of  General  Johnston's  staff,  with 
the  startling  information  that  the  enemy's  reserves,  composed  of 
fresh  troops,  and  in  considerable  force,  had  penetrated  our  lines 
at  Union  Mills  Ford,  and  were  marching  on  Manassas.  The  re 
port  did  not  originate  with  Major  Illicit,  but  had  been  brought  to 
him  by  the  adjutant  of  General  D.  II.  Jones,  in  person. 

No  sooner  had  this  unwelcome  news  been  received  than  General 
Beauregard,  without  the  loss  of  a  moment,  rode  back  to  the  Lewis 
House,  saw  General  Johnston,  agreed  with  him  as  to  what  meas 
ures  should  be  adopted  for  the  emergency,  and,  mounting  a  fresh 
horse  (the  fourth  on  that  day,  one  of  them  having  been  killed 
under  him  by  the  explosion  of  a  shell,  while  he  was  giving  in 
structions  to  General  Jackson),  he  proceeded  at  once  to  the  point 
reported  to  be  threatened,  ordering  thither  E well's  and  Ilolmes's 
brigades,  which  had  just  come  up  to  the  Lewis  House.  With  these 
troops  he  proposed  to  attack  the  enemy  vigorously  before  he 
should  effect  a  lodgment  on  our  side  of  Bull  Hun.  He  asked  also 
for  such  reinforcements  as  could  be  spared  from  the  pursuit. 


HO  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

As  General  Beanregard  reached  the  vicinity  of  Union  Mills  Ford, 
towards  dark,  he  ascertained,  with  mingled  feelings  of  joy  and  re 
gret,  that  the  troops  which  had  been  seen  advancing  from  that 
direction  were  none  other  than  those  belonging  to  the  command 
of  General  Jones,  originally  posted  near  McLean's  Ford.  General 
Jones  had  crossed  Bull  Run  at  that  point,  in  the  morning,  as  al 
ready  stated,  to  aid  in  the  projected  attack  by  our  right  and  centre 
on  the  enemy,  at  Centreville ;  but  had  been  ordered  back,  in  con 
sequence  of  the  movements  against  our  left.  In  obedience  to 
new  instructions,  he  was  again  thrown  across  Bull  Run,  to  make 
demonstrations  against  the  enemy  from  a  quarter  supposed  by 
him  to  be  unguarded.  His  advance  was  most  gallantly  effected ; 
and  not  only  did  the  brisk  firing  of  his  brigade  drive  the  enemy's 
infantry  to  cover,  but  the  bold,  unexpected  movement  was  greatly 
instrumental  in  spreading  the  panic  which  finally  disbanded  the 
Federal  army.  His  command  was  on  the  march  to  resume  its 
former  position,  behind  Bull  Run,  when  thus  mistaken  for  the 
enemy.  It  should  here  be  added,  in  explanation  of  this  unfortu 
nate  error,  that  the  uniforms  of  General  Jones's  men  differed  very 
slightly  from  those  of  the  Northern  troops  —  a  fact  of  no  small 
significance,  which  had  already  embarrassed  many  a  Confederate 
officer,  during  the  day,  particularly  on  the  arrival  of  General 
Early 's  forces  on  the  field. 

After  this  mishap  and  the  causes  leading  to  it  had  been  fully 
explained,  it  was  too  late  to  resume  the  pursuit,  as  night  had 
then  set  in.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  besides,  that  our  troops 
had  been  marching  and  counter-marching  since  early  morning — 
"  most  of  the  time,"  says  General  Beanregard,  "  without  water 
and  without  food,  except  a  hastily  snatched  meal  at  dawn  " — and 
that,  when  not  thus  marching,  they  had  been  fighting  against  a 
determined  foe,  at  some  points  more  than  three  times  their  su 
perior  in  number.  Well,  therefore,  were  the  Confederate  troops 
of  Manassas  entitled  to  rest,  that  evening,  on  the  laurels  they  had 
so  gallantly  yet  so  dearly  won.  Few,  however,  enjoyed  the  privi 
lege  afforded  them  ;  so  wakeful  had  success  made  both  officers  and 
men,  so  carried  away  were  they  by  the  glorious  victory  achieved. 

While  retracing  his  steps  towards  the  Lewis  House,  General  Beau- 
regard  was  informed  that  President  Davis  and  General  Johnston 
had  both  gone  to  Manassas.  He  repaired  thither  and  found  them, 
between  half-past  nine  and  ten  o'clock,  at  his  headquarters. 


GENERAL   BEAUUEGARD.  HI 

The  President,  who,  upon  approaching  the  field,  accompanied 
by  Colonel  Jordan,  of  General  Beauregard's  staff,  had  felt  quite 
despondent  at  the  signs  of  defeat  which  he  thought  he  saw  in  the 
groups  of  stragglers  and  fugitives — fragments  thrown  out  from  the 
heat  and  collision  of  battle — came  up  just  in  time  to  witness  the 
rout  and  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  He  was  greatly  elated  over  the 
victory,  and  was  profuse  in  his  compliments  to  the  generals  and  the 
troops.  After  listening  to  General  Beauregard's  account  of  the  bat 
tle,  he  proposed  that  a  brief  despatch  be  sent  to  the  "NVar  Depart 
ment,  which  was  done,  that  very  night,  in  the  following  words: 

<;  MANASSAS,  July  21^,  1861. 

"  Night  has  closed  upon  a  hard-fought  field.  Our  forces  have  won  a  glori 
ous  victory.  The  enemy  was  routed,  and  fled  precipitately,  abandoning  a 
very  large  amount  of  arms,  munitions,  knapsacks,  and  baggage.  The  ground 
was  strewn  for  miles  with  those  killed,  and  the  farm-houses  and  the  ground 
around  were  tilled  with  his  wounded.  The  pursuit  was  continued  along  several 
routes  towards  Lecsburg  and  Centreville,  until  darkness  covered  the  fugitives. 
We  have  captured  several  field-batteries  and  regimental  standards  and  one 
United  States  flag.  Many  prisoners  liavc  been  taken.  Too  high  praise  can 
not  be  bestowed,  whether  for  the  skill  of  the  principal  officers,  or  for  the  gal 
lantry  of  all  the  troops.  The  battle  was  mainly  fought  on  our  left,  several 
miles  from  our  field  works.  Our  force  engaged  them  not  exceeding  iifieen 
thousand;  that  of  the  enemy  estimated  at  thirty-live  thousand. 

••JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

The  list  of  the  ordnance  and  supplies  captured  from  the  enemy, 
merely  alluded  to  in  the  foregoing  despatch  to  General  Cooper,  in 
cluded  twenty-eight  field-pieces,  of  the  best  character  of  arms, 
with  over  one  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition  fur  each  gun  ;  thirtv- 
seven  caissons;  six  forges;  four  battery  wagons;  sixty-four  artil 
lery  horses,  completely  equipped;  live  hundred  thousand  rounds 
of  small-arms  ammunition;  four  thousand  five  hundred  sets  of 
accoutrements;  over  five  hundred  muskets;  nine  regimental  flags; 
a  large  number  of  pistols,  knapsacks,  swords,  canteens,  and  blank 
ets  ;  a  great  many  axes  and  intrenching  tools  ;  wagons,  ambulances, 
hospital  stores,  and  not  a  small  quantity  of  subsistence.  We  also 
captured  fully  sixteen  hundred  prisoners,  including  those  who  re 
covered  from  their  wounds. 

Our  loss  in  this  memorable  battle  was  computed  as  follows : 
Killed,  309  ;  wounded,  1483  ;  making  an  aggregate  of  1852.  This 
statement  is  taken  from  General  Beanregard's  report.  In  Gener 
al' Johnston's  report,  written  from  Fairfax  Court-House,  the  result 


112  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

was  summed  up  in  this  wise  :  Killed,  378 ;  wounded,  1489 ;  miss 
ing,  30 ;  aggregate,  1897. 

The  enemy's  loss  was  not  officially  acknowledged  at  the  time. 
The  feeling  which  had  led  the  .Northern  press  to  conceal  the  real 
strength  of  General  McDowell's  army  seems  also  to  have  impelled 
the  enemy  to  withhold  a  true  statement  of  his  casualties. 

In  his  report,  so  often  quoted  from — the  whole  of  which  ap 
pears  in  the  appendix  to  this  chapter — General  Beauregard  says : 
"  The  actual  loss  of  the  enemy  will  never  be  known — it  may  now 
only  be  conjectured.  Their  abandoned  dead,  as  they  were  buried 
by  our  people  where  they  fell,  unfortunately  were  not  enumerated, 
but  many  parts  of  the  field  were  thick  with  their  corpses  as  but 
few  battle-fields  have  ever  been.  The  official  reports  of  the 
enemy  are  studiously  silent  on  this  point,  but  still  afford  us 
data  for  an  approximate  estimate.  Left  almost  in  the  dark  in 
respect  to  the  losses  of  Hunter's  and  Heintzelman's  divisions — 
first,  longest,  and  most  hotly  engaged  —  we  are  informed  that 
Sherman's  brigade,  Tyler's  division,  suffered,  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing,  609 — that  is,  about  eighteen  per  cent,  of  the  bri 
gade.  A  regiment  of  Franklin's  brigade — Gorman's — lost  twenty- 
one  per  cent.  Griffin's  (battery)  loss  was  thirty  per  cent.,  and 
that  of  K  eyes' s  brigade,  which  was  so  handled  by  its  commander 
as  to  be  exposed  to  only  occasional  volleys  from  our  troops,  was  at 
least  ten  per  cent.  To  these  facts  add  the  repeated  references  in 
the  reports  of  the  reticent  commanders  to  the  'murderous'  fire 
to  which  they  were  habitually  exposed,  the  'pistol-range'  volleys 
and  galling  musketry,  of  which  they  speak  as  scourging  their 
ranks,  and  we  are  warranted  in  placing  the  entire  loss  of  the  Fed 
erals  at  over  forty '-Jive  hundred  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners. 
To  this  may  be  legitimately  added,  as  a  casualty  of  the  battle, 
the  thousands  of  fugitives  from  the  field,  who  never  rejoined  their 
regiments,  and  who  were  as  much  lost  to  the  enemy's  service  as 
if  slain  or  disabled  by  wounds.  These  may  not  be  included  under 
the  head  of  '  missing,'  because  in  every  instance  of  such  report  we 
took  as  many  prisoners  of  those  brigades  or  regiments  as  are  re 
ported  '  missing.'  "  In  his  report,  General  Johnston,  confirming 
General  Beauregard's  estimate,  says :  "  The  loss  of  the  enemy 
could  not  be  ascertained.  It  must  have  been  between  four  and 
five  thousand." 

It  is  not  our  purpose  to  dwell  at  any  length  on  that  part  of  a 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  H3 

subject  which,  to  us,  appears  of  but  minor  importance  in  compar 
ison  with  the  real  question  at  issue,  to  wit — the  result  of  the  bat 
tle  of  Manassas,  or,  in  other  words,  the  acknowledged  victory  of 
the  Confederate  forces  over  an  army  vastly  superior  in  point  of 
number,  armament,  and  equipment. 

The  reader  is  already  informed  of  the  correct  strength  of  our 
united  forces,  on  the  morning  of  the  21st  July.  It  was  increased 
by  1TOO  infantry,  and  a  battery,  on  the  arrival  of  part  of  General 
Kirby  Smith's  command,  at  3.30  r.  M.,  which  would  bring  up  our 
aggregate  to  30,SSS  of  all  arms.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  how 
ever,  that  the  commands  of  Generals  Holmes  and  Ewell,  aggre 
gating  at  least  3000  men,  though  mentioned  on  our  field  returns 
as  present  at  and  around  Manassas,  were  never  directly  engaged 
with  the  enemy  on  that  day. 

General  Beaure^ard  estimates  as  follows  the  numerical  strength 

O  O 

of  the  Federal  forces  against  us.  AVc  quote  from  his  report: 
"Making  all  allowances  for  mistakes,  we  are  warranted  in  saying 
that  the  Federal  army  consisted  of  at  \c^i  fifty-five  regiments  of 
volunteers,  eight  companies  of  regular  infantry,  four  of  marines, 
nine  of  the  regular  cavalry,  and  twelve  batteries,  numbering  to 
gether  one  hundred  and  nineteen  guns.  These  regiments,  at  one 
time,  .  .  .  numbered,  in  the  aggregate,  fifty-four  thousand  one 
hundred  and  forty,  and  averaged  nine  hundred  and  sixty-four 
men  each."  Deducting  as  many  as  one  hundred  and  sixty-four 
per  regiment,  for  the  sick,  and  men  on  detached  service,  the  aver 
age  would  then  be  reduced  to  eiyht  hundred  man.  Adding,  now, 
the  different  commands  of  regulars  of  all  arms,  mentioned  above, 
and  the  aggregate  of  the  Federal  army  opposing  us  at  Manassas 
could  not  have  been  less  i\&i\  fifty  thousand  men. 

The  facts  that  have  transpired  one  by  one,  gradually  throwing 
light  upon  this  point,  have  already  fallen  within  the  domain  of 
history,  and  show,  conclusively,  in  spite  of  the  extreme  reticence  of 
many  Federal  commanders,  that  an  army  fifty  thousand  strong, 
under  General  McDowell,  was  defeated  and  routed,  nt  Manassas, 
on  the  21st  of  July,  1861,  by  less  than  thirty  thousand  Confeder 
ate  troops,  under  the  immediate  command,  before  and  during  the 
battle,  of  General  G.  T.  Beauregard. 
I.— 8 


114:  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  X. 

President  Davis  and  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  Discuss  the  Propriety 
of  Pursuing  the  Enemy  during  the  Night  following  the  Battle. — Error  of 
Mr.  Davis  as  to  the  Order  he  Wrote. — On  the  22d  General  Beauregard  As 
signs  his  Troops  to  New  Positions. — The  President  Confers  the  Rank  of 
General  on  General  Beauregard,  subject  to  the  Approval  of  Congress. — On 
the  25th,  Address  Issued  to  Troops  by  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard. 
— Organization  of  General  Bcauregard's  Army  into  Brigades. — Impossi 
bility  of  any  Military  Movement  of  Importance,  and  Why. — Army  With 
out  Transportation  and  Without  Subsistence. — Colonel  Northrop  Appoints 
Major  W.  B.  Blair  as  Chief  Commissary  of  the  Army. — General  Beauregard 
Informs  the  President  of  the  Actual  State  of  Affairs. — Colonel  Lee  to  the 
President. — General  Beauregard  to  Colonels  Chestnut  and  Miles. — His 
Telegram  to  Colonel  Myers. — Answer  of  President  Davis. — General  Beau- 
regard's  Reply. — Colonel  Myers  alleges  Ignorance  of  Want  of  Transporta 
tion  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. — General  Beauregard's  Answer. — Cause 
of  the  Failure  of  the  Campaign. — Effect  of  General  Beaurcgard's  Letter 
upon  Congress. — An  Apparent  Improvement  in  Commissary  and  Quarter 
master  Departments. — General  Beauregard  Complains  again  on  the  23d 
of  August. — No  Action  Taken. — Suggests  Removal  of  Colonel  Northrop. 
— The  President  believes  in  his  Efficiency,  and  Upholds  him. — Fifteen 
and  Twenty  Days'  Rations  asked  for  by  General  Beauregard. 

TOWARDS  1.1  P.M.,  on  the  day  of  the  battle,  while  President 
Davis,  at  General  Beauregard's  headquarters,  was  engaged  in  writ 
ing  the  despatch  to  General  Cooper  given  in  the  preceding  chap 
ter,  information  was  received,  through  Captain  Hill,  of  General 
Johnston's  forces,  that  the  enemy,  at  Centreville,  was  in  a  com 
plete  state  of  demoralization,  and  in  full  flight  towards  Washing 
ton.  Upon  learning  this,  President  Davis,  with  great  animation, 
urged  the  necessity  of  an  immediate  pursuit  by  General  Bonham's 
forces,  which,  with  General  Longstreet's  brigade,  were  then  in  the 
closest  proximity  to  Centreville.  After  a  brief  discussion  of  the 
matter  between  the  President  and  Generals  Johnston  and  Beaure 
gard,  it  was  agreed  that,  as  Captain  Hill's  informal  report  was  not 
sufficiently  authenticated,  and  the  troops  were  fatigued  and  with 
out  rations,  the  suggestion  made  should  not  be  acted  upon  ;  no 
order,  therefore,  was  issued  for  its  execution. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGAKD.  H5 

Mr.  Davis's  memory,  that  such  an  order  was  actually  dictated  by 
him,  and  modified  as  to  the  hour  of  its  execution,  is  clearly  at 
fault.  This  is  shown  by  Colonel  (afterwards  General)  Jordan's 
letter,  referred  to  by  Mr.  Davis  himself,  as  the  authority  for  his 
assertion  to  that  effect.  That  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard 
kept  no  copy  of  an  order  that  fell  still-born  from  the  lips  of  tlit.' 
President,  is  not  to  be  wondered  at ;  and  Colonel  Jordan,  no  doubt 
— and  very  naturally — destroyed  it  as  soon  as  it  was  penned,  there 
having  been,  as  he  says,  "  a  unanimous  decision  against  it."  From 
this  expression  we  infer  that  Mr.  Davis,  no  less  than  the  two  gen 
erals,  acknowledged  the  uselessness  of  the  order. 

There  was  no  other  order  for  pursuit  given,  or  spoken  of,  that 
night.  So  says  General  Beauregard;  so  says  Colonel  Jordan,  his 
chief  of  staff;  so  would  undoubtedly  say  General  Johnston,  who 
was  opposed  to  any  further  immediate  advance  of  our  troops  after 
the  battle.  The  order  dictated  substantially  to  Colonel  Jordan, 
and  condemned  and  abandoned  without  being  "despatched,"'  is 
the  only  order  with  which  Mr.  Davis  had  anything  to  do  on  the 
night  of  the  21st  of  July.  Colonel  Jordan,  in  the  letter  quoted  by 
Mr.  Davis,  says  :  "  This  was  the  only  instance  during  Mr.  Davis's 
stay  at  Manassas  in  which  lie  exercised  any  voice  as  to  the  move 
ment  of  the  troops.  Profoundly  pleased  with  the  results  achieved, 
.  .  .  his  bearing  towards  the  generals  who  commanded  them  was 
eminently  proper,  as  I  have  testified  on  a  former  occasion  ;  and  I 
repeat,  he  certainly  expressed  or  manifested  no  opposition  to  a  for 
ward  movement,  nor  did  he  display  the  least  disposition  to  inter 
fere,  by  opinion  or  authority,  touching  what  the  Confederate  forces 
should  or  should  not  do.'1 

An  "  order  to  the  same  effect,"  says  Mr.  Davis  (that  is,  an  order 
for  pursuit,  modified  by  him,  and  by  him  deferred  till  the  next 
day,  at  early  dawn), "  was  sent''  by  General  Beauregard,  "on  the 
night  of  the  21st  of  July,  .  .  .  for  a  copy  of  which"  Mr.  Davis 
is  "indebted  to  the  kindness  of  that  chivalrous  gentleman,  soldier, 
and  patriot,  General  Bonham."  f 

This  is  another  error. 

The  order  sent  to  General  Bonham  by  General  Beauregard,  and 
given  in  full  in  Mr.  Davis's  book,  J  was  not  for  the  pursuit  of  the 


*  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,'1  vol.  i.  p.  354. 
t  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  355.  J  Ibid.  vol.  i.  pp.  355,  35G. 


116  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

enemy,  but  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  reconnoissance — of  afford 
ing  assistance  to  our  wounded,  and  of  collecting  "  all  the  arms,  am 
munition,  and  abandoned  stores,  subsistence,  and  baggage,"  that 
could  be  found  "  on  the  road  in  our  front  towards  Centreville," 
and  on  other  roads  by  which  the  enemy  had  retreated  towards 
the  stone  bridge  and  Sudley's  Mills. 

Whoever  reads  the  order  here  referred  to  cannot  fail  to  see, 
from  its  very  phraseology,  that  it  conveys  no  such  meaning  as  Mr. 
Davis  is  pleased  to  ascribe  to  it.  For  the  order  required  that  Gen 
eral  Bonham  should  take  with  him  "a  vast  amount  of  transporta 
tion,"  which,  of  itself,  would  have  impeded  the  pursuit.  And  Mr. 
Davis  acknowledges  that  "  the  22d,  the  day  after  the  battle,  was 
spent  in  following  up  the  line  of  the  retreating  foe,  and  collecting 
the  large  supplies  of  arms,  of  ammunition,  and  other  military 
stores."  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that,  at  the  time  mentioned 
by  Mr.  Davis,  General  Johnston  was  already  in  actual  command 
of  our  united  forces,  and  that  General  Beauregard  had,  therefore, 
no  authority  to  issue  any  such  orders.  Strange,  indeed,  would  it 
have  been  that  the  general  second  in  command  should  have  sent 
his  troops,  or  part  of  his  troops,  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  when  he 
knew  that  his  superior  in  rank  had  expressed  strong  opposition  to 
any  immediate  advance  on  our  part,  and  had  declared  it  utterly 
impracticable. 

Just  then,  General  Johnston  was  correct  in  his  judgment.  Our 
troops — even  those  that  had  taken  no  part  in  the  battle — were 
more  or  less  exhausted  by  marches  and  countermarches,  and  our 
cavalry  was  evidently  too  insignificant  in  number  to  admit  of  any 
serious  hope  of  an  effectual  pursuit  that  night,  or  even  the  next 
morning.  Another  obstacle,  of  no  minor  importance,  intervened, 
which  was  sufficient  of  itself  to  cut  short  all  idea  of  then  following 

O 

the  routed  Federal  army.  On  the  evening  of  the  21st,  at  about 
nine  o'clock,  the  heavens  began  to  assume  a  threatening  appear 
ance,  and,  a  few  hours  later,  a  heavy  rain  fell,  which  lasted  unre 
mittingly  throughout  the  whole  of  the  succeeding  day.  Mean 
while,  our  troops  were  without  provisions,  and  had  no  means  of 
transportation.  The  railroad  bridge  across  Bull  Run  had  been  de 
stroyed,  too,  and  its  reconstruction  was  indispensable  to  open  the 
way  for  a  farther  advance,  which,  thus  deferred,  could  no  longer 


*  "Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  359. 


GENERAL  BEAUEEGARD.  117 

be  called  a  pursuit.  The  fact  is,  the  pursuit  ordered  by  General 
Beauregard,  at  the  close  of  the  buttle,*  having  been  stopped  at 
about  6.30  P.M.,  in  consequence  of  the  false  alarm  referred  to  in 
the  preceding  chapter,  no  movement  that  night  could  have  met 
with  a  successful  result.  It  should  have  been  instantly  and  vigor 
ously  made,  "  on  the  very  heels  of  the  flying  enemy ;"  and,  even 
then,  it  could  not  have  been  kept  up  long  tinder  the  circum 
stances. 

At  pages  359,  360,  of  the  first  volume  of  his  work,  Mr.  Davis 
says:  "On  the  night  of  the  22d  I  held  a  second  conference  with 
Generals  Johnston  andBeauregard,  .  .  .  and  propounded  to  them 
the  inquiry  as  to  what  more  it  was  practicable  to  do.  They  con 
curred  as  to  their  inability  to  cross  the  Potomac ;  and  to  the  fur 
ther  inquiry  as  to  an  advance  to  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac, 
General  Beauregard  promptly  stated  that  there  were  strong  forti 
fications  there,  occupied  by  garrisons  which  had  not  been  in  the 
battle,  and  were  therefore  not  affected  by  the  panic  which  had 
seized  the  defeated  army.  He  declared  those  fortifications  as  hav 
ing  wide,  deep  ditches,  with  palisades,  which  would  prevent  the 
escalade  of  the  works.  Turning  to  General  Johnston,  he  said, 
'  They  have  spared  no  expense.' ;: 

Here,  truth  compels  us  to  state  that,  in  all  this  matter,  Mr. 
DaviVs  memory  is  again  unqualifiedly  at  fault.  General  Beaure 
gard  could  not  have  spoken  as  he  is  represented  to  have  done, 
for  the  simple  reason  that  all  the  information  then  in  his  pos 
session,  whether  received  by  means  of  his  u  underground  rail 
road"  or  otherwise,  led  him  to  the  strong  belief  that  Washington 
was,  at  that  time,  entirely  unprotected;  that  the  works  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Potomac  were  barely  commenced,  except  Fort 
Hunnyon,  which  was  still  incomplete,  and  armed  with  but  a  few 
guns;  as  appeared  by  a  sketch  of  it,  received  in  the  usual  mysteri 
ous  way  from  within  the  enemy's  lines.  Mrs.  G- ,  to  whose 

tact  and  intelligence  was  due  most  of  the  secret  knowledge  of 
the  condition  of  affairs  at  and  around  the  Federal  capital,  had 
assured  General  Beauregard,  many  a  time,  that  no  obstacle  ex 
isted  to  prevent  a  successful  advance  on  our  part,  and  that  noth 
ing  was  dreaded  more  by  those  high  in  authority  at  "Washington. 
More  than  once,  after  the  battle  of  Manassas,  Mrs.  G ended 


*  Sec  report  of  battle,  in  Chapter  IX. 


118  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

her  despatches  in  these  words:  "Come  on!  why  do  you  not 
come?"  We  could,  in  this  connection,  were  it  not  necessary  to 
resume  the  thread  of  our  narrative,  tell  of  some  very  interesting 
occurrences,  showing  the  manner  in  which  news  was  brought  to 
General  Beauregard  from  Washington.  We  mention  a  single  in 
stance.  About  the  middle  of  July,  on  a  bright,  sultry  morning, 
a  young  lady  of  much  refinement,  and  possessing  both  youth 
and  beauty,  rode  into  General  Bonham's  lines,  at  Fairfax  Court- 
Ilouse,  and  delivered  to  him  a  despatch  of  great  importance,  for 
General  Beauregard,  "from  our  friends  in  Washington."  She 
had  incurred  great  fatigue  and  danger  in  the  accomplishment  of 
her  mission.  This  despatch  she  carried  carefully  concealed  in  her 
hair,  which,  when  enrolled  in  the  presence  of  the  Confederate 
general,  appeared  to  him — to  use  his  own  language — "  the  most 
beautiful  he  had  ever  seen  on  human  head."*  The  young  lady 
in  question  was  a  resident  of  the  Federal  capital,  and  had  passed 
out  of  it  in  a  small  farm  wagon,  disguised  as  a  plain  country 
woman  coining  from  market.  Farther  on  her  wav,  at  the  resi- 

O  */   ' 

dence  of  a  relative,  well  known  and  wealthy,  she  obtained  the 
horse  she  was  riding  and  the  habit  she  then  wore.  We  refrain 
from  giving  her  name,  but  it  will  never  be  forgotten  either  by 
General  Beauregard  or  by  General  Bonham,  and  is,  no  doubt,  as 
deeply  graven  upon  the  memory  of  the  several  staff  officers  who 
had  the  pleasure  of  escorting  her  through  our  lines.  We  wish, 
nevertheless — and  look  upon  it  as  a  duty — to  place  upon  record 
her  patriotic  deed,  so  fearlessly  and  successfully  accomplished. 

Irregular  and  unofficial  as  were  the  secret  communications  here 
spoken  of,  General  Beauregard,  who  knew  their  importance  and 
trustworthiness,  never  failed  to  forward  their  contents  to  the 
War  Department.  Mr.  Davis,  therefore,  was  aware  —  or  should 
have  been — of  what  General  Beauregard  thought  of  the  readiness 

£5  O 

of  Washington  to  resist  an  advance  of  our  forces  at  that  time. 
It  is  not  here  pretended  that  no  one  spoke  to  Mr.  Davis,  on  that 
occasion,  as  lie  asserts  that  General  Beauregard  did ;  but  it  is 
now  stated,  emphatically,  and  on  the  direct  authority  of  General 
Beauregard,  that  he  did  not  make  use  of  anv  such  language  to 

£3  j  c/  O         O 

Mr.  Davis.  In  support  of  the  position  here  so  positively  assumed 
the  reader  is  referred,  first,  to  the  fact,  afterwards  so  thoroughly 

*From  a  letter  of  General  Bonham  to  General  Beauregard. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  H<) 

verified,  that  no  fortifications  existed  then  at  or  around  Washing 
ton  ;  none,  at  any  rate,  that  could  have  seriously  obstructed  the 
inarch  of  our  army;  second,  to  General  Beauregard's  letter  to  Colo 
nels  Chestnut  and  Miles,  bearing  date  July  29th,  1SC1,  and  to  his 
answer  to  President  Davis  (August  10th  of  the  same  year),  where 
in  is  considered  this  very  question  of  an  advance  upon  Washing 
ton,  and  its  feasibility,  as  late  as  the  2±th  of  July.  These  letters 
appear  in  full  further  on  in  the  present  chapter.  The  fact  is, 
that  General  Beau  regard's  whole  correspondence,  official  and  pri 
vate,  touching  these  events,  confirms,  in  every  respect,  what  is 
stated  in  the  two  letters  above  mentioned. 

Our  object  is  not,  at  present,  to  dwell  upon  the  causes — what 
ever  they  may  have  been — of  our  failure  to  reap  the  fruits  of  that 
first  great  victory  of  the  war.  AVe  wish  merely  to  state  that 
General  Beaurcgard  exonerates  Mr.  Davis  from  all  responsibility 
for  the  failure  to  pursue  the  enemy  on  the  night  of  the  21st  of 
July.  Mr.  Davis  did  not  object  to  such  a  pursuit;  on  the  con 
trary,  he  desired  it.  But  it  was  declared  inexpedient,  and,  after 
discussion,  Mr.  Davis  himself  acknowledged  it  to  be  so.  This, 
however,  does  not  relieve  him  from  the  responsibility  of  prevent 
ing,  a  few  days  or  weeks  later,  the  advance  of  our  army,  in  an 
aggressive  campaign  against  Washington. 

On  the  morning  after  the  battle  an  order  was  issued  by  General 
Beauregard,  recalling  his  troops  to  their  organization,  and  assign 
ing  them  new  positions,  with  the  advance — Bonham's  brigade— 
at  Centrcville.  Ilolmes's  brigade,  by  direction  of  President 
Davis,  was  ordered  back  to  "its  former  position.""1 

At  the  breakfast- table,  on  the  same  morning,  the  President 
handed  General  Beauregard  the  following  graceful  letter: 

"  MANASSAS,  VA.,  July  21tf,  1801. 

"/Sir, — Appreciating  your  services  in  the  battle  of  Manassas  and  on  several 
other  occasions  during  the  existing  war,  as  affording  the  highest  evidence  of 
your  skill  as  a  commander,  your  gallantry  as  a  soldier,  and  your  zeal  as  a 
patriot,  you  are  appointed  to  be  'General'  in  the  army  of  the  Confederate 
States  of  America,  and,  with  the  consent  of  the  Congress,  will  be  duly  com 
missioned  accordingly.  "  Yours,  etc., 

"  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 
"General  G.  T.  BEAUREGAKD." 

On  the  23d,  Hunton's  Sth  Virginia,  with  three  companies  of 


Sec  Appendix  to  this  chapter. 


120  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

cavalry,  was  ordered  to  re-occupy  Leesburg,  and  Bonham's  brig 
ade,  with  Delaware  Kemper's  and  Shields' s  batteries  and  a  force 
of  cavalry,  were  ordered  to  advance  to  Vienna  Station,  and  Long- 
street  to  Centreville.  As  the  leading  column  was  approaching 
Fairfax  Court- House,  Captain  Terry,  of  Texas,  a  noted  marks 
man,  lowered  the  Federal  flag  by  cutting  the  halliards  with  a  rifle 
ball.  This  flag  was  sent,  through  General  Longstreet,  as  a  present 
to  General  Beauregard,  but  was  placed  among  the  stock  of  tro 
phies  where  it  belonged,  as  well  as  a  larger  flag,  offered  to  Mr. 
Davis,  who  had  already  left  Manassas  for  Richmond.  Many 
spoils  were  gathered  daring  and  after  the  battle;  and  the  line  of 
march  of  our  troops,  on  their  way  to  the  new  positions  assigned 
them,  was  rich  in  abandoned  arms  and  other  military  property.  A 
great  deal  was  carried  off  by  the  people,  and  was  recovered  with 
much  trouble. 

On  the  25th,  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  issued  an  ad 
dress  to  their  troops,  awarding  to  them  the  praises  they  deserved 
for  their  patriotic  courage  on  the  battle-fields  of  the  18th  and 
21st.  The  concluding  words  were  as  follows:  "  Soldiers,  we  con- 

O 

gratnlate  you  on  a  glorious,  triumphant,  and  complete  victory. 
We  thank  you  for  doing  your  whole  duty  in  the  service  of  your 
country." 

On  that  day,  also,  General  Beauregard,  in  anticipation,  it  might 
be  said,  of  the  future  orders  of  the  government,  organized  his 
army,  as  now  increased  into  eight  brigades,  each  of  which  was 
made  up  of  regiments  coming  from  a  single  State.  But  no  mili 
tary  movement  of  importance  could  be  undertaken,  on  account  of 
additional  embarrassments  from  the  want  of  transportation  and 
subsistence.  Only  one  wagon  and  four  horses  were  assigned  to 
every  hundred  men.  Each  brigade  staff  and  each  hospital  were 
limited  to  the  same  insufficient  transportation.  The  army  was 
living  from  hand  to  mouth,  and  actually  suffering  from  want  of 
food.  Colonel  R.  B.  Lee,  the  efficient  Chief  Commissary  of  the 
army  in  the  field,  had  not  been  long  in  finding  out  that  the  ways 
of  the  Commissary-General,  Colonel  Northrop,  were  altogether  im 
practicable  ;  and,  in  order  to  keep  our  forces  properly  supplied, 
he  was  compelled  to  resort,  in  a  measure,  to  the  system  formerly 
pursued  by  Captain  Fowle,  under  General  Beauregard's  instruc 
tions,  and  without  which  the  arm}  would  have  fallen  to  pieces, 
even  before  the  battle  of  Manassas.  Colonel  Northrop,  thereupon, 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  121 

became  very  much  irritated  against  the  energetic  Colonel  Lee, 
and,  without  consulting  or  informing  the  general  of  either  army, 
superseded  him,  as  he  had  lately  done  Captain  Fowle,  for  a  sim 
ilar  reason,  appointing  another  Chief  Commissary,  namely,  Major 
William  B.  Blair. 

With  regard  to  this  all-important  question  of  provisioning  the 
arm}7  and  supplying  it  with  transportation,  we  put  before  the 
reader  the  following  letters,  which  speak  for  themselves,  and  show 
General  Beauregard's  sagacity  and  intense  anxiety  upon  these 
points.  They  also  hold  up  to  public  view  the  appalling  misman 
agement  of  all  army  affairs  at  Richmond,  in  relation  to  the  Quar 
termaster  and  Commissary  Departments. 

'•  CAMP  PICKENS.  July  23(7,  1SG1. 
u  To  His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States : 

"Sir, — I  am  commanded  by  General  Beauregard  to  inform  your  Excellency 
that  the  stock  of  provisions  has  become  alarmingly  reduced,  in  consequence 
of  the  non-fulfilment  of  requisitions  of  the  Commissary-General. 

u  The  general  directs  me  to  say,  that  unless  immediate  supplies  are  forwarded, 
in  conformity  with  these  requisitions,  most  serious  consequences  are  inevitable. 
"  With  much  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

"R.B.LEE,Lieut.-Col.C.S.A., 

and  Chief  Commissary  of  Army  of  Potomac." 

On  the  20th  of  July,  no  satisfactory  change  having  resulted 
from  the  foregoing  communication  to  the  President,  General  Beau- 
regard  wrote  the  following  letter  to  Colonels  Win.  P.  Miles  and 
James  Chestnut,  both  members  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  at 
that  time,  and  both  of  whom  had  acted  as  his  volunteer  aids  in 
South  Carolina  and  in  Virginia. 

"  MAXASSAS,  VIRGINIA,  July  29M,  1801. 

"My  dear  Colonels, — I  send  you,  herewith,  some  important  suggestions  rel 
ative  to  the  best  mode  of  providing  for  the  wants  of  this  army,  furnished  me 
by  Colonel  L.  M.  Hatch,  whose  experience  in  such  matters  entitles  his  views 
and  opinions  to  considerable  weight.  Unless  the  requirements  of  our  army  in 
the  field  are  provided  for  beforehand,  we  shall  be  in  a  perfect  state  of  destitu 
tion  very  shortly. 

"I  will  remark  here,  that  we  have  been  out  of  subsistence  for  several  days, 
some  of  my  regiments  not  having  had  anything  to  eat  for  more  than  twenty- 
four  hours.  They  have  stood  it,  though,  nobly;  but,  if  it  happens  again,  I  shall 
join  one  of  their  camps  and  share  their  wants  with  them;  for  I  will  never  al 
low  them  to  suppose  that  I  feast  while  they  suffer. 

"The  want  of  food  and  transportation  has  made  us  lose  all  the  fruits  of  our 


122  MILITARY  OPERATIONS    OF 

victory.  We  ought  at  this  moment  to  be  in  or  about  Washington,  but  we  are 
perfectly  anchored  here,  and  God  only  knows  when  we  will  be  able  to  advance ; 
without  these  means  we  can  neither  advance  nor  retreat.  The  mobility  of  an 
army,  which  constitutes  the  great  strength  of  modern  armies,  does  not  certainly 
form  an  element  of  ours,  for  wre  seem  to  be  rooted  to  this  spot. 

"  Cannot  something  be  done  towards  furnishing  us  more  expeditiously  and 
regularly  with  food  and  transportation  ? 

"  It  seems  to  me  that  if  the  States  had  been  called  upon  to  furnish  their 
quota  of  wagons  per  regiment  in  the  field,  one  of  these  evils  could  have  been 
obviated. 

"  From  all  accounts,  Washington  could  have  been  taken  up  to  the  24th  in 
stant,  by  twenty  thousand  men  !  Only  think  of  the  brilliant  results  we  have 
lost  by  the  two  causes  referred  to ! 

"  Again,  we  must  have  a  few  more  field-officers  from  the  old  service,  other 
wise  our  regiments  will  get  worsted  sooner  or  later. 

"  In  haste,  yours  truly, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

On  the  1st  of  August  he  forwarded  the  following  telegram  to 
Colonel  A.  C.  Myers,  Assistant  Quartermaster-General : 

"  Several  of  my  brigades  are  entirely  destitute  of  transportation ;  no  advance 
can  be  made  until  procured.  Can  you  not  send  me  about  one  hundred  wagons  ? 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

Congress  becoming  alarmed — and  justly  so — at  such  a  state  of 
affairs,  upon  information  communicated  to  it  by  members  of  the 
Military  Committee,  instituted  an  investigation,  which,  besides 
very  much  incensing  the  heads  of  the  two  departments  implicated, 
also  aroused  the  displeasure  of  the  President,  who  gave  expression 
to  his  irritation  in  the  following  letter : 

"  RICHMOND,  VIRGINIA,  August  WtJt,  1801. 
"  GENERAL  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  My  dear  Sir, — Enclosed  I  transmit  copies  of  a  resolution  of  inquiry  and  the 
reply  to  it.  You  will  perceive  that  the  answer  was  made  in  view  of  the  tele 
gram  which  I  enclosed  to  you,  that  being  the  only  information  then  before  me. 
Since  that  time  it  has  been  communicated  to  me  that  your  letter  to  lion.  Mr. 
Miles,  on  the  wants  of  your  army,  and  the  consequences  thereof,  was  read  to 
the  Congress,  and  hence  the  inquiry  instituted.  Permit  me  to  request  that  you 
will  return  the  telegram  to  me,  which  I  enclosed  to  show  you  the  form  in  which 
the  matter  came  before  me. 

"Some  excitement  has  been  created  by  your  letter;  the  Quartermaster  and 
the  Commissary  General  both  feel  that  they  have  been  unjustly  arraigned.  As 
for  myself,  I  can  only  say  that  I  have  endeavored  to  anticipate  wants,  and  any 
failure  which  has  occurred  from  -imperfect  knowledge  might  have  been  best 
avoided  by  timely  requisitions  and  estimates. 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGARD.  123 

"  I  think  you  arc  unjust  to  yourself  in  putting  your  failure  to  pursue  the 
enemy  to  Washington  to  the  account  of  short  supplies  of  subsistence  and  trans 
portation.  Under  the  circumstances  of  our  army,  and  in  the  absence  of  the 
knowledge  since  acquired,  if,  indeed,  the  statements  be  true,  it  would  have  been 
extremely  hazardous  to  have  done  more  than  was  performed.  You  will  not 
fail  to  remember  that,  so  far  from  knowing  that  the  enemy  was  routed,  a  large 
part  of  our  forces  was  moved  by  yon,  in  the  night  of  the  21st,  to  repel  a  sup 
posed  attack  on  our  right,  and  that  the  next  day's  operations  did  not  fully 
reveal  what  has  since  been  reported  of  the  enemy's  panic. 

"Enough  was  done  for  glory,  and  the  measure  of  duty  was  full;  let  us 
rather  show  the  untaught  that  their  desires  are  unreasonable,  than,  by  dwell 
ing  on  possibilities  recently  developed,  give  form  and  substance  to  the  criti 
cisms  always  easy  to  those  who  judge  after  the  event. 

''  With  sincere  esteem,  I  am,  your  friend, 

"  JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

The  foregoing  letter  shows,  among  other  tilings,  how  complete 
ly  the  reiterated  suggestions  and  remonstrances  and  requisitions 
of  General  Beauregard  concerning  the  necessity  of  supplies  and 
transportation,  had  slipped  President  Davis's  memory.  AVe  re 
frain  from  fatiguing  the  attention  of  the  reader,  by  again  placin^ 

1       *        o 

before  him  the  evidence  and  correspondence  given  on  this  sub 
ject  in  a  preceding  chapter  (Chapter  VI.).  It  is  enough  to  say 
that,  from  the  3d  of  June,  just  after  his  arrival  at  Manassas,  to 
the  time  when  President  Davis  penned  the  letter  given  above, 
General  Beauregard  had  never  ceased  calling  his  attention  and 
that  of  the  "War  Department  to  the  vital  importance  of  these  two 
matters.  How  President  Davis  could  possibly  plead  "imperfect 
knowledge,"  and  complain  of  want  "  of  timely  requisitions  and 
estimates,"  is  more  than  we  can  understand  ;  and  we  have  sought  in 
vain,  in  his  book,  for  any  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  matter. 
But  General  Beauregard's  answer  to  the  President  dispenses  with 
the  necessity  for  further  comment  : 


AS,  YA.,  August  IQth,  1861. 

u  Dear  Sir,  —  Your  letter  of  the  4th  instant  has  been  received,  but  my  end 
less  occupations  have  prevented  me  from  acknowledging  it  immediately,  as 
I  should  have  done. 

"I  regret  exceedingly  to  hear  that  Colonel  Miles  read  my  letter  of  the  29th 
to  Congress.  It  was  written  only  for  the  purpose  of  expediting  matters,  if 
possible,  and  immediately  after  having  been  informed  that  one  brigade  and 
two  or  more  regiments  were  without  food,  and  had  been  so  for  twenty-four 
hours.  I  had  before  been  informed  that  we  were  short  of  provisions  ;  but  I 
never  supposed  it  would  be  permitted  to  go  to  the  extent  referred  to.  Some 
time  before  the  battle  of  the  21st  ultimo  I  had  endeavored  to  remedy  the  im- 


MILITARY    OPERATIONS  OF 

pending  evil  by  ordering  Major  Fowle,  the  acting  Commissary-General  here, 
to  provide  a  certain  number  of  rations,  by  purchasing  in  the  surrounding  coun 
ties,  which  drew  from  the  Commissary-General  of  the  army  a  letter  so  dis 
courteous  to  me  that  the  want  of  time  alone  prevented  me  from  enclosing  it 
to  you  for  your  consideration. 

"With  regard  to  making  timely  requisitions  on  the  Quartermaster  and 
Commissary  Department,  not  knowing  what  number  of  troops  the  War  De 
partment  intended  at  any  time  to  concentrate  here,  it  was  impossible  to  make 
proper  requisitions  until  after  the  arrival  of  those  troops. 

"  I  will  here  remark,  that  troops  arriving  at  this  place  have  often  been  a 
day  or  more  without  food  in  the  cars,  and  I  have  had  several  times  to  order 
issues  of  provisions  here  to  troops  on  their  way  to  Winchester,  for  the  same 
cause.  I  accuse  no  one,  I  state  facts. 

"  I  am  fully  aware  that  you  have  done  more  than  could  be  expected  of  you 
for  this  army,  and  that  it  is  utterly  impossible  you  should  be  able  to  direct 
each  one  of  the  bureaus  of  the  War  Department,  but  the  facts  referred  to  show 
a  deficiency  somewhere,  which  ought  to  be  remedied,  otherwise  we  will,  soon 
er  or  later,  be  liable  to  the  same  unfortunate  results. 

"  My  experience  here  teaches  me  that,  after  issuing  an  order,  I  have  to  in 
quire  whether  it  has  been  carried  into  effect ;  this  is  especially  the  case  with 
the  newly  arrived  troops. 

"  With  regard  to  my  remarks  about  inarching  on  to  Washington,  you  must 
have  misunderstood  them,  for  I  never  stated  that  we  could  have  pursued  the 
enemy  on  the  evening  of  the  21st,  or  even  on  the  22d.  I  wrote :  '  The  want  of 
food  and  transportation  has  made  us  lose  all  the  fruits  of  our  victory.  We 
ought  at  this  time,  the  29th  of  July,  to  be  in  or  about  Washington,  and,  from 
all  accounts,  Washington  could  have  been  taken  up  to  the  24th  inst.  (July), 
by  twenty  thousand  men.' 

"  Every  news  from  there  confirms  me  still  more  in  that  opinion.  For  sev 
eral  days  (about  one  week)  after  the  battle,  I  could  not  put  my  new  regi 
ments  in  position  for  want  of  transportation.  I  do  not  say  this  to  injure  my 
friend  Colonel  Myers,  but  to  benefit  the  service.  We  have,  no  doubt,  by  our 
success  here,  achieved  '  glory  '  for  our  country,  but  I  am  fighting  for  some 
thing  more  real  and  tangible,  i.  <?.,  to  save  our  homes  and  firesides  from  our 
Northern  invaders,  and  to  maintain  our  freedom  and  independence  as  a  na 
tion.  After  that  task  shall  have  been  accomplished,  as  I  feel  that  I  am  only 
fit  for  private  life,  I  shall  retire  to  my  home,  if  my  means  will  permit,  never 
again  to  leave  it,  unless  called  upon  to  repel  again  the  same  or  another  foe. 
"  With  much  respect,  I  remain, 

"  Sincerely  your  friend, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGAIID." 

The  same  surprise  and  want  of  knowledge  expressed  by  Pres 
ident  Davis,  concerning  the  deficiency  of  these  two  departments, 
was  also  manifested — strange,  to  say — by  the  Quartermaster-Gen 
eral  himself.  His  communication  to  General  Beauregard,  dated 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  125 

August  1st,  establishes  the  almost  incredible  fact  that  the  head  of 
one  of  the  most  important  of  our  departments  did  not  know  the 
state  of  its  affairs.  This  was  but  additional  evidence  of  improvi 
dence  and  mismanagement.  There  was  this  difference,  however, 
between  Colonel  Myers  and  Colonel  Northrop ;  the  former  was 
ever  ready  to  correct  an  error  when  in  his  power  to  do  so,  the  lat 
ter  would  not  allow  his  errors  to  be  pointed  out,  and,  still  less, 
discussed.  In  Colonel  Myers's  letter  to  General  Beauregard,  above 
referred  to,  he  writes:  "I  never,  until  day  before  yesterday,  have 
heard  one  word  of  this  deficiency ;  then,  the  knowledge  came  to 
me  through  a  despatch  from  GeneralJ.  E.  Johnston,  to  the  Adju 
tant-General.  I  took  immediate  steps  to  collect,  at  Manassas,  as 
much  transportation  as  I  suppose  you  will  require.  .  .  .  The 
military  operations  and  manoeuvres  of  your  army  are  never  di 
vulged,  and  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  me  to  know  how  to  an 
ticipate  your  wants.  .  .  .  We  have  had,  so  far,  too  many 
heads,  which  I  can  say  to  you,  and  which  means,  we  have  /md  no 
head  at  all.  You  should  write  me  often,  if  only  a  line,  when  any 
thing  is  required,  and  you  shall  be  provided  if  possible/' 

The  only  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  this  is,  that  General 
Beauregard's  demands  and  requisitions  made  to  the  War  Depart 
ment  were  totally  disregarded,  and  never  reached  the  office  of 
the  Quartermaster-General.  We  now  give  General  Beau  regard's 
answer  to  Colonel  Myers : 

'•MANASSAS,  VA.,  Augmt  5th,  18C1. 

"Dear  Colonel, — Your  favor  of  the  1st  has  been  received.  My  surprise  was 
as  great  as  yours  to  find  that  you  had  not  been  informed  of  our  want  of 
transportation,  which  has  so  crippled  us,  together  with  the  want  of  provisions, 
that  we  have  been  anchored  here  since  the  battle,  not  being  able  to  send  a, 
few  regiments  three  or  four  miles  from  their  former  positions.  Major  Cabell 
says  that,  'Knowing  your  inability  to  comply  with  his  former  requisitions  for 
wagons,  etc.,  he  thought  it  was  useless  to  make  new  ones  upon  you,  hence  he 
was  trying  to  get  them  from  around  here.'  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  result  was, 
that  about  fifteen  thousand  men  were  sent  me  by  the  AVar  Department,  with 
out  one  solitary  icagon.  Before  tile  arrival  of  these  troops,  we  had,  per  reg 
iment,  only  about  twelve  wagons  of  the  meanest  description,  being  coun 
try  wagons,  that  break  down  whenever  they  come  to  a  bad  part  of  the 
road.  General  Johnston's  command  had  only  about  seven  wagons  per  regi 
ment  on  arriving  here.  This  state  of  things  cannot  and  ought  not  to  last 
longer. 

"I  am  perfectly  willing  to  fight,  but  my  troops  must  be  provided  with  all 
the  means  necessary  to  constitute  an  army.  I  must  be  prepared  to  advance 


126  MILITARY   OPERATIONS    OF 

or  retreat  according  to  circumstances,  otherwise  disasters  will  overtake  us  in 
every  direction. 

"  For  a  long  time  I  could  not  get  more  than  twenty  rounds  of  ammunition 
per  man,  when  within  a  few  miles  (not  over  ten)  from  an  enemy  three  times 
our  strength. 

"  I  have  applied  forColonelJ.  L.  Kemper,  7th  Virginia  regiment,  to  be  made 
Provisional  Quartermaster-General  of  this  and  Johnston's  army.  I  wish  you 
would  aid  in  the  matter.  I  should  like,  also,  to  have  General  McGowan,  of 
South  Carolina,  appointed  in  that  department.  He  would  be  very  useful. 
The  best  man  for  each  position  must  be  looked  for  and  appointed  forthwith, 
without  regard  to  other  considerations;  otherwise  we  will  never  succeed  in 
defeating  the  enemy,  wrho  is  more  numerous  than  we,  and  has  more  resources 
at  hand.  In  haste,  yours  truly, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.'' 

Upon  calm  reflection,  an  impartial  mind  is  forced  to  acknowl 
edge  that  the  failure  of  this  campaign,  during  what  were  so  appro 
priately  called  "  the  golden  days  of  the  Confederacy,"  was  the  un 
mistakable  result  of  short-sighted  and  inefficient  management,  the 
responsibility  for  which  rests  upon  him  who,  though  clearly  un 
able  to  give  personal  supervision  to  and  direct  each  detail  of  the 
wheels  of  government,  yet  would  allow  no  latitude  either  to  the 
heads  of  the  various  bureaus  of  the  War  Department,  or  to  the 
generals  in  the  field. 

The  unceasing  efforts  of  General  Beauregard  finally  succeeded 
in  stirring  up  the  authorities  at  Richmond,  and  brought  about 
some  effort  to  produce  a  favorable  change  in  the  administration 
of  the  Quartermaster's  and  Commissary's  Departments.  This  is 
testified  to  by  the  following  letter  of  Hon.  W.  P.  Miles,  of  South 
Carolina,  then  chairman  of  the  Military  Committee  of  Congress, 
addressed  to  General  Beauregard,  under  date  of  August  8th,  1861 : 

"Dear  General, — Your  despatch  has  just  been  received,  and  I  hasten  to  send 
you  copy  of  your  letter,  as  you  desire. 

"Whatever  'the  powers  that  be'  may  think  of  it,  or  however  much  they 
may  foil  to  relish  it,  I  have  no  doubt  it  has  had,  and  will  continue  to  have,  a 
very  salutary  and  stimulating  effect.  You  may  rely  upon  it,  Congress  and  the 
country  sympathize  with  you,  although  there  may  be  and  arc  differences  of 
opinion  as  to  the  immediate  advance  upon  Washington. 

"  Very  truly  yours, 

"  WM.  PORCHER  MILES." 

But  the  improvement  alluded  to — a  spasmodic  one,  it  would 
seem,  and  one  which  had  been  altogether  compulsory — was  only 
of  very  short  duration.  Colonel  Myers,  it  is  fair  to  say,  seriously 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  127 

exerted  himself,  and,  in  a  reasonable  measure,  satisfied  many  of  the 
exigencies  of  the  hour.  But  Colonel  Northrop  was  less  open  to 
conviction.  This  officer,  whose  want  of  administrative  capacity 
was  obvious  to  all — the  President  alone  excepted — could  not  be 
induced  to  pursue  any  other  than  the  inefficient,  improvident 
course  he  had,  thus  far,  so  persistently  followed.  This  fact  is 
again  brought  to  notice  by  the  following  extract  from  another 
communication  from  General  Beaurcgard  to  President  Davis: 

"  HEADQUARTERS  IST  COUPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS,  YA.,  August  23<Z,  1801. 
"To  His  Excellency,  President  JEFFERSON  DAVIS,  etc.,  etc. : 

u  Dear  >SVr, — I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  you  herewith  a  copy  of  the  state 
ment  of  provisions,  etc.,  remaining  on  hand  at  this  point  and  available,  on  the 
21st  instant,  for  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  by  which  it  will  be  seen  that  little 
improvement  has  taken  place  in  that  respect,  since  I  last  had  the  honor  of  ad 
dressing  your  Excellency  on  the  subject,  on  the  10th  instant;  and  that  we  are 
still  as  unprepared  to  advance  or  retreat,  in  consequence  thereof,  as  at  that 
period.  A  serious  accident  to  the  railroads,  from  here  to  liichmoml,  would 
place  this  army  in  quite  a  critical  condition,  so  far  as  its  subsistence  is  con 
cerned. 

"For  the  active  operations  that  we  may  be  called  upon  shortly  to  make  in 
this  vicinity,  with  Camp  Pickcns  as  a  pivot  <V  act  ion  (centre  of  movement),  it 
ought  to  be  provided  with  at  least  fifteen  or  twenty  days'  provisions  on  hand ; 
otherwise,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  taking  possession  of  our  lines  of  com 
munication,  we  would  have  to  abandon  this  place  and  fall  back,  as  our  forces 
could  not  be  provided  with  means  of  subsistence.  I  regret  to  say  that  we 
could  not  now  march  from  here  with  even  three  days'  rations.  I  earnestly 
and  solicitously  call  your  attention  to  this  important  subject.  AVithout  an 
ample  supply  of  provisions  we  will  be  perfectly  powerless. 

u  I  hope  you  will  do  me  the  justice  to  believe  that  these  facts  are  brought 
to  your  Excellency's  attention,  without  regard  whatsoever  to  individuals.  I 
look  only  to  the  success  of  our  cause,  regardless  of  friends  or  foes. 

********* 

"  I  remain,  dear  Sir,  respectfully, 

"Your  obedient  servant  and  friend, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.'-' 

The  most  effective  mode  of  remedying  these  evils  was,  ns  General 
Beauregard  and  many  other  leading  men  of  the  country  had 
pointed  out  and  suggested,  forthwith  to  remove  Colonel  JSTorthrop 
from  a  position  he  was  so  inadequate  to  fill.  But  this  the  admin 
istration  would  not  do.  In  spite  of  the  pressure  of  public  opinion, 
brought  to  bear  against  the  Commissary-General,  whose  honesty 
none  doubted,  but  whose  incapacity  all  knew,  the  President  per- 


128  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

sistently  upheld  him,  as  lie  was  wont  to  do  all  personal  friends  of 
his.  This  is  corroborated  by  the  following  extract  from  a  signifi 
cant  letter  of  the  Hon.  Win.  P.  Miles  to  General  Beauregard,  bear 
ing  date  of  Richmond,  August  6th,  1861. 

"  Dear  General, — I  received  your  despatch  to-day,  suggesting  Colonel  R.  B. 
Lee  as  the  '  best  man  for  Commissary-General,  and  Colonel  J.  L.  Kemper  as 
Assistant  Quartermaster-General.'  The  President  has  not  the  remotest  idea 
of  removing  Colonel  Northrop.  On  the  contrary,  he  is  under  the  impression 
that  he  has  done  everything  in  his  power  in  his  department.  You  can  readily 
see  that  there  is,  therefore,  no  possibility  of  the  radical  reform  you  suggest 
in  this  department.  In  the  other  case  it  would  require  a  reorganization  of  the 
general  staff,  so  for  as  the  Quartermaster  Department  is  concerned. 

********* 

"  Very  sincerely  yours, 

"  "Wai.  PORCHER  MILES." 

Colonel  Miles's  opinion  was  more  than  confirmed  by  events. 
Not  only  was  the  Commissary-General  maintained  in  his  position, 
but  his  influence  with  the  administration  appeared  to  increase,  as 
did,  most  undoubtedly,  his  well-known  and  already  proverbial  in 
efficiency.  Mr.  Davis' s  book  is  replete  with  words  of  praise  and 
commendation  for  him.  Mr.  Davis  has  not,  even  to  this  day,  for 
given  those  who  complained,  not  of  the  motives  of  Colonel  North 
rop — who  was  known  to  be  a  man  of  character  and  education — but 
of  his  fearful  shortcomings,  so  detrimental  to  the  good  of  the 
service. 

Mr.  Davis  says  that  it  affords  him  the  greatest  pleasure  to  speak 
as  he  does  of  Colonel  Northrop,  "  because  those  less  informed  of 
all  he  did,  and  skilfully  tried  to  do,  have  been  profuse  of  criti 
cism,  and  sparing  indeed  of  the  meed  justly  his  due.""5"  In  an 
other  part  of  his  book  he  uses  the  following  language :  "  To  di 
rect  the  production,  preservation,  collection,  and  distribution  of 
food  for  the  army,  required  a  man  of  rare  capacity  and  character 
at  the  head  of  the  subsistence  department.  It  was  our  good  fort 
une  to  have  such  a  one  in  Colonel  L.  B.  Northrop,  who  was  ap 
pointed  Commissary-General  at  the  organization  of  the  bureaus 
of  the  executive  department  of  the  Confederate  government."f 
These  remarks  of  Mr.  Davis  are  made  in  defiance  of  the  opinion 
of  the  whole  South,  as  entertained  and  openly  expressed  through 
out  the  war.  The  disposition  to  defend  a  friend  and  to  protect  his 

*  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  315. 
t  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  303. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  129 

reputation  is  a  commendable  trait,  which  should  ever  be  admired 
among  men  ;  but  the  First  Magistrate  of  a  free  people,  and  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  their  armies,  is  not  a  man,  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of  the  word :  he  must  be  more  guarded  in  his  encomiums  of  a 
friend ;  he  cannot  be  allowed  to  give  rein  to  his  likes  or  dis 
likes ;  his  eye,  ever  keen  and  watchful,  must  be  directed  to  the 
general  good  of  those  who  chose  him  as  their  leader ;  otherwise 
he  betrays  the  trust  reposed  in  him  ;  he  is  recreant  to  his  duty ; 
he  derides  public  opinion,  becomes  the  accomplice  of  inefficiency, 
if  not  unworthiness,  and  deserves  as  great — perhaps  greater — 
blame,  than  those  he  so  unwisely  sustains. 

Mr.  Davis's  efforts  to  shield  Colonel  Xorthrop  can  only  result 
in  shaking  the  confidence  heretofore  felt  by  many  persons  in  the 
judgment  and  sagacity  of  the  ex-President  of  the  Confederacy, 
without  doing  the  slightest  good  to  his  former  Commissary-Gen 
eral.  It  would  have  been  kinder,  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Davis,  to  have 
adopted  towards  him  the  course  he  never  hesitates  to  follow  to 
wards  those  whose  merits  he  cannot  deny,  but  will  not  admit— 
pass  him  by  in  silence,  as  though  he  had  never  been  an  actor  in 
the  great  drama  wherein  were  lost  most  of  the  fondest  hopes  of 
the  South. 

The  supply  of  fifteen  or  twenty  days'  rations,  at  Manassas,  sug 
gested  in  the  foregoing  communication  to  the  President,  as  a  nec 
essary  preparation  for  probable  movements  of  the  army,  had  long 
been  the  subject  of  General  Beau  regard's  anxious  thought.  As 
we  have  already  seen  (Chapter  VI.),  he  had  endeavored,  as  early 
as  June,  to  collect  many  of  the  wagons  he  needed,  and  u  twenty- 
five  days'  rations  for  about  twenty  thousand  men."'  Again,  a  little 
later,  he  caused  the  following  order  to  be  given  to  his  Chief  Com 
missary  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS  JUNCTION,  July  lltJi,  18G1. 
'•  Captain  "W.  II.  FOWLE,  Camp  Pickcns  : 

u  Captain, — The  general  commanding  directs  that  you  take  prompt  and  ef 
fective  measures  to  provide  forthwith,  at  your  depot  near  these  headquarters, 
ample  provisions — including  fat  cattle — for  twenty-five  thousand  men  for  two 
weeks,  and  that  amount,  at  least,  must  be  constantly  maintained  on  hand, 
subject  to  requisition,  until  otherwise  ordered. 

u  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  G." 

That  this  had  not  been  done,  at  the  time  referred  to,  or  at  any 
I.— 9 


130  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

subsequent  period,  General  Beau  regard's  earnest  appeal  to  the 
President  for  such  supplies  very  conclusively  demonstrates.  It  is 
almost  unnecessary  to  add,  that  no  action  was  taken  by  the  "War 
Department  to  carry  out  these  all-important  suggestions ;  and  that, 
far  from  any  advance  on  the  enemy  being  made  practicable  for  us, 
\ve  were  saved  from  the  calamities  foreseen  and  dreaded  by  Gen 
eral  Beauregard,  not  through  efforts  of  the  administration,  but  by 
the  simple  fact  that  the  enemy  was  so  crippled  and  demoralized 
as  to  preclude  any  forward  movement  on  his  part. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

General  Beauregard  Suggests  a  Forward  Movement. — Not  Approved  by  Gen 
eral  Johnston. — Sanitary  Measures. — Deficiency  in  Light  Artillery. — In 
structions  to  Colonel  Stuart. —  Mason's  and  Munson's  Hills. — General 
Beauregard  Proposes  to  Hold  Them. — General  Johnston  of  a  Different 
Opinion. — Popularity  of  General  Beauregard. — He  Establishes  His  Head 
quarters  at  Fairfax  Court-House. — Proposes  Another  Plan  Involving  De 
cisive  Battle.  —  General  Johnston  Deems  it  Better  not  to  Hazard  the 
Movement. — Organization  of  the  Forces  into  Divisions. — General  Beaure 
gard  Advises  that  the  Army  be  Placed  Under  One  Head. — President 
Davis  Invited  to  a  Conference  at  Fairfax  Court-House. — Scheme  of  Oper 
ations  Submitted.  —  Generals  Johnston  and  G.  AV.  Smith  Approve  it. 

Troops  in  Splendid  Fighting  Condition. — The  President  Objects. N<> 

Reinforcements  can  be  Furnished,  and  no  Arms  in  the  Country. — Review 
of  Mr.  Davis's  Remarks  on  the  Subject. — He  Proposes  a  Plan  for  Opera 
tions  Across  the  Potomac. — The  Commanding  Generals  do  not  Consider 
it  Feasible. 

Ox  the  Sth  of  August,  at  General  Beauregard's  suggestion, 
Colonel  Evans  was  ordered  to  move  his  brigade  to  Leesburg,  and 
assume  command  of  all  the  forces  in  London  County,  the  object 
being  to  protect  that  region  against  Federal  incursions,  about 
which  numerous  complaints  were  made. 

It  was  about  that  time  that  General  Beauregard  resolved  to 
throw  his  own  forces  forward,  lie  hoped,  by  an  advance,  to  be 
able  more  easily  to  take  the  offensive,  or  draw  on  a  battle,  while 
the  enemy  was  yet  demoralized  and  undisciplined.  Accordingly, 
on  the  9th  and  10th,  Longstreet's  brigade  was  moved  to  Fairfax 
Court-House,  and  D.  R.  Jones's  to  Germantown.  Bonham  was 
drawn  back  from  Vienna  to  Flint  Hill,  leaving  a  strong  mounted 
guard  at  the  former  place.  Cocke  was  stationed  at  Centreville ; 
Ewell  at  gangster's  Crossroads;  Early  and  Hampton  at  the  inter 
section  of  the  Occoquan  with  the  Wolf  Run  Shoals  road  ;  and  the 
Louisiana  brigade  at  Mitchell's  Ford.  Elzey's  brigade,  of  General 
Johnston's  forces,  was  placed  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Fairfax 
Station,  and  Jackson's,  also  of  General  Johnston's  forces,  held  a  posi 
tion  near  the  crossing  of  Braddock's  and  the  Fairfax  Station  roads. 


132  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

From  these  advanced  positions,  the  forces,  as  above  enumerated, 
could  be,  at  any  time,  concentrated  for  offensive  or  defensive  pur- 
poses.  General  Beauregard's  desire  was,  by  a  bold  movement,  to 
capture  the  exterior  lines  of  the  enemy  at  Annandale,  and,  should 
any  serious  force  come  out  in  support,  give  it  battle,  with  the 
chances  in  favor  of  the  Confederates.  But  this  plan  or  project, 
General  Beauregard  being  second  in  command,  had,  first,  to  be 
submitted  to  General  Johnston,  whose  approval  was  necessary  for 
its  execution.  General  Johnston  did  not  assent  to  it.  This  dis 
agreement  of  opinion  between  the  two  commanding  generals, 
whose  official  intercourse  had  always  been — and  continued  to  be — 
most  friendly,  showed,  however,  that  they  differed  widely  in  tem 
perament,  and  belonged  to  essentially  distinct  military  schools : 
General  Beauregard.  ever  in  favor  of  the  a^^ressive,  and  of  sub- 

O  >  OO  ' 

jecting  an  adversary's  movements  to  his  own  plans  —  General 
Johnston,  ever  on  the  defensive,  and  apparently  awaiting  the  action 
of  the  enemy. 

On  the  13th  of  August  General  Beauregard  was  officially  in 
formed,  by  the  Hon.  L.  P.  Walker,  Secretary  of  War,  of  his  ap 
pointment,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  Congress,  as 
"  General "  in  the  army  of  the  Confederate  States,  to  take  rank 
from  July  21st,  1861.  lie  gratefully  accepted  the  high  distinction 
thus  conferred  upon  him  by  the  President,  who,  it  will  be  remem 
bered,  had  not  awaited  the  action  of  Congress  to  reward  his  services. 

The  reader  is  aware  that,  on  the  23d  of  August,  General  Beau- 
regard  again  addressed  the  President*  with  regard  to  the  insuffi 
ciency  of  subsistence  for  the  army  at  Manassas.  lie  also  urged 
the  sanitary  benefits  and  economy  of  procuring  for  each  company 
a  good  professional  cook  and  baker,  with  portable  kitchens  and 
ovens  for  encampments.  Out  of  thirty-two  thousand  six  hundred 
and  fifty-five  men,  the  total  of  his  own  army  at  that  time,  only 
twenty -two  thousand  two  hundred  and  ninety -one  were  fit  for 
duty;  much  of  the  sickness  being  due,  it  was  thought,  to  bad 
cooking,  as  well  as  bad  water. 

General  Beauregard,  at  this  time,  also  represented  to  the  Presi 
dent,  through  Captain  E.  P.  Alexander,  his  Chief  of  Artillery  and 
Ordnance,  the  great  deficiency  of  the  army  in  light  artillery  (there 
was  but  one  piece  to  each  of  his  thirty-five  regiments).  He  urged 

*  See  Chapter  X. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  133 

the  necessity  of  three  guns  to  each  regiment,  or,  if  these  were  not 
to  be  had,  that  rocket  batteries  should  be  supplied  for  the  purpose 
of  frightening  the  untrained  horses  of  the  enemy.  lie  asked, 
likewise,  that  the  cavalry  should  be  raised  to  at  least  four  or  five 
thousand  men,  for  the  purpose  of  charging  on  McClellan's  bat 
teries  and  raw  troops,  when  thrown  into  disorder  by  the  rockets. 
It  was  long,  however,  before  this  want  of  artillery  was  even  par 
tially  supplied,  and  the  organization  of  the  rocket  batteries  was 
subsequently  thwarted  by  the  military  authorities. 

General  Beauregard  now  instructed  Colonel  Stuart,  command 
ing  the  cavalry  outposts,  to  keep  constantly  near  the  enemy,  and 
ordered  General  Longstreet,  with  his  brigade,  to  remain  in  close 
proximity  to  Stuart.  Towards  the  end  of  August,  in  complying 
with  these  orders,  Stuart,  who  was  an  officer  of  great  enterprise, 
by  a  series  of  daily  encounters  gradually  drove  back  the  Federal 
force  in  his  front,  and,  with  the  co-operation  of  General  Long- 
street,  finally  captured  Mason's  and  Munson's  Hills,  in  full  view  of 
Washington.  General  Beauregard,  who  had  had  minute  informa 
tion  concerning  these  positions,  through  Colonel  George  W.  Lay, 
long  a  resident  of  Washington,  proposed  to  General  Johnston, 
now  that  they  were  in  our  hands,  to  hold  and  support  them  by 
the  following  arrangement  of  troops  : 

1  brigade  (Bonham's)  at  or  about  old  Court-House,  near  Vienna. 

2  brigades  (D.  R.  Jones's  and  Cockc's)  at  or  about  Falls  Church. 
1  brigade.  (Longstrcet's)  at  or  about  Munson's  Hill. 

1  brigade  (Johnston's  forces)  half-way  between  Mason's  and  Munson's  Hills. 

1  brigade  (Johnston's  forces)  at  Mason's  Hill. 

2  brigades  (Walker's  and  Early's)  at  or  about  Annandale. 
1  brigade  (Ewcll's)  at  or  about  Springfield. 

Some  of  General  Johnston's  other  brigades  were  to  be  placed  at 
Centreville,  Fairfax  Court-House,  and  Fairfax  Station,  and  they 
might  occasionally  be  moved  towards  the  Potomac  above,  to  alarm 
the  enemy  and  keep  him  in  a  state  of  constant  anxiety  as  to  the 
safety  of  Washington ;  then  troops  could  cross  into  Maryland, 
should  the  enemy  move  in  a  large  force  from  Washington  to  any 
point  on  the  lower  Potomac.  The  place  on  the  river  which 
General  Beauregard  believed  the  enemy  would  make  his  next 
point  dJappui  was  Evansport,  some  thirty  miles  below  Washing 
ton,  and,  at  the  request  of  General  Holmes,  he  had  given  instruc 
tions  as  to  the  manner  of  its  fortification. 


MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

General  Johnston,  however,  was  opposed  to  the  occupation  of 
Mason's  and  Munson's  Hills,  and  did  not  approve  of  the  arrange 
ment  suggested,  considering  the  line  of  Fairfax  Court-House  suf 
ficiently  advanced  for  all  purposes ;  and  even  too  distant  for  the 
support  of  Evansport.  His  main  objection  was  the  danger  of 
being  drawn  into  a  serious,  perhaps  general,  action,  so  much  nearer 
to  the  Federal  position  than  to  our  own.  But  General  Beaure- 
gard  believed  that  any  expedition  of  the  enemy,  sent  down  the 
Potomac,  might  be  at  once  neutralized  by  a  bold  movement  from 
above  into  Maryland  and  on  the  rear  of  Washington.  He  was 
willing,  besides,  should  it  so  happen,  to  exchange  Richmond,  tem 
porarily,  for  Washington  and  Maryland.  As  to  a  general  action, 
he  desired  it,  for  the  reason  that  the  Federal  army  was  yet  undis 
ciplined,  while  our  forces,  as  strong  in  numbers  as  might  for  some 
time  be  expected,  were  in  the  full  prestige  of  recent  victory ;  an 
advantage  now  clearly  perceptible  in  the  occasional  encounters, 
with  or  without  an  action,  between  the  respective  reconnoitring 
and  foraging  parties,  and  quite  conspicuous  in  the  affair  at  Lewins- 
ville,  on  the  llth  of  September — but  sure  to  diminish,  as  time 
elapsed,  by  the  great  increase  in  numbers,  discipline,  and  arma 
ment  of  the  opposing  forces. 

The  chronic  evil — lack  of  transportation — had  become  the  sub 
ject  of  anxious  remonstrance  from  Captain  Alexander,  General 
Beauregard's  Chief  of  Ordnance.  With  a  portion  of  the  army 
now  at  the  threshold  of  the  Federal  encampments  (Sept.  7th)  his 
reserve  ammunition  had  been  more  than  a  week  awaiting  trans- 

O 

portation,  for  which  requisition  had  been  made  on  the  20th  of 
August,  on  the  Chief  Quartermaster  of  the  army  corps. 

These  ever-recurring  annoyances,  resulting  from  the  incurable 
inefficiency  which  had  to  be  daily  contended  against,  would  have 
depressed  and  utterly  discouraged  a  man  less  gifted  than  General 
Beauregard.  But  his  activity,  his  energy  and — we  may  add — his 
confidence  in  his  own  resources,  seemed  to  increase  with  the  ob 
stacles  thus  thrown  in  his  way.  He  could  not  and  would  not  be 
despondent.  His  words,  both  to  his  officers  and  to  hfs  men,  no 
matter  under  what  circumstances,  were  always  of  a  nature  to  in 
spire  them  with  additional  hope,  renewed  endurance,  and  confi 
dence  of  success. 

Through  that  quick,  innate  sympathy  with  military  glory,  which 
has  ever  distinguished  the  American  people,  General  Beatiregard's 


GENERAL   BEAUREGAUD.  135 

name  was  now  borne  to  the  highest  point  of  popularity.  He  had 
struck  the  first  blow  at  Sumter,  and  had  thereby  asserted  the  ex 
istence  of  the  Confederacy.  He  had  struck  the  second  blow  at 
Manassas,  and  had  there  demonstrated  the  power  and  vitality  of 
our  cause.  "  On  the  afflatus  of  victory,"  says  the  author  of  "  The 
Lost  Cause,"  "Beau regard  at  once  ascended  to  the  first  reputation 
of  the  war."  lie  was  looked  up  to  as  the  future  military  agent 
of  Southern  Independence.  The  many  letters  of  congratulation, 
and  testimonials  of  sympathy,  confidence,  and  esteem,  he  had  re 
ceived  from  every  part  of  the  country,  and  from  all  classes  of  our 
people,  sufficiently  showed  the  light  in  which  he  was  held,  and  to 
whom  chiefly,  of  all  Southern  leaders  in  the  field,  was  attributed 
the  triumphant  achievements  of  our  arms.  The  real  difficulties 
of  the  task  he  had  performed  were  better  understood  by  his  of 
ficers  and  men  ;  and,  with  them,  the  enthusiasm  which  his  successes 
had  created  throughout  the  country  took  the  form  of  an  absolute 
devotion.  Nor  was  this  all.  Gentlemen  of  position  and  influence 
outside  of  the  army  now  urged  him  to  allow  his  name  to  be  pre 
sented  for  the  Constitutional  Presidency,  the  election  to  which 
was  then  approaching.  But  he  unhesitatingly  declined,  declaring 
his  place  to  be  only  that  of  a  soldier. 

Led  by  that  singleness  of  purpose  which  guided  him  through 
out  the  war,  and  undated,  except  by  a  just  gratification  that  his 
efforts  in  the  cause  had  borne  fruitful  results,  and  had  brought 
him  heart  to  heart  with  his  comrades  and  countrymen,  he  at  once 
directed  his  whole  care  to  the  reorganization  of  the  troops  in  the 
iield,  to  the  preparation  for  new  successes,  and  the  advancement 
of  the  strategic  frontier  beyond  the  Potomac. 

Throwing  forward  a  portion  of  his  troops,  by  the  12th  of  Sep 
tember,  he  moved  his  headquarters  to  Fairfax  Court-House,  in  or 
der  to  be  nearer  to  his  outer  lines,  which  now  stretched  from 
Springfield,  below  Alexandria,  on  the  right,  to  the  little  falls  on 
the  Potomac,  above  Georgetown,  on  the  left,  enclosing  the  Federal 
forces  within  a  narrow  circle,  from  which  they  made  their  obser 
vations  and  occasional  sorties.  For  the  purpose  of  watching  our 
camps,  and  of  gaining  information  of  what  transpired  there,  a  bal 
loon  was  much  used  by  the  enemy,  often  in  the  night.  To  de 
ceive  this  inconvenient  scrutiny,  General  Beauregard  ordered  the 
kindling  of  numerous  fires  as  soon  as  darkness  fell,  so  as  to  sug 
gest  extensive  bivouacs  on  our  lines,  lie  had  himself  endeavored, 


136  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

before  this,  to  procure  a  balloon  from  Richmond,  but  without 
success;  and  though  he  afterwards  obtained  one  from  a  private 
source,  some  defect  in  its  construction  rendered  it  of  no  avail. 

Anxious  not  to  lose  the  present  opportunities,  General  Beaure- 
gard  now  proposed  to  General  Johnston,  who  had  also  moved  his 
headquarters  to  Fairfax  Court-House,  a  plan  involving  a  decisive 
battle.  General  Gustavus  W.  Smith,*  with  General  Johnston's 
forces,  was  to  advance  and  menace  the  Federal  front,  while  Gen 
eral  Beauregard,  passing  southward  of  the  Occoquan,  was  to  turn 
the  Federal  left  flank  and  attack  it  with  vigor ;  an  operation  re 
sembling  that  subsequently  made  by  General  Jackson  with  brilliant 
success,  near  Richmond,  in  1862,  though  the  Confederate  forces, 
at  the  time  of  which  we  write,  were  in  a  condition,  both  moral 
and  material,  more  favorable  to  success  in  such  a  movement. 
General  Johnston,  however,  deemed  it  better  not  to  hazard  a 
battle  at  this  juncture. 

The  necessity  of  organizing  the  forces  into  divisions  had  been 
a  matter  of  discussion  between  the  two  generals.  As  the  lack  of 
division-generals  had  been  the  principal  cause  of  the  unfortunate 
miscarriage  of  General  Beauregard's  orders  in  the  recent  battle 
of  Manassas,  he  had  shortly  afterwards  written  to  the  Adjutant- 
General  on  this  important  matter,  and,  later,  had  represented  to 
the  President  that  both  armies  should  be  placed  under  one  head, 
and  commanded  as  the  two  corps  of  a  single  army.  The  fact  is 
that,  as  early  as  July  24th,  only  a  few  days  after  the  battle  of 
Manassas,  the  division  of  our  forces  into  two  army  corps,  as  sug 
gested  by  General  Beauregard,  had  been  practically  effected  by 
the  two  commanding  generals.f  The  War  Department  had  not 
authorized  the  change,  but  had,  by  its  silence,  clearly  acquiesced 
in  it.  This  was  followed  by  a  recommendation,  on  the  part  of  the 
senior  generals,  of  seven  officers  for  appointment  as  major-generals, 
and  of  eight  others  as  brigadiers,  two  of  whom  were  already  in 
command  of  brigades. 

Towards  the  latter  part  of  September  General  Johnston  wrote 


*  General  Smith  had  joined  the  Confederacy,  and,  upon  the  suggestion  of 
Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  had  been  commissioned  as  a  Major-Genera  1 
by  the  War  Department,  August,  18G1. 

f  From  July  24th,  all  Orders,  General  or  Special,  issued  by  General  Beau- 
regard,  were  dated  "  Headquarters  1st  Corps,  Army  of  the  Potomac." 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  137 

to  the  Secretary  of  War,  asking  that  either  lie  or  the  President 
should  come  to  Fairfax  Court-House,  to  confer  upon  the  subject 
of  organization,  and  upon  a  plan  for  an  offensive  movement,  which 
would  then  be  submitted  to  him. 

General  Beau  regard  had  conceived  a  scheme  of  operations,  as 
distinguished  for  its  breadth  of  view,  and  greatness  of  proposed 
result,  as  that  which  had  been  ineffectually  urged  before  the  bat 
tle  of  Manassas.  It  involved  the  raising  of  the  available  forces 
from  forty  thousand  to  sixty  thousand,  by  drawing  troops  from 
various  parts  of  the  Confederacy  ;  their  places,  in  the  meantime, 
to  be  filled  by  State  troops,  called  out  for  three  or  six  months. 
This  force  assembled,  a  small  corps  of  diversion  was  to  remain  in 
front,  while  the  army  should  cross  the  Potomac,  under  partial  cov 
er  of  night,  either  at  Edwards's  Ferry,  or,  by  means  of  a  pontoon 
train,  at  a  point  nearly  north  of  Fairfax  Court-House,  which  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  was  having  reconnoitred  for  that  purpose.  This 
army  was  then  to  march  rapidly  upon  Washington,  and  seize  the 
Federal  supplies  in  that  city.  It  seemed  almost  certain  that,  even 
should  McClellan  reach  the  threatened  point  in  time — which  he 
might  undoubtedly  do — he  could  not  withstand  our  sudden  at 
tack  and  maintain  his  position.  His  forces  were  undisciplined 
and  demoralized,  and  Washington  had  not  yet  been  fortified. 
Modellings  army  thus  placed  at  our  mercy,  and  Maryland  won. 
the  theatre  of  war  was  to  be  transferred  to  the  Northern  States, 
from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Mississippi,  the  entire  West  being  there- 
bv  relieved  from  peril  of  invasion.  As  the  Federal  government 
had  not  yet  recovered  from  the  effects  of  defeat,  none  of  the 
points  from  which  troops  were  to  be  drawn  for  this  movement 
were  seriously  threatened  ;  some  of  them  were  not  menaced  at  all ; 
and  this  offensive  movement  would  have  forced  the  Federal  gov 
ernment  to  recall  its  scattered  troops  for  the  protection  of  those 
points  upon  which  the  Confederate  army  would  have  been  able 
to  march  after  the  fall  of  Washington.  The  moral  effect  of  such 
an  exhibition  of  power  on  the  governments  of  England  and 
France  would  have  been  of  incalculable  benefit  to  the  Confed 
eracy. 

Upon  the  submission  of  this  plan  to  Generals  Johnston  and 
Smith,  the  latter  at  once  approved  it,  and  the  former,  though 
for  some  time  unwilling,  finally  yielded  his  assent. 

President  Davis  arrived  at  Fairfax  Court-House  on  the  30th  of 


138  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

September,  and  remained  there  two  days,  at  General  Beanregard's 
headquarters.  In  the  conferences  which  followed  between  him  and 
Generals  Johnston,  Beauregard,  and  Smith,  he  objected  to  the 
organization  of  the  army  into  corps  and  divisions,  and  to  the  ap 
pointment  of  major-generals,  as  suggested  ;  but  yielded  so  far  as  to 
consent  to  the  formation  of  divisions  and  the  appointment  of  two 
division-generals  (Van  Dorn  and  Longstreet)  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,*  and  two  others  (G.  "VV.  Smith  and  Jackson)  to  the  Army  of 
the  Shenandoah.f  This  matter,  which  we  may  call  a  compromise, 
being  thus  settled,  the  plan  of  invading  Maryland  was  earnestly 
supported  by  the  three  senior  generals.  Mr.  Davis,  however, 
would  not  agree  to  it.  He  declared  that  he  could  draw  no  troops 
from  the  points  named,  and  that  there  were  no  arms  in  the  coun 
try  for  new  levies,  if  raised.  This  last  objection,  it  is  proper  here 
to  say,  was  not  an  insuperable  one.  The  President  should  have 
remembered  that  if  the  Confederacy  was  thus  deficient  in  arma 
ment  it  was  because  he  had  refused  to  avail  himself  of  the  offer 
by  which,  as  early  as  May,  18614  all  the  arms  and  equipments 
needed  for  our  armies  could  have  been  procured.  But  why  should 
not  arms  have  been  imported,  even  at  that  time  (October,  1861), 
when  no  Federal  blockading  squadron  could  have  interfered  with 
any  of  our  plans  to  that  effect  ?  It  is  an  historical  fact  that  the 
blockade,  though  officially  proclaimed  in  May,  was  only  partially 
effectual  twelve  months  afterwards.  Was  it  that  the  President 
thought  it  too  late  then  to  make  the  effort?  He  should  have 
known  that  the  plan  of  campaign  submitted  to  him  could  not  be 
put  into  immediate  execution  ;  that  the  massing  of  the  additional 
troops  required  to  carry  it  out — some  of  which  were  to  be  drawn 
from  great  distances — would  necessarily  consume  some  time.  The 
least  display  of  energy  on  the  part  of  the  administration,  the  send 
ing  of  an  order  by  telegraph  to  the  house  of  John  Frazer  &  Co., 
of  Charleston,  would  have  been  more  than  sufficient  to  secure  for 
the  government  all  the  arms  it  required  for  the  new  levies  spoken 
of,  which,  though  not  directly  needed  for  the  forward  movement 


*  Designation  of  General  Beanregard's  forces,  as  per  orders  issued  by  him,  on 
the  20th  of  June,  1861. 

t  Designation  of  General  Johnston's  forces,  before  and  after  his  junction  with 
General  Beauregard. 

I  Proposal  of  John  Frazer  &  Co.,  set  forth  in  Chapter  V. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  139 

and  aggressive  campaign  urged  upon  Mr.  Davis,  could  have  been 
used  to  fill  the  place  of  the  seasoned  troops  withdrawn  to  reinforce 
the  Army  of  Virginia. 

In  vain  was  it  urged  upon  the  President  that  the  army  was  now 
in  splendid  fighting  condition,  and  eager  again  to  meet  its  recently 
defeated  foe  ;  while,  if  left  inactive,  it  was  liable  to  deteriorate  dur 
ing  the  winter,  and  lose  greatly  in  numbers  by  the  expiration  of  the 
enlistment  term  of  the  twelve  months'  men.  It  was  further  urged 
that,  with  the  army  raised  to  sixty  thousand  men,  the  movement 
could  be  undertaken,  with  the  prospect  of  success  to  follow  at 
every  other  point  along  the  frontier  ;  whereas,  should  disaster  re 
sult  from  the  loss  of  present  opportunity,  the  entire  Confederacy 
might  be  endangered  at  a  later  date,  with  but  inferior  hope  of  re 
cuperation.  Mr.  Davis,  however,  could  not  be  influenced,  and  de 
clared  that  the  utmost  he  could  do  would  be  to  furnish  recruits, 
to  be  armed  with  the  surplus  stands  of  arms  then  at  Manassas, 
amounting  to  about  two  thousand  five  hundred. 

Thus  was  abandoned  a  plan  which,  had  it  been  carried  out, 
would  have  borne  mighty  results  to  the  Confederacy.  That  it  was 
a  bold  one  is  undoubted.  But  boldness  in  our  movements,  while 
the  prestige  of  victory  yet  animated  our  troops,  was  clearly  the 
wisest  policy  to  be  adopted.  It  was  of  the  utmost  importance  for 
us  to  follow  up  our  victory,  and  the  surest  way  of  doing  so  was 
by  making  aruaggressive  campaign.  It  would  have  compelled  the 
enemy,  demoralized  and  unprepared  as  he  still  was,  to  put  himself 
on  the  defensive  to  repel  invasion  on  his  own  soil,  instead  of  at 
tempting  it  on  ours. 

In  lieu  of  the  unaccepted  movement  favored  by  the  generals  in 
command,  Mr.  Davis  suggested  that  a  column  be  crossed  to  the 
eastern  shore  of  the  Potomac,  opposite  Aquia  Creek,  to  capture  a 
Federal  division  posted  there  under  General  Sickles.  As  the 
river,  at  that  point  more  than  a  mile  wide,  was  held  by  United 
States  war  vessels,  and  there  would  hardly  have  been  an  oppor 
tunity  for  the  troops,  even  if  successful,  to  return  to  Virginia,  this 
proposition  met  the  approval  of  none  of  the  three  generals,  and 
was  therefore  courteously  discarded.  We  shall  have  to  recur  to 
this  subject  later  in  the  present  chapter. 

Mr.  Davis  devotes  five  pages  of  his  book  to  the  "  Fairfax  Court- 
llouse  Conference,"  as  it  was  called,  and  most  unjustifiably  arraigns 
Generals  J.  E.  Johnston,  Beauregard,  and  G.  W.  Smith,  not  for 


140  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

having  taken  a  part  in  it,  or  expressed  their  views  upon  the  points 
at  issue  between  them,  but  for  having, "  about  four  months  after 
wards,"  prepared  a  "paper"  wherein  was  made  "a  record  of  their 
conversation  ;  a  fact,"  says  Mr.  Davis,  "  which  was  concealed  from 
me,  whereas,  both  for  accuracy  and  frankness,  it  should  have  been 
submitted  to  me,  even  if  there  had  been  nothing  due  to  our  official 
relations.  Twenty  years  after  the  event  I  learned  of  this  secret 
report,  by  one  party,  without  notice  having  been  given  to  the  other, 
of  a  conversation  said  to  have  lasted  two  hours."*  And  Mr.  Davis 
continues  as  follows:  "I  have  noticed  the  improbabilities  and 
inconsistencies  of  the  paper,  and  without  remarks  I  submit  to 
honorable  men  the  concealment  from  me  in  which  it  was  pre 
pared,"  etc.f 

This  language  is  all  the  more  unwarrantable,  because  Mr.  Davis 
fails  to  show — though  he  asserts  it — that  any  effort  at  conceal 
ment  was  ever  made  by  those  whom  he  accuses  of  it.  Knowing 
the  importance  of  this  conference,  and  desirous  of  having  a  true 
and  correct  account  of  it,  one  that  could  not  be  effaced  or  altered 
by  the  lapse  of  time,  the  three  generals  wrote  out,  while  it  was 
still  fresh  in  their  memory,  all  that  had  passed  between  them  and 
the  President.  As  nothing  was  added  and  nothing  suppressed  in 
the  memorandum  thus  made,  what  obligation  was  there  on  their 
part  to  submit  it  to  Mr.  Davis  ?  He  knew,  as  well  as  they  did, 
what  had  transpired,  and  had  nothing  further  to  learn  about  it. 
He  also — in  all  propriety — could  have  committed  the  conversation 
to  writing,  had  it  so  pleased  his  fancy ;  and,  provided  it  was  done 
correctly,  no  account  whatever  of  his  action  in  the  matter  was  due 
to  the  three  generals  or  any  one  of  them. 

What  Mr.  Davis  says,  to-day,  of  that  conference,  shows  how 
wise  and  how  far-seeing  were  Generals  Johnston,  Beauregard,  and 
Smith,  in  preparing  the  paper  alluded  to,  which  has  aroused  to 
such  an  extent  the  ire  of  the  ex-President.  General  Beauregard, 
for  one,  had  already  had  occasion  to  learn  what  light  work  could 
be  made  with  a  plan  of  operations  verbally  submitted  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  our  armies.  We  refer  to  the  plan  proposed, 
through  Colonel  Chestnut,  on  the  14th  of  July,  1SG1,  before  the 
battle  of  Manassas,  which  Mr.  Davis  denied  having  ever  had  any 

*  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,1'  vol.  i.  p.  451. 
t  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  452. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD. 

official  cognizance  of,  because  no  written  communication  had  been 
handed  to  him  at  the  time;  and  because,  no  doubt,  he  was  una 
ware  that  a  full  report  of  the  circumstance  had  been  drawn  up  by 
Colonel  Chestnut,  and  was  in  General  Beauregard's  possession. 
And  here,  perhaps,  the  following  query  may  find  a  fitting  place 
in  this  review  :  Did  Mr.  Davis  ever  communicate  to  General  Beau- 
regard  his  official  endorsement  upon  the  report  of  the  battle  of 
Manassas?  If  he  had  done  so,  his  charge  of ''concealment/'  un 
just  though  it  is,  would  come  with  a  better  grace  than  it  does ; 
but,  as  he  did  not,  his  imputation  of  duplicity  falls  upon  himself. 
For,  as  the  reader  will  hereafter  learn,-"  the  President's  endorse 
ment,  contradicting,  with  unreserved  severity,  statements  made  by 
General  Beauregard  in  his  report,  was  an  official  paper,  officially 
forwarded  to  Congress,  but  studiously  kept  from  General  Beaure 
gard's  knowledge.  The  impugned  memorandum  was  altogether 
an  unofficial  paper,  prepared  by  the  three  generals  for  their 
own  private  files,  without  even  a  shadow  of  reproach  against  the 
President,  and  merely  intended  as  a  reminder,  hereafter,  of  an 
important  military  event.  Hence  we  say,  it  was  a  wise  and  emi 
nently  proper  measure  to  prepare  a  written  memorandum  of  what 
occurred  at  the  Fairfax  Court-House  council.  "  Verba  volant 
scripta  niancnt  :^  an  adage  always  to  be  appreciated  for  the  sound, 
practical  teaching  it  contains.  It  is  the  right,  no  less  than  the 
duty,  of  leading  men,  in  all  countries  and  in  all  ages,  to  see  to  it 
that  the  truth  concerning  public  events  is  carefully  guarded  and 
preserved,  in  order  that  it  may  not  be  easily  tampered  with,  or 
made  to  degenerate  into  error.  As  matters  now  stand,  and  thanks 
to  the  foresight  displayed  by  Generals  Johnston,  Beauregard,  and 
Smith,  Mr.  Davis,  no  less  than  those  who  figured  with  him  in  the 
conference  we  speak  of,  must  abide  by  its  text,  as  recorded  at  the 
time.  And  to  show  how  completely  Mr.  Davis  errs,  when  he 
charges  that  he  was  kept  purposely  in  ignorance  of  the  "secret 
report"  he  so  bitterly  denounces,  we  here  state  that  it  was  seen 
of  many  men  during  the  war — and  not  as  a  secret;  and  that,  as 
early  as  1807  or  1SG8 — in  other  words,  fully  fifteen  or  sixteen 
years  ago— General  Beauregard  had  this  identical  memorandum 
published  in  The  Land  We  Love — a  magazine  edited,  at  that  time, 
by  General  D.  II.  Hill,  of  North  Carolina.  It  was  commented  on 


*  In  Chapter  XIII. 


142  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

at  length,  if  not  republished,  in  the  Jackson  (Miss.)  Clarion.  No 
one  is  responsible  for  Mr.  Davis's  neglect  to  take  cognizance  of 
it.  His  appeal,  therefore,  to  the  "  honorable  men  "  of  the  country, 
whose  sympathies  he  desires  to  enlist  in  his  favor,  becomes  sim 
ply  puerile;  and,  far  from  resulting  in  injury  to  those  whom  he 
assails,  it  only  recoils  upon  himself,  and  exposes  the  extreme  care 
lessness  with  which  he  writes. 

Mr.  Davis  should  have  inserted  that  document  in  his  book.  His 
criticisms  would  then  have  been  better  appreciated.  Why  he  ab 
stained  from  doing  so  is  not,  however,  hard  to  understand.  As 
General  Beauregard  has  no  like  reasons  to  refrain  from  giving  full 
publicity  to  it  (we  know  that  Generals  Johnston  and  Smith  think 
as  he  does  on  the  subject),  we  now  lay  the  whole  paper  before  the 
reader,  asking  his  most  careful  consideration  of  it. 

"On  the  26th  of  September,  1801,  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  addressed  a 
letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  regard  to  the  importance  of  putting  this  army 
in  condition  to  assume  the  offensive ;  and  suggested  that  his  Excellency  the 
President,  or  the  Secretary  of  "War,  or  some  one  representing  them,  should  at 
an  early  day  come  to  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  then  at  or  near  Fairfax 
Court-House,  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  whether  the  army  could  be  rein 
forced  to  the  extent  that  the  commanding  general  deemed  necessary  for  an 
offensive  campaign. 

"  His  Excellency  the  President  arrived  at  Fairfax  Court-House  a  few  days 
thereafter,  late  in  the  afternoon,  and  proceeded  to  the  quarters  of  General 
Beauregard. 

"  On  the  same  evening  General  Johnston  and  I  called  to  pay  our  respects. 
No  official  subjects  of  importance  were  alluded  to  in  that  interview.  At  eight 
o'clock  the  next  evening,  by  appointment  of  the  President,  a  conference  was 
had  between  himself,  General  Johnston,  General  Beauregard,  and  myself.  Va 
rious  matters  of  detail  were  introduced  by  the  President,  and  talked  over  be 
tween  himself  and  the  two  senior  generals.  Having  but  recently  arrived,  and 
not  being  well  acquainted  with  the  special  subject  referred  to,  I  took  little  or 
no  part  in  this  conversation.  Finally,  with  perhaps  some  abruptness,  I  said, 
'  Mr.  President,  is  it  not  possible  to  put  this  army  in  condition  to  assume  the 
active  offensive  ?'  adding,  that  this  was  a  question  of  vital  importance,  upon 
which  the  success  or  failure  of  our  cause  might  depend.  This  question 
brought  on  discussion.  The  precise  conversation  which  followed  I  do  not 
propose  to  give:  it  was  not  an  argument;  there  seemed  to  be  little  difference 
of  opinion  between  us  in  regard  to  general  views  and  principles.  It  was 
clearly  stated  and  agreed  to,  that  the  military  force  of  the  Confederate  States 
was  at  the  highest  point  it  could  attain  without  arms  from  abroad ;  that  the 
portion  of  this  particular  army  .present  for  duty  was  in  the  finest  fighting  con 
dition  ;  that,  if  kept  inactive,  it  must  retrograde  immensely  in  every  respect 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD.  143 

during  the  winter,  the  effect  of  which  was  foreseen  and  dreaded  by  us  all. 
The  enemy  were  daily  increasing  in  numbers,  arms,  discipline,  and  efficiency 
— we  looked  forward  to  a  sad  state  of  things  at  the  opening  of  a  spring  cam 
paign.  These  and  other  points  being  agreed  upon  without  argument,  it  was 
again  asked, 4  Mr.  President,  is  it  not  possible  to  increase  the  effective  strength 
of  this  army,  and  put  us  in  condition  to  cross  the  Potomac  and  carry  the 
war  into  the  enemy's  country  ?  Can  you  not,  by  stripping  other  points  to  the 
last  they  will  bear,  and  even  risking  defeat  at  all  other  places,  put  us  in  con 
dition  to  move  forward  ?  Success  here  at  this  time  saves  everything,  defeat 
here  loses  all.'  In  explanation,  and  as  an  illustration  of  this,  the  unqualified 
opinion  was  advanced,  that  if,  for  want  of  adequate  strength  on  our  part  in 
Kentucky,  the  Federal  forces  should  take  military  possession  of  that  whole 
State,  and  even  enter  and  occupy  a  portion  of  Tennessee,  that  a  victory  gained 
by  this  army  beyond  the  Potomac  would,  by  threatening  the  heart  of  the 
Northern  States,  compel  their  armies  to  fall  buck,  free  Kentucky,  and  give  us 
the  line  of  the  Ohio  within  ten  days  thereafter.  On  the  other  hand,  should 
our  forces  in  Tennessee  and  Southern  Kentucky  be  strengthened  so  as  to  en 
able  us  to  take  and  to  hold  the  Ohio  River  as  a  boundary,  a  disastrous  de 
feat  of  this  army  would  at  once  be  followed  by  an  overwhelming  wave  of 
Northern  invaders,  that  would  sweep  over  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  extend 
ing  to  the  northern  part  of  the  Cotton  States,  if  not  to  New  Orleans.  Similar 
views  were  expressed  in  regard  to  ultimate  results,  in  Northwestern  Virginia, 
being  dependent  upon  the  success  or  failure  of  this  army;  and  various  other 
special  illustrations  were  offered — showing,  in  short,  that  success  here  was 
success  everywhere ;  defeat  here,  defeat  everywhere ;  and  that  this  was  tin- 
point  upon  which  all  the  available  force  of  the  Confederate  States  should  be 
concentrated. 

"It  seemed  to  be  conceded  by  all  that  our  force,  at  that  time  here,  was  not 
sufficient  for  assuming  the  offensive  beyond  the  Potomac;  and  that,  even  with 
a  much  larger  force,  an  attack  upon  their  army,  under  the  guns  of  their  for 
tifications  on  this  side  of  the  river,  was  out  of  the  question.  The  President 
asked  me  what  number  of  men  were  necessary,  in  my  opinion,  to  warrant  an 
offensive  campaign,  to  cross  the  Potomac,  cut  off  the  communication  of  the 
enemy  with  their  fortified  capital,  and  carry  the  war  into  their  country.  I 
answered,  'Fifty  thousand  effective  seasoned  soldiers ;'  explaining  that  by  sea 
soned  soldiers  I  meant  such  men  as  we  had  here  present  for  duty;  and  add 
ed  that  they  would  have  to  be  drawn  from  the  peninsula  about  Yorktown, 
Norfolk,  from  Western  Virginia,  Pensacola,  or  wherever  might  be  most  ex 
pedient. 

"General  Johnston  and  General  Bcauregard  both  said  that  a  force  of  suti/ 
thousand  such  men  would  be  necessary;  and  that  this  force  would  require 
large  additional  transportation  and  munitions  of  war,  the  supplies  here  beins; 
entirely  inadequate  for  an  active  campaign  in  the  enemy's  country,  even 
with  our  present  force.  In  this  connection  there  was  some  discussion  of 
the  difficulties  to  be  overcome,  and  the  probabilities  of  success,  but  no  one 
questioned  the  disastrous  results  of  remaining  inactive  throughout  the 
winter. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

"  Notwithstanding  the  belief  that  many  in  the  Northern  army  were  opposed 
on  principle  to  invading  the  Southern  States,  and  that  they  would  fight  bet 
ter  in  defending  their  own  homes  than  in  attacking  ours,  it  was  believed  that 
the  best,  if  not  the  only  place,  to  insure  success,  was  to  concentrate  our  forces, 
and  attack  the  enemy  in  their  own  country.  The  President,  I  think,  gave  no 
definite  opinion  in  regard  to  the  number  of  men  necessary  for  that  purpose, 
and  I  am  sure  that  no  one  present  considered  this  a  question  to  be  finally  de 
cided  by  any  other  person  than  the  commanding  general  of  this  army.  Re 
turning  to  the  question  that  had  been  twice  asked,  the  President  expressed 
surprise  and  regret  that  the  number  of  surplus  arms  here  was  so  small ;  and, 
I  thought,  spoke  bitterly  of  this  disappointment.  He  then  stated,  that,  at  that 
time,  no  reinforcement  could  l>e  furnished  to  this  army  of  the,  character  asked  for, 
and  that  the  most  that  could  be  done  would  be  to  furnish  recruits  to  take  the 
surplus  arms  in  store  here  (say  twenty -five  hundred  stand).  That  the  whole  coun 
try  was  demanding  protection  at  his  hands,  and  praying  for  arms  and  troops  for 
defence.  He  had  long  been  expecting  arms  from  abroad,  but  had  been  disap 
pointed.  He  still  hoped  to  get  them,  but  had  no  positive  assurance  that  they 
would  be  received  at  all.  The  manufacture  of  arms  in  the  Confederate  States 
was  as  yet  undeveloped  to  any  considerable  extent.  Want  of  arms  was  the 
great  difficulty ;  he  could  not  take  any  troops  from  the  points  named,  and, 
without  arms  from  abroad,  could  not  reinforce  this  army.  He  expressed  re 
gret,  and  seemed  to  feel  deeply,  as  did  every  one  present. 

u  When  the  President  had  thus  clearly  and  positively  stated  his  inability 
to  put  this  army  in  the  condition  deemed  by  the  general  necessary  before  en 
tering  upon  an  active  offensive  campaign,  it  was  felt  that  it  might  be  better 
to  run  the  risk  of  almost  certain  destruction,  fighting  upon  the  other  side  of 
the  Potomac,  rather  than  see  the  gradual  dying-out  and  deterioration  of  this 
army  during  a  winter  at  the  end  of  which  the  term  of  enlistment  of  half  the 
force  would  expire.  The  prospect  of  a  spring  campaign,  to  be  commenced  un 
der  such  discouraging  circumstances,  wras  rendered  all  the  more  gloomy  by 
the  daily  increasing  strength  of  an  enemy  already  much  superior  in  numbers. 
On  the  other  hand  was  the  hope  and  expectation  that  before  the  end  of  win 
ter  arms  would  be  introduced  into  the  country  ;  and  all  were  confident  that 
we  could  then  not  only  protect  our  own  country,  but  successfully  invade  that 
of  the  enemy. 

"  General  Johnston  said  that  he  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  express  an  opinion 
as  to  the  practicability  of  reducing  the  strength  of  our  forces  at  points  not 
within  the  limits  of  his  command ;  and  with  but  few  further  remarks  from 
any  one,  the  answer  of  the  President  was  accepted  as  final ;  and  it  was  felt 
that  there  was  no  other  course  left  but  to  take  a  defensive  position  and  await 
the  enemy.  If  they  did  not  advance  we  had  but  to  await  the  winter  and  its 
results. 

"  After  the  main  question  was  dropped,  the  President  proposed  that,  instead 
of  an  active  offensive  campaign,  we  should  attempt  certain  partial  operations 
— a  sudden  blow  against  Sickles  or  Banks,  or  to  break  the  bridge  over  the 
Monocacy.  This,  he  thought,  besides  injuring  the  enemy,  would  exert  a  good 
influence  over  our  troops,  and  encourage  the  people  of  the  Confederate  States 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  145 

generally.  In  regard  to  attacking  Sickles,  it  was  stated  in  reply  that,  as  the 
enemy  controlled  the  river  with  their  ships  of  war,  it  would  be  necessary  for 
us  to  occupy  two  points  on  the  river,  one  above  and  another  below  the  point 
of  crossing,  that  we  might  by  our  batteries  prevent  their  armed  vessels  from 
interfering  with  the  passage  of  the  troops.  In  any  case  the  difficulty  of  cross 
ing  large  bodies  over  wide  rivers,  in  the  vicinity  of  an  enemy,  and  then  recross- 
ing,  made  such  expeditions  hazardous ;  it  was  agreed,  however,  that  if  any 
opportunity  should  occur,  offering  reasonable  chances  of  success,  that  the  at 
tempt  would  be  made. 

"During  this  conference,  or  council,  which  lasted,  perhaps,  two  hours,  all 
was  earnest,  serious,  deliberate ;  the  impression  made  upon  me  was  deep  and 
lasting,  and  I  am  convinced  that  the  foregoing  statement  is  not  only  correct 
as  far  as  it  goes,  but,  in  my  opinion,  it  gives  a  fair  idea  of  all  that  occurred 
at  that  time  in  regard  to  the  question  of  our  crossing  the  Potomac. 

"  G.  AV.  SMITH,  Maj.-Gcn.  C.  S.  A. 
"  CENTREVILLE,  VA.,  January  olst,  18G2.   Signed  in  Triplicate. 

''  Our  recollections  of  that  conference  agree  fully  with  this  statement  of  Gen 
eral  G.  W.  Smith. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gen.  C.  S.  A. 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  Gen.  C.  S.  A. 
"  CENTRE VILLE,  VA.,  January  31sf,  18G2.   Signed  in  Triplicate." 

This  is  what  took  place  at  the  Fairfax  Court-House  conference. 
It  confirms  what  we  have  already  stated  at  the  beginning  of  the 
present  chapter. 

We  now  resume  our  review  of  Mr.  Davis's  remarks  about  it. 

In  that  authoritative  tone  which  ill  befits  him  to-day,  and  frees 
from  undue  courtesy  towards  him  those  whom  he  so  cavalierly 
misrepresents,  Mr.  Davis,  with  a  view  to  impugn  the  veracity  of 
the  authors  of  the  foregoing  memorandum,  writes  as  follows  :  "  It 
does  not  agree  in  some  respects  with  my  memory  of  what  occurred, 
and  is  not  consistent  with  itself.'7 '  Not  consistent,  says  Mr. 
Davis,  "  because  in  one  part  of  the  paper  it  is  stated  that  the  re 
inforcements  asked  for  were  to  be  '  seasoned  soldiers?  such  as  were 
there  present ;"  and  in  another  part,  "  that  he  could  not  take  any 
troops  from  the  points  named,  and,  without  arms  from  abroad, 
could  not  reinforce  that  army."  f 

Thereupon,  and  after  propping  up  his  premises  to  suit  his 
purpose,  Mr.  Davis  concludes  that,  clearly,  from  the  answer  he  is 
said  to  have  made  to  the  three  generals,  "  the  proposition  had  l>cen 

*  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  450. 
t  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  431. 
I.— 10 


146  MILITARY    OPERATIONS   OF 

for  such  reinforcements  as  additional  arms  could  enable  him  to 
give"  * 

These  are  sweeping  assumptions,  and  such  as  only  men  who 
think  themselves  certain  of  impunity  would  venture.  Unfortu 
nately  for  Mr.  Davis,  this  is  not  the  case  with  him.  Can  he  really 
believe  that  because  he  was  President  of  the  Confederate  States, 
his  mere  allegations,  resting,  as  they  do,  only  upon  his  memory  of 
what  occurred  twenty  years  ago,  will  counterbalance  and  even  out 
weigh  a  document,  carefully  prepared  and  signed  and  vouched 
for,  by  three  such  generals  as  Johnston,  Beauregard,  and  Smith, 
his  peers  in  gentlemanly  attainments,  his  superiors  —  especially 
two  of  them — in  military  merit;  men  of  unstained  character,  en 
joying,  now  as  then,  the  entire  confidence  of  their  people ;  and 
who  have,  to-day,  something  more  tangible  than  words  to  fall  back 
upon,  in  support  of  their  statements? 

No  unbiassed  reader  will  believe  that  this  document  contains 
aught  but  the  truth.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  three  men  of  honor 
certify  to  its  truth,  and  do  so  four  months  after  the  occurrence  it 
refers  to;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Davis  alone,  without  note 
or  memorandum  to  assist  him,  and  after  twenty  years  have  elapsed, 
comes  forward  and  says :  My  version  of  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  is  not  in  accord  with  yours.  You  are  wrong,  though  you 
committed  to  writing  the  entire  conference ;  I  am  right,  though 
my  memory,  frail  and  treacherous  as  it  may  be,  is  my  only  vouch 
er  to  justify  me  in  controverting  the  positions  you  have  taken. 

With  regard  to  the  "  inconsistencies"  complained  of  by  Mr. 
Davis,  which  he  would  have  his  readers  believe  were  so  easily  de 
tected  in  the  written  memorandum  now  before  us,  we  do  not  hesi 
tate  to  say  that  they  exist  in  his  imagination  only.  Let  the  reader 
carefully  examine  the  paper  we  have  submitted  to  him,  and  see 
if  he  can  discover  the  "  inconsistencies,"  so  obvious,  according  to 
Mr.  Davis,  as  to  make  it  a  downright  "  absurdity."  f  However 
strong  Mr.  Davis's  arguments  may  appear  in  the  absence  of  the  doc 
ument  which  he  interprets  to  suit  his  fancy,  they  fall  to  the  ground 
and  burst  as  bubbles  when  confronted  with  the  true  facts  of  the  case. 

The  object  of  the  conference,  as  we  know,  was  to  urge  upon  the 
President  the  necessity  of  an  offensive  campaign ;  to  accomplish 


*  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  451.    The  italics 
are  ours.  t  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  450. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  147 

which,  the  army  at  or  near  Fairfax  Court-House  was  to  be  raised 
to  an  effective  force  of  sixty  thousand  men.  Not  sixty  thousand 
additional  men,  but  an  increase  of  such  a  number  of  "  seasoned 
soldiers  "  as  would  make  up  a  total  of  sixty  thousand.  The  Vir 
ginia  army  consisted,  at  that  time,  of  about  forty  thousand  men. 
General  Smith  thought  that  fifty  thousand,  that  is  to  say,  only  ten 
thousand  more  than  we  then  had — would  be  sufficient  to  under 
take  the  forward  movement.  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard 
gave  it  as  their  opinion  that  sixty  thousand  would  be  needed ;  in 
other  words,  twenty  thousand  additional  troops. 

This  being  the  case — as  we  have  it  vouched  for  by  the  three 
generals — where  did  Mr.  Davis  discover  and  how  can  he  assert, 
that  "  the  lowest  estimate  made  ly  any  of  them  was  about  twice 
the  number  there  present  for  duty"?*  which — if  this  were  true, 
as  it  is  not — would  have  brought  up  "the  force  required  for 
the  contemplated  advance  into  Maryland''  to  eighty  thousand 
men  and  no  less.  This  assertion  shows  how  unsafe  and  untrust 
worthy  Mr.  Davis's  memory  is,  and  it  explains,  satisfactorily,  we 
think,  why  it  was  that  he  would  not  give  a  place  in  his  book  to 
that  "  secret  report,"  as  lie  is  pleased  to  call  it. 

If,  as  late  as  October,  1801,  Mr.  Davis  had  no  arms  to  furnish  to 
recruits,  he  had,  unquestionably,  at  the  different  points  designated 
by  the  three  generals,  troops  already  armed  and  equipped,  already 
disciplined  and  drilled.  These,  had  he  been  willing  to  favor  the 
plan  submitted  to  him,  he  could,  in  less  than  three  weeks'  time, 
have  transported  to  the  borders  of  Virginia,  to  reinforce  the  army 
said,  by  those  who  knew  it  best,  to  be  "  in  the  finest  fighting  con 
dition."  lie  was  asked  for  such  troops  as  could  then  be  found  in 
the  peninsula  around  Yorktown,  in  Western  Virginia,  at  Pcnsacola, 
at  Mobile,  at  Charleston,  at  Xew  Orleans ;  points  from  which  about 
twenty-five  thousand  men — five  thousand  more  than  were  needed 
— could  have  been  withdrawn  without  unnecessarily  exposing  the 
positions  they  occupied.  These  were  the  "seasoned  soldiers" 
the  three  generals  wanted.  They  neither  called  for  nor  desired 
raw  recruits,  raised  to  bear  the  arms  Mr.  Davis  might  possibly  re 
ceive  from  Europe,  and  which  he  was  hoping  for,  "  barring  the 
dangers  of  the  sea."  Recruits  of  that  kind,  however  well  armed, 


*  "  Rise  and  Full  of  the  Confederate  Government,1'  vol.  i.  p.  449.    The  italics 
are  ours. 


14:8  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

would  have  been  useless,  as  they  could  not  have  sustained  the  ar 
duous  campaign  sought  to  be  inaugurated,  which  required  pre 
vious  military  training  and  discipline.  But  Mr.  Davis  turned  a 
deaf  ear  to  the  suggestions  made  to  him.  He  would  not  receive 
the  advice  of  the  generals  in  the  field.  He  failed  to  seize  the 
great  opportunity  offered  him,  and,  as  usual,  took  upon  himself  to 
decide  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy.  No  troops,  he  declared, 
could  be  taken  from  the  points  named — though  none  of  them 
were  threatened  at  the  time — and  no  reinforcements,  of  the  char 
acter  asked  for,  could,  therefore,  be  furnished  to  the  army.  He 
did  propose  twenty-five  hundred  recruits  for  that  number  of  small 
arms  which  we  had  in  store ;  but  no  further  mention  was  made  of 
recruits,  either  before,  during,  or  after  the  conference.  What  was 
said  of  arms,  of  the  expectations  of  the  government  about  them, 
and  even  of  Mr.  Davis's  disappointment  at  finding  the  strength 
of  the  army  "  but  little  increased,"  are  side  issues,  which  should 
not  divert  our  attention  from  the  true  object  of  the  conference 
and  the  main  question  submitted  to  the  President,  namely:  An 
aggressive  campaign  into  the  enemy's  country,  conditioned  upon 
reinforcements  to  be  procured  from  divers  points  of  the  Confeder 
acy,  then  and  there  specially  designated. 

Mr.  Davis  charges  Generals  Johnston,  Beatiregard,  and  Smith 
with  assuming  to  know  more  about  the  positions  of  our  troops  at 
different  stations  of  the  country  than  the  "War  Department  itself, 
whose  duty  it  was  to  receive  all  the  army  returns,  and  by  which 
questions  involving  the  position  and  withdrawal  of  troops,  in  the 
field  or  elsewhere,  "could  best  be  decided."  If  the  War  Depart 
ment,  or  "  Richmond,"  as  Mr.  Davis  has  it,  knew  so  much  about 
army  matters,  how  is  it  that  the  President,  or  head  of  the  War 
Department,  expressed  so  much  wonder  at  the  relative  small- 
ness  of  our  force  at  Fairfax  Court -House?  The  "returns" 
forwarded  to  Richmond  must  certainly  have  shown  him  the  fact, 
and  the  cause  of  it.  If  the  Cornmander-in-Chief  of  the  army 
and  navy  knew  so  little  about  the  number  and  condition  of 
forces  then  in  such  close  proximity  to  Richmond,  is  it  not  rea 
sonable  to  suppose  that  his  knowledge  of  troops  stationed  at 
distant  points,  and  in  other  States,  was  still  more  scanty  and  im 
perfect  ? 

Knowing  the  purely  patriotic  motives  actuating  Generals  John 
ston,  Beauregard,  and  Smith,  when  they  suggested  the  means  by 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  149 

which  the  advance  movement  urged  by  them  could  be  effected ; 
and  knowing  also  how  far  from  their  thought  it  was  to  make  any 
display  of  superior  knowledge,  we  must  deprecate  the  bitterness 
of  language  used  and  the  irritable  personality  indulged  in  by  Mr. 
Davis,  in  the  following  passage  of  his  book :  "  Very  little  experi 
ence,  or  a  fair  amount  of  modesty,  without  experience,  would  serve 
to  prevent  one  from  announcing  his  conclusion  that  troops  could 
be  withdrawn  from  a  place  or  places,  without  knowing  how  many 
were  there,  and  what  was  the  necessity  for  their  presence.'' 

Whatever  may  be,  to-day,  the  efforts  made  by  Mr.  Davis  to 
shield  himself  from  censure,  for  the  course  he  then  adopted,  it 
remains  none  the  less  an  incontrovertible  fact,  that  troops,  armed 
and  equipped,  officered  and  drilled,  could  have  been  brought  from 
the  points  designated  to  him,  and  that  he  positively  refused  to  al 
low  their  transfer  to  be  effected.  That,  as  Commander-in-Chief, 
he  had  the  right  so  to  act,  is  unquestioned  ;  but  that  he  erred  in 
exercising  that  right  is  clear  to  all  who  followed  the  history  of 
events,  from  that  time  to  the  end  of  the  war. 

Mr.  Davis  insists,  that  though  the  generals  he  met  at  Fairfax 
Court-IIouso  were  of  opinion  that  u  it  were  better  to  run  the  risk 
of  almost  certain  destruction  fighting  upon  the  other  side  of  the 
Potomac,  rather  than  see  the  gradual  dying-out  and  deterioration 
of  this  army  during  a  winter,"  ctc.,f  yet,  "when  it  icas  proposed 
to  ihcm"  by  Mr.  Davis,  "to  cross  into  eastern  Maryland,  on  a 
steamer  in  our  possession,  for  a  partial  campaign,  difficulties  arose 
like  the  lion  in  the  path  of  tfie  sluggard,  so  that  the  proposition 
was  postponed  and  never  executed.  In  like  manner,  the  other  ex 
pedition  in  the  valley  of  Virginia  was  achieved  by  an  officer  not 
of  this  council,  General  T.  J.  Jackson"  ^ 

No  similar  expedition  was  ever  thought  of  or  executed  during 
the  Confederate  War.  Mr.  Da  vis's  proposition  was  unique.  The 
campaign  in  the  valley  of  Virginia,  which,  he  says,  was  achieved 
"  by  another  officer  not  of  this  council,''  resembled  in  nothing  the 
one  he  had  suggested  ;  for,  if  it  had,  even  with  such  a  commander 

*  "Rise  and  Full  of  the  Confederate  Government,''  vol.  i.  p.  451. 

f  They  did  make  use  of  such  language,  but  added  :  "At  the  end  of  which 
the  term  of  enlistment  of  half  the  force  would  expire;"  which  made  a  most  sig 
nificant  difference. 

I  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  pp.  450,  451.  The 
italics  arc  ours. 


150  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

as  Jackson  to  lead  it,  overwhelming  disaster  would  have  been  the 
result. 

Mr.  Da  vis's  plan  was,  by  means  of  a  steamer  (a  single  one),  then 
in  our  possession,  to  throw  troops  across  the  lower  Potomac,  for  a 
partial  campaign,  against  a  Federal  force  said  to  be  on  the  oppo 
site  bank,  under  General  Sickles. 

Mr.  Davis  had  evidently  forgotten  that  the  Potomac,  at  that 
point,  was  more  than  a  mile  and  a  half  wide ;  with  a  tide  rising 
and  falling  from  five  to  six  feet,  twice  in  twenty-four  hours;  with 
shallow  mud-flats  in  many  places,  along  both  shores ;  and,  last  but 
not  least,  with  United  States  war-vessels  controlling  the  river  with 
untiring  activity.  He  had  also  forgotten  that  the  Confederate 
column — not  a  regiment,  nor  even  a  brigade,  but,  at  least,  a  division 
— thus  to  be  sent  into  Maryland,  would,  of  necessity,  have  had  to 
return  to  the  Virginia  shore  after  the  expedition,  whether  success 
ful  or  unsuccessful.  Suppose  the  landing  on  the  other  side  had 
been  safely  effected — we  cannot  see  how,  but  will  suppose  it, 
nevertheless — while  the  fighting  was  in  progress,  the  river  would 
have  been  patrolled  with  increased  vigilance.  The  enemy  would 
have  put  forth  every  effort  to  cut  off  the  return  of  the  column. 
Reinforcements  would  have  poured  in,  from  all  points,  to  assist 
the  attacked  Federals.  What  then  would  have  become  of  the  one 
steamer  in  our  possession  ?  How  could  she  have  brought  back 
our  troops,  and  what  troops  would  have  been  left  to  bring  back? 

We  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that,  had  such  a  movement 
been  attempted,  the  fate  that  overtook  the  Federal  column  at 
Ball's  Bluff,  on  the  21st  of  October  of  the  same  year,  would  have 
befallen  the  Confederates.  Few  indeed — if  any — of  the  doomed 
men  sent  across  the  Potomac,  on  Mr.  Davis's  expedition,  would 
have  returned  to  the  Virginia  shore  to  tell  the  story  of  their 
defeat. 

Had  any  other  but  the  President  and  Commander-in-Chief  of 
our  armies  proposed  such  a  movement  to  Generals  Johnston  and 
Beauregard,  he  would  have  been  pitilessly  and  openly  derided. 
As  it  was,  our  commanding  generals  did  what  military  etiquette 
and  their  duty  towards  their  men  required ;  they  courteously,  but, 
unhesitatingly,  rejected  the  proposal. 

We  find  it  stated  in  the  memorandum  we  have  so  often  referred 
to,  that,  at  the  end  of  the  Fairfax  Court-House  conference,  Mr. 
Davis,  after  crushing  the  hopes  of  our  generals  by  rejecting  their 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD. 

plan,  suggested  certain  "partial  operations"  against  the  enemy, 
among  which,  and  most  conspicuous  of  all,  as  being  the  most 
promising,  was  the  one  just  commented  upon.  This  is  un 
doubtedly  correct.  But  as  no  mention  is  made  of  other  opera 
tions  in  Mr.  Davis's  book,  and  as  General  Beauregard's  recollec 
tion  is  not  quite  clear  as  to  their  strategic  merit,  we  refrain  from 
attempting  any  description  of  them.  That  they  were  not  exe 
cuted,  is,  to  us,  proof  sufficient  of  their  manifest  impracticability. 


152  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Signal  Rockets  and  Signal  Telegraph.  —  General  Beauregard  Advises  Coast 
Defenses  at  New  Orleans,  Mobile,  Galveston,  and  Berwick  Bay,  and  Calls 
Attention  to  the  Exposure  of  Port  Royal.  —  Counsels  General  Lovell  Con 
cerning  River  Obstructions  between  Forts  St.  Philip  and  Jackson.  —  General 
Johnston  Orders  the  Troops  into  Winter  Quarters.  —  Our  Lines  Formed  at 
Centreville.  —  Drainsville  and  Ball's  Bluff.  —  General  Beauregard  Proposes 
to  Intercept  General  Stone's  Retreat,  and  also  Suggests  Resolute  Attack 
against  McClellan's  Right.  —  Unfriendly  Correspondence  Between  War 
Department  and  General  Beauregard.  —  Uncourtcous  Language  of  Mr. 
Benjamin.  —  General  Beauregard  Exposes  the  Ignorance  of  the  Acting 
Secretary  of  War.  —  Controversy  in  the  Press  about  General  Beauregard's 
Report  of  Battle  of  Manassas.—  His  Letter  to  the  Editors  of  Richmond 
Whig.  —  The  President  Accuses  General  Beauregard  of  Attempting  to  Ex 
alt  Himself  at  His  Expense.  —  He  Upholds  Mr.  Benjamin  and  Condemns 
General  Beauregard.  —  Dignity  and  Forbearance  of  the  Latter. 


tlic  organization  of  the  array  into  divisions  was  being 
effected,  General  Beauregard,  from  close  scrutiny  of  the  Northern 
journals,  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  an  early  attack  was 
meditated  against  his  lines.  To  avoid  all  possibility  of  surprise, 
and  deceive  the  enemy  about  his  real  strength,  he  caused  rockets 
to  be  distributed  to  his  command,  with  minute  instructions  as  to 
their  use.  Very  shortly  afterwards,  as  night  had  just  set  in,  Cap 
tain  E.  P.  Alexander,  whose  zeal  and  activity  were  untiring,  came 
to  headquarters  and  reported  that  rockets  were  being  thrown  up, 
in  a  very  strange  manner,  from  the  lines  of  the  forces  opposing 
us.  General  Beauregard  at  once  ordered  the  discharge  of  the 

O  O 

appropriate  signals;  and,  in  a  few  moments  a  counter  -blaze  of 
rockets  swept  the  sky  along  the  entire  line  of  the  Confederate 
pickets,  which  extended  about  ten  miles  from  the  Occoquan,  on 
the  right,  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Potomac,  north  of  Falls  Church, 
on  the  left.  The  consequence  was  a  most  extraordinary  illumina 
tion,  which  produced  an  excitement  in  Washington,  where  charges 
soon  became  rife  that  officers  of  the  War  Department  had  given 
information  of  an  intended  advance  by  McClellan,  in  the  night, 
which  the  Confederates  had  shown  their  readiness  to  meet. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  153 

Through  the  same  officer  (Captain  Alexander),  General  Bcaure- 
gard  had  also  succeeded  in  establishing  a  signal  telegraph  between 
Mason's  and  Munson's  Hills  and  Washington.  A  piece  of  new 
tin,  made  to  perform  certain  turns  in  the  sunlight,  by  a  friendly 
hand,  from  the  window  of  an  elevated  mansion  in  the  Federal  capi 
tal,  informed  him  of  McClellan's  movements.  True,  the  informa 
tion  was  only  of  a  general  character,  and,  uncorroborated,  could 
not  have  been  of  much  assistance.  But  it  served  to  arouse  his 
attention,  and  what  with  the  secret  service  of  his  "underground 
railroad"  and  the  news  culled  from  Northern  journals,  which 
were  regularly  procured,  he  arrived  at  a  fairly  correct  knowledge 
of  the  enemy's  intentions.  To  render  this  communication  more 
efficient,  an  alphabet  was  afterwards  established  and  messages  were 
sent  by  moving  the  shades  on  the  several  windows  of  the  mansion 
alluded  to,  which,  at  night,  was  well  lighted  up,  to  make  the  signs 
visible.  From  Mason's  and  Munson's  Hills  answers  were  given  by 
the  usual  system,  that  is  to  say,  flags  in  the  daytime,  and  lanterns 
as  soon  as  it  grew  dark.  From  Washington,  lights  were  resorted 
to  for  night  signals,  and,  for  the  day,  the  shifting  of  window  cur 
tains,  right  and  left  of  an  imaginary  central  line.  As  to  General 
Beau  regard's  headquarters  and  his  different  outposts,  they  were 
put  in  communication  by  means  of  wire  telegraph. 

The  inability  of  the  President  to  aid  in  the  execution  of  the 
aggressive  campaign  so  urgently  pressed  upon  him  had  left  no 
other  course  open  but  to  take  a  defensive  position  and  "await 
the  winter  and  its  results."  We  were  to  take  no  initiatory 
steps,  and  light  only  if  attacked.  Believing  that  a  period  of 
enforced  inactivity  would  now  ensue,  General  Beauregard's 
thoughts  were  turned  to  the  dangers  which  might  threaten  the 
Southern  ports  —  especially  New  Orleans;  and  on  the  5th  of 
October,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  he  ex 
pressed  his  desire  to  be  sent  there  during  the  probable  suspension 
of  hostilities  in  Virginia.  He  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  Xew 
Orleans,  Mobile,  Galveston,  and  Berwick  Bay,  along  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  would  undoubtedly  be  assailed,  and  should  be  protected 
by  field  defences  proper  to  withstand  attack,  until  reinforcements 
could  come  to  the  rescue.  He  also  called  attention  to  the  expos 
ure  of  Tort  Royal,  South  Carolina,  as  a  harbor  of  safety  on  the 
Atlantic,  for  the  Federals,  and  as  leading  directly  to  the  railroad 
communication  between  Charleston  and  Savannah. 


154  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

On  the  6th,  Major -General  Mansfield  Lo  veil,  who  had  joined 
the  Southern  cause,  and  had  just  been  commissioned  in  the  Pro 
visional  Army,  came  to  Fairfax  Court-House,  requesting  General 
Beauregard's  counsel  with  regard  to  the  defense  of  New  Orleans, 
whither  he  had  been  ordered  by  the  War  Department.  This 
counsel  General  Beauregard  gave  him  with  great  care  and  much 
minuteness.  It  is  proper  here  to  state,  that,  during  the  recent 
visit  of  President  Davis  to  Fairfax  Court-House,  the  subject  of 
the  unprotected  condition  of  New  Orleans  having  arisen,  General 
Beauregard,  expressing  his  regret  that  the  Military  Board  of 
Louisiana  had  taken  no  action  as  to  the  suggestions  he  had  made 
to  them,  in  February,  1861,  again  strongly  urged  his  views  about 
constructing  floating  booms  between  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip, 
to  obstruct  the  passage  of  a  Federal  fleet,  should  such  be  attempted. 
The  President  gave  but  little  weight  to  these  suggestions,  and  ap 
peared  to  have  no  apprehension  as  to  the  safety  of  that  city. 

In  his  interview  with  General  Lovell,  General  Beauregard  em 
phasized,  both  orally  and  in  writing,  the  absolute  necessity  of  such 
an  obstruction,  and  hoped  that  General  Lovell,  who  had  approved 
of  his  system,  would  lose  no  time  in  putting  it  into  operation. 
Later  events  showed,  however,  that  the  work  was  not  constructed 
as  planned  and  advised  by  General  Beauregard,  both  in  his  con 
ference  with  General  Lovell  and  in  his  memoir  to  the  Louisiana 
Military  Board.* 

A  few  days  later,  General  Johnston,  apprehending  the  ap 
proaching  cold  weather,  proposed  that  the  forces  should  now  fall 
back  and  establish  their  winter  quarters  at  Manassas.  General 
Beauregard,  whose  arrangements  for  signal  communication  with 
Washington  had  been  perfected,  was  reluctant  to  retire  with 
out  a  trial  of  their  present  opportunity  against  the  enemy.  But 
there  wras  no  way  of  avoiding  the  movement.  General  Beaure 
gard,  fearing  the  bad  effect  upon  the  army  and  the  people  of  a 
retreat  to  the  point  held  by  us  before  our  late  victory,  proposed 
Centreville  instead  of  Manassas ;  and,  to  overcome  the  objection 
that  the  former  place  was  somewhat  commanded  by  a  succession 
of  heights  too  distant  to  be  embraced  wTithin  the  Confederate 
line,  he  undertook  himself  to  prepare  its  defences.  The  order  to 

*See  Chapter  L,  page  17,  about  obstructions  and  floating  boom  between 
Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  155 

withdraw  his  army,  however,  was  so  abrupt  as  to  be  impracticable 
without  giving  the  movement  the  appearance  of  flight,  and  in 
volving  the  loss  of  valuable  property ;  it  was  not  executed,  there 
fore,  until  the  18th  or  19th. 

In  withdrawing  from  Mason's  and  Munson's  Hills,  the  Confed 
erates  took  their  last  view  of  the  Federal  capital,  and  bade  fare 
well  to  a  post  where  soldierly  enjoyment,  under  the  exhilaration 
of  successful  daring,  had  been  at  its  highest  during  days  still 
pleasantly  remembered  as  the  festive  period  of  the  army  life. 
The  positions  we  abandoned  were  excellent  points  of  observation, 
from  which  the  tents  of  General  McClellan's  army  might  be 
counted ;  and  the  fact  of  our  being  so  near  the  enemy  confused 
him  as  to  our  plan  of  operations,  fur  our  position  seemed  to 
promise  offensive  measures  on  our  part,  and  denoted  both  confi 
dence  and  strength.  Under  a  bolder  direction,  the  two  hills  would 
have  been  fortified  and  made  central  strategic  and  tactical  points. 
They  were  scarcely  more  than  seven  miles,  in  an  air  line,  from 
Washington,  whence  the  Confederate  flag  was  clearly  visible,  and 
acted  as  a  red  capa  on  the  impetuous  and  imprudent  politicians, 
provoking  them  to  insist  upon  a  premature  attack.  Had  the  two 
hills  been  fortified  and  supplied  with  artillery,  and  the  adjacent 
ground  arranged  for  a  pitched  battle,  into  which  the  enemy  might 
have  been  drawn  in  an  attempt  to  seize  them,  the  result  to  Gen 
eral  McClellan  might  have  been  made  destructive,  as,  on  his  side, 
the  ground  was  very  bad,  and  unfavorable  to  the  movements  of 
troops.*  Such  an  attack  was  intended  by  him  about  the  time  the 
positions  were  abandoned. 

The  Confederate  forces  now  took  up  a  line  of  triangular  shape, 
with  Centreville  as  the  salient,  one  side  running  to  Union  Mills  and 
the  other  to  the  stone  bridge,  with  outposts  of  regiments  three  or 
four  miles  forward  in  all  directions,  and  cavalry  pickets  as  far  in 
advance  as  Fairfax  Court-House.  The  Federals  followed  with  a 
corresponding  advance  of  their  outposts.  Afterwards,  upon  the 
closer  approach  of  the  enemy,  in  order  to  supply  the  deficiency  of 
cannon,  General  Beauregard  devised  a  substitute  in  wooden  logs, 
so  shaped  and  blackened  as  to  present  the  appearance  of  guns. 
They  were  covered  with  a  shed  of  brush  and  leaves,  so  as  to 
escape  balloon  observations,  and  made  quite  an  imposing  array, 

*  General  McClellan  so  describes  it  in  his  report. 


156  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

the  peaceful  character  of  which  very  much  surprised  the  Federal 
forces  when  they  occupied  these  works,  after  their  evacuation  in 
the  spring. 

On  the  19th,  General  McClellan  having  ordered  McCall's  divis 
ion  to  Drain  svillc,  about  sixteen  miles  west  of  Alexandria,  to  cov 
er  reconnoissances  in  that  quarter,  and  procure  supplies,  directed 
Brigadier-General  Stone  to  feign  a  crossing  of  the  Potomac  from 
Poolsville,  Maryland,  and  threaten  Leesburg,  held  by  one  of  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  brigades,  nnder  Colonel  Evans.  lie  hoped  by 
these  movements  to  induce  the  evacuation  of  the  place.  On  the 
21st,  while  General  McCall  was  returning  to  his  camp  at  Langley, 
General  Stone  began  crossing  his  division  at  Edwards's  Ferry,  and 
one  of  his  subordinates,  General  Baker,  engaged  Colonel  Evans  in 
the  forenoon.  During  the  day  General  Stone  threw  over  his  en 
tire  division,  and  the  battle  continued  until  night,  when  the  Fed 
eral  forces  were  completely  routed,  and  many  of  them,  driven  over 
the  steep  banks  at  Ball's  Bluff,  lost  their  lives  in  the  river.* 

Upon  receiving  from  Evans  immediate  news  of  the  conflict, 
General  Beauregard  proposed  to  General  Johnston  to  march  at 
once,  with  sufficient  force,  and  cut  off  General  Stone's  retreat,  as 
the  Potomac,  swollen  by  rains,  was  then  difficult  to  cross.  Gen 
eral  Johnston  did  not  agree  to  this,  fearing  that  some  occurrence 
might  take  place  requiring  the  presence  of  all  our  forces  with  the 
main  army.  While  Banks's  division,  from  Darnestown,  Maryland, 
moved  to  his  support,  General  Stone  intrenched  on  the  Virginia 
shore,  but  did  not  succeed  in  recrossing  until  the  night  of  the  23d 
and  24th. 

Just  at  this  time  transports  had  been  observed  descending  the 
Potomac,  laden  with  a  heavy  armament,  reported  to  be  intended 
for  use  against  General  Magruder,  who  commanded  at  Yorktown, 
on  the  Peninsula  below  Richmond,  and  a  heavy  force  had,  mean 
while,  gathered  north  of  the  Potomac,  opposite  to  Evans.  Seiz 
ing  the  opportunity,  General  Beauregard  proposed  a  resolute  at 
tack  against  McClellan's  extreme  right,  exposed  by  its  salience  in 
the  quarter  of  Drainsville,  in  order  to  relieve  Evans  and  break 
through  the  enemy's  plans;  but  the  proposition  was  not  assented 
to  by  General  Johnston, 

Evans's  loss  at  Ball's  Bluff  was  forty  men.     He  captured  four- 

*  From  General  McClellan's  Report. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  157 

teen  officers  and  seven  hundred  men.  The  entire  loss  of  the  en 
emy,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  was  between  one  thousand 
and  twelve  hundred.  Among  the  slain  was  General  Baker, 
whose  body  was  returned  to  the  Federal  lines.  When,  at  a  later 
date,  General  Stone  was  arrested  and  put  on  trial  for  his  conduct 
of  that  expedition,  Colonel  Jordan,  General  Beauregard's  Chief  of 
Staff,  noticed  in  a  Northern  journal  that  one  of  the  charges  against 
General  Stone  was  his  failure  to  give  certain  orders  to  General 
Baker.  Written  orders,  however,  had  been  found  on  General  Ba 
ker's  body,  which  would  aid  in  vindicating  General  Stone  ;  and 
Colonel  Jordan,  having  mentioned  the  fact  to  General  Beaure- 
gard,  the  latter  caused  the  papers  to  be  immediately  sent  Xorth, 
under  a  flag  of  truce ;  an  act  of  chivalry  to  the  imperilled  honor 
of  a  foe. 

Until  early  October,  the  personal  relations  of  General  Beaure- 
gard  with  the  government  officials — except  in  the  case  of  Colo 
nel  Xorthrop's  violent  eccentricities — had  been  those  of  unstudied 
friendship,  although  serious  obstructions  had  also  been  encoun 
tered  from  the  Quartermaster's  Department  at  Richmond.  Hav 
ing  now  occasion  to  recommend  the  appointment  of  Mr.  T.  B.  Fer 
guson,  as  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  the  "  First  Corps,"  in  the  place  of 
Captain  E.  P.  Alexander,  whose  services  had  been  transferred  to 
General  Johnston,  on  account  of  his  needs  as  General-in-Chief, 
General  Beauregard  received  from  a  subordinate  in  the  War  De 
partment*  the  brief  reply  that  the  President  did  not  approve  the 
division  of  the  army  into  two  corps,  and  preferred  that  there 
should  be  but  one  Chief  of  Ordnance  to  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac. 

General  Beauregard  was  more  than  disappointed  at  this  abrupt, 
unceremonious  way  of  rejecting  his  demand.  Though  not  always 
successful  in  his  applications,  he  had  been  accustomed  to  more 
courteous  treatment  from  the  War  Department.  He  thought 
that,  apart  from  the  question  of  giving  him  an  ordnance  officer, 
of  the  need  of  whose  services  he  was  no  doubt  the  better  judge, 
the  President  ought  not  arbitrarily  to  interfere  with  measures  of 
usefulness  and  efficiency,  which  generals  actually  in  the  field  could 
more  accurately  appreciate  and  more  wisely  manage.  In  the  an 
tagonism  of  Mr.  Davis  to  a  system  of  organization  which  had 


*  A.  T.  Bledsoe,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 


158  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

been  working  with  remarkable  success  for  several  weeks,  he  saw  a 
fixed  purpose  to  thwart  not  only  his  own  views,  but  more  partic 
ularly  those  of  General  Johnston,  whose  relations  with  Richmond 
were  already  growing  to  be  of  a  delicate  and  uneasy  character. 
He  therefore  expressed  his  dissatisfaction  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
and  went  so  far  as  to  say,  that  if  he  was  to  understand,  by  such  a 
letter,  that  he  was  no  longer  in  command  of  an  army  corps,  he  re 
quested  to  be  relieved  at  once  from  his  false  position  ;  otherwise, 
he  desired  the  services  of  a  Chief  of  Ordnance.  He  urged  that 
the  more  imperfect  the  elements  of  an  army  in  the  field,  the 
greater  should  be  its  subdivisions  under  competent  officers,  in  or 
der  that  commanders  might  spare,  for  their  most  important  duties, 
the  time  and  attention  unprofitably  lost  in  devotion  to  minor  de 
tails  ;  and  that  Mr.  Ferguson's  appointment  was  to  provide  a 
Chief  of  Ordnance  to  attend  to  the  duties  of  that  important  de 
partment.  He  also  addressed  the  President  on  the  same  subject. 
In  the  month  of  August,  Adjutant-General  Cooper  had  earnest 
ly  approved  General  Beau  regard's  proposition  to  introduce  a  rock 
et  battery  in  his  command.  The  object  of  such  a  battery  has  al 
ready  been  explained.  The  Chief  of  Ordnance,  having  procured 
the  manufacture  of  the  rockets,  General  Beauregard  intrusted 
Captain  E.  P.  Alexander  with  the  organization  of  the  battery,  and 
in  the  latter  end  of  September,  upon  his  recommendation,  had  au 
thorized  Lieutenant  Edmund  Cummins  to  enlist  a  rocket  company 
of  fifty  volunteers.  Being  now  in  Richmond  on  this  duty,  Lieu 
tenant  Cummins,  on  application  to  the  Post  Quartermaster  and 
Commissary,  found  his  authority  questioned,  and  no  attention 
given  to  his  requisitions.  Referred  ultimately  for  recognition  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Benjamin,  the  latter  told  him  to  wait 
until  the  President  should  decide  the  matter.  He  then  finally  in 
formed  him  that  his  orders  wrere  invalid,  and  remanded  him  to  the 
army.  There  followed  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
General  Beauregard,  expressing  his  "  no  small  surprise  "  that  he 
should  have  committed  an  act  "  without  warrant  in  law,"  and  in 
forming  him  that  he  could  be  excused  and  "go  unpunished,"  only 
on  account  of  his  motive  and  his  defect  of  judgment.  This  un 
called-for  and  altogether  unwarrantable  language,  on  the  part 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  staggered  General  Beauregard,  as  it 
seemed  improbable  that  Mr.  Benjamin  had  ventured  it  on  his 
own  responsibility.  Viewed  as  an  extreme  expedient  to  provoke  a 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  159 

predetermined  quarrel,  it  corroborated  warnings  already  received 
from  high  quarters,  warnings  too  authentic  to  be  wholly  disre 
garded,  to  which,  however,  General  Beauregard  had  been  unwill 
ing  to  yield  entire  credence.  Overlooking  Mr.  Benjamin,  he  refer 
red  his  letter  to  the  President,  to  whom  he  exposed  the  Secretary's 
ignorance  upon  the  subject,  and  protested  against  his  ill-timed  ob 
structions  and  arguments.  The  following  is  an  extract  from  the 
letter,  written  to  Mr.  Davis,  under  date  of  October  20th,  1861. 
*****  *#* 

"  I  have  felt  it  due  to  your  Excellency  and  the  country,  at  this  juncture,  as 
well  as  to  myself,  to  invoke  your  notice  of  this  matter,  so  that  guard  may  be 
placed  against  a  recurrence  of  this  character  of  correspondence.  ...  I  am  utter 
ly  at  a  loss  to  understand  wherein  my  course,  in  connection  with  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  Secretary's  letter,  can  be  pronounced  '  without  warrant  in  law,' 
and  be  the  source  of 'so  much  surprise.'  The  Secretary  seems  to  be  unaware, 
evidently,  that  a  rocket  company  is  but  a  field  artillery  company,  nothing 
more,  and  not,  by  any  means,  a  special  corps  or  arm  of  the  service,  like  that, 
for  example,  of  sappers,  miners,  or  pontoniers — as  I  apprehend  he  supposes — 
requiring  congressional  enactments  for  its  organization,  in  addition  to  existing 
laws.  An  acquaintance  with  the  history  of  the  military  establishment  and 
organization  of  the  late  United  States  would  have  protected  the  Acting  Secre 
tary  from  this  misapprehension,  as  he  would  have  then  known  in  what  way, 
during  the  war  with  Mexico,  a  rocket  battery  was  organized  for  the  field, 
with  the  army  under  General  Scott.  .  .  . 

"  But  in  this  very  matter,  it  so  happens  I  did  not  act  without  consultation 
with  all  proper  authorities.  Assured  of  the  difficulties  in  getting  field  guns 
in  any  adequate  number  for  the  exigency,  and  convinced  of  the  value  of  war 
rockets  against  such  troops  as  our  adversaries  have,  I  despatched  an  officer 
of  my  staff— Captain  E.  P.  Alexander — last  August,  to  Richmond,  to  consult 
and  arrange  measures  with  the  proper  departments.  lie  saw  the  Adjutant- 
General  of  the  army  on  the  subject,  and  received,  I  am  happy  to  say,  the  most 
ample,  cordial  approval  of  the  plan ;  and  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  took  immediate 
steps  for  manufacturing  the  rockets  with  the  utmost  celerity. 

"  On  the  return  of  Captain  Alexander  from  his  mission,  so  satisfactorily  con 
cluded  in  all  respects,  it  became  proper  to  secure  men  to  be  ready  for  the  rocket 
battery,  so  that  no  time  should  be  lost.  It  so  happened  that  a  valuable  offi 
cer,  by  circumstances  thrown  out  of  employment,  was  available,  and  thought 
to  be  particularly  fitted  for  the  command  of  a  rocket  battery ;  while  it  was 
believed  that  he  could  readily  recruit  a  company  without  subtracting  from 
our  already  too  weak  army.  Under  these  circumstances,  I  need  not  say  to 
your  Excellency,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  direct  him  to  recruit  such  a  company  as 
soon  as  possible.  .  .  .  God  knows,  in  all  I  do  at  this  time,  I  have  no  other  end 
in  view  than  the  good  and  success  of  our  cause  and  the  interests  of  our  coun 
try,  now  sorely  pressed ;  and  I  can  and  do  confidently  deny  the  allegation  of 
the  Acting  Secretary,  that  my  conduct  has  been  wanting  in  judgment  in  this 


160  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

connection.  I  am  quite  willing,  indeed,  that  you  shall  decide  whose  '•judgment'* 
has  been  most  at  fault — that  of  your  general,  who  has  simply  done  what  was 
essential  to  provide  men  to  handle  the  rockets  as  soon  as  ready  for  use,  and 
thus  materially  increase  his  means  of  defence  and  ability  to  maintain  our  im 
perilled  cause ;  or  that  of  the  functionary  at  his  desk,  who  deems  it  a  fit  time 
to  weave  technical  pleas  of  obstruction,  to  debate  about  the  prerogative  of 
his  office  and  of  your  Excellency's,  and  to  write  lectures  on  law  while  the 
enemy  is  mustering  in  our  front,  with  at  least  three  times  our  force  in  infan 
try,  and  four  times  as  much  artillery. 

"  In  the  interest  of  the  country,  you  have  been  graciously  pleased  to  dele 
gate  to  myself  and  other  generals  in  command  of  the  armies  of  the  Confeder 
ate  States,  ample  powers — which  could  be  readily  adduced — under  which  I 
could  show  full  'warrant'  for  what  I  have  done.  Strange,  indeed,  were  it 
not  so ;  passing  strange  that  a  general  officer,  intrusted  with  such  an  army  as 
I  command,  and  the  solemn,  momentous  duties  imposed  'upon  him  at  this 
time,'  should  be  left  utterly  without  power  to  add  to  his  forces  a  single  com 
pany,  in  the  simple  manner  proposed  in  Special  Orders  No.  353  ;  and  that  the 
attempt  to  do  so  should  fill  a  high  public  functionary  with  so  much  surprise 
that  I  can  only  be  excused  and  '  go  unpunished '  in  view  of  my  motives  and 
defect  of  judgment. 

Hi******** 

"  Excuse  me  for  the  length  of  this  letter,  the  subject-matter  of  which  I  now 
hope  to  dismiss,  and  about  which  I  can  have  no  controversy  whatever  with 
the  Secretary  at  this  time. 

"  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gen.  Coin  dig." 

As  General  Beauregard  wrote  the  foregoing  communication,  an 
other  letter  came  from  the  Secretary  on  the  subject  of  the  appoint 
ment  of  a  Chief  of  Ordnance,  and  the  question  of  treating  the  ar 
mies  of  the  Potomac  and  of  the  Shenandoah  as  two  corps  of  one 
army,  characterized,  likewise,  by  an  unjustified  and  offensive  li 
cense  of  expression.  This,  also,  General  Beauregard  felt  bound 
to  refer  to  the  President,  with  the  request  that  he  might  be  shield 
ed  from  a  repetition  of  such  personal  attacks.  lie  said : 

"  I  am  willing  that,  in  the  future,  my  countrymen  shall  adjudge  whether  or 
not  I  have  'studied'  aright  the  legislation  of  Congress  in  relation  to  army  or 
ganizations  ;  whether,  as  the  honorable  Secretary  courteously  advises,  I  have 
taken  the  'pains'  to  read  the  laws  of  Congress,  made  to  'provide  for  the  pub 
lic  defence  ;'  or  whether,  in  my  ignorance  of  that  legislation,  I  require  enlight 
enment  after  the  manner  of  the  communication  enclosed. 

"Meantime  I  am  here,  as  the  soldier  of  the  cause,  ready,  to  the  best  of  my 
ability,  to  execute  the  orders  of  the  government,  either  with  regard  to  the 
organization  of  this  army  or  its  operations,  asking  only  for  definite  orders  from 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  161 

the  proper  source,  and  expressed  in  proper  terms.     I  am  ready  to  act  in  any 
capacity  demanded  of  me. 

"With  this,  I  shall  leave  it  to  your  Excellency,  an  educated  soldier,  keenly 
alive  to  all  the  sensibilities  which  our  profession  and  associations  engender, 
to  shield  me,  for  the  present,  from  these  ill-timed,  unaccountable  annoyances. 
"Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gen.  Coradg." 

Though,  as  between  General  Beanregard  and  the  Secretary  of 
War  personally,  these  letters  were  well  answered  by  a  significant 
silence  on  the  part  of  the  former,  yet  they  produced  on  his  mind 
a  painful  impression.  In  close  proximity  to  an  enemy  far  supe 
rior  in  number  to  our  forces,  and  who,  at  any  moment,  might 
make  an  attack  upon  us — every  hour  of  his  life,  apart  from  brief 
rest,  being  devoted  to  the  hard  task  before  him — he  felt  keenly 
this  absence  of  support,  and  the  refusal  of  such  an  easy  increase 
to  his  scant  resources;  all  the  more  strange,  as  it  had  been  previ 
ously  approved  of  by  the  heads  of  two  high  department  bureaus, 
to  whom  it  had  been  submitted,  and  whose  sanction  had  clothed 
it  with  all  sufficient  authority. 

Notwithstanding — and  immediately  following — this  correspond 
ence,  General  Beanregard,  ever  forgetful  of  self,  and  thinking  only 
of  the  interests  of  the  cause,  exchanged  views  with  the  President 
respecting  this  important  point  of  army  organization.  It  was 
done  in  the  same  spirit  of  friendliness  and  kindness  of  tone  that 
had  hitherto  prevailed  between  them.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac 
(General  Beauregard's)  and  that  of  the  Shenandoah  (General 
Johnston's)  had  never  been  merged  by  any  order  of  the  War  De 
partment,  but  had  been  designated  by  both  generals,  since  the 
battle  of  Manassas,  the  First  and  Second  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  for  convenience  and  abbreviation;  and,  though  separate 
in  administration,  had  been  considered  as  acting  together  under  the 
chief  command  of  General  Johnston,  as  senior  officer  present ;  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  retaining  command  of  his  own  troops,  and  Major- 
General  G.  W.  Smith  takin^  chanre  of  General  Johnston's  forces 

CD  O 

proper.  That  the  "War  Department,  as  we  have  already  alleged, 
was  fully  cognizant  of  this  fact,  is  further  shown  by  the  very  let 
ter  informing  General  Beauregard  of  the  President's  disapproval 
of  such  a  division.  A.  T.  Bledsoe,  "  Chief  Bureau  of  War  " — as  he 
signs  himself  in  that  letter  dated  "War  Department,  Richmond, 
October  SM,  1801"— says:  "The  letter  of  Captain  E.  P.  Alexan- 
L— 11 


162  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OLS 

der,  recommending  T.  B.  Ferguson  for  the  post  of  Chief  of  Ord 
nance  for  the  First  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  with  your 
endorsement,  has  been  referred,"  etc.  Besides,  all  the  official  pa 
pers  sent  by  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  for  months  past 
to  the  War  Department,  or  to  the  President,  had  been  headed 
"  First "  or  "  Second  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac."  It  is  nat 
ural  to  suppose,  therefore,  that  the  change  in  the  President's  mind, 
which  induced  him  to  disapprove,  at  this  late  hour,  of  what  he  had 
tacitly — if  not  otherwise — consented  to,  had  been  brought  about 
by  reasons  and  influences  having  very  little  to  do  with  the  real 
question  at  issue. 

The  War  Department  acted  on  the  theory  that  General  Beaure 
gard  was  in  command  of  the  whole  united  army ;  but,  that  there 
being  another  officer  present  of  equal  grade  and  anterior  commis 
sion,  the  latter  was  first  in  command  of  the  whole,  and  General 
Beauregard  second  in  command  of  the  whole.  The  General  rep 
resented  to  Mr.  Davis  the  evil  consequences  of  this  theory,  as  vir 
tually  throwing  out  of  position  several  officers  of  the  highest 
grades,  upon  the  junction  of  their  forces  for  some  great  object, 
and  at  the  very  time  when  their  services,  in  command  of  their 
proper  corps,  were  most  needed;  as  in  the  event  of  General  Lee's 
army,  in  Northwestern  Virginia,  and  General  Holmes's,  at  Aquia 
Creek,  uniting  with  Generals  Johnston's  and  Beauregard's.  There 
would  thus  be  a  second  and  third  commander  of  the  whole  army, 
which  would  result  in  all  the  generals,  excepting  the  senior  one — 
General  Lee — being  out  of  service.  He  brought  forward  and 
dwelt  upon  another  reason,  which  was  that,  with  such  an  organ 
ization,  separate  inferior  commanders  would  not  be  so  prompt  to 
execute  a  junction  at  a  critical  moment. 

This  theory  of  the  War  Department  wTas  without  precedent  in 
military  administration,  and  one  of  its  many  evils,  depending  on 
the  possible  deductions  of  the  department,  was  the  present  with 
drawal,  from  an  entire  army  corps,  of  the  services  of  a  Chief  of 
Ordnance,  on  the  ground  that  the  army  of  the  junior  officer  was 
absorbed,  and  there  existed  no  such  legal  organization  as  a  "  corps." 
The  President  also  desired  that  divisions,  as  well  as  brigades, 
should  be  composed  of  troops  from  the  same  State.  General 
Beauregard  had  already  thus  organized  his  brigades  on  the  25th 
of  July,  but  declared  his  judgment  against  extending  the  rule  to 
divisions,  because,  in  case  a  division  thus  organized  were  cut  to 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  163 

pieces  or  captured  in  battle,  the  loss  would  fall  too  heavily  on  a 
single  State ;  and  in  this  Mr.  Davis  seemed  to  agree,  as  that  form 
of  organization  was  not  further  urged. 

President  Davis  also  wrote  strongly,  assuring  General  Beaure- 
gard  that  the  Acting  Secretary  of  War  had  intended  no  offense, 
asking  him  to  overlook  the  language  of  the  technical  lawyer,  and 
stating  his  conviction  of  the  latter's  regard  and  admiration  for  the 
General ;  though,  meanwhile,  Mr.  Benjamin,  certain  of  impunity, 
was  writing,  upon  other  matters,  letters  of  like  impropriety,  under 
cover  of  the  forms  of  conventional  courtesy. 

General  Beauregard's  attention  was  now  drawn  to  a  controversy, 
raised  in  the  press,  about  that  portion  of  a  published  synopsis  of 
his  Manassas  report  which  revealed  to  the  public  his  plan  of  cam 
paign,  as  proposed  to  the  President  through  Colonel  Chestnut,  for 
the  occupation  of  Maryland  and  the  capture  of  "Washington,* 
which  had  been,  at  that  time,  the  1-ith  of  July,  1861,  discarded  bv 
Mr.  Davis  and  pronounced  impracticable.  This  publication,  and 
the  discussion  arising  from  it,  were  subjects  of  much  concern  to 
General  Beauregard,  who,  deploring  all  division  among  our  lead 
ers,  refused  to  take  any  part  whatever  in  the  controversy.  Finally, 
however,  but  only  with  a  view  to  allay  public  feeling,  he  wrote  to 
the  Richmond  Whiy  a  letter,  which  called  forth  the  warm  praise 
of  his  numerous  friends,  who  were  anxious,  as  he  was  himself,  that 
the  cause  of  public  defence  should  not  be  embarrassed  by  personal 
contests.  We  deem  it  proper  to  lay  this  whole  letter  before  the 
reader. 

"  CEXTREVILLE,  VA.  (within  hearing  of  the  enemy's  guns), 

Nov.  3(7,  18G1. 
"To  the  Editors  of  the  Richmond  Whig  : 

"  Gentlemen, — My  attention  has  just  been  called  to  an  unfortunate  contro 
versy  now  going  on,  relative  to  the  publication  of  the  synopsis  of  my  report  of 
the  battle  of  Manassas.  None  can  regret  more  than  I  do  this  publication, 
which  was  made  without  my  knowledge  or  authority. 

"  The  President  is  the  sole  judge  of  when  and  what  parts  of  the  report  of  u 
commanding  officer  should  be  made  public.  I,  individually,  do  not  object  to 
delaying  its  publication  as  long  as  the  War  Department  shall  think  it  neces 
sary  and  proper  for  the  success  of  our  cause. 

"  Meanwhile,  I  entreat  my  friends  not  to  trouble  themselves  about  refuting 
the  slanders  and  calumnies  aimed  at  me.  Alcibiades,  on  a  certain  occasion, 
resorted  to  a  singular  method  to  occupy  the  minds  of  his  traducers ;  let,  then. 
'  that  synopsis '  answer  the  same  purpose  for  me  in  this  instance. 

*  Chapter  VIII.,  page  85. 


164  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

"  If  certain  minds  cannot  understand  the  difference  between  patriotism, 
the  highest  civic  virtue,  and  office-seeking ,  the  lowest  civic  occupation,  I  pity 
them  from  the  bottom  of  my  heart.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that  I  prefer  the  respect 
and  esteem  of  my  countrymen  to  the  admiration  and  envy  of  the  world.  I 
hope,  for  the  sake  of  our  cause  and  country,  to  be  able,  with  the  assistance  of 
a  kind  Providence,  to  answer  my  calumniators  with  new  victories  over  our 
national  enemies  ;  but  I  have  nothing  to  ask  of  the  country,  the  government,  or 
my  friends,  except  to  afford  me  all  the  aid  they  can,  in  the  great  struggle  we 
are  now  engaged  upon.  I  am  not,  and  never  expect  or  desire  to  be,  a  candidate 
for  any  civil  office  in  the  gift  of  the  people  or  of  the  executive.  The  acme  of 
my  ambition  is,  after  having  cast  my  mite  in  the  defense  of  our  sacred  cause, 
and  assisted,  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  in  securing  our  rights  and  independence 
as  a  nation,  to  retire  into  private  life  (my  means  then  permitting)  never  to 
leave  my  home,  unless  to  fight  again  the  battles  of  my  country. 
''Respectfully, your  most  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

The  circumstances  attending  the  publication  of  this  letter  are 
described  with  graphic  precision  by  Mr.  Pollard,  in  his  book  en 
titled  "Lee  and  his  Lieutenants,"  pp.  246-248.  Our  only  sur 
prise,  after  reading  what  the  author  there  asserts  of  the  causes 
leading  to  the  unfriendly  relations  which,  from  that  time,  existed 
between  the  President  and  General  Beau  regard,  is  that  he  should 
have  deemed  General  Beauregard's  letter  unnecessary,  and  its 
"  publication  ill-advised."  Had  he  not  disclaimed  all  idea  of  rival 
ry  with  the  President  and  openly  declared  that  he  was  no  aspirant 
to  political  honors,  the  animosity  displayed  by  President  Davis 
would  have  been  still  greater  against  him,  to  the  manifest  injury 
of  the  public  service.  Mr.  Pollard  says:  "Whatever  the  merits 
of  that  controversy,  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  from  this  time  there 
commenced  to  be  evident  that  jealousy  or  dislike  on  the  part  of 
the  administration  towards  General  Beauregard  which,  through 
the  war,  tended  to  cripple  his  energies  and  neutralized  his  best 
plans  of  campaign."  Such  being  the  case,  what  might  not  have 
been  the  result,  had  General  Beauregard,  by  his  silence,  confirmed 
Mr.  Davis  in  his  avowed  suppositions  concerning  him  ?  The  fol 
lowing  letter  testifies  to  the  feelings  which  appear  to  have  been 
suddenly  aroused  in  Mr.  Davis's  mind.  It  explains  the  hostile 
attitude  of  his  administration  towards  General  Beauregard,  and 
fully  justifies  the  latter  in  his  endeavor  to  set  himself  right  before 
the  country.  The  importance  and  the  significant  bearing  of  this 
letter  render  necessary  its  publication  entire. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  1(55 

"  RICHMOND,  VA.,  Oct.  30M,  1861. 
"  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  Sir. —  Yesterday  my  attention  was  called  to  various  newspaper  publica 
tions  purporting  to  have  been  sent  from  Manassas,  and  to  a  synopsis  of  your 
report  of  the  battle  of  the  21st  of  July  past,  and  in  which  it  is  represented  that 
you  had  been  overruled  by  me  in  your  plan  for  a  battle  with  the  enemy  south 
of  the  Potomac,  for  the  capture  of  Baltimore  and  Washington,  and  the  libera 
tion  of  Maryland. 

"  I  inquired  for  your  long-expected  report,  and  it  has  to-day  been  submitted 
to  my  inspection  ;  it  appears  by  official  endorsement  to  have  been  received  by  the 
Adjutant-General  on  the  15th  of  October,  though  it  is  dated  August  2Gth,  1801.* 

"With  much  surprise  I  found  that  the  newspaper  statements  were  sustained 
by  the  text  of  your  report. 

"I  was  surprised,  because,  if  we  did  differ  in  opinion  as  to  the  measures  and 
purposes  of  contemplated  campaigns,  such  fact  could  have  no  appropriate 
place  in  the  report  of  a  battle;  further,  because  it  seemed  to  be  an  attempt  to 
exalt  yourself  at  my  expense  ;  and  especially  because  no  such  plun  (is  that  described 
icas  submitted  to  me.^  It  is  true  that  some  time  before  it  was  ordered  you  ex 
pressed  a  desire  for  the  junction  of  General  Johnston's  army  with  your  own. 
The  movement  was  postponed  until  the  operations  of  the  enemy  rendered  it 
necessary,  and  until  it  became  thereby  practicable  to  make  it  with  safety  to  the 
valley  of  Virginia.  Hence,  I  believe,  was  secured  the  success  by  which  it  was 
attended. 

"  If  you  have  retained  a  copy  of  the  plan  of  campaign  which  you  say  was 
submitted  to  me  through  Colonel  Chestnut,  allow  me  to  request  that  you  will 
furnish  me  with  a  duplicate  of  it. 

"  Very  respectfully  yours,  etc., 

"  JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

The  tenor  of  this  letter,  the  assertions  it  contains,  and  the  ex 
pressions  made  use  of  by  President  Davis  are  so  extraordinary, 
and  denote  such  a  state  of  mental  irritation,  that,  though  reluc 
tant,  we  arc  compelled  to  iix  public  attention  upon  it.  The  prcss- 


*  General  Beaurcgard's  report  of  the  battle  of  Manassas  had  been  written 
and  was  about  to  be  forwarded  to  the  War  Department,  when  the  Federal  re 
ports  began  to  appear  in  the  Northern  papers.  Taking  advantage  of  many  facts 
and  incidents  thus  divulged,  and  of  important  admissions  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy,  General  Beauregard  determined  to  transform  his  report  into  a  full  "his 
tory"  of  the  battle — which  was  accordingly  done — thereby  considerably  add 
ing  to  its  length  and  value.  The  first  portion  of  the  report,  containing  what 
was  termed  the  "strategy  "of  the  campaign,  remained  unchanged,  and,  by  an 
oversight,  the  date  was  left  as  originally  written.  A  letter  from  General  Beau- 
regard  to  General  Cooper  showed  distinctly,  however,  when  the  "  history  "  of 
the  battle  was  prepared  and  sent  in  to  Richmond. 

fThe  italics  are  ours. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

ure  of  official  business  may  have  contributed  to  weaken  the  Pres 
ident's  memory  of  many  an  event  that  occurred  between  the  be 
ginning  of  the  war  and  the  period  we  now  write  of;  but  that  the 
proposition  of  so  momentous  a  campaign,  urged  and  presented  to 
his  consideration  through  the  medium  of  such  a  man  as  Colo 
nel  Chestnut,  could  have  altogether  disappeared  from  his  mem 
ory,  is  an  assertion  which  we  regret  that  Mr.  Davis  ever  made. 
Still  more  to  be  deplored  is  the  further  assertion  that  the  junc 
tion  of  General  Johnston's  army  with  General  Beauregard's  was 
purposely  postponed  by  him  (the  President)  until  that  junction 
became  opportune  and  thus  "  secured  the  success  by  which  it  was 
attended."  While  writing  these  words,  Mr.  Davis  had  evidently 
lost  sight  of  the  telegram  sent  by  General  Cooper — it  is  needless 
to  say  by  whose  authority — which  is  given  in  full  in  the  Appendix 
to  Chapter  VIII.  of  this  work.  For  convenience,  we  copy  it  again, 
as  follows : 

"  RICHMOND,  July  19$,  1801. 
"  General  BEAUREGARD,  Manassas,  VA.  : 

"  We  have  no  intelligence  from  General  Johnston.  If  the  enemy  in  front  of 
you  has  abandoned  an  immediate  attack,  and  General  Johnston  has  not  moved, 
you  had  better  withdraw  tJie  call  upon  him,  so  that  he  may  he  left  to  his  full  discre 
tion*  All  the  troops  arriving  at  Lynch  burg  are  ordered  to  join  you.  From 
this  place  we  will  send  as  fast  as  transportation  permits.  The  enemy  is  advised 
at  Washington  of  the  projected  movement  of  Generals  Johnston  and  Holmes,  and 
may  vary  his  plans  in  conformity  thereto. 

"  S.  COOPER,  Adjutant-General." 

Had  General  Beauregard  obeyed  the  instructions  there  given 
by  the  War  Department,  and  "  withdrawn"  his  call  upon  General 
Johnston,  need  we  say  that  no  "junction  "  would  have  taken  place 
at  all,  and  that  the  "success  by  which  it  was  attended"  would 
never  have  caused  Mr.  Davis  the  gratification  lie  expressed  ? 

Here  are  glaring  facts  which  cannot  be  gainsaid.  It  was  only 
when  the  War  Department  had  been  informed,  on  the  17th  of 
July,  that  the  enemy,  in  force,  had  driven  in  General  Bonham's 
pickets,  at  Fairfax  Court-House,  not  more  than  twelve  miles  from 
Manassas,  that  General  Beauregard  was  allowed  to  call  upon  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  then  at  Winchester,  more  than  sixty  miles  away  on 
his  left,  and  upon  General  Holmes,  then  at  Aquia  Creek,  about 

*  The  italics  are  ours. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  167 

thirty  miles  distant  on  his  right,  to  form  a  junction  with  him  at 
Manassas.  And  it  must  be  remembered,  that  General  Beaure- 
gard's  forces  at  that  moment  numbered  about  eighteen  thousand 
men,  while  those  of  General  McDowell,  at  and  advancing  on  Fair 
fax  Court-House,  amounted  to  some  forty  thousand.  And  it  was 
only  because  General  Beauregard's  sagacious  strategy  forced  the 
enemy  to  follow  General  Bonham  in  his  preconcerted  retreat  to 
Mitchell's  Ford,  the  only  strong  point  of  General  Beauregard's  de 
fensive  line,  that  he  was  enabled  to  defeat  McDowell  on  the  ISth, 
and  hold  him  in  check  until  the  20th,  when  General  Holmes  joined 
his  forces  with  General  Beauregard's,  and  General  Johnston  ar 
rived  with  part  of  his  own,  the  other  and  larger  portion  of  which 
only  reached  the  point  of  concentration  about  3  r.  M.  on  the  21st, 
while  the  battle  was  in  fierce  progress  and  we  were  near  being  over 
powered.  Procrastination  and  hesitation  are  always  fatal  to  mili- 
tar}^  success.  It  is  through  waiting  for  the  enemy  to  develop  his 
plans  that  great  battles  and  great  opportunities  in  war  are  lost. 

Two  days  after  forwarding  his  letter  to  the  Richmond  Whig — 
to  wit,  on  November  the  5th — General  Beauregard  addressed  a 
communication  to  the  President,  accepting  his  assurance  that  the 
Secretary  of  War  had  meant  no  offence  by  his  previous  communi 
cations,  but  protesting  that  the  latter  should  not  call  his  motives 
into  question,  and,  when  seeking  to  point  out  errors,  should  do  it 
in  a  more  becoming  tone  and  style.  Alluding  to  the  reference 
made  by  Mr.  Davis  to  the  "technical  lawyer,"  lie  expressed  his 
concern  lest  Mr.  Benjamin,  following  the  professional  bent  of  his 
mind,  would  view  only  the  legal  aspect  of  things,  and  insensibly 
put  both  the  army  and  himself  into  the  "  strait  jackets"  of  the 
law. 

Mr.  Davis,  with  the  tenacity  which  characterized  his  whole  career 
as  President,  would  not  admit  that  the  Secretary  whom  lie  had 
selected  could,  under  any  circumstances,  commit  an  error  or  im 
propriety.  And  the  injudicious  support  he  had  given,  before,  to 
Colonel  Northrop,  he  now,  but  more  directly,  bestowed  upon  Mr. 
Benjamin,  careless  of  the  wide-spread  evils  which  might  result 
from  such  an  act.  If  he  did  not  prompt  the  course  of  Mr.  Benja 
min,*  he  openly  interposed  himself  to  soothe  the  exaggerated  sus- 

*  The  lion.  L.  P.  Walker,  of  Alabama,  being  a  civilian,  without  knowledge 
of  army  matters,  accepted  the  position  of  Secretary  of  War,  with  the  express 


168  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

ceptibilities  of  his  Secretary  of  War,  and  sacrificed  the  feelings 
and  pride  of  a  general  who  enjoyed,  as  he  well  knew,  the  full  con 
fidence  of  both  army  and  people. 

We  extract  the  following  passages  from  his  answer  to  General 
Beau  regard : 

"  RICHMOND,  VA.,  November  IQth,  1861. 
"  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

"/&>, — When  I  addressed  you  in  relation  to  your  complaint  because  of  the 
letters  written  to  you  by  Mr.  Benjamin,  Acting  Secretary  of  War,  it  was  hoped 
that  you  would  see  that  you  had  misrepresented  his  expressions,  and  would  be 
content. 

********* 

"I  do  not  feel  competent  to  instruct  Mr.  Benjamin  in  the  matter  of  style; 
there  are  few  whom  the  public  would,  probably,  believe  fit  for  that  task.  But 
the  other  point  quoted  from  your  letter  presents  matters  for  graver  considera 
tion,  and  it  is  that  which  induces  me  to  reply.  It  cannot  be  peculiar  to  Mr. 
Benjamin  to  look  at  every  exercise  of  official  power  in  its  legal  aspect,  and  you 
surely  did  not  intend  to  inform  rne  that  your  army  and  yourself  are  outside  of 
the  limits  of  the  law. 

"  It  is  my  duty  to  see  that  the  laws  are  faithfully  executed,  and  I  cannot 
recognize  the  pretension  of  any  one  that  their  restraint  is  too  narrow  for  him. 
********* 

"  Very  respectfully, 

"JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

It  was  a  polemic  turn  of  words  to  give  such  meaning  to  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  language  as  applied  to  the  facts  and  to  Mr. 
Davis's  own  suggestion  about  the  "technical  lawyer."  Mr.  Ben 
jamin's  possible  merits  as  to  "style"  were,  then,  of  little  moment 
to  the  public;  the  graver  matter  being  that  it  was  "peculiar"  to 
the  Administrator  of  the  War  Department  to  be  "  a  poor  civilian 
who  knows  nothing  about  war"  as  he  had  regarded  himself  until 
clothed  with  the  pretensions  of  office;*  and  to  make  up  for  his 
lack  of  usefulness  in  that  important  seat,  he  was  pleased  to  indulge 
in  abstract  and  futile  disquisitions.  The  least,  though  still  great, 
harm  of  this  peculiarity  was  the  loss  of  time  it  occasioned,  the 
weight  it  became  upon  the  service,  when  pushed  to  the  extent  of 


understanding  that  President  Davis,  who  had  been  Secretary  of  War  under 
President  Pierce,  should  direct  the  affairs  of  the  office.  Doubtless,  Mr.  Benja 
min  filled  the  post  in  the  same  way. 

*  See  letter  of  Mr.  Benjamin  to  General  Bcauregard  after  the  fall  of  Sumter, 
Chapter  V. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  169 

harassing  a  general  in  the  field,  with  sensitive  personal  cares,  at  a 
time  when  his  headquarters  were  "  within  sound  of  the  enemy's 
guns." 

As  soon  as  he  could,  General  Beau  regard  replied  to  the  Presi 
dent's  letter  respecting  the  Manassas  report,  but  made  it  a  point 
to  take  no  notice  whatever  of  its  personal  imputations.  It  was 
impossible,  of  course,  to  comply  literally  with  the  request  for  a 
duplicate  of  the  copy  of  the  plan  said  to  have  been  submitted,  as 
the  plan  was  not  written,  but  presented  to  Mr.  Davis  himself, 
through  Colonel  Chestnut,  who  carried  a  written  memorandum  of 
its  main  features,  and  full  verbal  instructions.  General  Beaure- 
crard's  answer  read  as  follows: 

o 

"HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  TIIR  POTOMAC, 

"  CI:NTREVILLK,  VA.,  y»v.  22<7,  1801. 

«  sif^ — In  compliance  with  your  request,  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  you 
herewith,  at  the  earliest  moment  practicable,  a  copy  of  the  following  papers 
relating  to  the  strategic  part  of  my  report  of  the  battle  of  Manassas,  to  wit : 

"  1st.  Report  of  the  Hon.  James  Chestnut  of  his  visit  to  Richmond,  July  14th, 
18G1,  to  submit  to  you  my  plan  of  operations  for  the  defeat  of  the  enemy.  The 
original  of  this  report  has  just  been  received  from  New  Orleans,  where  it  had 
been  sent  for  safe-keeping,  with  other  important  papers.* 

"2d.  Abstract  of  my  report,  containing  only  the  strategic  portion  of  it.f 
"3d.  Letter  of  Brigadier-General  Sam.  Jones,  giving  his  recollection  of  the 
memorandum  dictated  to  him  by  me,  at  about  11  o'clock  P.M.,  on  the  13th  of 
July  last,  for  the  use  of  Colonel  James  Chestnut,  one  of  my  volunteer  aids. 
The  memorandum  was  never  returned  to  me,  and  I  kept  no  copy  of  it.J 

"4th.  Nine  telegrams  received  or  sent  by  me,  from  the  15th  to  the  19th  July, 
18G1.§ 

"I  remain,  Sir,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  General  Comdg. 
"  To  his  Excellency  President  JEFFERSON  DAVIS,  Richmond,  Va." 

*  See  Colonel  Chestnut's  report   to   General   Beaurcgard,  given  in  full  in 
Chapter  VIII. 

t  The  abstract  alluded  to  is  the  first  part  of  the  Mauassas  Report,  to  be 
found  in  Appendix  to  Chapter  IX. 

*  Brigadier-General  Sam.  Jones's  letter  appears  in  full  in  Appendix  to  Chap 
ter  VIII. 

§  Most  of  the  telegrams  referred  to  are  given  in  Chapter  VIII.  One  of  them 
appears  in  full  in  this  Chapter. 


170  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Creation  of  the  Department  of  Northern  Virginia. — Distribution  of  New 
Confederate  Battle  Flags. — Debate  in  Congress  about  the  Action  of  the 
President  with  Regard  to  General  Beauregard's  Report  of  the  Battle 
of  Manassas. — Telegram  of  the  Hon.  James  L.  Kemper  Concerning  it. — 
General  BeauregarcVs  Answer. — Letter  of  Colonel  Pryor  on  the  Same 
Subject. — Commentaries  on  the  Executive  Endorsement. — Governor  Moore 
Forwards  Resolutions  of  Louisiana  Legislature,  Congratulating  General 
Beauregard. — Circular  to  Division  Commanders  about  Leaves  of  Absence. 
— Congress  Passes  an  Act  in  Regard  to  the  Matter. — Its  Effect. — General 
Beauregard's  Plan  of  Recruitment. 

BY  General  Orders  Ko.  15,  received  October  25th,  from  the 
War  Department,  the  armies  in  northern  and  eastern  Virginia 
were  brought  into  combined  relation  ;  a  system  which  had  been 
urgently  recommended  by  General  Beauregard  in  the  early  part 
of  June. 

The  Potomac  district,  between  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the  Po 
tomac,  to  the  north  bank  of  Powells  River,  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  General  Beauregard.  On  its  right  and  rear,  the 
Aquia  District,  between  the  southern  bank  of  Powells  River,  the 
Potomac,  the  Chesapeake,  and  the  Rappahannock,  including  the 
counties  along  the  southern  bank  of  the  latter  river  from  its 
mouth  to  Fredericksburg,  was  assigned  to  Major-General  Holmes. 
On  its  left,  the  Valley  District,  between  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the 
Alleghanies,  was  assigned  to  Major-General  Jackson.  All  were 
brought  into  one  department,  under  the  command  of  the  senior 
general — Joseph  E.  Johnston. 

The  army  of  the  Potomac  was  organized  into  four  divisions, 
under  Major-Generals  Van  Dorn,  G.  "W.  Smith,  Longstreet,  and  E. 
K.  Smith.  But  as  General  Johnston  did  not  give  the  command 
of  that  army  to  General  Beauregard,  lie,  out  of  delicacy,  would 
not  move  in  the  matter,  but  confined  himself  technically,  as  be 
fore,  to  a  so-called  army  corps  (his  former  army  of  the  Potomac), 
though  under  no  orders  placing  him  in  command  of  that  or  any 
other  corps.  Such  a  command  the  War  Department  persistently 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  171 

ignored,  addressing  General  Beauregard  as  the  commander  of  the 
district,  though  sending  to  him,  directly,  for  execution,  orders 
which  evidently  referred  to  the  army.  Delicate  embarrassments 
in  administration  arose  from  this  state  of  affairs,  which  virtually 
reduced  the  leading  general  of  the  Confederacy  to  the  rank  of  a 
Ma  j  o  r-Gen  e  r  al . 

On  the  7th  of  November  a  strong  United  States  naval  expedi 
tion,  under  Admiral  Dupont,  seized  Forts  Walker  and  Beauregard, 
two  small  field-works  armed  with  thirty -five  guns  of  inferior  cali 
bre  and  only  two  of  them  rifled,  guarding  the  entrance  to  Port 
Royal  harbor,  South  Carolina.  The  reader  is  already  aware  of 
what  had  been  done,  upon  General  Beauregard's  advice,  with  re 
gard  to  the  protection  of  that  harbor.  He  had  never  concealed 
the  fact  that,  inadequately  armed  as  it  necessarily  would  be,  its 
defense,  against  any  regularly  organized  expedition,  would  be  im 
possible.*  As  it  was,  however,  the  works  held  out  longer  than 
had  been  expected,  and  were  the  objects  of  praise  even  in  the 
reports  of  the  Federal  commanders. 

On  the  2Sth  of  November  General  Beauregard  distributed  to 
his  troops  (Van  Donfs  and  Longstreet's  divisions)  the  new  Con 
federate  battle-flags  which  he  had  just  received,  and  solemnized 
the  act  with  imposing  religious  ceremonies. 

During  the  battle  of  Manassas  he  had  observed  the  difficulty  of 
distinguishing  our  own  from  the  enemy's  colors,  and,  in  order  to 
prevent  all  error  in  the  future,  had  determined  to  adopt  in  his 
army  a  battle -flag  distinct  in  color  and  design.  He,  at  first, 
sought  to  procure  a  change  in  the  Confederate  flag  itself,  and 
Colonel  W.  P.  Miles,  then  chairman  of  the  House  Military  Com 
mittee,  had  caused,  at  his  request,  a  report  to  be  presented  to 
that  effect,  but  with  no  result.  General  Johnston  had  then  or 
dered  the  troops  to  carry  their  State  flags,  none  of  which,  how 
ever,  could  be  obtained  except  for  the  Virginia  regiments,  which 
received  them  from  the  hands  of  Governor  Letcher,  on  the  30th 
of  October.  In  a  conference  between  the  three  senior  officers,  at 
Fairfax  Court -House,  in  September,  out  of  four  designs  for  a 
battle -flag,  one,  presented  by  General  Beauregard,  was  adopted. 
It  was  a  red  field  with  a  diagonal  blue  cross,  the  latter  edged 
with  white,  and  bearing  white  stars.f  To  render  it  more  portable, 

*  See  Chapter  V.,  p.  51. 

tThis  beautiful  design,  by  a  strange  coincidence,  had  been  previously  dc- 


172  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

it  was  made  square  instead  of  oblong,  by  order  of  General 
Johnston. 

In  the  beginning  of  December,  General  D.  II.  Hill  was  sent  to 
relieve  General  Evans  in  the  important  command  at  Leesburg, 
with  instructions  to  fall  back  to  the  main  army  at  Centreville  in 
the  event  of  an  advance  on  the  latter  place,  as  Colonel  Hunton 
had  done  before  the  battle  of  Manassas. 

During  the  remainder  of  December  there  came  occasional  warn 
ings  and  menaces  of  attack,  to  which,  in  fact,  the  United  States 
authorities  and  General  McClellan  were  constantly  urged  by  the 
more  impatient  part  of  the  Northern  people  and  press;  and  a 
watchful  state  of  preparation  was  maintained  along  the  Confed 
erate  positions,  from  Evansport,  by  the  way  of  Centreville,  to 
Leesburg,  on  the  upper  Potomac.  But  no  encounter  of  interest 
occurred  except  one  at  Drains ville,  on  the  23d  of  December,  be 
tween  two  foraging  parties  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery.  The 
Confederates,  with  about  twenty-five  hundred  men,  under  Briga 
dier-General  Stuart,  attacked  the  Federals,  numbering  four  thou 
sand  in  a  strong  position,  under  Brigadier-General  Ord.  After  a 
sharp  conflict  our  forces  were  repulsed,  though  not  pursued.  The 
enemy's  loss  was  seven  killed  and  sixty-one  wounded;  ours, forty- 
three  killed  and  one  hundred  and  eighty-seven  wounded  and  missing. 

Our  army  now  went  into  winter  quarters.  The  cold  was  in 
tense,  and  it  was  hard,  at  times,  for  officers  and  men  to  protect 
themselves  against  it.  All  remained  quiet  along  the  lines.  Such, 
however,  was  not  the  case  in  Richmond.  Towards  the  10th  of 
January  the  halls  of  the  Confederate  Congress  became  the  scene 
of  an  animated  secret  debate,  resulting  from  Mr.  Da  vis's  action 
upon  General  Beauregard's  report  of  the  battle  of  Manassas,  the 
preliminary  remarks  of  which  had  been  resented  by  the  Presi 
dent.  Upon  sending  in  this  report  to  Congress,  he  had  accom- 


vised  by  Colonel  Miles,  and  recommended,  for  the  Confederate  flag,  to  the 
Congress  then  in  session  at  Montgomery,  in  March,  1861.  It  had  also  been 
proposed  by  Mr.  Edward  C.  Hancock,  at  the  request  of  Colonel  James  B. 
Walton,  at  New  Orleans,  in  the  month  of  April.  It  had  been  offered  by  Colo 
nel  Miles  to  General  Beauregard,  in  substitution  for  one  nearly  similar  in  em 
blem  and  pattern,  but  different  in  the  distribution  of  colors,  suggested  to  him 
by  General  Beauregard  when  the  latter  was  seeking  to  procure  a  change  in 
the  Confederate  flag.  And  it -was  now  proposed  anew  to  the  General  by 
Colonel  Walton,  who  had  Mr.  Hancock's  design. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  173 

panied  it  with  strictures  and  comments,  which  were  never  given 
to  the  public  until  the  appearance  of  his  book,  and  which,  after 
much  trouble,  were  procured  about  that  time  for  this  work ;  not 
through  Mr.  Davis,  however,  it  is  proper  to  add. 

Personally,  General  Beauregard  remained  indifferent  to  this 
debate,  most  sincerely  deprecating  the  unfortunate  effects  it  was 
likely  to  produce.  He  positively  declined  to  advise  any  of  his 
friends  as  to  what  should  be  done  in  the  matter. 

The  following  telegram,  and  his  answer  to  it,  show  what  were 
his  feelings  on  the  subject. 

"  RICHMOND,  January  Wi,  18G2. 
"General  BEAUREGARD: 

"  Hon.  Mr.  Pryor  wishes  to  know,  confidentially,  if  you  wish  report  of  the 
battle  of  Manassas  to  be  published,  and,  if  published,  must  all,  or  a  part,  be 
published,  omitting  preliminary  statement.  Congress  discusses  the  matter  to 
morrow. 

"  JAMES  L.  KEMPER." 

The  next  day  General  Beauregard  sent  this  reply  : 

*' CEXTREVILLE,  VA.,  January  10f//,  18G2. 

"  Let  Congress  do  for  the  best.  AVe  must  think  of  the  country  before  \vc 
think  of  ourselves.  I  believe  Burnside's  expedition  is  intended  for  Wilming 
ton,  to  cut  off  railroad  to  Charleston.  Let  government  look  to  it. 

UG.  T.  BEAT-REGARD. 
"Hon.  JAMES  L.  KEMPEH,  Speaker  House  of  Delegates,  Richmond,  Vu." 

Referring  to  this  despatch,  Colonel  E.  A.  Pryor,  then  a  Member 
of  Congress,  wrote  as  follows :  "  I  took  the  liberty  of  reading  your 
telegram.  The  effect  of  its  patriotic  sentiment  on  Congress  would 
have  been  most  grateful  to  your  feelings  had  you  witnessed  it." 

An  effort  was  made  to  suppress  the  entire  report;  while  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  friends,  and  the  friends  of  justice,  were  equally 
resolved  that  it  should  be  published  as  actually  transmitted  to  the 
War  Department.  The  latter  course  would  probably  have  pre 
vailed,  had  not  General  Beauregard,  in  the  same  spirit  which  had 
prompted  his  letter  to  the  editors  of  the  Richmond  W/iiy,  formally 
requested  that  no  further  action  should  be  taken  in  the  matter. 
Congress  then  decided  to  publish  the  report,  omitting  the  first  part, 
which  referred  to  the  strategy  of  the  campaign,  and,  with  that  part, 
omitting  also  the  accompanying  annotations  of  the  President. 

The  importance  of  this  executive  endorsement,  and  the  notoriety 


174:  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

given  it  since  the  appearance  of  Mr.  Davis's  book,  justify  us  in 
transcribing  it  in  full,  despite  its  length. 

It  is  a  key  to  the  feelings  underlying  many  of  the  official  acts 
of  President  Davis.  It  brings  to  light  the  reasoning  to  which  he 
resorted,  at  times,  in  his  efforts  to  cover  his  errors  as  a  military 
chief.  How  strange,  and  how  much  to  be  regretted,  that  such 
moral  weaknesses  should  have  existed  in  one  whose  career,  as  Chief 
Magistrate  of  the  Confederacy,  had  he  been  able  to  divest  himself 
of  the  inordinate  love  of  power  which  is  characteristic  of  him, 
would  have  been  one  of  unclouded  success  and  glory.  He  could 
easily  have  availed  himself  of  the  counsels  of  men  whose  patriot 
ism  equalled  his  own,  and  whose  experience  as  statesmen,  and  tal 
ents  as  commanders  in  the  field,  would  have  safely  guided  him  to 
the  goal  he  must  have  earnestly  desired,  but  signally  failed,  to  at 
tain. 

The  endorsement  of  Mr.  Davis  began  as  follows : 

"  The  order  issued  by  the  War  Department  to  General  Johnston  was  not,  as 
herein  reported,  to  form  a  junction,  'should  the  movement,  in  his  judgment,  le 
deemed  adcisaMeS  *  The  following  is  an  accurate  copy  of  the  order : 

"  '  General  Beauregard  is  attacked.  To  strike  the  enemy  a  decisive  blow,  a  junction 
of  all  your  effective  force  will  be  needed.  If  practicable,  make  the  movement,  sending 
your  sick  and  baggage  to  Culpepper  Court-House,  either  by  rail  or  by  Warreuton. 
In  all  the  arrangements  exercise  your  own  discretion.^  "  * 

It  is  proper,  in  the  outset,  to  state,  that  no  copy  of  this  endorse 
ment  was  ever  seen  by  General  Beauregard  until  one  was  fur 
nished  him  from  the  Bureau  of  War  Records  at  Washington,  in  the 
autumn  of  1880.  Until  that  time  he  was  unable  to  ascertain  its 
exact  tenor,  which,  for  reasons  of  their  own,  his  friends,  in  Congress 
and  elsewhere,  had  carefully  withheld  from  his  knowledge. 

The  words  given,  no  doubt  from  memory,  in  the  preliminary 
part  of  General  Beauregard's  report  of  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and 
purporting  to  be  the  substance  of  the  order  sent  to  General  John 
ston,  under  date  of  July  17th,  1861,  are  not  identically  the  words 
made  use  of  in  the  order.  That  is  evident.  But  who  can  deny 
that,  though  different  in  exact  phraseology,  they  convey  precisely 
the  same  meaning?  Will  any  one  pretend  that  such  an  order 
could  have  been  looked  upon  as  a  peremptory  one,  and  that  the 
only  thing  General  Johnston  had  to  do  after  receiving  it,  was  blind- 

*  The  italics  are  ours. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  175 

ly  to  obey  it  ?  What  difference  is  there  between  the  words  "Make 
the  movement  should  you,  in  your  judgment,  deem  it  advisable"  - 
which  are  the  words  objected  to,  and  denied  to  have  been  used  in 
the  order — and  the  following  :  "If practicable,  make  the  movement" 
—which,  it  is  contended,  were  the  real  terms  employed  in  the  tele 
gram  to  General  Johnston  ?  Was  not  the  latter  fully  authorized, 
"in  all  arrangements"  relative  to  the  suggested  movement,  to 
"exercise  his  own  discretion"?  Who  was  to  judge  of  the  advisa 
bility  or  practicability  of  the  junction  sought  to  be  made  for  the 
purpose  of  "  striking  a  decisive  blow  on  the  enemy  ?"  Was  it  the 
War  Department,  who  issued  the  order,  or  General  Johnston,  who 
received  it?  It  is  clear  that,  under  the  order  as  given,  General 
Johnston  could  have  moved,  or  not,  as  he  thought  best  in  the  cir 
cumstances;  and  that  the  making  or  not  making  of  the  junction 
was  left  entirely  to  his  own  decision. 

That  such  is  the  only  correct  conclusion  to  be  arrived  at  after 
reading  that  order,  is  shown  by  the  following  passage  in  the  cn» 
dorsement  of  Mr.  Davis  : 

"The  words  'if  practicable'  had  reference  to  letters  of  General  Johnston 
of  12th  and  15th  of  July,  which  made  it  extremely  doubtful  if  he  had  the 
power  to  make  the  movement,  in  view  of  the  relative  strength  and  position  of 
Patterson's  forces  as  compared  with  his  own." 

Hence  the  uncertainty,  hence  the  want  of  authoritativeness,  so 
perceptible  in  the  governmental  despatch  alluded  to.  That  the 
War  Department  construed  it  as  entirely  contingent,  and  as  de 
pending  upon  General  Johnston's  judgment,  is  further  shown  by 
the  telegram  already  mentioned  in  Chapter  VIII.  of  this  book,  but 
which  we  again  offer  to  the  reader : 

"  RICHMOND,  July  17ffc,  1861. 
"  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

"You  are  authorized  to  appropriate  the  North  Carolina  regiment  on  its 
route  to  General  Johnston.  If  possible,  send  to  General  Johnston  to  say  he 
has  been  informed,  via  Stauntou,  that  you  were  attacked,  and  that  he  will  join 
yon,  if  practicable,  with  his  effective  force,  sending  his  sick  and  baggage  to 
Culpcpper  Court-House,  by  rail  or  through  Warrenton. 

"  S.  COOPER,  Adjutant-General." 

General  Johnston's  telegram  to  General  Beau  regard,  of  the  same 
date,  corroborates  our  conclusion.  It  read  as  follows: 


176  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

"  WINCHESTER,  VA.,  July  \lth,  18G1. 
"  General  BEAUREGARD,  Manassas : 

«  Is  the  enemy  upon  you  in  force  ?  „  j  R  JoHNSTON  „ 

He  was  gathering  all  such  information  as  might  guide  him  in 
determining  his  course.  He  was  carefully  weighing  the  advisa 
bility  of  moving  just  then,  or  not,  as  best  suited  the  emergency  and 
the  interests  of  his  command.  But,  whatever  may  have  prompted 
his  final  action,  he  was  in  nowise  obeying  a  peremptory  order. 
"In  the  exercise  of  the  discretion  conferred  by  the  terms  of  the 
order" — says  General  Johnston,  in  his  report  of  the  battle  of 
"Manassas — "I  at  once  determined  to  march  to  join  General  Beau- 
regard."  lie  determined.  But,  for  having  construed  the  Rich 
mond  order  to  him  as  a  contingent  one,  General  Johnston,  no  less 
than  General  Beauregard,  incurred  the  displeasure  of  the  Presi- 
ident.*  In  a  foot-note  in  Johnston's  "Narrative,"  p.  34,  we  read 
as  follows :  "...  In  an  endorsement  on  it  (the  report)  by  Mr. 
Davis,  I  am  accused  of  reporting  his  telegram  to  me  inaccurately. 
I  did  not  profess  to  quote  his  words,  but  to  give  their  meaning, 
which  was  done  correctly." 

Mr.  Davis's  remarks,  in  his  book,  on  this  point,  are  valueless. 
How  can  he  tell  what  construction  General  Johnston  put  upon  the 
telegram  he  received  ?  How  can  he  deny  that  General  Johnston 
considered  the  question  of  making  a  junction  as  left  to  his  discre 
tion  ?  Further  comments  are  unnecessary. 

•/ 

We  quote  again  from  the  executive  endorsement  upon  General 
Beauregard's  report : 

"The  plan  of  campaign  reported  to  have  been  submitted,  but  not  accepted, 
and  to  have  led  to  a  decision  of  the  War  Department,  cannot  be  found  among 
its  files,  nor  any  reference  to  any  decision  made  upon  it ;  and  it  was  not  known 
that  the  army  had  advanced  beyond  the  line  of  Bull  Run,  the  position  previ 
ously  selected  by  General  Lee,  and  which  was  supposed  to  have  continued  to 
be  the  defensive  line  occupied  by  the  main  body  of  our  forces.  Inquiry  has 
developed  the  fact  that  a  message,  to  be  verbally  delivered,  was  sent  by  Hon. 
Mr.  Chestnut.  If  the  conjectures  recited  in  the  report  were  entertained, 
they  rested  on  the  accomplishment  of  one  great  condition,  namely,  that  a 
junction  of  the  forces  of  Generals  Johnston  and  Holmes  should  be  made  with 
the  army  of  General  Beauregard,  and  should  gain  a  victory.  The  junction  wTas 
made,  the  victory  was  won,  but  the  consequences  that  were  predicted  did  not 

*  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  066. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  177 

result.  The  reasons  \vhy  no  such  consequences  could  result  are  given  in  the 
closing  passage}  of  the  reports  of  both  the  commanding  generals,  and  the  re 
sponsibility  cannot  be  transferred  to  the  government  at  Richmond,  which  cer 
tainly  would  have  united  in  any  feasible  plan  to  accomplish  such  desirable 
results." 

The  plan  of  campaign,  mentioned  in  the  strategic  portion  of 
General  Beauregard's  report,  as  having  been  submitted  to  and  not 
accepted  by  the  President, "  could  not  be  found  among  the  files  of 
the  "War  Department,"  for  the  simple  reason  —  and  Mr.  Davis 
knew  it — that  the  plan  referred  to  was  not  proposed  by  letter,  but 
communicated,  personally,  through  Colonel  James  Chestnut  of 
South  Carolina,  one  of  General  Bean  regard's  aids.  This  officer 
carried  with  him  a  written  memorandum  dictated  by  General 
Beauregard  to  Colonel  Sam.  Jones,  on  the  evening  of  the  13th  of 
July,  containing  all  the  main  features  of  the  military  operations, 
acknowledged  to  be  "  brilliant  and  comprehensive,"  but,  unfortu 
nately,  opposed  at  Richmond,  and  no  less  unfortunately  rejected.* 

Mr.  Davis,  after  showing  great  incredulity  as  to  having  ever 
"entertained  "  such  a  plan — one  of  the  most  important  of  the  war 
— succeeds,  however,  in  recalling  to  memory,  "inquiry  having  de 
veloped  the  fact,"  that  Colonel  Chestnut  did,  in  effect,  verbally 
deliver  a  message  in  General  Beauregard's  name.  That  "  mes 
sage,"  as  the  President  thought  proper  to  call  the  communication 
he  had  received,  was  no  less  than  the  plan  for  an  aggressive  ad 
vance  upon  the  enemy,  ably  and  exhaustively  explained  by  Colonel 
Chestnut,  in  a  conference  granted  him  by  the  President,  as  the 
representative  and  authorized  exponent  of  General  Beauregard's 
views  on  the  subject.  Besides  Mr.  Davis  and  Colonel  Chestnut, 
Generals  Lee  and  Cooper  were  present,  and  so  was  Colonel  (after 
wards  General)  John  S.  Preston,  of  South  Carolina.  We  call  the 
reader's  special  attention  to  Colonel  Chestnut's  report  to  General 
Beauregard,  July  16th,  1SC1,  on  his  return  from  Richmond, 
wherein  appear  the  full  details  of  the  plan  proposed,  and  the 
reasons  given  by  the  President  for  not  adopting  it.  That  report 
is  to  be  found  in  Chapter  VIII.  of  this  work,  page  85.  AVe  also 
refer  the  reader  to  the  preceding  chapter  (Chapter  XII.),  in  which 

*  See,  in  Appendix  to  Chapter  VIII.,  letter  of  General  (then  Colonel)  Sam. 
Jones,  about  written  memorandum  given   to   Colonel  Chestnut  by  General 
Beauregard. 
I.— 12 


178  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

was  given,  in  cxtenso,  President  Davis's  letter  to  General  Beaure 
gard  (October  30th)  arid  the  answer  thereto  (November  22d),  in 
reference  to  the  report  of  the  battle  of  Manassas.  "No  such  plan 
as  that  described,"  said  the  President,  in  the  letter  we  refer  to, 
"  was  submitted  to  me."  Here  the  denial  is  absolute.  Mr.  Davis, 
at  that  time,  was  evidently  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  Colonel  Chest 
nut  had  reduced  to  writing  all  that  had  occurred  during  that  im- 

o  O 

portant  conference. 

In  the  endorsement  now  occupying  our  attention  the  President 
no  longer  denies,  but,  in  his  attempt  to  palliate  his  error,  insinu 
ates  his  doubts,  and  apparently — though  not  quite  consistently — 
fails  to  remember.  This  is  all  the  more  strange,  inasmuch  as  he  was 
then  in  possession,  not  only  of  Colonel  Chestnut's  report,  sent  him 
by  General  Beauregard  at  his  own  request,  but  also  of  General 
Sam.  Jones's  letter,  which  bore  witness  that  the  plan  referred  to  in 
the  report  of  the  battle  of  Manassas  was  "  substantially  the  same  "  as 
the  one  proposed  by  him  through  the  medium  of  Colonel  Chestnut. 

Early  in  the  month  of  June,  Bonham's  brigade  of  four  South 
Carolina  regiments  had  been  advanced  to  Fairfax  Court-House, 
and  Swell's  brigade  posted  in  front  of  Bull  Run,  at  Union  Mills 
Ford  ;  all  of  which  had  been  duly  announced,  and  was  well  known 
to  the  Confederate  War  Department,  as  the  correspondence  of  the 
period  will  show.  This,  however,  is  not  at  all  material  to  the 
issue  made  by  Mr.  Davis's  endorsement  with  reference  to  General 
Beauregard's  plan  of  concentration  and  aggression,  communicated 
to  him  through  Colonel  Chestnut.  We  mention  it  here,  that 
our  silence  may  not  be  construed  as  an  acquiescence  in  Mr. 
Davis's  assertion  "that  it  was  not  known  that  the  army  had  ad 
vanced  beyond  the  line  of  Bull  Run."  The  entire  army  had  not, 
but  two  of  its  brigades  had ;  and  General  Beauregard  is  certainly 
not  responsible  for  Mr.  Davis's  ignorance  of  the  fact. 

We  positively  assert — and  history  bears  us  out — that  the  "junc 
tion"  referred  to  in  the  endorsement  was  only  effected  because 
General  Beauregard,  on  the  19th  of  July,  after  checking  Mc 
Dowell's  advance  at  the  engagement  of  Bull  Run,  refused  to  with 
draw  the  call  made  upon  General  Johnston,  so  that  the  latter 
"might  le  left  to  his  full  discretion."  *  Had  General  Beauregard 

*  See,  in  Appendix  to  Chapter  VIII,  General  Cooper's  telegram  to  General 
Beaurcgard,  to  that  effect. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGABD.  170 

obeyed  the  telegram  of  General  Cooper,  General  Johnston,  about 
whose  movements  the  War  Department  admitted  its  ignorance, 
would  not  have  left  Winchester,  and  no  "victory"  could  have 
been  won  by  the  Confederates  on  the  21st  of  July.  That  "junc 
tion,"  that  "  victory,"  were  the  results  of  General  Beauregard's 
untiring,  unflinching  perseverance.  The  first  was  effected,  the 
second  achieved,  in  spite  of — not  owing  to — the  action  of  Mr. 
Davis  or  of  the  War  Department. 

"  The  reasons  why  no  such  consequences  could  result  are  given," 
not  only  u  in  the  closing  passages  of  the  reports  of  both  the  com 
manding  generals,"  as  Mr.  Davis  has  it,  but  also  in  General  Beau- 
regard's  repeated  communications  to  the  War  Department,  before 
and  after  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and  especially  in  his  letter  to 
President  Davis,  dated  August  10th,  1861,*  in  which  lie  said: 
"  With  regard  to  my  remarks  about  inarching  on  to  Washington, 
you  must  have  misunderstood  them,  for  I  never  stated  that  we 
could  have  pursued  the  enemy  on  the  evening  of  the  21st,  or  even 
on  the  22d.  I  wrote:  'The  want  of  food  and  transportation  has 
made  us  lose  all  the  fruits  of  our  victory.  We  ought,  at  this  time, 
the  29th  July,  to  be  in  or  about  Washington,  and  from  all  ac 
counts  Washington  could  have  been  taken  up  to  the  24th  instant, 
by  twenty  thousand  men.'  Every  news  from  there  confirms  mo 
still  more  in  that  opinion.  For  several  days'  (about  one  week) 
after  the  battle,  I  could  not  put  my  new  regiments  in  position  for 
want  of  transportation.  I  do  not  say  this  to  injure  my  friend 
Colonel  Myers,  but  to  benefit  the  service.  We  have,  no  doubt,  by 
our  success  here,  achieved  i  glory'  for  the  country,  but  I  am 
fighting  for  something  more  real  and  tangible,  i.  e.,  to  save  our 
homes  and  firesides  from  our  Northern  invaders,  and  to  maintain 
our  freedom  and  independence  as  a  nation." 

It  is  not  desirable  to  repeat  here  the  main  reasons  which  pre 
vented  "  the  consequences  predicted"  as  the  result  of  the  "  victory 
won,"  after  the  long-praycd-for  junction  of  General  Johnston's 
forces  with  General  Beauregard's  at  Manassas.  For  such  infor 
mation  the  reader  is  referred  to  Chapter  X.  of  this  work,  wherein 
full  details  of  General  Beauregard's  requisitions,  and  complaints 
as  to  insufficiency  of  provisions  and  transportation,  are  minutelv 

*  The  whole  of  this  letter  is  to  be  found  in  Chapter  X.  of  this  work,  at 
page  123. 


180  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

given.  We  will  merely  add  that  Mr.  Davis  evidently  lost  sight 
of  the  fact  that  even  had  he  positively  ordered  the  junction  of  the 
Confederate  forces  at  Manassas,  and  not  desired,  as  he  did,  to 
countermand  it  on  the  19th  of  July,  that  junction,  effected  eight 
days'  after  it  had  been  suggested,  in  General  Beauregard's  name, 
by  Colonel  Chestnut,  could  very  well  fail  to  bring  about  the  result 
then  reasonably  expected  of  it  and  so  earnestly  urged  upon  the 
government.  As  originally  proposed,  it  was  a  measure  of  timely 
preparation  for  a  clearly  impending  hostile  movement  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy ;  a  preparation  to  meet  that  movement  upon  the  only 
correct  principle  of  war  in  the  situation — the  active  defensive. 
As  executed,  it  was  a  junction  unwillingly  assented  to,  at  the  last 
hour,  when  the  enemy  was  already  upon  General  Beauregard  with 
a  largely  superior  force,  and  when  most  of  the  "  consequences  pre 
dicted"  could  no  longer  be  realized.  For  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  plan  insisted  upon  by  General  Beauregard  involved 
an  offensive  movement  on  our  part  after  concentration  ;  while  the 
actual  junction,  when  it  was  made,  had  become  altogether  impera 
tive  as  a  purely  defensive  measure  ;  and  what  Mr.  Davis  points 
out  as  a  different  result  from  that  originally  proposed  was  but  the 
necessary  sequel  of  the  rejection  of  General  Beauregard's  plan. 
The  endorsement  of  Mr.  Davis  proceeds  as  follows : 

"  If  the  plan  of  campaign  mentioned  in  the  report  had  been  presented  in  a 
written  communication,  and  in  sufficient  detail  to  permit  proper  investigation, 
it  must  have  been  pronounced  to  be  impossible  at  that  time,  and  its  proposal 
could  only  have  been  accounted  for  by  the  want  of  information  of  the  forces 
and  positions  of  the  armies  in  the  field.  The  facts  that  rendered  it  impossible 
are  the  following : 

"  1.  It  was  based,  as  related  from  memory  by  Colonel  Chestnut,  on  the  suppo 
sition  of  drawing  a  force  of  about  twenty -five  thousand  men  from  the  command 
of  General  Johnston.  The  letters  of  General  Johnston  show  his  effective  force 
to  have  been  only  eleven  thousand,  with  an  enemy  thirty  thousand  strong  in 
his  front,  ready  to  take  possession  of  the  valley  of  Virginia  on  his  withdrawal." 

Mr.  Davis's  statement  as  to  insufficiency  of  detail  in  the  plan 
submitted  to  him  forces  upon  him  one  of  the  following  alterna 
tives  :  He  was  either  thoroughly  informed  of  General  Beauregard's 
proposal  to  him,  and  he,  therefore,  more  than  errs  in  alleging 
want  of  adequate  knowledge  of  the  question  at  issue ;  or  he  was 
without  the  necessary  data  to  guide  him;  and,  in  that  case,  his  re 
jection  of  a  proposition  which  he  had  not  comprehended  was  cer 
tainly  unwise,  if  not  unpardonable. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAUD. 

The  truth  is,  that  the  plan  presented  in  General  Beauregard's 
name  to  President  Davis  Lad  all  the  definiteness  and  detail  that 
any  written  proposition  of  the  same  import  and  moment  could 
have  had.  This  is  established  by  Colonel  Chestnut's  official  report, 
already  referred  to,  which  we  urge  the  reader  to  examine  again 
with  particular  attention.  It  was  presented  by  an  interpreter 
thoroughly  possessed  of  his  subject,  speaking,  not  from  memory 
alone,  but  from  carefully  prepared  notes,  taken  under  the  dicta 
tion  of  General  Beau  regard  himself.  It  is,  therefore,  superfluous 
to  deal  further  with  Mr.  Davis's  futile  attempt  to  prove  that  a 
"written  communication  "  was  necessary  for  "  the  proper  investi 
gation  "  of  a  vital  plan  of  campaign,  upon  the  merits  of  which— 
say  what  he  may — he  had,  nevertheless,  deliberated,  and  which  he 
had  finally  condemned. 

The  criticism  of  Mr.  Davis,  based  on  the  estimated  numbers, 
whether  of  General  Johnston  or  of  General  Patterson,  is  utterly 
without  point,  in  presence  of  the  fact  that  the  former  had  no  dif 
ficulty  whatever  in  bringing  away  his  forces,  when  he  essayed  to 
do  so.  Nor  did  the  latter  "  take  possession  of  the  valley  of  Vir 
ginia  on  the  withdrawal  "  of  his  opponent;  nor  did  he  even  threat 
en  to  make  any  demonstration  of  the  kind.  On  the  other  hand, 
Colonel  Chestnut's  report  shows  that  General  Beauregard  had  es 
timated  General  Johnston's  forces  at  twenty  thousand  men,  and 
not  at  twenty-five  thousand,  as  Mr.  Davis  has  it.  As  to  General 
Patterson,  his  army,  at  the  time  we  speak  of — that  is  to  sav,  be 
tween  the  14rth  and  21st  of  July — never  amounted  even  to  twenty 
thousand  men,  though  it  was  rumored,  as  early  as  the  13th,  that 
it  numbered  upwards  of  thirty-two  thousand.  General  Johnston 
refers  to  that  rumor  in  his  report  of  the  battle  of  Manassas,  but, 
in  his  book,  reduces  the  number  "  to  about  twenty  thousand,  in 
stead  of  thirty-two  thousand,  the  estimate  of  the  people  of  Mar- 
tinsburg,  at  the  time."*  And  General  Patterson,  who  must  be  sup 
posed  to  have  known  something  about  it,  in  a  letter  from  Harper's 
Ferry,  dated  July  24th,  says:  "My  force  is  less  than  twenty 
thousand  ;  nineteen  regiments,  whose  term  of  service  was  up,  or 
will  be  within  a  week.  .  .  .  Five  regiments  have  gone  home.  Two 
more  go  to  day,  and  three  to-morrow.  To  avoid  being  cut  oft 
with  the  remainder,  I  fell  back,  and  occupied  this  place."  No\v 

*  General  Johnston's  "Narrative  of  Military  Operations/'  p.  31. 


182  MILITARY    OPERATIONS   OF 

when  General  Johnston  began  to  move  from  Winchester  to  Ma 
li  assas,  on  the  18th,  his  army,  with  an  average  effective  strength, 
per  regiment,  not  much  exceeding  five  hundred  men,  could  be 
computed  at  not  less  than  ten  thousand,  exclusive  of  artillery  and 
cavalry,  exclusive  also  of  the  sick — seventeen  hundred  in  number 
—who  were  comfortably  provided  for  in  Winchester/-"  These, 
however,  are  mere  side  issues,  and  not  at  all  connected  with  the 
question  really  before  us.  General  Beauregard  never  pretended 
to  know,  except  by  approximation,  the  exact  force  under  General 
Johnston.  What  he  wished  and  asked  for  was  the  concentration 
of  that  force,  such  as  it  might  be,  with  his  own,  in  order  to  strike 
the  enemy  with  masses,  not  with  fractions,  and  thus  compel  him, 
not  us,  to  take  the  defensive.  When  General  Beauregard  recom 
mended  that  concentration  and  predicted  its  results,  he  had  every 
reason  to  be  confident  that  the  advance  of  McDowell  was  immedi 
ately  impending;  and  had  Mr.  Davis  allowed  the  scheme  to  be 
carried  out,  in  anticipation  of  what  the  enemy  was  preparing  to  do, 
but  had  not  yet  actually  done,  the  junction  of  our  forces  would 
have  taken  place  at  least  forty-eight  hours  earlier  than  the  date  at 
which  it  was  effected,  and  Bull  Run  would  have  been  fought  with 
the  combined  forces  of  both  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  to 
say  nothing  of  General  Holmes,  who  naturally  would  have  followed 
and  joined  in  the  movement,  and  McDowell's  army  would  have 
been  annihilated,  or  turned  and  cut  off  from  Washington. 
Mr.  Davis's  endorsement  goes  on  as  follows : 

"  2.  It  proposed  to  continue  operations,  by  effecting  a  junction  of  a,  part  of 
the  victorious  forces  with  the  army  of  General  Garnett,  in  Western  Virginia  ; 
General  Garnett's  forces  amounted  only  to  three  or  four  thousand  men,  then 
known  to  be  in  rapid  retreat  before  vastly  superior  forces  under  McClellan, 
and  the  news  that  lie  was  himself  killed  and  his  army  scattered  arrived  with 
in  forty-eight  hours  of  Colonel  Chestnut's  arrival  in  Richmond." 

This  reference  to  the  Garnett  disaster  is  characteristic  of  Mr. 
Davis  as  a  polemist,  and  we  chiefly  touch  upon  it  to  assert  that, 
at  the  time  he  decided  adversely  on  the  general  plan  laid  before 
him,  he  was  not  aware  of  what  had  happened  to  Garnett,  an  event 
which  could  only  have  made  the  concentration  at  Manassas — the 
essential  feature  of  General  Beauregard's  plan — the  more  necessary 
in  the  exigency,  as  any  military  man  may  see. 

*  General  Johnston's  "Narrative  of  Military  Operations,"  p.  35. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  183 

The  co-operation  with  Garnett  against  McClellan  was  but  a  pos 
sible  incident  of  the  scheme  of  campaign,  and  could  not  properly 
have  weighed  in  deciding  the  main  question  of  General  Johnston's 
concentration  with  General  Beanregard,  in  order  to  defeat  Mc 
Dowell  and  Patterson.  These  two  results,  even  if  not  followed 
by  the  proposed  movement  into  Maryland,  and  on  the  rear  of 
Washington,  would  have  driven  McClellan  back  into  Ohio,  or,  if 
he  had  ventured  a  farther  advance  into  Virginia,  would  have  left 
him  at  our  mercy. 

The  third  main  reason  which  rendered  General  Beanregard's 
scheme  "impossible"  is  thus  explained  in  Mr.  Davis's  endorse 
ment  : 

"  3.  The  plan  was  based  on  the  improbable  and  inadmissible  supposition  that 
the  enemy  was  to  await  everywhere,  isolated  and  motionless,  until  our  forces 
could  effect  junctions,  to  attaek  them  in  detail." 

This  is  without  weight  or  effect,  and  scarcely  deserves  a  serious 
answer. 

The  enemy,  on  his  first  entrance  into  Virginia,  had  displayed 
the  greatest  hesitation  and  uncertainty  in  all  his  forward  move 
ments.  He  felt  that  he  was  treading  upon  dangerous  ground.  It 
was  the  procrastination  and  lack  of  vigor  of  those  who  held  the 
reins  of  power  in  Richmond  which  finally  aroused  in  that  enemy 
a  spirit  of  assurance  and  conquest,  until  then  dormant.  To  check 
his  first  steps  forward  was,  therefore,  for  us,  the  all-important 
object. 

General  Beauregard's  plans  were  not  based  on  any  '•  improbable 
and  inadmissible  supposition,"  as  Mr.  Davis  asserts,  but  upon  in 
formation  that  the  chief  Federal  force  was  about  to  be  thrown  for 
ward  against  him  ;  and  his  scheme,  in  accordance  with  a  cardinal 
principle  in  war,  involved  an  immediate  concentration  of  our  avail 
able  masses,  offensively  to  meet  and  overwhelm  that  advance. 
What  actually  occurred— the  defeat  of  McDowell,  after  the  long- 
delayed  junction  was  brought  about,  under  the  disadvantageous 
conditions  already  alluded  to — shows  that  the  iirst  and  main 
feature  of  General  Beauregard's  plan,  to  which  the  others  were 
mere  consequences,  was  the  true  military  course  for  the  Confed 
erate  authorities  to  pursue.  Its  success — as  always  in  the  business 
of  war — must  have  deprived  the  enemy  of  the  power  to  make  his 
own  movements  at  his  own  pleasure,  and  enabled  us  to  beat  him 


184:  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

successively  in  detail.  Mr.  Davis,  in  rejecting  that  plan,  left  the 
Confederate  forces  "  to  await  everywhere,  isolated  and  motionless, 
until"  the  Federal  "forces  could  effect  junctions,  to  attack  them 
in  detail."  And  this,  we  may  add,  was,  unhappily,  his  military 
method  throughout  the  war. 

Says  Mr.  Davis,  in  his  endorsement : 

"4.  It  could  not  be  expected  that  any  success  obtainable  on  the  battle-field 
could  enable  our  forces  to  carry  the  fortifications  on  the  Potomac,  garrisoned 
and  within  supporting  distance  of  fresh  troops;  nor,  after  the  actual  battle 
and  victory,  did  the  generals  on  the  field  propose  an  advance  on  the  capital; 
nor  does  it  appear  that  they  have  since  believed  themselves  in  a  condition  to 
attempt  such  a  movement." 

Had  the  concentration  been  made,  McDowell's  forces  would 
have  been  captured,  with  his  munitions  and  transportation,  leaving 
the  works  at  Washington  substantially  unoccupied ;  and  Mr. 
Davis  had  no  authority  for  supposing  that  a  supporting  force  was 
in  reach.  The  whole  history  of  the  time  shows  that,  after  Mc 
Dowell's  defeat,  Washington  was  at  our  mercy,  had  we  advanced 
upon  it.  That  we  did  not  do  so  was  in  no  way  due  to  General 
Beau  regard  or  to  his  plans. 

The  concluding  words  in  Mr.  Davis's  fourth  objection,  to  wit — 
"  nor  does  it  appear  that  they  (Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard) 
have  since  believed  themselves  in  a  condition  to  attempt  such  a 
movement,"  are  an  extraordinary  assertion  when  it  is  considered 
that,  not  many  weeks  before  this  endorsement  was  written,  the 
President  had  visited  our  army  headquarters,  at  Fairfax  Court- 
Hon.  ,>,  and  had  there  been  urged  by  Generals  Johnston,  G.  W. 
Smith,  and  Beauregard,  to  make  a  concentration  of  our  forces 
readily  available,  for  an  offensive  movement  upon  the  rear  of 
Washington,  the  material  for  which  was  most  minutely  pointed 
out  to  him/"  This  second  proposed  concentration  and  forward 
movement  was  then  entirely  practicable,  and  the  failure  to  make 
it  at  that  time  was  one  of  the  fatall}7  false  courses  which  charac 
terized  Mr.  Davis's  control  of  the  military  resources  of  the  Con 
federate  people,  by  which  he  habitually  neutralized  the  great  ad 
vantage  that  we  had  in  the  possession  of  the  interior  lines. 

The  following  are  the  concluding  words  of  the  endorsement : 

"It  is  proper  also  to  observe  that  t-here  is  no  communication  on  file  in  the 
War  Department,  as  recited  at  the  close  of  the  report,  showing  wh.it  were  the 

*  See  Chapter  XI.,  p.  142,  and  Appendix  to  the  same  chapter. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  185 

causes  which  prevented  the  advance  of  our  forces,  and  prolonged  vigorous  pur 
suits  of  the  enemy  to  and  beyond  the  Potomac. 

"  JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

It  was  out  of  General  Beau  regard's  power  to  know  what  was 
technically  "on  iile  in  the  War  Department,"  at  the  time  Mr. 
Davis  wrote  his  endorsement ;  but  lie  does  know  that  the  Presi 
dent  had  been  fully  advised  in  writing,  directly  and  through  the 
War  Department,  of  certain  needs  with  regard  to  subsistence 
and  transportation  ;  needs  which,  left  nnsnpplicd,  as  they  were, 
made  it  impossible  for  that  army,  immediately  upon  the  defeat  of 
McDowell,  to  undertake  the  only  practicable  offensive  movement, 
to  wit',  the  passage  of  the  Potomac,  at  or  about  Edwards's  Ferry, 
into  Maryland,  and  a  march  thence  upon  the  rear  of  Washington. 

If  Mr.  Davis  had  allowed  General  Beauregard  to  carry  out  his 
proposed  plan  of  operations  against  McDowell  and  Patterson,  we 
should  have  captured  from  the  enemy  all  the  requisite  supplies 
that  the  President  and  the  chiefs  of  the  Commissary  and  Quarter 
master  Departments  had  so  signally  failed  to  procure.  This  chap 
ter  and  several  preceding  ones  of  this  work  arc  replete  with  proof 
of  remonstrances  ignored,  of  demands  unheeded,  of  requisitions  dis 
regarded,  by  Mr.  Davis  and  the  War  Department,  from  the  early 
part  of  June  up  to,  and  long  after,  the  battle  of  Manassas. 

The  foregoing  commentaries  upon  this  "  executive  endorsement " 
may,  at  first  sight,  appear  harsh,  and,  to  a  degree,  unmerited. 
Put  a  critical  examination  will  show  their  entire  justice.  Far  eas 
ier  and  less  painful  would  it  be,  when  chronicling  our  defeat,  to 
place  the  blame  upon  circumstances  and  not  upon  persons.  Un 
happily  for  Mr.  Davis,  his  conspicuous  position  as  President,  and 
the  fact  that  his  friends  attempt  to  make  of  him  the  sacred  cen 
tral  figure  of  the  late  Southern  Confederacy,  to  whom  no  reproach 
should  ever  be  affixed,  compel  all  conscientious  writers,  while  pass 
ing  upon  his  eventful  career,  to  a  clear  and  exhaustive  exposition 
of  the  truth.  Such  has  been  our  object  in  discussing  the  different 
parts  of  his  criticism  of  General  Beau  regard's  report  of  the  battle 
of  Manassas.  We  hold  that  even  Mr.  Davis  cannot  be  allowed  to 
controvert  the  historical  events  of  that  period  ;  that  he  is  bound 
by  them  ;  that  he  must  accept  the  logical  conclusions,  whether  for 
praise  or  for  censure,  of  his  own  acts  ;  and  as  his  words— written 
or  spoken — have  more  weight  in  the  minds  of  many  persons  than 
the  assertions  of  other  men,  he  should  be  held  to  a  strict  responsi- 


186  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

bility,  and  judged  with  all  due  severity,  whenever  he  gives  rein  to 
prejudice,  or  ceases  to  be  fair  and  impartial. 

In  thus  speaking,  we  are  moved  by  no  personal  animosity  to 
Mr.  Davis — far  from  it;  but  knowing  the  truth  of  all  the  facts 
alluded  to,  and  desiring  that  no  injustice  shall  be  done  to  one  who, 
no  less  than  Mr.  Davis,  had  his  whole  heart  in  the  success  of  the 
cause  for  which  he  fought,  it  is  deemed  a  duty,  as  well  as  a  right, 
to  impart  knowledge  to  the  public,  and  show  the  source  from 
which  it  is  derived. 

The  singular  circumstance  that  General  Beauregard's  report  of 
the  battle  of  Manassas  is  dated  August  the  26th,  when  it  was  not 
forwarded  until  the  14th  of  October,*  has  already  been  explained 
in  a  foot-note  to  be  found  in  Chapter  XII.  of  this  work,  page  165. 
A  repetition  here  would  be  unnecessary.  We  merely  submit  the 
following  letter,  showing  the  exact  time  at  which  General  Beau- 
regard's  report  was  sent  to  the  War  Department. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  FAIRFAX  COURT-HOUSE,  October  Hth,  1861. 
"  General  S.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Gen.,  Richmond,  Va. : 

"  Sir, — I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  by  my  aid,  Lieutenant  S.  W.  Ferguson, 
the  report  of  the  battle  of  Manassas,  with  the  accompanying  papers  and  draw 
ings,  as  well  as  the  flags  and  colors  captured  from  the  enemy  on  that  occa 
sion.  Occupations  of  the  gravest  character  have  prevented  their  earlier  trans 
mission. 

"  I  send,  as  a  guard  to  said  colors,  two  of  the  soldiers'  who  participated  in 
their  capture. 

"  I  remain,  Sir,  respectfully,  etc., 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  General." 

After  usin^  his  best  endeavors  to  vindicate  his  course  and  fur- 

O 

nish  to  "  the  student  of  history  "  all  he  should  learn  as  to  the  facts 
of  the  case,  Mr.  Davis,  with  great  apparent  generosity  towards  his 
assailants,  adds  the  following  sentence :  "  It  is  fortunate  for  the 
cause  of  justice  that  error  and  misrepresentation  have,  in  their  in 
consistencies  and  improbabilities,  the  elements  of  self-destruction, 
while  truth  is  in  its  nature  consistent,  and  therefore  self-sustain 
ing."  f 

We  quite  agree  with  Mr.  Davis  in  this  expression  of  a  general 
truth.  Is  it  possible,  however,  that,  while  penning  the  words 


*  General  J.  E.  Johnston's  Report  bore  the  same  date. 

t  "Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  371. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAHD.  187 

quoted,  lie  failed  to  see  the  stinging  irony  of  their  application  to 
that  part  of  his  own  book  which  treats  of  this  matter? 

Among  the  many  evidences  of  regard,  in  which  General  Beau- 
regard  found  consolation  for  official  annoyances,  came,  just  about 
that  time  (January  20th),  the  following  letter  from  Governor 
Moore  of  Louisiana,  transmitting  the  thanks  of  the  Legislature 
of  his  State,  for  the  victories  of  Sumtcr,  .Bull  Him,  and  Manassas. 

"EXECUTIVE  OFFICE,  BATON  ROUGE,  "L\.,  January  l±th,  18G2. 
"  To  Major-General  G.  T.  REAL-REGARD  : 

"  Sir, — I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  herewith,  as  requested,  a  copy  of  a  joint 
resolution  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  State  of  Louisiana. 

"  The  unanimous  expression  of  the  Legislature  is  but  the  echo  of  the  equal 
ly  unanimous  voices  of  the  people  of  your  native  State.  "While  they  confide 
in  the  efficiency  and  rejoice  in  the  success  of  the  troops  under  your  command, 
they  entertain  the  highest  esteem  and  gratitude  for  the  talents  and  labor  em 
ployed  by  you  in  preparing  our  volunteers  for  such  successful  action  and  in 
leading  them  to  victory. 

"  In  performing  this  pleasing  duty,  permit  me  to  express  my  full  and  cor 
dial  concurrence  in  the  well-deserved  tribute  of  thanks  which  our  Legislature 
has  offered  you. 

"  "NViLli  the  highest  consideration,  I  r.in,  very  respectfully, 

k>  Your  obedient  servant, 
4>  THOMAS  O.  MOOHK,  Governor." 

Attentive,  as  ever,  to  the  personal  needs  of  his  men,  General 
Beauregard,  on  the  18th  of  December,  addressed  a  circular  to 
his  division  commanders,  providing  for  the  granting  of  leaves  of 
absence,  after  Christmas,  to  officers  and  privates,  in  limited  num 
bers  at  a  time,  and  in  the  order  claimed  by  the  relative  wants  of 
their  families  and  affairs — a  necessary  privilege  to  many  who,  at 
the  first  sudden  call,  had  left  their  homes,  and  had,  ever  since, 
been  absent  from  them.  On  the  24-th,  however,  upon  learning 
that  Congress  had  passed  an  act  granting  furloughs  of  sixty  days 
to  such  twelve  months'  volunteers  as  would  re-enlist  for  a  term  of 
two  or  three  years,  or  the  war,  General  Beauregard  revoked,  but 
with  great  reluctance,  the  leaves  given,  and  ordered  that,  unless 
in  exceptional  cases,  they  should  be  granted  to  those  only  who 
would  accept  the  provisions  of  the  act.  General  Beauregard  was 
informed  of  this  wholesale  method  of  granting  furloughs  through 
General  Orders  Xo.  1,  from  the  Adjutant-General's  ofiice,  which 
was  communicated  to  him  as  commander  of  the  district,  on  or 
about  the  ICtli  of  January,  with  instructions  to  execute  it  at  once, 


1SS  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

but  in  such  a  manner  only  as  might  be  compatible  with  safety  to 
the  service.  For  reasons  already  stated,  this  order  and  the  instruc 
tions  accompanying  it  were  necessarily  referred  to  General  John 
ston,  who  deemed  it  best,  at  the  time,  to  withhold  its  publication. 

On  the  17th,  circulars  under  cover  to  General  Beauregard,  and 
separately  addressed  to  his  care,  were  received  from  Richmond, 
for  all  the  colonels  in  the  army,  providing  for  the  issue  of  recruit 
ing  commissions  from  all  regiments,  battalions,  and  independent 
companies.  This  new  official  freak,  on  the  part  of  the  Acting  Sec 
retary  of  War,  following,  as  it  did,  closely  upon  the  "bounty  and 
furlough  law,"  as  it  was  called  in  the  army,  was  calculated  to  do 
the  greatest  harm,  and  pressed  heavily,  not  only  upon  company 
and  regimental  commanders,  but,  likewise,  upon  the  generals  in 
chief.  General  Johnston,  alluding  to  this  unfortunate  interven 
tion  of  Mr.  Benjamin,  says  in  his  "Narrative  of  Military  Opera 
tions,"  page  90:  "Either  from  defects  in  the  law  itself,  or  faults 
in  the  manner  in  which  it  was  administered,  it  had  the  effect  of 
weakening  the  army,  by  its  immediate  operation,  without  adding 
to  its  strength  subsequently.  Its  numbers  were  greatly  reduced 
before  the  end  of  the  month  by  furloughs  under  the  recent  law, 
given  directly  by  the  Acting  Secretary  of  War.  It  was  further 
weakened,  and  its  discipline  very  much  impaired,  by  Mr.  Benja 
min's  daily  interference  in  its  administration  and  interior  manage 
ment.  That  officer  was  in  the  habit  of  granting  leaves  of  absence, 
furloughs,  and  discharges,  accepting  resignations,  and  detailing 
soldiers  to  labor  for  contractors,  or  on  nominal  service,  taking 
them  out  of  the  army  upon  applications  made  directly  to  himself, 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  officers  whose  duty  it  was  to  look 
to  the  interests  of  the  government  in  such  cases.  lie  also  granted 
indiscriminately,  to  officers,  privates,  and  civilians,  authority  to 
raise  companies  of  cavalry  and  artillery — especially  the  latter — 
from  our  excellent  infantry  regiments,  in  some  instances  for 
merely  local  services." 

Meanwhile,  a  widespread  spirit  of  discontent  arose,  from  with 
holding  the  publication  of  the  orders  of  the  department  respect 
ing  furloughs ;  and  General  Beauregard  again  found  himself  in 
the  embarrassing  position  of  being  addressed  and  looked  to  by  the 
War  Department  as  the  commander  of  the  army,  while  in  reality 
he  had  not  been  invested  with  such  command  by  the  commander 
of  the  military  department. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  139 

To  put  an  end  to  this  embarrassing  state  of  affairs,  Colonel  Jor 
dan,  his  Chief  of  Staff,  urged  upon  General  Beauregard  the  advis 
ability  of  dropping  his  practice  of  dating  his  orders  from  "Head 
quarters  1st  Corps  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  and  of  informing  Gen 
eral  Johnston  of  the  change,  in  order  to  avoid  clashing  with  the 
War  Department.  General  Beauregard  acknowledged  the  sound 
ness  of  the  advice,  which  had  already  presented  itself  to  his  mind, 
but,  through  a  feeling  of  delicacy  towards  General  Johnston,  and 
being  reluctant  to  appear,  in  any  way,  to  encroach  upon  his  pre 
rogatives  as  Commander-in-Chief,  he  once  more  declined  to  move 
in  the  matter.  Opposition  to  the  War  Department  or  to  any  or 
der  emanating  therefrom,  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  his  de 
cision.  Shortly  afterwards,  fault  being  again  found  with  this  corps 
command,  General  Beauregard,  in  order  to  avoid  all  further  com 
plication  and  appearance  of  disobedience  to  orders,  forwarded  the 
following  telegram  to  President  Davis : 

"  CEXTREVILLE,  VA.,  December  31sf.  1601. 
"  To  President  JEFF.  DAVIS,  Richmond  : 

"  Please  state  definitely  what  I  am  to  command,  if  I  do  not  command  a  corps, 
in  consequence  of  latter  being  unauthorized. 

k>  G.  T.  BKAUHEGAHD." 

To  this  no  reply  came,  and  the  uncertainty  continued — the 
War  Department  persisting  in  practically  considering  him  as  in 
command  of  the  whole  army;  while  General  Johnston,  though 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  Department  of  Northern  Virginia,  had 
not  relinquished  his  claim  to  the  same  position. 

The  matter  of  recruitment  had  given  anxious  thought  to  Gen 
eral  Beauregard,  who  reflected,  with  alarm,  that,  upon  the  disband- 
mcnt  of  the  twelve  months'  volunteers,  the  army  would  consist 
mostly  of  raw  recruits,  in  opposition  to  a  force  comparatively  vet 
eran,  and  superior  both  in  numbers  and  in  all  the  appointments  of 
war.  Accordingly,  on  the  20th  of  January,  he  communicated  to 
the  lion.  Roger  A.  Pryor,  of  the  Confederate  House  of  Represent 
atives,  a  plan  with  the  following  main  features:  The  governors  of 
the  States,  upon  an  immediate  call  by  the  Confederate  govern 
ment,  to  lill  the  regiments  in  the  field  to  their  legal  standard,  by 
a  draft  of  five  hundred  men  for  each ;  to  hold  in  reserve  an  addi 
tional  number  of  five  hundred  men,  with  which  to  raise  them 
again  to  their  full  standard  at  the  end  of  the  term  of  the  twelve 
months'  men ;  the  second  quota  to  be  furnished  about  one  month 


190  MILITARY    OPERATIONS  OF 

before  that  event — less,  however,  such  number  of  "veterans"  as 
should  then  have  re-enlisted ;  the  recruits  thus  excepted  forming 
a  reserve  to  supply  occurring  vacancies.  Upon  the  arrival  of  the 
second  quota,  the  officers  of  regiments  to  be  elected,  subject  to  ap 
proval  after  examination  for  competency ;  promotion  to  be,  thence 
forward,  by  grade — the  lowest  grade  being  filled  by  election  under 
like  approval. 

No  action  was  taken  by  Congress  upon  these  suggestions,  and 
it  is  even  doubtful  that  they  were  ever  presented  in  that  body. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  191 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

The  Part  taken  by  General  Johnston  in  the  Battle  of  Manassas. — He  Assumes 
no  Direct  Responsibility,  and,  though  Superior  in  Hank,  desires  General 
Bcauregard  to  Exercise  Full  Command. — President  Davis  did  not  Plan 
the  Campaign ;  Ordered  Concentration  at  the  Last  Moment ;  Arrived  on 
the  Battle-field  after  the  Enemy  had  been  Routed. — Pursuit  Ordered  and 
Begun,  but  Checked  inconsequence  of  False  Alarm. — Advance  on  Wash 
ington  made  Impossible  by  AVaut  of  Transportation  and  Subsistence. 

VARIOUS  are  the  comments  and  animadversions  that  have  been 
made  upon  the  conduct  of  the  Manassas  campaign,  and  the  Con 
federate  victory  resulting  from  it.  The  clearest  and  most  satis 
factory  evidence  exists  with  regard  to  what  then  occurred.  The 
public,  informed  of  the  truth,  would  have  naturally  accepted  it; 
but  public  opinion  has  been  studiously  kept  in  a  state  of  uncer 
tainty  by  the  propounding  of  many  insidious  questions  which  may 
not  here  be  passed  without  being  set  at  rest. 

What  has  been  said,  and  is  yet  persisted  in,  by  those  who, 
through  error  or  otherwise,  have  drawn  false  conclusions  from  the 
contradictory  accounts  of  these  events,  may  be  classified  and  con 
densed  under  three  heads  : 

1.  Was  it  not  General  Johnston,  the  superior  in  rank  of  General 
Bcauregard,  who   planned   and   fought   the   battle   of  Manassas? 
Did  not  the  latter  merely  act  as  one  of  the  former's  subordinates, 
and  in  obedience  to  orders  received  I 

2.  Was  not  President  Davis  the  originator  of  the  concentration 
of  our  forces  at  and  around  Manassas?     AVas  it  not  his  timely 
presence  on  the  battle-lield,  and  his  inspiriting  influence  over  the 
troops,  that  secured  victory  to  our  arms? 

3.  Why  was  not  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  continued  after  the 
battle  of  Manassas?     Admitting  the  impossibility  of  doing  so  on 
the  evening  of  the  21st  of  July,  why  was  it  not  attempted  after 
wards  ? 

It  is  due  to  the  distinguished  services  of  General  Beanregard, 
no  less  than  to  the  truth,  that  each  of  the  points  enumerated  above 


192  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

shall  be  carefully  and  impartially  examined,  with  the  declared  object 
not  to  argue,  but  simply  to  demonstrate. 

I.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  General  Johnston  arrived  at 
Manassas  on  the  20th  of  July,  at  noon  ;  that  is  to  say,  only  half  a 
day,  arid  one  night,  before  the  battle  of  the  21st.  He  would  cer 
tainly  have  arrived  too  late,  had  not  the  result  of  the  action  of 
Bull  Run,  on  the  18th,  deterred  General  McDowell  from  sooner 
making  his  contemplated  attack.  And  it  must  also  be  borne  in 
mind  that  General  Johnston  marched  to  the  assistance  of  General 
Beauregard,  not  of  his  own  free  will,  or  to  prepare  for  a  battle  he 
had  already  planned,  but  in  compliance  with  a  tardy  telegram  from 
Richmond,  issued  at  the  urgent  request  of  General  Beauregard, 
who,  from  the  early  part  of  June  until  that  day,  had  never  ceased 
to  counsel  concentration  and  an  aggressive  campaign.  Such  a 
junction  had  at  last  become  an  imperative  necessity.  General 
Johnston  was  forced  to  acknowledge  it.  Left  free  to  use  his  dis 
cretion  as  to  the  "practicability"  of  the  "movement,"  he  lost  no 
time  in  putting  his  troops  in  motion. 

Now,  what  did  General  Johnston  do  upon  reaching  General 
Beauregard's  headquarters  at  Camp  Pickens  ?  Upon  assuming 
command,  did  he  immediately  instruct  General  Beauregard  as  to 
what  should  be  done  in  view  of  the  corning  conflict  ?  Did  he  draw 
up  a  plan  of  operations?  Did  he  issue  orders  for  the  distribu 
tion  and  location  of  the  forces  already  at  Manassas,  and  of  those 
that  had  just  arrived,  or  might  come  in  afterwards?  Not  at  all. 
In  his  own  words  we  have  it  (Johnston's  "Narrative  of  Military 
Operations,"  p.  39)  "  that  the  position  occupied  by  the  Confed 
erate  army  was  too  extensive,  and  the  ground,  much  of  it,  too 
broken,  thickly  wooded,  and  intricate,  to  be  studied  to  any  purpose 
in  the  brief  space  of  time  at  my  disposal ;  for  I  had  come  im 
pressed  with  the  opinion  that  it  was  necessary  to  attack  the  enemy 
next  morning,  to  decide  the  event  before  the  arrival  of  General 
Patterson's  forces."  And  here  we  might  properly  remark,  that 
General  Patterson  never  arrived,  nor  has  it  been  shown  that  he 
ever  intended  to  do  so.  Long  before  writing  his  book,  General 
Johnston,  in  his  official  report,  had  said:  "I  found  General  Beau- 
regard's  position  too  extensive,  and  the  ground  too  densely  wooded 
and  intricate,  to  be  learned  in  the  brief  time  at  my  disposal,  and 
therefore  determined  to  rely  on  his  knowledge  of  it  and  of  the  ene 
my's  positions.  This  1  did  readily,  from  full  confidence  in  his 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  193 

capacity"  And  well  may  General  Johnston  have  been  impressed 
with  the  opinion  that  it  was  necessary  to  attack  the  enemy  the 
next  morning;  for  General  Beauregard,  in  several  letters  to  him, 
in  messages  delivered  by  special  aids  (Colonel  Chisolm  among 
them),  and  by  his  telegram  dated  July  17th,  had  clearly  announced 
his  determination,  if  reinforced,  to  attack  and  crush  the  enemy. 
Before  proceeding  further,  we  think  it  our  duty  to  add  that 
General  Johnston  is  certainly  mistaken  when  he  asserts  that  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  telegram  asking  —  we  might  almost  say  implor 
ing  —  him  to  move  on  immediately,  was  only  received  on  the  18th, 
when  his  answer  to  it  is  dated  July  17th,  and  reads  as  follows: 

''WINCHESTER,  VA.,  July  lltli,  18G1. 
"General  BEAUREGARD,  Manassas  : 

"  Is  the  enemy  upon  you  in  force  ?  u 


This  shows  conclusively  how  little  General  Johnston  had  thought 
of  leaving  Winchester,  and  how  utterly  improbable  it  is  that  he 
had  planned  a  battle  to  be  fought  at  Manassas,  through  a  junction 
of  his  forces  with  those  of  General  Beauregard.  Does  it  not 
show,  besides,  how  unwilling  he  was  to  move  at  all,  unless  assured 
that  there  was  no  exaggeration  in  General  Beauregard's  anticipa 
tion  of  a  powerful  impending  attack  ?  It  was  necessary  to  telegraph 
to  him  again  before  he  finally  agreed  to  put  his  troops  in  motion. 
Hence  their  late  arrival,  some  of  them  not  coming  up  until  the 
latter  part  of  the  battle.  General  Johnston  had,  evidently,  no 
plan  of  his  own  when  he  reached  Manassas.  That  he  drew  up  no 
plan  after  his  arrival  there  is  quite  as  evident.  He  had  no  time 
in  which  to  do  so.  The  circumstances  were  too  pressing,  lie 
knew  nothing  of  the  position  of  our  own  forces,  and  still  less  of 
that  of  the  enemy,  lie  was  obliged  to  rely  on  the  knowledge 
which  General  Beauregard  had  of  the  whole  country  at  and 
around  Manassas,  and,  though  the  superior  in  rank,  he  very  wisely 
declined  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  a  battle  in  the  prepara- 
ations  for  which  he  had  had  no  share.  In  his  report  General 
Beauregard  says:  "Made  acquainted  with  my  plan  of  operations 
and  dispositions  to  meet  the  enemy,  he  (General  Johnston)  gave 
them  his  entire  approval,  and  generously  directed  their  execution 
under  my  command."  This  passage  of  General  Beauregard's 
report  corroborates  and  completes  the  passage  quoted  above  from 
General  Johnston's  report.  Ilad  not  such  an  understanding  existed 
L—  13 


194  MILITARY  OPEKATIONS  OF 

between  the  two  generals,  how  can  it  be  supposed,  first,  that  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  would  have  asserted  it,  and,  next,  that  General 
Johnston  would  have  allowed  the  assertion  to  pass  uncontradicted, 
when  we  consider  that  the  language  used  in  General  Beauregard's 
report  would  have  virtually  deprived  General  Johnston  of  his  right 
ful  claim  to  the  command  of  our  united  forces. 

We  quote  again  from  General  Johnston's  "Narrative  of  Military 
Operations,"  pp.  40,  41 :  "  General  Beauregard  pointed  out,  on  his 
rnap,  five  roads  converging  to  Centreville  from  different  points  of 
his  front,  and  proposed  an  order  of  march  on  these  roads,  by  which 
the  army  should  be  concentrated  near  the  Federal  camps.  It  was 
accepted  without  hesitation ;  and,  having  had  no  opportunity  to 
sleep  in  either  of  the  three  nights  immediately  preceding,  I  re 
quested  him  to  draw  up  this  order  of  march,  and  have  the  number 
of  copies  necessary  written  by  our  staff  officers  and  brought  to  me 
for  distribution  that  evening,  while  I  was  preparing,  by  rest,  for 
the  impending  battle." 

The  order  of  march — that  is,  the  plan  of  battle — is  proposed  by 
General  Beauregard;  "accepted  without  hesitation,"  by  General 
Johnston,  and  "drawn  up"  by  the  former,  while  the  latter  is 
"preparing,  by  rest,  for  the  impending  battle."  General  John 
ston  sleeps  quietly,  undisturbed  by  any  direct  responsibility  for 
what  is  to  ensue  in  the  morning.  He  comes  to  assist  General 
Beauregard,  not  to  interfere  with  his  plans.  This  fight  is  not  his 
own,  but  General  Beauregard's,  and  he  so  expresses  himself  in 
declining  to  direct  the  operations  against  the  enemy.  And  while 
he  thus  tranquilly  takes  his  rest,  General  Beauregard,  who  has  no 
leisure  to  do  the  same,  and  has  hardly  had  any  sleep  at  all  since 
the  17th,  the  day  preceding  the  engagement  of  Bull  Hun,  goes  on 
with  the  active  preparations  needed  at  the  hour;  issues  and  dis 
tributes  the  order  of  march  and  other  orders ;  locates  troops — his 
own  and  General  Johnston's — as  if  reinforcements  alone  had  been 
sent  him,  unaccompanied  by  an  officer  of  superior  rank. 

"We  admit,  say  those  critics  to  whom  this  chapter  is  specially 
addressed,  that  the  idea  of  concentration  was  General  Beaure 
gard's ;  that  the  first  plan  of  battle  was  his,  likewise;  but  it  was 
not  carried  out;  the  enemy's  movements  rendered  it  unavailing, 
and  another  plan  was  substituted  in  its  stead.  General  Johnston, 
the  superior  in  rank,  being  then  on  the  field,  who  suggested  it? 

Our  answer  is,  that  a  modification  of  the  original  plan  had  to 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  195 

be  resorted  to,  but  was  suggested — as  had  been  the  plan  itself — by 
General  Beauregard,  and  by  no  other.  In  his  "Narrative  of  Mili 
tary  Operations,"  page  42,  General  Johnston  says :  "  The  plan  of 
operations  adopted  the  day  before  was  now,  apparently,  made  im 
practicable  by  the  enemy's  advance  against  our  left.  It  was  aban 
doned,  therefore,  and  another  adopted,  suggested  by  General  Beau- 
regard.  . . .  The  orders  for  this,  like  those  preceding  them,  were  dis 
tributed  by  General  Beauregard's  staff  officers,  because  they  were 
addressed  to  his  troops,  and  my  staff  knew  neither  the  positions  of 
the  different  brigades  nor  the  paths  leading  to  them."  It  matters 
very  little  whether  "the  enemy's  advance  against  our  left"  had 
necessitated  "  another"  plan,  as  General  Johnston  affirms,  or  mere 
ly  a  "  modification  "  of  the  first,  as  he  expresses  it  in  his  report,  and 
as  was  really  the  case  ;  the  essential  fact  that  it  was  General  Beaure 
gard — and  not  General  Johnston — who  again  suggested  it,  remains 
the  same,  and  is  beyond  dispute.  And,  here,  truth  compels  us  to 
add  that  the  allegation  that  such  orders  "and  those  preceding  them 
were  distributed  by  General  Beauregard's  staff  officers  because 
they  were  addressed  to  his  troops"  is  altogether  erroneous;  for 
almost  all  orders,  from  the  afternoon  of  the  day  previous  to  that 
time,  had  been  forwarded  through  General  Beauregard's  staff; 
the  palpable  reason  being,  that  the  officers  of  General  Johnston's 
staff  were  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  location  of  our  various 
troops,  as  much  so  of  General  Johnston's  as  of  General  Beaure 
gard's.  Xor  must  we  forget  that  General  Johnston  was  "prepar 
ing,  by  rest,  for  the  impending  battle,"  while  all  our  forces— those 
already  arrived  or  arriving — at  Manassas,  were  being  placed  in 
position,  by  General  Beauregard's  orders. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  the  fact  is  not  the  less  plain  that  the  new 
plan,  or  the  modification  of  the  original  one,  was  conceived  and 
offered  by  General  Beauregard,  and  merely  adopted  by  General 
Johnston.  This  forms  an  essential  feature  in  our  line  of  evidence, 
and  in  no  inconsiderable  degree  adds  to  its  weight.  What  we  con 
sider  ambiguous  and  incomprehensible  are  the  following  words,  to 
be  found  in  General  Johnston's  "Narrative  of  Military  Opera 
tions,"  at  the  close  of  the  paragraph  we  have  given  above:  "Want 
of  promptness  in  the  deliver}'  of  these  orders  frustrated  this  plan 
—perhaps  fortunately." 

It  is  true  that  circumstances  occurred  which  made  necessary  a, 
second  modification  in  the  details  of  General  Beauregard's  plan, 


196  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

and  this,  we  submit,  should  surprise  no  one ;  but  what  can  be  the 
meaning  and  intent  of  the  words  "  perhaps  fortunately,"  as  applied 
to  the  change  General  Johnston  alludes  to?  If  the  plan  was  unwise, 
why  had  he  approved  it?  If  it  was  judicious  —  as  lie  must  have 
thought  it — why  does  he  afterwards  cast  a  shadow  of  censure  over 
it?  It  may  have  been  because,  having  declined  to  assume  com 
mand,  he  was  unwilling  to  appear  to  oppose  General  Beauregard's 
views.  Then,  why  should  he  lead  the  readers  of  his  report  and  of 
his  book  to  the  erroneous  belief  that  his  was  the  controlling  spirit 
directing  each  and  every  incident  of  the  battle  ?  We  can  imagine 
only  one  set  of  conditions  under  which  the  frustration  of  the 
modified  plan  might  have  been  a  fortunate  occurrence,  and  that 
is,  that  General  Johnston,  who  was  ignorant,  as  he  admits,  of  the 
surrounding  country,  and  had  but  superficially  examined  that  plan, 
should  himself  havo  undertaken  to  carry  it  into  operation.  Such 
could  not  have  been  the  case  with  General  Beauregard,  who  knew 
every  inch  of  ground  covered  by  our  united  forces,  and  certainly 
understood  what  he  had  himself  conceived.  In  truth,  though  it 
seems  idle  to  speculate  upon  the  possible  results  of  events  that 
never  occurred,  General  Beauregard  thinks — and  so  do  many  of 
ficers  of  merit,  well  acquainted  with  the  matter — that,  if  the  plan 
alluded  to  by  General  Johnston  had  been  executed  in  time,  the 
rout  of  the  enemy  would  have  occurred  early  in  the  day,  instead  of 
late  in  the  afternoon,  and  the  whole  of  General  McDowell's  army— 
not  a  small  portion  of  it  only — would  have  been  captured  or  an 
nihilated.  The  use  of  the  phrase  "  perhaps  fortunately  "  is,  there 
fore,  logically  and  truthfully  speaking,  without  any  justification 
whatever.  Towards  the  end  of  his  report,  alluding  to  the  fact 
of  his  orders  having  failed  to  reach  the  brigade  commanders  to 
whom  they  were  forwarded,  General  Beauregard  says :  "  In  con 
nection  with  the  miscarriage  of  the  orders  sent  by  courier  to 
Generals  Holmes  and  Ewell,  to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank  and  re 
verse  at  Centreville,  through  which  the  triumph  of  our  arms  was 
prevented  from  being  still  more  decisive,  I  regard  it  in  place  to 
say,"  etc.  And  he  here  recommends  a  "divisional  organization," 
which,  he  thinks,  "  would  greatly  reduce  the  risk  of  such  mis 
haps  "  in  the  future. 

All  things  considered,  we  feel  justified  in  saying  that  the  phrase 
"perhaps  fortunately,"  though  necessarily  void  of  any  effect, 
would  mean  more  if  applied  to  what  might  have  happened  to 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  197 

the  enemy,  than  it  does  in  connection  with  the  modified  plan  of 
General  Beauregard.  "  Fortunately "  for  General  McDowell's 
army,  not  u  fortunately  "  for  ours,  the  miscarriage  occurred. 

lief  erring,  in  his  report,  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy  in  the 
early  morning  of  the  21st,  and  the  non-arrival  of  the  expected 
troops  (some  five  thousand  of  his  own)  General  Johnston  says: 
"General  Beauregard  afterwards  proposed"  (Beauregard  always 
proposing,  Johnston  always  accepting)  "  a  modification  of  the  aban 
doned  plan — to  attack  with  our  right,  while  the  left  stood  on  the 
defensive.  This,  too,  became  impracticable,  and  a  battle  ensued, 
different  in  place  and  circumstances  from  any  previous  plan  on 
our  side."  On  the  other  hand,  his  "Narrative  of  Military  Opera 
tions,"  pp.  47,  4:8,  has  the  following  passage :  "  It  was  now  evident 
tlmt  a  battle  was  to  be  fought,  entirely  different,  in  place  and  cir 
cumstances,  from  cither  of  the  two  plans  previously  adopted.  .  .  . 
Instead  of  taking  the  initiative  and  operating  in  front  of  our  line, 
we  were  now  compelled  to  fight  on  the  defensive,  a  mile  and  a 
half  behind  that  line,  and  at  right  angles  to  it,  on  a  new  and  un- 
surveyed  field,  with  no  other  plans  than  those  suggested  by  the 
changing  events  of  battle." 

The  conclusion  we  arc  to  draw  from  this  is,  that,  as  first  agreed, 
we  were  to  fight  according  to  plans  prepared  and  proposed  by 
General  Beauregard  and  accepted  by  General  Johnston ;  and  that 
now — strange  as  the  assertion  may  appear — we  are  about  to  fight 
according  to  no  plan  at  all.  We  submit  that  the  fact — if  fact  it 
were — of  our  fighting  "  with  no  other  plans  than  those  suggested 
by  the  changing  events  of  battle,"  does  not  show,  in  the  least,  that 
General  Johnston,  either  at  that  moment,  or  before  or  afterwards, 
ever  assumed  the  responsibility  of  planning  or  directing  the  opera 
tions  of  the  day. 

We  thus  dwell  upon  General  Johnston's  assertions,  made  in  his 
report  and  in  his  book,  because  we  take  it  that  no  better  evidence 
than  his  own  can  be  adduced  in  matters  where  he  is  so  directly 
concerned.  More  conclusive  still  does  such  evidence  become, 
when  corroborated,  explained — though  at  times  corrected — by  pas 
sages  of  General  Beauregard's  report  on  the  same  subject-matter. 

Before  quoting  again  from  General  Johnston's  work,  let  us 
briefly  review  the  situation,  as  defined  by  its  author.  We  are  now 
fighting  with  no  preconcerted  plan  whatever.  We  know  nothing 
of  the  ground  we  stand  upon.  This,  however,  clearly  applies  to 


198  MILITARY   OPERATIONS    OF 

General  Johnston  alone,  for  be  admits  the  knowledge  General 
Beauregard  had  of  our  own  and  of  the  enemy's  positions.  All  our 
forces  already  on  the  field  are  being  concentrated,  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  on  the  ground  where  the  enemy  compels  us  to  give  him 
battle.  The  weight  against  us  is  terrible.  Our  troops  display 
the  greatest  gallantry,  but  are  about  to  give  way.  Generals  John 
ston  and  Beauregard  are  among  them.  They  rally  on  their 
colors.  The  battle  is  re-established. 

And  now,  at  this  critical  moment  of  the  day,  "  the  aspect  of 
affairs  being  not  encouraging,"  as  General  Johnston  says,  a  circum* 
stance  occurred,  which,  better  than  any  other,  will  serve  to  define 
the  real  position  of  the  two  generals,  and  finally  determine  to 
which  of  them  unmistakably  belong  the  success  and  glory  of  the 
battle  of  Manassas 

We  quote  from  the  "Narrative  of  Military  Operations,"  p.  48: 
"  After  assigning  General  Beauregard  to  the  command  of  the 
troops  immediately  engaged,  which  he  properly  suggested  belonged 
to  the  second  in  rank,  not  to  the  commander  of  the  army,  I  re 
turned  to  the  whole  field."  The  language  of  the  report  is  as  follows : 
"  Then,  in  a  brief  and  rapid  conference,  General  Beauregard  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  left,  which,  as  the  younger  officer, 
he  claimed,  while  I  returned  to  that  of  the  whole  field." 

The  question  naturally  occurring  to  the  reader's  mind  is,  where, 
at  that  momentous  juncture,  was  "the  whole  field?"  We  must 
not  forget  what  General  Johnston  tells  us,  to  wit,  that  the  "field" 
is  a  new  one ;  that  the  battle  is  being  fought  according  to  no 
body's  plan  ;  that  all  our  forces  are  either  now  engaged  on,  or  be 
ing  sent  to,  the  ground  where  the  enemy  forced  us  to  fight  him, 
and  where  "  the  aspect  of  affairs  is  not  encouraging."  To  what 
"  whole  field "  is  General  Johnston,  the  "  commander  of  the 
army,"  now  about  to  "  return  ?"  The  word  "return  "  implies  the 
act  of  going  back  to  a  place — in  this  instance  to  a  "field" — where 
one  had  been  before.  "Where  was  the  "  whole  field,"  before  ? 
Where  was  it  at  this  time?  The  evidence  General  Johnston  fur 
nishes  shuts  out  all  other  conclusion  than  this,  that  by  "return 
ing"  to  what  he  terms  "the  whole  field,"  he  was  actually  leaving 
the  immediate  field  of  battle.  For  here,  on  the  ground  where 
General  Beauregard  is  now  fighting,  where  all  our  forces — except 
reinforcements  not  yet  arrived — are  being  massed,  is  unquestion 
ably  the  "field." 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  199 

"With  the  passages  just  quoted  from  General  Johnston's  book 
and  from  his  report,  let  us  now  connect  what  General  Beau- 
regard,  in  his  report,  says  of  this  period  of  the  day:  "As  soon 
as  we  had  just  rallied  and  disposed  our  forces,  I  urged  General 
Johnston  to  leave  the  immediate  command  of  the  field  to  me''  (the 
"field"— not  the  "left")— "  while  he,  repairing  to  Portici— the 
Lewis  House — should  urge  reinforcements  forward.  At  first  he 
was  unwilling,  but,  reminded  that  one  of  us  must  do  so,  and  that, 
properly,  it  was  his  place,  he  reluctantly,  but  fortunately,  com 
plied  ;  fortunately,  because,  from  that  position,  by  his  energy  and 
sagacity,  his  keen  perception,  and  anticipation  of  my  needs,  he 
so  directed  the  reserves  as  to  insure  the  success  of  the  day." 

This  passage  of  General  Beauregard's  report,  explaining  the 
part  General  Johnston  took  in  the  battle,  is  marked  by  a  high- 
toned  courtesy  and  disinterestedness  reflecting  honor  upon  the 
spirit  actuating  it.  lie  there  speaks  of  his  superior  in  rank,  of 
one  who,  in  published  orders,  had  ostensibly  assumed  command  of 
the  army,  but,  wisely  declining  to  exercise  his  rights  as  such,  had 
"generously  permitted  the  carrying  out  of  his  (Beau regard's) 
plans."  Feeling  sure  that  if  untrammelled  in  the  command,  he 
could  achieve  a  victory,  and  fully  appreciating  the  opportunity 
left  in  his  hands  by  General  Johnston's  withdrawal  from  the  field, 
he  finds  no  words  too  eulogistic  to  express  his  gratification  at  the 
assistance  General  Johnston  gives  him — how  I  by  sending  forward 
reinforcements  in  anticipation  of  his  needs. 

General  Beauregard's  considerateness  of  feeling  is  all  the  more 
striking  because  what  he  says  is  in  decided  contrast  with  what 
General  Johnston  does  not  say,  but  clearly  insinuates,  both  in  his 
report  and  in  his  book. 

The  truth  is,  that  the  presence  of  the  two  generals  on  the  field 
was  worse  than  useless,  under  the  circumstances.  So  long  as  Gen 
eral  Johnston  remained  there,  General  Beauregard,  in  obedience 
to  military  etiquette,  had  to  refer  to  him,  before  issuing  any  of  his 
orders.  Hence  unavoidable  delays  must  have  occurred  in  their 
execution,  which  might  have  imperilled  the  result  of  the  day. 

General  Beauregard  had  strenously  exerted  himself  to  procure 
the  concentration  of  our  forces  at  Manassas.  He  had  suggested 
the  plan  which  was  now  being  carried  out,  though  modified,  so  as 
to  meet  the  inevitable  changes  and  chances  of  a  battle-field.  To 
him,  the  immediate  position  of  our  troops  and  all  the  surrounding 


200  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF  ~ 

country  were  "as  familiar  as  a  nursery  tale,"  whereas  they  were 
wholly  unknown  to  General  Johnston.  It  was,  therefore,  both 
natural  and  just  that  General  Beauregard  should  have  the  actual 
command  of  the  army,  as  he  certainly  had  the  responsibility  for 
the  issue  of  the  contest.  General  Beauregard  was  in  command, 
not  of  the  "left"  only,  but  of  our  whole  line,  including  the  left, 
the  centre,  and  the  right.  He  issued  orders  to  all  our  united 
forces  then  gathered  on  the  field,  the  "  new  field,"  which,  General 
Johnson  says,  had  been  substituted  for  the  first.  On  that  "field" 
did  he  command,  fight,  and  win  the  battle,  while  General  John 
ston,  at  his  request,  had  gone  to  the  rear  to  assist  him  by  sending 
forward  reinforcements.  Not  once  during  the  whole  battle  did 
General  Johnston  give  him  a  single  order.  All  orders  on  the 
evening  previous,  as  wrell  as  on  that  day,  were,  as  we  have  seen, 
suggested  and  issued  by  General  Beauregard,  and  acquiesced 
in  by  General  Johnston.  From  the  moment  the  latter  withdrew 
from  the  field,  at  11.30  A.M.,  or  about  that  time,  until  4.30  r. M., 
when  General  Beauregard  joined  him  at  the  Lewis  House,  he  com 
municated  only  once  with  General  Beauregard,  and  then,  only  to 
send  him  an  unimportant  message,  through  Colonel  Lay,  one  of 
his  aids.  So  might  have  done,  and  so  did,  Colonel  Jordan,  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  Chief  of  Staff,  and  other  subordinate  officers, 
whose  duty  it  was  to  inform  the  commanding  general  of  all  that 
occurred  in  their  front,  with  a  view  to  receiving  further  instruc 
tions  from  him. 

Suppose  General  Beauregard,  yielding  to  General  Johnston's 
reluctance  to  take  the  position  he  had  indicated  for  him  at  the 
Lewis  House,  had  gone  thither  himself,  would  that  have  put 
General  Beauregard  in  command  of  the  "  whole  field  "  ?  Yet  that 
is  the  very  position  General  Johnston  would  have  wished  General 
Beauregard  to  take,  had  not  the  latter  "claimed"  the  command, 
which,  for  the  reasons  so  often  alluded  to,  had  been  given  him  by 
General  Johnston  himself.  If  the  position  taken  by  General 
Johnston,  at  the  request  of  General  Beauregard,  was  the  proper 
one  to  be  taken  by  the  commander  of  the  army,  he  should  have 
gone  thither  of  his  own  free  will,  as  soon  as  "  order  was  restored 
and  the  battle  re-established."  But  he  insisted  upon  remaining 
with  the  troops  immediately  engaged,  and  upon  doing  what  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  actually  did.  Was  it  because  he  was  the  com 
mander  of  the  army  ?  If  the  Lewis  House  was  not  the  position 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  201 

for  the  responsible  commander,  then  such,  most  undoubtedly,  was 
General  Beauregard's  on  the  field. 

Much  more  could  be  said.  Letters  and  documents  could  be 
quoted  to  corroborate  the  truth  of  every  assertion  here  made  about 
the  point  under  examination.  But  it  is  deemed  unnecessary,  as  it 
would  only  multiply — not  strengthen — our  evidence.  The  reader 
is  referred  simply  to  the  two  following  letters — the  first,  an  official 
one,  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  other  from  General  Lee 
— which  show  conclusively  to  whom  the  honors  of  the  victory  of 
Manassas  were  accorded. 

•'  C.  S.  A.  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
IkciiMOND,  July  24tf,  1861. 

"  My  dear  General, — Accept  my  congratulations  for  the  glorious  and  most 
brilliant  victory  achieved  by  you. 

"  The  country  will  bless  you  and  honor  you  for  it, 

"  Believe  Die,  dear  general,  truly  your  friend, 

"  L.  P.  WALKER. 
"  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

'•  RICHMOND,  July  24JA,  1861. 

"My  dear  General, — I  cannot  express  the  joy  I  feel,  at  the  beautiful  victory 
of  the  21st.  The  skill,  courage,  and  endurance  displayed  by  yourself  excite  my 
highest  admiration.  You  and  your  troops  have  the  gratitude  of  the  whole 
country,  and  I  offer  to  all  my  heartfelt  congratulations  at  their  success. 

"The  glorious  dead  are  at  peace.  I  grieve  for  their  loss,  and  sympathize 
with  the  living. 

"May  your  subsequent  course  be  attended  with  like  success. 

"RE.  LEE. 
"General  BEAUKEGARD." 

The  War  Department  and  General  Lee  no  doubt  knew  that 
such  letters  would  have  been  altogether  irrelevant  had  the  hero  of 

^3 

Manassas  been  General  Johnston,  and  not  General  Beauregard,  to 
whom  they  were  addressed. 

Ask  the  survivors  of  that  first  battle  of  the  war — be  they  Vir 
ginians,  Carolinians,  Georgians,  Alabamians,  Mississippians,  Ten- 
nesseeans,  or  Louisianians — who  led  them,  on  the  21st  of  July, 
1861;  ask  them,  when,  broken  down  by  exhaustion  and  over 
whelmed  by  numbers,  they  wavered  and  had  all  but  lost  the  sense 
of  their  soldierly  duties,  who  sprang  before  them,  radiant  with  in 
spiriting  valor,  and,  ordering  their  colors  planted  in  their  front, 
rallied  them  to  these  sacred  emblems  of  country,  honor,  and  liber 
ty  ?  We  have  written  and  reasoned  in  vain ;  we  know  not  what 


202  MILITAKY  OPERATIONS  OF 

sounds  and  what  echoes  move  most  the  hearts  of  those  "  who  wore 
the  gray,"  if  one  name — Beauregard's — is  not  the  name  they  will 
one  and  all  couple  with  that  great  victory. 

II.  A  retrospective  glance  over  the  preceding  chapters  will  con 
vince  the  reader  that  President  Davis  had  nothing  whatever  to 
do  with  the  plan  according  to  which  was  effected  the  concentra 
tion  of  our  forces  at  Manassas.  General  Beauregard's  letter  to  him, 
written  as  early  as  June  12th,  and  the  President's  answer,  are  in 
existence  to  testify  that  General  Beauregard,  ten  days  after  assum 
ing  command  at  Manassas,  and  as  soon  as  he  had  familiarized  him 
self  with  our  own  and  the  enemy's  positions,  began  urging  con 
centration  upon  the  Confederate  government,  in  which  he  was 
steadily  opposed  by  Mr.  Davis.  Failing  in  this,  General  Beaure 
gard  asked  for  a  junction  of  General  Holmes's  forces  with  his  own, 
showing — General  Holmes  agreeing — the  uselessness  of  that  com 
mand  in  the  position  it  then  occupied.  This,  too,  was  refused. 
Grieved,  though  not  discouraged,  at  his  want  of  success  in  securing 
compliance  with  suggestions  which  he  knew  were  not  only  wise 
but  of  the  utmost  importance,  General  Beauregard  did  all  he  could 
to  prepare  himself  for  the  imminent  conflict  approaching.  On  the 
8th  of  July  he  wrote  to  Senator  "Wigfall  the  letter  already  placed 
before  the  reader  (Chapter  YIL),  wherein  is  depicted  the  critical 
strait  he  was  in,  owing  to  slowness,  want  of  forethought,  and  gen 
eral  inefficiency  in  the  management  of  military  affairs  at  the  seat 
of  government.  With  fifteen  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  lie  was 
threatened  and  would  soon  be  attacked  by  forty  thousand  of  the 
enemy's  forces.  He  was  determined  to  give  battle,  however,  no 
matter  what  odds  there  might  be  against  him  ;  for  the  Federal  ad 
vance  must  be  checked  even  at  the  heaviest  cost.  lie  was  evidently 
anxious  that  the  President  should  be  approached  on  the  subject,  so 
as  to  put  a  stop,  at  once,  to  the  improvidence  spoken  of. 

On  the  next  day  he  forwarded  the  following  telegram : 

"  MANASSAS,  July  9th,  1801. 
"  President  DAVIS  .• 

"Enemy's  force  increasing  and  advancing  daily  this  side  of  Potomac.  Ho 
•will  soon  attack  with  very  superior  numbers.  No  time  should  be  lost  in  rein 
forcing  me  here,  with  at  least  ten  thousand  men,  volunteers  or  militia.  I  write 
to-day, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Brig.-Gcn.  Comdg." 

He  did  not  write  on  that  day,  but  did  so  on  the  llth  of  July, 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  203 

setting  forth  the  disparity  of  numbers  between  his  forces  and 
those  of  the  enemy,  and  alluding  to  the  apprehension  of  his  left 
flank  being  turned  and  his  communication  with  .Richmond  event 
ually  destroyed.  "In  view  of  the  odds  against  me" — he  wrote 
in  that  letter — "and  of  the  vital  importance,  at  this  juncture,  of 
avoiding  the  hazard  of  defeat,  which  would  open  to  the  enemy 
the  way  to  Richmond,  I  shall  act  with  extreme  caution.  If  forced 
to  retire  before  an  overwhelming  force,  .  .  .  my  line  of  retreat  can 
be  taken,  through  Brentsville,  to  a  junction  with  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Holmes,  at  or  near  Fredericksburg,  whence  we  could  operate 
on  the  line  of  communication  of  the  enemy,  ...  so  as  to  retard 
him  by  the  way."  lie  wished  it  clearly  understood,  however, 
that  should  the  enemy  offer  battle  on  the  line  of  Bull  Run,  he 
would  accept  it  for  his  command,  against  whatever  odds  he  (the 
enemy)  might  array  in  his  front. 

Hardly  had  this  communication  been  forwarded  to  Richmond, 
before  he  despatched  thither  Colonel  Preston,  and,  immediately 
afterwards,  Colonel  Chestnut,  with  another  and  more  extensive 
plan  of  concentration  and  aggression.  It  is  given  in  full  in 
Colonel  Chestnut's  report  of  his  mission,  to  which  we  refer  the 
reader.*  The  result  was,  that,  after  consultation  with  Generals 
Cooper  and  Lee,  the  President  once  more  refused  to  accede  to  the 
plan  of  concentration  offered  him  by  General  Beauregard.  The 
enemy  were  yet  too  near  their  cover  to  allow  any  reasonable  hope 
of  the  accomplishment  of  this  proposed  scheme,  which  was  de 
clared  to  be  a  very  brilliant  and  comprehensive  one,  but,  withal, 
pronounced  impracticable.  Such,  in  substance,  was  the  decision 
against  the  wisest— as  it  was  undoubtedly  the  boldest — concen 
trated,  aggressive  campaign  attempted  during  the  war.  Before 
sending  to  Richmond,  General  Beauregard,  in  a  letter  dated  July 
13th,  had  also  communicated  the  outlines  of  this  plan  to  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  whose  influence  in  its  support  he  was  anxious  to 
secure.  lie  was  as  unfortunate  there  as  he  was  with  the  President. 
An  expectant  and  defensive  policy  was,  at  that  moment,  the  one 
absorbing  thought  of  President  Davis  and  of  Generals  Cooper, 
Lee,  and  Johnston. 

At  last  the  crisis  came  upon  us.  On  the  IGth  of  July  General 
Beauregard  was  informed,  by  a  secret  message  from  Washington, 

*To  be  found  at  the  beginning  of  Chapter  VIII. 


204:  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

that  General  McDowell  had  been  ordered  to  advance,  and  would 
do  so  that  very  night.  He  forwarded  this  news  to  Eichmond,  an-d, 
undaunted  by  his  former  fruitless  attempts,  urged  the  absolute  ne 
cessity  of  ordering  Generals  Johnston  and  Holmes  to  join  their 
forces  to  his. 

Then  it  was — but  only  then — that  President  Davis  consented 
to  the  long-suggested,  long-prayed-for  concentration,  so  repeatedly 
and  vainly  demanded.  An  order — not  an  imperative  one,  how 
ever —  was  sent  to  General  Johnston,  to  move  on  to  General 
Beauregard's  assistance,  "  if  practicable."  It  was  dated  July  17th, 
and  has  already  been  transcribed  in  these  pages.  Too  late,  thought 
General  Beauregard,  and  he  so  expressed  himself  in  his  telegram 
to  General  Cooper,  advising  him  that  "  the  enemy  will  attack  in 
force"  the  next  morning.  And  the  enemy  did.  The  engage 
ment  of  Bull  Run  was  fought  and  won  ;  and  General  McDowell, 
frustrated  in  this  his  attempt  to  carry  our  lines,  fortunately  for 
us,  delayed  his  onward  movement  towards  Richmond.  Our  suc 
cess  was  announced  to  the  War  Department ;  what  answer  came 
back?  The  despatch  has  already  been  given,  but  it  is  necessary 
to  lay  it  again  before  the  reader. 

"  RICHMOND,  July  19^,  1861. 
"  GENERAL  BEATJREGARD,  MANASSAS,  VA.  : 

"  We  have  no  intelligence  from  General  Johnston.  If  the  enemy  in  front 
of  you  has  abandoned  an  immediate  attack,  and  General  Johnston  has  not 
moved,  you  had  better  withdraw  the  call  upon  him,  so  that  he  may  be  left  to 
his  full  discretion.  All  the  troops  arriving  at  Lynchburg  are  ordered  to  join 
you.  From  this  place  we  will  send  as  fast  as  transportation  permits.  The 
enemy  is  advised  at  Washington  of  the  projected  movement  of  Generals  John 
ston  and  Holmes,  and  may  vary  his  plans  in  conformity  thereto. 

"  S.  COOPEB,  Adjutant-General." 

Even  at  this  critical  juncture,  when  no  further  doubt  could  ex 
ist  of  the  enemy's  intention  to  rush  upon  our  lines  in  overwhelm 
ing  force — the  inevitable  result  of  our  defeat  being  the  capture 
of  Richmond — President  Davis,  so  far  from  having  projected  con 
centrating  our  forces  at  Manassas,  was  desirous  of  countermanding 
his  order  to  General  Johnston,  on  the  19th  of  July,  and  so  caused 
General  Beauregard  to  be  advised. 

No  more  need  be  said  to  show  that  the  concentration  of  our 
forces  at  Manassas  was  due  to  the  energy  and  untiring  efforts  of 
General  Beauregard  alone,  and  in  nowise  to  any  prevision  or 
plan  of  President  Davis,  "who  agreed  to  the  proposed  movement 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  205 

only  at  the  very  last  hour,  sorely  against  his  wishes,  and  only 
when  he  was  forced  to  realize  that  an  overpowering  foe  threat 
ened  us  with  annihilation. 

All  this  is  written  after  a  careful  perusal  of  Mr.  Da  vis's  book. 
Nowhere  in  it  does  he  assert,  in  so  many  words,  that  it  was  he, 
and  not  General  Beauregard,  who  first  thought  of  and  first  suggest 
ed  the  junction  of  our  armies  at  Manassas ;  hut,  by  using  such 
expressions  as,  "the  great  question  of  uniting  the  two  armies  had 
been  decided  at  Richmond,"  he  creates  a  false  impression  on  the 
reader's  mind.  That  it  was  Mr.  Davis  who  finally  signed  the  con 
tingent  order  for  the  junction,  and,  to  that  extent,  decided  the 
question  of  uniting  the  two  armies,  is  not  contended.  He  was 
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army  and  navy,  and,  as  such,  it 
was  necessary  that  his  consent  should  be  obtained  before  a  mili 
tary  movement  of  so  great  importance  could  be  carried  out.  It  is 
clear  that  General  Bcauregard  had  no  right  to  order  General  John 
ston  to  make  a  junction  with  him.  But  that  the  suggestion  came 
from  General  Beauregard,  and  that  Mr.  Davis,  at  the  last  hour 
only,  issvied  the  necessary  order,  is  none  the  less  an  undeniable 
fact. 

And  now,  that  many  idle  rumors  of  the  first  period  of  the  war 
have  died  out,  and  plain  historical  facts  have  rightfully  taken  their 
place,  is  it  possible  that  even  the  nearest  of  President  Davis's 
friends  can  still  seriously  claim  that  the  victory  of  Manassas  was, 
in  any  way,  due  to  his  presence  upon  the  battle-field  ?  So  contra 
ry  to  truth  is  any  assertion  of  the  kind,  so  plainly  obvious  is  the 
fact  that  President  Davis  saw  nothing  of  the  battle,  and,  therefore, 
took  no  part  whatever  in  it,  that  we  are  at  a  loss  for  means  of 
meeting  the  efforts  of  some  of  his  admirers,  who  wish  to  give  him 
the  meed  of  praise  exclusively  belonging  to  another. 

That  President  Davis  came  to  Manassas  on  the  21st  of  July, 
with  the  probable  intention  of  taking  an  active  part  in  the  battle, 
should  circumstances  justify  his  doing  so,  none  who  know  any 
thing  of  the  events  of  that  memorable  epoch  are  disposed  to  doubt 
or  gainsay.  But  that,  if  such  were  his  intention,  he  was  disap 
pointed,  is  no  less  historically  true. 

In  Johnston's  "  Narrative  of  Military  Operations,"  p.  53,  we  read 
as  follows  :  "  Some  half-hour  after  the  termination  of  the  battle,  the 
President  rode  upon  the  field,  conducted  from  Manassas  Station  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Jordan.  lie  had  arrived  there  from  Richmond 


206  ,    MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

when  the  struggle  had  just  closed,  and  had,  doubtless,  hurried  out 
to  take  part  in  it.  The  crowd  of  fugitives  he  had  seen  from  his 
railway  car,  before  reaching  the  station,  had  so  strongly  impressed 
upon  his  mind  the  idea  that  we  were  defeated,  that  it  was  not 
immediately  removed  by  the  appearance  of  the  field.  I  judged 
so,  at  least,  from  his  first  words,  while  we  were  shaking  hands : 
'  How  has  the  battle  gone  ?'  " 

In  Alfriend's  "  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis"  it  is  asserted  (p.  305) 
that  the  President  reached  "  the  battle-field  while  the  struggle  was 
still  in  progress  ;"  that  "  to  the  troops  his  name  and  bearing  were 
the  symbols  of  victory ;"  that  "  while  the  victory  was  assured,  but 
by  no  means  complete,  he  urged  that  the  enemy,  still  on  the  field 
(Heintzelman's  troops,  as  subsequently  appeared),  be  warmly  pur 
sued,  as  was  successfully  done"  (p.  313). 

"  These  are  fancies,"  says  General  Johnston.  "  He  arrived  upon 
the  field  after  the  last-armed  enemy  had  left  it,  when  none  were 
within  cannon-shot,  or  south  of  Bull  Run,  when  the  victory  \vas 
'complete'  as  wrell  as  assured,  and  no  opportunity  left  for  the  in 
fluence  of  his  name  and  bearing." 

General  Beauregard,  in  his  report,  also  alludes  to  the  arrival  of 
Mr.  Davis  on  the  battle-field  of  Manassas,  just  after  the  enemy 
had  "given  way  and  fled,  in  wild  disorder,  in  every  direction — a 
scene  the  President  of  the  Confederacy  had  the  high  satisfaction  of 
witnessing,  as  he  arrived  upon  the  field  at  that  exultant  moment." 

True,  President  Davis,  on  his  return  to  Richmond,  was  serenad 
ed  in  honor  of  the  great  Confederate  victory,  and  was  even  ex 
tolled  as  "  the  hero  "  of  that  memorable  day.  But  nowhere  has 
it  appeared,  so  far,  that  he  ever  laid  claim  to  this  honor,  though 
he  is  said  never  to  have  had  sufficient  moral  courage  openly  to  re 
fuse  it.  Be  this  as  it  may,  neither  the  efforts  of  his  friends,  nor 
the  insinuations  in  his  published  work,  will  succeed  in  altering 
the  facts  of  the  case.  History,  in  its  wonted  impartiality,  will 
never  accord  him  the  honors  of  the  plan  of  campaign,  or  of  the 
concentration  of  the  troops,  or  of  the  victory  won  on  the  hard- 
fought  field  of  Manassas.  On  those  points  the  true  verdict  of 
the  country  has  already  been  rendered. 

In  a  letter  to  General  Beauregard,  dated  Richmond,  August 
25th,  18G1,  Colonel  Chestnut,  of  South  Carolina,  so  aptly  and  for 
cibly  expresses  this  opinion,  that  we  feel  impelled  to  transcribe 
his  words.  He  wrote  : 


GENERAL  BEAUREGABD.  207 

"  The  country  owes  you  an  immense  debt  of  gratitude,  and  the  world  1ms 
already  paid  you  the  tribute  of  just  and  unqualified  admiration.  The  more 
the  consequences  of  the  victory  at  Manassas  are  understood,  the  greater  and 
the  more  glorious  will  it  seem. 

"  The  unbecoming  pruriency  of  some,  and  the  voracious  appetite  of  many 

for  even  a  fleeting  notoriety,  which  have  prompted  undue  and  untimely  claims 

to  all  the  honors  of  the  fight,  are  to  be  regretted,  but  do  not  amount  to  any 

serious  grievance.     After  a  little  time  truth  will  assign  each  his  proper  place. 

********* 

"  With  great  respect, 

"  Your  friend  and  obedient  servant, 

"  JAB.  CHESTNUT,  Jr. 
"General  BEAUREGARD." 

III.  A  few  words  will  suffice  to  explain  why  our  victory  was 
not  pushed  after  the  battle  of  Manassas. 

It  has  already  been  shown — and  a  repetition  here  would  be  use 
less — how  it  happened  that  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  though  or 
dered  and  in  course  of  execution,  was  checked  and  finally  aban 
doned  on  the  night  of  the  21st  of  July;  and  it  has  also  been 
shown  how  "an  unusually  heavy  and  unintermitting  fall  of  rain," 
the  next  day,  made  "an  efficient  pursuit,"  at  that  time,  "a  mili 
tary  impossibility.""1 

The  reasons  why  the  pursuit  was  not  taken  up  later  have  also 
been  given  in  detail  in  Chapter  X. 

An  army  deprived  of  transportation  and  subsistence  is  utterly 
powerless.  This  is  a  self-evident  proposition,  that  needs  no  argu 
ment  in  its  support.  That  our  army  was  in  that  position,  despite 
the  unceasing  efforts  and  remonstrances  of  General  Beau  regard, 
is  incontrovertibly  true ;  that  there  was  no  necessity  for  such  des 
titution  is  clear.  At  the  opening  of  the  war  provisions  were 
plentiful  all  over  the  land.  The  rich  agricultural  districts  of  Vir 
ginia,  in  close  proximity  to  the  army — not  to  speak  of  the  entire 
South,  so  willing  to  contribute  in  every  way  to  the  success  of  a 
cause  dear  to  all  hearts — were  stocked  with  food,  wagons,  and 
teams.  It  would  have  required  but  the  most  ordinary  administra 
tive  capacity,  and  but  a  small  amount  of  enterprise,  to  furnish  the 
army  with  the  "twenty  days' rations"  in  advance,  so  earnest^  and 
repeatedly  called  for  by  General  Beauregard,  and  with  transporta- 

*  See  Chapter  IX.  Sec  also  the  latter  part  of  General  Beaurcgard's  re 
port. 


208  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

tion  enough  to  carry  our  combined  forces  into  the  city  of  "Wash 
ington. 

We  do  not  say  that  President  Davis  was  opposed  to  the  ad 
vance  of  our  forces  on  Washington,  or  that  he  purposely  prevent 
ed  such  an  advance,  and  the  investment  and  consequent  capitula 
tion  of  the  Federal  capital  which  must  have  resulted  from  it ;  but 
we  do  say  that,  had  he  not  persistently  overlooked  the  just  de 
mands  of  General  Beauregard  for  transportation  and  subsistence, 
not  only  after  but  before  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and  had  he  not 
as  persistently  approved  the  narrowness  of  views  and  improvident 
methods  of  notoriously  incompetent  officials,  whose  shortcomings 
were  so  often  brought  to  his  knowledge,  the  Federal  capital  could 
have  been  captured  by  our  victorious  forces  as  early  as  the  2-ith 
of  July.  General  Beauregard  stated  this  as  his  conviction,  in  let 
ters  to  Representative  Miles,  and  to  Mr.  Davis  himself,  when  the 
latter  called  him  to  account  for  having  been  the  cause  of  a  con- 

£} 

gressional  investigation  on  the  deplorable  condition  of  our  army, 
and  its  inability  either  to  advance  or  retreat. 

From  New  Orleans,  March,  1876,  in  answer  to  the  lion.  John 
C.  Ferriss,  of  Tennessee,  who  wished  to  be  informed  upon  this 
point,  General  Beauregard  explained  how  it  was  that  no  advance 
was  made  on  Washington.  We  commend  to  the  serious  attention 
of  the  reader  the  following  passage  from  his  letter :  "  Our  only 
proper  operation  was  to  pass  the  Potomac  above,  into  Maryland, 
at  or  about  Edwards's  Ferry,  and  march  upon  the  rear  of  Washing 
ton.  With  the  hope  of  undertaking  such  a  movement,  I  had  caused 
a  reconnoisance  of  the  country  and  shore  (south  of  the  Potomac) 
in  that  quarter  to  be  made  in  the  month  of  June  ;  lut  the  neces 
sary  transportation  even  for  the  ammunition  essential  to  such  a 
movement  had  not  been  provided  for  my  forces,  notwithstanding 
my  application  for  it  during  more  than  a  month  beforehand  /  nor 
was  there  twenty-four  hours'*  food  at  Manassas,  for  the  troops 
brought  together  for  that  battle"  *  The  fact  is,  that  some  com 
mands  were  without  food  for  forty  hours  after  the  battle. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  further  upon  these  events.  The 
thought  of  what  could  have  been  accomplished,  but  was  not,  and  of 
the  reasons  for  our  failure,  will  continue  to  be  for  us  the  subject  of 
lasting  regret.  Our  army  did  not  follow  up  the  victory  of  Ma- 

*  The  italics  arc  ours. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  209 

nassas,  and  march  upon  the  rear  of  Washington,  as  already  said,  for 
want  of  transportation  and  subsistence.  Transportation  and  sub 
sistence  were  lacking  because  the  Commissary  and  Quartermaster 
Departments,  which  could  have  procured  both,  and  had  ample 
time  to  see  to  it,  failed  to  do  so  through  sheer  improvidence  and 
incapacity. 
L— 14 


210  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 


CHAPTER  XY. 

Colonel  Pryor,  of  the  Military  Committee  of  Congress,  Visits  General  Beaure- 
gard  at  Centreville,  to  Propose  his  Transfer  to  the  West. — General  Beau- 
regard  finally  Yields  to  the  Wishes  of  Congress  and  the  Executive. — 
He  Parts  with  his  Army  on  the  2d  of  February,  and  on  the  4th  Arrives 
at  Bowling  Green. — Interview  with  General  A.  S.  Johnston. — Succinct 
Review  of  the  Latter's  Situation. — Ignorance  of  the  War  Department  with 
Reference  to  his  Forces. — General  Beauregard  Desires  to  go  Back  to  his 
Army  in  Virginia. — General  Johnston  urges  Him  to  Stay  and  Assume 
Command  at  Columbus. — Inspection  of  the  Works  at  Bowling  Green. — 
What  General  Beauregard  Thinks  of  Them. — He  Suggests  Concentration 
at  Henry  and  Donelson  to  Force  a  Battle  upon  Grant. — General  Johnston 
Fears  the  Risk  of  such  a  Movement,  and  Adheres  to  his  own  Plan  of  Op 
erations. — Fall  of  Fort  Henry. — Conference  at  Bowling  Green. — Memo 
randum  of  General  Johnston's  Plan  of  the  Campaign. — His  and  General 
Polk's  Army  to  Operate  on  Divergent  Lines. — Evacuation  of  Bowling 
Green. — General  Beauregard  Asks  for  Specific  Instructions. — Letter  to 
Colonel  Pryor. — Fall  of  Fort  Donelson. — Its  Effect  upon  the  Country. — 
Criticism  of  General  Johnston's  Strategy. 

TOWARDS  the  end  of  January,  1862,  General  Beauregard  re 
ceived  a  visit,  at  his  headquarters  at  Centreville,  from  Colonel 
Roger  A.  Pryor,  of  Virginia,  a  member  of  the  Military  Commit 
tee  of  the  Confederate  Congress.  He  informed  General  Beanre- 

O 

gard  that  he  had  been  deputed  by  his  committee,  and  the  Repre 
sentatives  in  Congress  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  States  generally, 
to  confer  with  him  upon  a  plan  then  under  consideration  at  Rich 
mond,  and  to  urge  him  to  give  it  his  consent.  This  plan  consisted 
in  the  transfer  of  General  Beauregard  to  the  conduct  of  the  de 
fence  of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  upon  which  public  attention  had 
now  centred,  and  about  the  security  of  which  great  apprehensions 
were  expressed.  President  Davis  himself — Colonel  Pryor  said— 
was  desirous  of  ordering  the  transfer,  should  General  Beauregard 
agree  to  it. 

The  immediate  command  thus  proposed  to  General  Beauregard 
included  the  forces  under  Major-General  Polk,  with  headquarters 
at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  within  the  Department  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee,  commanded  by  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  211 

Colonel  Pryor  gave  many  strong  reasons  for  the  transfer  he  had 
been  sent  to  advocate,  and  mentioned,  among  others,  the  critical 
condition  of  affairs  in  that  part  of  the  country,  owing,  it  was  be 
lieved,  to  the  bad  organization  and  want  of  discipline  of  our  troops, 
confronting  whom  were  superior  Federal  forces  known  to  be  am 
ply  furnished  with  all  the  appliances  of  war.  "Well-founded  fears 
of  consequent  disaster  to  the  cause  were  very  generally  enter 
tained,  which,  Colonel  Pry  or  thought,  could  only  be  averted  by 
prompt  and  vigorous  action  on  the  part  of  the  government. 

General  Beauregard  at  first  declined  to  accede  to  the  proposi 
tion,  lie  was  loath  to  separate  himself  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  more  than  half  of  which  he  had  organized  and  disci 
plined,  and  whose  conduct  in  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and  throncrh- 

1  C 

out  the  minor  operations  of  the  fall, gave  assurance  of  still  greater 
successes  for  the  coming  spring  campaign.  Moreover,  he  had  just 
undergone  a  surgical  operation  of  the  throat,  the  result  of  which 
might  lead  to  serious  consequences,  should  he  be  too  soon  exposed 
to  the  inclemencies  of  the  weather.  But  Colonel  Pryor,  notwith 
standing  the  objections  raised  against  the  purpose  of  his  mission, 
represented  that  General  Beau  regard's  presence  in  the  West  was 
necessary  to  revive  public  confidence,  then  very  much  shaken  by 
the  defeat  of  Zolli coffer's  command  at  Mill  Spring,  in  eastern 
Kentucky,  and  that  it  would  impart  activity  and  efficiency  to  our 
operations.  lie  also  made  a  statement — the  truth  of  which,  he 
said,  was  vouched  for  by  the  Acting  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Benja 
min — that  the  effective  force  in  General  Johnston's  department 
numbered  fully  seventy  thousand  men — forty  thousand  under  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  in  middle  Kentucky,  and  the  remainder  under  Gen 
eral  Polk,  in  western  Tennessee. 

Meanwhile,  many  of  General  Beauregard's  friends  at  Centre- 
ville  and  Richmond,  aware  of  the  efforts  that  were  being  made, 
sought  to  dissuade  him  from  relinquishing  his  position  in  Vir 
ginia,  and  what  was  considered  the  chief  field  of  operations  of  the 
Confederate  forces.  They  argued,  furthermore,  that,  should  he 
consent  to  leave  this  army,  he  would  never  be  allowed  to  return 
to  it  again,  no  matter  upon  what  terms  he  might  agree  to  accept 
the  offer  so  alluringly  presented  to  him.  General  Beauregard  care 
fully  weighed  the  strength  of  the  arguments  used  on  both  sides. 
He  knew  that,  owing  to  bad  weather,  impracticable  roads,  and 
other  influences,  there  would  probably  be  no  military  operations  in 


212  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

northeastern  Virginia  before  the  ensuing  spring.  lie  was  gratified 
by  the  high  mark  of  confidence  and  consideration  conferred  upon 
him  by  the  gentlemen  of  Congress  in  whose  names  Colonel  Pryor 
had  spoken.  He  was  then,  as  ever,  "  the  soldier  of  the  cause  and  of 
his  country,"  ready  "  to  do  duty,  cheerfully,  wherever  placed  by  the 
constituted  authorities."  So  he  finally  yielded  to  Colonel  Pryors 
pressing  representations,  and  informed  him  of  his  acceptance  of 
the  proposed  transfer,  but  upon  the  three  following  conditions : 
first,  that  the  Army  of  the  West  should  consist  of  the  effective 
force  stated  by  him,*  or,  if  not,  should  be  sufficiently  reinforced 
to  enable  him  to  assume  the  offensive  immediately  after  his  ar 
rival  in  the  Mississippi  Valley ;  second,  that  he  should  take  with 
him  his  personal  and  general  staff,  and,  if  he  required  them,  ten  or 
twelve  experienced  officers  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — none 
above  the  rank  of  colonel — some  of  whom  were  to  be  promoted 
to  be  brigadier  and  major  generals,  the  others  to  receive  staff  ap 
pointments,  so  as  to  aid  in  organizing  and  disciplining  the  forces 
to  be  placed  under  him ;  and,  third,  that  he  should  return  to  the 
command  of  his  own  army  in  Virginia,  as  soon  as  his  services 
could  be  dispensed  with  in  the  West,  and,  if  possible,  in  time  for 
the  spring  campaign.  Colonel  Pryor  stated  that  he  was  not  au 
thorized  to  agree  to  the  last  two  conditions,  but  would  telegraph 
the  answer  of  the  War  Department  from  Richmond.  According 
ly,  on  the  23d,  he  telegraphed  the  following  assent : 

"  RICHMOND,  January  23d,  1862. 
"  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  Have  not  seen  Toombs.  Committee  extremely  anxious  you  should  go. 
Judge  Harris  is  sure  President  consents  to  all  your  wishes.  I  send  letter  in 
the  morning. 

"  ROGER  A.  FRYCR." 

A  letter  to  the  same  effect  came  the  next  day ;  and,  on  the 
25th,  the  War  Department  was  officially  notified  of  General  Beau- 
regard's  final  acquiescence  in  the  wishes  of  Congress  and  of  the 
Executive. 

So  important  to  success  did  he  consider  it  to  have  experienced 


*  The  statement  of  this  effective  force  at  seventy  thousand  men,  by  Colonel 
Pryor,  surprised  General  Beauregard  to  no  small  extent,  as  he  could  not  un 
derstand  how,  with  such  a  force  in  hand,  General  Johnston  could  so  long  re 
main  inactive. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  213 

officers  with  him,  that  he  immediately  forwarded  to  the  Adjutant- 
General's  Department  the  names  of  six  infantry  colonels  whom 
lie  had  selected  for  promotion  and  transfer  to  the  West,  and  of 
the  engineers  and  other  staff  officers  of  lower  grade,  who  should 
accompany  him.  And,  in  order  to  prevent  error  or  unnecessary 
delay,  he  sent  his  Chief  of  Staff,  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan,  to 
Richmond,  to  confer  directly  on  the  subject  with  the  Secretary 
of  War. 

On  the  2d  of  February  he  parted,  with  much  regret,  at  Ma- 
nassas,  from  the  last  representatives  of  that  great  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  which,  afterwards,  under  the  name  of  the  "Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,"  achieved,  by  innumerable  victories,  undying 
renown  for  itself  and  its  revered  commander,  General  Robert  E. 
Lee. 

General  Beauregard's  journey  from  Manassas  to  Bowling 
Green,  the  headquarters  of  General  Johnston,  was  marked  by  the 
most  gratifying  manifestations  of  confidence  and  enthusiasm  on 
the  part  of  the  people.  Every  railroad  station  was  crowded  with 
men,  women,  and  children,  who,  anticipating  his  arrival,  had  as 
sembled  to  greet  him,  and  wish  Godspeed  and  continued  success 
to  the  "hero  of  Sumter  and  Manassas/'  lie  was  detained  a  day 
in  Nashville,  at  the  request  of  the  State  authorities,  to  be  presented 
to  the  Legislature  and  receive  its  welcome. 

lie  reached  Bowling  Green  on  the  evening  of  the  4th,  and 
there  met,  for  the  first  time,  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston, 
who  gave  him,  on  arrival  in  his  department,  a  heartfelt  greeting. 
The  manly  appearance,  the  simple,  though  dignified,  bearing  of 
this  noble  patriot  and  soldier,  made  a  deep  impression  upon  Gen 
eral  Beauregard.  He  was  drawn  towards  him  by  a  spontaneous 
feeling  of  sympathy,  which  insured,  in  the  future,  complete  har 
mony  and  effectual  co-operation  between  them. 

At  General  BeauregaixTs  request,  he  made  a  succinct  review  of 
the  situation  in  his  department,  and  showed  much  anxiety  when 
referring  to  the  effects  of  Zollicoffer's  late  disaster  at  Mill  Spring. 
General  Buell  had  advanced  his  forces,  numbering  from  seventy- 
five  to  eighty  thousand  men,  to  within  forty  miles  of  Bowling 
Green,  at  Bacon  Creek,  on  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad; 
General  Grant  was  at  Cairo  and  Paducah,  with  twenty  thousand 
men,  pressing  an  expedition  which  was  to  move — General  John 
ston  thought — either  up  the  Tennessee  River,  against  Fort  Henry, 


214:  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

or  up  the  Cumberland,  against  Fort  Donelson ;  and  General  Pope, 
with  at  least  thirty  thousand  men,  in  Missouri,  stood  confronting 
Major-General  Polk.  The  entire  Federal  forces,  under  the  chief 
command  of  General  Halleck,  with  headquarters  at  St.  Louis, 
amounted  to  about  one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand  men.  To 
oppose  such  a  host,  General  Johnston  stated  that  he  had,  at  Bowl 
ing  Green,  some  fourteen  thousand  effectives  of  all  arms ;  at  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  about  five  thousand  live  hundred  more, 
under  General  Lloyd  Tilghman  ;  that  General  Floyd  was  covering 
Clarksville  with  eight  thousand  men,  and  that  General  Polk,  in 
his  district  of  West  Tennessee  and  West  Kentucky  (but  princi 
pally  at  and  around  Columbus),  had  some  iifteen  thousand  men, 
not  yet  well  organized  and  but  poorly  armed,  including  detached 
forces  at  Clarksville  and  Hopkinsville,  under  Generals  Clark  and 
Pillow.  Thus  the  whole  Confederate  force  in  General  Johnston's 
department  numbered  not  more  than  forty-five  thousand  men  of 
all  arms  and  conditions.*  Tens  of  thousands  of  men  were  anxious 
to  go  into  the  army  to  defend  their  homes,  but  the  Confederate 
government  had  no  arms  for  them. 

This  fearful  disparity  between  the  actual  effectiveness  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  command  and  the  fanciful  figures  which,  by  author 
ity  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  Colonel  Pryor  had  given  him,  struck 
General  Beauregard  with  amazement.  He  recounted  to  General 
Johnston  the  statement  made  of  the  strength  of  the  Western  army, 
and  imparted  to  him  the  hopes  he  had  entertained  that,  by  a 
proper  arrangement  of  the  river  defences  for  minimum  garrisons, 
and  a  rapid  concentration  by  railroad  of  all  our  available  forces, 
we  might  suddenly  have  taken  the  offensive  against  Buell,  who, 
unprepared  for  such  an  onslaught,  would  undoubtedly  have  been 
overpowered.  Thus  Kentucky  would  have  fallen  under  our  con 
trol,  and  its  people  would  have  freely  joined  the  Confederate 
standard. 

No  less  painfully  surprised  than  General  Beauregard  was  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  when  apprised  of  the  ignorance  of  the  War  De 
partment  about  matters  within  its  peculiar  province.  He  con 
firmed  General  Beauregard's  previously  expressed  opinion,  by 
declaring  at  once  that  he  never  would  have  remained  on  the 

O 

defensive  with  such  forces  under  him,  and  with  Buell  only  a  short 
*  General  Beauregard- has  furnished  these  figures  from  memory. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  215 

distance  in  his  front.  lie  also  said  that  he  had  little  confidence 
in  the  defensive  works  on  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  river?, 
to  inspect,  strengthen,  and  complete  which  he  had  recently  ordered 
his  Chief-Engineer,  Major  J.  F.  Gilmer,  an  officer  of  the  old  ser 
vice,  whose  worth  was  about  to  be  tested. 

When  thus  made  acquainted  with  the  deplorable  situation  of 
the  Western  department,  General  Beauregard,  realizing  to  what  an 
extent  he  had  been  misinformed,  and  how  useless  his  presence 
would  be  to  General  Johnston,  under  the  existing  circumstances, 
informed  the  latter  that,  in  his  opinion,  he  had  best  return  at  once 
to  Virginia,  where  an  active  campaign,  in  the  early  spring,  was  to 
be  expected,  and  where  he  could  be  of  more  service  to  the  cause 
than  by  remaining  with  a  command  which  it  was  more  than  like 
ly  would  be  forced  to  stand  passively  on  the  defensive.  General 
Johnston  strenuously  objected  to  his  adopting  such  a  course.  lie 
urged  that  General  Beauregard's  presence  was  most  fortunate,  and 
that  his  co-operation  would  be  invaluable,  not  only  in  western 
Kentucky  and  western  Tennessee,  but  in  the  whole  Mississippi 
Valley.  * 

Those  who  are  well  acquainted  with  General  Beauregard  have 
often  had  occasion  to  note  how  largely  the  trait  of  self-forgetful- 
ness  enters  into  his  character.  He  gave  a  strong  proof  of  the  fact 
on  this  occasion.  With  much  disinterestedness,  he  immediately 
offered  to  General  Johnston  to  waive  his  rank  and,  acting  as  his 

O 

Chief-Engineer  and  Inspector-General,  visit  the  various  works  and 
defences  throughout  the  department,  and  make  such  suggestions 
for  their  improvement  as  his  experience  might  dictate.  But  Gen 
eral  Johnston  was  unwilling  to  accept  so  great  a  sacrifice,  and  in 
sisted  that  General  Beauregard  should  go  to  Columbus,  there  to 
ascertain,  personally,  the  exact  state  of  affairs,  being  convinced 
that,  upon  doing  so,  he  would  no  longer  hesitate  to  assume  com 
mand.  So  earnest  and  pressing  was  he  on  this  point  that  General 
Beauregard  acceded  to  his  wishes,  and  began  making  preparations 
to  leave  by  the  Louisville  and  Memphis  Railroad.  It  was  his  near 
est  route,  but,  unless  he  used  all  due  diligence,  might  bo  closed  to 
him  by  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  over  the  Tennessee  River, 
should  Fort  Henry  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  lie  delayed 
his  departure,  however,  at  General  Johnston's  request,  and  on  the 
5th  of  February  inspected  with  him  all  the  works  in  and  around 
Bowling  Green.  lie  found  them  to  be  very  strong,  and  so  stated 


216  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

to  General  Johnston,  though  lie  was  not  sure  but  that  they  could 
be  turned  a  short  distance  above,  on  the  right.  He  inquired 
whether,  in  such  a  case,  General  Johnston  intended  to  remain  and 
defend  them.  The  latter  replied  that  there  was  a  ford  not  many 
miles  above,  and  that,  should  the  enemy  advance  by  that  way,  upon 
his  flank,  he  would  be  compelled  to  withdraw,  as  he  was  not  strong 
enough  to  maintain  the  position  with  no  army  of  relief  to  depend 
upon.  General  Beauregard  having  now  asked  what  was  the 
strength  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  General  Johnston  said 
they  were  tolerably  well  fortified,  but  he  was  doubtful  of  their 
ability  long  to  withstand  a  determined  attack.  In  the  course  of 
this  inspection  tour  General  Beauregard  expressed  his  regret  that 
the  works  at  Bowling  Green  had  not  been  limited  to  a  tete  de pont 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Barren  River,  and  to  a  single  fort  on  the 
south  side,  to  defend  the  bridge,  and  enable  the  garrison  of  the 
former  work  to  retire  at  the  proper  moment  and  destroy  the 
bridge.  The  time  and  labor  spent  upon  these  extensive  works  by 
General  Gilmer,  he  thought,  might  have  been  far  more  judiciously 
applied  in  the  strengthening  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson — par 
ticularly  the  former — as  the  command  of  the  Tennessee  was  next 
in  importance  to  that  of  the  Mississippi.  Its  loss  would  not  only 
cut  off  communication  between  General  Johnston's  and  General 
Folk's  forces,  but  allow  the  enemy  to  penetrate  to  Eastport  and 
Florence,  near  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad ;  thus  effec 
tually  turning  all  positions  in  middle  Kentucky  and  middle  Ten 
nessee,  on  one  side  of  the  river,  and  west  Kentucky  and  west 
Tennessee,  on  the  other  side,  down  to  the  Memphis  and  Charles 
ton  Railroad. 

In  view  of  the  importance  of  holding  Fort  Henry,  then  serious 
ly  threatened  by  the  Federal  forces  under  General  Grant,  General 
Beauregard  suggested  to  General  Johnston  the  following  views  of 
the  situation,  as  the  result  of  his  reflections  after  their  interview 
of  the  previous  evening. 

That  our  defensive  line,  extending  from  Bowling  Green  on  the 
extreme  right  to  Columbus  on  the  extreme  left,  with  Forts  Hen 
ry  and  Donelson  at  about  the  middle  of  the  line,  formed  a  re-en 
tering  angle  of  nearly  thirty  miles,  which  was  very  much  weak 
ened  by  being  intersected,  nearly  at  right  angles,  by  the  two  navi 
gable  streams  on  which  those  forts  were  located ;  that  our  flanks 
at  Bowline:  Green  and  Columbus  were  so  salient  that  the  former 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  217 

could  bo  easily  turned  and  must  fall  by  its  own  weight,  and  that 
the  latter  would  become  untenable  also,  should  Grant's  attack  on 
Fort  Henry  succeed  ;*  that,  therefore,  he  thought  it  urgently  nec 
essary  to  abandon  Bowling  Green,  except  as  a  point  of  observa 
tion,  and  concentrate  as  rapidly  as  possible  all  readily  available 
troops  upon  Henry  and  Donelson,  so  as  to  force  Grant  into  a  bat 
tle  in  that  quarter,  with  decisive  odds  against  him,  and  the  disad 
vantage  of  isolation  from  immediate  support.  This  General  Beau- 
regard  urged,  not  only  as  an  essential  measure  towards  regaining 
control  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  maintaining  that  of  the  Cum 
berland,  but  as  a  means  of  placing  our  forces  in  a  better  position, 
with  respect  to  the  ultimate  defence  of  Xashvillc,  than  that  which 
they  held  at  Bowling  Green,  which  could  not  be  looked  upon  as 
safe,  on  account  of  its  being  too  salient,  and  too  easily  turned. f 

General  Johnston,  although  admitting  the  force  of  these  observa 
tions,  objected,  substantially,  that  we  were  not  in  a  condition  to 
risk  too  much  ;  that  if  we  failed  to  defeat  Grant,  we  might  be 
crushed  between  his  forces  and  those  of  Buell  ;  that,  even  if  vic 
torious  over  Grant,  our  own  forces  would  be  more  or  less  disorgan 
ized,  and  if  Buell,  crossing  the  Big  Ban-en  River,  above  Bowling 
Green,  and  then  the  Cumberland  above  Nashville,  should  place 
himself  between  us  and  this  latter  city,  and  force  us  back 
against  the  Tennessee  River  (then  open  to  the  Federal  gunboats), 
without  the  means  of  crossing  or  of  extricating  ourselves  there 
from,  we  would  be  destroyed  or  captured,  Xashville  would  fall, 
and  the  whole  Tennessee  and  Mississippi  valleys  would  be  left  un 
protected,  except  by  the  as  yet  ill-organized  forces  of  General 

*  At  Centre villc,  Va.,  and  before  his  transfer,  Geijeral  Beauregard,  while  ex 
amining  the  military  situation  in  the  "West,  had  regarded  the  position  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  as  faulty,  the  true  position  for  the  works  to  defend  these 
rivers  being  at  an  advanced  point,  where  the  streams  approached  each  other 
within  three  miles ;  and  this  opinion  lie  had  expressed  in  a  conversation  on 
the  subject  with  his  Chief  of  Staff,  Colonel  Jordan,  at  Centrcville.  In  his  in 
terview  with  General  Cooper,  some  days  later,  in  the  Adjutant-General's  office, 
at  Richmond,  Colonel  Jordan  laid  before  him  these  radical  strategic  defects 
in  the  Confederate  positions  at  Bowling  Green,  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and 
Columbus.  General  Cooper  expressed  himself  as  convinced  of  the  truth  of 
these  observations,  and  asked  Colonel  Jordan  to  present  General  Beaurcgurd's 
views  to  the  President. 

t  The  development  of  this  plan  of  operations  was  also  explained  to  Colonel 
Jordan  by  General  Beauregard,  before  his  departure  for  the  "West. 


218  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

Polk,  at  Columbus,  which  were  themselves  threatened  by  greatly 
superior  numbers  assembling  in  southeast  Missouri.  He  further 
said  that,  at  present,  the  main  object  should  be  to  gain  time  to  re 
move  the  supplies  of  ammunition  and  provisions  collected  at  Bowl 
ing  Green,  and  the  still  larger  supplies  of  pork,  grain,  and  cloth 
ing  accumulated  at  Clarksville  and  Nashville,  contrary  to  his  ad 
vice,  by  the  Commissary  and  Quartermaster  Departments  at  Rich 
mond. 

In  answer,  General  Beauregard  remarked,  that  even  if  these 
depots  were  to  be  endangered,  it  was  more  important  to  defeat  the 
enemy  than  to  protect  the  supplies ;  that  Buell,  being  without  a 
pontoon  train,  and  unable  to  cross  the  Cumberland  between  Nash 
ville  and  Donelson,  we  could  have  time  to  escape  from  between 
the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers,  and  establish  ourselves  be 
hind  the  new  defensive  line  of  Duck  River,  or  probably  reach 
Nashville,  if  required,  before  the  arrival  of  Buell,  who  would  have 
to  make  a  much  longer  march.  That  our  success  must  lie  in  fol 
lowing  the  cardinal  principle  of  war,  the  swift  concentration  of  our 
masses  against  the  enemy's  exposed  fractions ;  and  that  if  we  could 
concentrate  our  forces  for  the  offensive  with  greater  rapidity,  all 
other  things  being  equal,  we  had  the  chances  in  our  favor;  and 
that  in  war  it  was  "Nothing  venture,  nothing  win."  General 
Johnston  admitted  this,  but  said  that,  owing  to  the  great  responsi 
bility  which  rested  on  him,  and  the  disaster  to  be  apprehended  to 
the  Confederacy,  should  he  meet  with  defeat,  he  must  adhere  to 
his  intended  plan  of  operations. 

This  was  another  of  those  fatal  errors,  and  losses  of  priceless 
opportunity,  which  brought  on  the  final  defeat  of  our  cause.  The 
result  was  a  proof  of  it. 

Fort  Henry,  being  attacked  on  the  6th,  was  surrendered  on  the 
same  day,  after  a  short,  but  soldierly,  defence.  Its  commander, 
Brigadier-General  Lloyd  Tilghman,  as  soon  as  he  discovered  his 
inability  to  resist  the  overpowering  land  and  naval  forces  brought 
against  him,  detached  the  supporting  force  —  two  thousand  six 
hundred  and  ten  strong — across  the  neck,  to  Fort  Donelson,  on 
the  Cumberland  River,  remaining  himself  to  work  the  guns  with 
a  handful  of  men — about  one  hundred — with  whom  he  was  cap 
tured.*  This  was  a  conspicuous  example  of  self-sacrifice  arid  gal- 

*  That  gallant  officer  was  subsequently  killed  while  defending  Port  Hudson, 
on  the  Mississippi  River,  shortly  after  his  return  from  captivity,  which  he  had 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  219 

luntry,  for  General  Tilghman  would  have  been  justified  in  retiring 
with  the  main  body  of  his  command,  leaving  a  subordinate  artil 
lery  officer  to  defend  the  work  until  compelled  to  surrender.  The 
railroad-bridge,  only  about  twelve  miles  south  of  Fort  Henry,  was 
now  burned  by  the  Federal  gunboats,  and  that  line  of  communi 
cation  between  General  Johnston  and  his  forces  at  Columbus, 
western  Kentucky,  was  cut  oil',  as  had  been  apprehended,  leaving, 
as  the  shortest  route  available,  the  line  of  railroad  by  Xashville, 
Dccatur,  Corinth,  and  Jackson. 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th,  while  confined  to  his  bed  by  sick 
ness,  General  Beauregard  was  visited  by  General  Ilardee,  a  class 
mate  of  his  at  the  Academy  at  AVcst  Point,  who  afterwards  dis 
tinguished  himself  on  many  a  battle-field  during  the  Confederate 
war.  Exposure  to  the  weather  had  produced  upon  General  Beau- 
regard's  health  the  effect  lie  had  feared  when  leaving  Ccntrcvillc. 
He  was  then  suffering  from  a  severe  cold,  accompanied  by  fever, 
and  the  violent  inflammation  of  the  throat  (laryngitis)  which  result 
ed  therefrom,  detained  him  at  Bowling  Green  until  its  evacuation, 
and,  for  six  months  afterwards,  caused  him  acute  pain  and  much 
discomfort.  The  fall  of  Fort  Henry  had,  more  than  ever,  con 
vinced  General  Beauregard  of  the  necessity  of  the  concentra 
tion  and  aggressive  movement  he  had  already  counselled.  In  his 
conversation  with  General  Ilardee  he  reiterated  this  opinion, 
and  it  was  agreed  between  them  that  General  Ilardee  should 
open  the  subject  anew  to  General  Johnston,  and  urge  him  to 
adopt  General  Beauregard's  views.  Later  in  the  day  a  confer 
ence  was  held,  at  General  Beauregard's  room,  between  Generals 
Johnston,  Ilardee,  and  himself,  Colonel  Mackall,  A.  A.  G.,  be 
ing  present  part  of  the  time.  General  Beauregard  again  called 
the  attention  of  General  Johnston  to  the  movement  of  con 
centration  against  General  Grant,  which  he  thought  still  practi 
cable,  if  immediately  carried  out,  General  Ilardee  concurring, 
though  not  with  much  earnestness.  General  Johnston,  after  some 
discussion,  adhered  to  the  objections  he  had  already  made  to  this 
plan,  and  gave  his  own  views  as  to  the  future  operations  of  the 
campaign.  He  being  Commander-in-Chicf,  and  responsible  for  all 

borne  with  no  less  patience  than  dignity.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that,  since  the 
war,  calumny  has  endeavored  to  fix  upon  him  the  responsibility  and  odium  of 
the  loss  of  that  uca.lv  and  badly  armed  work.  See,  in  Appendix,  the  report  of 
General  Tilghman. 


220  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

that  might  ensue,  his  views  necessarily  prevailed,  and  Colonel 
Mackall  having  been  called  out  to  attend  to  some  pressing  matters, 
relative  to  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  in  his  absence  Generals  Beau- 
regard  and  Hardee  drew  up  a  memorandum  of  General  Johnston's 
projected  plan,  as  then  explained  and  insisted  upon  by  him.  He 
had  declined  to  adopt  General  Beauregard's  proposed  concentra 
tion  for  the  offensive,  and  had  decided  that  his  own  and  General 
Folk's  army  should  operate  on  divergent  lines.  General  Beaure- 
gard  acquiesced  in  the  details  incident  to  General  Johnston's  cam 
paign,  as  stated  in  the  memorandum.  But  this  was  the  extent  of 
his  concurrence.  He  was  the  author  of  none  of  the  movements 
therein  enumerated.  The  views  he  had  expressed  were  diametri 
cally  opposite,  and  favored  concentration  against  Grant  at  Donel- 
son. 

The  following  is  the  memorandum  referred  to: 

"  BOWLING  GREEN,  KY.,  February  !th,  18G2. 

"At  a  meeting  held  to-day  at  my  quarters  (Covington  House)  by  Generals 
Johnston,  Hardee,  and  myself  (Colonel  Mackall,  A.  A.  G.,  being  present  part  of 
the  time),  it  was  determined  that  Fort  Henry,  on  the  Tennessee  River,  having 
fallen  yesterday  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  Fort  Donelson,  on  the  Cum 
berland  River,  not  being  tenable,  preparations  should  at  once  be  made  for  the 
removal  of  this  army  to  Nashville,  in  the  rear  of  the  Cumberland  River,  a  strong 
point  some  miles  below  that  city  being  fortified  forthwith,  to  defend  the  river 
from  the  damage  of  gunboats  and  transports. 

"  The  troops  at  present  at  Clarksville  shall  cross  over  to  the  south  side  of 
that  river,  leaving  only  sufficient  force  in  that  town  to  protect  the  manufactories 
and  other  property,  in  the  saving  of  which  the  Confederate  government  is  in 
terested. 

"From  Nashville,  should  any  further  retrograde  movement  become  neces 
sary,  it  will  be  made  to  Stevenson,  and  thence  according  to  circumstances. 

"  It  was  also  determined  that  the  possession  of  the  Tennessee  River  by  the 
enemy,  resulting  from  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  separates  the  army  at  Bowling 
Green  from  the  one  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  which  must  henceforth  act  inde 
pendently  of  each  other  until  they  can  again  be  brought  together.  The  first 
one  having  for  object  the  defence  of  the  State  of  Tennessee,  along  its  line  of 
operation,  as  already  stated,  and  the  other  one  of  that  part  of  the  State  lying 
between  the  Tennessee  River  and  the  Mississippi. 

"But  as  the  possession  of  the  former  river  by  the  enemy  renders  the  lines 
of  communication  of  the  army  at  Columbus  liable  to  be  cut  off  at  any  time 
from  the  Tennessee  River  as  a  base,  by  an  overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy, 
rapidly  concentrated  from  various  points  on  the  Ohio,  it  becomes  necessary,  to 
prevent  such  a  calamity,  that  the  main  body  of  that  army  should  fall  back  to 
Huinboldt,  and  thence,  if  necessary,  to  Grand  Junction,  so  as  to  protect  Mem- 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  221 

phis  from  either  point,  and  still  have  a  line  of  retreat  to  the  latter  place,  or  to 
Grenada,  Mississippi,  and,  if  necessary,  to  Jackson,  Mississippi. 

41  At  Columbus,  Kentucky,  will  be  left  only  a  sufficient  garrison  for  the  de 
fence  of  the  works  there,  assisted  by  Hollins's  gunboats,  for  the  purpose  of 
making  a  desperate  defence  of  the  river  at  that  point. 

"  A  sufficient  number  of  transports  will  be  kept  near  that  place  for  the  re 
moval  of  the  garrison  therefrom,  when  no  longer  tenable,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
commanding  officer. 

"  Island  No.  10  and  Fort  Pillow  will  likewise  be  defended  to  the  last  ex 
tremity,  aided  also  by  Hollins's  gunboats,  which  will  then  retire  to  the  vicinity 
of  Memphis,  where  another  bold  stand  will  be  made. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gen.  C.  S.  A. 
'•  W.  J.  HAIIDEE,  Maj.-Gen.'' 

Orders  were  accordingly  issued  on  that  day  (Ttli),  for  the  evacua 
tion  of  Bowling  Green,  which  was  begun  on  the  llth  and  com 
pleted  on  the  13th.  General  Beauregard  left  at  that  date,  for 
Columbus,  via  Xashville.  But  the  lapse  of  time  and  the  hurrying 
of  events  since  his  conference  with  General  Johnston  made  him 
desirous  of  obtaining,  before  his  departure,  specific  instructions  as 
to  the  immediate  disposition  of  the  force  at  Columbus.  General 
Johnston,  he  thought,  might  have  modified  his  views;  or  he 
might  have  received  IILW  directions  from  the  War  Department,  it 
being  well  known  that  the  authorities  at  Richmond  favored  the 
holding  of  Columbus.  He  therefore  wrote  the  following  letter, 
recapitulating  the  expressed  views  of  General  Johnston  as  to  the 
military  situation,  and  adding  the  suggestion  that  Columbus 
should  be  abandoned  altogether,  as  soon  as  Island  No.  10  could  be 
made  ready  for  defence ;  and  that  instead  of  his  falling  back  to 
llumboldt,  and  thence  to  Grand  Junction  and  other  points  in 
rear,  he  should  hold  the  Louisville  and  Memphis  and  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  railroads,  with  Jackson  as  his  centre,  and  llumboldt 
and  Corinth  as  left  and  right  flanks,  with  proper  detachments  at 
luka,  Tuscumbia,  and  even  Decatur;  thus  guarding  his  communi 
cations  by  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  with  the  east,  as 
he  apprehended  incursions  in  advance  of  the  enemy's  main  offen 
sive  movement  in  that  direction,  by  the  Tennessee  River. 

"  BOWLING  GREEX,  KY.,  February  12M,  1862. 

"  Gewral, — By  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  the  enemy  having  possession  of  the 
Tennessee  River,  which  is  navigable  for  their  gunboats  and  transports  to  Flor 
ence,  it  becomes  evident  that  the  forces  under  your  immediate  command  and 
those  under  General  Polk,  separated  unfortunately  by  that  river,  can  no  longer 


222  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

act  in  concert,  and  will  be  unable  to  support  eacli  other  until  the  fortune  of 
war  shall  have  restored  the  Tennessee  River  to  our  possession,  or  combined  the 
movements  of  the  two  armies  in  rear  of  it. 

"It  also  becomes  evident  that,  by  the  possession  of  that  river,  the  enemy 
can  concentrate  rapidly,  by  means  of  his  innumerable  transports,  all  his  dis 
posable  forces  on  any  point  along  its  banks,  either  to  attack  Nashville  in  rear, 
or  cut  off  the  communications  of  Columbus  by  the  Mississippi  River  with 
Memphis,  and  by  the  railroads  with  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad. 

"  Should  the  enemy  determine  on  the  former  plan  of  operations,  your  army, 
threatened  also  in  front  and  on  the  right  flank  by  Bnell's  large  army,  will  be 
in  a  very  critical  condition,  and  may  be  forced  to  take  refuge  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Tennessee  River.  But  should  Hallcck  adopt  the  second  plan  re 
ferred  to,  the  position  at  Columbus  will  then  become  no  longer  tenable  for  an 
army  inferior  in  strength  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and  must  fall  back  to  some 
central  point,  where  it  can  guard  the  main  railroads  to  Memphis,  i.  <?.,  from 
Louisville  and  from  Charleston.  Jackson,  Tennessee,  would  probably  be  the 
best  position  for  such  an  object,  with  strong  detachments  at  Humboldt  and 
Corinth,  and  with  the  necessary  advance  guards. 

"  The  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  so  important  on  account  of  its  exten 
sion  through  eastern  Tennessee  and  Virginia,  must  be  properly  guarded  from 
Inka  to  Tuscumbia,  and  even  to  Decatur,  if  practicable. 

"  Columbus  must  either  be  left  to  be  defended  to  the  last  extremity  by  its 
proper  garrison,  assisted  by  Hollins's  fleet  of  gunboats,  and  provided  with 
provisions  and  ammunition  for  several  months,*  or  abandoned  altogether,  its 
armament  and  garrison  being  transferred,  if  practicable,  to  Fort  Pillow,  which, 
I  am  informed,  is  naturally  and  artificially  a  strong  position,  about  fifty  miles 
above  Memphis. 

"Island  No.  10,  near  New  Madrid,  could  also  be  held  by  its  garrison,  assisted 
by  Ilollins's  fleet,  until  the  possession  of  New  Madrid  by  the  enemy  would 
compel  that  position  to  be  evacuated.  I  am  clearly  of  the  opinion  that  to  at 
tempt  at  present  to  hold  so  advanced  a  position  as  Columbus,  witli  the  mova 
ble  army  under  General  Polk,  when  its  communications  can  be  so  readily  cut 
off  by  a  surprise  force  acting  from  the  Tennessee  River  as  a  new  base,  would  be 
to  jeopardize,  not  only  the  safety  of  that  army,  but,  necessarily,  of  the  whole 
Mississippi  valley.  Hence  I  desire,  as  far  as  practicable,  specific  instructions 
as  to  the  future  movements  of  the  army  of  which  I  am  about  to  assume  com 
mand.  If  it  be  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  country  to  make,  with  all  my 
forces,  a  desperate  stand  at  Columbus,  I  am  ready  to  do  so. 

"I  regret  much  that  illness  has  prevented  me  from  being  already  at  my 
post,  but  during  my  stay  here  I  believe  I  have  made  myself  as  well  acquaint 
ed  with  your  general  views  and  intentions  as  circumstances  have  permitted. 


*  This  alternative  recommendation  was  based  on  the  supposition  that  Com 
modore  Hollins's  fleet  of  gunboats  would  prevent,  or  at  least  retard,  the  com 
plete  investment  of  the  place,  and  that  the  country  around  Columbus  was 
favorable  to  its  defence. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  223 

and  which  I  Tvill  always  be  happy  to  carry  into  effect  to  the  best  of  my  abil 
ities. 

"  I  am,  General,  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 
"  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Comdg.  Western  Dcpt,  Bowling  Green,  Ky." 

General  Johnston,  being  then  busy  with  the  evacuation  of 
Bowling  Green,  informed  General  Beauregard,  by  messenger,  that 
he  would  confer  with  him  at  Nashville  upon  his  arrival  there.  He 
established  his  headquarters  at  Edgefield,  opposite  Xashville,  on 
the  13th,  and  the  next  day  the  two  generals  met  in  conference  at 
the  residence  of  Mr.  Stevenson,  President  of  the  Xashville  and 
Chattanooga  Railroad.  General  Beauregard  was  still  quite  unwell, 
but,  notwithstanding  his  failing  health,  always  attending,  with 
scrupulous  care,  to  the  minutest  details  of  his  onerous  duties. 

In  answer  to  his  letter  of  the  12th,  General  Johnston  said  that 
his  views  were  unchanged  as  to  the  plan  of  operations  recorded  in 
the  memorandum  of  the  7th,  with  the  exception  that  he  assented 
to  the  entire  abandonment  of  Columbus,  should  the  War  Depart 
ment  approve  of  it.  lie  informed  General  Beauregard  that  when 
compelled  to  retire,  he  would  do  so  along  the  line  of  the  Xash- 
ville,  Stevenson,  and  Chattanooga  Railroad,  to  defend  the  country 
in  that  direction,  and  the  crossing  of  the  Tennessee  River  ;  and,  as 
it  was  probable  that  the  Federal  forces  would  soon  interpose  be 
tween  them,  General  Beauregard  must  take  charge  of  the  defence 
of  the  Mississippi  Valley  without  instructions  or  orders,  using  his 
own  judgment,  in  the  event  of  that  separation,  to  counteract  the 
movements  and  designs  of  the  enemy  in  that  quarter. 

Before  leaving  Bowling  Green,  General  Beauregard  had  tele 
graphed  Colonel  Pry  or,  at  Richmond,  to  meet  him  at  Xashville, 
that  he  might  see  with  his  own  eyes,  and  make  known  to  the  Mil 
itary  Committee  and  to  the  government  the  exact  condition  of 
affairs  in  the  "Western  Department.  Colonel  Pryor  came  as  far  as 
Lynchburg,  Va.,  but  hearing  that  communications  with  Nashville 
were  interrupted,  and  that  the  enemy  was  at  Florence  and  Tus- 
cumbia,  concluded  to  go  back  to  Richmond. 

The  day  after  his  arrival  at  Nashville,  General  Beauregard.  in 
reply  to  a  letter  from  Colonel  Pryor,  dated  February  9th,  wrote 
him  the  following : 


224  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

"NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  February  Hth,  1802. 

"  Dear  Colonel, — Your  favor  of  the  9th  inst.  has  been  received.  I  regret 
much  you  did  not  come  on  from  Lynch  burg,  for  the  rumors  you  refer  to  were 
all  unfounded,  and  the  matters  General  Johnston  and  myself  had  to  communi 
cate,  through  you,  to  the  government,  were  of  great  importance — being  to  pro 
vide  for  the  very  unfortunate  contingency  now  existing  here. 

"Moreover,  I  desired  you  to  see  for  yourself  and  others  the  exact  condition 
of  things  here,  in  justice  to  my  own  self;  for  I  am  taking  the  helm  when  the 
ship  is  already  on  the  breakers,  and  with  but  few  sailors  to  man  it.  How  it 
is  to  be  extricated  from  its  present  perilous  condition  Providence  alone  can 
determine,  and,  unless  with  its  aid,  I  can  accomplish  but  little.  My  health, 
moreover,  has  failed  me  completely  lately.  I  was  confined  to  my  room  by  a 
wretched  cold  all  the  time  I  was  at  Bowling  Green.  It  was  the  most  unfort 
unate  thing  that  could  have  happened  to  me  ;  for  the  loss  of  one  or  two  weeks 
now  is,  or  may  be,  most  fatal  to  us.  However,  I  am  better  now,  and  am  hur 
rying  on  to  my  post  as  fast  as  possible.  We  must  defeat  the  enemy  some 
where,  to  give  confidence  to  our  friends.  Large  depots  of  provisions,  ammuni 
tion,  etc.,  ought  to  be  provided  for  at  Atlanta,  Montgomery,  and  Jackson, 
Miss.,  etc..  without  loss  of  time,  for  future  contingency. 

"  We  must  give  up  some  minor  points,  and  concentrate  our  forces,  to  save  tlie  most 
important  ones,  or  we  will  lose  all  of  them  in  succession. 

"The  loss  of  Fort  Donelson  (God  grant  it  may  not  fall)  would  be  followed 
by  consequences  too  lamentable  to  be  now  alluded  to. 

"  General  Johnston  is  doing  his  best,  but  what  can  he  do  against  such  tre 
mendous  odds  ? 

"  Come  what  may,  however,  we  must  present  a  bold  front  and  stout  hearts 
to  the  invaders  of  our  country. 

"  In  haste,  yours  truly, 

"G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

;'  Colonel  R.  A.  PEYOR,  Richmond,  Va." 

General  Beauregard  left  Nashville  on  the  15th,  and  as  there  was 
no  train  from  Decatur  that  afternoon,  resumed  his  journey  next 
morning  with  the  opportunity — which  he  desired — of  observing 
the  character  of  the  country.  At  Corinth,  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th,  Judge  Milton  Brown,  President  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
Railroad,  arrived  with  a  special  train  to  take  him  to  Columbus; 
but  he  felt  so  extremely  unwell  that  he  was  compelled  to  stop  at 
Jackson  on  the  same  day.  There  he  became  the  guest  of  Judge 
Brown,  from  whose  family  he  received  the  kindest  attentions 
during  his  illness. 

On  his  arrival  at  Corinth  on  the  16th,  he  found  waiting  for  him 
two  telegrams  from  Nashville — one  from  General  Johnston,  an 
other  from  Colonel  Mackall — informing  him  of  the  fall  of  Fort 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  225 

Donelson  at  2  o'clock  A.M.  on  that  day.  The  fort  had  surrendered, 
and  the  whole  army  was  lost,  except  half  of  Floyd's  brigade,  which 
had  crossed  the  river ;  and  the  head  of  General  Johnston's  columns 
was  about  reaching  Xashville. 

On  the  Cth  of  February,  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  Brigadier- 
General  Bushrod  E.  Johnson  had  arrived  at  Fort  Donelson  and 
assumed  command;  but  on  the  10th  was  relieved  by  his  senior, 
Brigadier  -  General  Gideon  J.  Pillow,  who  had  been  a  major- 
general  during  the  Mexican  war.  On  the  llth,  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  S.  B.  Buckner  came  in  with  orders  from  General  Floyd  to 
withdraw  his  division  to  Cumberland  City.  These  two  officers, 
deeming  the  fort  untenable  for  a  long  defence,  preferred  leaving 
a  small  force  to  hold  it  as  long  as  possible,  and  then  retire,  if  prac 
ticable,  upon  Nashville.  General  Pillow,  who  was  still  in  com 
mand,  insisted  upon  the  retention  of  Buckner' s  division,  and  the 
transfer  to  the  fort  of  Floyd's  scattered  forces,  which  that  officer 
was  still  endeavoring  to  concentrate  at  Cumberland  City.  He  ap 
plied  to  General  Johnston,  who  ordered  the  movement  on  the 
night  of  the  12th.  Meanwhile,  Floyd,  yielding  to  General  Pillow's 
views,  had  entered  Donelson  on  the  1.3th,  before  daylight,  and  as 
sumed  command,  his  whole  force  being  fifteen  thousand  effectives.-" 
On  the  12th  General  Grant  appeared  in  front  of  Donelson,  and, 
early  on  the  13th,  commenced  its  investment  with  fifteen  thousand 
men,  increased  to  twenty-five  thousand  on  the  evening  of  the  same 
day.  Commodore  Foote,  with  a  fleet  consisting  of  two  wooden 
and  four  ironclad  gunboats,  made  a  determined  attack  on  the  14th, 
but  was  definitively  repulsed.  A  brilliant  and  successful  sortie  was 
effected  the  next  day  by  the  Confederates,  but,  not  being  properly 
sustained  according  to  the  plan  decided  upon,  it  failed  of  favorable 
results  ;  so  that,  during  the  night  between  the  15th  and  10th — as 
mentioned  in  General  Johnston's  telegram — the  commanding  offi 
cers,  regarding  the  continuance  of  the  struggle  against  the  united 
Federal  land  and  naval  forces  as  likely  only  to  lead  to  a  useless  sac 
rifice  of  life,  concluded  to  surrender.  This  unpleasant  duty  devolved 
upon  General  Buckner.  About  ten  thousand  men  were  surrendered  ; 
some  two  thousand  were  killed  and  wounded  ;  and  about  two  thou 
sand  escaped,  with  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow,  by  boats  and  other- 


*  Report  of  Colonel  J.  F.  Gilnier,  Chief  Engineer. 
I.-15 


226  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

wise ;  while  some  five  hundred  cavalry,  with  Colonel  Forrest,  passed 
out  between  the  enemy's  right  and  the  river. 

The  fall  of  Fort  Henry  and  the  calamitous  capitulation  of  Fort 
Donelson,  resulting  in  the  loss  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  were 
blows  that  staggered  the  Confederacy.  A  cry  of  condemnation 
arose  against  General  Johnston,  upon  whom,  as  commander  of  the 
Western  Department,  rested  the  responsibility  of  these  irreparable 
disasters. 

The  disappointment  and  profound  discouragement  that  became 
manifest  all  over  the  country,  but  especially  in  that  portion  of  it 
lying  in  close  proximity  to  the  scenes  of  our  successive  defeats, 
cannot  be  described.  The  demoralization  of  the  army  and  the 
panic  of  the  people  were  complete ;  and  bitter  complaints  against 
the  general  commanding  our  forces  were  heard  on  all  sides.  Pleas 
of  incompetency  and  lack  of  generalship  were  openly  urged,  and 
direct  demands  were  made  to  the  President  to  remove  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  and  thus  save  the  cause  from  irretrievable  loss. 
General  Johnston,  with  that  elevation  of  mind  and  uncomplaining 
fortitude  for  which  he  was  conspicuous,  bore,  unflinchingly,  and 
without  explanation,  the  reproaches  and  accusations  levelled  against 
him,  though  he  was  most  keenly  alive  to  the  withdrawal  of  public 
confidence  from  him. 

On  the  18th  of  March,  about  forty  days  after  the  events  above 
related,  he  wrote  to  President  Davis  a  long  and  earnest  letter, 
wherein  he  described  the  disastrous  results  which  had  followed  the 
aggressive  movement  of  the  enemy,  and  explained  what  seemed 
to  him  to  make  necessary  his  plan  of  campaign  as  given  in  the 
"memorandum  "  we  have  already  mentioned,  and  his  evacuation  of 
Bowling  Green,  pending  the  battle  that  was  then  being  fought  at 
Donelson.  The  letter  was  evidently  meant  as  a  justification  of 
his  defensive  policy,  and  contained  a  synopsis  of  his  views  and  em 
barrassments  at  that  period.  No  one  will  ever  question  his  sin 
cerity  or  honesty  of  purpose  as  there  expressed.  Still,  there  are 
passages  of  this  letter,  and  inconsistencies,  almost  amounting  to 
contradictions,  which  it  is  but  fair  to  point  out  and  correct.  We 
shall  consider  these  matters  at  the  proper  time  and  place,  as  we 
proceed  with  our  narrative. 

Without  wishing  to  cast  undue  blame  on  that  gallant  soldier,  it 
may  not  be  amiss  to  look  back  to  what  might  have  been  done  even 
with  his  small  and  ill-armed  forces,  had  he  followed  a  different 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  227 

course  and  adopted  General  Beauregard's  suggestions,  made  to  him 
on  the  Gth  of  February,  after  their  inspection  of  the  works  around 
Bowling  Green. 

General  Grant,  according  to  his  official  report,  brought  to  the 
attack  of  Fort  Henry,  on  the  6th  of  February,  a  force  of  fifteen 
thousand  men  of  all  arms.  After  a  delay  of  a  week  he  appeared 
before  the  unfinished  defensive  works  of  Fort  Donelson  with  the 
very  same  troops,  and  was  there  joined,  not  earlier  than  the  even 
ing  of  the  13th,  by  a  reinforcement  of  ten  thousand  men,  including 
Lew  Wallace's  division  of  BuelPs  army.  BuelPs  army,  meanwhile, 
was  at  Bacon  Creek  (on  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad, 
about  fifty-five  miles  northeast  of  Bowling  Green)  and  in  southeast 
Kentucky,  with  not  less  than  seventy-three  thousand  five  hundred 
effectives  in  all.  He  would  have  had  to  march  at  least  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty-five  miles  by  the  shortest  distance,  and  on  un- 
macadamized  roads,  crossing  two  streams  (the  Big  Barren  and 
Cumberland),  to  form  a  junction  with  General  Grant ;  which 
movement,  with  his  many  new  levies,  unused  to  marching,  would 
have  required  at  least  ten  days.  That  junction  could  not  have 
been  made  before  the  17th :  whereas  General  Johnston  had,  at 
Bowling  Green,  on  the  7th,  about  fourteen  thousand  men,  of  whom 
ten  thousand  could  have  been  transported  by  rail — about  eighty 
miles — to  Cumberland  city,  thence,  by  boat — about  twenty  miles 
—to  Fort  Donelson,  or  by  railroad  to  the  vicinity  of  the  fort,  in 
two  days  at  most;  as  there  was  ample  rolling-stock  available  in 
west  and  middle  Tennessee,  and  there  was  also  a-  sufficient  number 
of  steamboats  at  Nashville.*  General  Floyd  had,  at  Russellville, 
eight  thousand  men,  who,  with  over  three  thousand  at  Clarksville, 
could  have  been  moved  by  railroad  to  Fort  Donelson  in  two  days 
at  most  from  the  date  of  the  order.  Fort  Donelson  already  con 
tained  a  force  of  five  thousand  seven  hundred  and  fifty  men. 
Thus,  after  leaving  some  troops  —  chiefly  cavalry  —  at  Bowling 
Green,  to  keep  up  appearances  of  occupation  and  to  delay  Buell  at 
the  Big  Barren  River  while  removing  the  public  property  col 
lected  there  to  Nashville,  or  southward,  a  force  of  about  twenty- 
seven  thousand  men  could  have  been  thrown  suddenly  upon  Gen 
eral  Grant's  forces  near  Fort  Donelson,  by  the  10th  of  February 

*  There  were,  at  that  time,  ten  steamboats  at  Nashville,  three  of  them  in  very 
good  order.     These  three  could  have  towed  the  others  down  the  stream. 


228  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

at  the  latest.  Such  a  force  would  have  had  ample  time,  before  the 
13th,  to  work  the  annihilation  of  General  Grant's  forces  of  fifteen 
thousand  men,  and  would  have  regained  Fort  Henry  and  the  con 
trol  of  the  Tennessee  River.  The  other  ten  thousand  reinforce 
ments  of  Buell's  arm y,  who  arrived  by  boats  on  the  evening  of  the 
13th,  would  have  met  the  same  fate,  had  they  landed  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Cumberland.  Such  a  victory  over  General  Grant 
would  certainly  have  deterred  Buell  from  an  offensive  movement, 
while  our  own  success  would  have  given  us  the  power  to  act  im 
mediately  against  him. 

The  Tennessee  River  was  next  in  importance  to  the  Mississippi ; 
and  Fort  Henry  was  the  position  of  first  strategic  value,  east  of 
Columbus,  in  the  defensive  line  then  held  by  General  Johnston. 
It  was,  therefore,  deeply  to  be  regretted  that  he  spent  so  much 
time,  from  September  18th  to  October  12th,  superintending  the 
fortifying  of  Columbus,  without  giving  proper  and  sufficient  at 
tention  to  Fort  Henry.  The  works  at  Columbus  were  made  for  a 
garrison  of  at  least  thirteen  thousand  men,  armed  with  one  hun 
dred  and  forty  (mostly  heavy)  guns;  while  the  War  Department 
was  short  of  guns  for  other  defences  and  of  men  to  operate  with 
in  the  field,  where  the  fate  of  the  Confederacy  was,  after  all,  to  be 
decided.  The  country  about  Columbus,  on  the  left  bank,  after 
wards  proved,  on  proper  examination,  to  be  such  as  to  afford  ad 
vantages  to  a  land  attack;  yet  stores,  for  six  months,  had  been 
accumulated  there,  although  it  is  a  well-known  axiom  in  engineer 
ing,  that  field-works  capable  of  complete  investment  by  a  sufficient 
force,  without  local  advantages,  cannot  make  a  long  defence,  un 
less  there  be  lack  of  judgment  on  the  part  of  the  assailant,  in  the 
investment  and  mode  of  attack.  A  well  constructed  work  at 
Columbus,  armed  with  seventy-five  or  eighty  guns,  and  with  a  gar 
rison  of  at  most  five  thousand  men,  would  have  been  capable  of  as 
long  a  defence  as  the  extensive  works  there  put  up,  leaving  the 
remaining  troops  for  operation  in  the  field,  and  the  remaining  sixty 
guns  for  other  works  on  the  Mississippi,  or  for  Fort  Henry,  on  the 
Tennessee.  The  latter  was  a  small  and  badly  located  work,  com 
manded  and  enfiladed  by  heights  within  easy  range,  on  both  sides 
of  the  river/-  It  was  armed  with  seventeen  guns — twelve  of  them 

*  See  reports  of  General  Tilghrnan,  commanding  Fort  Henry,  and  of  Colonel 
Gilmcr,  Chief-Engineer. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  229 

bearing  on  the  river — and  was  manned  by  a  force  of  two  brigades, 
amounting  to  "  two  thousand  six  hundred  and  ten  men,  only  one 
third  of  whom  had  been  at  all  disciplined  or  well  armed.''* 

The  position  of  Fort  Donelson  was  no  better,  and  its  works  were 
incomplete,  until  inspected  and  strengthened  by  Colonel  Gilmer, 
on  the  3d  and  following  days  of  February. f  Its  armament  con 
sisted  of  thirteen  guns,  two  of  them  heavy  ones.  Had  a  reasonable 
portion  of  the  time  and  labor  misspent  upon  Columbus  and  Bowl 
ing  Green  been  applied  to  the  construction  of  proper  defensive 
works  on  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland,  and  had  the  guns  not 
required  at  the  former  places  been  added  to  those  of  the  two  forts 
and  of  other  works  on  both  rivers,  our  resistance  at  Henry  and 
Donelson,  if  not  finally  successful,  would  have  certainly  afforded 
us  ample  time  to  retire  with  the  whole  of  our  forces,  and  to  pre 
serve,  unaffected  by  too  crushing  a  defeat,  the  morale  of  our  troops, 
and  the  confidence  of  our  people  in  the  cause  we  were  lighting 
for.  It  is  even  likely  that,  with  sufficient  energy,  a  system  of 
works  might  have  been  constructed,  after  General  Johnston's  as 
sumption  of  command,  at  the  narrowest  part  of  the  neck  of  land 
where  the  rivers  flow  less  than  three  miles  apart,  and  nearly  on  a 
line  with  Bowling  Green  and  Columbus.  These  would  have 
given  us  complete  command  of  the  two  rivers,  and  might  have 
been  defended  by  a  limited  force  which  could  have  been  rapidly 
reinforced  by  boats  held  ready  for  the  purpose,  at  Cumberland 
city,  on  the  Cumberland  River,  or  at  Benton,  where  the  Memphis 
and  Louisville  Railroad  crosses  the  Tennessee  River. 

Under  the  circumstances,  to  prevent  the  loss  of  the  Tennessee 
River,  by  which  the  whole  country  (including  Columbus)  north 
of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  was  turned,  and  that 
great  line  of  communication  immediately  exposed,  the  only  course 
for  General  Johnston  was  to  concentrate,  at  the  proper  time,  at 
Henry  and  Donelson,  and,  for  that  purpose,  to  hold  his  forces  and 
means  of  transportation  well  in  hand,  so  as  to  bo  ready,  at  a  mo 
ment's  notice,  to  avail  himself  of  his  extraordinary  advantages  of 
communication  by  rail  and  water  between  his  centre  and  wings. 
Thus  Grant  could  have  been  opportunely  met,  and  certainly  crushed 
with  superior  numbers.  After  the  fall  of  Henry  this  plan  of  con 
centration  was  again  imperative  for  the  regaining  of  the  Tenncs- 

*  See  General  Tilgliman's  2d  report. 

t  Colonel  Gilmer's  report,  see  "Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,''  p.  113  et  scg. 


230  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

see  and  the  saving  of  the  Cumberland,  besides  the  great  advantage 
and  prestige  of  destroying  one  of  the  Federal  armies.  The  means 
for  such  concentration  were  ample.  It  could  have  been  effected 
in  two  or,  at  most,  three  days,  and  in  good  season.  After  the 
fall  of  Henry,  on  the  6th,  General  Grant  did  not  move  upon  Don 
elson  until  the  12th,  with  fifteen  thousand  men,  and  was  only  re 
inforced  to  the  number  of  twenty-five  thousand  on  the  evening 
of  the  13th;  while  General  Johnston  could  have  been  present 
with  twenty-seven  thousand  men  on  the  10th,  at  the  latest.  No 
serious  conflict  occurred  until  the  garrison  itself  attacked  the  Fed 
erals,  on  the  loth,  and,  in  view  of  the  brilliant  success  of  that  ef 
fort  in  its  first  stages,  there  can  be  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  what 
the  result  would  have  been  if  the  Confederate  forces  had  been  ten 
thousand  stronger. 

General  Johnston  gave  disproportionate  consequence  to  the 
preservation  of  the  depots  of  reserve  supplies  at  Bowling  Green, 
Clarksville,  and  Nashville.  Their  accumulation  at  those  points 
was  a  serious  error  on  the  part  of  the  government;  and  upon  the 
assembling  of  such  large,  threatening  forces  along  General  John 
ston's  front,  these  supplies  should  have  been  speedily  removed  far 
to  the  rear,  leaving  the  country  and  the  army  clear  and  free  for 
action.  But,  this  having  been  neglected,  the  operations  of  the 
army  and  the  opportunity  to  defeat  the  enemy  should  not  have 
been  subordinated  and  sacrificed  to  the  immediate  effort  to  save  sup 
plies  which,  after  all,  were  destroyed  at  Clarksville,  and,  in  great 
measure,  at  Nashville. 

This  concentration  should,  therefore,  have  been  made,  or  else 
Donelson  should  have  been  abandoned  altogether;  thereby  saving 
its  garrison,  and  part,  at  least,  of  the  prestige  of  our  arms.  Gen 
eral  Floyd,  however,  was  left  without  specific  instructions,  until, 
with  General  Buckner's  advice,  he  began  to  withdraw  the  hitter's 
division  from  the  fort,  but,  upon  General  Pillow's  remonstrance, 
was  ordered  by  General  Johnston,  on  the  night  of  the  12th,  to  go 
into  Donelson  with  all  the  forces  under  his  control,  aggregating 
within  the  fort  an  effective  force  variously  estimated  at  from  thir 
teen  thousand  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  in  the  reports,  and  by  other 
authorities  at  seventeen  thousand. *  Upon  the  adoption  of  this 

*  See  General  Floyd's  supplemental  report  in  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Bat 
tles,"  pp.  55-57.  See  also  his  letter  to  General  Johnston,  of  February  12th,  ad 
vising  concentration  near  Cumberland  city. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  231 

latter  course,  General  Johnston  should  have  left  to  General  Har- 
dee  the  evacuation  of  Bowling  Green  and  the  conduct  of  the  re 
treat  of  its  garrison  upon  Nashville,  and  should  himself  have  re 
paired  to  Donelson,  where  so  critical  a  struggle  was  imminent — 
nay,  certain.  Such  a  step  on  his  part  would  have  harmonized  the 
divided  'counsels  of  the  commanding  officers,  and  undoubtedly 
have  prevented  the  demoralization  of  their  troops.  It  would  have 
combined  the  resources  of  defence  under  his  own  inspiriting  in 
fluence,  and  history,  though  not  crediting  us  with  a  Confederate 
victory,  would  have  spared  us,  at  least,  the  humiliation  of  such  an 
overwhelming  defeat.  As  it  was,  on  the  very  day  of  the  attack 
on  Fort  Donelson — the  13th — the  General-in-Chief,  without  being 
pressed  by  Buell,  was  retreating  from  the  scene  of  conflict,  and 
had  even  reached  Xashville  before  evening.  The  Tennessee  and 
Cumberland  were  lost.  The  whole  of  middle  Kentucky  and  mid 
dle  Tennessee,  including  Xaslivillc,  were  given  up.  And,  as  a  fatal 
consequence  of  this  great  calamity,  west  Kentucky  and  west  Ten 
nessee,  with  Columbus,  and  with  most  of  the  supplies  sought  to  be 
saved,  were  also,  shortly  afterwards,  entirely  abandoned.  About 
thirteen  thousand  men,  organized  and  disciplined,  were  thereby 
withdrawn  from  operations  in  the  field  ;  a  force  which  would  have 
aided  us  to  a  complete  and  easy  victory  in  the  battle  fought  with 
General  Grant  two  months  later,  or,  rather,  which  would  have  en 
abled  us  to  take  the  offensive  some  time  earlier;  disposing  of  Gen 
eral  Grant's  forces  at  Pittsbnrg  Landing,  recovering  the  Tennes 
see  llivcr,  and  then,  if  made  strong  enough,  meeting  and  fighting 
Buell,  as  soon  as  the  crossing  of  the  river  could  be  accomplished. 
These  would  have  been  the  immediate  results  in  the  field ;  to  say 
nothing  of  the  indirect  consequences  from  the  encouragement  and 
readiness  of  the  people,  instead  of  the  anxiety  and  despondency 
which  fell  so  heavily  upon  them. 


232  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

General  Beauregard  Telegraphs  for  Instructions  after  the  Fall  of  Donelson. — 
General  Johnston's  Answer. — Colonel  Jordan's  Report  of  the  Situation  at 
Columbus. — General  Beauregard  Calls  General  Polk  to  Jackson,  Tennessee, 
for  Conference. — Opinion  of  the  Latter  as  to  the  Strength  of  Columbus. — 
He  Concurs,  however,  in  General  Beauregard's  Views. — Evacuation  of  Co 
lumbus  Authorized  by  the  War  Department. — General  Beauregard's  De 
tailed  Instructions  to  that  ErTect. — Defects  in  River  Defences  at  Columbus. 
— Governor  Harris  of  Tennessee. — General  Johnston  Retreating  towards 
Stevenson,  along  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad. — His  Letter  of 
February  18th  to  the  War  Department. — Depression  of  the  People. — Gen 
eral  Beauregard  Resolves  to  Replenish  the  Army. — Makes  Use  of  the  Dis 
cretion  given  him  by  General  Johnston. — His  Plan  of  Operations. — Be 
lieves  Success  Depends  upon  Offensive  Movement  on  Our  Part. — Calls 
upon  the  Governors  of  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  and  Tennessee; 
and  also  upon  Generals  Van  Dorn,  Bragg,  and  Lovell,  for  Immediate  As 
sistance. —  Sixty  and  Ninety  Days  Troops.  —  The  War  Department  not 
Favorable  to  the  Method  Proposed,  but  Finally  Gives  its  Assent. — General 
Johnston  Requested  by  General  Beauregard  to  Change  his  Line  of  Retreat 
and  Turn  towards  Decatur,  so  as  to  Co-operate  with  him. — General  John 
ston  Accedes  to  his  Request. 

AFTER  receiving,  at  Corinth,  the  despatches  announcing  the  fall 
of  Fort  Donelson,  with  the  capture  of  most  of  its  garrison,  General 
Beauregard  telegraphed  General  Johnston  to  know  whether  lie 
had  issued  any  direct  orders  for  the  troops  in  General  Folk's  dis 
trict.  The  following  answer,  forwarded  to  Columbus,  in  antici 
pation  of  General  Beauregard's  arrival  there,  was  received  by  him 
on  the  17th,  at  Jackson.  It  is  given  in  full : 

"NASHVILLE,  February  IGth,  1862. 
"  To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

"Your  despatch  of  IGth  received.  You  must  do  as  your  judgment  dictates. 
No  orders  for  your  troops  have  issued  from  here.  Colonel  Chalmers  is  a 
brigadier-general. 

"  W.  W.  MACKALL,  A.  A.  Genl." 

Two  days  afterwards  General  Johnston  himself  forwarded  this 
additional  telegram : 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  233 

"  NASHVILLE,  February  18th,  1862. 
"  To  General  BEATJREGARD,  Jackson,  Tennessee  : 

"  You  must  now  act  as  seems  best  to  you.  The  separation  of  our  armies  is 
for  the  present  complete. 

"  A.  S.  JOHNSTON/' 

The  day  before  receiving  this  last  despatch,  General  Beaure- 
gard's  Adjutant,  Colonel  Jordan,  who,  after  his  visit  to  the  Wai- 
Department  at  Richmond,  had  gone  directly  to  Columbus,  re 
joined  him  at  Jackson,  Tennessee.  His  report  concerning  General 
Folk's  district  was  decidedly  unfavorable,  and  confirmed  General 
Beauregard's  apprehensions  as  to  the  incomplete  state  of  its  de 
fences,  lie  emphasized  the  too  great  development  of  the  lines, 
and  their  defective  location,  characterizing  the  place  as  a  certain 
"dead  fall"  to  its  garrison,  if  attacked.  lie  also  reported  the 
troops  to  be  imperfectly  organized,  and  declared  his  inability  to 
procure  a  clear  statement  of  the  forces  and  resources  present,  for 
want  of  proper  returns. 

General  Beauregard,  who  was  still  too  unwell  to  assume  imme 
diate  command,  called  General  Polk  at  once  to  Jackson,  and  also 
his  own  Chief-Engineer,  Captain  D.  B.  Harris,  who  had  preceded 
him  to  Columbus.  They  came  on  the  19th,  and  Captain  Harris's 
detailed  information  as  to  the  position,  its  works,  and  the  surround 
ing  locality,  confirmed  Colonel  Jordan's  report  of  its  alarming 
weakness.  Upon  this  definite  statement  of  the  character  and  con 
dition  of  the  place,  General  Beauregard  considered  that  immediate 
preparations  should  be  made  for  its  evacuation,  so  as  to  secure  its 
supplies,  armament,  and  garrison,  which  included  nearly  all  the 
forces  under  General  Polk.  It  was  to  be  apprehended  that  Gen 
eral  Grant,  by  marching  westward  from  Fort  Henry  to  Union 
City  or  Clinton — some  sixty  or  seventy  miles — after  forming  a 
junction  with  part  of  the  forces  under  General  Pope,  which  might 
have  landed  in  Kentucky,  above  the  fort,  could  complete  its  in 
vestment  within  a  few  days ;  while  batteries  placed  below  it,  on 
both  sides  of  the  river,  would  cut  off  communication  or  retreat  by 
water,  unless  prevented  by  our  gunboat  fleet.  Batteries,  enfilad 
ing  its  parapets,  which  were  without  traverses,  would  dismount  its 
guns,  while  mortar  batteries  would  fire  its  wooden  store-houses 
and  destroy  its  supplies,  compelling  its  surrender  in  a  very  few 
days. 

Apart  from  the  river  batteries,  which  were  strongly  constructed 


234:  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

and  powerfully  armed,  the  defensive  works,  besides  being  badly 
planned  and  unfinished,  were  much  too  extensive,  requiring  a  gar 
rison  of  about  thirteen  thousand  men,  to  resist  a  combined  land 
and  naval  attack,  while  the  forces  of  General  Polk,  in  his  whole 
district,  numbered  less  than  fifteen  thousand  of  all  arms,  badly 
equipped  for  the  field,  commanded  by  officers  who  were  brave  and 
zealous,  but  without  military  training  or  experience.  Moreover, 
his  troops  were  not  regularly  formed  into  brigades  and  divisions, 
and  his  cavalry  was  not  yet  fully  organized  into  regiments.  The 
capture  of  Fort  Columbus  and  its  garrison  would  have  opened 
to  the  Federals  the  whole  Mississippi  Valley  to  New  Orleans,  as 
between  those  two  points  there  was  not  another  organized  body 
of  troops  capable  of  offering  any  resistance  to  the  united  forces  of 
Generals  Grant  and  Pope.  Fort  Pillow,  about  fifty  miles  above 
Memphis,  was  not  then  in  as  good  condition  as  Fort  Columbus; 
its  defences  being  still  incomplete.  It  was  not  yet  armed,  and 
required  a  garrison  of  about  ten  thousand  men,  while,  at  that  time, 
it  only  had  one  regiment  to  defend  it.  At  the  Madrid  Bend  de 
fences  only  one  or  two  heavy  batteries  had  been  commenced,  on 
Island  "No.  10,  armed  with  a  few  guns  of  small  calibre ;  and  at 
New  Madrid  only  some  light  field-works  had  been  constructed. 
General  Polk  had  unbounded  confidence  in  the  strength  of 

O 

Columbus,  which  he  termed  the  "  Gibraltar  of  the  West."  With 
his  characteristic  gallantry  he  declared  himself  capable  of  holding 
it  against  any  force,  as  long  as  his  supplies  should  last;  and  these, 
he  alleged,  could  hold  out  six  months.  But  his  statements,  in 
answer  to  minute  inquiries  as  to  its  condition  and  surroundings, 
corroborated  none  the  less  what  had  been  previously  reported  by 
Colonel  Jordan  and  Captain  Harris;  and  upon  General  Beaure- 
gard  exposing  to  him  the  saliency  of  the  fort  and  the  various  feat 
ures  of  its  weakness,  he  concurred  in  the  opinion  that  it  could  riot 
long  withstand  a  determined  attack. 

The  War  Department  having,  on  the  19th,  telegraphed  its  assent 
to  the  evacuation  of  Columbus,  General  Beaure^ard  directed  Gen- 

O 

eral  Polk  to  prepare  for  it  without  delay.  The  safe  removal  of  the 
supplies  and  armament  was  likely  to  be  a  difficult  operation,  should 
the  Federal  land  and  naval  forces  be  handled  with  judgment  and 
resolution.  Careful  and  minute  instructions  were  accordingly 
given  to  General  Polk  by  General  Beauregard.  All  reserve  sup 
plies  and  materials  were  to  be  sent  to  Grenada  and  Columbus,  by 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  235 

railroad,  including  those  at  Trenton  and  Jackson,  Tennessee;  the 
remaining  supplies,  to  Union  City,  Humboldt,  the  positions  at 
Madrid  Bend,  New  Madrid,  and  Memphis.  The  heaviest  guns 
that  could  be  spared  were  to  be  taken  to  Island  No.  10,  to  the 
batteries  at  the  Bend,  on  the  left  bank,  and  to  New  Madrid, 
with  some  of  lighter  calibre,  for  the  land  defences  of  the  latter 
place.  The  other  guns  were  to  be  placed  as  far  as  possible  in  con 
dition  for  ready  removal,  part  of  them  for  transfer  to  the  works 
at  Madrid  Bend,  and  the  remainder  to  Fort  Pillow.  The  disman 
tling  of  the  fort  and  embarkation  of  material  and  supplies,  by 
boat  and  railroad,  were  to  be  conducted  with  secrecy,  and,  as  far 
as  practicable,  by  night ;  and  as  it  was  necessary  to  hold  Colum 
bus  until  the  works  at  Island  No.  10  and  in  the  Bend  should  be 
ready  to  defend  the  river,  General  Polk  was  to  maintain  a  vigilant 
watch  and  repel  vigorously  all  attempts  at  reconnoissance,  by  land 
or  by  water. 

A  few  days  later,  he  was  instructed  to  open  a  road  across  the 
difficult  country  opposite  Island  2s o.  10,  and  to  establish  a  tele 
graph  line  between  the  Island  and  Humboldt,  or  Union  City, 
via  Obionville,  as  a  line  of  communication.  The  cavalry,  at  Paris, 
was  to  watch  and  report  the  passage  of  any  gunboats  or  transports 
up  the  Tennessee  Kiver,  from  the  direction  of  Fort  Henry,  extend 
ing  its  pickets  as  near  as  poss-ible  to  Mayfield,  which  was  then 
occupied  by  Federal  cavalry,  keeping  the  latter  always  in  sight, 
and,  if  compelled  to  retire,  to  burn  the  bridges  and  thus  hinder 
reconnoissances. 

In  view  of  the  great  importance  of  Xe\v  Madrid,  General  Polk 
was  further  instructed  to  send  as  strong  a  garrison  thither  as  he 
could,  including  most  of  the  troops  at  Fort  Pillow,  if  necessarv. 
lie  was  also  to  aid  in  hastening  the  immediate  completion  and 
arming  of  the  batteries  there  and  of  those  at  the  head  of  Island 
No.  10  and  at  the  Bend,  which  were  intended  for  temporary  occu 
pation,  while  Fort  Pillow  was  being  strongly  fortified  and  com 
pleted  for  permanent  maintenance.  The  gorges  of  the  works  at 
New  Madrid  were  to  be  palisaded  merely,  so  that  our  gunboats 
might  fire  into  them  from  the  river  if  taken  by  the  enemy.  The 
defences,  consisting  of  strong  profiles,  were  composed  of  three 
works,  two  on  the  river  and  one  a  little  in  advance  of  the  others, 
and  were  calculated  for  about  five  hundred  men  each.  The  crt- 
maillere  lines,  ordered  on  the  right  and  rear  of  Island  No.  10,  were 


23G  .MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

to  be  provided  with  small  redans  for  a  few  siege  guns,  and  the 
navigation  of  Black  Lagoon  obstructed,  so  as  to  prevent  the 
enemy's  barges  from  getting  into  Reelfoot  Lake,  the  shores  of 
which,  between  the  two  cremaillere  lines,  were  to  be  well  guarded, 
and,  if  necessary,  properly  defended.  The  island  opposite  Tipton- 
ville  was  to  be  examined,  to  determine  whether  or  not  it  could  be 
advantageously  fortified. 

General  McCown,  of  General  Folk's  forces,  was  selected  to 
command  those  river  defences,  and  General  Trudeau,*  of  Louisi 
ana,  to  take  charge  of  the  heavy  batteries  at  Island  No.  10  and  in 
the  Bend.  Both  of  these  officers  were  to  report  to  General  Beaure- 
gard  at  Jackson,  for  special  instructions.  The  troops  at  Columbus, 
apart  from  those  to  be  sent  to  protect  the  construction  of  and 
occupy  the  river  defences  at  New  Madrid,  Island  No.  10,  and  the 
Bend,  were  to  be  withdrawn  to  Union  City  and  LIumboldt,  for 
the  protection  of  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  those  important  de 
fences,  against  any  movement  from  the  Tennessee  River,  the  cav 
alry  to  be  thrown  out  well  in  advance. 

It  was  understood,  from  General  Polk,  that  the  earth-works  at 
Island  No.  10  and  the  Bend  were  already  prepared  for  a  sufficient 
number  of  heavy  guns  to  make  an  effective  defence,  and  that  a 
large  force  of  negro  laborers  was  there  with  the  necessary  tools ; 
which,  however,  proved  to  be  an  error.  General  Beauregard  gave 
specific  instructions  to  Captain  Harris  (the  only  engineer  who  had 
accompanied  him  from  Virginia,  and  whose  great  ability  was  not 
then  matured  by  sufficient  experience)  as  to  the  planning,  laying- 
out,  and  construction  of  these  batteries,  including  the  details  of 
their  parapets,  embrasures,  traverses,  and  magazines ;  after  the 
completion  of  this  duty  he  repaired  to  Fort  Pillow,  to  reduce  that 
work  and  adapt  it  to  a  garrison  of  about  three  thousand  men. 
The  work,  at  that  point,  had  been  planned  upon  so  extensive  a 
scale  as  to  require  a  garrison  of  nearly  ten  thousand  men. 

The  grave  defect  in  these  river  defences,  at  Columbus  and  Fort 
Pillow,  was  in  their  extended  lines,  requiring  a  whole  army  to 
hold  them,  leaving  no  forces  for  operations  in  the  field.  This  was 
one  of  the  great  mistakes  in  engineering  on  both  sides  during  the 
war.  A  garrison  of  from  three  to  five  thousand  men,  in  properly 
constructed  forts,  with  an  ample  supply  of  ammunition  and  pro- 

*  At  that  time  a  Vol.  A.  D.  C.  to  General  Polk. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  237 

visions,  would  Lave  been  sufficient  for  the  defence  of  our  principal 
rivers  until  reinforcements,  in  an  emergency,  could  have  been 
sent  to  their  relief. 

From  Memphis,  on  the  18th,  Governor  Harris,  of  Tennessee, 
telegraphed  General  Beauregard  to  know  his  plans,  saying  that  he 
had  made  similar  inquiries  of  the  President  and  Generals  John 
ston  and  Pillow,  so  as  to  enable  him  to  rally  at  once  all  possible 
forces  in  Tennessee,  and  issue  orders  to  them  accordingly.  He 
was  requested  to  meet  General  Beauregard,  with  General  Polk, 
at  Jackson,  on  the  19th.  His  reply  was  that  he  had  ordered  out 
every  man  in  the  State  who  could  be  armed,  but  that  he  himself 
was  compelled  to  go  to  Nashville.  General  Beauregard,  there 
upon,  repeated  his  request,  through  General  Polk,  urging  the  ad 
vantage  of  the  governor's  visiting  Jackson,  where  he  arrived,  ac 
cordingly,  on  the  20th.  It  was  agreed  between  them  that  the 
State  troops  called  out  in  west  Tennessee  should  be  directed  to 
Jackson  and  Corinth,  from  which  latter  place  General  lluggles's 
brigade  was  liable  to  be  called,  at  any  moment,  to  support  General 
Polk,  at  or  about  Columbus.  General  Euggles's  brigade  had  been 
iirst  ordered  from  New  Orleans,  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  on  Feb 
ruary  8th,  to  report  to  General  Beauregard  at  Columbus;  but  his 
communication  of  that  date  to  General  Johnston,  having  been  re 
ferred  to  the  former,  and  the  evacuation  of  Columbus  being  then 
contemplated,  General  Beauregard,  who  had  not  yet  directly  as 
sumed  command,  requested  General  Johnston,  in  accordance  with 
his  letter  of  the  12th,  to  order  that  brigade  to  Corinth;  the  im 
mediate  object  being  to  protect  that  point  and  be  within  support 
ing  distance  of  General  Polk. 

Meanwhile,  General  Johnston,  followed  by  BuelTs  forces,  had 
resolved  to  abandon  Nashville,  lie  began  his  retreat  towards 
Stevenson,  along  the  line  of  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  rail 
road,  as  in  that  event  previously  determined  upon,  and  fully  set 
forth  in  the  memorandum  of  his  plan  of  campaign,  given  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  at  page  220. 

The  following  is  General  Johnston's  letter  to  the  War  De 
partment,  in  explanation  of  his  future  operations: 

"  HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

NASHVILLE,  February  18th,  1862. 

"  Sir, — In  conformity  with  the  intention  announced  to  the  department,  thq 
corps  under  the  command  of  Major-Gencral  Hardee  completed  the  evacuation 


238  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

of  Bowling  Green  on  the  14th  instant,  and  the  rear  guard  passed  the  Cumber 
land  at  this  point  yesterday  morning  in  good  order. 

"  I  have  ordered  the  army  to  encamp  to-night  midway  between  this  place 
and  Murfrecsboro'.  My  purpose  is,  to  place  the  force  in  such  a  position  that  the 
enemy  cannot  concentrate  his  superior  strength  against  the  command,  and  to 
enable  me  to  assemble  as  rapidly  as  possible  such  other  troops  in  addition  as  it 
may  be  in  my  power  to  collect.  The  complete  command  which  their  gunboats 
and  transports  give  them  upon  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland,  renders  it 
necessary  for  me  to  retire  my  line  between  the  rivers.  I  entertain  the  hope 
that  this  disposition  will  enable  me  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check ;  and,  when 
my  forces  are  sufficiently  increased,  to  drive  him  back.  .  .  . 

********* 

"  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 
"  IIou.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Secretary  of  War,  Richmond,  Va." 

The  military  situation  was  now  of  a  desperate  character.  While 
General  Johnston's  crippled  army  was  retreating  towards  north 
east  Alabama  and  Georgia  before  Buell's  overwhelming  forces, 
the  Federal  army,  under  General  Grant,  with  or  without  the  co 
operation  of  Pope's  command,  might  move  from  Fort  Henry, 
upon  the  rear  of  Columbus,  or  execute  a  still  more  dreaded  move 
ment  by  ascending  the  Tennessee  River  to  Hamburg  or  East- 
port,  seizing  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  thus  defini 
tively  separating  Generals  Johnston  and  Polk,  turning  completely 
west  Kentucky  and  west  Tennessee  to  Memphis,  and  compelling 
the  fall  of  the  latter  city,  Fort  Pillow,  New  Madrid,  Island  isTo.  10, 
and  Columbus.  The  capture  of  General  Folk's  forces  would 
thus  be  insured,  and  the  entire  Mississippi  Valley  would  be  thrown 
open  as  far  as  New  Orleans. 

There  was  no  army  to  oppose  such  a  movement,  and  there  were 
no  fortified  positions  on  the  Mississippi  River,  to  check  the  Fed 
eral  gunboats  and  transports  in  carrying  the  supplies  of  the  invad 
ing  forces,  should  the  line  of  railroads  be  rendered  unavailable. 
The  panic,  followed  by  despondency,  which  had  seized  the  people 
after  the  successive  disasters  of  the  campaign,  left  little  hope  of 
raising  an  army ;  and  the  situation  was  such  that,  even  with  the 
utmost  enthusiasm  to  aid  such  an  undertaking,  there  was  no  ex 
pectation  of  its  achievement  in  time  to  meet  the  emergency,  un 
less  favored  by  our  adversary's  failure  to  embrace  the  opportunity 
offered.  General  Johnston  had  informed  General  Beauregard,  at 
Bowling  Green,  that  he  had  exhausted  all  means  of  procuring 
more  armed  troops  from- the  Confederate  and  State  governments, 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  939 

and  his  official  correspondence  shows  that  he  had  done  his  utmost 
in  that  respect.  General  Beauregard  resolved,  nevertheless,  to  in 
voke  at  once  every  possible  resource,  and,  if  he  saw  any  expecta 
tion  of  raising  an  army,  to  use  every  effort  to  that  end,  while  con 
tinuing  to  give  general  direction  to  affairs  until  his  physical 
condition  should  permit  him  to  assume  the  cares  of  formal  com 
mand.  His  physicians  had  assured  him  that  they  could  keep  the 
illness  from  which  he  was  suffering  under  control,  and  the  forlorn 
condition  of  the  entire  AVest,  mingled  now  with  fears  for  his  own 
home,  determined  him  to  make  the  effort,  however  doubtful  the 
result  might  be. 

The  only  forces  he  could  dispose  of  were  some  fourteen  thousand 
five  hundred  men,  under  General  Polk,  holding  the  Mississippi 
River  defences,  imperfectly  organized  and,  as  yet,  poorly  equipped 
for  the  field;  about  two  thousand,  under  General  Chalmers,  at 
luka  and  its  vicinity  ;  and  three  thousand,  under  General  Rugglcs, 
at  Corinth.  But  the  energetic  efforts  of  Governor  Harris  now 

O 

gave  him  the  hope  of  soon  being  able  to  increase  his  strength. 
Instead,  therefore,  of  operating,  with  his  movable  forces,  on  the 
defensive  line  laid  down  by  General  Johnston,  as  shown  by  the 
memorandum  of  the  7th,  that  is,  from  Columbus  via  Jackson  to 
Grand  Junction,  fifty  miles  west  of  Corinth,  with  Memphis  or 
Grenada,  and  Jackson,  Mississippi,  as  ultimate  points  of  retreat, 
General  Beauregard  determined  to  take  up  a  new  defensive  line- 
confronting  the  enemy  from  that  part  of  the  Tennessee  River — 
a  line  extending  from  the  river  defences  at  Island  Xo.  10  to  Cor 
inth,  via  "Union  City,  Ilumboldt,  and  Jackson  ;  throwing  his  forces 
across  the  Louisville  and  Memphis  and  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Railroads;  thus  covering  Memphis  and  the  important  railroad 
centre  of  Corinth,  with  strong  advanced  forces  at  luka,  and  a 
small  force  at  Tuscumbia,  to  protect  his  railroad  communication 
with  the  East.  "With  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad  along  his  line, 
he  would  thus  be  enabled  to  concentrate  quickly,  either  to  oppose 
any  advance  of  the  enemy  along  the  Louisville  and  Memphis 
Railroad,  or,  if  ready  and  strong  enough  for  such  an  operation,  to 
attack  him  suddenly  should  he  attempt  or  effect  a  landing  at  any 
point  along  the  bend  of  the  Tennessee  River,  between  Coffee 
Landing  and  Eastport.  General  Beauregard  decided  on  this  new 
disposition  of  his  forces,  in  the  exercise  of  that  full  discretion 
given  him  by  General  Johnston's  telegrams  of  February  IGth  and 


24:0  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

18th,  the  full  texts  of  which  have  already  been  laid  before  the 
reader.  An  additional  despatch  of  the  21st  was,  in  substance,  as 
follows : 

As  you  have  had  time  sufficiently  to  study  the  field,  even  should 
you  be  too  unwell  to  assume  command,  I  hope  you  will  advise 
General  Polk  of  your  judgment  as  to  the  proper  disposition  of  his 
army,  in  accordance  with  the  views  expressed  in  your  memoran 
dum,  unless  you  have  deemed  it  necessary  to  change  them.  I 
cannot  issue  any  orders  to  him,  for  fear  that  mine  might  conflict 
with  yours. 

Here  was  an  entirely  different  plan  of  operations,  based  upon 
entirely  different  views,  which  circumstances  now  brought  forth, 
and  to  which  no  reference,  however  remote,  had  been  or  could 
have  been  made  in  the  "  memorandum "  of  General  Johnston's 
strategic  movements,  so  often  alluded  to  before. 

In  reflecting  upon  the  situation,  as  shaped  by  our  recent  disas 
ters,  General  Beauregard  became  convinced  that  our  substantial 
success  required  the  abandonment  at  once,  on  our  part,  of  the  pas 
sive-defensive  through  which,  defeated  at  every  successive  point 
in  the  West,  we  had  gradually  been  driven  to  our  present  state  of 
distress;  and  it  was  his  conviction  that  necessity  now  compelled 
us  boldly  to  assume  the  offensive.  To  this  end,  and  while  review 
ing  thoroughly  the  sources  from  which  additional  troops  might 
be  levied  or  spared,  he  resolved  to  call  upon  the  governors  of 
Mississippi,  Alabama,  Louisiana,  and  Tennessee,  for  whatever  num 
ber  of  men  they  could  collect,  if  only  for  sixty  or  ninety  days, 
with  whatever  arms  they  could  procure,  to  enable  him  to  make  or 
meet  the  last  encounter,  which,  he  thought,  would  decide  the  fate 
of  the  Mississippi  Valley.  The  following  is  the  confidential  cir 
cular  he  sent  on  that  occasion.  Its  admirable  conception  and 
characteristic  vigor  will,  no  doubt,  be  appreciated  by  the  reader: 

"JACKSON,  TENN.,  February  21st,  1862. 
"To  his  Excellency  Tuos.  O.  MOORE,  Governor  of  Louisiana,  etc. : 

"Dear  Sir, — As  you  are  aware,  heavy  disasters  have  recently  befallen  our 
arms  on  the  Kentucky  border.  The  Tennessee  River  is  in  possession  of  the 
enemy  since  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry.  The  evacuation  of  Bowling  Green, 
and  subsequent  fall  of  Fort  Donelson,  with  large  loss  of  officers,  men,  arms, 
and  munitions,  have  so  weakened  us  on  that  line,  that  Nashville  can  only  be 
held  by  superhuman  energy,  determination,  and  courage.  At  the  same  time, 
the  direct  communications  of  the  forces  at  Columbus  with  those  under  General 
A.  S.  Johnston  are  broken,  and  the  two  armies  effectually  isolated  from  each 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD. 

other.  Yvlth  the  enemy  in  command  of  the  Tennessee  River,  the  position  at 
Columbus  is  so  endangered  from  a  land  approach  from  that  river  by  a  greatly 
superior  force,  that  its  fall  must  be  regarded  as  certain,  unless  some  extraor 
dinary  efforts  arc  made  to  reinforce  its  present  small  army  of  occupation.  I 
need  not  dwell  upon  the  consequences  of  such  a  disaster.  Suffice  it  to  say, 
it  would  involve  the  immediate  loss  to  the  Confederate  States  of  the  Mississippi 
River  and  Valley. 

u  In  view  of  the  palpable  situation,  I  am  instructed  to  evacuate  Columbus 
and  take  up  less  vulnerable  positions  on  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Island  No.  10, 
and  at  New  Madrid.  In  the  execution  of  this  measure,  however,  much  will 
depend  on  the  energy  with  which  our  enemy  may  follow  up  his  late  success 
es,  and  whether  he  will  give  us  time  to  withdraw  and  receive  his  onset  else 
where. 

•'Coming  to  the  command  at  such  a  crisis,  I  have  been  filled  with  profound 
anxiety  and  sense  of  the  necessity  for  a  prompt,  resolute  encounter  with  the 
exigency,  in  time  to  prevent  an  irrevocable  defeat.  Columbus  is  now  occu 
pied  by  but  about  twelve  thousand  men  of  all  arms.  At  Island  No.  10  and 
New  Madrid  are  some  four  thousand  men,  to  which  add  Rugglcs's  brigade  and 
one  under  General  Chalmers  at  luka,  say  five  thousand  more;  thus  you  will 
perceive  I  have  a  force  at  my  disposition  of  but  twenty-one  thousand.  If  we 
remain  supine  and  unarouscd  to  the  dangers  accumulating  day  by  day,  await 
ing  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  he  will  assemble  such  a  force  as  to  insure  his 
success  and  a  repetition  of  the  late  disasters,  only  with  more  desolating  con 
sequences. 

"  Hence,  I  have  thought  I  would  submit,  for  the  consideration  of  the  govern 
ors  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  States,*  a  plan  which  I  deem  most  practicable  foy 
the  recovery  of  our  losses  and  the  defence  of  this  river,  and  call  upon  them 
for  the  means  of  execution. 

"I  propose  that  the  governors  of  the  States  of  Tennessee,  Mississippi,  and 
Alabama,  and  your  Excellency,  shall  fiich  furnish  me  with  from  five  thousand  to 
ten  thousand  men,  armed  and  equipped,  with  the  utmost  possible  celerity; 
for  time  is  precious,  and  despatch  essential  to  success.  I  shall  call  on  General 
Van  Dorn  to  unite  his  forces  with  mine,  and,  leaving  a  suitable  garrison  at 
Columbus,  with  troops  to  guard  and  hold  my  rear  at  Island  No.  10,  I  would 
then  take  the  field  with  at  least  forty  thousand  men,  march  on  Paducah,  seize 
and  close  the  mouths  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers;  aided  by 
gun-boats,  I  would  also  successfully  assail  Cairo,  and  threaten,  if  not,  indeed, 
take,  St.  Louis  itself. 

k'In  this  way,  be  assured,  we  may  most  certainly  and  speedily  recover  our 
losses  and  insure  the  defence  of  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  and  every  man 


*  This  confidential  circular  was  sent  by  special  messengers  to  the  governors 
of  Tennessee,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Louisiana  —  the  rendezvous  of  the 
troops  furnished  to  be  as  follows:  those  from  Tennessee,  at  Jackson,  Tcnn.  ; 
from  Alabama,  at  Corinth;  from  Mississippi, at  Grand  Junction;  from  Louis 
iana,  at  Jackson,  Tenn.,  if  b}7  railroad,  and  at  Columbus,  Ky.,  if  by  water. 
I. —1C 


2^2  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

you  may  send  me  will  really  be  placed  in  the  best  possible  position  for  the 
defence  of  his  own  home  and  hearthstone. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

<k  G.  T.  BEAUHEGAIID,  General  C.  S.  A.r 

He  also  called  upon  General  Bragg  for  what  forces  he  could 
spare  from  Pensacola  and  Mobile,  inviting  him  to  come  in  person, 
if  he  could.  A  similar  demand  for  troops  he  addressed  to  Gen 
eral  Lovell,  at  !N"ew  Orleans ;  and  General  Yan  Dorn  was  request 
ed  to  join  him  at  once,  with  ten  thousand  of  his  forces,  from 
Arkansas,  across  the  Mississippi.  The  following  is  the  letter  de 
spatched  to  General  Yan  Dorn.  Its  importance  and  historical 
value  justify  us  in  transcribing  it  here  : 

"  JACKSON,  TEXX.,  February  21st,  1862. 

"  My  dear  General, — By  the  fall  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers,  the 
forces  under  General  Polk  (now  to  be  under  me)  are  entirely  cut  off  from  those 
under  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  and  must  henceforth  depend  upon  themselves 
alone  for  the  defence  of  the  Mississippi  River  and  contiguous  States;  the  fall 
of  Columbus,  and  of  Island  No.  10,  must  necessarily  be  followed  by  the  loss  of 
the  whole  Mississippi  Valley,  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  River.  The 
fate  of  Missouri  necessarily  depends  on  the  successful  defence  of  Columbus, 
and  of  Island  No.  10;  hence,  we  must,  if  possible,  combine  our  operations  not 
only  to  defend  those  positions,  but  also  to  take  the  offensive,  as  soon  as  prac 
ticable,  to  recover  some  of  our  lost  ground.  I  have  just  called  on  the  govern 
ors  of  Tennessee,  Louisiana,  and  Mississippi,  for  five  thousand  men  from  each 
State.  I  have  fifteen  thousand  disposable  for  the  field  ;  if  you  could  certain 
ly  join  me,  via  New  Madrid  or  Columbus,  with  ten  thousand  more,  we  could 
thus  take  the  field  with  forty  thousand-jnen,  take  Cairo,  Paducah,  the  mouth 
of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers,  and,  most  probably,  be  able  to  take 
also  St.  Louis,  by  the  river.  "What  say  you  to  this  brilliant  programme  which 
I  know  is  fully  practicable,  if  we  can  get  the  forces  ?  At  all  events,  we  must 
do  something  or  die  in  the  attempt,  otherwise,  all  will  be  shortly  lost. 
u  Yours  truly  and  sincerely, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGAHD,  General  C.  S.  A. 

"  EARL  VAN  DORN,  Commanding,  etc.,  Pocahontas,  Arkansas. 

"P.  S. — I  expect  also  the  co-operation  of  twelve  gunboats  from  New  Orleans. 
I  will  inform  you  of  the  governors'  answers,  as  soon  as  received. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.'' 

General  Beauregard  was  of  the  opinion,  and  so  expressed  it. 
at  the  time,  that  the  usefulness  of  Van  Dora's  command  would 
be  greater  east  of  the  Mississippi  than  in  the  position  it  then 
occupied,  and  that  New  Orleans  itself  would  be  better  defended 
by  the  concentration  he  was  endeavoring  to  effect,  than  by  any  of- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  243 

fort  made  at  its  own  gates,  when  all  outside  barriers  should  have 
been  destroyed  and  swept  away.  lie  asked  that  all  troops  sent 
him  should  be  provided,  upon  starting,  with  three  days'  cooked 
rations,  arid  forty  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man.  And  in  order 
to  secure  additional  strength,  and  increase  his  chances  of  success, 
lie  also  sent  to  General  Johnston,  then  at  Murfreesboro',  urging 
him  to  abandon  his  line  of  retreat,  along  the  Stevenson  and  Chat 
tanooga  Railroad,  which  was  taking  him  farther  and  farther  away, 
and,  unless  the  enemy  should  anticipate,  or  intercept  him,  to  turn 
towards  Decatur,  from  which  quarter  he  would  then  be  within 
easy  distance  to  co-operate  with  or  join  him.  Thus  was  he  mak 
ing  all  possible  preparation,  in  case  he  should  succeed  in  levying 
and  assembling  the  troops  he  had  called  for,  from  so  many  differ 
ent  points. 

On  the  20th  he  sent  despatches  to  each  of  the  governors  of  the 
above-mentioned  States,  notifying  them  that  special  messengers 
would  go  to  them,  from  him,  on  important  public  business.  And 
the  next  morning  (the  22d)  the  following  members  of  his  stair 
left  his  headquarters,  at  Jackson,  Tennessee,  upon  their  several 
missions :  Lieutenant  (afterwards  General)  S.  W.  Ferguson  went 
to  General  Johnston  and  Governor  Harris,  at  Murfreesboro' ;  Lieu 
tenant  A.  R.  Chisolm,  to  Governor  Shorter,  of  Alabama,  and  Ma 
jor-General  Bragg,  at  Mobile  ;  Dr.  Samuel  Choppin,  to  Governor 
Moore,  of  Louisiana,  and  Major-General  Lovell,  at  Xew  Orleans ; 
Lieutenant  A.  !N".  T.  Bean  regard,  to  Governor  Pettus,  of  Mississip 
pi  ;  and  Major  B.  B.  Wuddell,  who  was  well  acquainted  with  the 
country  in  the  Trans-Mississippi,  was  sent  to  General  Van  Dorn, 
the  location  of  whose  headquarters  had  not  yet  been  ascertained. 

General  Beau  regard  also  wrote  to  General  Cooper,  at  Richmond, 
asking  for  any  instructions  the  War  Department  might  think  prop 
er  to  give  him,  with  regard  to  this  calling  out  of  State  troops,  and 
as  to  the  movement  he  had  requested  General  Van  Dorn  to  make 
out  of  the  limits  of  his  department,  in  order  to  join  him  in  his 
contemplated  operations.  He  represented  that  all  operations  in 
States  bordering  on  the  Mississippi  River  should  be  made  subor 
dinate  to  the  secure  possession  of  that  river,  which,  if  lost,  would 
involve  the  complete  isolation  and  destruction  of  any  army  west 
of  it. 

The  War  Department  did  not  approve  of  this  call  on  the  govern 
ors  of  the  States,  for  sixty  or  ninety  days  troops,  objecting  that 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

there  was  no  law  authorizing  such  a  levy,  and  that  it  interfered 
with  the  "War  Department's  own  recruiting  operations.  General 
Beatiregard  answered  that  the  call  was  to  be  made  by  each  gov 
ernor,  in  the  name  of  his  own  State,  and  that  after  the  expected 
battle,  the  troops  thus  levied  might,  on  their  return  home,  enlist 
under  the  general  government.  These  reasons  appear  to  have 
been  satisfactory,  as  no  further  opposition  was  offered. 

General  Johnston,  who  was  then  at  Murfreesboro',  reorganizing 
his  troops,  on  his  way  towards  Stevenson,  acceded  to  General 
Beauregard's  request,  and,  some  days  later,  upon  completing  his 
reorganization,  changed  his  line  of  march  towards  Decatur,  via 
Shelbyville,  Fayetteville,  and  Huutsville.  General  Bragg  refer 
red  the  question  of  compliance  with  General  Beauregard's  re 
quest  to  the  War  Department,  which,  as  he  informed  General 
Beauregard,  left  it  to  his  own  discretion.  He  decided  to  go  at 
once,  and  furnish  about  ten  thousand  men,  including  three  regi 
ments  that  he  had  already  sent  to  Chattanooga,  to  reinforce 
General  Johnston,  and  some  other  regiments  on  their  way  to 
that  point,  which  he  recalled.  General  Lovell  also  cheerfully 
responded — so  did  the  four  governors — promising  to  do  their 
utmost  in  furtherance  of  the  plan,  and  to  rendezvous  their  troops 
as  requested,  with  the  rations,  and  forty  rounds  of  ammunition 
called  for.  It  was  not  until  later,  however,  that  any  news  could 
be  had  from  General  Yan  Dorn,  he  being  then  engaged  in  a 
movement  which  resulted  in  the  battle  of  Elkhorn,  with  the  Fed 
erals,  under  General  Lyon. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  945 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

Evacuation  of  Columbus. — How  the  Enemy  Discovered  It. — Loss  of  Ordnance 
Stores,  Anchors,  and  Torpedoes. — Island  No.  10. — Difficulty  in  Placing 
Guns  in  Position. — Federal  Gunboats  might  have  Passed  Unhindered. — 
Small  Garrison  under  Colonel  Gautt  Reinforced  by  General  McCown  with 
Part  of  the  Garrison  of  Columbus. — Defences  at  New  Madrid  to  be  held  un 
til  the  Completion  of  the  Works  at  Fort  Pillow. — Remainder  of  General 
Folk's  Forces  Assembled  upon  Ilumboldt. — Preparations  for  an  Offensive 
Movement  by  the  Enemy. — Danger  of  Isolation  for  General  Johnston. — 
General  Beaurcgard's  Letter  to  him. — The  Great  Battle  of  the  Controversy 
to  be  Fought  at  or  near  Corinth. — General  Johnston  accedes  to  General 
Beaurcgard's  request,  and  Begins  a  Movement  to  Join  him. — General 
Bcaurcgard  Assumes  Command. — Arrival  of  General  Bragg's  Forces  at 
Corinth. — Corinth  the  Chief  Point  of  Concentration,  as  Originally  De 
cided  upon. — General  Bcaurcgard  Appeals  to  the  AVar  Department  for 
the  General  Officers  Promised  him. — Their  Services  Greatly  Needed. — 
Unwillingness  and  Apathy  of  the  War  Department. 

IT  will  be  remembered  that  one  of  the  conditions  of  General 
Beauregard's  departure  for  the  Mississippi  Valley  was,  that  he 
should  be  furnished  with  a  certain  number  of  officers  from  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  should  their  services  be  needed,  some  of 
them  to  be  promoted  to  be  brigadier-generals  and  others  to  be  ma 
jor-generals.  Early  in  February  a  list  of  their  names  was  left  with 
the  War  Department  by  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan,  General  Beaure 
gard's  Adjutant  and  Chief  of  Stall.  On  the  20th  of  that  month 
General  Beanregard  called  for  Captains  "Wampler  and  Fremeaux, 
as  Assistant  Engineers,  to  aid  in  constructing  the  several  defences 
on  the  Mississippi  Iliver ;  and  for  Major  G.  W.  Brent,  as  Inspect 
or  and  Judge-Advocate-General,  whose  immediate  services  were 
much  needed  at  the  time.  After  considerable  delay,  the  two  en 
gineers  only  were  sent :  Captain  Fremeaux  arriving  a  few  days 
previous  to  the  impending  battle,  and  Captain  "Warn pier  not  until 
it  had  been  fought.  Closely  following  this  first  demand  upon  the 
War  Department,  General  Beauregard,  with  a  view  properly  to  or 
ganize  the  forces  under  General  Polk,  and  the  new  levies  daily 
expected,  formally  applied  for  the  general  officers  so  greatly  need- 


246  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

ed  for  the  efficiency  of  his  command  ;  carefully  explaining  that  no 
suitable  subdivision  of  the  troops  had  yet  been  made,  or  could  be 
practicable,  without  their  assistance.  His  request,  however,  re 
mained  unheeded,  or,  rather,  after  much  controversy,  was  only 
partly  complied  with  at  the  last  hour,  and  not  according  to  his  de 
sires,  nor  in  the  manner  promised.  We  shall  again  refer  to  this 
subject  as  we  proceed  with  the  present  chapter. 

Meanwhile,  General  Polk  was  making  preparations  for  the  evac 
uation  of  Columbus,  which  began  on  the  25th  of  February.  The 
next  day  he  requested  General  Beauregard  to  join  him  there,  but 
this  the  latter  was  unable  to  do,  being  yet  too  unwell  to  under 
take  the  journey.  He  continued,  however,  to  send  directions 
to  General  Polk,  as  the  necessity  arose  respecting  certain  main 
points  of  the  evacuation,  and  particularly  as  to  the  occupation  of 
New  Madrid.  So  imminent  was  the  danger  of  an  attack  upon 
that  place,  that  he  had  telegraphed  General  Johnston  for  a  bri 
gade  to  be  sent  there,  as  soon  as  possible,  by  railroad ;  a  request 
which,  it  seems,  could  not  be  complied  with.  On  the  28th,  his 
Adjutant- General  was  sent  to  Columbus,  to  suggest  the  estab 
lishment  of  a  telegraphic  line  between  Humboldt  or  Union 
City  and  Island  No.  10,  by  means  of  which  that  now  important 
position — the  left  of  his  new  defensive  line — should  be  brought 
into  immediate  communication  with  his  headquarters.  Colonel 
Jordan  was  also  commissioned  to  advise  General  Polk  in  person 
as  to  the  evacuation  then  in  process  of  execution,  which  he  did. 
He  then  returned  without  delay  to  Jackson. 

The  evacuation  of  Columbus  was  completed  on  the  2d  of 
March,  owing,  in  no  small  degree,  to  a  lack  of  watchfulness  and 
daring  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  So  cautious  in  their  reconnoi 
tring  had  the  Federal  gunboats  been,  that  the  fact  that  Columbus 
was  unoccupied  was  only  discovered  by  them  on  the  4th,  and  then 
by  mere  accident.  While  slowly  advancing  down  the  river,  they 
were  much  surprised  at  the  sight  of  a  United  States'  flag  flying 
over  the  place.  It  had  been  hoisted  there  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
3d,  by  a  troop  of  Federal  cavalry,  who,  attracted  by  a  cloud  of 
smoke  rising  from  the  quarters  and  storehouses,  and  prudently 
creeping  up  to  the  works,  had  thus  discovered  the  real  state  of  the 
case.  These  buildings  had  been  set  on  fire  by  injudicious  orders, 
the  day  before  the  appearance  of  the  reconnoitring  party.  In  the 
hurry  of  final  departure,  some  ordnance  and  a  quantity  of  ord- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  247 

nance  stores,  torpedoes,  and  anchors — the  latter  much  needed  for 
river  obstructions  at  Xew  Orleans — were  left  behind  and  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

At  Island  No.  10  and  the  batteries  in  the  Bend,  the  difficulty 
of  placing  the  guns  in  position  from  the  spot  where  they  had  been 
landed  was  such  that  for  at  least  two  days  neither  of  those  de 
fences  could  have  successfully  resisted  the  passage — if  attempted 
—of  any  of  the  Federal  gunboats.  Had  Commodore  Foote  then 
displayed  the  boldness  which  he  afterwards  showed  at  the  same 
place,  and  which  so  characterized  Admirals  Farragut  and  Buchan 
an,  and  Captain  Brown,  of  the  Arkansas,  he  might  have  passed 
without  much  resistance  and  captured  New  Orleans  from  the  rear. 
Instead  of  this,  he  merely  left  a  gunboat  and  two  mortar-boats  to 
protect  Columbus  from  the  river,  and,  with  the  remainder,  quietly 
returned  to  Cairo.* 

A  part  of  the  heavy  armament  and  ammunition  from  Colum 
bus  was  sent  to  the  unfinished  batteries  on  the  upper  end  of  Island 
No.  10,  a  naturally  good  and  defensible  position  in  Xew  Madrid 
Bend,  and  to  those  on  the  main  Tennessee  shore.  The  small  gar 
rison  under  Colonel  Gantt,  at  New  Madrid,  a  little  town  on  the 
Missouri  bank  of  the  river,  about  sixty  miles  below  Columbus, 
and  ten,  more  or  less,  from  Island  Xo.  10,  was  reinforced  by  Gen 
eral  McCown,  with  part  of  the  garrison  of  Columbus,  and  was  has 
tily  fortified  with  field-works.  General  McCown,  with  about  seven 
thousand  men,  was  placed  in  command  of  all  the  defences  at  Mad 
rid  Bend,  intended  to  be  held  only  long  enough  to  permit  the  com 
pletion  of  the  stronger  and  more  important  works  designed  for 
Fort  Pillow,  to  which  the  remainder  of  the  heavy  armament  and 
ammunition  from  Columbus  had  already  been  sent.  This  position 
(Fort  Pillow),  about  fifty-nine  miles  above  Memphis,  which,  as  yet, 
was  but  partly  fortified,  General  Beauregard  had  determined  to 
strengthen  and  hold,  with  a  garrison  not  to  exceed  four  thousand 
men,  as  the  left  of  his  new  defensive  line,  already  referred  to,  cov 
ering  Memphis,  and  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad. 

What  was  left  of  General  Folk's  forces  (about  seven  thousand 
men)  was  then  assembled,  mainly  upon  Ilumboldt,  at  the  inter 
section  of  the  Memphis  and  Louisville  and  Mobile  and  Ohio  Rail 
roads — a  point  having  central  relation  and  railroad  communication 

*  See  "Record  of  the  Rebellion;1  vol.  iv.  p.  22G. 


24:8  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

with  the  principal  towns  in  west  Tennessee  and  north  Mississippi. 
A  strong  line  of  infantry  outposts  was  established  from  Union 
City,  on  the  left,  to  Lexington,  on  the  right,  by  the  way  of  Dresden 
and  Huntington,  protected  by  a  line  of  cavalry  pickets  thrown 
well  out  in  advance,  from  Hickman,  on  the  Mississippi,  to  Paris, 
near  the  Tennessee  Eiver.  Mounted  parties,  supplied  with  light 
artillery,  patrolled  the  west  bank  of  the  latter  stream,  and  kept 
General  Beauregard  well  informed  of  the  movements  of  the  ene 
my's  boats. 

During  the  evacuation  of  Columbus,  reports  of  great  prepara 
tions  for  an  offensive  movement  had  reached  General  Beaure^ard 

o 

from  the  Federal  rendezvous  at  Cairo,  Paducah,  and  Fort  Henry. 
Pope's  forces  were  then  moving  upon  New  Madrid,  the  left  of  our 
river  defences,  and  it  seemed  evident  that  the  abandonment  of  Co 
lumbus  must  necessarily  stimulate  active  hostile  operations  in  the 
valley. 

Convinced  that  there  was  early  danger  to  be  apprehended  from 
the  direction  of  the  Tennessee  River,  which  might  result  in  com 
pletely  isolating  General  Johnston's  forces,  General  Beauregard, 
who  now  had  the  assurance  of  being  soon  joined  by  General  Bragg 
and  the  reinforcements  promised  him  by  the  governors  to  whom 
he  had  applied,  on  the  2d  of  March  despatched  Captain  Otey,  of 
his  staff,  to  General  Johnston,  with  written  evidence  of  the  ene 
my's  threatening  intentions,  and  with  a  short  but  impressive  letter, 
urging  him  to  hurry  forward  his  troops  by  railroad  to  Corinth. 

This  letter  read  as  follows : 

"  JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  2d,  1802. 

"Dear  General, — I  send  you  herewith  enclosed  a  slip  showing  the  intended 
movements  of  the  enemy,  no  doubt  against  the  troops  in  western  Tennessee.  I 
think  you  ought  to  hurry  up  your  troops  to  Corinth  by  railroad,  as  soon  as 
practicable,  for  there  or  thereabouts  will  soon  be  fought  the  great  battle  of  this 
controversy.  General  Bragg  is  with  me  ;  we  are  trying  to  organize  every 
thing  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Yours  truly, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

"General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Stevenson,  Ala." 

On  the  same  day,  and  to  the  same  effect,  he  also  telegraphed 
General  Johnston,  reaffirming  the  urgency  of  a  junction  at  Cor 
inth,  and  asking  specially  for  the  9th  and  10th  Mississippi  and 
5th  Georgia  regiments,  under  Brigadier-General  J.  E.  Jackson, 
they  having  been  sent  to  Chattanooga,  by  order  of  the  "War  De 
partment,  to  reinforce  General  Johnston,  then  moving  upon  Steven- 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD. 

con,  and  about  the  disposition  of  whose  troops,  and  projected  plans, 
Mr.  Benjamin  wrote  that  he  "  was  still  without  any  satisfactory 
information."*  General  Beauregard  was  most  anxious  that  these 
troops  should  at  once  reach  Corinth — now  become  the  important 
strategic  point — in  anticipation  of  the  arrival  there  of  the  rein 
forcements  coming  from  the  adjacent  States. 

On  the  3d,  General  Johnston,  through  Colonel  Mackall,  A.  A. 
G.,  replied,  from  Shelby  ville,  that  the  10th  Mississippi  would  be 
forwarded  from  Chattanooga,  and  that  his  own  army  would  move 
as  rapidly  as  it  could  march,  lie  then  answered  General  Beaure- 
gard's  letter,  from  Fayetteville,  on  the  5th,  stating  that  his  army 
was  advancing;  that  it  had  already  reached  that  place;  would 
move  on  to  join  him,  as  fast  as  possible ;  and  that,  upon  his  arrival 
at  Decatur,  he  would  decide  upon  the  promptest  mode  of  effect 
ing  the  desired  junction. 

General  Beauregard,  by  most  strenuous  efforts,  and  in  the  face 
of  almost  insurmountable  obstacles,  was  thus  enabled  to  hope  that 
all  our  available  forces  would  be  assembled  in  the  quarter  desig 
nated,  ready  to  meet  the  enemy  as  soon  as  he  should  venture  upon 
the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee  Iliver,  and  before  he  could  be  fully 
prepared  for  our  attack. 

Hitherto,  in  order  to  avoid  the  burden  of  the  irksome  details  in 
cident  to  the  organization  of  an  army,  General  Beauregard  had 
not  assumed  command,  but  had  directed  matters  through  General 
Polk;  but  as  the  new  levies  and  reinforcements  were  now  gath 
ering,  and  as  there  was  a  prospect  of  an  early  encounter  with  the 
enemy,  he  determined  formally  to  assume  command,  and,  on  the  5th 
of  March,  issued  the  following  order  to  the  forces  under  him : 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI. 
"JACKSON,  TESX.,  March  5^,  1862. 

"  Soldiers, — I  assume  this  day  command  of  the  'Army  of  the  Mississippi,'  for 
the  defence  of  our  homes  and  liberties,  and  to  resist  the  subjugation,  spoliation, 
and  dishonor  of  our  people.  Our  mothers  and  wives,  our  sisters  and  children, 
expect  us  to  do  our  dut}',  even  to  the  sacrifice  of  our  lives. 

"  Our  losses,  since  the  commencement  of  the  war,  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners,  are  now  about  the  same  as  those  of  the  enemy. 

"He  must  be  made  to  atone  for  the  reverses  we  have  lately  experienced. 
Those  reverses,  far  from  disheartening,  must  nerve  us  to  new  deeds  of  valor 

*  See  Mr.  Benjamin's  letter  to  General  Bragg,  dated  Richmond,  Va.,  Febru 
ary  18th,  18C2. 


250  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

and  patriotism,  and  should  inspire  us  with  an  unconquerable  determination  to 
drive  back  our  invaders. 

"  Should  any  one  in  this  army  be  unequal  to  the  task  before  us,  let  him 
transfer  his  arms  and  equipments  at  once  to  braver,  firmer  hands,  and  return 
to  his  home. 

"  Our  cause  is  as  just  and  sacred  as  ever  animated  men  to  take  up  arms,  and 
if  we  are  true  to  it  and  to  ourselves,  with  the  continued  protection  of  the  Al 
mighty,  we  must  and  shall  triumph. 

"  G.  T.  BEAIHIEGARD,  General  Comdg." 

Recent  information  had  led  General  Beauregard  to  look  upon 
Pittsburg,  on  the  Tennessee,  as  one  of  the  places  likely  to  be  se 
lected  by  the  enemy  for  a  landing ;  and  on  the  1st  he  had  ordered 
General  Ruggles  to  occupy  it,  and  make  it,  as  well  as  Hamburg,  a 
point  of  observation.  This  required  the  substitution  of  Bethel  Sta 
tion,  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  for  McNairy's,  as  one  of  the 
places  appointed  for  the  assembling  of  the  Tennessee  troops. 

The  order  concerning  Pittsburg  was  executed  by  General  Rug 
gles,  who  sent  thither  the  18th  Louisiana,  one  of  the  finest  regi 
ments  from  that  State,  supported  by  Captain  Gibson's  battery  of 
light  artillery.  On  the  day  following,  General  Beauregard's  fore 
sight  was  shown  to  have  been  accurate  by  the  enemy  attempting 
to  make  a  landing  at  that  point.  The  18th  Louisiana,  armed  with 
rifles  and  smooth-bore  muskets,  and  firing  from  the  steep  bluffs 
overhanging  the  river,  forced  the  landing  party  to  take  to  their 
boats,  and  even  drove  back  the  two  gunboats  —  the  Lexington 
and  Tyler  —  inflicting  severe  loss  upon  them.  This  dashing 
and  curious  encounter  caused  the  regiment'"  to  be  highly  com 
plimented  in  general  orders.  Had  the  supporting  battery  stood 
its  ground  and  exhibited  equal  intrepidity,  not  only  would  the 
whole  landing  party  have  been  captured,  but  probably  the  fore 
most  of  the  two  gunboats  would  also  have  fallen  into  our  hands. 

General  Bragg's  forces  began  to  arrive  at  Corinth,  from  Mobile 
and  Pensacola,  on  the  6th.  lie  had  reported  in  person  to  General 
Beauregard,  at  Jackson,  on  the  evening  of  the  2d,  and  was  placed 
at  once  in  charge  of  that  portion  of  the  forces  assembling  at  Cor 
inth,  with  definite  instructions  as  to  their  organization  into  bri 
gades  and  divisions,  and  as  to  supplying  them  with  equipments, 

*  The  18th  Louisiana  was,  at  that  time,  under  Colonels  Mouton  and  Roman 
and  Major  Bush.  Later  it  acquired  additional  fame  under  the  heroic  Armant, 
killed  at  Mansfield.  Colonel  Jos.  CoUins,  of  New  Orleans,  was  its  last  commander. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD.  251 

transportation,  ammunition,  and  tents,  according  to  our  limited 
means. 

General  Ecaurcgard  now  directed  General  Eragg  to  examine 
critically  the  position  of  Monterey,  about  half-way  from  Corinth 
to  Pittsburg  or  Hamburg;  for  though  he  had  selected  Corinth  as 
the  chief  point  of  concentration  for  his  reinforcements,  yet,  from 
examination  of  the  map,  the  advanced  position  of  Monterey  seemed 
to  offer  such  advantages  for  a  sudden  offensive  movement,  in  case 
the  enemy  should  land  at  either  of  those  places,  that  he  was  in 
clined  to  substitute  Monterey  for  Corinth,  as  he  could  move  from 
either  with  equal  facility,  to  the  defensive  position  of  Yellow 
Creek,  in  advance  of  Burnsville,  should  the  enemy  decide  upon 
effecting  a  landing  at  Eastport.  General  Bragg,  however,  having 
reported  in  favor  of  Corinth,  on  account  of  the  character  of  the 
roads  and  the  deficiency  of  transportation  among  the  reinforce 
ments  arriving  there,  Corinth  remained,  as  originally  determined 
upon  by  General  Eeauregard,  the  grand  central  point  for  the  rally 
ing  and  concentration  of  all  the  Confederate  forces. 

The  services  of  the  officers  General  Eeauregard  had  called  for 
now  became  indispensable,  in  view  of  the  great  diligence  and  en 
ergy  displayed  in  the  assembling  of  his  furces.  Though  required 
for  the  proper  organization  of  the  troops  under  General  Polk, 
these  officers  were  even  more  needed  to  assist  General  Eragg  in 
preparing  for  the  field  the  large  number  of  raw  Confederate  and 
State  forces  just  concentrated  at  the  three  points  designated,  Cor 
inth,  Grand  Junction,  and  Bethel.  Every  moment  was  precious, 
and  rapid  and  determined  action  imperative.  On  the  4th  of 
March,  General  Beauregard,  therefore,  again  urgently  asked  for 
two  major-generals  and  live  brigadiers — one  of  the  latter  to  serve 
with  the  cavalry — and  all  to  be  ordered  to  report  immediately  to 
him.  To  his  great  surprise  —  and  greater  disappointment  —  the 
War  Department  replied  that  these  officers  could  not  be  spared. 
General  Beauregard's  perplexity  was  extreme.  lie  could  not  ac 
count  for  the  procrastination  and  evident  unwillingness  shown  by 
the  War  Department.  Here  was  an  incongruous  army,  concen 
trated  under  the  greatest  difficulties  imaginable,  ready  for  any  sac 
rifice,  eager  to  meet  the  enemy,  but  whose  organization  and  effec 
tiveness  were  fearfully  impaired  by  the  absolute  want  of  general 
officers,  to  enforce  discipline  and  establish  harmony  between  its 
several  parts.  General  Beauregard  could  not  quietly  acquiesce  in 


252  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

such  supineness.  He  appealed  to  the  "War  Department,  "  for  the 
sake  of  our  cause  and  country,"  to  send,  at  once,  Colonel  Mackall 
as  major-general,  and  three  officers  recommended  by  hirn  for  bri 
gadiers,  with  Colonel  Ransom  to  take  charge  of  the  cavalry.  He 
was  informed  that  Colonel  Mackall  had  been  nominated  for  bri 
gadier,  and  that  all  officers  designed  for  promotion  must  be  selected 
from  among  those  of  his  own  present  army.  As  General  Beaure- 
gard  had  then  with  him  very  few  graduates  of  West  Point,  or  of 
other  military  schools,  or  officers  of  any  experience,  he  answered, 
on  the  7th,  that  he  knew  of  none  to  recommend ;  but  he  for 
warded,  for  immediate  action,  a  list  containing  the  names  of  two 
major-generals  and  six  brigadiers,  suggested  by  Generals  Bragg 
and  Polk;  and,  as  there  was  still  no  cavalry  colonel  to  recommend, 
he  repeated  his  application  for  Colonel  Hansom.  On  the  8th  he 
also  asked  that  either  Colonel  R.  B.  Lee  or  Major  Williams,  of  his 
former  Army  of  Virginia,  be  sent  him,  for  the  important  duties  of 
Chief  Commissary,  as  he  had,  in  his  present  command,  no  officers 
of  equal  experience  to  select  from ;  and  he  earnestly  inquired 
whether  Major  G.  W.  Brent  would  be  sent  him  for  inspector,  as 
he  needed  the  services  of  such  an  officer  almost  hourly.  The 
reply  came,  that  the  promotions  as  general  officers  could  not  be 
made  until  he  recommended  them  from  his  own  personal  experi 
ence  of  their  merits. 

The  existing  state  of  affairs  had  become  all  the  more  embarrass 
ing  for  the  reason  that  General  Beauregard's  scouts  reported  large 
forces  of  the  enemy  moving,  in  transports,  up  the  Tennessee  River, 
with  the  probability  of  an  early  landing,  at  any  moment.  He,  there 
fore,  overlooking  the  discourtesy  shown  and  the  annoyance  occasion 
ed  him  by  the  War  Department,  asked  that  permission  be  given  him 
to  appoint  acting  brigadiers  and  major-generals,  to  supply  the  im 
mediate  wants  of  his  army.  He  again  received  an  unfavorable 
reply.  His  request,  said  the  War  Department,  was  irregular  and 
unauthorized  by  law.  Not  knowing  what  further  step  to  take,  he 
telegraphed  General  Cooper,  unofficially,  that  if  the  officers  he  had 
applied  for  the  day  before  were  denied  him  (so  disastrous  might 
be  the  consequences,  from  the  fact  that  part  of  his  forces  were  in 
a  state  of  chaos,  and  his  health  too  greatly  affected  to  allow  him, 
if  unaided,  to  establish  order  around  him),  he  would  forthwith  re 
quest  to  be  relieved  from  his  present  command.  The  obstructive 
policy  of  the  government  so  palpably  thwarted  his  efforts  and  en- 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  253 

dangcred  the  success  of  his  plans,  that  lie  had  even  resolved,  should 
it  be  longer  persevered  in,  to  tender  his  resignation. 

By  telegram  of  the  9th,  received  on  the  llth,  he  was  notified 
that  the  following  officers  were  nominated  for  his  command :  J. 
L.  Bowen,  as  major-general ;  J.  M.  Ilawes,  J.  E.  Slaughter,  and  S. 
M.  Walker,  as  brigadiers ;  Ilawes  for  the  cavalry.  lie  was  also 
notified  that  Ransom  was  appointed  a  brigadier,  but  must  be  sent 
to  North  Carolina,  as  his  presence  there  was  of  the  first  impor 
tance;  and  that  Samuel  Jones  had  been  promoted  to  be  major-gen 
eral,  but  could  not  be  spared  from  Mobile.  We  must  here  state 
that  Bowen  was  not  confirmed  as  major-general,  and  did  not  re 
port ;  nor  did  Ilawes,  until  about  a  month  later,  and  just  before 
the  battle  of  Shiloh.  General  Beauregard  at  once  replied  that  he 
had  called  for  ten  generals,  as  absolutely  indispensable  to  the 
efficiency  of  his  forces ;  that  out  of  the  four  granted  him,  two  only 
were  present  for  duty;  and  that,  as  the  enemy  was  already  en 
gaged  with  his  left  at  Xew  Madrid,  he  would  not  hold  himself 
responsible  for  the  consequences  that  might  ensue.  He  appealed, 
at  the  same  time,  to  some  leading  members  of  Congress,  urging 
them  to  use  their  influence  with  the  government,  so  as  to  change 
its  unaccountable  policy  in  matters  of  such  vital  importance  to 
the  Confederacy ;  but  this  was  of  no  effect.  The  course  of  the 
War  Department  resulted  disastrously,  as  General  Beauregard 
had  apprehended;  for  it  contributed  towards  delaying,  by  several 
days,  our  subsequent  offensive  movement  from  Corinth,  against 
the  enemy  at  Pittsburg  Landing. 


254:  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTEK    XVIII. 

General  Beauregard  Orders  the  Collection  of  Grain  and  Provisions,  and  Es 
tablishes  Depots  of  Supplies. — His  Appeal  to  the  People  to  Procure  Met 
al  for  the  Casting  of  Cannon. — Warning  Preparations  of  the  Enemy. — 
Arrival  of  Federal  Divisions  at  Savannah. — General  Sherman's  Attempt 
ed  Raid  to  Destroy  the  Railroad.— Burning  of  Small  Bridge  near  Bethel 
Station. — General  Pope  Before  New  Madrid. — The  Place  Abandoned. — 
General  Beauregard's  Instructions  to  General  McCown. — General  Mackall 
Relieves  him. — Bombardment  of  Island  No.  10. — What  might  have  been 
the  Result  had  the  Enemy  Disembarked  at  once  at  Pittsburg  Landing. — 
The  Troops  we  had  to  Oppose  Them. — What  General  Johnston  Thought 
of  Bolivar  as  a  Base  of  Operation.  —  Recommends  it  as  more  Advanta 
geous  than  Corinth. — Why  General  Beauregard  Preferred  Corinth. — He 
Presses  Concentration  there,  as  soon  as  the  Intentions  of  the  Enemy  be 
come  Sufficiently  Developed. — Success  of  his  Plan. — Co-operation  of  the 
Governors  of  Adjacent  States. — Troops  Poorly  Armed  and  Equipped. — 
The  Enemy  begins  Landing  at  Pittsburg. — Arrival  of  Ilurlbut's,  Prentiss's, 
McClernand's,  and  the  Two  Wallaces'  Divisions. — Force  of  the  Army  Op 
posing  us. — General  Buell. — His  Slow  Advance  on  Nashville. — Is  at  Last 
Aroused  by  Order  to  Unite  his  Forces  with  those  of  General  Grant.— 
Aggregate  of  Buell's  Forces  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. — Our  only  Hope 
for  Success  was  to  Strike  a  Sudden  Blow  before  the  Junction  of  Buell 
and  Grant. 

LOOKING  to  the  evacuation  of  Columbus  and  the  concentration 
of  troops  at  and  around  Corinth,  General  Beauregard  had  ordered, 
early  in  March,  the  immediate  collection  of  the  requisite  quantity 
of  grain  and  provisions,  at  Union  City,  Humboldt,  Jackson,  and 
Henderson,  in  West  Tennessee,  and  at  Corinth,  Grand  Junction, 
and  luka,  in  Mississippi,  with  the  establishment  of  chief  de 
pots  of  supplies  of  all  kinds,  at  Columbus,  Mississippi,  and  Gre 
nada.  At  this  latter  place  he  had  endeavored  to  establish  a 
percussion-cap  manufactory,  which  he  looked  upon  as  very  im 
portant,  because  the  difficulty  of  procuring  a  proper  supply  of 
this  essential  part  of  our  ammunition  had  become  great ;  but  he 
failed  in  his  efforts  to  accomplish  the  purpose.  Foreseeing  also 
that  the  demand  for  powder  would  soon  increase  in  the  Missis 
sippi  Valley,  he  made  a  second — but  likewise  fruitless — effort  to 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  255 

start  a  powder  factory  at  Meridian,  a  point  lie  considered,  and 
rightly  so,  safe  from  Federal  intrusion,  and  one  which,  in  fact, 
was  held  by  the  Confederates  until  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  need  of  metal  for  the  casting  of  field-guns  was  already 
a  subject  of  most  serious  consideration  for  our  leaders.  The 
guns  the  Confederacy  had,  in  the  field  and  elsewhere,  were  in 
adequate,  and  that  more  were  required  was  evident  to  all.  So 
lacking  in  enterprise  and  forethought,  in  that  respect,  had  the  gov 
ernment  shown  itself,  that  no  reliance  could  be  placed  upon  it 
to  improve  the  situation.  The  people,  not  the  government,  were 
the  source  from  which  alone  assistance  could  be  had.  Deeply  con 
vinced  of  this  truth,  General  Beauregard  issued  an  appeal  to  the 
good  citizens  of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  asking  them  to  yield  up  their 
plantation  bells,  that  more  cannon  might  be  made  for  the  defence 
of  their  homes.  They  responded  with  alacrity  to  his  call;  and,  so 
great  was  the  enthusiasm  pervading  all  classes  of  the  population, 
that  even  religious  congregations  gave  up  their  church-bells,  while 
women  offered  their  brass  candlesticks  and  andirons. 

By  the  Sth  of  March,  the  busy  preparations  of  the  enemy  at 
Fort  Henry,  up  the  Tennessee  lliver.  indicated  an  early  offensive 
movement,  to  meet  which  the  greatest  activity  on  our  part  was 
necessary.  On  the  13th,  five  Federal  divisions  arrived  at  Savannah, 
twelve  miles  below  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  river,  followed,  a  few  days  later,  by  a  reinforcement  of  some 
five  thousand  men.  These  troops,  numbering  now  about  forty 
thousand  infantry,  and  three  thousand  artillery  and  cavalry,  were 
commanded  by  Major-General  C.  F.  Smith,  a  gallant  and  accom 
plished  officer.*  General  Grant,  who,  for  a  time  after  the  capture 
of  Fort  Donelson,  had  been  virtually  suspended  by  General  Ilal- 
Icck,  for  an  alleged  disobedience  of  orders,  arrived  on  the  17th, 
and  resumed  command.  Meanwhile,  on  the  14th,  General  Sher 
man's  division,  which  had  not  been  landed  at  Savannah,  was  de 
tached  up  the  river,  under  the  protection  of  two  gunboats,  to  de 
stroy  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  near  Eastport  and 
Chickasaw  Bluff,  but  evinced  such  extreme  caution  that  he  was 
deterred  from  landing  by  two  companies  of  infantry,  acting  as 
artillery,  with  two  2-i-poundcrs.  These  companies  belonged  to  a 

*  He  had  been  Commandant  at  tlic  United  States  Military  Academy,  while 
General  Beauregard  was  a  cadet  there  ;  and  had  at  a  later  period  served  with 
distinction  in  the  Mexican  War. 


256  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

regiment  of  General  Chalmers's  brigade.  The  brigade  proper, 
composed  of  about  two  thousand  five  hundred  men,  was  stationed 
at  the  time  at  or  near  Inka,  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Rail 
road,  and  five  or  six  miles  back  from  the  river.  Sherman's  force 
then  retired  a  few  miles,  to  the  mouth  of  Yellow  River,  intending 
to  move  thence  to  destroy  the  railroad  company's  shops  at  Beirns- 
ville,  a  small  village  eight  miles  west  of  luka.  After  landing  and 
making  an  abortive  attempt  to  reach  Beirnsville,  with  nothing  to 
oppose  him  but  high  water,  General  Sherman  hurriedly  re-em 
barked  his  troops  and  dropped  down  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  on  the 
night  of  the  14th,  having  made  a  useless  demonstration,  but  one 
which  confirmed  General  Beauregard  in  the  opinion  that  Corinth 
would  be  the  final  objective  point  of  the  Federal  movement. 

On  the  13th,  General  MeClernand's  division  of  C.  F.  Smith's 
forces  was  crossed  over  to  Crump's  (or  McWilliams's)  Landing,  on 
the  west  bank  of  the  river,  five  or  six  miles  above  Savannah,  to 
destroy  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  between  Corinth  and  Jack 
son.  But  no  more  was  effected  than  the  burning  of  a  small  bridge 
near  Bethel  Station,  twenty-four  miles  north  of  Corinth.  After 
this  the  division  fell  back  to  the  landing  and  re-embarked,  show 
ing  the  same  degree  of  nervousness  that  characterized  the  Sher 
man  expedition. 

General  Pope,  in  co-operation  with  these  movements  on  the 
Tennessee,  had  appeared  before  New  Madrid,  about  the  end  of  Feb 
ruary,  and  attacked  that  place  with  artillery.  Not  being  defended 
with  the  tenacity  which  afterwards  distinguished  the  defence  of 
Island  No.  10  and  its  neighboring  batteries,  that  important  position 
was  abandoned  during  the  night  of  the  14th.  Its  garrison  was 
transferred  to  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  and  a  portion  of  it 
sent  to  reinforce  the  troops  supporting  the  batteries  at  and  about 
Island  No.  10.  The  guns  left  in  position  at  New  Madrid,  not 
having  been  properly  spiked,  were  immediately  put  in  condition  to 
cut  off,  from  escape  down  the  river,  eight  transports  and  the  gun 
boat  used  by  General  McCown  in  the  evacuation. 

General  Beaure^ard's  instructions  to  that  officer  had   been  to 

O 

hold  those  defences  to  the  very  last  extremity,  in  order  to  give 
time  for  completing  the  works  at  Fort  Pillow  ;  to  sink  some  of 
his  transports  in  the  Missouri-shore  channel,  so  as  to  narrow  it  still 
more,  or  render  it  impassable ;  and  to  anchor  a  fire-raft  in  the  middle 
of  the  wider  Tennessee-shore  channel,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy's 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  257 

gunboats  from  passing,  under  cover  of  night,  the  batteries  protect 
ing  it.  lie  was  cautioned  not  to  allow  his  remaining  transports 
and  gunboats  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  under  any  cir 
cumstances.  Finally,  he  was  informed  that  no  reinforcements 
could  possibly  be  sept  him  until  after  the  impending  battle  in  the 
vicinity  of  Corinth. 

Somewhat  later  General  Beauregard  relieved  General  McCown 
from  his  duties,  and  General  Mackall,  the  gallant  and  efficient 
Assistant  Adjutant-General  of  General  Johnston's  army,  was  se 
lected  to  command  at  Madrid  Bend.  The  following  note  was  his 
answer  when  first  informed  of  General  Beauregard's  wish  to  that 
effect : 

"DECATUK,  ALA.,  March  IQth,  18G2. 

"  Dear  General, — I  thank  you  for  my  promotion.  You  arc  entitled  to  my 
services  and  shall  always  command  them.  But  now  this  army  is  in  trouble, 
and  I  cannot  leave  it,  with  honor,  until  it  joins  you. 

4i  Yours  sincerely, 

"W.  W. MACKALL,  A. A.  G." 

The  junction  having  been  effected,  he  left  for  his  new  post ; 
and  held  the  works  under  him  until  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh, 
several  days  longer  than  would  have  been  done  otherwise.  It  was 
too  late,  however,  to  accomplish  the  main  object  General  Beaure 
gard  had  had  in  view,  in  assigning  him  to  that  important  position. 

On  the  16th,  the  Federal  fleet  of  gun  and  mortar  boats,  under 
Commodore  Foote,  appeared,  and  began  the  prolonged  attack  and 
bombardment  which  rendered  the  defence  of  Island  Xo.  10  mem 
orable  in  the  history  of  the  war. 

Until  the  10th  of  March,  a  large  Federal  army  was  intended  to 
operate  against  Florence,  about  seventy  miles  farther  south  than 
Savannah,  but  on  the  13th  it  landed  at  the  latter  place.  Had  that 
army  been  at  once  disembarked  at  Fittsburg  Landing,  twenty-two 
miles  from  Corinth,  or,  better  still,  at  Hamburg,  eight  miles  south 
of  Pittsburg  and  two  or  three  miles  nearer  to  Corinth,  it  would 
have  met  with  no  serious  opposition  ;  for,  at  the  time  of  the  land 
ing,  General  Beauregard  had  only  one  regiment  of  cavalry  in  ob 
servation,  supported,  at  Monterey,  about  half-way  to  Corinth,  by 
one  or  two  regiments  of  infantry  and  a  battery  of  field  artillery ; 
while  at  Hamburg  he  had  only  a  strong  picket  of  cavalry.  At 
Corinth  he  had,  then  collected,  not  more  than  fifteen  thousand 
men,  who  could  have  offered  no  great  resistance,  as  they  were  in  a 
I.— 17 


258  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

state  of  confusion,  gathered,  as  they  had  been,  from  many  different 
quarters,  as  fast  as  they  could  be  brought  by  rail,  and  were  in  large 
part  poorly  armed  and  equipped.  Some  of  the  regiments  were 
not  yet  formed  into  brigades,  and  only  one  or  two  divisions  had 
been  organized.  General  Beauregard  is  clearly  of  the  opinion 
that,  had  the  Federal  forces  been  handled  with  confidence  and  of 
fensively  pressed  forward,  they  must  have  dispersed  the  troops  he 
had  then  assembled  there,  especially  as  more  than  half  of  the  Fed 
eral  army  consisted  of  seasoned  troops,  fresh  from  the  successes 
of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  with  supports  at  convenient  dis 
tances,  and  abundantly  supplied  with  munitions  for  offensive  oper 
ations.  In  fact,  General  Johnston,  regarding  Corinth  as  too  close 
to  the  Tennessee  River,  as  a  point  of  concentration  on  our  side, 
had  telegraphed  General  Beauregard,  recommending  the  south 
bank  of  the  Hatchee  River,  near  Bolivar,  as  offering  greater  secur 
ity.  His  telegram  read  as  follows : 

(Ciphered  Telegram.) 

"  DECATUR,  March  15th,  1862. 
"  To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  Have  you  had  the  south  bank  of  the  Hatchee  examined,  near  Bolivar.  I 
recommend  it  to  your  attention.  It  has,  besides  other  advantages,  that  of  be 
ing  further  from  enemy's  base. 

"A.  S.  JOHNSTON." 

This  is  very  much  in  contrast  with  the  assertions  of  some  of 
General  Johnston's  panegyrists,  that,  as  early  as  January,  1862 
(others  have  it  on  the  1st  and  4th  of  February),  he  had  designated 
Shiloh  Church — some  say  Corinth — as  the  spot  where  "the great 
battle  of  the  southwest  would  be  fought."  This  erroneous  state 
ment  merits — and  will  receive — attention  before  that  part  of  our 
narrative  referring  to  the  campaign  of  the  West  is  closed. 

General  Beauregard  differed  with  General  Johnston  on  that  all- 
important  subject,  because,  while  willing  to  admit  that  the  south 
bank  of  the  Hatchee  River  was,  possibly,  a  good  defensive  line,  it 
was  by  no  means,  in  his  opinion,  a  proper  one  for  the  offensive  he 
proposed  to  take,  and  in  view  of  which  he  would  have  even  pre 
ferred  Monterey  to  Corinth,  owing  to  its  still  greater  proximity 
to  the  anticipated  landing-point  of  the  enemy.  Events,  however, 
justified  his  selection  of  Corinth,  favored  as  he  was  by  the  hesi 
tancy  and  lack  of  enterprise  of  the  opposing  forces,  which  enabled 
him  to  proceed,  unmolested,  with  the  measures  of  concentration 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  259 

lie  had  so  much  at  heart.  General  Beauregard's  apparent  temerity 
in  selecting  for  his  base  of  operations  a  point  so  near  the  ground 
chosen  for  the  landing  of  a  powerful  enemy,  was  the  result,  not 
of  rashness,  but  of  close  and  sagacious  observation.  With  the 
eye  and  daring  of  a  true  general — noting  the  timidity  of  the  Fed 
eral  forces  in  their  attempts  at  incursions  on  the  western  bank  of 
the  Tennessee,  and  their  disjointed  manner  of  disembarking — he 
knew  that  the  nearer  he  was  to  his  opponents  the  better  it  would 
be  for  the  handling  of  his  troops  and  the  success  of  his  plan. 
From  a  point  near  his  foe  he  could  attack  fractions  instead  of  con 
centrated  masses  of  the  enemy,  with  the  chances  of  success  in  his 
favor. 

As  soon  as  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  on  the  Tennessee,  had 
sufficiently  developed  his  intentions,  General  Beauregard  ordered 
an  immediate  concentration,  by  railroad,  of  all  troops  then  avail 
able  in  West  Tennessee  and  North  Mississippi.  Those  at  Grand 
Junction  and  luka  he  massed  upon  Corinth;  those  at  Fort  Pillow, 
and  General  Folk's  forces  at  Ilumboldt  and  Lexington,  he  assem 
bled  at  Bethel  and  Corinth,  leaving  detachments  at  Union  City 
and  Ilumboldt,  to  keep  open  the  communications  established,  with 
great  difficulty,  between  Island  Xo.  10  and  Jackson.  A  line  of 
cavalry  pickets  was  left  in  place  of  the  infantry  outposts  at  Union 
City,  Dresden,  Iluntington,  and  Lexington  ;  their  fronts  and  inter 
mediate  spaces  being  well  patrolled  by  scouting  parties,  to  give 
timely  notice  of  any  hostile  advance;  in  case  of  which,  the  cavalry, 
if  compelled  to  fall  back,  had  orders  to  retire  gradually  on  Bolivar, 
on  the  Mississippi  Central  Railroad,  thirty-eight  miles  northwest  of 
Corinth,  keeping  up  constant  communication  with  the  forces  at 
Bethel  and  Corinth. 

By  the  middle  of  March,  less  than  one  month  after  General 
Beauregard's  arrival  at  Jackson,  Tennessee,  he  had  succeeded  in 
assembling,  within  easy  concentrating  distances  of  Corinth,  some 
twenty-three  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  independently  of  the  four 
teen  thousand,  more  or  less,  he  had  found  in  the  district  under 
General  Folk,  on  the  17th  of  February.  lie  hoped  to  be  joined, 
before  the  end  of  March,  by  General  Johnston's  command,  of 
about  thirteen  thousand  men — exclusive  of  cavalry — then  arriving 
at  Decatnr ;  and  General  Van  Dorn,  at  Van  Burcn,  Arkansas,  had 
promised,  at  that  time,  his  co-operation  with  an  army  of  nearly 
twenty  thousand.  General  Beauregard  had  sent  Van  Dorn  all  the 


260  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

water  transportation  he  could  collect  on  the  Mississippi  River,  with 
which  to  effect  the  junction.  These  movements  of  concentration 
were  approved  by  General  Johnston,  but  had  received  no  encour 
agement  from  the  War  Department  or  the  Chief  Executive.  They 
were  brought  about  through  the  untiring  efforts  and  perseverance 
of  General  Beauregard;  through  the  cheerful  and  patriotic  assis 
tance  of  the  governors  of  Tennessee,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and 
Louisiana;  through  General  Bragg,  at  Pensacola,  and  General 
Lovell,  at  New  Orleans.  Without  their  hearty  and  powerful  aid 
it  would  have  been  impossible  to  collect,  in  time,  a  force  of  suffi 
cient  strength  successfully  to  oppose  the  enemy,  who,  had  he  used 
his  resources  with  ordinary  vigor,  must  soon  have  obtained  undis 
puted  possession  of  the  Mississippi  River,  and,  consequently,  of 
the  entire  valley,  including  New  Orleans. 

The  State  troops  thus  hastily  assembled  were,  as  we  have  said, 
poorly  equipped,  without  drill,  and  badly  armed,  some  of  them  only 
with  the  discarded  flint  -  lock  musket  of  former  days ;  and  great 
difficulty  was  experienced  in  procuring  the  proper  quality  of 
flints.  Not  a  third  of  the  cavalry  had  fire-arms,  and  those  who 
had  were  ill-armed,  with  a  medley  of  pistols,  carbines,  muskets, 
and  shot-guns,  chiefly  the  latter.  Few  of  them  had  sabres.  The 
personnel  of  this  new  levy,  however,  could  not  have  been  better. 
It  was  composed  of  the  best  young  men,  from  the  city  and  coun 
try,  who  had  rushed  to  arms  at  the  call  of  their  States.  Animated 
by  a  feeling  of  patriotism  and  high  martial  spirit,  they  gave  fair 
promise  of  great  efficiency,  if  well  officered.  As  soon  as  their 
regiments  arrived  at  the  rendezvous  assigned  them  they  were 
brigaded,  equipped  for  the  field  as  well  as  our  restricted  means 
permitted,  and,  owing  to  the  lack  of  time  for  better  instruction, 
we're  exercised  only — and  but  slightly — in  company  and  battalion 
drills,  while  awaiting  orders  to  march  to  the  battle-field. 

On  the  16th  of  March,  General  Sherman,  by  order  of  General 
C.  F.  Smith,  at  Savannah,  disembarked  with  his  division  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  to  make  a  reconnoissance  in  the  direction  of  Mon 
terey,  twelve  miles  from  the  Landing  and  ten  miles  from  Corinth. 
He  marched  a  few  miles  into  the  interior,  encountering  only  the 
regiment  stationed  there,  which  retired  as  he  advanced.  He,  never 
theless,  returned  to  the  Landing  and  re-embarked  with  his  division. 
On  the  18th,  Ilnrlbnt's  division  landed  and  took  position  about 
a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  river,  near  the  fork  of  the  roads,  lead- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  261 

ing,  the  one  to  Corinth,  the  other  to  Hamburg,  five  or  six  miles 
up  the  river.  On  the  19th,  General  Sherman  again  disembarked 
his  division,  taking  post  about  three  miles  in  the  interior,  with 
three  of  his  brigades,  at  or  near  a  little  log  meeting-house,  cover 
ing  the  roads  to  Purdy,  in  a  northwesterly,  and  to  Corinth,  in  a 
southwesterly,  direction.  His  fourth  brigade  was  detached  to  a 
point  more  than  two  miles  to  his  left  rear,  at  the  crossing  of  the 
Pittsburff  and  Hamburg:  road,  over  Lick  Creek.  u  Within  a  few 

o  o 

days,"  says  General  Sherman,  in  his  memoirs,  Frentiss's  division 
arrived,  and  was  camped  on  his  left,  filling  the  space  between  his 
third  and  fourth  brigades,  but  some  distance  in  advance  of  the 
latter  ;  afterwards  McClernand's  and  W.  II.  L.  Wallace's  divisions 
were  landed,  the  first  placing  itself  within  supporting  distance  of 
Sherman,  and  the  second  on  the  right  of  Ilurlbut,  forming  a 
third  line,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  Landing. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  if  we  had  been  able  to  carry  out  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  original  intention  of  concentrating  his  forces  at 
Monterey,  only  nine  miles  from  Sherman's  position,  we  should 
have  had  several  days  during  which  to  attack  the  isolated  divisions 
of  Sherman  and  Ilurlbut,  numbering  about  seven  thousand  men, 
according  to  Federal  accounts,  and  with  a  large  and  rapid  river  in 
their  rear.  Such  an  opportunity  for  annihilating  in  detail  the 
fractional  part  of  a  powerful  enemy  is  seldom  offered  in  a  cam 
paign. 

Another  division,  under  Lew.  Wallace,  about  seven  thousand 
strong,  with  twelve  guns,  had  also  landed,  and  occupied  a  position, 
fi ve  or  six  miles  from  Sherman's  right,  on  the  north  side  of  Snake 
Creek,  on  a  road  leading  from  ('rump's  (McWilliamsV)  landing  to 
Purdy,  a  small  village  half-way  to  the  railroad  station  of  Bethel, 
on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  road. 

The  five  divisions  in  front  of  Pittsburg  Landing  were  accom 
panied  by  twelve  batteries  of  field  artillery,  of  six  pieces  each,  and 
four  or  five  battalions  of  cavalry,  distributed  among  the  several 
commands,  which  then  numbered,  together,  at  least  thirty-nine 
thousand  infantry  and  artillery,  with  some  fifteen  hundred  cav 
alry,  forming  a  well-organized  and  fully  equipped  force  of  over 
forty -seven  thousand  men,  including  Lew.  Wallace's  division, 
which  was  watching  and  threatening  in  the  direction  of  Purdy. 
This  army,  of  which  at  least  forty  per  cent,  were  flushed  with 
recent  victories,  was  soon  to  be  reinforced  by  General  Buell,  al- 


262  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

ready  on  the  march  from  Nashville  to  Savannah,  with  five  divis 
ions  of  the  best  organized,  disciplined,  and  equipped  troops  in  the 
Federal  service,  numbering  fully  thirty-seven  thousand  effectives.* 

General  Buell  f  had  entered  Bowling  Green  on  the  15th  of 
February,  the  day  after  it  was  evacuated  by  the  Confederates,  and 
one  day  before  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson.  lie  had  then  ad 
vanced  leisurely  on  Nashville,  about  seventy-five  miles  distant,  ar 
riving  opposite  that  city,  on  the  Cumberland  River,  on  the  23d. 
It  was  surrendered  to  him  on  the  25th,  by  the  civil  authorities,  and 
he  occupied  it  the  next  day.  The  rear  guard  of  the  Confederate 
forces,  under  General  Floyd,  had  left  Nashville  for  Murfreesboro', 
thirty-two  miles  distant  in  a  southerly  direction,  on  the  Nashville 
and  Chattanooga  Railroad,  when  the  enemy  appeared  on  the  south 
side  of  the  river. 

General  Buell  remained  at  Nashville,  a  passive  spectator  of 
General  Johnston's  slow  and  quiet  retreat,  first  to  Murfreesboro', 
thence  to  Fayetteville,  Huntsville,  and  Decatur,  making  no  appar 
ent  effort  to  harass  him  or  prevent  his  junction  with  the  forces 
collected,  meanwhile,  by  General  Beauregard,  about  Corinth.  The 
Federal  general's  torpor  does  not  seem  to  have  been  disturbed 
until  about  the  middle  of  March,  when  he  was  instructed  by  Gen 
eral  Halleck — who  had  been  assigned,  on  the  llth,  to  the  command 
in  chief  —  to  unite  his  forces  with  those  of  General  Grant,  at 
Savannah,  on  the  Tennessee  River.  This  point  of  concentration 
was  afterwards  changed  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  twelve  miles  higher 
up,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river;  but  no  immediate  communi 
cation  to  that  effect  was  made  to  General  Buell.  While  on  the 
march,  however,  he  decided  to  move  to  Hamburg,  about  six  miles 
above  Pittsburg,  and  thence  to  the  place  of  concentration,  wher 
ever  it  might  be. 

While  at  Nashville,  BuelPs  whole  force  in  Tennessee  and  Ken- 


*  "  Buell  himself,  with  five  divisions,  numbering  nearly  forty  thousand  men, 
was  ordered  from  Nashville,  to  the  support  of  Grant." — Badeau's  "Military 
History  of  U.  S.  Grant,"  vol.  i.  p.  G8. 

file  was  a  contemporary  of  General  Beauregard's  at  the  United  States 
Military  Academy,  and  had  clone  good  service  as  a  young  officer  in  Mexico, 
lie  was  on  the  staff  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  as  Adjutant -General  in  the 
Utah  expedition,  shortly  before  the  late  war  between  the  States.  He  was 
brave  and  intelligent,  but  wras  generally  considered  too  much  of  a  disciplina 
rian  to  effect  great  results  with  irregular  troops. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD.  263 

tucky  consisted  of  seven  divisions,  with  detached  troops  for  guard 
ing  his  communications,  maintaining  order,  and  otherwise  provid 
ing  for  his  safety,  and  amounted,  in  the  aggregate,  to  94,783  men 
of  all  arms.  The  army  presented  an  effective  force  for  the  field 
of  73,472  men,  of  which  60,882  were  infantry,  9237  cavalry,  and 
3368  artillery,  with  twenty-eight  field  and  two  siege  batteries  of 
six  guns  each.* 

On  the  15th  Baell  commenced  his  march,  with  five  divisions, 
as  already  stated,  to  effect  leisurely  the  junction  ordered  by  Gen 
eral  Ilalleck;  while  one  division,  the  7th,  under  General  G.  W. 
Morgan,  went  to  East  Tennessee,  and  another,  the  3d,  under  Gen 
eral  O.  M.  Mitchell,  to  pursue  General  Johnston  and  destroy  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  south  of  Fayettevillc.  Xei- 
ther  of  these  last-named  operations  was  performed  with  much 
celerity. 

On  arriving  at  Columbia,  forty  miles  south  of  Xashville,  Gen 
eral  Euell  found  the  bridge  across  Duck  Ilivcr  destroyed,  and  the 
water  too  high  to  ford.  lie  was  delayed  there  until  the  morning 
of  the  29th,  when,  the  bridge  having  been  rebuilt,  he  again  start 
ed  for  Savannah,  thence  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  a  distance  of  about 
one  hundred  miles,  which  he  accomplished  in  nine  days,  marching 
slightly  more  than  eleven  miles  a  day.  His  head  of  column,  Xel- 
soirs  division,  arrived  at  Pittsburg  Landing  at  3  o'clock  P.M.  on 
the  6th  of  April,  the  march  from  Savannah  having  been  hurried 
in  order  to  reach  the  field  of  Shiloh,  from  which  the  sound  of  the 
battle  was  plainly  heard. 

The  united  armies  of  Grant  and  Buell  (his  five  divisions)  would 
have  presented  a  well -disciplined  and  fully  equipped  force  of 
about  84,000  men.  Against  this  we  could  not  possibly  bring 
more  than  38,500  infantry  and  artillery,  4300  cavalry,  and  fifty 
field  guns.  This  estimate  excludes  7000  men  at  Island  Xo.  10 
and  vicinity,  who  were  indispensable  to  hold  at  bay  Pope's  army 
of  over  20.000  men,  and  to  keep  control  of  the  Mississippi  River 
at  that  point.  Moreover,  the  forces  General  Beauregard  had 
hastily  collected  (about  25,000  strong)  were  imperfectly  armed, 
insufficiently  drilled,  and  only  partly  disciplined.  They  had  but 
recently  been  organized  into  two  corps,  under  Generals  Polk  and 
Bragg,  composed  of  two  divisions  each.  General  Beauregard  be- 

*  Sec  Van  Home's  "  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.  p.  99. 


264  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

lieved  that,  under  such  circumstances,  our  only  hope  of  success  lay 
in  striking  a  sudden,  heavy  blow  before  the  enemy  should  concen 
trate  all  his  forces.  He  therefore  urged  General  Johnston  to  join 
him  at  Corinth  at  the  earliest  moment  practicable,  and  he  again 
telegraphed  the  War  Department  (as  late  as  the  28th)  to  send  him 
at  once  some  of  the  field-officers  he  had  so  often  called  for.  Those 
most  needed  then  were  a  chief  of  artillery,  a  commander  of  cav- 
alry,  and  a  chief  commissary,  without  whom  his  organization  could 
not  be  completed.  But,  notwithstanding  the  persistence  of  his 
calls,  only  the  last  two  were  sent ;  and  they  arrived  when  our 
army  was  marching  from  Corinth,  to  fight  the  battle  which  proved 
to  be  one  of  the  greatest  and  bloodiest  of  the  war. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  265 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

Arrival  of  General  Johnston  at  Corinth.— Position  of  his  Troops  on  the  27th 
of  March. — Offers  to  Turn  Over  Command  of  the  Army  to  General  Beau- 
regard,  who  Declines.  —  General  Beauregard  Urges  an  Early  Offensive 
Movement  against  the  Enemy,  and  Gives  his  Views  as  to  Plan  of  Organ 
izing  the  Forces. — General  Johnston  Authorizes  him  to  Complete  the 
Organization  already  Begun. — General  Orders  of  March  29th. — Reasons 
why  the  Army  was  Formed  into  Small  Corps. — General  Beauregard  De 
sirous  of  Moving  against  the  Enemy  on  the  1st  of  April. — Why  it  was 
not  done.  —  On  the  2d,  General  Chcatham  Reports  a  Strong  Federal 
Force  Threatening  his  Front. — General  Beauregard  Advises  an  Immedi 
ate  Advance. — General  Johnston  Yields. — General  Jordan's  Statement  of 
his  Interview  with  General  Johnston  on  that  Occasion. — Special  Orders 
No.  8,  otherwise  called  "Order  of  March  and  Battle."— By  Whom  Sug 
gested  and  by  Whom  Written. — General  Beauregard  Explains  the  Order 
to  Corps  Commanders. — Tardiness  of  the  First  Corps  in  Marching  from 
Corinth. — Our  Forces  in  Position  for  Battle  on  the  Afternoon  of  the  uth  ; 
Too  Late  to  Commence  Action  on  that  Day. — Generals  Ilardcc  and  Bragg 
Request  General  Beauregard  to  Ride  in  Front  of  their  Lines. — General 
Johnston  Calls  General  Beauregard  and  the  Corps  Commanders  in  an  Infor 
mal  Council. — General  Beauregard  Believes  the  Object  of  the  Movement 
Foiled  by  the  Tardiness  of  Troops  in  Arriving  on  the  Battle-field. — Al 
ludes  to  Noisy  Demonstrations  on  the  March,  and  to  the 'Probability  of 
Buell's  Junction,  and  Advises  to  Change  Aggressive  Movement  into  a  Re- 
connoissancc  in  Force. — General  Johnston  Decides  Otherwise,  and  Orders 
Preparations  for  an  Attack  at  Dawn  next  Da}*. — Description  of  the  Field 
of  Shiloh. — Strength  of  the  Federal  Forces. — What  General  Sherman  Tes 
tified  to. — We  Form  into  Three  Lines  of  Battle. — Our  Effective  Strength. 
— Carelessness  and  Oversight  of  the  Federal  Commanders. — They  are 
not  Aroused  by  the  many  Sounds  in  their  Front,  and  are  Taken  by  Sur 
prise. 

GENERAL  JOIIXSTOX  reached  Corinth  on  the  night  of  the  22d 
of  March,  in  advance  of  his  army,  which  followed  closely  after 
him,  portions  arriving  daily  up  to  the  27th.  General  Ilardce 
took  position  in  the  vicinity,  with  a  body  of  about  eight  thousand 
men;  while  the  remainder,  under  General  Crittenden — some  five 
thousand  strong,  exclusive  of  cavalry — were  halted  at  Beirnsville 
and  luka,  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad. 


266  MILITAEY  OPERATIONS  OF 

A  shade  of  sadness,  if  not  of  despondency,  rested  upon  General 
Johnston's  brow.  The  keen  anxiety  and  still-increasing  gloom 
overspreading  the  country  weighed  heavily  upon  him.  He  suf 
fered  deeply,  both  as  a  patriot  arid  as  a  soldier;  but  men  of  his 
courage  and  character  are  uncomplaining.  "  The  test  of  merit,  in 
my  profession,  with  the  people,"  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Davis,  on  the 
IS th  of  March,  "  is  success.  It  is  a  hard  rule,  but  I  think  it  right." 
The  concluding  lines  of  his  letter  show  what  were  his  feelings, 
when  complying  with  General  Beauregard's  urgent  request  for  a 
junction  of  their  armies:  "  If  I  join  this  corps  to  the  forces  of 
Eeauregard  (I  confess,  a  hazardous  experiment),  then,  those  who 
are  now  declaiming  against  me  will  be  without  an  argument." 

Soon  after  General  Johnston's  arrival,  and  in  the  course  of  his 
first  conference  with  General  Beauregard,  he  expressed,  with  evi 
dent  emotion,  his  purpose  to  turn  over  to  the  latter  the  direct 
command  of  our  united  forces,  and  to  confine  his  own  functions 
to  those  of  Department  Commander,  with  headquarters  at  Mem 
phis  or  Holly  Springs.  He  alleged,  as  his  reason  for  wishing  to 
do  so,  that  such  a  course  would  be  best  for  the  success  of  our 
cause ;  that  he  had  lost,  in  no  small  degree,  the  confidence  of  the 
people,  and  somewhat,  he  feared,  of  the  army  itself,  in  consequence 
of  recent  disasters ;  while  he  felt  sure  that  General  Beauregard, 
who  held  the  confidence  of  both,  was  better  fitted  to  cope  with 
present  difficulties  and  dangers,  and  fulfil,  successfully,  public  ex 
pectation.  General  Beauregard,  in  a  spirit  of  disinterestedness 
and  generosity  which  equalled  that  of  General  Johnston,  refused 
to  accept  his  offer.  lie  had  left  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and 
come  to  the  West,  he  said,  to  assist  General  Johnston,  not  to  su 
persede  him.  That  it  was  due  to  the  country  and  to  General 
Johnston  himself  that  he  should  remain  at  the  head  of  the  army, 
now  concentrated  for  a  decisive  blow  before  the  enemy  was  fully 
prepared,  and  pledged  him  his  cordial  support,  as  second  in  com 
mand.  Upon  this,  General  Johnston,  who,  no  doubt,  understood 
General  Beauregard's  motives,  rose  from  his  seat,  advanced  tow 
ards  him,  and,  shaking  him  warmly  by  the  hand,  said,  "Well,  be 
it  so,  General !  We  two  together  will  do  our  best  to  secure  suc 
cess."  It  was  an  affecting  scene,  and  one  worthy  of  being  re 
corded.  For,  if  General  Johnston  wras  loath  to  reap  the  benefit 
of  the  great  preparations  made  by  General  Beauregard,  the  latter 
was  no  less  reluctant  that  the  victory  which  he  hoped  would  re- 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  267 

suit  from  his  efforts  at  concentration  should  be  exclusively  attrib 
uted  to  himself,  thus  depriving  General  Johnston  of  the  chance 
of  changing  the  tide  of  popular  favor  in  his  behalf,  and  of  re 
gaining  the  affection  and  confidence  of  the  people  and  army, 
which  he  feared  he  had  lost. 

Thus  was  finally  settled  the  delicate  question  of  precedence  and 
command  between  these  two  Confederate  leaders,  whose  single  ob 
ject  was,  not  personal  advancement  or  glory,  but  the  success  of  the 
cause  they  were  engaged  in.  General  Beauregard  now  explained 
the  situation  of  affairs  in  the  Mississippi  Valley  and  immediately 
around  him;  urged  the  necessity  of  the  earliest  possible  offensive 
movement  against  the  enemy,  and  gave  his  views,  already  fully 
matured,  as  to  the  best  plan  of  organizing  our  forces.  General 
Johnston  readily  agreed  to  what  General  Beauregard  proposed, 
and  authorized  him  to  complete  all  necessary  orders  to  that  effect. 
Accordingly,  a  few  daj-s  later,  General  Beauregard  drew  up  a  plan 
for  the  reorganization  of  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  which, 
upon  submission  to  General  Johnston,  was  signed  by  the  latter, 
without  the  slightest  change  or  alteration,  and  published  to  the 
troops,  in  a  general  order,  as  follows : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  FORCES, 
"  General  Orders,  No.  — .  CORINTH,  Miss.,  March  29*A,  1862. 

"I.  The  undersigned  assumes  the  command  and  immediate  direction  of  the 
armies  of  Kentucky  and  of  the  Mississippi,  now  united,  and  which,  in  military 
operations,  will  be  known  as  the  '  Army  of  the  Mississippi.' 

"  II.  General  G.  T.  Beauregard  will  be  second  in  command  to  the  Command 
er  of  the  Forces. 

"  III.  The  Arm}'  of  the  Mississippi  will  be  subdivided  into  three  army  corps, 
and  reserves  of  cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry,  as  follows :  1.  The  First  Corps, 
under  the  command  of  Major-Gencral  L.  Polk,  to  consist  of  the  Grand  Division 
now  under  his  command,  as  originally  organized,  less  the  artillery  and  cav 
alry  hereinafter  limited,  and  detached  as  reserves,  and  the  garrison  of  Fort 
Pillow  and  the  works  for  the  defence  of  Madrid  Bend,  already  detached  from 
that  command.  2.  The  Second  Corps,  under  Major-General  Braxton  Bragg, 
to  consist  of  the  Second  Grand  Division  of  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  less 
the  artillery  and  cavalry,  hereinafter  limited,  and  detached  as  reserves.  3.  The 
Third  Corps,  under  Major-General  W.  J.  Hardee,  to  consist  of  the  Army  of  Ken 
tucky,  less  the  cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry  hereinafter  limited,  and  detached 
as  reserves.  4.  The  infantry  reserves,  under  command  of  Major-General  G.  B. 
Crittenden,  shall  be  formed  of  a  division  of  not  less  than  two  brigades.* 

*  These  infantry  reserves,  at  Beirnsville,  were  under  Brigadier  -  General 
Breckinridge,  who  had  succeeded  General  Crittenden. 


268  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

"  IV.  The  brigades  of  eacli  army  corps  and  of  the  reserve  will  be  so  formed 
as  to  consist  severally  of  about  two  thousand  five  hundred  total  infantry,  and 
one  light  battery  of  six  pieces,  if  practicable. 

"  V.  Divisions  shall  consist  of  not  less  than  two  brigades  and  one  regiment 
of  cavalry. 

"VI.  All  cavalry  and  artillery  not  hereinbefore  assigned  to  divisions  and 
brigades  will  be  held  in  reserve :  the  cavalry  under  Brigadier-General  Hawes, 
the  artillery  under  an  officer  to  be  subsequently  announced. 

"  VII.  All  general  orders  touching  matters  of  organization,  discipline,  and 
conduct  of  the  troops,  published  by  General  G.  T.  Beauregard  to  the  Army  of 
the  Mississippi,  will  continue  in  force  in  the  whole  army  until  otherwise  di 
rected,  and  copies  thereof  will  be  furnished  to  the  Third  Army  Corps  and  the 
reserve. 

"  VIII.  Major-General  Braxton  Bragg,  in  addition  to  his  duties  as  com 
mander  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  is  announced  as '  Chief  of  Staff'  to  the 
Commander  of  the  Forces. 

"  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  C.  S,  A." 

"  NOTE. — The  above  organization  of  the  forces  at  Corinth  was  submitted 
by  General  G.  T.  Beauregard,  second  in  command,  and  adopted  by  General 
A.  S.  Jolmstonv  first  in  command,  without  any  alteration  whatever. 

"  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  G." 

Our  forces  had  thus  been  formed  into  small  corps  for  two  rea 
sons  :  first,  to  enable  our  inexperienced  senior  commanders  to  handle 
their  raw  troops  with  more  facility ;  second,  to  induce  the  enemy 
to  believe  that  our  army  was  much  stronger  than  it  really  was — it 
being  natural  to  suppose  that  each  corps  would  number  at  least 
twenty  thousand  men,  with  a  general  reserve  of  about  half  as 
many.  This  second  purpose  was  apparently  accomplished,  for, 
during  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  General  Grant  telegraphed  General 
Buell,  who  was  then  at  Savannah,  that  he  was  heavily  attacked  by 
one  hundred  thousand  men,  and  that  he  needed  his  immediate  as 
sistance. 

In  the  general  orders  give«n  above,  General  Beauregard  was  an 
nounced  as  second  in  command,  and  General  Bragg  was  appointed, 
nominally,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  a  position  borrowed  from 
Continental  European  armies,  though  there  was  no  provision  for 
such  an  arrangement  made  by  law  in  the  Confederate  military 
service ;  it  was,  however,  an  irregularity  not  considered  impor 
tant,  inasmuch  as  General  Bragg  was  not  to  be  detached  or  di 
verted  from  the  command  of  his  corps.  In  fact,  his  designation 
to  that  position  was  simply  to  enable  him,  in  a  contingency  on  the 
field,  to  give  orders  in  the  name  of  the  General-in-Chief,  or  of  the 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  269 

second  in  command ;  an  arrangement  which  both  Generals  John 
ston  and  Beauregard  thought  could  inure  only  to  the  benefit  of 
the  service.  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan,  General  Beauregard's  Adju 
tant-General,  was  named  Adjutant-General  of  the  united  forces ; 
but  remained  at  General  Beauregard's  headquarters,  receiving  in 
structions  from  the  latter,  and  issuing  them  in  the  form  of  orders, 
by  command  of  the  "  General-in-Chief."* 

General  Beauregard,  notwithstanding  his  impaired  health,  de 
voted  himself  assiduously  to  preparing  the  army  fur  an  immediate 
offensive  movement,  which  he  hoped  would  take  place,  at  latest, 
on  the  1st  of  April,  as  our  spies  and  friends  in  middle  Tennes 
see  had  informed  us  that  General  Buell  was  at  Franklin,  on  his 
way  to  form  a  junction  with  General  Grant,  at  Savannah,  where 
he  might  be  expected  early  in  April.  It  was  known,  however, 
that  the  bridges  on  his  line  of  inarch — especially  the  large  one 
across  Duck  River,  at  Columbia — had  been  destroyed,  and  that 
lie  might  thereby  be  delayed  several  davs. 

General  Johnston  had  left  the  organization  and  preparation  of 
the  forces  for  offensive  operations  to  General  Beauregard.  Corps 
commanders  made  their  reports  directly  to  him,  or  through  his  of- 
iice  ;  the  General-in-Chief  being  kept  well  advised  of  all  informa 
tion  of  an  important  nature  that  reached  army  headquarters. 

The  hope  of  being  able  to  move  from  Corinth  on  the  1st  of 
April  could  not,  however,  be  realized.  As  that  day  approached, 
our  deficiencies  in  arms,  ammunition,  and  the  most  essential 
equipments  were  more  and  more  felt,  as  was  also  the  want  of  the 
general  officers  promised,  but  not  sent,  as  agreed  upon,  by  the 
War  Department.  Their  inexperienced  substitutes,  though  zeal 
ous  and  indefatigable,  were  unacquainted  with  the  needs  of  their 
new  commands,  or  did  not  know  how  best  to  supply  them.  TJiev 
had  to  be  instructed  amid  the  hurry  of  the  moment,  as  to  many 
details,  which,  to  persons  who  are  not  conversant  with  military  or 
ganization,  appear  insignificant,  but  which  are  really  very  im 
portant  in  the  preparation  of  an  army.  The  lack  of  competent 
engineers  was  also  a  source  of  great  annoyance,  as  without  them 
it  became  next  to  impossible  to  make  necessary  reconnoissances, 

*  General  Mackall  was  not  made  Adjutant-General  of  the  united  armies,  be 
cause  of  his  having  been  previously  assigned,  by  General  Beauregard,  to  the 
command  of  Madrid  Bend,  on  the  Mississippi,  his  services  at  that  important 
point  being  considered  indispensable.  See  Chapter  XVIII.,  p.  257. 


270  MILITARY    OPERATIONS  OF 

and  map  off  the  country  lying  between  the  two  opposing  armies. 
The  sketches  prepared  by  staff  officers,  untrained  and  inexperi 
enced  in  such  matters,  were  very  imperfect,  but  some  accurate 
knowledge  of  the  future  field  of  battle  had  been  obtained,  by  con 
ferring  with  officers  of  the  troops  who  had  been  on  picket  duty 
at  and  about  Pittsburg  Landing,  before  the  appearance  of  the  en 
emy  at  that  point.  From  inhabitants  who  had  been  compelled 
to  leave  their  homes,  after  the  landing  of  the  hostile  forces,  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  also  gained  useful  information,  relative  to  the  po 
sitions  occupied  by  the  several  Federal  commands. 

Such  was  the  situation,  as  night  fell  on  the  2d  of  April,  when 
General  Cheatham,  who  commanded  a  division  posted  at  Bethel 
Station,*  telegraphed  to  his  corps  commander,  General  Polk,  that 
a  strong  body  of  the  enemy,  believed  to  be  General  Lew.  Wallace's 
division,  was  seriously  threatening  his  front.  General  Polk  at 
once  (about  10  p.  M.)  transmitted  the  despatch  to  General  Beaure 
gard,  who,  believing  that  the  Federal  forces  were  divided  by  the 
reported  movement,  immediately  sent  in  the  news  to  General 
Johnston,  by  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army,  in  person,  with 
this  brief  but  significant  endorsement:  "Now  is  the  moment  to 
advance,  and  strike  the  enemy  at  Pittsburg  Landing." 

General  (then  Colonel)  Thomas  Jordan,  the  Adjutant-General 
above  alluded  to,  reports  his  mission  on  that  occasion,  as  follows: 

"  I  found  General  Johnston  in  the  room  of  some  of  his  personal  staff,  where 
I  handed  him  the  despatch  with  your  endorsement.  He  then  repaired  with 
me  to  the  neighboring  quarters  of  General  Bragg,  whom  we  found  in  bed. 
This  officer  at  once  declared  in  favor  of  your  proposition.  General  Johnston, 
expressing  several  objections  with  much  clearness  and  force,  questioned  the 
readiness  of  the  army  for  so  grave  an  offensive  movement.  His  views  shook 
the  opinion  of  General  Bragg.  Having  discussed  the  subject  almost  daily 
with  you  during  the  past  ten  days,  and  knowing  the  reasons  which  made  you 
regard  the  immediate  offensive  our  true  course  in  the  exigenc}7, 1  stated  them 
with  as  much  vigor  and  urgency  as  I  could,  dwelling  particularly  upon  the 
fact  that  we  were  now  as  strong  as  we  could  reasonably  hope  to  be  at  any 
early  period,  while  our  adversary  would  be  gaining  strength,  by  reinforce 
ments,  almost  daily,  until  he  would  be  so  strong  as  to  be  able  to  take  the  of 
fensive  with  irresistible  numbers.  That  our  adversary's  position  at  Pittsburg 
Landing,  with  his  back  against  a  deep,  broad  river,  in  a  cul-de-sac  formed  by 
the  two  creeks  (Owl  and  Lick),  would  make  his  defeat  decisively  disastrous, 
while  the  character  of  the  country  made  it  altogether  practicable  for  us  to  steal 
upon  and  surprise  him;  and  that  your  proposition  was  based  on  the  practi- 

*  Twenty-four  miles  north  of  Corinth. 


GENERAL    BEAUREGAHD.  271 

cability  of  such  a  surprise,  with  the  conviction  that  we  should  find  the  Fed 
eral  army  unprotected  by  intrcnchments. 

"These  views  seemed  to  satisfy  General  Johnston,  and  he  authorized  me  to 
give  the  preparatory  orders  for  the  movement,  which  orders  I  wrote  at  a  table 
in  General  Bragg's  room,  being  a  circular  letter  to  Generals  Bragg,  Polk,  and 
Ilardee,  directing  them  to  hold  their  several  corps  in  condition  to  move,  at  a 
moment's  notice,  having  forty  rounds  of  ammunition  in  their  cartridge-boxes, 
and  three  days1  cooked  rations  in  their  haversacks  ;  also,  sixty  rounds  of  am 
munition,  and  uncooked  rations  in  wagons,  for,  I  think,  three  days,  together 
with  certain  other  details,  affecting  reserve  supplies,  and  their  transporta 
tion.  • 

"  These  orders  were  immediately  despatched  by  couriers,  from  General 
Bragg's  headquarters,  to  Generals  Polk  and  Hardec,  who  received  them,  as 
well  as  now  remembered,  at  1.40%A.  M.,  as  stated  in  the  receipts  signed  by 
those  officers,  respectively,  at  the  time.  General  Breckinridge,  commanding  a 
detached  division  at  Beirnsvillc,  received  his  orders  from  the  telegraph-office. 
After  having  despatched  the  orders  in  question,  I  repaired  directly  to  your 
headquarters,  roused  Captain  A.  It.  Chisolin,  of  your  personal  staff,  and  told 
him  to  awake  you  at  5  A.  M. 

"  About  7  A.  M.  of  (next  day)  the  3d  April,  you  sent  for  me,  and  I  found 
that  you  had  drawn  up  the  notes  of  a  general  order,  prescribing  the  order  and 
method  of  the  movement  from  Corinth  upon  Pittsburg,  with  peculiar  minute 
ness,  as,  from  the  wooded  and  broken  nature  of  the  country  to  be  traversed, 
it  would  be  a  most  difficult  matter  to  move  so  large  a  body  of  men  with  the 
requisite  celerity  for  the  contemplated  attack.  These  notes  you  gave  me  as 
the  basis  for  the  proper  general  order  to  be  issued,  directing  and  regulating 
the  march,  coupled  with  the  order  in  which  the  enemy  was  to  be  attacked, 
and  from  them  I  drew  up  the  order  of  march  and  battle,  which,  issued  in  the 
name  of  General  Johnston,  was  signed  by  me  as  Adjutant-General  of  the 
Army,  in  the  course  of  that  day,  without  any  modification,  but,  of  course,  made 
fuller  with  details  in  connection  with  the  staff  service,  which  details  you  left 
habitually  to  me,  holding  me  responsible  that  they  should  be  clear  and  com 
prehensive,  so  as  to  insure  the  execution  of  your  general  plan  of  operation. 
But  before  I  was  able  to  shape  the  order  in  question,  General  Johnston  and, 
soon  thereafter,  General  Bragg,  came  to  your  room,  at  your  headquarters,  where 
I  had  gone  also,  to  consult  you  upon  some  details.  You  were  explaining 
your  plan  of  movement,  and  of  the  attack,  to  General  Johnston,  when  I  en 
tered  your  apartment ;  and,  to  make  the  subject  clearer,  you  drew  a  sketch  of 
the  country,  in  pencil,  upon  your  table,*  as  I  had  taken  to  my  office  the 
sketch  supplied  by  the  engineers,  to  enable  me  to  write  the  order  with  the 
necessary  precision. 

"General  Johnston  weighed  all  that  was  said  with  much  deliberation,  and 
not  until  every  detail  had  been  very  thoroughly  discussed  did  he  decide  to 

*  The  table  bearing  the  diagram  here  referred  to  went,  as  office  furniture, 
to  Charleston,  S.  C.,  where  the  pencil  sketch  on  the  board  was  visible  two 
years  afterwards. 


272  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

make  the  movement,  as  you  proposed  it.  By  this  time,  Major-Generals  Polk 
and  Hardee  had  likewise  arrived.  I  then  remarked  that,  as  the  preparation 
of  the  order,  with  all  the  necessary  copies  for  general  and  staff  officers,  would 
take  some  hours,  its  details  might  be  verbally  explained  to  the  corps  com 
manders,  all  present,  so  that  the  movement  could  be  made  without  delay  at 
the  prescribed  moment,  by  the  several  corps,  without  waiting  for  the  written 
orders,  so  much  of  which  concerned  the  second  day's  march,  and  the  tactics 
of  the  attack.  This  was  assented  to  by  General  Johnston,  as  best,  and  I  left 
you  explaining  to  Generals  Polk  and  Hardee  that  which  they  particularly 
were  to  do,  jointly  and  severally,  on  that  day  and  the  next  morning;  that  is 
to  say,  the  order  and  manner  in  which  they  should  begin,  and  make,  the  ad 
vance,  with  their  respective  corps,  to  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy's  position,  as 
will  be  found  set  forth  in  the  written  order,  which  was  afterwards  printed  as 
follows : 

"  '  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  or  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  3d,  1862. 
"  '  Special  Orders,  No.  8. 

"  '  I.  In  the  impending  movement,  the  corps  of  this  army  will  inarch,  assem 
ble,  and  take  order  of  battle,  in  the  following  manner,  it  being  assumed  that 
the  enemy  is  in  position  about  a  mile  in  advance  of  Shiloh  Church,  with  his 
right  resting  on  Owl  Creek,  and  his  left  on  Lick  Creek. 

" '  1.  The  Third  Corps,  under  Major-General  Hardee,  wrill  advance,  as  soon  as 
practicable,  on  the  Ridge  road  from  Corinth,  to  wrhat  is  known  as  the  Bark 
road,  passing  about  half  a  mile  northward  of  the  workhouse.  The  head 
of  this  column  \vill  bivouac,  if  possible,  to-night,  at  Mickey's  house,  at  the  in 
tersection  of  the  road  from  Monterey  to  Savannah.  The  cavalry,  thrown  well 
forward  during  the  march,  to  reconnoitre  and  prevent  surprise,  will  halt  in 
front  of  the  Mickey  house,  on  the  Bark  road. 

"  '2.  Major  Waddell,  A.  D.  C.  to  General  Beauregard,  with  two  good  guides, 
will  report  for  service  to  General  Hardee. 

"  '3.  At  3  o'clock  A.M.,  to-morrow,  the  Third  Corps,  with  the  left  in  front, 
will  continue  to  advance  by  the  Bark  road  until  within  sight  of  the  enemy's 
outposts  or  advanced  position,  when  it  wdll  be  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  ac 
cording  to  the  nature  of  the  ground,  its  left  resting  on  Owl  Creek,  its  right 
towards  Lick  Creek,  supported  on  that  flank  by  half  its  cavalry,  the  left  flank 
being  supported  by  the  other  half.  The  interval  between  the  extreme  right 
of  this  corps  and  Lick  Creek  will  be  filled  by  a  brigade  or  division — accord 
ing  to  the  extent  of  the  ground — from  the  Second  Corps.  These  troops,  dur 
ing  the  battle,  will  also  be  under  the  command  of  Major-General  Hardee. 

" '  He  will  make  the  proper  distribution  of  the  artillery  along  the  line  of 
battle,  remembering  that  the  rifled  guns  are  of  long  range,  and  should  be 
placed  in  commanding  positions,  in  rear  of  his  infantry,  to  fire  mainly  on  re 
serves  and  second  line  of  the  enemy,  but  occasionally  will  be  directed  on  his 
batteries  and  heads  of  columns. 

"  '  II.  The  Second  Corps,  under  Major-General  Braxton  Bragg,  will  assemble 
on  Monterey  and  move  thence  as  rarly  as  practicable,  the  right  wing,  with  left 
in  front,  by  the  road  from  Monterey  to  Savannah,  the  head  of  column  to  reach 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  273 

the  immediate  vicinity  of  Mickey's  house,  at  the  intersection  with  the  Bark 
road,  before  sunset. 

" '  The  cavalry  with  this  wing  will  take  position  on  the  road  to  Savannah, 
beyond  Mickey's,  as  far  as  Owl  Creek,  having  advanced  guards  and  pickets 
well  to  the  front.  The  left  wing  of  this  corps  will  advance  at  the  same  time, 
also  left  in  front,  by  the  road  from  Monterey  to  Purdy ;  the  head  of  the  column 
to  reach,  by  night,  the  intersection  of  that  road  with  the  Bark  road.  This 
wing  will  continue  the  movement  in  the  morning,  as  soon  as  the  rear  of 
the  Third  Corps  shall  have  passed  the  Purdy  road,  and  which  it  will  then 
follow. 

"  '  The  Second  Corps'  will  form  the  second  line  of  lattle,  about  one  thousand 
yards  in  the  rear  of  the  first  line.  It  will  be  formed,  if  practicable,  with  regi 
ments  in  double  columns,  at  half  distance,  disposed  as  advantageously  as  the 
nature  of  the  ground  will  admit.  The  artillery  placed  as  may  seem  best 
to  Major-General  Bragg. 

"  'III.  The  First  Corps,  under  Major-General  Polk,  with  the  exception  of  the 
detached  division  at  Bethel,  will  take  up  its  line  of  march  by  the  Ridge  road, 
hence  to  Pittsburg,  half  an  hour  after  the  rear  of  the  Third  Corps  shall  have 
passed  Corinth,  and  will  bivouac  to-night  in  rear  of  that  corps,  and  on  to 
morrow  will  follow  the  movements  of  said  corps,  with  the  same  interval  of 
time  as  to-day. 

'"  When  its  head  of  column  shall  reach  the  vicinity  of  the  Mickey  house  it 
will  be  halted  in  column  or  massed  on  the  line  of  the  Bark  road,  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  ground,  as  a  reserve.  Meanwhile  one  regiment  of  its  cavalry 
will  be  placed  in  observation  on  the  road  from  Johnston's  house  to  Stanton- 
ville,  with  advanced  guards  and  pickets  thrown  out  well  in  advance  towards 
Stantonville.  Another  regiment  or  battalion  of  cavalry  will  be  posted,  in  the 
same  manner,  on  the  road  from  Monterey  to  Purdy,  with  its  rear  resting  on  or 
about  the  intersection  of  that  road  with  the  Bark  road,  having  advanced 
guards  and  pickets  in  the  direction  of  Purdy. 

" '  The  forces  at  Bethel  and  Purdy  will  defend  their  positions,  as  already  in 
structed,  if  attacked ;  otherwise  they  will  assemble  on  Purdy  and  thence  ad 
vance,  with  advanced  guards,  flankers,  and  all  other  military  precautions, 
forming  a  junction  with  the  rest  of  the  First  Corps,  at  the  intersection  of  that 
road  with  the  Bark  road  leading  from  Corinth. 

u '  IV.  The  reserve  of  the  forces  will  be  concentrated,  by  the  shortest  and 
best  routes,  at  Monterey,  as  soon  as  the  rear  of  the  Second  Corps  shall  have 
moved  out  of  that  place.  Its  commander  will  take  up  the  best  position, 
whence  to  advance  either  in  the  direction  of  Mickey's  or  of  Pratt's  house,  on 
the  direct  road  to  Pittsburg,  if  that  road  is  found  practicable,  or  in  the  direc 
tion  of  the  Ridge  road  to  Hamburg,  throwing  all  its  cavalry  on  the  latter 
road,  as  far  us  its  intersection  with  the  one  to  Pittsburg,  passing  through 
Gricrsford,  on  Lick  Creek. 

u  '  The  cavalry  will  throw  well  forward  advanced  guards  and  videttes  tow 
ards  Griersford  and  in  the  direction  of  Hamburg,  and  during  the  impending 
battle,  when  called  to  the  field  of  combat,  will  move  by  the  Griersford  road. 

" '  A  regiment  of  the  infantry  reserve  will  be  thrown  forward  to  the  intersec- 
L— 18 


274  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

tion  of  the  Gravel  Hill  road  with  the  Ridge  road  to  Hamburg,  as  a  support 
to  the  cavalry. 

"  '  The  reserve  will  be  formed  of  Breckinridge's,  Bowen's,  and  Statham's 
brigades,  as  now  organized,  the  whole  under  command  of  Brigadier-General 
Breckinridge. 

"  '  V.  General  Bragg  will  detail  the  51st  and  52cl  regiments  Tennessee  Volun 
teers,  Blount's  Alabama  and  Desha's  Arkansas  battalion,  and  Bairn's  battery, 
from  his  corps,  which,  with  two  of  Carroll's  regiments,  now  en  route  for  these 
headquarters,  will  form  a  garrison  for  the  post  and  depot  of  Corinth. 

"  '  VI.  Strong  guards  will  be  left  at  the  railway  bridge  between  luka  and 
Corinth,  to  be  furnished  in  due  proportion  from  the  commands  at  luka,  Beirns- 
ville,  and  Corinth. 

" '  VII.  Proper  guards  will  be  left  at  the  camps  of  the  several  regiments  of 
the  forces  in  the  field.  Corps  commanders  will  determine  the  strength  of  these 
guards. 

" '  VIII.  Wharton's  regiment  of  Texas  cavalry  will  be  ordered  forward,  at 
once,  to  scout  on  the  road  from  Monterey  to  Savannah,  between  Mickey's  and 
its  intersection  with  the  Pittsburg-Purdy  road.  It  will  annoy  and  harass  any 
force  of  the  enemy  moving,  by  the  latter  way,  to  assail  Cheatham's  division  at 
Purdy. 

'"IX.  The  Chief-Engineers  of  the  forces  will  take  due  measures  and  pre 
cautions,  and  give  all  requisite  orders,  for  the  repair  of  the  bridges,  causeways, 
and  roads,  on  which  our  troops  may  move,  in  the  execution  of  these  orders. 

"  '  X.  The  troops,  individually  so  intelligent  and  with  such  great  interest  in 
the  issue,  are  urgently  enjoined  to  be  observant  of  the  orders  of  their  superiors, 
in  the  hour  of  battle.  Their  officers  must  constantly  endeavor  to  hold  them  in 
hand,  and  prevent  the  waste  of  ammunition  by  heedless,  aimless  firing  ;  the  fire 
should  be  slow,  always  at  a  distinct  mark.  It  is  expected  that  much  and  ef 
fective  work  will  be  done  by  the  bayonet. 

" '  By  command  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston, 

'"THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Acljt.-Gen.' 

"  CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  18th,  1862. 

"  The  foregoing  plan  of  operations  and  orders  of  engagement  were  drawn  up 
and  submitted  by  General  Beauregard,  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  April,  18G2, 
to  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  who  accepted  the  same  without  modification  in  a 
single  particular. 

"  THOMAS  JORDAN,  Brig.-Gen.  and  A.  A.  G." 

The  following  passage  is  taken  from  a  statement  of  Colonel  I). 
Urquhart,  of  General  Bragg's  staff,  addressed  to  General  Jordan. 
It  confirms,  as  the  reader  will  see,  all  that  precedes : 

"  NARRAGANSETT,  R  I.,  August  25th,  1880. 

"My  dear  General, — I  am  in  receipt  of  your  letter  of ,  and  in  reply  have 

to  say,  that  I  remember  the  visit  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  accompanied  by 
yourself,  the  night  of  the  2d  of  April,  1862,  to  the  headquarters  or  apartments 
of  General  Bragg,  at  Corinth,  Mississippi.  On  that  occasion,  I  was  not  pres- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  275 

cnt  through  the  whole  interview',  but  while  the  interview  lasted  I  was  in  and 
out  of  the  room  repeatedly,  and  know  that  that  interview  was  had  for  the 
consideration  of  a  proposition  on  the  part  of  General  Beauregard,  conveyed 
through  you,  that  the  Confederate  army  should,  the  very  next  day,  advance  to 
attack  the  Federal  forces  at  or  about  Pittsburg  Landing.  And  I  know,  also, 
that  the  result  of  the  conference  was  the  order  to  make  that  advance,  an  order 
written  by  you  that  night  in  the  quarters  of  General  Bragg,  in  the  shape  of  a 
circular  letter,  addressed  to  Generals  Bragg,  Polk,  and  Hardee,  severally  corps 
commanders. 

"  As  for  the  order  of  march  and  battle  issued  the  following  day,  I  was  fur 
nished  with  a  copy  from  your  office,  and  can  state  that  it  was  well  understood 
at  the  time  throughout  that  army,  that  the  whole  plan  of  operations  was  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's,  and,  in  fact,  that  all  which  concerned  the  array,  from  the 
time  of  its  collection  at  Corinth,  was  arranged  at  and  proceeded  from 
General  Beaurcgard's  headquarters.  Further,  that,  essential!}*,  he  exercised 
the  command  of  the  army.  In  this  connection  it  is  proper  for  me  to  state 
that  I  learned  at  that  time  from  General  Bragg  himself,  that  General  Johnston 
had  said,  soon  after  his  arrival  at  Corinth,  that  he  had  lost  the  confidence  of 
his  army,  and  therefore  had  insisted  that  General  Beauregard  must  undertake 
the  work  of  organization;  also,  that  with  General  Bragg  as  Chief  of  Staff,  he 
should  issue  all  orders  without  the  formula  of  being  submitted  and  approved 
by  General  Johnston,  except,  of  course,  such  an  order  as  that  of  directing  the 
offensive. 

********* 

"Yours  truly,  DAVID  URQUHART. 

"  To  General  THOMAS  JOHDAN,  New  York/' 

At  the  hour  prescribed  in  the  preparatory  circular  to  the  corps 
commanders,  which  had  been  sent  out  that  morning — vis.,  about 
ten  o'clock — the  troops  were  all  under  arms  in  Corinth,  apparently 
ready  for  the  march.  Meanwhile,  owing  to  the  many  more  ur 
gent  occupations  of  the  Adjutant-General's  office,  copies  of  the  pre 
ceding  general  orders  had  not  been  prepared  for  distribution  that 
day,  as  the  corps  commanders  were  to  begin  the  march  pursuant 
to  the  verbal  order  and  instructions  which  General  Beauregard,  in 
the  presence  of  General  Johnston,  had  given  them,  individually,  as 
to  the  initial  movements  from  Corinth.  The  march,  nevertheless, 
did  not  begin  at  the  time  directed,  chiefly  through  the  misappre 
hension  of  the  commander  of  the  First  Corps,  who,  instead  of 
moving  forward  upon  the  full  verbal  instructions  he  had  received, 
held  his  corps  under  arms  and,  with  its  trains,  blocked  the  way  of 
the  other  troops.  As  soon  as  this  most  unfortunate  delay  was 
brought  to  General  Beauregard's  knowledge,  he  despatched  an 
order  to  the  First  Corps  to  clear  the  way  at  once,  which  was  done; 


276  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

but  it  was  already  dark  before  the  rear  of  its  column  filed  out  of 
Corinth.  Had  it  not  been  for  this  deplorable  loss  of  the  after 
noon  of  the  3d,  the  Confederate  army  must  have  made  the  march 
to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  enemy  by  the  evening  of  the  4th. 
The  attack  would  then  have  been  made  on  the  morning  of  the  5th, 
as  had  been  planned,  or  twenty-four  hours  earlier  than  it  actually 
occurred,  in  which  event  Buell  must  have  reached  the  theatre  of 
action  entirely  too  late  to  retrieve  the  disaster  inflicted  upon 
Grant,  and  must  himself  have  been  forced  to  retire  from  middle 
Tennessee.  The  delay  which  had  marked  the  outset  was  followed 
by  unwarrantable  tardiness  in  the  general  conduct  of  the  march, 
so  much  so  that,  by  the  evening  of  the  4th,  the  forces  bivouacked 
at  and  slightly  in  advance  of  Monterey,  only  ten  miles  from  Cor 
inth  ;  and  it  was  not  until  two  o'clock  r.  M.,  on  the  5th,  that  they 
approached  the  Federal  position,  near  the  Shiloh  meeting-house. 
The  whole  distance  traversed  was  not  more  than  about  seventeen 
and  a  half  miles.  True,  there  were  heavy  rain-falls  during  the 
night  of  the  4th,  and  the  early  part  of  the  next  day,  which  made 
the  roads  somewhat  difficult,  not  to  speak  of  their  narrowness  and 
of  the  fact  of  their  crossing  a  densely  wooded  country.  But  these 
causes  account  only  in  part  for  the  slowness  of  the  inarch,  which 
was  mainly  attributable  to  the  rawness  of  the  troops  and  the  in 
experience  of  the  officers,  including  some  of  superior  rank. 

During  the  advance  of  the  4th  of  April  a  reconnoissance  in 
force  was  injudiciously  made  by  a  part  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Sec 
ond  Corps,  with  such  audacity — capturing  an  officer  and  thirteen 
men  of  the  enemy — that  it  ought  to  have  warned  the  Federal 
commander  of  our  meditated  attack. 

Our  forces  could  not  get  into  position  for  battle  until  late  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  5th — too  late  to  commence  the  action  on 
that  day.  Soon  after  General  Hardee's  line  of  battle  (the  front 
one)  had  been  formed,  he  sent  a  messenger  with  an  urgent  request 
that  General  Beauregard  should  ride  along  in  front  of  his  troops. 
This  General  Beauregard,  through  motives  of  prudence,  at  first 
refused,  and  only  agreed  to  do  at  the  instance  of  General  John 
ston  himself,  but  he  prohibited  any  cheering  whatever,  lest  it 
should  attract  the  attention  of  the  opposing  forces,  which  were 
known  to  be  not  more  than  two  miles  from  us.*  Afterwards,  at 

*  See  statements  of  Colonel  Jacob  Thompson  and  Major  B.  B.  Waddell  in 
Appendix  to  Chapter  XX. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  277 

tlie  request  of  General  Bragg,  General  Beauregard  also  rode  along 
the  front  of  the  Second  Corps,  where  it  was  difficult  to  enforce  the 
order  prohibiting  cheering,  so  enthusiastic  were  the  troops — espe 
cially  those  from  Louisiana — when  he  appeared  before  them. 

As  soon  as  it  had  become  evident  that  the  day  was  too  far  ad 
vanced  for  a  decisive  engagement,  General  Johnston  called  the 
corps  and  reserve  commanders  together  in  an  informal  council,  in 
the  roadway,  near  his  temporary  headquarters,  within  less  than 
two  miles  of  those  of  General  Sherman,  at  the  Shiloh  meeting 
house.  He  was  then  informed,  by  Major-General  Polk,  that  his 
troops  had  already  exhausted  their  rations  and  that  he  had  brought 
none  in  reserve.  General  Bragg  thereupon  stated  that  his  men 
had  been  so  provident  of  their  food  that  he  could  supply  General 
Folk  witli  what  he  needed.  This  promise,  however,  he  never 
executed,  because  of  the  hurry  and  confusion  of  events,  which 
engrossed  his  own  attention  as  well  as  that  of  his  subordinate  offi 
cers  ;  and  because,  though  his  troops  might  have  been  somewhat 
less  improvident  than  those  of  General  Polk,  they  were,  at  best, 
scantily  provided  with  what  was  necessary  for  themselves,  and  had, 
certainly,  no  surplus  rations  to  spare.  The  transportation  wagons, 
containing  the  live  clays'  uncooked  reserved  rations  for  all  the 
corps,  were  miles  away  in  the  rear,  not  having  been  able,  on  ac 
count  of  the  heavy  roads,  to  keep  up  witli  the  march. 

The  fact  that  the  army  was  threatened  with  a  total  lack  of  food, 
and  that,  by  the  loss  of  a  whole  day,  the  offensive  movement  he 
had  so  carefully  prepared  was  seriously  imperilled,  produced  great 
disappointment  and  distress  in  General  Beauregard's  mind.  Im 
pressed  with  the  gravity  of  the  situation  and  the  responsibility 
which  rested  on  him,  as  having  proposed  and  organized  this  entire 
campaign,  he  stated  to  General  Johnston  and  to  the  corps  com 
manders  present  at  the  conference,  that,  in  his  opinion,  our  plan 
of  operations  had  been  foiled  by  the  tardiness  of  our  troops  in 
starting  from  Corinth,  followed  by  such  delays  and  noisy  demon 
strations  on  the  march,  that  a  surprise,  which  was  the  basis  of  his 
plan,  was  now  scarcely  to  be  hoped  for;  that  ample  notice  of  our 
proximity  for  an  aggressive  movement  must  have  been  given 
through  the  conflict  of  our  cavalry,  on  the  preceding  day,  with 
the  enemy's  reconnoitring  force,  and  the  prolongation  of  our 
presence  in  front  of  their  positions  before  the  hour  for  battle, 
next  morning;  that  the  Federal  army  would,  no  doubt,  be  found 


278  MILITARY    OPERATIONS   OF 

intrenched  to  the  eyes,  and  ready  for  our  attack ;  that  it  was  un 
wise  to  push,  against  breastworks,  troops  so  raw  and  undisciplined 
as  ours,  badly  armed  and  worse  equipped,  while  their  antagonists, 
besides  the  advantage  of  number,  position,  discipline,  and  superi 
ority  of  arms,  were  largely  composed  of  men  lately  victorious  at 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson ;  that,  from  his  experience  in  the  war 
with  Mexico  and,  more  recently,  at  Manassas  and  Centreville,  he 
considered  volunteers,  when  well  commanded  and  occupying  strong 
defensive  positions,  equal  to  regulars,  if  attacked  in  front,  as  the 
Federals  would  be  by  us ;  *  that,  under  these  circumstances,  and 
for  the  further  reason  that  the  enemy,  being  on  the  alert,  Buell's 
junction  would  no  doubt  be  hastened,  he  was  no  longer  in  favor 
of  making  the  attack,  but  favored  inviting  one  by  turning  this 
offensive  movement  into  a  reconnoissance  in  force,  to  draw  the 
enemy  after  us  nearer  to  our  base — Corinth — and  thereby  detach 
him  further  from  his  own,  at  Pittsburg  Landing.  Somewhat  sim 
ilar  strategy  had  been  resorted  to  by  Wellington  in  1810,  when, 
advancing  to  attack  Massena  at  Santarem,  he  unexpectedly  found 
that  able  officer  on  his  guard,  ready  for  battle,  on  ground  of  his 
own  choosing,  arid  much  stronger  than  he  had  anticipated.  After 
making  some  demonstrations  in  front  of  his  wily  adversary,  to 
draw  him  away  from  his  stronghold,  Wellington  did  not  hesitate 
to  retire  without  giving  battle. 

General  Beauregard's  views  produced  a  visible  effect  on  all 
present.  General  Johnston,  although  shaken,  after  some  reflec- 

*  General  Sherman,  in  his  "  Memoirs,"  says  of  the  Federal  position :  "  The  po 
sition  was  naturally  strong,  with  Snake  Creek  on  our  right,  a  deep,  bold  stream, 
with  a  confluent  (Owl  Creek)  to  our  right  front,  and  Lick  Creek,  with  a  simi 
lar  confluent,  on  our  left,  thus  narrowing  the  space  over  which  we  could  be 
attacked  to  one  and  a  half  or  two  miles.  At  a  later  period  of  the  war  we 
could  have  rendered  this  position  impregnable  in  one  night,  but  at  this  time 
we  did  not  do  it." 

The  fact  is,  that  the  position  was  not  strong,  except  that  it  could  not  be 
flanked,  but  might  have  been  readily  made  impregnable  in  one  night  to  the 
assault  of  so  raw  a  force  as  ours.  We  knew,  from  the  careful  examination  of 
Colonel  Crocket,  the  Federal  officer  captured  on  the  4th,  that,  up  to  the  even 
ing  of  that  day,  there  were  no  breastworks ;  but  the  several  warnings  given 
by  the  conflict  in  which  he  was  captured,  the  noisy  incidents  of  the  next  day's 
march  and  reconnoissance,  and  our  presence  in  full  force  on  the  field  for  fifteen 
hours  before  the  attack,  were  facts  which  forced  General  Beauregard  to  believe 
the  Federals  would  surely  use  the  ample  time  they  had,  during  that  night,  to 
throw  up  intrenchments  sufficient  for  the  repulse  of  our  raw  troops. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  279 

tion  said  that  he  admitted  the  weight  and  force  of  General  Bean- 
regard's  remarks,  but  still  hoped  we  could  find  the  enemy  unpre 
pared  for  an  attack ;  that  as  our  army  had  been  put  in  motion  for 
battle  and  was  now  on  the  field,  it  would  be  better  to  make  the 
venture.  lie  therefore  ordered  that  preparations  should  be  made 
for  an  attack  at  dawn,  next  day.  Thus  ended  this  memorable  con 
ference  ;  the  officers  who  had  been  present  at  it  repairing  to  their 
respective  headquarters,  in  good  spirits  and  hopeful  for  the 
morrow. 

A  description  of  the  field  of  Shiloh  may  be  appropriate,  to  en 
able  the  reader  more  readily  to  understand  an  account  of  that  bat 
tle.  The  sketch  of  the  country  furnished  by  General  Jordan, 
Adjutant-General  of  the  Confederate  forces,  in  his  "Campaigns 
of  General  Forrest,"  is  so  correct  that  we  shall  transcribe  it  here, 
with  only  slight  alteration  : 

>'Two  streams, Lick  and  Owl  Creeks — the  latter  a  confluent  of  Snake  Creek, 
which  empties  into  the  Tennessee — take  their  rise  very  near  each  other,  just 
westward  of  Monterey  (in  a  ridge  which  parts  the  waters  that  fall  into  the 
Mississippi  from  those  which  are  affluents  of  the  Tennessee),  flowing  sinuously 
with  a  general  direction,  the  latter  to  the  northeast  and  the  former  south  of 
east,  and  they  finally  empty  into  the  Tennessee,  about  four  miles  asunder.  Be 
tween  these  watercourses  is  embraced  an  area  of  undulating  table-land,  some 
five  miles  in  depth  from  the  river  bank,  from  three  to  five  miles  broad,  and 
about  one  hundred  feet  above  the  low-water  level  of  the  river.  Intersected 
by  a  labyrinth  of  ravines,  the  drainage  is  principally  into  Owl  Creek,  as  the 
land  rises  highest  and  ridgelike  near  Lick  Creek.  Adjoining  the  river  these 
ravines,  deep  and  steep,  have  a  water-shed  in  that  direction.  Recent  heavy 
rains  had  filled  them  all  with  springs  and  small  streams,  making  the  soil  boggy, 
and  hence  difficult  for  artillery,  over  much  of  their  extent.  A  primeval  forest 
combined  with  a  great  deal  of  undergrowth  covered  the  region,  except  a  few 
small  farms  of  fifty  or  seventy  acres,  scattered  occasionally  here  and  there. 

k'  Pittsburg  Landing — a  warehouse  and  a  house  or  two  by  the  water's  side — 
lay  three  miles  below  the  mouth  of  Liek  Creek.  Two  roads  leading  from 
Corinth,  crossing  that  creek  about  a  mile  apart,  converge  together  about  two 
miles  from  the  Landing  and  one  mile  in  rear  of  the  Shiloh  meeting-house. 
Other  roads  also  approach  from  all  directions ;  one,  passing  Owl  Creek  by  a 
bridge  before  its  junction  with  Snake  Creek,  branches,  the  one  way  tending 
westwardly  towards  Purely,  the  other  northwardly  towards  Crump's  Landing, 
six  miles  below  Pittsburg.  Another,  near  the  river  bank,  crossing  Snake  Creek 
by  a  bridge,  also  connects  the  two  points." 

The  Federal  forces  —  five  divisions  of  infantry,  four  or  five 
squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  sixteen  light  batteries  of  six  pieces  each, 
amounting  in  all  to  at  least  forty-three  thousand  men,  occupied 


280  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

the  ground  between  the  Shiloh  meeting-house  and  the  river,  in 
three  lines  of  encampments,  as  already  stated. 

General  Sherman,  in  his  sworn  testimony  before  a  court-mar 
tial  which,  in  August,  1862,  tried  Colonel  Thomas  Worthington 
of  the  46th  Ohio  Volunteers,  for  severely  criticising  his  manage 
ment  before  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  said,  of  the  position  occupied  by 
the  Federals:  "But  even  as  we  were  on  the  6th  of  April,  1862, 
you  might  search  the  world  over  and  not  find  a  more  advantage 
ous  field  of  battle ;  flanks  well-protected,  and  never  threatened ; 
troops  in  easy  support;  timber  and  broken  ground  giving  good 
points  to  rally ;  and  the  proof  is,  that  forty-three  thousand  men,  of 
whom  at  least  ten  thousand  ran  away,  held  their  ground  against 
sixty  thousand  chosen  troops  of  the  South  with  their  best  leaders. 
On  Friday,  the  4th,  no  officers  nor  soldiers,  not  even  Colonel 
Worthington,  looked  for  an  attack,  as  I  can  prove." 

It  is  somewhat  strange  that  General  Sherman,  in  his  "Me 
moirs,"  should  maintain  that  the  Federal  forces  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  Shiloh  numbered  only  thirty-twro  thousand  men  of  all 
arms,  when,  four  months  after  that  event,  he  stated,  under  oath,  at 
the  trial  of  Colonel  Worthington,  that  they  amounted  to  forty- 
three  thousand  men,  exclusive,  be  it  remembered,  of  Lew.  Wallace's 
division  of  about  eight  thousand  men,  on  the  northwest  side  of 
Owl  Creek.  He  then  supposed  our  force  was  sixty  thousand 
strong,  instead  of  its  actual  number — forty  thousand  three  hun 
dred  and  thirty-five  men  of  all  arms  and  conditions.  But  it  may 
be  fair  to  infer  that  he  judged  of  their  number  by  the  effect  they 
produced.  Thus  it  was  that  Mr.  Lincoln  was  sorely  puzzled  dur 
ing  the  war  at  his  commanding  generals  reporting  constantly 
that  they  had  fought  the  "  Rebels  "  with  inferior  numbers.  In 
the  instance  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  this  phenomenon  might,  how 
ever,  possibly  have  happened;  for  in  about  thirty  days,  with  our 
defective  means  of  transportation,  we  had  collected  at  Corinth, 
from  Murfreesboro',  Pensaeola,  Mobile,  Xew  Orleans,  and  other 
distant  points,  an  effective  force  of  over  forty  thousand  men  of  all 
arms,  while  the  Federals  had  failed  to  bring  together,  in  time,  at 
Pittsburg  Landing,  notwithstanding  their  ample  means  of  land 
and  water  transportation,  the  armies  of  Buell,  from  Nashville,  Ten 
nessee,  and  of  Pope,  from  southeast  Missouri. 

Yet  the  Confederate  army  had  advanced  and  was  then  assem 
bled  at  Monterey  and  vicinity,  less  than  nine  miles  in  his  front. 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGAED.  281 

Our  forces,  as  they  had  arrived  in  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  at 
the  intersection  of  the  Griersford  (Lick  Creek)  and  Ridge  roads, 
from  Corinth  to  Pittsburg,  less  than  two  miles  from  the  Sliiloh 
meeting-house,  were  formed  into  three  lines  of  battle ;  the  first, 
under  General  Hardee,  extended  from  near  Owl  Creek,  on  the  left, 
to  near  Lick  Creek,  on  the  right,  a  distance  of  less  than  three  miles, 
and  somewhat  oblique  to  the  Federal  front  line  of  encampments, 
being  separated  from  it,  on  the  right,  by  about  one  and  a  half 
miles,  and  on  the  left,  by  about  two  miles.  General  Ilardee's  com 
mand  not  being  sufficiently  strong  to  occupy  the  whole  front,  it 
was  extended  on  the  riirht  bv  Gladden's  brigade,  of  General  Brass's 

*/  i  O  C^) 

corps,  and  his  artillery  was  formed  immediately  in  his  rear,  on  the 
main  Pittsbnrg  road.  11  is  cavalry  protected  and  supported  his 
flanks.  The  second  line,  about  five  hundred  yards  in  rear  of 
the  first,  was  composed  of  the  rest  of  General  Bragg's  troops,  ar 
ranged  in  the  same  order.  General  Folk's  corps,  formed  in  column 
of  brigades,  deployed  on  the  left  of  the  Pittsburg  road,  between 
the  latter  and  Owl  Creek.  The  front  of  the  column  was  about 
eight  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  centre  of  General  Bragg's 
left  wing,  and  each  brigade  was  followed  immediately  by  its  bat 
tery.  General  Folk's  cavalry  supported  and  protected  his  left 
Hank.  Breckinridge's  command  occupied  a  corresponding  position 
behind  General  Pragg's  right  wing,  between  the  Fittsburg  road 
and  Lick  Creek.  His  cavalry  protected  and  supported  his  right 
flank.  The  two  latter  commands  constituted  the  reserve,  and  were 
to  support  the  front  lines  of  battle  by  being  deployed  when  re 
quired  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  Fittsburg  road,  or  otherwise, 
according  to  exigencies. 

General  Ilardee's  effective  force  of  infantry  and  artillery  was, 
then,  nine  thousand  and  twenty-four  men  ;  General  Pragg's,  ten 
thousand  seven  hundred  and  thirty-one;  General  Folk's,  nine 
thousand  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  ;  and  General  Breckin ridge's, 
seven  thousand  and  sixty-two;  presenting  a  total  of  thirty-live 
thousand  nine  hundred  and  fifty-three,  infantry  and  artillery.'-  to 

*  It  is  proper  to  remark  here,  that,  through  the  want  of  experienced  com 
manding  officers  of  artillery  and  cavalry,  and  because  of  the  wooded  nature 
of  the  battle-field,  it  became  necessary  to  subdivide  and  distribute  those  two 
arms  of  the  service  among  the  different  corps,  to  enable  us  to  obtain  even  a 
partial  benefit  from  their  presence  on  the  field.  The  strict  rules  of  military 
organization  for  battle,  in  that  and  other  respects,  had  to  be  departed  from. 
under  stress  of  circumstances. 


232  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

which  must  be  added  four  thousand  three  hundred  and  eighty-two 
cavalry,  so  imperfectly  armed  and  so  recently  organized  that  all 
but  one  third  of  it  was  useless,  except  for  outpost  service  that  did 
not  involve  skirmishing. 

Our  pickets  had  been  thrown  out  well  in  advance  of  our  first 
line  of  battle,  not  far  from  the  enemy's  position,  without  seeing 
or  discovering  any  of  his  pickets  or  outposts.  Such  an  oversight 
on  the  part  of  the  Federal  commanders  is  really  unaccountable, 
unless  they  chose  to  overlook  that  important  maxim  of  war: 
"  Never  despise  an  enemy,  however  weak  and  insignificant  he  may 
appear." 

So  near  to  each  other  were  the  opposing  forces,  that,  hearing  a 
loud  beating  of  drums  about  the  hour  of  tattoo,  and  believing  it 
proceeded  from  our  lines,  General  Beauregard  immediately  de 
spatched  a  staff  officer  with  orders  to  suppress  such  thoughtless 
and  imprudent  sounds.  The  staff  officer  returned  shortly  after 
wards  and  reported  that  the  noise  General  Beauregard  had  heard, 
and  was  desirous  of  quieting,  came,  not  from  our  troops,  but  from 
the  enemy's  encampments  in  our  front.  Later  in  the  evening,  a 
Federal  assistant  surgeon  and  his  orderly,  riding  out  on  some  night 
excursion,  crossed  our  picket  lines  and  were  captured.  They  were 
speechless  with  astonishment  when  brought  to  Generals  Johnston 
and  Beauregard,  at  beholding  so  large  a  force  within  striking  dis 
tance  of  their  own  camps,  where  all  was  now  silence  and  repose, 
and  where  none  suspected  the  approaching  storm.  From  them 
we  learned  that  General  Grant  had  returned  for  the  night  to  Sa 
vannah,  and  that  General  Sherman  commanded  the  advanced 
forces.  No  other  information  of  importance  was  obtained  from 
the  two  prisoners. 

Such  was  the  lack  of  discipline  in  the  largest  part  of  the  Con 
federate  forces,  that,  despite  the  strict  orders  given  to  enforce 
perfect  quiet  among  our  troops,  drums  were  beaten,  bugles  blown, 
fires  kindled,  here  and  there,  by  many  regiments,  and  firearms  dis 
charged,  at  different  points  in  our  rear,  during  that  eventful  night. 
These  and  other  bivouac  noises  should  have  betrayed  to  the  Fed 
eral  generals  on  the  first  line  the  close  proximity  of  their  foe. 
That  such  was  not  the  case  is  due,  no  doubt,  to  the  fact  that  they 
fell  into  an  error  similar  to  that  which  General  Beauregard  and 
others  of  our  officers  had  made,  and  attributed  these  untimely 
sounds  to  their  own  troops. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD.  233 


CHAPTER  XX. 

Battle  of  Shiloh. —  Varied  Incidents  and  Events  of  the  First  Day. —  Enemy 
Taken  by  Surprise. — His  Lines  Driven  in. — Entire  Forces  Engaged  on  Both 
Sides. — Triumphant  Advance  of  our  Troops. — General  Johnston  in  Com 
mand  of  the  Right  and  Centre. — General  Beauregard  of  the  Left  and  Re 
serves. — Allurements  of  the  Enemy's  Camps. — Straggling  Begins  among 
our  Troops. — Death  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. — General  Beauregard  As 
sumes  Command  and  Renews  the  Attack  all  along  the  Line. — Enemy  again 
Forced  to  Fall  Back  and  Abandon  other  Camps. — Evidence  of  Exhaustion 
among  the  Troops. — Straggling  Increasing. — General  Beauregard 's  Efforts 
to  Check  it. — Collects  Stragglers  and  Pushes  them  Forward.— Battle  still 
Raging. — Capture  of  General  1'rcntiss  and  of  his  Command.— Our  Troops 
Reach  the  Tennessee  River. —  Colonel  Webster's  Batteries. —  Arrival  of 
Ammcn's  Brigade,  Nelson's  Division,  of  BueH's  Army. — Its  Inspiriting 
Effect  upon  the  Enemy. — The  Gunboats. — Intrepidity  of  our  Troops. — 
Their  Brilliant  but  Ineffectual  Charges. — Firing  Gradually  Slackens,  as 
the  Day  Declines. — At  Dusk  General  Beauregard  Orders  Arrest  of  Conflict. 
-Troops  Ordered  to  Bivouac  for  the  Night,  and  be  in  Readiness  for 
Offensive  Movement  next  Day. — Storm  during  the  Night. — Arrival  of  the 
Whole  of  Buell's  Army. — Gunboats  Keep  up  an  Incessant  Shelling. 

As  the  Federal  troops  lay  encamped,  Sherman's  and  Prcntiss's 
divisions  stretched  from  the  Owl  Creek  bridge,  on  the  Pnrdy  road, 
to  the  ford  of  Lick  Creek,  on  the  Shore  road,  from  Pittsbnrg  to 
Hamburg.  Sherman's  1st  brigade,  under  Colonel  McDowell,  was 
on  the  extreme  right;  his  -ith,  under  Colonel  Buckland,  west 
of  and  resting  on  the  Shiloh  meeting-house;  his  3d,  under  Colo 
nel  llildebrand,  east  of  and  resting  also  on  the  Shiloh  meeting 
house.  Xext  came  Prentiss's  division,  and,  at  a  very  wide  inter 
val —  by  a  loose  arrangement  —  was  Sherman's  2d  brigade,  un 
der  Colonel  Stuart,  near  Lick  Creek.  About  half  a  mile  in  rear 
of  this  line,  and  between  Sherman  and  Prentiss,  lay  McClernand's 
division;  and  two  miles  in  rear,  towards  the  Tennessee  Iliver,  C. 
F.  Smith's  division,  now  under  General  W.  II.  L.  Wallace;  while 
on  Wallace's  left  was  Iltirlbut's  division,  on  the  Hamburg  road, 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  in  rear  of  Stuart. 

Before  five  o'clock  A.  M.,  on  the  Cth  of  April,  General  Ilardee's 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

pickets,  driving  in  those  of  General  Prentiss,  encountered  some 
companies  of  the  Federal  advanced  guard,  and  a  desultory  firing 
began.  The  order  to  advance  was  now  given,  and  at  five  o'clock 
General  Ilardee's  entire  line  moved  forward.  Overhead  was  the 
promise  of  a  bright  day,  but  the  after  mists  of  the  recent  storm  yet 
hung  in  the  valleys  and  woods,  veiling  still  more  thickly  the  for 
est-screened  positions  of  the  enemy,  upon  which  the  lines  of  battle 
were  directed  only  by  conjecture.  General  Prentiss  having  hur 
ried  a  reinforcement  to  the  guard  and  informed  Generals  Wallace 
and  Hurlbut  of  the  attack,  threw  forward  three  regiments  well  to 
the  front.*  His  position  was  a  prolongation  of  the  elevated 
ground  where  stood  the  Sliiloh  meeting-house,  held  by  General 
Sherman;  the  whole  bounded  in  front  by  a  ravine  and  water 
course  which,  rising  near  the  left  of  Prentiss,  fell  into  Owl  Creek, 
near  the  Purely  road  bridge,  occupied  by  Sherman's  right. 

The  Confederate  lines  of  attack  soon  appeared,  driving  before 
them  the  skirmish  line  formed  of  the  troops  of  the  guard.  Pren- 
tiss's  whole  force  was  now  thrown  forward  and  became  the  first 
engaged,  as  his  position  was  slightly  in  advance  of  General  Sher 
man's,  and  the  difficulties  of  the  ground  in  front  of  the  latter 
caused  our  line  to  oblique  still  more  to  the  right.  Shortly  after  six 
o'clock  General  Prentiss's  command  was  falling  under  fire,  and 
the  assailing  wave  soon  struck  General  Sherman's  pickets,  sweep 
ing  them  back  in  the  direction  of  his  camps.  General  Sherman 
called  upon  General  McClernand  for  assistance  and  gave  notice  of 
the  attack  to  Generals  Prentiss  and  Hurlbut,  the  latter  of  whom 
despatched  Yeatch's  brigade  of  four  regiments  to  the  support  of 
General  Sherman's  left.f  Before  seven  o'clock  the  musketry  fire, 
which  had  gradually  swelled,  slackened  and  almost  ceased,  while 
the  Federal  skirmishers  were  leaving  the  field,  and  the  wooded  in 
terval  separating  the  enemy's  encampments  from  our  advancing 
lines  was  lessening  more  and  more.  It  was  the  momentary  lull 
before  the  full  outburst  of  the  storm. 

*  In  his  Report,  General  Prentiss  says :  ".  .  .  This  information  received,  I  at 
once  ordered  the  entire  force  into  line,  and  the  remaining  regiments  of  the  1st 
brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Everett  Peabody,  consisting  of  the  25th  Mis 
souri,  IGth  Wisconsin,  and  12th  Michigan  infantry,  were  advanced  well  to  the 
front.  I  forthwith,  at  this  juncture,  communicated  the  fact  of  the  attack  in 
force  to  Major-General  Smith  and  Brigadier-General  S.  A.  Hurlbut." 

t  General  Hurlbut's  Report. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  285 

Shortly  before  this  General  Johnston,  meeting  General  Beaure 
gard  near  the  former's  headquarters,  expressed  liis  satisfaction  at 
the  manner  in  which  the  battle  had  been  opened,  and  after  an  in 
terchange  of  views  concerning  the  operations  of  the  day,  left  him 
and  rode  to  the  front.  They  parted  here  for  the  last  time. 

At  seven  o'clock  the  thunder  of  artillery  announced  the  serious 
opening  of  the  conflict,  and  was  followed  by  the  sharp,  increasing 
volleys  of  musketry.  Generals  Polk  and  Breckinridge  were  now 
hastened  forward,  and,  reporting  to  General  Beauregard,  at  half- 
past  seven,  were  by  him  deployed  in  column  of  brigades,  General 
Breckinridge  on  the  right,  General  Polk  on  the  left.  They  re 
ceived  from  General  Beauregard  brief  general  instructions  to  keep 
at  a  proper  distance  in  rear  of  General  Bragg's  line  and  apart  from 
each  other,  until  called  on  for  assistance,  when  they  should  move 
promptly  with  concentrated  forces  wherever  needed,  and,  if  in 
doubt  from  the  hidden  and  broken  character  of  the  country,  to 
move  upon  the  sound  of  the  heaviest  firing.  By  this  time  the 
attack  had  become  general  along  the  entire  front  of  Generals 
Prentiss  and  Sherman,  though  stronger  as  yet  on  the  former,  who 
received  the  full  shock  of  GJadden's,  Hindman's,  and  Wood's  bri 
gades  of  General  llardee's  line,  and  was  driven  back  upon  his 
camps,  calling  upon  Generals  "Wallace  and  llurlbut  for  assistance."- 
General  Beauregard  now  despatched  members  of  his  staff  to  several 
quarters  of  the  field,  to  ascertain  and  report  its  precise  condition, 
and  sent  forward  Adjutant-General  Jordan,  charging  him  to  main 
tain  a  careful  inspection  of  the  lines  of  battle,  so  as  to  secure  the 
massing  of  the  troops  for  unity  of  attack  and  prompt  reinforce 
ment  to  weakened  points;  also  with  impressive  directions  to  the 
corps  and  division  commanders  to  mass  their  batteries  in  action, 
and  tight  them  twelve  guns  on  a  point. 

Notwithstanding  the  bold  movements  of  the  Confederate  cav 
alry  on  the  previous  evening  and  the  noise  of  the  conflict  since 
dawn,  General  Sherman  remained  under  the  belief  that  no  more 
than  a  strong  demonstration  was  intended,  until  nearly  eight 
o'clock,  when,  seeing  the  Confederate  bayonets  moving  in  the 
woods  beyond  his  front,  he  "  became  satisfied,  for  the  first  time, 

*  General  Prentiss,  in  his  Report,  says  lie  was  assailed  "  by  the  entire  force  of 
the  enemy,  advancing  in  three  columns  simultaneously  upon  our  left,  centre, 
and  right/' 


286  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

that  the  enemy  designed  a  determined  attack  "  on  the  entire  Fed 
eral  camp.*  The  regiments  of  his  division,  all  then  under  arms, 
were  thrown  into  line  of  battle.  Taylor's  and  Waterhouse's  bat 
teries  were  posted,  the  former  at  the  Shiloh  meeting-house,  and 
the  latter  on  a  ridge  to  the  left,  with  a  front  fire  over  open  ground 
between  Mungen's  and  Appier's  regiments  of  his  left  (Hilde- 
brand's)  brigade.  General  McClernand,  responding  promptly  to 
General  Sherman's  call,  had  sent  forward  three  Illinois  regiments, 
which  were  posted  in  rear  of  Waterhouse's  battery  and  of  Appier, 
upon  whom  General  Sherman  impressed  the  necessity  of  holding 
his  ground  at  all  hazards.  Yeatch's  brigade,  of  General  Hurlbut's 
division,  took  position  on  General  Sherman's  left.f 

As  the  heavy  roll  of  musketry  soon  extended  to  the  left,  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  ordered  General  Polk  to  move  two  of  his  bri 
gades  to  the  left  rear  of  General  Bragg's  line  and  to  keep  in  per 
sonal  communication  with  the  latter,  who  was  also  informed  of 
the  movement.  General  Bragg  reported  that  his  infantry  was 
not  yet  engaged,  but  ready  to  support  General  Hardee  when  re 
quired,  and  that  his  artillery  was  shelling  the  Federal  camp. 
Colonel  Jacob  Thompson,  of  General  Beauregard's  staff,  now 
came  in  with  a  message  from  General  Johnston,  informing  him 
that  General  Hardee's  line  was  within  half  a  mile  of  the  enemy's 
camps,  and  advising  the  sending  forward  of  strong  reinforcements 
to  the  left,  as  he  had  just  learned  that  the  enemy  wras  there  in 
great  force.  Three  brigades  of  General  Breckinridge  were  accord 
ingly  set  in  motion  as  an  additional  reinforcement  for  that  quarter. 
But  later  a  courier  came  in  from  General  Johnston,  with  informa 
tion  that  the  enemy  was  not  strong  on  the  left,  and  had  fallen  back  ; 
while  Colonel  Augustin  and  Major  Brent,  of  General  Beauregard's 
staff,  returning  about  half-past  eight  from  a  reconnoissance  of  the 
extreme  right,  reported  an  active  engagement  in  that  quarter,  the 
right  of  General  Hardee's  line  under  a  severe  fire,  and  requiring 
extension,  as  it  was  uncovered  for  the  space  of  a  mile  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Lick  Creek,  and  the  enemy  was  occupying  the  country  be 
yond  the  right.  General  Beauregard  thereupon  ordered  General 
Breckinridge  to  send  but  one  (Trabue's)  brigade  to  the  left,  and 
lead  his  remaining;  two  brigades  to  the  ri£rht  of  Gladden,  so  as  to 

O  O  O  ' 

*  General  Sherman's  Report,  sec  "  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  p.  407. 
t  General  Hurlbufs  Report,  "Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  p.  400. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  2ST 

share  in  the  forward  movement  of  the  first  line,  and  extend  his 
own  right  as  far  as  possible  towards  Lick  Creek.  Colonel  Augus- 
tin  was  sent  to  conduct  him  into  position. 

It  was  now  half-past  eight  o'clock.  The  attack  was  being  pushed 
with  great  vigor,  the  Confederate  lines  of  battle  following  quick 
ly  in  the  wake  of  the  shells  that  were  bursting  in  the  enemy's 
camps.  Fortunately  for  the  Federals,  on  that  day,  from  an  un 
avoidable  ignorance  of  their  exact  positions,  the  left  of  the  Con 
federate  first  line  of  battle  fell  short  of  General  McDowell's  bri 
gade,  on  General  Sherman's  right,  which  thus  had  ample  time  for 
deliberate  preparation  before  it  was  struck  by  the  second  line,  un 
der  General  Bragg.*  Thus,  while  the  brigades  of  Generals  Glad 
den,  Ilindman,  and  Wood  were  striking  an  unbroken  series  of 
blows  on  General  Prentiss's  division  and  on  General  Sherman's 
left  and  left  centre,  it  happened  that  Cleburne's  brigade,  the  left 
of  General  Ilardee's  line,  was  moving  single-handed  against  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  right  centre  and  was  being  overlapped  by  his  right. 
Its  order  was  broken  in  crossing  the  difficult  morass  which  here 
covered  the  Federal  front,  and,  as  it  charged  up  the  hill,  deadly 
volleys  were  poured  upon  it  from  behind  bales  of  hay  and  other 
convenient  defences,  till,  after  repeated  efforts  against  a  front  and 
flank  fire,  it  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss;  the  Gth  Mississippi  regi 
ment  losing  in  these  charges  more  than  three  hundred  killed  and 
wounded,  out  of  an  effective  force  of  four  hundred  and  twentv- 

V 

five  men. 

The  diverging  course  of  Lick  Creek  had  left  an  ever-widening 
space  between  it  and  the  right  of  General  Ilardee's  line,  as  the 
latter  advanced.  To  fill  this  space  Chalmers's  brigade,f  with 
Gage's  battery,  was  thrown  forward  from  the  second  line  and  de 
ployed  on  the  right  of  General  Gladden,  in  conformity  with  direc 
tions  contained  in  the  order  of  march  and  battle.  The  gallant 
Gladden,  at  that  time  vigorously  urging  his  troops  against  Pren- 
tiss,  fell  mortally  wounded,  and  was  carried  from  the  field.  His 
brigade  was  now  wavering  before  the  severe  artillery  and  musketrv 

*  The  Confederate  line  while  advancing  was  somewhat  oblique  to  the  Fed 
erals,  being  nearest  to  General  Prentiss's  left  and  farthest  from  General  Sher 
man's  right. 

t  See  General  "Withers's  Report  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  in  "  Confederate  Official 
Reports  of  Battles,1'  p.  235.  See  also,  in  same  work,  General  Chalmers's  Re 
port,  at  page  250. 


288  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

fire  brought  to  bear  against  it,  when  Colonel  Daniel  "W.  Adams,  its 
new  commander,  seizing  a  battle-flag,  "called  upon  his  men  to 
follow  him,  which  they  did  with  great  alacrity  ;"*  and  such  was  the 
impetus,  as  Chalmers's  brigade  charged  on  the  right,  that  Pren- 
tiss's  entire  line  gave  way  in  confusion  and  disorder.  It  was 
pursued  through  its  camps  and  about  half  a  mile  across  a  ravine, 
to  the  ridge  beyond,  by  Chalmers's  brigade,  till  the  latter  was 
halted  by  order  of  General  Johnston, f  then  in  that  quarter,  and 
withdrawn  to  a  position  on  the  rear  and  right  of  General  Gladden. 
At  the  same  time,  Mungen's  and  Appier's  regiments  of  Ililde- 
brand's  brigade,  of  Sherman's  division,  broke  and  fled,  leaving 
Waterhouse's  battery  entirely  exposed.;}:  Here  the  supporting 
regiments  from  McClernand's  and  Hurlbut's  divisions  pressed  for 
ward,  and,  together  with  Hildebrand's  own  regiment,  still  held 
their  ground,  while  another  brigade  of  McClernand's  came  to  their 
support.  Meantime  McArthur's  brigade,  of  Wallace's  division, 
while  moving  to  the  assistance  of  Stuart's  brigade,  on  the  Federal 
extreme  left,  had  mistaken  its  way,  and  come  opportunely  into  the 
void  left  by  the  routed  General  Prentiss.§  For  a  while  it  stood 
firmly,  but  was  forced  back  and  formed  farther  to  the  rear,,  with 
the  remaining  forces  of  its  own  division,  hurried  forward  to  its 
relief.  General  Hurlbut  also  was  bringing  up  his  two  remaining 
brigades  for  the  support  of  Prentiss's  left,  when  he  met  the  flee 
ing  troops  of  that  division,  who  straggled  through  his  lines.  He 
formed  his  brigades  on  two  sides  of  an  open  field  with  woods  in 
rear,  and  his  three  batteries  (Meyer's,  Mann's,  and  Ross's)  respect 
ively  on  the  right,  the  centre,  and  the  left — their  fire  converging 
over  the  open  ground  in  front ;  [  while  General  Prentiss,  rallying 
what  he  could  of  his  troops,  led  them,  together  with  the  23d  Mis 
souri  (just  landed  from  a  transport),  into  position  on  Hurlbut's 
right,  and  on  the  left  of  Wallace's  division. ^[  But  here,  after  the 
capture  of  Prentiss's  camps,  further  advance  on  the  right  was  sus- 

*  Sec  Colonel  D.  W.  Adams's  Report,  in  "  Confederate  Official  Reports  of 
Battles,"  p.  242. 

t  See  General  Chalmers's  Report,  in  "  Confederate  Official  Reports  of  Battles," 
p.  257. 

I  General  Sherman's  Report,  "Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.  p. 407. 

§  "  Agate,"  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.  p.  389. 

||  Ilurlbut's  Report,  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.  p.  400. 

*H  Prentiss's  Report. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  289 

pended  for  about  half  an  hour,  as  the  enemy's  movements  were 
concealed.*  This  proved  a  valuable  respite  to  the  Federals,  pend 
ing  which,  report  coming  to  that  quarter  that  the  enemy  was  form 
ing  in  line  of  battle  some  distance  off,  on  the  right  flank,  General 
Johnston  led  Chalmers's  and  Jackson's  brigades  back  across  the 
ravine  and  southeast  three  quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  right,  until 
the  right  of  Chalmers  rested  on  Lick  Creek  bottom,  Jackson  form 
ing  on  his  left.  Here  they  were  halted  for  about  half  an  hour, 
while  the  position  of  the  enemy  (Stuart's  brigade)  was  being  ascer 
tained,  f 

After  General  Breckinridge's  two  brigades  had  passed  head 
quarters  in  their  movement  to  the  right,  General  Beauregard  sent 
Johnson's  brigade,  of  General  Folk's  corps,  as  a  further  reinforce 
ment  to  the  right;  and,  thereupon,  at  about  9.20  A.M.,  moved  with 
his  staff  to  a  more  advanced  position,  on  the  road  to  Pittsburg, 
now  giving  more  particular  attention  to  the  conflict  on  the  left.* 
Here  General  Euggles's  division,  of  General  Brngg's  corps,  the 
second  line  of  attack,  had  come  into  position  on  General  Ilardee's 
left,  and  was  ready  to  grapple  with  General  Sherman,  who,  sup 
ported  now  by  all  of  McClernand's  division  and  Wright's  regi 
ment  of  Wallace's  second  brigade,§  was  endeavoring  to  cling  to 
the  position  of  Shiloh. 

The  severity  of  the  contest,  thus  far,  was  attested  by  the  large 
number  of  wounded  found  on  the  way.  A  great  many  stragglers 
were  also  met,  whom  General  Beauregard's  staff  ||  and  escort  pres 
ent  were  at  once  employed  in  reorganizing  and  leading  forward 
to  their  regiments.  As  General  Iltiggles's  division,  the  left  of 
General  Bragg's  line,  was  inclining  to  the  right  before  making  its 
direct  movement  forward,  an  interval  occurred  between  the  lead 
ing  brigade,  Gibson's,  and  its  two  other  brigades,  Anderson's  and 
Pond's.T  A  brigade  of  General  Folk's  division,  believed  to  be 
Russell's,'**  which  had  been  ordered  forward  by  General  Beaure- 

*  Chalmers's  Report,  "  Confederate  Official  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  257. 
f  Generals  Withers's,  Chalmers's,  and  Jackson's  Reports,  "  Confederate  Re 
ports  of  Battles,1'  pp.  235,  257,  265. 

I  Reports  of  General  Bcauregard's  Staff,  in  Appendix. 
§  Colonel  Wright's  Report,  "  Rebellion  Record,"  p.  370. 
||  Reports  of  General  Beauregard's  Staff,  in  Appendix. 
IT  General  Bragg's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  227. 
**  Major  Clack's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  317. 
I.— 19 


290  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

gard,  opportunely  filled  this  vacant  space,  thus  completing  the  sec 
ond  line  in  that  quarter,  and  supporting  the  assault  of  Ilindman's 
division  upon  McClernand  and  Yeatch,  who  were  then  striving  to 
hold  the  position  from  which  Sherman's  left  brigade  had  been 
mostly  routed,  and  was  now  wholly  slipping  away. 

Still  farther  to  the  left,  Anderson's  brigade  formed  the  second 
line  along  the  ridge,  with  Hodgson's  battery,  which  went  at  once 
into  vigorous  action. 

O 

Across  the  ravine,  and  on  the  opposite  dominating  ridge,  were 
General  Sherman's  remaining  brigades,  supporting  their  batteries, 
with  an  infantry  advance  thrown  out  to  the  edge  of  the  boggy 
ravine  which  here  divided  the  two  lines  of  battle.  It  was  a  swamp 
so  overgrown  with  shrubs,  saplings,  and  vines  thickly  interwoven, 
as  to  require,  in  many  places,  the  use  of  the  knife  to  force  a  pas 
sage.""  As  Anderson's  regiments  went  down  the  slope  and  forced 
their  way  through  the  swamp  thicket,  they  encountered  a  severe 
fire  from  the  enemy's  artillery  and  musketry,  and,  as  they  charged 
up  the  opposite  hill,  they  were  partially  broken  by  some  scatter- 
ii)"*  forces  from  the  first  line  and  from  the  right.  All,  however, 

O  O 

were  rallied  together  and  held  for  a  time,  under  cover  of  the  browr 
of  the  hill  occupied  by  General  Sherman,  while  Hodgson's  guns 
threw  a  destructive  fire  upon  the  opposite  Federal  battery;  and 
the  neighboring  forces  on  the  right,  supported  by  another  battery, 
moving  around  the  swamp  and  thicket,  poured  a  flank  fire  upon 
General  Sherman's  left.f  What  remained  of  Hildebrand's  bri 
gade  now  wholly  gave  way,  throwing  disorder  into  McClernand's 
forces,  who  were  driven  back,  abandoning  Waterhouse's  six  guns  ; 
and  as  Taylor's  battery  now  slackened  under  Hodgson's  fire,  An 
derson's  brigade  again  ascended  the  slope  with  three  regiments  of 
Pond's  brigade,  on  the  left,  supported  by  two  sections  of  Ketch- 
urn's  batteiy.  By  this  front  and  flank  charge,  General  Sherman 
was  forced  to  fall  back  with  McDowell's  and  Buckland's  brigades 
to  the  Purdy  and  Hamburg  roads;  thus,  by  ten  o'clock,  abandon 
ing  his  entire  line  of  camps. ;£  As  the  attacking  lines  vigorously 

*  General  Patton  Anderson's  Report,  "Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p. 
301. 

t  This  was  one  of  the  batteries  which  had  been  placed  in  position  by  General 
Trudeau,  volunteer  aide-de-camp  of  General  Polk,  acting  under  instructions  of 
General  Beauregnrd,  who  was  present  at  the  time. 

I  Colonel  Buckland's  Report,  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.  p.  372. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGAED.  201 

followed,  Buckland's  brigade  began  rapidly  to  dissolve ;  Behr's 
battery  was  abandoned  without  tiring  a  shot*  from  its  new  posi 
tion,  and  the  remains  of  Sherman's  division  fell  farther  back  on 
the  right  of  McClernand's,  which  had  been  well  rallied,  and  formed 
on  the  line  of  its  camps,  with  Veatch's  cleft  brigade  allotted  on  its 
right  and  left.  In  taking  his  new  position,  General  Sherman  was 
enabled  somewhat  to  relieve  McClernand,f  who  was  under  a  se 
vere  attack,  by  delivering  his  retreating  fire  upon  the  flank  of  the 
assailing  force  in  that  quarter. 

About  the  hour  that  General  Sherman's  last  camps  were  car 
ried,  and  his  troops  were  being  driven  back  upon  the  line  of  the 
Purdy  road,  the  battle  broke  along  the  front  formed  by  Generals 
W.  II.  L.  Wallace  and  Ilurlbut,  who  had  selected  strong  defensive 
positions.  Here,  after  the  line  of  battle  had  been  formed  beyond 
General  Prentiss's  camps,  a  fortunate  shell,  from  Jlobertson's  bat 
tery,  striking  amid  one  of  Hurlbut's,  stampeded  the  entire  bat 
tery,  horses  and  caissons,  as  well  as  guns,  being  abandoned,  though 
the  latter  were  spiked  by  other  artillerists.^:  By  direction  of  Gen 
eral  Ilardee,  then  on  his  way  towards  the  left,  Colonel  Adams 
made  a  skirmishing  reconnoissance  to  feel  the  enemy's  strength. 
He  was  then  ordered  by  General  Bragg  to  advance,  but  found  his 
men  short  of  ammunition.  At  this  moment  General  Breckin- 
ridge's  division  was  led  into  position  by  Colonel  Augustin,  of 
General  Beauregard's  staff,§  on  Colonel  Adams's  right,  while 
Cheatham's  division  (Bushrod  Johnson's  and  Stevens's  brigades), 
sent  to  the  same  quarter  by  General  Beauregard,  came  up  on  its 
left.]  These  two  divisions  now  joined  their  lines  and  engaged 
the.  enemy,  while  Adams's  (Gladdcn's)  brigade  fell  to  the  rear. 
Johnson's  two  right  regiments,  which  had  become  temporarily  de 
tached  by  reason  of  the  features  of  the  ground,  were  ordered  sep 
arately  into  action  by  General  Bragg,  and  unfortunately  remained 
separated  from  the  rest  of  the  brigade  and  their  commander  dur 
ing  the  day.^f 

Wallace's  and  Ilurlbut's  divisions,  deliberately  posted  and  han- 

*  General  Sherman's  Report,  "  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  407. 

t  Ibid. 

I  General  Ilurlbut's  Report,  "  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  400. 

§  See  Colonel  Augustin's  Report,  in  Appendix. 

||  General  Cheatham's  Report. 

IF  General  Bushrod  Johnson's  Report. 


292  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

died  with  skill,  maintained  a  stubborn  resistance  to  the  attack. 
Consisting  mostly  of  troops  who  had  served  at  Donelson,  they 
gallantly  formed  their  lines,  notwithstanding  the  surprise  and  dis 
order  through  which  they  had  been  ushered  into  the  conflict. 

Shortly  after  ten  o'clock,  the  enemy  being  reported  very  strong 
in  the  centre — that  is,  along  "Wallace's  front — General  Beauregard 
reinforced  that  point  by  Trabue's  brigade,*  of  General  Breckin- 
ridge's  division,  which  he  had  held  near  his  headquarters.  A  little 
before  that  time  Stuart's  forces  had  also  been  reached.f  This  offi 
cer,  when  warned,  at  half-past  seven,  by  General  Prentiss,  of  the 
presence  of  the  Confederates,  had  formed  his  three  regiments  in  line 
of  battle  on  a  ridge  faced  by  a  ravine  and  watercourse  emptying  into 
Lick  Creek,  and  awaited  developments,  until,  seeing  the  Confed 
erates  penetrating  on  Prentiss's  rear,  he  called  for  support  from 
Hurlbut,  who  despatched  him  an  Illinois  regiment  and  a  battery, 
which  took  position  on  his  right.  It  was  scarcely  ten  o'clock  when 
his  skirmish  line,  thrown  out  on  another  ridge,  in  front,  was  driven 
in  by  the  attacking  forces,  who  planted  a  battery  there  and  shelled 
his  lines,  Jackson's  brigade  opening  the  conflict  under  General 
Johnston's  personal  ordei'4  Stuart,  upon  going  to  the  right,  found 
that  the  71st  Ohio  regiment,  together  with  Hurlbut's  Illinois  bat 
talion  and  battery,  had  taken  flight. §  A  similar  fate  had  overtaken 
the  52d  Tennessee,  of  Chalmers's  brigade,  when,  shortly  before,  it 
had  received  the  fire  of  Stuart's  skirmishers ;  and,  excepting  two 
companies  of  soldierly  behavior,  it  was  ordered  out  of  the  lines. jj 
Stuart's  other  two  regiments,  after  being  forced  back  some  dis 
tance,  were  still  farther  withdrawn,  and  formed  along  the  brow  of 
a  hill,  numbering  now  a  force  of  eight  hundred  men.  His  posi 
tion  was  protected  by  a  fence  and  thick  undergrowth,  with  an 
open  field  in  front  and  a  ravine  on  the  left ;  and  here,  without  ar 
tillery,  he  maintained  a  creditable  resistance  against  greatly  supe 
rior  numbers.!" 

*  See  Major  Brent's  Report,  in  Appendix. 

t  "Agate,"  "Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  Doc.  p.  391. 

I  Report  of  Colonel  Joseph  Wheeler,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p. 
275. 

§  Stuart's  Report. 

1  Chalmers's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  257. 

"T  Stuart's  Report  mentions  no  artillery  but  the  battery  sent  him  by  Hurlbut, 
which  went  away;  as  to  infantry,  he  was  greatly  outnumbered. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD. 

All  the  forces  on  each  side  were  now  in  action.  The  Confed 
erate  front  line,  as,  according  to  the  conformation  of  the  ground, 
it  developed  the  positions  of  the  enemy  and  the  needs  of  reinforce 
ments,  had  been  extended  on  its  right  and  left,  and  filled,  at  in 
tervening  points,  by  the  troops  of  the  second  and  third,  or  reserve 
lines.  With  a  general  direction  from  northwest  to  southeast, 
oblique  to  the  Tennessee  River,  and  its  right  thrown  back,  the 
order  of  the  Federal  forces  was,  from  right  to  left,  as  follows  : 
Sherman's  remaining  troops  ;  McClernand's  division,  with  a  por 
tion  of  Yeatch's  brigade,  of  Hurlbut's  division  ;  and,  beyond  a  wide 
interval,  Stuart's  isolated  brigade,  on  the  extreme  left. 

The  Confederate  forces  in  opposing  order,  left  to  right,  were : 
Two  brigades  (Pond's  and  Anderson's)  of  Ruggles's  division,  of 
Bragg' s  corps ;  one  brigade  (Russell's)  of  Folk's  corps  ;  Hardee's 
three  brigades  (Cleburne's,  Wood's,  and  Ilindman's),  with  Gibson's 
brigade,  of  Ruggles's  division,  and  Trabue's,  of  Breckinridge's  di 
vision,  in  support  or  filling  up  the  line  ;  Cheatham's  division,  of 
Folk's  corps,  and  Breckinridge's  division,  with  Gladden  in  rear; 
and  on  the  extreme  right,  at  the  distance  of  about  three  quarters 
of  a  mile,  Withers's  division  (Jackson's  and  Chalmers's  brigades), 
of  Bragg's  corps,  carrying  on  the  attack  against  Stuart  under  Gen 
eral  Johnston. 

The  contest  now  went  on  in  all  parts  of  the  field,  without  any 
important  incident  or  change,  during  the  remainder  of  the  morn 
ing  and  the  early  afternoon.  About  eleven  o'clock,  General  John 
ston,  leaving  Withers's  division,  passed  over  to  the  rear  of  General 
Breckinridge's,  and  remained  directing  its  movements.  Previous 
ly  to  this  General  Bragg  had,  by  understanding  with  General 
Polk,  taken  position  near  the  right  centre  and  General  Polk  near 
the  left  centre,  while  General  Ilardee  remained  at  the  extreme 
left.  General  Beauregard,  following  the  general  movement,  main 
tained  a  central  position  in  rear. 

In  the  succession  of  ravines,  ridges,  and  woods,  the  Federals  had, 
every  where,  natural  defensive  positions  more  or  less  strong,  which 
their  opponents  were  compelled  to  carry  by  assault.  These  were 
attacked  with  great  bravery  and  heavy  loss  of  life,  but  not  with 
that  concert  and  massing  of  forces  essential  to  decisive  effects, 
though  this  fact  was,  in  some  measure,  due  to  the  concealed  char 
acter  of  the  country,  which,  in  most  parts,  admitted  of  no  contin 
uous  view  of  any  large  body  of  troops.  General  officers  in  imme- 


294:  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

diate  direction  of  their  commands  were  too  intent  upon  the  efforts 
of  brigades,  and  even  regiments,  thus  losing  sight  of  the  disjointed 
remainder,  and  neglecting  to  combine  efficiently  the  service  of  the 
artillery  and  infantry.  Brigades  and  regiments,  as  well  as  batter 
ies,  were  often,  for  this  reason,  at  a  stand-still  without  orders ;  and 
sometimes,  from  the  same  lack  of  cohesion,  bodies  of  our  own 
troops  were  mistaken  for  the  enemy  and  even  fired  into  on  the 
flank  or  rear,  and  thrown  into  some  confusion.  Other  commands, 
after  casualties,  remained  without  leadership  from  a  ranking  offi 
cer,  until  so  reported  to  General  Beauregard,  and  by  him  supplied 
through  his  staff.  Straggling  also  began  early  in  the  day,  a  great 
many  men  being  engaged  in  the  plunder  of  the  captured  camps, 
while  numbers  made  their  way  to  the  rear.  General  Beauregard 
used  part  of  the  cavalry,  under  his  staff  and  escort,  to  drive  them 
out  of  the  camps,  and  when  collected,  they  were  formed  into  bat 
talions,  officered  as  well  as  could  be  done  under  the  circumstances, 
and  again  sent  forward.  Thus  all  loose  or  halting  commands  were 
attached  to  the  readiest  lines  of  movement,  or  to  those  needing 
reinforcement.  At  about  half-past  twelve,  part  of  Pond's  brigade 
and  two  regiments  of  Cleburne's  brigade,  united  under  Colonel 
Pond,  with  a  battery  and  squadron  of  cavalry,  were  ordered  to  as 
sail  the  Federal  right.  Here,  between  twelve  and  one  o'clock, 
Sherman's  and  McClernand's  forces  began  to  fall  back,*  and,  at 
half -past  one,  General  Beauregard  ordered  General  Ilardee  to 
throw  the  cavalry  f  upon  the  retreating  regiments,  sending  a  force 
by  a  circuitous  way,  and  under  screen  of  the  woods,  against  the 
right  rear,  so  as  to  cut  them  off.  The  movement  was  vigorously 
executed,  though  a  part  of  the  force,  carried  too  far  by  its  ardor, 
and  coming  upon  an  unseen  body  of  the  enemy  in  a  wood,  was  re 
pulsed  ;  but  the  remainder,  under  Morgan,  charged  and  drove 
back  the  retreating  battalions,  capturing  a  number  of  guns.  At 
two  o'clock,  General  Beauregard  again  sent  orders  to  General  liar- 
dee  J  to  push  the  enemy's  right  with  vigor,  and  Sherman's  and 
McClernand's  troops  now  rapidly  gave  way,  the  larger  part  of  them 
retiring  towards  Snake  Creek,  where  they  remained  aside  from  the 
scene  of  conflict;  another  part  retreating  upon  Wallace's  camps, 

*  Reports  of  Colonels  Hare  and  Crocker, "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.  pp. 
376-378. 
t  See  Staff  Reports  in  Appendix.  I  Ibid. 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGABD.  295 

while  Yeatch's  brigade  fell  back  towards  the  landing,  where,  later, 
it  reunited  with  Ilurlbut's  division. 

The  way  was  now  open  for  an  advance  of  tl>3  Confederate  left 
against  "Wallace's  division,  which  was,  at  that  time,  the  advanced 
Federal  right.  Posted  on  a  ridge  under  cover  of  a  thicket,  and 
supported  by  artillery,  this  division  had  unflinchingly  held  its 
ground,  repelling  with  slaughter  every  attack  made  upon  it.  Un 
der  the  orders  of  General  Bragg,  who  was  directing  the  move 
ments  against  its  left,  between  eleven  and  three  o'clock,  Ilindman's 
division  was  led  to  the  assault,  but  repulsed  under  a  murderous 
fire,*  its  gallant  commander  falling  severely  wounded.  It  was 
rallied  and  led  to  a  second  charge,  but  with  no  better  success. 
Gibson's  brigade  was  then  sent  up,  without  artillery  support,  in 
four  bloody,  detached,  and  unavailing  assaults,  f  its  flank  raked  by 
a  battery,  and  its  front  covered  by  the  fire  of  the  infantry  posted 
in  the  thicket  on  the  ridge.  After  these  repulses,  General  Bragg 
abandoned  the  task  and  passed  farther  to  the  right,  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Breckinridge's  division. J 

Meanwhile  "Withers's  division  (Chalmers's  and  Jackson's  bri 
gades)  had  been  gradually  forcing  back  Stuart's  two  regiments, 
sweeping  with  its  right  the  edge  of  the  Tennessee  bottom,  until, 
about  three  o'clock,  Chalmers's  brigade  was  struck  by  the  shells 
of  the  Federal  gunboat  "  Tyler,"  and  moved  away  from  the  river.§ 
As  Stuart's  force,  winding  its  way  through  ravines  to  Pittsburg 
Landing,  went  out  of  view,  and  no  other  enemy  appeared  in  that 
quarter,  the  division,  wheeling  on  its  left,  by  order  of  Withers,  in 
accordance  with  the  general  plan  of  battle,  |  advanced  upon  the 
sound  of  the  neighboring  conflict,  where  Breckinridgc's  and 
Cheatham's  forces  were  warmly  engaged  with  those  of  llurlbut 
and  Prentiss.  General  Johnston  had  been  some  three  quarters  of 
an  hour  in  rear  of  Brcckinridge's  division^  (the  right  of  the  main 
line  of  battle),  while,  under  a  galling  fire  and  at  great  cost,  it  had 
steadily  held  its  position,  until  he  decided  to  lead  it  to  the  charge. 

*  General  Bragg's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  228. 
t  General  Gibson's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,''  p.  286. 
J  General  Bragg's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  228. 
§  General  Chalmers's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  258,  and 
General  Jackson's  Report,  p.  26G. 

||  General  "Witliers's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  236. 
IF  Governor  Harris's  letter  to  General  Bcauregard,  see  Appendix. 


296  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

The  enemy's  force  was  driven  to  the  next  ridge  beyond,  and  Breck- 
inridge's  line  was  re-formed  under  a  severe  fire,  when  Governor 
Harris,*  volunteer  aid,  returning  from  the  delivery  of  an  order  to 
Colonel  Statham,  to  charge  a  battery  on  their  immediate  left,  found 
General  Johnston  wounded.  This  was  between  two  and  half- 
past  two  o'clock.  Sustaining  him  in  the  saddle,  Governor  Har 
ris  withdrew  him  to  a  ravine,  about  one  hundred  yards  in  the 
rear,  where,  within  half  an  hour,  that  patriotic  and  noble  soldier 
breathed  his  last.  Meanwhile,  General  Hurlbut,  informed  by  Stu 
art  that  his  left  flank  was  uncovered  by  the  latter's  forced  retreat,f 
shifted  his  right  (Lanman's)  brigade  to  his  left,  and  ordered  Wil- 
liams's  brigade  and  Prentiss's  command  to  fall  back  steadily,  thus 
endeavoring  to  meet  the  flanking  movement  of  Withers's  division. 
Adjutant-General  Jordan  had  come  upon  this  quarter  of  the  field 
at  half-past  two,  shortly  after  General  Johnston's  withdrawal,  and 
finding  Breckinridge's  division  at  rest,  ordered  it  to  charge  the 
enemy  in  front,:];  posted  behind  a  fence  in  the  border  of  a  wood. 
He  gave  the  order  in  the  name  of  General  Johnston,  not  knowing 
at  the  time  of  his  whereabouts  or  mortal  wound.  General  Breck- 
inridge  advanced  steadily,  forcing  the  enemy  back  from  their  po 
sition. 

While  this  was  going  on,  and  after  the  Federal  right  had  been 
broken  and  driven  back,  General  Beauregard,  having  ordered  Gen 
eral  Hardee  to  reorganize  his  forces  for  another  onslaught,  turned 
his  attention  to  that  quarter  of  the  field,  in  the  centre,  where  the 
enemy's  obstinate  resistance  had  baffled  General  Bragg's  previous 
efforts.  He  advanced  in  that  direction  portions  of  Anderson's  and 
Gibson's  brigades,  two  detached  batteries,  and  several  battalions 
just  formed  from  stragglers  and  scattered  commands.  At  this 
moment  Colonel  Marshall  J.  Smith's  Crescent  regiment,  of  New 
Orleans,  came  up  from  the  extreme  left,  with  Colonel  Looney's 
38th  Tennessee,  and,  seeing  General  Beauregard,  raised  a  gallant 
cheer,  which  immediately  drew  upon  the  spot  the  concentrated 
fire  of  the  enemy.  General  Beauregard,  bidding  them  "  go  forward 
and  drive  the  enemy  into  the  Tennessee," §  attached  to  them  an- 

*  Governor  Harris's  letter  to  General  Beauregard,  see  Appendix, 
f  General  Hurlbut's  Report,  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.  p.  401. 
I  General  Cheatham's  Report. 

§  Colonel  Marshall  J.  Smith's  Report,  "  Confederate  Official  Reports  of  Bat 
tles,"  p.  343. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  297 

other  battalion  formed  of  stragglers,  and  sent  them  in  the  same 
direction,  to  support  two  batteries  (Hodgson's  and  another)  which 
he  had  just  ordered  ahead.  Here  a  vigorous  artillery  fire  was 
now  combined  with  the  efforts  of  the  infantry,  under  Generals 
Polk  and  Kuggles,  and  the  stubborn  enemy  began  to  relax  his 
hold.* 

But,  farther  down  on  the  right,  Generals  Prcntiss  and  Ilurlbut 
were  still  contending  so  strongly  that  Generals  Breck  in  ridge  and 
Crittenden  called  earnestly  on  Jackson  and  Chalmers  for  assist- 
ance.f  The  flanking  march  of  these  two  latter  brigades  was  met 
by  Lanman's  brigade,  supported  by  powerful  artillery,  and  there  a 
fierce,  exhausting  contest  ensued. 

As  General  Beauregard,  in  advance  of  the  Shiloh  meeting-house, 
was  directing  the  movement  beyond  McClernand's  camps,  Governor 
Harris  reached  him,  shortly  after  three  o'clock,  and  informed  him 
of  General  Johnston's  death.  This  was  a  great  shock  to  General 
Beauregard,  who  had  not  anticipated  the  possibility  of  such  a  loss, 
and  who  knew  what  effect  it  would  produce  upon  the  troops,  es 
pecially  those  who  had  formed  part  of  General  Johnston's  original 
command.  He  sent  immediate  intelligence  of  the  sad  event  to 
the  corps  commanders,  enjoining  silence  concerning  it,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  gave  orders  to  push  the  attack  vigorously  in  all  quar 
ters  of  the  field. 

Wallace's  right  was  now  attacked  by  Looney's  and  Marshall  J. 
Smith's  regiments,  of  Anderson's  brigade,  and  by  a  portion  of  Gib 
son's,  under  General  Polk.  The  remains  of  Hindman's  division 
and  Gladden' s  brigade,  with  Cheatham's  and  Breckinridge's  forces, 
were  pressed  against  his  left;  and  Prentiss's  command,  with  a 
portion  of  Ilurlbut's,  was  attacked  with  great  determination  by 
General  Bragg;  while  Jackson  and  Chalmers  were  assailing  Ilurl 
but  in  front  and  on  the  left  flank.  The  latter,  as  he  withdrew, 
attempted  to  make  a  stand  on  the  line  of  his  camps,  but,  to  avoid 
being  cut  off,  fell  back,  at  about  four  o'clock,  upon  Pittsburg  Land 
ing,  thus  allowing  Chalmers  and  Jackson  to  move  upon  the  flank 
of  the  line  formed  by  Prentiss  and  Wallace. 

While  all  these  forces  were  closing  upon  Wallace  and  Prcntiss, 


*  See,  in  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  Ruggles's  Report,  p.  282,  Ander 
son's  Report,  p.  304,  and  Hoge's  Report,  p.  291. 
t  Report  of  General  Jackson,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  2G5. 


298  MILITAKY  OPERATIONS  OF 

General  Hardee  was  engaged  on  the  left  with  McClernand's  regi 
ments  and  the  remnants  of  Sherman's  command.  Hearing  from 
a  staff  officer"-  that  a  brigade  was  inactive  in  that  quarter,  and, 
apparently,  without  a  commander,  General  Eeauregard  sent 
Colonel  Ferguson,  of  his  staff,  to  lead  it  into  action,  under  the  di 
rection  of  General  Hardee.  This  was  part  of  the  brigade  of 
Colonel  Pond,  who,  far  from  being  inactive,  was,  in  fact,  recon 
noitring  so  as  to  ascertain  his  position  more  accurately  and  act  un- 
derstandingly  against  the  battery  in  his  front.  By  orders,  said  to 
have  been  from  General  Hardee,  a  brilliant  but  ineffective  charge 
was  then  and  there  made  by  the  18th  Louisiana, f  under  Colonel 
Mouton,  and  immediately  afterwards  by  the  Orleans  Guard  battal 
ion,  under  Major  Querouze;  the  16th  Louisiana  followed  in  the 
rear  of  the  column,  but  was  only  partially  engaged.  Alone  and 
unsupported  the  18th  Louisiana  charged  gallantly  up  the  hill, 
closely  upon  the  battery,  which  had  already  begun  to  abandon  its 
ground,  when  a  murderous  fire  from  three  regiments  of  McCler- 
nand's  force  compelled  the  regiment  to  retire,  after  a  loss  of  two 
hundred  and  seven  officers  and  men,  killed  and  wounded,  who 
could  not  be  removed  from  the  field.;}:  The  Orleans  Guard  bat 
talion  lost  about  eighty  men  while  making  a  similar  charge,  im 
mediately  afterwards. 

The  enemy  at  this  point,  however,  was  now  falling  back,  in  ac 
cordance  wkh  the  retrograde  movement  of  the  other  Federal 
forces,  when  General  Wallace  fell,  mortally  wounded,  after  having, 
by  his  skill  and  tenacity,  contributed  much  towards  the  salvation 
of  the  Federal  army.  But  General  Prentiss,  unaware  of  the  move 
ment  executed  by  Wallace's  division,  still  clung  to  his  position,  to 
gether  with  the  8th,  12th,  and  14th  Iowa  and  the  58th  Illinois,  of 
Wallace's  division,  who  were  endeavoring  to  save  their  artillery. 
After  they  were  cut  off  they  made  several  ineffectual  charges  in 
an  effort  to  break  through  to  the  Landing,  and  at  about  half-past 
five  o'clock  r.  M.,  surrounded  and  hemmed  in  by  our  troops,  they 
finally  abandoned  the  struggle,  and  surrendered,  amid  the  loud 
cheers  of  the  victors.  The  prisoners  there  captured  numbered 
some  twenty-five  hundred  men,  and  among  them  was  General 


*  Colonel  Ferguson's  Report,  see  Appendix. 

t  Colonel  Pond's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  329. 

I  Colonel  Moutou's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  333. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  290 

Prentiss  himself.*     They  were  sent  to  the  rear  under  escort  of 
cavalry  and  a  detachment  from  Wood's  brigade.f 

This  closing  in  of  the  Confederate  lines  had  brought  the  ex 
treme  right  and  the  left  centre  of  the  line  of  battle  unexpectedly 
face  to  face,  as  the  last  wooded  ridge  was  crossed  which  had  sepa- 
ated  them  as  they  pressed  on  both  flanks  of  the  Federal  divisions. 
Much  confusion  ensued,  as  well  as  delay  for  the  replenishment  of 
ammunition,  before  the  commands  were  extricated  and  directed 

anew  against  the  enemy. 

o  « 

Meanwhile,  since  four  o'clock,  Colonel  J.  D.  Webster,  an  able  offi 
cer  of  General  Grant's  staff,  had  been  collecting  the  reserve  artillery 
and  other  batteries,  till  he  had  massed  about  sixty  guns  (some  of 
them  24-pounder  siege  guns)  along  a  ridge  covering  Pittsburg 
Landing,  and  reaching  out  to  the  camps  of  Wallace,  a  portion  of 
which  was  still  held  by  the  remainder  of  that  division,  with  some 
of  MeClernand's  regiments,  and  fragments  of  Sherman's,  on  their 
right.  In  rear  of  Webster's  guns  was  also  Ilurlbut's  division,  J 
with  Veatcli's  brigade  now  reattached,  and  two  of  Stuart's  regi 
ments,  all  of  these  reinforced  by  numbers  rallied  from  the  broken 
commands.  General  Grant  having  arrived  on  the  field  at  one 
o'clock  p.  M.,§or  about  that  time,  had  been  busy  at  this  work  since 
three  o'clock.  The  line  of  bluffs  masked  all  view  of  the  river ;  but, 
in  fact,  General  Buell's  Army  of  the  Ohio  was  also  now  arriving 
from  Savannah,  on  the  opposite  bank,  below  Pittsburg  Landing, 
and  Ammen's  brigade,  of  .Nelson's  advance  division,  had  been 
thrown  across  and  placed  in  support  of  Webster's  battery,  at  five 
o'clock.  Generals  Buell  and  Xelson  were  both  present  on  the 
field,  jj  Behind  these  forces  and  below  the  bluff  was  the  remainder 

*  General  Preritiss,  in  his  report  of  the  battle,  written  after  his  return  from 
captivity,  thus  alludes  to  this  memorable  incident :"...!  determined  to  as 
sail  the  enemy,  which  had  passed  between  me  and  the  river,  charging  upon 
him  with  my  entire  force.  I  found  him  advancing  in  mass,  completely  encir 
cling  my  command,  and  nothing  was  left  but  to  harass  him  and  retard  his 
progress  so  long  as  might  be  possible.  This  I  did  until  5.30  r.  M.,  when  find 
ing  that  further  resistance  must  result  in  the  slaughter  of  every  man  in  the 
command,  I  had  to  yield  the  fight.  The  enemy  succeeded  in  capturing  my 
self  and  twenty-two  hundred  rank  and  file,  many  of  them  wounded." 

t  General  Eunice's  Report. 

I  General  Ilurlbut's  Report,  "Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  401. 

§  General  Badcau  says,  eight  o'clock  A.  M. 

1  General  Nelson's  Report,  "  Record  of  the  Rebellion,''  vol.  iv.  p.  413. 


300  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

of  Grant's  army,  its  flight  arrested  by  the  river,  and  its  masses 
tossing  in  uncontrollable  panic  and  disorder.* 

But  in  rear  of  the  victorious  Confederate  line  was  a  scene 
of  straggling  and  pillage  which,  for  a  time,  defied  all  remon 
strance  and  all  efforts  at  coercion.  The  disorder  and  plunder 
that  had  followed  the  capture  of  Prcntiss's,  Sherman's,  and  Mc- 
Clernand's  camps  were  now  all  the  greater,  as  the  troops,  fasting 
since  dawn — and  some  of  them  since  the  previous  evening — were 
exhausted  from  incessant  fighting  and  marching.  The  commands 
were  broken  and  mixed  ;  and  among  many  the  idea  prevailed  that 
the  battle  had  been  won  and  was  virtually  ended.  One  cheering 
feature,  however,  in  the  scene  of  spoil,  \vas  the  strewing  of  old 
flint-locks  and  double-barrelled  shot-guns,  exchanged  for  the  En- 
field  and  Minie  rifles  abandoned  by  the  enemy.  In  view  of  this 
change  of  armament  and  the  general  scarcity  of  ammunition, 
General  Beauregard  ordered  the  collection  of  the  enemy's  ordnance 
stores,  as  well  as  all  available  provisions,  to  be  sent  to  the  rear  for 
greater  security. 

The  forces  were  deployed  again  into  line  from  the  point  around 
which  they  had  centred  in  the  capture  of  Prentiss's  and  Wallace's 
advanced  regiments.  Those  under  General  Bragg's  direction 
moved  to  the  right,  Chalmers's  brigade  leading,  after  a  halt  for 
re-distribution  of  ammunition  ;f  and,  extending  to  the  Tennessee 
bottom,  Jackson's  brigade  followed,  without  ammunition,  the 
bayonet  being  their  only  weapon.^:  The  remainder  of  the  line 
was  continued  from  right  to  left,  with  the  same  brigades  that  had 
been  previously  engaged.  Those  on  the  right  of  the  Bidge  road 
were  practically  under  the  direction  of  General  Bragg,  and  those 
on  the  left  of  it,  under  Generals  Polk  and  Hardee.  This  road,  as 
well  as  all  approaches  to  the  Landing,  was  swept  by  the  enemy's 
artillery.  The  Federal  position,  on  the  bluffs,  was  fronted  by  a 
deep  ravine  and  creek,  running  into  the  Tennessee,  with  branches 
falling  into  it  from  the  line  of  the  Confederate  advance,  all  filled 
with  back  water  from  the  river,  on  account  of  the  late  heavy  rains ; 
and  the  main  ravine,  wrhicli  protected  the  Federal  front,  was  enfi- 


*  "  Agate,"  "  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  393.     Sec  also  General 
BuelVs  Report,  vol.  iv.  p.  410. 

t  See  Chalmers's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  258. 
J  General  Jackson's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  2GG. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  301 

laded  by  the  fire  of  the  gunboats  lying  in  its  mouth.  Over  this 
ground,  divided  and  thickly  wooded,  a  continuous  line  of  battle 
was  impracticable.  General  Beauregard,  seeing  that  nothing  but 
a  concerted  and  well-supported  attack,  in  heavy  mass,  could,  that 
evening,  strike  the  finishing  blow  by  which  the  enemy  would  be 
crushed,  ordered  the  corps  commanders,  on  the  right  and  left,  to 
make  a  hasty  reorganization  of  the  troops  under  their  control,  for 
a  combined  onslaught,  while  he,  at  the  centre,  should  organize  re 
inforcements  for  the  line  of  attack  in  his  immediate  .front.  He 
caused  all  fragmentary  bodies  and  stragglers,  in  his  vicinity,  to  be 
brought  up  from  the  rear,  and  formed  into  such  organizations  as 
the  emergency  allowed,  and  they  were  thus  carried  forward  to 
swell  the  line  of  battle. 

The  troops,  however,  were  not  pressed  to  the  front  in  combined 
attack,  as  ordered,  but  in  a  series  of  disjointed  assaults,  with  but 
little  support  from  the  batteries,  many  of  which  were  allowed  to 
remain  inactive  in  the  rear.*  These  assaults  were  easily  broken, 
and  with  slaughter,  by  the  formidable  weight  of  metal  which 
girded  the  Federal  position,  supported  by  a  still  heavy  force  of  in 
fantry,  reinforced  by  some  of  General  Buell's  troops,  while  the 
shells  of  the  gunboats  swept  the  long  ravine  which  our  different 
commands  had  to  cross  in  assailing  the  bluff,  and  which  formed 
their  only  rallying  cover  from  the  lire  in  front.  The  troops,  more 
over,  were  greatly  disorganized ;  the  commands  were  cut  up  and 
intermingled,  and  regimental  organization  was  greatly  confused. 
The  corps  commanders,  then  as  throughout  the  day,  continued  to 
give  examples  of  personal  courage,  but  exhaustion  and  hunger  nul- 


*  In  his  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  324,  Captain  Hodgson, 
writing  of  the  charge  made  by  the  18th  Louisiana,  and,  subsequently,  by  the 
Orleans  Guard  battalion,  at  four  o'clock  r.  M.,  or  about  that  time,  says :  "This 
was  about  the  last  firing  of  my  battery,  on  the  Gth  instant/' 

Captain  Ketchum,  in  his  Report  (ibid.  pp.  340,  341),  says  :  "  Colonel  Pond's 
fine  brigade  was  badly  cut  up  in  a  charge  on  a  battery,  in  one  of  these  camps, 
which,  I  have  always  thought,  might  have  been  avoided,  had  my  lattery  not  ~bccn 
withdrawn  from  the  advance  I  was  making  on  this  camp.'1'1 

General  Chalmers,  in  his  Report,  p.  2GO,  says  :  "  During  this  engagement, 
Gage's  battery  was  brought  up  to  our  assistance,  but  suffered  so  severely  that 
it  was  soon  compelled  to  retire." 

Sec  also  Pond's  and  Mouton's  Reports,  as  to  the  separate  and  isolated  action 
of  their  commands. 


302  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

lified  all  attempts  to  create  enthusiasm  on  the  part  of  the  men. 
General  Hardee,  in  command  on  the  left,  to  whom  General  Beau- 
regard  had  sent  Lieutenant  Chisolm,  of  his  staff,  to  ascertain  how 
he  was  faring,  answered:  "We  are  getting  along  very  well,  but 
tell  the  General  they  (meaning  the  enemy)  are  putting  it  to  us 
very  severely."  Chisolm,  though  ordered  to  return,  and  report 
before  dark,  remained  as  aide-de-camp  to  General  Hardee,  who  had 
none  of  his  staff  with  him,  and  was  bringing  up  two  regiments 
into  position,  from  the  rear,  when  one  of  them  broke  in  disorder, 
under  the  artillery  fire  from  the  field-pieces  and  gunboats,  and  fell 
back  out  of  the  fight.*  Here,  also,  part  of  Pond's  brigade,  when 
about  to  make  a  last  forward  movement,  received  a  fatal  volley 
from  the  27th  Tennessee,  of  Cleburne's  brigade,  which  compelled 
it  to  face  about,  and  their  artillery  support  to  take  a  new  position 
against  a  supposed  hostile  attack  from  the  rear — an  untoward  event, 
which  ended  the  share  of  this  brigade  in  the  conflict  of  that  day.  f 
The  remaining  troops,  under  General  Ilardee — that  is  to  say, 
Wood's  brigade,  greatly  diminished  by  detachment  and  casual 
ties,  and  a  small  portion  of  Cleburne's — did  not  succeed  in  making 
any  impression  on  the  force  of  artillery  and  infantry  defending 
the  position  of  Wallace's  camps,  still  held  by  fragments  of  Wal 
lace's,  McClernand's,  and  Sherman's  divisions.  The  forces  on  the 
right  of  General  Hardee,  under  General  Folk's  direction,  were  en 
gaged  in  the  same  desultory  and  indecisive  contest,  Gibson's  and 
Anderson's  brigades  not  being  actively  employed  by  him.J  So 
was  it  with  General  Breckin ridge's  division.  Colonel  Trabue, 
commanding  the  first  Kentucky  brigade  of  that  division,  in  his  re 
port  of  the  battle,  speaking  of  the  events  of  the  day,  following  the 
surrender  and  capture  of  General  Prentiss's  command,  says: 

"  Finding  the  troops  who  had  come  in  from  my  right  halting  one  or  two 
hundred  yards  in  my  front,  I  allowed  the  6th  and  9th  Kentucky  regiments 
hastily  to  change  their  guns  for  Enfield  rifles,  which  the  enemy  had  surren 
dered,  and  I  then  moved  up  and  rejoined  General  Breckinridge,  who,  with 
Statham's  and  Bowen's  brigades,  was  occupying  the  front  line,  being  on  the 
crest  of  the  hill  (or  highland)  overlooking  the  narrow  valley  of  the  Tennes 
see  River,  on  which,  and  near  by,  was  Pittsburg  Landing.  Having  been 
halted  here  for  more  than  an  hour,  we  endured  a  most  terrific  cannonading 


*  Colonel  Chisolm's  Report,  in  Appendix. 

t  Colonel  Pond's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  329. 

J  General  Anderson's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  305. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  303 

and  shelling  from  the  enemy's  gunboats.  My  command,  however,  had  seen 
too  much  hard  fighting  to  be  alarmed,  and  the  4th  Kentucky  stood  firm, 
while  some  of  our  troops  to  the  front  fell  back  through  their  lines  in  confu 
sion.  .  .  .  From  this  position,  when  it  was  nearly  dark,  we  were  ordered  to 
the  rear  to  encamp,  which  movement  was  effected  in  good  order.  I  followed, 
in  the  darkness  of  the  night,  the  Purdy  road,  after  having  re-united  to  my 
command  Byrne's  battery  and  the  others  of  my  troops  who  had  been  de 
tached  to  the  right,  not  including,  however,  Cobb's  battery/' 

Among  the  forces  of  General  Bragg,  on  the  right,  where  that 
officer  was  directing  movements,  Gladdeifs  brigade  had  become 
dissevered*  in  the  confusion  following  the  capture  of  General 
Prentiss,  and  took  no  part  in  the  assaults  upon  the  last  Federal 
position,  though  the  portion  remaining  under  its  commanding  of 
ficer,  Colonel  Deas,  was  formed  on  the  left  of  Jackson's  brigade. 
This  latter  brigade  was  led,  under  a  heavy  lire  from  the  light  bat 
teries,  siege-pieces,  and  gunboats, f  across  the  ravine,  and  with  its 
only  weapon,  the  bayonet,  ascended  the  ridge  nearly  to  the  crest, 
bristling  with  guns  ;  but,  without  support,  it  could  be  urged  no 
farther.  It  remained  for  some  time  sheltering  itself  against  the 
precipitous  sides  of  the  ravine,  till  Jackson,  seeing  his  men  use 
lessly  under  a  raking  fire,  and  that  a  farther  advance  was  imprac 
ticable,  without  support  and  a  simultaneous  movement  along  the 
whole  line,  sought  for  orders  from  his  division  commander,  Gen 
eral  Withers  ;  but  darkness  closed  the  conflict  before  he  could 
reach  him.  Of  tin's  eventful  part  of  the  day,  after  which  hostili 
ties  entirely  ceased  on  both  sides,  Colonel  Joseph  "Wheeler,  com 
manding  the  19th  Alabama  regiment,  in  his  report  says:  "  But  af 
ter  passing  through  the  deep  ravine  below  the  lowest  camps,  we 
were  halted  within  about  four  hundred  yards  of  the  river,  and  re 
mained  ready  to  move  forward  for  about  half  an  hour,  when  night 
came  on,  and  we  were  ordered  to  the  rear,  and  were  assigned  to 
bivouac,  by  General  "Withers.''^  Chalmers's  brigade,  the  extreme 
right,  vainly  attempted  to  mount  the  ridge  against  the  fire  from 
the  line  of  batteries  and  infantry,  assisted  by  the  flank  fire  of 
the  gunboats,  though  it  made  repeated  charges,  till  night  closed 
in.g  ^ 

*  Colonel  Deas's  Report,  u  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles/'  p.  245. 
t  General  Jackson's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  2GG. 
I  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles/'  p.  270. 
§  General  Chalmers's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  2GO. 


304  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

Meanwhile,  General  Beauregard  had  been  weighing  attentive!}', 
and  no  doubt  anxiously,  the  premonitory  signs  visible  during  the 
kiter  hours  of  the  battle.  The  strength  of  the  Federal  batteries 
was  apparent,  by  their  extent  and  sound,  and  by  the  effect  pro 
duced  on  the  Confederate  lines  ;  while  the  steady  and  heavy  rolls 
of  musketry,  proceeding  from  the  same  quarter,  indicated  the 
presence  either  of  fresh  troops,  the  arrival  of  which  General  Beau- 
regard  had  feared  and  predicted  the  evening  before,  or  of  forces 
reorganized  from  the  stragglers  on  the  field,  as  had  been  done 
with  our  own  stragglers  several  times  that  day.  As  General 
Beauregard  rode  in  rear  of  the  disjointed  lines,  the  futility  of  these 
fitful,  detailed  attacks  became  more  and  more  evident  to  him. 
Most  of  the  commands  were  disorganized  and  fragmentary,  sun 
dered  by  the  deep,  wooded  ravines,  and  numbers  of  stragglers 
could  be  seen  in  all  directions.  lie  felt  not  only  that  it  was  im 
practicable  to  gather  up  all  his  forces  for  a  general  and  simultane 
ous  onslaught,  which  alone  might  have  been  effective,  but  also 
that  the  brief  space  of  time  now  remaining  to  him  before  night 
fall  must  be  used  to  collect  the  troops  into  position,  or  the  morn 
ing,  and  its  threatened  possibilities,  would  find  him  with  but  a 
nominal  army.  He  knew  that  Lew.  Wallace's  division,  of  some  eight 
thousand  men,  was  near  by,  observing  the  road  from  Furdy ;  that  it 
had  not,  as  yet,  been  engaged  in  the  conflict,  and  might,  at  any  mo 
ment,  fall  upon  us  in  flank,  left,  or  rear.  He  therefore  resolved, 
without  further  delay,  to  withdraw  the  troops  gradually  from  the 
front,  and  reorganize  them,  as  wrell  as  possible,  to  resume  the  offen 
sive  on  the  7th,  and  complete  his  victory  over  Grant.  According 
ly,  at  dusk,  he  sent  to  the  different  corps  commanders  the  order, 
k*  to  arrest  the  conflict,  and  fall  back  to  the  enemy's  abandoned 
camps  for  the  night."* 

General  Bragg  had  also  concluded  that  the  troops  were  incapable 
of  any  further  offensive  efforts  in  his  quarter  of  the  field,  and  had 
already  resolved  to  withdraw,  f  He  gave  orders  to  that  effect, 
which  were  anticipated,  as  to  some  of  the  commands,  by  the  or 
ders  sent  by  General  Beauregard.:):  Chalmers  had  fought,  as  al- 

*  Colonel  Augustin's  and  Captain  C.  H.  Smith's  Reports,  in  Appendix. 

t  Dr.  Nott's  letter,  in  Appendix. 

|  The  order  to  General  Bragg  was  borne  by  Captain  Clifton  Smith,  acting 
aide-de-camp.  In  a  few  cases  it  was  communicated  directly  to  brigade  com 
manders  by  Colonel  Augustin.  another  aide-de-camp  to  General  Beauregard. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  305 

ready  stated,  till  night  had  closed  in  upon  him  ;  and  as  he  and  Jack- 
eon  fell  back  in  the  darkness,  the  hitter's  regiments  became  sepa 
rated  from  each  other,*  and  he  from  them,  and  so  remained  during 
the  night  and  the  following  day.  The  withdrawal  of  the  troops,  as 
a  general  thing,  was  attended  with  disorder,  by  reason  of  the  dark 
woods  and  broken  character  of  the  country.  u  It  was  eight  o'clock 
at  night,"  says  General  Anderson,  in  his  report,  "  before  we  had 
reached  a  bivouac,  near  General  Bragg' s  headquarters,  and  in  the 
darkness  of  the  night  the  20th  Louisiana,  and  portions  of  the  17th 
Louisiana,  and  Confederate  Guards,  got  separated  from  that  por 
tion  of  the  command  in  which  I  was,  and  encamped  on  other 

gronnd."t 

Colonel  Forrest's  cavalry  was  picketed  along  Wallace's  and 
Ilurlbut's  camps,  while  another  regiment  of  cavalry  was  posted  to 
protect  the  left  flunk,  and  guard  the  approaches  from  the  Snake 
Creek  bridge,  exposed  to  Lew.  Wallace's  fresh  force  of  eight  thou 
sand  men.  General  Ilardee's  corps  and  General  B  reck  in  ridge's  di 
vision  withdrew  to  McClernand's  camps,  and  General  Bragg's  corps, 
with  one  (Clark's)  division  of  General  Polk's  corps,  rested  in  those 
of  Sherman.  Through  a  misunderstanding  of  order.-,  on  the  part  of 
General  Polk,  his  other  (Cheatham's)  division  was  sent  back  about 
three  miles  and  a  half,  to  its  bivouac  of  the  previous  night. £ 

General  Bragg  and,  later  in  the  evening,  the  other  corps  com 
manders  visited  General  Bcaurcgard's  headquarters,  in  General 
Sherman's  camps,  and  reported  orally  their  operations  of  the  day. 
All  were  elated  and  congratulatory  over  the  success  of  the  day,  and 
the  expectations  of  the  morrow. £  The  results,  indeed,  were  great 

*  Jackson's  Report,  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,''  p.  2GG. 

t  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battle?,'1  p.  30o. 

I  General  Cheatliam  says,  in  his  Report :  "  At  the  close  of  the  day,  a  part  of 
my  command  remained  on  the  field,  and  a  portion  returned  to  our  encamp 
ment  of  the  night  previous/'  In  a  letter  to  General  Bcauregard,  dated  Nash 
ville,  Tenn.,  November  27th,  1870,  General  Cheatliam  uses  the  following  lan 
guage:  "  At  dusk,  on  the  evening  of  the  Gth,  I  was  on  the  extreme  left  of  our 
army,  near  the  river.  I  recollect  that  General  Cleburnc's  division  was  on  my 
right.  The  second  brigade  of  my  division  (Stcphens's),  with  a  portion  of 
Johnson's  (my  first),  retired  to  our  camp  of  the  night  previous  —  Saturday 
night.  This  camp  was  near  General  Folk's  headquarters,  where  the  enemy's 
cavalry  horses  were  killed  by  our  artillery,  on  Friday,  and  several  miles — at 
least  three — in  front  of  Mickey's." 

§  Colonel  Jacob  Thompson's  letter,  in  Appendix. 
I.— 20 


306  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

and  encouraging.  A  half-disciplined  army,  poorly  equipped  and  ap 
pointed,  had  assailed  an  opposing  array  larger  in  numbers,  nearly 
half  of  which  was  composed  of  seasoned  troops,  provided  with  the 
best  and  most  abundant  armament  and  supplies,  arrayed,  besides, 
on  familiar  ground,  chosen  by  its  own  leaders.  That  army  had 
steadily  been  driven  back  to  its  last  stronghold,  a  great  part  of  it 
routed  and  demoralized ;  its  tents,  baggage,  subsistence,  and  hos 
pital  stores  captured,  together  with  thirty  stands  of  colors,  fully 
sixty  field-pieces,  many  thousand  small  arms  and  accoutrements, 
and  ammunition  enough  for  another  day's  battle.  General  Beau- 
regard's  promise,  that  the  Confederate  army  should  sleep  in  the 
enemy's  camps,  was  fulfilled ;  and,  reorganized  for  the  next  day, 
it  would  undoubtedly  have  given  the  finishing  stroke  to  the  entire 
Federal  forces,  had  Buell  marched  towards  Florence,f  as  it  had 
just  been  reported  that  he  had  done,  instead  of  effecting  his  junc 
tion  with  Grant,  on  the  evening  and  night  of  the  6th,  as  wTas 
actually  the  case. 

A  despatch  wits  sent  to  Richmond,  announcing  the  day's  victory 
and  the  hope  of  its  completion  on  the  morrow,  and  the  corps  com 
manders  were  dismissed  with  instructions  to  reorganize  their  re 
spective  forces  as  thoroughly  as  possible,  and  hold  them  in  readi 
ness  to  take  the  offensive  at  break  of  da}r. 

The  night  had  closed  with  heavy  clouds,  and,  about  midnight,  a 
cold,  drenching  rain  set  in,  which  made  it  the  more  difficult  to  col 
lect  and  re-form  the  broken  commands  and  numerous  stragglers,  who 
were  moving  about  for  pillage,  through  the  alluring  camps  of  the 
enemy.  The  storm  also  interfered  with  the  care  of  the  wounded, 
who  were  unavoidedly  neglected,  but  the  little  that  could  be  done 
for  them  was  done  alike  for  friend  and  foe. 

The  gunboats,  all  through  the  night,  at  the  suggestion,  it  was 
said,  of  General  Nelson,  threw  shells  into  the  Confederate  bivouacs, 
the  dim  light  of  the  camp-fires  guiding  them  in  their  aim.  Thus 
were  slumber  and  rest  chased  away  from  our  exhausted  men. 

Indefatigable  and  daring  as  usual,  Colonel  Forrest,  under  cover 
of  the  storm  and  darkness,  sent  scouts,  clothed  in  Federal  over 
coats,  within  the  enemy's  lines.  They  reported  that  large  bodies 
of  troops  were  crossing  the  river  to  Pittsburg  Landing  and  that 

t  Colonel  Helm  had  telegraphed  to  General  Beanrcgard  that  Buell's  army 
was  marching  on  Florence ;  it  proved  to  be  Mitchell's  division,  and  not 
Buell's  army. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  307 

much  confusion  existed  among  them.  Colonel  Forrest  so  advised 
Generals  Ilardee  and  Breckinridge,  suggesting  that  an  attack 
should  be  made  at  once,  or  that  the  army  should  withdraw  next 
morning.  He  was  referred  to  General  Beauregard,  but,  un 
fortunately,  was  unable  to  find  his  headquarters.*  At  a  later 
hour  he  again  sent  in  his  scouts,  who  returned  at  two  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  stating  that  Federal  troops  were  still  arriving.  Gen 
eral  Ilardee,  being  informed  of  the  fact  for  the  second  time,  in 
structed  Colonel  Forrest  to  go  back  to  his  regiment,  and,  keeping 
a  vigilant  picket  line,  to  notify  him  of  all  hostile  movements, 
should  any  be  attempted.  But  General  Ilardee  failed  to  com 
municate  this  important  information  to  General  Beauregard. 


*  See   "Campaigns  of  Lieutenant -General   Forrest,"  by  General  Thomas 
Jordan. 


308  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  XXL 

Difficulty  of  Collecting  and  Organizing  Commands  during  Night  of  the  Gth. — 
Firing  Resumed  Early  next  Morning. — Nelson's  Brigades  Cross  the  Ten 
nessee. — Positions  Taken  by  the  Federals.  —  Chalmers's  Brigade  and  a 
Mixed  Command  Force  Back  Nelson's  Advance. — At  8  A.  M.  the  Confed 
erates  are  Driven  Back  with  the  Loss  of  a  Battery. — They  Regain  the 
Position  and  Battery  at  9.  —  Critical  Situation  of  Ammcn's  Brigade. — 
New  Position  Assumed  by  the  Confederates. — Crittenden's  Division  En 
gaged. — Absence  of  General  Polk  from  the  Field. — His  Timely  Arrival  at 
10.30. — His  Charge  with  Cheatham's  Brigade. — Organization  of  Federal 
Army  during  the  Night  of  the  Gth. — Inaction  of  General  Sherman  on  the 
Morning  of  the  7th. — General  Breckinridge  Ordered  Forward. — Enemy 
Driven  Back  on  our  Whole  Line. — Advance  of  Federal  Right  AVing. — 
Its  Repulse. — At  1  p.  M.  Enemy  on  our  Left  Reinforced. — General  Bragg 
Calls  for  Assistance.  —  General  Beauregard  in  Person  Leads  the  18th 
Louisiana  and  Other  Troops  to  his  Aid. — Predetermination  of  General 
Beauregard  to  Withdraw  from  the  Battle-field.— Couriers  sent  to  Corinth 
to  Inquire  about  General  Van  Dorn. — Preparations  for  Retreat. — Guns  and 
Colors  Captured  by  Confederates  on  the  Gth. — Slow  and  Orderly  With 
drawal  of  Confederate  Forces. — Inability  of  the  Enemy  to  Follow. — 
Reconnoissance  of  General  Sherman  on  the  Morning  of  the  8th. — Con 
federates  not  Disorganized. — Their  Loss  During  the  Battle. — Computa 
tion  of  Numbers  Engaged  on  Both  Sides. — Federal  Loss. 

THE  night  of  the  6th  of  April,  as  has  been  already  stated,  was 
so  dark  and  stormy  that  it  was  found  impossible  properly  to  col 
lect  and  organize  all  the  commands.  The  fighting,  moreover,  had 
been  protracted  even  after  dusk,  on  certain  parts  of  the  field,  be 
fore  General  Beauregard's  orders  to  arrest  the  conflict  could  be 
communicated  and  carried  out. 

At  about  half -past  five  o'clock,  on  the  morning  of  the  7th, 
the  skirmish-firing  on  our  right,  in  an  easterly  direction,  towards 
the  Tennessee  River,  indicated  that  the  enemy  was  about  to  as 
sume  the  offensive.  Generals  Ilardee,  Breckinridge,  and  Bragg 
repaired  at  once  to  their  respective  commands,  and  availed  them 
selves  of  such  forces  as  they  had  immediately  at  hand,  with  which 
to  oppose  this  onset.  Geneial  Ilardee  had,  under  his  orders,  on 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  309 

his  extreme  right,  two  of  General  Bragg's  brigades,  namely— 
Chalmers's  and  Jackson's,  of  Withers's  division.  General  Bragg 
had,  on  the  left  of  our  line,  the  remainder  of  his  corps,  increased 
by  one  division  (Clark's)  of  General  Folk's  corps,  which  was  sub 
sequently  reinforced  by  Trabuc's  brigade.  On  the  left  of  Gen 
eral  Ilardee  came  General  Breckinridge ;  and  between  him  and 
General  Bragg  was  the  position  which  had  been  assigned  to  Gen 
eral  Polk. 

General  Jordan,  in  his  "Campaigns  of  Lieutenant-General  For 
rest,"  page  137,  thus  correctly  gives  the  positions  and  forces  of 
the  enemy : 

•'  By  seven  o'clock  r.  M.,  on  the  Gth,  Nelson's  (two)  brigades  had  crossed  the 
Tennessee,  and,  with  the  one  that  so  materially  helped — with  "Webster's  op 
portunely  posted  battery— to  save  the  Federal  army  from  utter  overthrow, 
were  at  once  thrown  forward  by  General  Bucll,  as  a  shield  between  General 
Grant's  army  and  the  Confederates.  Crittendcn's  division  likewise  came  up 
from  Savannah  by  water  not  long  after,  and  was  promptly  established  in  the 
same  manner,  on  Nelson's  right.  Moreover,  Lew.  Wallace,  strangely  unable  to 
find  the  road  battleward,  amid  the  thunder  peals  of  more  than  a  hundred 
cannon  within  six  miles  of  him,  as  soon  as  the  dusky  shadows  ami  the  quiet 
of  night  had  supervened,  found  a  way  to  the  south  bank  of  Snake  Creek  and 
to  a  position  then  commanding  the  bridge,  and  by  chance,  too,  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Sherman,  with  the  shreds,  or  odds  and  ends,  of  his  own  and  other 
divisions  that  had  rallied  around  him.  One  of  McCook's  brigades  (Rousseau's) 
also  reached  the  scene  about  sunrise,  and  the  other  two  were  near  at  hand. 

''  Thus  were  marshalled  there,  or  near  at  hand,  ready  to  take  the  offensive 
against  the  victors  of  the  day  before,  twenty -five  thousand  fresh  Federal 
troops,*  three  battalions  of  which  were  Regulars.  On  the  Confederate  side,  to 
meet  such  an  onset,  there  was  not  a  man  who  had  not  fought  steadfastly  for 
the  greater  part  of  Sunday.  In  addition  to  the  many  stragglers  incident  to 
all  battles,  the  casualties  did  not  fall  short  of  six  thousand  five  hundred  offi 
cers  and  men,  so  that  not  more  than  twenty  thousand  Confederate  infantry 
(and  artillery)  could  have  been  found  to  answer  to  their  names  that  morning. 
Scattered  widely,  the  regiments  of  the  brigades  of  Bragg's  and  Ilardec's  corps 
had  slept  here  and  there,  among  the  captured  encampments,  wheresoever  they 
could  find  subsistence.  Folk's  corps  had  been  embodied,  to  some  degree,  and 
led  during  the  night  by  their  general,  rearward,  at  least  a  mile  and  a  half  be 
yond  Shiloh,  towards  Corinth. "f 

*  General  Sherman  estimates  at  eighteen  thousand  men  those  that  had  fought 
the  day  before.  Sec  his  "Memoirs,"  p.  245. 

t  Only  one  of  his  divisions  (Chcatham's)  had  been  collected  together  and 
taken  back,  through  a  misunderstanding  of  orders,  to  its  bivouac  of  the  night 
of  the  5th,  about  three  and  a  half  miles  from  the  Shiloh  meeting-house. 


310  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

The  positions  occupied  by  the  Federal  forces  on  the  morning 
of  the  7th  are  still  more  definitely  given  in  Yan  Home's  "His 
tory  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.  pp.  109,  111,  as 
follows : 

"General  Buell  first  formed  General  Nelson's  division  next  to  the  river  as 
the  left  of  the  battle  front,  and  General  Grant  assigned  Wallace's  division  to 
the  right  flank,  near  Snake  Creek,  below  the  mouth  of  Owl  Creek.  Between 
these  extremes  the  remaining  forces  were  formed — Crittenden's  division  on 
the  right  of  Nelson's,  with  a  space  for  McCook's  on  his  right,  when  it  should 
arrive,  and  on  the  right  of  the  position  of  this  division  the  troops  engaged  the 
day  previous,  somewhat  refreshed,  extended  the  line  to  Wallace's  left. 
********* 

"At  the  time  that  the  recession  of  Nelson's  line  was  arrested,  McCook's  fore 
most  brigade,  Rousseau's,  moved  into  position  on  the  right  of  Crittenden. 
This  brigade  extended  the  line,  but  Rousseau's  flank  was  for  a  time  as  much 
exposed  as  Crittenden's  had  been,  as  there  was  still  a  wide  space  between  the 
two  armies.  Before,  however,  the  enemy  could  take  advantage  of  this  expos 
ure  Kirk's  brigade  reached  the  field,  and  was  placed  in  reserve  on  the  right 
flank.  Each  brigade  of  Buell's  army  was  now  required  to  furnish  its  reserves, 
while  Boyle's  brigade  of  Crittenden's  division  was  designated  as  a  general 
reserve,  and  was  so  placed  as  to  be  facile  of  movement  whenever  there  should 
be  need  of  support.  General  Buell  also  availed  himself  of  the  fragmentary 
forces  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  found  in  his  rear. 

"The  Army  of  the  Ohio  (Cumbe?'lanc£)  now  offered  a  battle  front  one  mile 
and  a  half  long,  about  half  the  distance  between  Nelson's  left  and  Wallace's 
right.  The  left  flank  was  covered  with  skirmishers,  and  was  in  some  degree 
protected  by  the  roughness  of  the  ground  near  the  river.  The  right  had  no 
assured  connection  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  but  rested  in  a  wood.  To 
strengthen  the  right,  thus  exposed  to  an  enfilading  or  reverse  fire,  Gibson's 
brigade  of  McCook's  division,  on  coming  to  the  field,  was  placed  in  reserve 
in  proximity.  In  front  of  Nelson  was  an  open  field,  partially  screened  by 
woods,  which  extended  beyond  the  enemy's  line.  Crittenden's  left  brigade 
and  McCook's  right  were  covered  by  a  dense  undergrowth,  while  in  front 
of  their  right  and  left  brigades,  respectively,  the  ground  was  open.  The 
ground,  mainly  level  in  front  of  Nelson,  formed  a  hollow  before  Crittenden, 
which  fell  into  a  small  creek,  passing  in  front  of  McCook.  The  Hamburg 
road  penetrated  the  line  near  Nelson's  left.*  The  enemy  was  in  heavy  force 
beyond  the  open  ground  in  Buell's  front,  in  a  line  slightly  oblique  to  his  line, 
having  one  battery  so  posted  as  to  command  Nelson's  left,  another  to  sweep 
his  front  and  the  woods  before  Crittenden's  left,  a  third  bearing  upon  the 
junction  of  Crittcndeu's  right  and  McCook's  left,  and  a  fourth  in  the  immedi- 


*  When  Van  Home  states  that  the  Hamburg  road  passed  perpendicularly 
through  the  Federal  line  near  Nelson's  left,  he  means  the  Hamburg  and 
Purdy  road,  not  the  Hamburg  and  Pittsburg  road. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  311 

ate  front  of  the  latter.  Beauregard  had  massed  his  forces  on  his  right  the 
evening  previous,  under  General  Bragg,  to  grasp  the  Lauding,  and  in  conse 
quence  this  flank  was  strong  for  defense  in  the  morning." 

The  Confederate  pickets  and  skirmishers  encountered  by  the 
advanced  line  of  Nelson's  division  were  those  of  Forrest's  cavalry 
regiment.     They  gradually  fell  back  in  the  direction  of  Hardee's 
line,  then  being  formed  near  and  beyond  McClernand's  old  en 
campments,  to  the  rear  of  which  they  retired  soon  afterwards,  to 
take  position  on  Hartleys  right  flank.     Xelson's  advancing  line 
soon  encountered  Chalmers's  brigade  and  Moore's  regiment,  added  > 
to  which  was  an  extemporized  command,  consisting  of  the  19th 
Alabama,  of  Jackson's  brigade ;  the  21st  Alabama,  of  Gladden's 
brigade;  and,  says  General  Chalmers,  in  his  report,*  the  Crescent 
(Louisiana)  regiment;  also  a  Tennessee  regiment,  under  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Yenable ;  and  another  Alabama  regiment  (the  20th), 
under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Chadwick,  supported  by  batteries.    They 
not  only  checked  Xelson's  force,  but  compelled  it  to  fall  back 
some  distance,  when,  being  supported  by  the  advance  of  Crittcn- 
den's  division,  it  again  resumed  the  offensive,  at  about  eight  o'clock 
A.M.  ;  and  Ilazen's  brigade,  on  Nelson's  right,  being  now  pushed 
forward  with  great  gallantry,  forced  the  Confederates  back,  with 
the  temporary  loss  of  a  battery.     They  soon  rallied,  and,  aided  by 
their   batteries   and   other   small   reinforcements   which   General 
Beauregard  very  opportunely  sent  them,  resumed  the  offensive  at 
nine  o'clock  A.M.,  recovering  their  former  position  and  their  lost  bat 
tery,  inflicting  a  severe  loss  on  Ilazen's  brigade,  and  compelling 
that  officer  to  call  earnestly  for  aid.     Meanwhile,  Nelson's  left  bri 
gade,  under  Ammen,  was  sorely  pressed,  and  was  in  serious  danger 
of  beinc:  turned  on  its  left. 


"  This  brigade  [says  Van  Home]  fought  gallantly  to  maintain  a  position 
second  to  none  on  the  field,  but  at  length  began  to  give  ground,  and  a  decided 
advantage  to  the  enemy  seemed  inevitable,  as  Nelson  had  neither  artillery  nor 
infantry  to  direct  to  his  support,  Ilazen's  brigade  having  been  shattered,  and 
Bnell's  being  needed  in  its  own  position.  But  the  impending  disaster  was 
averted  by  Terrell's  regular  battery  of  McCook's  division,  which,  having  just 
arrived  from  Savannah,  dashed  into  position,  and,  by  its  rapid  and  accurate 
firing,  silenced  the  enemy's  first  battery,  which  was  aiding  the  infantry  force 
pressing  Ammen.  Subsequently,  the  enemy  repeated  the  attack,  and  endan- 

*  "  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,"  p.  261. 


312  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

gered  both  the  brigade  and  Terrell's  battery,  the  latter  having  lost  very  many 
gunners,  and  being  without  adequate  support.  .  .  .  Then,  by  a  flank  attack 
by  Nelson,  and  a  direct  one  by  Crittenden,  aided  by  a  concentric  fire  from  the 
batteries  of  Mendenhall,  Terrell,  and  Bartlett,  he  was  driven  beyond  the  posi 
tion  of  his  second  and  third  batteries."  * 

The  Confederates  soon  assumed  a  new  position.  It  was  main 
tained,  despite  all  the  efforts  of  the  Federals,  until  General  Beau- 
regard  determined  to  retire  his  troops,  at  about  2.30  P.M.,  when 
some  guns  had  to  be  abandoned  for  want  of  horses  to  carry  them 
off  the  field. 

Crittenden's  division  had  also  been  hotly  engaged,  shortly  after 
Kelson's,  with  the  rest  of  Hardee's  and  part  of  Breckin ridge's 
commands,  and,  after  a  severe  contest  of  several  hours,  in  which 
it  had  to  be  supported  on  the  right,  at  about  ten  o'clock  A.M.,  by 
several  thousands  of  General  Grant's  troops,  under  McClernand 
and  Hurlbut,  it  was  held  at  bay  until  two  brigades,  Gibson's  and 
Kirk's,  of  McCook's  division,  joined  in  the  struggle.  His  other 
brigade,  Rousseau's,  containing  three  battalions  of  Regulars,  had 
reached  the  field  early  in  the  morning  and  taken  a  position  near 
General  Sherman's  left.  Yan  Home  says : 

"  Thus,  McCook  followed  Crittenden  in  attacking  the  enemy.  This  divis 
ion  met  the  same  stubborn  resistance,  and  made  frequent  charges.  Rousseau's 
brigade,  having  taken  an  advanced  position  early  in  the  day,  repulsed  a  charge 
as  its  introduction  to  battle.  It  then  gave  a  counter-blow,  drove  the  oppos 
ing  force  some  distance,  and  captured  a  battery.  The  direction  of  Rousseau's 
advance  left  an  opening  between  McCook  and  Crittenden,  which  the  enemy 
perceived,  and  began  to  mass  troops  to  occupy.  To  prevent  this,  General 
McCook  ordered  Colonel  Willich,  commanding  the  32d  Indiana,  to  drive  back 
the  enemy,  and,  by  the  bayonet  and  bullet,  this  was  gallantly  accomplished. 
The  remainder  of  Gibson's  brigade  followed  "Willich,  and  soon  both  brigades, 
Rousseau's  and  Gibson's,  were  in  hottest  conflict.  "VVillich's  regiment  at  one 
time  became  wedged  between  other  forces,  and,  receiving  their  fire,  was  com 
pelled  to  withdraw.  This  led  to  confusion,  but  order  was  soon  restored. 
Kirk's  brigade  reached  the  field  just  as  Rousseau  had  exhausted  his  ammu 
nition,  and  took  his  position,  that  he  might  replenish.  While  Rousseau  was 
absent  Gibson  was  severely  pressed,  as  the  enemy  continued  his  movements 
to  separate  Crittenden  and  McCook.  His  left  regiment,  the  49th  Ohio,  was 
involved  in  imminent  danger,  and  was  compelled  to  change  front  twice  under 
fire  to  prevent  the  turning  of  the  position.  Upon  the  return  of  Rousseau,  his 
brigade,  and  two  regiments  of  Hurlbut's  division  hitherto  in  reserve,  went 

*  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.  pp.  112, 113. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  313 

into  line,  when  General  McCook's  whole  division,  thus  supported,  advanced 
and  drove  the  enemy  beyond  General  Sherman's  camps."  * 

This  was  not  done,  however,  until  General  Beauregard  had  de 
termined  to  withdraw  from  the  field,  in  order  not  to  prolong  a 
then  useless  contest. 

Just  about  the  time  (10.30  A.M.)  when  General  McCook  was  as 
suming  the  offensive  with  his  whole  division,  and  was  near  push 
ing  through  the  gap  between  General  Breckinridge's  left  and  Gen 
eral  Bragg's  right,  caused  by  the  absence  of  General  Polk  with 
one  of  his  divisions,  the  latter  arrived  on  the  iield.  It  was  relief, 
indeed,  to  General  Beauregard,  whose  anxiety  concerning  Polk 
had  been  intense.  Unable,  since  morning,  to  hear  anything  of 
General  Poik's  whereabouts,  the  thought  had  even  crossed  his 
mind  that  the  commander  of  his  First  Corps  had  been  captured. 
But,  at  half-past  nine  o'clock,  he  at  last  ascertained  that,  through,  a 
misunderstanding  of  the  orders  given  the  previous  evening,  Gen 
eral  Polk  had  retired,  with  Cheatham's  division,  to  his  bivouac  of 
the  5th,  for  the  purpose  of  recruiting  and  re-supplying  that  com 
mand  with  provision  and  ammunition.  A  message — and  rather 
an  imperative  one — was  instantly  sent  him,  to  hurry  back  to  the 
front — and  hurry  back  he  did.  Dashing  forward,  with  drawn 
sword,  at  the  head  of  Cheatham's  fine  division,  he  soon  formed  his 
line  of  battle  at  the  point  where  his  presence  was  so  much  need 
ed,  and,  with  unsurpassed  vigor,  moved  on,  against  a  force  at  least 
double  his  own,  making  one  of  the  most  brilliant  charges  of  in 
fantry  made  on  either  day  of  the  battle.  lie  drove  back  the  op 
posing  column  in  confusion,  and  thus  compensated  for  the  tardi 
ness  of  his  appearance  on  the  iield.  Shortly  before  this,  General 
Beauregard  had  placed  a  battery  in  position,  on  a  slight  elevation 
some  distance  in  advance  of  the  Shiloh  meeting-house,  thereby 
holding  the  enemy  in  check  through  the  gap  referred  to,  and  ma 
terially  assisting  the  gallant  charge  of  Cheatham's  division. 

During  the  night  of  the  6th  and  early  morning  of  the  7th,  Gen 
eral  Grant's  shattered  forces,  of  a  mixed  character,  had  been  par 
tially  collected  and  formed  into  three  divisions,  under  Generals 
Sherman,  McClernand,  and  Ilurlbut,  in  advance  of  the  bivouacs  of 
the  first  two  commands,  not  far  from  the  bridge  across  Snake 
Creek.  General  Lew.  Wallace's  fresh  division,  with  two  batteries 

*  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,11  vol.  i.  pp.  113, 114. 


314  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

of  six  pieces  each,  from  near  Crump's  landing,  was  formed  on 
Sherman's  right,  and  constituted  the  extreme  right  of  General 
Grant's  extensive  line. 

General  Sherman,  in  his  report  of  the  battle,  says  of  the  opera 
tions  on  this  part  of  the  field : 

"  At  daylight,  on  Monday,  I  received  General  Grant's  orders  to  advance 
and  recapture  our  original  camps.  I  despatched  several  members  of  my  staff 
to  bring  up  all  the  men  they  could  find,  especially  the  brigade  of  Colonel 
Stuart,  which  had  been  separated  from  the  division  all  the  day  before ;  and 
at  the  appointed  time  the  division,  or,  rather,  what  remained  of  it,  with  the 
13th  Missouri  and  other  fragments,  moved  forward  and  reoccupied  the  ground 
on  the  extreme  right  of  General  McClernand's  camp,  where  we  attracted  the 
fire  of  a  battery  located  near  Colonel  McDowell's  former  headquarters.  Here 
I  remained,  patiently  waiting  for  the  sound  of  General  Buell's  advance  upon 
the  main  Corinth  road.  About  ten  o'clock  A.M.,  the  heavy  firing  in  that  di 
rection,  and  its  steady  approach,  satisfied  me ;  and  General  Wallace  being  on 
our  right  flank,  with  his  well-conducted  division,  I  led  the  head  of  my  col 
umn  to  General  McClernand's  right,  formed  line  of  battle  facing  south,  with 
Buckland's  brigade  directly  across  the  ridge,  and  Stuart's  brigade  on  its  right 
in  the  woods ;  and  thus  advanced,  steadily  and  slowly,  under  a  heavy  fire  of 
musketry  and  artillery." 

Thus  General  Sherman  remained  several  hours  "  patiently  wait 
ing  for  the  sound  of  General  Buell's  advance  upon  the  main  Cor 
inth  road."  But  the  attack  of  General  Nelson  had  fairly  com 
menced  at  eight  o'clock  A.M.,  and  that  of  Crittenden  and  McCook 
about  an  hour  later.  This  inaction,  on  the  part  of  General  Sher 
man,  enabled  General  Beauregard  to  reinforce  his  centre  from  his 
left.  Had  General  Sherman  boldly  advanced,  before  Cheatham's 
division  so  gallantly  took  its  position  in  line,  he  would  have  been 
able  to  penetrate  our  line  between  General  Bragg's  right  and  Gen 
eral  Breckinridge's  left,  as  we  have  already  intimated,  and  would 
have  cut  the  Confederate  line  in  two,  for  General  Beauregard  had 
then  no  reserves,  and  could  not  have  opposed  General  Sherman's 
advance. 

When  General  Breckinridge,  in  the  centre,  was  ordered  to  take 
the  offensive  and  relieve  the  right  of  our  line,  his  left  flank  was 
still  unprotected,  and  the  fear  of  its  being  turned  prevented  him 
from  executing  the  movement ;  seeing  this,  General  Beauregard 
sent  back  to  him  one  of  his  brigades — Trabue's — then  on  General 

O 

Bragg's  left ;  and,  shortly  afterwards,  also  gave  orders  that  Rus 
sell's  brigade,  of  Clark's   (now   Stewart's)  division,  of   General 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  315 

Polk's  corps — which,  for  the  time  being,  was  on  General  Bragg's 
right — should  be  at  once  extended  towards  General  Breckinridge's 
left,  so  as  to  afford  some  protection  to  his  threatened  flank,  and 
enable  him  to  engage  the  enemy  in  his  front.  This  he  did  with 
no  less  vigor  than  success,  having  Hodgson's  (Slocomb's)  Louis 
iana  battery,  and  two  sections  of  other  batteries,  to  support  him. 
But,  at  about  eleven  o'clock  A.M.,  McCook's  fresh  division,  with 
a  part  of  Crittenden's  and  some  of  General  Grant's  reorganized 
forces,  pressed  him  so  hard  that  he  was  driven  back  some  distance 
and  compelled  to  abandon  one  of  his  batteries.  Then  there  was 
sent  to  his  assistance  a  small  brigade,  under  Colonel  Iceichart,  of 
New  Orleans — a  most  efficient  Bavarian  officer,  commanding  the 
20th  Louisiana  regiment.  This  brigade  was  temporarily  composed 
of  Colonel  Reichart's  own  regiment,  Colonel  Hill's  Tennessee  reg 
iment,  and  a  battalion  of  stragglers,  which  General  Beauregard  had 
very  opportunely  placed  under  command  of  Captain  Lockctt,  of  the 
C.  S.  Engineers.*  These  troops,  who  had  just  been  brought  to 
General  Beauregard  from  the  woods  on  our  right  rear,  marched 
forward  with  great  alacrity  and  spirit,  and  by  twelve  o'clock  Gen 
eral  Breckinridge  had  retaken  both  his  position  and  his  battery, 
and  the  enemy  was  being  driven  back  on  our  whole  front. 

This  renewal  of  hostilities,  first  originating  on  our  extreme  left, 
then  gradually  extending  towards  General  Bnigg's  right,  brought 
out,  most  conspicuously,  that  soldierly  valor  and  surprising  spirit 
of  endurance  which  signalized  the  Confederate  troops  on  many  a 
battle-field,  but  never  more  so  than  upon  these  two  days  of  un 
paralleled  hard  fighting.  The  battle  now  raged  fiercely  on  our 
whole  front,  except  over  the  interval  between  Generals  Bragg 

*  These  stragglers,  from  every  arm  of  the  service,  were  brought  to  General 
Beauregard,  with  no  one  to  take  command  of  them.  As  he  was  looking 
around  in  search  of  a  temporary  leader  to  march  them  off  to  the  front,  his  eye 
fell  on  a  young  officer  just  then  passing  near  him,  whose  soldierly  bearing  at 
once  attracted  his  attention.  The  young  officer  was  halted,  and  found 
himself  in  the  presence  of  General  Beauregard.  "  Could  you  command  a  bat 
talion?"  said  the  General  to  him.  "If  ordered  to  do  so,  I  think  I  can,"  was 
the  modest  and,  at  the  same  time,  firm  reply.  General  Beauregard,  having 
now  ascertained  his  name,  took  him  to  the  battalion  of  stragglers  near  by,  and, 
introducing  him  to  the  men,  said,  u  Here  is  Colonel  Lockett,  whom  I  now  place 
in  charge  of  you.  lie  will  lead  you  to  victory,  if  you  only  follow  him."  In 
a  loud  and  earnest  cheer  they  each  and  all  promised  to  do  it,  and  gallantly 
redeemed  their  promise  half  an  hour  later. 


316  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

and   Breckin ridge,  where  skirmishing  only   appeared  to  be  go 
ing  on.* 

The  Federal  right  wing  advanced  steadily  at  first,  under  a  light 
fire  from  the  Confederates,  but  when  it  had  come  within  fair  range 
of  Bragg's  line  (consisting  of  the  remnant  of  Ruggles's  division, 
his  own  corps,  part  of  Folk's  second  division — Clark's,  now  com 
manded  by  Stewart— and  one  brigade  of  Breckinridge's  command), 
it  was  greeted  with  such  a  terrible  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery, 
that— 

"The  Federals  reeled  and  rushed  rearward,  followed  nearly  a  mile  by  the 
Confederates ;  but  here,  reinforced  by  McCook,  Sherman  attempted  to  resume 
the  advance.  Now  the  fight  waxed  obstinate,  and  the  firing,  says  Sherman, 
was  the  severest  musketry  fire  he  had  ever  heard.  Rousseau's  Federal  brigade 
here  was  pitted  against  Trabue's  Kentuckians.  Both  fought  with  uncommon 
determination  to  win,  but  the  Federals  were  repulsed,  and  Wallace  was  so 
pressed  that  his  situation  became  extremely  critical.!  McCook's  other  brigade 
had  joined  in  the  action  meanwhile ;  and  in  that  part  of  the  field,  including 
Grant's  forces  under  Sherman  and  McClernand,  there  were  fully  twenty  thou 
sand  Federals  opposed  by  not  half  that  number  of  battle-battered  Confederates. 
The  impetus  of  the  Confederate  attack  was,  therefore,  slackened  in  the  face  of 
such  odds.  Yet  several  brilliant  charges  were  made,  one  of  which,  to  the  left 
of  Shiloh,  General  Beauregard  himself  led  in  person,  carrying  the  battle-flag 
of  a  Louisiana  regiment."! 

*  During  the  fierce  struggle  in  front,  General  Beauregard  noticed,  through 
the  woods,  some  troops  apparently  uniformed  in  white.  He  at  first  took  them 
to  be  Federals,  but  observing  that  they  w?ere  fighting  on  our  side,  he  sent  an 
aid  to  ascertain  where  they  came  from,  hoping  they  might  be  part  of  Van 
Dora's  army.  They  proved  to  be  the  18th  Louisiana  and  the  Orleans  Guard 
battalion,  temporarily  merged  into  one  command.  Their  coats  being  blue, 
they  had  been  fired  into,  on  the  day  before,  by  some  of  our  own  troops ;  and,  in 
order  to  avoid  a  repetition  of  the  mistake,  had  turned  their  coats  "inside  out." 

When  General  Beauregard  had  resigned  his  commission  in  the  United  States 
army,  in  February,  1861,  he  had  joined,  as  a  private,  the  Orleans  Guard  bat 
talion,  then  just  organized  in  the  city  of  New  Orleans.  When  he  was  made 
brigadier-general  in  the  Confederate  service  and  sent  to  Charleston,  his  name 
was  preserved  on  the  rolls  of  that  battalion,  and,  whenever  called,  the  color- 
sergeant,  stepping  forward,  would  answer:  "Absent  on  duty."  Tins  custom 
was  kept  up  as  long  as  the  battalion  remained  in  service,  and  even  on  the  bat 
tle-field  of  Shiloh.  Their  flagstaff  was  made  of  a  piece  of  the  Sumter  flagstaff, 
which  General  Beauregard  had  sent  to  their  commander,  after  the  surrender 
of  that  celebrated  fort,  in  April,  18G1. 

fThis  is  General  Wallace's  own  statement.  See  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol. 
iv.  p.  359.  J  "  Campaigns  of  Lieutenant-General  Forrest,"  p.  142. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD.  317 

At  about  one  o'clock  p.  M.,  the  enemy,  on  our  left,  being 
reinforced,  had  resumed  the  offensive.  General  Bragg — whose 
forces  had  been  weakened  by  the  withdrawal  of  three  brigades 
(Anderson's,  Trabue's,  and  Russell's),  which,  in  the  course  of  the 
morning,  had  been  sent  to  strengthen  our  centre  and  right — was 
gradually  driven  back,  towards  the  Shiloh  meeting-house.  lie 
then  sent  to  General  Beauregard  for  assistance.  Fortunately,  in 
the  small  ravine  passing  immediately  south  of  the  meeting-honse 
were  the  18th  Louisiana  and  the  Orleans  Guard  battalion,  together 
with  two  Tennessee  regiments,  which  had  been  collected  there  in 
obedience  to  orders.  General  Beauregard  rode  down  to  them,  ad 
dressed  a  few  words  of  encouragement  to  the  lirst  two,  and  ordered 
them  to  move  promptly  to  the  support  of  General  Bragg.  A? 
they  passed  by,  with  a  tired,  heavy  gait,  they  endeavored  to  cheer 
their  own  favorite  commander,  but  were  so  hoarse  from  fatigue 
and  over-exertion  that  they  could  only  utter  a  husky  sound,  which 
grated  painfully  on  General  Beaurcgard's  car.  They  had  not  pro 
ceeded  far,  when  another  staff  officer  came  to  him,  in  great  haste, 
and  informed  him,  on  the  part  of  General  Bragg,  that  unless  the 
latter  was  reinforced  at  once,  he  would  certainly  be  overpowered. 
Looking  in  his  direction,  General  Beauregard  saw  the  commander 
of  the  Second  Corps  gallantly  rallying  his  troops  under  a  heavy  fire 
from  a  much  superior  force  of  the  enemy.  He  rode,  with  his 
staff,  to  the  leading  regiment  of  Pond's  brigade,  the  ISth  Louisi 
ana  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Roman  commanding,  Colonel  Mo ut on 
having  been  wounded),  and,  seizing  its  colors,  ordered  ''his  Louisi- 
anians  "  to  follow  him.  They  started  with  an  elasticity  of  step  sur 
prising  in  troops  that,  a  moment  before,  appeared  so  jaded  and 
broken  down.  They  were  soon  at  the  side  of  General  Bragg.* 
Leaving  them  in  his  charge,  General  Beauregard  returned  to  one 
of  the  rear  regiments  of  Tennesseeans,  which  lie  led  in  a  similar 
manner,  but  being  too  weak,  from  illness,  to  carry  its  flag,  a  large 
and  heavy  one,  he  transferred  it  to  one  of  his  volunteer  aids,  Colo 
nel  II.  E.  Pevton,  of  Virginia,  who  carried  it  until  the  regiment 


*Tlicn  it  was  that  General  Beauregard,  being  almost  reproved  by  Colonel 
Augustin,  one  of  his  aids,  for  thus  exposing  himself,  said :  "  The  order  must  now 
be  'follow,'  not '  go  /'  "  Colonel  Augustin  had  taken  the  flag,  however,  and  for  a 
few  moments  led  the  18th  Louisiana  and  the  Orleans  Guard  battalion,  the  latter 
of  which  he  himself  had  organized,  some  eight  months  before,  in  New  Orleans. 


318  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

got  into  position.  General  Bragg  resumed  the  offensive,  and,  de 
spite  the  broken  and  disjointed  condition  of  the  forces  under  him, 
drove  the  enemy  back,  out  of  sight  from  the  Shiloli  meeting 
house,  and  kept  him  at  that  distance  until  about  2.30  P.  M.,  when 
General  Beauregard  gave  him  orders  to  retire  slowly  arid  join  the 
retreat. 

At  an  early  hour  in  the  morning  General  Beauregard  had  es 
tablished  his  headquarters  on  a  small  knoll,  to  the  right  (eastward) 
of  the  Shiloli  meeting-house,  which  appeared  to  be  the  most  eligi 
ble  and  central  point,  and  one  from  which  he  could,  with  greatest 
facility,  communicate  with  his  corps 'commanders  and  they  with 
him. 

Long  before  the  charge  we  have  just  described,  the  enemy's 
boldness,  his  active  and  steady  movements,  and  the  heavy  roll  of 
musketry  on  our  right,  and,  shortly  afterwards,  in  our  front,  had 
confirmed  General  Beauregard  in  his  belief  that  General  Buell 
had,  at  last,  formed  a  junction  of  the  remainder  of  his  forces  with 
those  of  General  Grant.  He  knew  that  his  depleted  and  exhausted 
forces  were  now  facing  at  least  twenty  thousand  fresh  troops,  in 
addition  to  Lew.  Wallace's  command,  in  addition  also  to  Ammen's 
brigade  of  Kelson's  division,  whose  timely  crossing,  the  day  be 
fore,  had  saved  the  Federals  from  annihilation.  To  indulge  a 
hope  of  success  with  these  fearful  odds  against  him  would  have 
been  to  show  a  lack  of  judgment  impossible  to  such  a  soldier  as 
Beauregard.  The  die,  however,  was  cast.  There  was  no  means 
of  avoiding  the  issue.  The  only  plan  left,  General  Beauregard 
thought,  was,  in  appearance,  to  fight  a  outrance,  so  as  to  deceive 
the  enemy  as  to  his  real  intentions,  and,  so  deceiving  him,  to  effect, 
at  the  proper  time,  an  orderly,  safe,  and  honorable  retreat.  The 
victorious  army  of  the  day  before  could  leave  the  battle-field  in 
no  other  way.  He  carefully  kept  his  own  counsel,  and,  from  about 
noon,  issued  all  his  orders  accordingly.  To  show  a  bold  front  all 
alon£r  his  line ;  to  offer  as  strong  a  resistance  as  the  nature  of  the 

O  O 

ground  and  the  condition  of  his  forces  would  permit;  and, if  pos 
sible,  to  cross  to  the  south  side  of  the  ravines,  in  front  of  the 
Shiloli  meeting-house,  which  had  so  effectually  protected  Sher 
man's  and  Prentiss's  commands,  on  the  preceding  morning — such 
were  the  objects  he  now  strained  every  nerve  to  secure.  And  the 
task  before  him  was  difficult,  because  the  least  symptom  of  weak 
ness  or  hesitancy  on  his  part  would  necessarily  increase  the  bold- 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  319 

ness  of  liis  opponent,  and  correspondingly  depress  his  new,  hardly 
organized,  and  worn-out  forces. 

Meanwhile,  with  feelings  of  anxiety  easily  understood,  he  de 
spatched  couriers  to  Corinth,  to  hurry  forward  General  Van  Doru's 
army  of  about  twenty  thousand  men, daily  expected  there  from 
Van  Buren,  Arkansas,  from  which  point  he  had  promised  to  form 
a  junction  with  General  Beauregard,  at  the  earliest  practicable 
moment.  But  the  high  waters,  and  want  of  means  of  transporta 
tion,  had  greatly  delayed  Yan  Dorii's  movement.  Had  he  arrived 
in  time  on  the  field,  General  Beauregard's  intention  was  to  have 
kept  about  five  or  six  thousand  men  of  that  command  with  him 
self,  as  a  reserve,  and  to  have  sent  Yan  Dorn  with  the  rest  to  at 
tack  Lew.  Wallace's  extreme  right  and  rear,  while  he,  Beauregard, 
would  have  attacked  both  Lew.  Wallace  and  Sherman  in  front, 
with  his  own  left.  The  light  there  could  not  have  lusted  long. 
lie  would  then  have  attacked  successively,  in  flank,  rear,  and  front, 
McClernand's  and  McCook's  divisions ;  and  afterwards,  the  other 
divisions  towards  their  left.  Had  it  been  possible  to  execute  that 
programme,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  victory,  on  this  sec 
ond  day  of  the  battle,  would  have  been  more  complete  than  on  the 
first ;  and  that  it  would  have  been  ended  before  Wood's  division,  of 
BuelTs  army,  could  have  come  to  the  enemy's  relief;  for  it  was 
nearly  dark  when  that  division  arrived. 

While  his  couriers  were  hurrying  on  their  way  to  Corinth,  in 
search  of  news  from  Yan  Dorifs  army,  General  Beauregard,  still 
biding  his  time,  and  unwilling,  yet,  to  hasten  the  moment  of  his 
predetermined  retreat,  went  on  supplying  reinforcements  to  his 
front,  with  stragglers  and  stray  commands  collected  from  the  woods 
and  ravines  in  his  rear.  History,  we  think,  furnishes  no  other  ex 
ample  of  a  great  battle,  against  such  odds,  being  prolonged  over 
four  hours,  with  reserves  thus  brought  together  and  organized.* 

*  During  the  late  war,  General  Beauregard's  experience  of  Southern  volunteers 
convinced  him  that  they  furnish  the  best  material  for  soldiers.  Active,  in 
telligent,  brave,  self-reliant,  and  persevering,  their  powers  of  endurance  are 
simply  wonderful.  After  being  three  months  under  arms,  they  become  as 
trustworthy  on  the  field  of  battle  as  veterans ;  and  no  more  than  six  months' 
drilling  is  required  to  make  them  as  proficient  as  regulars  of  two  and -three 
years'  service.  But  they  soon  consider  themselves  capable  of  passing  jud«>- 
ment  on  their  commanders ;  and,  should  these  forfeit  their  confidence,  they 
grow  dissatisfied  and  intractable,  and  lose  sonic  of  their  best  soldierly  qualities. 


320  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

At  last,  however,  the  drain  made  upon  his  feeble  resources  had  ex 
hausted  them.  Stragglers  and  stray  commands  could  no  longer 
be  found.  And  just  then  his  couriers  arrived  from  Corinth. 
They  reported  that  Van  Dorn  was  not  there,  and  that  his  where 
abouts  was  unknown.  The  time  had  evidently  come  when  it 
was  imperative  to  put  the  plan  of  retreat  into  execution.'*  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  hope  of  Tan  Dorn's  junction  on  that  day  had 
been  but  a  fleeting  one ;  he  had  regarded  it  as  a  thing  possible,  but 
hardly  probable.  He  ordered  Colonel  Chisolm,  one  of  his  aids,  to 
go  immediately  to  the  rear  with  a  company  of  cavalry,  and  clear 
and  repair  the  roads  for  any  emergency.  About  an  hour  later,  he 
instructed  Colonel  Jordan,  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  army,  to 
select  at  once  a  position  across  the  ravine  in  the  rear,  for  such 
troops  and  batteries  as  were  available  to  protect  the  retreat.  He 
then  ordered  the  corps  commanders  to  be  prepared  to  retire  slow 
ly  and  leisurely,  but,  before  doing  so,  to  take  the  offensive  again 
with  vigor,  and  drive  back  the  enemy  as  far  as  possible,  while  he 
established  batteries  and  posted  troops  to  protect  his  retiring 
forces.  After  placing  a  battery  in  front  of  the  Shiloh  meeting 
house,  and  another  on  the  Ridge  road,  towards  the  right,  he  went 
in  person  across  the  ravine,  to  examine  the  location  of  the  troops 
intrusted  to  Colonel  Jordan,  and  he  there  posted  two  additional 
batteries,  the  better  to  cover  the  retrograde  movement,  which  had 
then  fairly  begun,  and  was  being  executed  in  a  very  orderly  man 
ner.  General  Breckinridge,  occupying  the  centre  of  the  line  of 
battle,  retired  first  (the  adjacent  divisions  closing  up  the  void 
space)  and  took  up  his  position  in  rear  of  the  troops  and  batteries 

*A  remarkable  instance  of  bravery  was  shown  by  a  mere  boy,  about  this 
time,  when  matters  were  looking  gloomy,  and  the  stoutest  hearts  were  begin 
ning  to  fail.  The  meeting-house  of  Shiloh  had  been  turned  into  a  hospital, 
and  many  of  our  wounded  were  collected  there  to  be  operated  on.  General 
Beauregard  sent  one  of  his  aids  to  have  them  transferred  to  the  rear,  prepara 
tory  to  a  retrograde  movement.  Upon  his  return  the  aid  reported  that  while 
there,  a  private  (a  boy  scarcely  over  fourteen  years  of  age),  had  come  to  have 
a  wound  in  his  hand  attended  to.  While  the  surgeon  was  dressing  it — the 
fighting  still  going  on  near  by — the  boy  said  :  "Make  haste,  please,  doctor,  I 
want  to  go  back  and  take  another  shot  at  the  Yankees."  General  Beauregard 
told  his  aid  to  return  immediately  and  ascertain  the  name  of  the  young  hero, 
so  as  to  have  it  published  in  general  orders.  It  was  too  late.  He  had,  no 
doubt,  gone  back  "  to  take  another  shot  at  the  Yankees." 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  321 

established  across  the  Shiloli  meeting-house  ravine,  so  as  to  form 
the  rear  guard.  Then  came  the  commands  of  Generals  Polk, 
Hardce,  and  Bragg,  which  gradually  withdrew  from  the  field,  be 
hind  General  B  reck  in  ridge's  position,  and  continued  their  retreat 
in  the  direction  of  Corinth,  to  the  points  designated  to  be  occupied 
by  them  that  night. 

General  Jordan  thus  correctly  speaks  of  that  retreat   in   the 
"Campaigns   of   Lieutenant  -General    Forrest,"  pages   143    and 


"The  battle  kindled  soon  after  daylight,  and  raged  furiously  from  right  to 
left  for  more  than  five  hours.  And,  notwithstanding  the  odds  of  fresh  troops 
brought  up  against  them,  despite  their  long-continued  engagement,  the  Con 
federates  had  not  receded  from  the  ground  upon  which  they  had  been  con 
centrated,  as  soon  as  it  was  apparent  that  the  battle  was  in  their  hands.  But 
they  were  being  fearfully  depleted  meanwhile.  Beginning  the  combat  with 
not  more  than  twenty  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  cavalry,  less  than  fifteen 
thousand  were  now  in  the  Confederate  ranks.  General  Beauregard,  seeing 
the  unprofitable  nature  of  the  struggle,  determined  not  to  prolong  it.  Direct 
ing  his  Adjutant-General  to  select  a  position,  anil  post  such  troops  as  were 
available  to  cover  the  retreat,  he  despatched  other  staff  officers  to  the  corps 
commanders,  with  the  order  to  retire  simultaneously  from  their  several  posi 
tions,  ready,  however,  to  turn  and  fight  should  it  become  necessary.  And  ac 
cordingly,  about  two  o'clock  (2.30),  the  retrograde  movement  of  the  Confeder 
ates  was  inaugurated  and  carried  out  with  a  steadiness  never  exceeded  by 
veterans  of  a  hundred  fields. 

"During  the  various  stages  of  the  conflict  General  Beauregard  had  tried 
to  use  his  cavalry,  but  so  dense  and  broad-spread  were  the  woods  that  they 
proved  altogether  fruitless  of  results.  .  .  . 

"  The  retreat  had  now  commenced  in  earnest,  but  so  stunned  and  crippled 
was  the  enemy  that  no  effort  or  pretence  to  pursue  was  made.  The  line  es 
tablished  to  cover  the  movement  commanded  the  ground  of  Shiloh  church, 
and  some  open  fields  in  the  neighborhood  ;  thence  keeping  up  a  vigorous 
play  of  artillery  on  the  woods  beyond  ;  there  was  no  reply,  nor  did  any  enemy 
become  visible.  That  line  was  then  withdrawn  about  three  fourths  of  a  mile, 
to  another  favorable  position.  Meanwhile,  the  retreat  had  been  effected  in 
admirable  order,  all  stragglers  falling  in  the  ranks,  and  that  line  was  abandoned 
with  no  enemy  in  sight.  .  .  . 

"  Of  trophies  the  Confederates  carried  from  the  field  some  twenty-six  stands 
of  flags  and  colors,  and  about  thirty  of  the  guns  captured  on  the  6th.  The 
guns  which  figure  in  Federal  subordinate  reports  as  captured  from  the  Con 
federates,  with  few  exceptions,  were  those  lost  on  Sunday  by  the  Federals, 
which,  for  want  of  horses  to  draw  them  from  the  field,  had  been  left  by  the 
Confederates  where  they  had  been  taken." 

General  Grant  says,  in  his  report  : 
L—  21 


322  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

"Before  the  close  of  the  action  the  advance  of  General  T.  J.  Wood's  division 
(two  brigades  of  Buell's  corps)  arrived  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  action. 

"  My  force  was  too  much  fatigued  from  two  days'  hard  fighting  and  ex 
posure  in  the  open  air  to  a  drenching  rain  during  the  intervening  night,  to 
pursue  immediate!}7.  Night  closed  in  cloudy  and  with  a  heavy  rain,  making 
the  roads  impracticable  for  artillery  by  the  next  morning. 

"  General  Sherman,  however,  followed  the  enemy,  finding  that  the  main 
part  of  the  army  had  retreated  in  good  order." 

But  General  Sherman,  in  his  report,  uses  the  following  lan 
guage  : 

"At  the  time  of  recovering  our  camps  (about  four  o'clock  P.M.)  our  men 
were  so  fatigued  that  we  could  not  follow  the  retreating  masses  of  the  enemy." 

And  General  Buell  says,  in  his  report : 

"  Two  brigades  of  General  Wood's  division  arrived  just  at  the  close  of  the 
battle ;  but  only  one,  that  of  Colonel  Wagner,  in  time  to  participate  actively 
in  the  pursuit,  which  it  continued  for  about  a  mile,  and  until  halted  by  my 
order." 

If  any  pursuit  beyond  the  Shiloh  meeting-house  was  made  by 
the  Federals  on  the  afternoon  of  the  7th,  it  must  have  been  made 
very  cautiously,  for  the  Confederates  were  not  at  all  disturbed  in 
their  slow  and  quiet  retreat.  General  Breckinridge,  commanding 
the  reserve,  bivouacked  for  the  night  near  the  former  headquarters 
of  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  on  the  night  of  the  5th,  at 
about  one  and  a  half  miles  from  the  battle-field.  The  next  morn 
ing  (on  the  8th)  he  fell  back  to  a  position  only  three  miles  farther 
to  the  rear,  where  he  remained  undisturbed  for  several  days,  with 
the  cavalry  thrown  out  well  to  the  front,  in  close  proximity  to  the 
Federal  lines. 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th,  General  Sherman,  with  two  brigades 
and  some  cavalry,  advanced  to  reconnoitre,  on  the  lower  Corinth 
road,  while  General  Wood,  with  two  brigades,  reconnoitred  on  the 
upper  road.  On  arriving  at  General  Breckinridge's  bivouac  of 
the  preceding  night  they  found  our  cavalry  pickets  in  position, 
arid  pursued  them  for  about  half  a  mile  with  a  regiment  of  cavalry 
and  one  of  infantry.  At  that  point  Colonel  Forrest  appeared, 
and  charged  the  enemy  with  a  part  of  his  forces,  a  company  of 
"Wirt  Adams's  regiment,  a  squadron  of  the  8th  Texas,  and  some 
Kentuckians,  under  Captain  John  Morgan,  amounting  in  all  to 
about  three  hundred  and  fifty  troopers.  The  Federals  were  thrown 
into  great  confusion,  and  routed;  "although,"  says  General  Slier- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  303 

man,  in  his  report,  "the  ground  was  admirably  adapted  for  a  de 
fence  of  infantry  against  cavalry,  being  miry,  and  covered  with 
fallen  timber."  Their  loss  amounted  to  fifteen  killed,  about 
twenty-five  wounded,  and  some  seventy  prisoners.  The  Confed 
erates  pursuing  too  vigorously,  and  coming  suddenly  on  the  bri 
gades  of  Federal  infantry,  were  repulsed,  after  the  brave  and  dash 
ing  Forrest  had  been  severely  wounded  in  the  side.  His  command 
then  retired,  followed  a  short  distance  by  some  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  towards  General  Breckin ridge's  encampment,  at  Mickey's 
farm,  only  about  two  and  a  half  miles  from  the  point  of  collision. 

General  Sherman  concludes  his  report,  dated  on  the  day  of  this 
encounter,  as  follows:  "The  check  sustained  by  us  at  the  fallen 
timber  delayed  our  advance,  so  that  night  came  upon  us  before 
the  wounded  were  provided  for  and  the  dead  buried  ;  and  our 
troops  being  fagged  out  *  by  two  days'  hard  fighting,  exposure,  and 
privation,!  ordered  them  back  to  their  camps,  where  they  now  are." 

We  discover  here  two  oversights  on  General  Sherman's  part. 
The  short  conflict  referred  to  occurred  early  in  the  morning,  and 
there  was  certainly  ample  time  in  which  to  bury  fifteen  dead  and 
remove  twenty-five  wounded.  And  the  two  brigades  of  Wood's 
division,  of  BuelTs  army,  which  accompanied  his  command,  had 
taken  but  little  part  in  the  battle  of  the  preceding  day,  having  ar 
rived  on  the  field  about  the  time  the  battle  terminated. 

The  remainder  of  the  Confederate  forces,  sorely  disappointed, 
but  not  without  heart,  returned  from  Shiloh  to  their  former  posi 
tions  at  and  about  Corinth,  to  recruit  and  reorganize,  and  to  await 
a  favorable  opportunity  of  striking  another  blow  at  their  antago 
nists. 

The  loss  on  the  Confederate  side  was  unusually  heavy,  but  this 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  it  had  been  the  assailant  all  day  on  the 
6th,  and  very  often  on  the  7th.  The  army  under  Generals  John 
ston  and  Beauregard  had  gone  into  the  battle  with  thirty-nine 
thousand  six  hundred  and  thirty  men  of  all  arms  and  condition, 
and  it  received  no  reinforcements  during  the  two  days'  fight,  ex 
cept  Colonel  Hill's  Tennessee  regiment,  which  reached  the  front 
unarmed  on  the  morning  of  the  Oth,  and  was  furnished  with  arms 
and  equipments  picked  up  on  the  field.  This  regiment  swelled 

*'They  could  not  have  been  more  ''fagged  out"  than  their  adversaries 
were. 


324  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

the  Confederate  numbers  to  about  forty  thousand  men.  Our  loss 
was  1728  killed,  8012  wounded,  and  959  missing;  presenting  an 
aggregate  of  10,699,  or,  in  killed  and  wounded,  twenty-four  and  one 
third  per  cent,  of  those  present  on  the  field.  This  is  a  very  re 
markable  proportion,  in  view  of  the  rawness  of  most  of  the  troops, 
and  the  nature  of  the  ground  upon  which  the  battle  was  fought. 
It  is  about  the  greatest  average  ever  attained  in  any  single  contest 
between  veteran  armies,*  and  in  most  instances  the  defeated  army 
is  either  completely  routed  or  unfit  for  another  campaign  until 
largely  reinforced. 

The  Federals  commenced  the  battle,  on  the  6th,  with  over  forty 
thousand  men  of  all  arms,  and  were  reinforced  that  day  by  the 
timely  arrival  of  Am  men's  brigade,  of  General  Buell's  army.  Dur 
ing  the  night  of  the  6th  and  the  next  morning  they  were  rein 
forced  again,  by  Lew.  Wallace's  division  of  General  Grant's  army; 
by  three  divisions  (Crittenden's,  McCook's,  and  Kelson's  two  other 
brigades)  of  General  Buell's  army ;  and,  towards  the  end  of  the 
second  day's  battle,  by  two  brigades  of  Wood's  division  of  the 
same  army,  f  which  brought  up  the  number  of  fresh  Federal  troops, 
on  the  7th,  to  over  thirty-two  thousand  men  of  all  arms.  Our 
computation  is  based  on  the  fact  that  these  divisions  contained  no 
less  than  seven  thousand  men  each,  as  is  established  by  General 
Yan  Home,  in  his  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland," 
vol.  i.  p.  99,  where  the  following  passage  is  found: 

"  The  1st,  2d,  4th,  5th,  and  6th  divisions,  commanded  respectively  by  Briga 
dier-Generals  Thomas,  McCook,  Nelson,  Crittenden,  arid  Wood,  with  a  contin 
gent  force  of  cavalry,  in  all  thirty-seven  thousand  effective  men,  constituted 
the  main  army,  which,  under  the  personal  command  of  General  Buell,  was  to 
join  General  Halleck  in  the  projected  movement  against  the  enemy  at  Corinth, 
Mississippi.1' 

The  total  force  of  the  Federals  on  both  days  amounted,  there 
fore,  to  about  seventy-two  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  and  their 
losses  were,  according  to  official  reports — in  General  Grant's  army, 

*  Those  losses  generally  vary  from  one  twentieth,  or  five  per  cent.,  to  one 
fourth,  or  twenty-five  per  cent.,  of  the  troops  engaged.  The  British,  at  "Wa 
terloo,  lost  not  quite  one  sixth,  or  only  sixteen  per  cent.  The  Austrians,  at  Ma 
genta,  lost  only  one  thirteenth,  that  is,  not  quite  eight  per  cent. ;  and  the  Prus 
sian  loss  at  Sadowa  was  remarkably  small,  being  only  one  twentieth,  or  five 
per  cent. 

t  See  Generals  Grant's  r.nd  Bucll's  Reports. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  325 

1437  killed,  5679  wounded,  and  2934  prisoners  ;  in  General  Buell's 
army,  236  killed,  1816  wounded,  and  88  prisoners;  making  1673 
killed,  7495  wounded,  and  3022  prisoners,  or  a  grand  total  of 
12,190.  Thus  the  proportion  of  killed  and  wounded,  on  the  Fed 
eral  side,  as  compared  to  the  number  of  troops  present  on  the 
Held,  was  nearly  thirteen  per  cent.,  which  is  about  the  ordinary 
proportion  in  modern  warfare. 


326  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

Commentaries  on  the  Battle  of  Shiloli :  I.  "Why  Generals  Johnston  and  Beau- 
regard  did  not  Sooner  Move  the  Army  from  Corinth.. — II.  Their  Reasons 
for  Forming  their  Lines  of  Battle  as  they  did.  —  III.  Why  the  Con 
federate  Attack  was  Made  Chiefly  on  the  Enemy's  Right,  and  not  on 
his  Entire  Front.— IV.  Demonstration  of  the  Fact  that  the  Confederate 
Attack  took  the  Enemy  Completely  by  Surprise. — V.  General  Beau- 
regard's  Opinion  and  Criticism  of  General  Sherman's  Tactics  during  the 
Battle. — VI.  Refutation  of  the  Charge  that  the  Confederate  Troops  were 
Withdrawn  too  soon  from  the  Battle-field  on  the  Evening  of  the  Gth. — 
Comparison  Drawn  by  Mr.  Davis  between  General  A.  S.  Johnston  and 
Marshal  Turenrtc. — VII.  General  Beaurcgard's  Opinion  as  to  the  Fight 
ing  of  the  Confederates  during  the  Battle  of  the  7th. — VIII.  Correction 
of  the  Absurd  Story  that  General  Beauregard  did  not  Leave  his  Am 
bulance  during  the  First  Day  of  the  Battle,  and,  when  Informed  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  Death,  "  Quietly  Remained  where  lie  was,  Waiting  the 
Issue  of  Events." 

I. 

GENERALS  JOHNSTON  and  Beauregard  have  both  been  censured 
for  not  moving  sooner  and  more  rapidly  from  Corinth,  to  attack 
the  Federals  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  so  as  to  anticipate  General 
Buell's  junction  with  General  Grant.  The  causes  of  this  delay, 
as  already  given  in  the  preceding  chapters,  sufficiently  absolve 
the  two  Confederate  commanders  from  any  just  blame.  The  read 
er  will  pardon  us  for  briefly  reverting  to  them. 

General  Beauregard,  it  will  be  remembered,  only  arrived  at 
Jackson,  Tennessee,  on  the  17th  of  February.  General  Polk,  with 
about  fourteen  thousand  five  hundred  men  of  all  arms,  was  in 
command  in  that  military  district.  Four  days  after  General  Beau- 
regard's  arrival,  and  before  he  had  yet  formally  assumed  com 
mand,  he  despatched  five  officers  of  his  staff  to  the  governors  of 
Tennessee,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Louisiana,  to  ascertain  wheth 
er  they  could  send  him,  at  Corinth,  the  State  troops  they  had 
available  at  that  time ;  and  he  also  requested  General  Johnston, 
who  was  then  at  Murfreesboro',  retiring,  with  some  fifteen  thou- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  327 

sand  men,  from  Bowling  Green  and  JSTashville,  to  Stevenson,  to 
change  the  direction  of  his  retreat  to  Dccatur,  Alabama,  that  he 
might  more  readily  form  a  junction  with  the  forces  at  Corinth,  at 
the  proper  time.  To  this  request,  General  Johnston  willingly  ac 
ceded. 

By  the  27th  of  March,  with  our  defective  means  of  transporta 
tion,  and  restricted  supplies  of  all  kinds,  General  Beauregard  had 
assembled,  at  and  about  Corinth,  an  army  of  over  forty  thousand 
men,  exclusive  of  some  nine  thousand  occupying  the  Mississippi 
llivcr  defences,  at  Xew  Madrid,  Island  2s o.  10,  and  Fort  Pillow. 
And  General  Van  Dorn,  at  General  Beauregard's  request,  was  mov 
ing  rapidly  from  Van  Buren,  Arkansas,  with  an  army  of  nearly 
twenty  thousand  men,  to  unite  also  with  our  forces  at  Corinth. 
lie  would  have  arrived  in  time  to  take  a  part  in  the  battle  of  Shi- 
loh,  had  he  not  been  delayed  by  high  waters,  which  prevented  his 
marching  to  Memphis,  when  he  could  not  immediately  procure  suf 
ficient  river  transportation.  Even  with  these  obstacles  to  overcome, 
General  Van  Dorn's  troops  commenced  arriving  at  Memphis  on 
the  10th  of  April,  only  three  days  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  How 
different  might  have  been  the  result,  had  he  arrived  in  time  ! 

Great  difficulties  were  encountered  in  organizing  and  supplying 
so  many  troops,  hastily  gathered  up  from  such  remote  points.  These 
difficulties  were  increased  by  the  want  of  experienced  officers,  to 
take  charge  of  the  brigades  and  divisions  as  soon  as  formed.  A 
delay  of  one  or  two  days  may  be  attributed  to  that  cause  alone. 
The  War  Department  had  promised  General  Beauregard  a  certain 
number  of  officers,  below  the  rank  of  brigadier-generals,  designa 
ted  by  him,  from  his  army  of  the  Potomac,  so  as  to  assist  in  or 
ganizing  the  troops  of  his  new  command,  if  needed  ;  but  that 
promise  was  only  partly  complied  with,  and  much  too  late. 

Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  intended  to  move  from  Cor- 

O 

inth,  on  or  about  the  1st  of  April,  with  the  hope  of  beginning 
their  attack  against  the  Federals  on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  at 
latest ;  whereas  they  were  not  able  to  leave  until  the  latter  da}r, 
and  did  not  get  into  position  before  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  at 
too  advanced  an  hour  to  open  the  attack  immediately.  With 
better  disciplined  troops,  the  march  of  less  than  eighteen  miles 
could  have  been  made  in  one  day ;  but  two  of  our  corps,  Generals 
Folk's  and  Bragg's,  which  had  been  recently  organized,  were  most 
ly  composed  of  commands  not  yet  used  to  marching.  General 


328  MILITARY   OPERATIONS    OF 

Folk's  corps  was,  besides,  rather  slow  in  starting;  and  we  were 
two  days  in  passing  over  that  short  distance. 

II. 

It  lias  pleased  some  hypercritical  military  writers,  also,  to  criticise 
severely  the  order  of  battle  adopted  at  Shiloh.  They  think  that 
a  great  mistake  was  made,  in  deploying  the  different  corps,  in  suc 
cessive  lines,*  along  the  whole  front  of  battle,  instead  of  intrust 
ing  a  part  of  that  front  to  each  corps,  itself  formed  on  several 
lines. 

The  first  merit  of  a  commander  is,  to  be  able  to  adapt  the  means 
at  his  disposal  to  the  circumstances  in  which  he  is  placed,  and 
to  apply  them,  in  the  simplest  manner  possible,  to  the  accom 
plishment  of  the  object  in  view.  Our  "  corps"  were  thus  designa 
ted,  not  only  for  the  purpose  of  deceiving  the  enemy  as  to  the 
number  of  our  troops,  which  we  wished  to  exaggerate,  but  also  to 
inspire  our  own  men  with  greater  confidence.  The  truth  is,  that 
these  corps  were  properly  "  divisions,"  at  least  in  size,  and  were 
composed  only  of  from  four  to  five  brigades,  averaging  each  about 
two  thousand  infantry,  so  that  the  first  line,  General  Hardee's, 
consisting  of  four  brigades,  contained  some  eight  thousand  five 
hundred  bayonets,  and  the  second  line  —  five  hundred  yards  in 
rear  of  the  first — consisting  of  five  brigades,  under  General  Bragg, 
had  about  fifteen  hundred  more  bayonets,  or  nearly  ten  thousand 
in  all.  General  Folk's  corps  and  General  Ereckinridge's  division 
composed  the  first  of  four  brigades,  numbering  not  over  eight 
thousand  five  hundred  men,  and  the  second,  of  about  six  thousand, 
gave  a  total  of  less  than  thirty-five  thousand  infantry.  The  forces 
of  Generals  Folk  and  Breckinridge  were  formed  in  columns  of 
brigades,  at  proper  intervals,  in  rear  of  the  second  line  of  battle. 
Our  front  was  therefore  of  limited  extent  for  one  command,  com 
pared  to  many  other  fronts  of  battle  subsequently  used  during 
the  war,  especially  in  Virginia,  with  the  corps  of  Generals  Jack 
son  and  Longstreet. 

General  Hardee's  command,  used  to  marching  and  moving  as  an 
organized  body,  under  that  cool  and  gallant  officer,  constituted 

*  Only  two  corps,  Generals  Hardee's  and  Bragg's,  were  thus  deployed  j  the 
other  two,  Generals  Folk's  and  Breckinridge's,  were  in  columns  of  brigades, 
supporting  each  wing. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  329 

the  front  line  of  battle,  to  secure  unity  of  action,  during  what 
was  expected  to  be  a  surprise.  General  Bragg's  troops  were 
equally  well  disciplined  as  regiments,  but  were  unused  to  inarch 
ing  by  brigades,  and  many  of  his  regiments  had  never  before 
been  under  his  orders.  It  was  supposed  that,  in  a  broken  and 
wooded  country,  they  might  very  well  follow  and  support  General 
Ilardec's  lines,  but  might  not  do  so  well  if  deployed  to  form  the 
immediate  front.  General  Folk's  command,  recently  organized, 
was  even  less  prepared  to  occupy  such  a  position.  Breckinridge's 
division  was  composed  of  excellent  material,  and  could  march 
well,  having  lately  retreated  from  Kentucky  and  middle  Tennes 
see,  with  General  Ilardee's  corps ;  hence,  it  was  thought  advisable, 
at  first,  to  hold  it  in  reserve  for  any  emergency  which  might  hap 
pen  on  any  distant  part  of  the  field. 

That  the  commands  got  very  much  broken  and  mixed  up  dur 
ing  the  battle  was  not  surprising,  and  was  due  less  to  the  order  of 
battle  than  to  the  rawness  of  the  troops,  including  officers,  the 
broken  and  wooded  nature  of  the  field,  and  the  severity  of  the 
contest.  General  Beauregard  is  of  opinion  that  any  other  order 
of  battle  would  have  resulted  similarly,  under  like  circumstances. 
The  Federals  were  also  in  the  same  mixed-up  condition,  according 
to  their  own  reports,  when  the  battle  had  lasted  only  a  few  hours. 
At  the  close  of  the  first  battle  of  Manassas,  the  Confederates,  who 
had  fought  on  the  defensive,  in  a  single  line  of  battle,  owing  to 
the  want  of  troops,  were  nearly  as  badly  disorganized  as  the  army 
at  Shiloh  was.  General  Beauregard  says  that  he  has  often  seen 
nc\v  troops  when  attempting  to  mananivre,  even  on  level  ground, 
get  so  thoroughly  mixed  up  in  a  few  moments  that  a  long  time 
was  required  to  disentangle  them.  It  may  be  true  that  our  re 
serves  were  engaged  somewhat  too  early  in  the  action ;  but  this 
was  done  to  save  time,  as  success  depended  on  the  rapid  execution 
of  the  offensive,  and  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  reorganizing  and 
concentrating  for  the  defensive. 

III. 

Another  objection  raised  against  the  attack  at  Shiloh  is,  that  it 
was  made  to  bear  too  much  on  the  Federal  left,  which  brought 
the  Confederates  in  too  close  proximity  to  the  Tennessee  River, 
where  their  right  flank  became  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
two  gunboats. 


330  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

The  attack  was  made  oblique  on  the  right,  as  has  been  already 
stated  in  the  narrative  of  the  battle,  in  order  to  get  on  better 
ground,  towards  the  ridge  separating  the  waters  which  flow  into 
Lick  Creek  from  those  which  empty  into  Owl  Creek.  This  ar 
rangement  enabled  us,  besides,  to  take  the  Federal  encampments 
more  in  flank  than  would  have  been  possible  by  a  direct  attack. 
The  country  was  too  much  broken  and  too  heavily  wooded  to 
justify  much  fear  of  the  gunboats  in  the  river.  They  could  not 
have  distinguished  friends  from  foes,  except  at  a  short  distance, 
and  they  would  have  had  to  fire  at  random.  We  expected  to  back 
the  Federals  against  Owl  and  Snake  Creeks — the  two  narrow  and 
rickety  bridges  of  which  could  not  have  stood  heavy  pressure — 
early  in  the  day,  without  incurring  much  risk  from  the  gunboats. 
It  was  only  late  on  the  afternoon  of  the  6th,  when  attacking  Pitts- 
burg  Landing  itself,  that  our  right  flank  became  really  exposed  to 
their  fire,  and  our  attack  was  checked,  principally,  by  the  water 
in  the  creeks  and  ravines  which  empty  into  the  Tennessee  River. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Confederates  had  no  accurate 
knowledge  of  the  ground  occupied  by  the  Federals,  and  they  had 
no  proper  staff  officers  to  make  the  necessary  reconnoissances,  if 
practicable.  The  expedition  was  intended  to  be  a  surprise,  and 
they  feared  to  arouse  the  suspicions  of  the  enemy  by  a  forced 
reconnoissance :  hence,  they  preferred  to  take  the  risk  attending 
an  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  ground  over  which  they  had  to 
operate,  rather  than  incur  the  danger  of  giving  timely  warning 
of  the  attack  to  the  enemy.  War  is  usually  a  contest  of  chances, 
and  he  who  fears  to  incur  any  risk  seldom  accomplishes  great  re 
sults. 

It  is  possible  that,  if  we  had  had  an  army  of  veterans  and  had 
possessed  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  Federal  positions,  we 
might  have  attacked  in  a  different  manner.  At  any  rate,  we 
would  have  so  extended  our  left  as  to  engage  Sherman's  troops 
'shortly  after  we  attacked  Prentiss's,  which  would  have  given  the 
former  less  time  to  prepare  for  the  onslaught.  There  is  no  doubt 
that,  at  early  dawn,  Sherman  was  no  better  prepared  than  Pren- 
tiss  to  receive  an  attack.  But  General  Beauregard  had  been  as 
sured,  while  collecting  information  at  Corinth  for  the  movement, 
that  the  distance  between  Owl  and  Lick  Creeks,  near  the  Shiloh 
meeting-house,  was  about  two  miles,  whereas  it  was  more  nearly 
three:  hence  our  front,  was  not  sufficiently  extended  to  attack, 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  331 

in  rapid  succession,  the  whole  Federal  front,  a  circumstance  which 
gave  Sherman  time  hastily  to  form  his  division  to  oppose  us;  and 
on  this  fact  he  bases  his  denial  of  having  been  surprised  by  the 
Confederates. 

IV. 

Our  narrative  of  the  movement  from  Corinth  to  Shiloh  has 
clearly  established  the  surprise  of  the  Federals  on  that  occasion. 
When  an  army  of  nearly  forty  thousand  men  advances  to  within 
a  mile  and  a  half  of  an  enemy's  encampments ;  establishes  lines 
of  battle  in  the  woods  in  his  front,  during  a  whole  afternoon  ; 
bivouacs  all  night  in  that  position  without  being  disturbed,  and 
the  next  morning  advances  at  leisure,  in  line  of  battle,  to  within 
sight  of  those  encampments,  without  meeting  any  serious  opposi 
tion,  it  is  absurd  to  deny  that  a  surprise  is  effected ;  otherwise, 
there  is  evidently  no  attack  in  war  that  can  be  thus  designated. 
If  the  attack  was  not  a  surprise,  how  can  General  Sherman  ac 
count  for  the  success  achieved  against  Prentiss,  in  about  one  hour, 
and  against  himself  in  about  two  hours,  by  a  force  not  well  or 
ganized,  badly  armed,  and  worse  equipped  ?  lie  says,  in  his  "  Me 
moirs,-'  p.  233,  of  the  general  position  at  Tittsburg  Landing: 

"The  ground  itself  admits  of  easy  defence  by  a  small  command,  and  yet  af 
fords  admirable  camping  ground  for  a  hundred  thousand  men." 

Again,  on  page  229  : 

"  We  did  not  fortify  our  camps  against  an  attack,  because  we  had  no  orders 
to  do  so,  and  because  such  a  course  would  have  made  our  raw  men  timid. 
The  position  was  naturally  strong,  with  Snake  Creek  on  our  right,  a  deep, 
bold  stream,  with  a  confluent  (Owl  Creek)  to  our  right  front;  and  Lick  Creek, 
with  a  similar  confluent,  on  our  left ;  thus  narrowing  the  space  over  which  we 
could  be  attacked  to  about  a  mile  and  a  half  or  two  miles." 

In  his  report  of  the  battle,  he  says  of  his  own  position  near  the 
Shiloh  meeting-house : 

"  The  fire  came  from  the  bushes  which  line  a  small  stream  that  rises  in  the 
field  in  front  of  Appier's  camp,  and  flows  to  the  north  along  my  whole  front. 
This  valley  afforded  the  enemy  partial  cover;  but  our  men  were  so  posted  as 
to  have  a  good  fire  at  them  as  they  crossed  the  valley  and  ascended  the  rising 
ground  on  our  side/' 

In  his  testimony  at  the  trial  of  Colonel  AVorthington,  an  officer 
of  his  command,  in  August,  1SG2,  he  said: 

"And  here  I  mention,  for  future  history,  that  our  right  flank  was  well 


332  MILITARY    OPERATIONS  OF 

guarded  by  Owl  and  Snake  Creeks,  our  left  by  Lick  Creek,  leaving  us  simply 
to  guard  our  front.  No  stronger  position  was  ever  held  by  an  army.  . .  .  But 
even  as  we  were  on  the  6th  of  April,  you  might  search  the  world  over  and 
not  find  a  more  advantageous  field  of  battle — flanks  well  protected,  and  never 
threatened,  troops  in  easy  support,  timber  and  broken  ground  giving  good 
points  to  rally ;  and  the  proof  is  that  forty-three  thousand  men,  of  whom  at 
least  ten  thousand  ran  away,  held  their  ground  against  sixty  thousand  chosen 
troops*  of  the  South  with  their  best  leaders.  On  Friday  the  4th,  nor  officer, 
nor  soldier,  not  even  Colonel  Worthington,  looked  for  an  attack,  as  I  can 
prove." 

Now,  what  forces  had  lie  and  General  Prentiss  with  which  to 
hold  and  defend  their  impregnable  positions?  Sherman  had 
three  of  his  brigades  of  infantry,  three  batteries  of  six  pieces  each, 
and  some  cavalry,  and  was  reinforced  by  one  brigade  of  McCler- 
nand's  division,  making  in  all  over  nine  thousand  men  ;  and  General 
Prentiss  had  three  brigades  of  infantry  and  two  batteries,  or  about 
six  thousand  men — together  they  had  over  fifteen  thousand  men. 

Their  positions  were  carried  in  from  one  to  two  hours  by  liar- 
dee's  corps  of  four  brigades,  numbering  nine  thousand  and  twenty- 
four  infantry  and  artillery,  assisted  by  Bragg's  five  brigades,  ten 
thousand  seven  hundred  and  thirty-one  infantry  and  artillery,  and 
by  two  brigades  of  Folk's  corps,  about  four  thousand  five  hundred 
men,  or,  in  all,  less  than  twenty-five  thousand.  Folk's  other  two 
brigades  and  Breckinridge's  division  of  three  brigades  took  no  part 
in  this  first  attack.  Is  it  probable  that  the  Federals,  who  fought 
so  gallantly  during  the  rest  of  that  day,  would  have  been  driven  so 
soon  from  such  a  stronghold  as  is  described  by  General  Sherman,  if 
they  had  not  been  surprised  ?  But  the  reports  of  several  of  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  own  brigade  commanders  show  conclusively  that 
the  Confederate  attack,  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  came  upon 
them  quite  unexpectedly.  A  remarkable  circumstance  is,  that 
General  Sherman  had  then  no  cavalry  pickets  in  advance  of  his 
encampments,  having  forgotten,  apparently,  that  cavalry  is  "  the 
eye  of  an  army."  His  infantry  pickets  and  guards  were  so  few 
and  close  to  his  first  line  of  sentinels  as  not  to  be  able  to  delay 
our  advance,  or  give  timely  notice  of  our  approach.  General 
Sherman  says  also,  in  his  report : 

*  The  Confederates  numbered  not  quite  forty  thousand  men,  and  about  one 
third  of  this  force  was  composed  of  newly  formed  regiments,  very  recently 
armed. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  333 

"On  Saturday  (5th)  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  again  very  bold,  coming  well 
down  to  our  front,  yet  I  did  not  believe  they  designed  anything  but  a  strong 
demonstration." 

And  further  on  lie  adds : 

About  8  A.  M.  (Sunday)  I  saw  the  glistening  bnyonets  of  heavy  masses  ot 
infantry,  to  our  left  front,  in  the  woods  beyond  the  small  stream  alluded  to, 
and  became  satisfied  for  the  first  time  that  the  enemy  designed  a  determined 
attack  on  our  whole  camp." 

Major  Ricker  says  that,  after  reporting  to  General  Sherman  a 
reconnoissance  he  had  made  on  the  day  preceding  the  battle: 

"  I  told  him  I  had  met  and  fought  the  advance  of  Bcaurcgard's  army,  and 
that  he  was  advancing  on  us.  General  Sherman  remarked, 'It  could  not  be 
possible ;  Beauregard  was  not  such  a  fool  as  to  leave  his  base  of  operations  to 
attack  us  in  ours — mere  reconnoissance  in  force.'  "  * 

But  Generals  Sherman  and  Prentiss  were  not  the  only  com 
manding  officers  surprised  by  Beaurcgard's  "foolish"'  attack. 
Generals  Ilallcck,  Grant,  and  Buell  seem  to  have  been  equally 
unprepared  for  his  sudden  onslaught.  General  Buell,  with  five 
divisions  of  his  army,  well  organized  and  fully  equipped,  num 
bering  at  least  thirty-seven  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  had  left 
Nashville  from  the  15th  to  the  20th  of  March,  to  form  a  junction 
at  his  leisure  with  Grant  at  Savannah,  via  Columbia,  Mount  Pleas 
ant,  and  Waynesboro.  lie  was  delayed  several  days  at  Columbia 
by  high  water  in  Duck  River,  the  bridge  having  been  destroyed 
by  the  Confederates.  While  there  he  first  heard,  on  or  about  the 
29th  of  March,  that  Grant's  army  had  moved  to  Pittsburg  Land 
ing,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River.  General  Buell  re 
sumed  his  march  on  the  31st,  intending — having  obtained  the  ap 
proval  of  General  llalleck — "to  stop  for  cleaning  up  and  rest  at 
Waynesboro ;"  he  had  not  yet  received  any  intimation  that  Gen 
eral  Grant  was  in  danger,  or  that  he  (Buell)  should  hurry  up  with 
his  forces. 

But  in  order  that  we  may  not  be  suspected  of  a  disposition  to 
be  unfair  towards  the  distinguished  generals  referred  to,  we  quote 
from  Van  Home's  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol. 
i.  pp.  102  et  seq.,  as  follows  : 


*  See  Boynton's  "  Sherman's  Historical  Raid,"  pp.  33,  34,  for  further  extracts 
from  official  records. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

"  General  Buell  had  not  yet  *  received  an  intimation  that  General  Grant  was 
in  any  danger,  or  that  there  was  need  of  haste  in  the  movement  of  his  army, 
and,  desiring  to  have  his  forces  in  good  shape  to  meet  a  comrade  army,  ob 
tained  permission  from  General  Halleck  to  stop  for  rest  at  "VVaynesboro.  The 
army  commander  had  also  under  consideration  the  propriety  of  moving  to 
Hamburg,  above  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  thence  to  the  place  of  conjunction. 
Stronger  evidence  could  not  be  adduced  than  this  project  of  stopping  at 
Wayncsboro,  that  neither  General  Halleck  nor  General  Buell,  at  this  time, 
thought  that  there  was  anything  actual,  probable,  or  possible,  in  the  situa 
tion  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  to  demand  the  hurried  advance  of  the  army  of  the 
Ohio.  But  General  Nelson  [commanding  the  leading  division],  ignorant  of 
this  proposal  to  halt  at  Waynesboro,  and  alive  to  the  probability  of  an  early 
attack  upon  General  Grant,  hurried  through  the  place  for  rest  and  trimming 
up  for  a  handsome  introduction  to  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and,  by  sweep 
ing  impetuously  on  the  road  to  Savannah,  he  both  defeated  the  deflection 
towards  Hamburg  and  the  halt  at  Wayncsboro ;  for  before  General  Buell 
thought  it  necessary  to  give  orders  to  Nelson,  other  divisions,  to  which  the 
speed  of  the  first  had  been  communicated,  were  also  beyond  Waynesboro,  and 
could  not  then  be  recalled. 

"That  General  Grant  felt  secure  at  this  time  is  equally  manifest.  Tele 
graphic  communications  between  him  and  Nelson  were  established  on  the  3d 
of  April.  The  latter  telegraphed  that  he  could  bo  at  Savannah  with  his 
division  on  the  5th.  On  the  4th,  General  Grant  replied  that  he  need  not 
hasten  his  march,  as  transports  to  convey  him  to  Pittsburg  Landing  would 
not  be  ready  before  the  8th.  Nevertheless,  Nelson  hastened  on,  and  it  was  well 
he  did,  for  he  gave  motion  to  the  whole  army  behind  him,  and  General  John 
ston  was  even  then  on  the  march  from  Corinth,  with  his  entire  army,  to  crush 
General  Grant  before  General  Buell  could  give  him  assistance.  .  .  . 

"A  variety  of  facts  support  the  assumption  that  neither  General  Halleck, 
General  Grant,  nor  the  division  commanders  on  the  field  beyond  Pittsburg 
Landing,  had  the  remotest  expectation  that  the  enemy  would  advance  in  of 
fence  from  Corinth  with  full  strength.  General  Halleck  proposed  to  com 
mand  the  united  armies  in  their  advance  upon  Corinth,  and  yet  he  was  not 
to  leave  his  headquarters  at  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  until  the  7th.  Oil  the  5th, 
General  Sherman,  though  not  the  senior  division  commander,  yet  virtually  so, 
from  the  confidence  reposed  in  him  by  General  Grant,  telegraphed  to  the 
latter :  '  All  is  quiet  along  my  lines  now ;  the  enemy  has  cavalry  in  our  front, 
and  I  think  there  are  two  regiments  and  one  battery  six  miles  out.'  t  Again : 
«I  have  no  doubt  that  nothing  will  occur  to-day  more  than  some  picket  firing. 
The  enemy  is  saucy,  but  got  the  worst  of  it  yesterday,  and  will  not  press  our 

*  On  the  31st  of  March. 

t  The  Confederates  were  then  within  that  distance  with  their  whole  army 
of  nearly  forty  thousand  men,  and  they  formed  their  lines  of  battle  that  after 
noon  about  a  mile  and  a  half  in  his  front.  They  had  passed  the  night  of  the 
4th  at  Monterey,  only  nine  miles  from  his  headquarters. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAED.  335 

pickets  far.  I  will  not  be  drawn  out  far,  unless  with  a  certainty  of  advantage, 
and  I  do  not  apprehend  anything  like  an  attack  upon  our  position.1 

"General  Grant  telegraphed  the  same  day  as  follows:  'The  innin  force  of 
the  enemy  is  at  Corinth,  with  troops  at  different  points  east.  .  .  .  The  num 
ber  of  men  at  Corinth,  and  within  supporting  distance  of  it,  cannot  be  far 
from  eighty  thousand  men.  Some  skirmishing  took  place  between  our  out- 
guards  and  the  enemy's  yesterday  and  the  day  before.  ...  I  have  scarcely 
the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  (general  one)  being  made  upon  us,  but  will  be 
prepared,  should  such  a  thing  take  place.  ...  It  is  my  present  intention  to 
send  them  (EiieH's  three  foremost  divisions)  to  Hamburg,  some  four  miles 
above  Pittsburg,  when  they  all  get  here.'  .  .  . 

"  They  [the  Federal  divisions  at  Pittsburg  Landing]  were  widely  separated, 
and  did  not  sustain  such  relations  to  each  other  that  it  was  possible  to  form 
quickly  a  connected  defensive  line.  .  .  .  They  had  no  defences  and  no  desig 
nated  line  for  defence  in  the  event  of  a  sudden  attack,  and  there  was  no  gen 
eral  on  the  field  to  take,  by  special  authority,  the  command  of  the  whole 
force  in  an  emergency. 

"  While  the  national  army  was  unprepared  for  battle  and  unexpectant 
of  such  an  event,  and  was  passing  the  night  of  the  5th  in  fancied  security, 
Johnston's  army  of  forty  thousand  men  was  in  close  proximity,  and  readv  for 
the  bloody  revelation  of  its  presence  and  purpose  on  the  following  morning. 
.  .  .  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  Cth  of  April,  a  Sabbath  day  of  unusual 
brightness,  cannonading  in  the  direction  of  Pittsburg  Landing  was  distinctly 
heard  at  Savannah.  General  Grant  supposed  that  it  indicated  an  attack  upon 
his  most  advanced  positions,  and,  not  waiting  to  meet  General  Buell,  as  he 
had  appointed,  and  not  leaving  any  instructions  or  suggestions  for  his  guid 
ance  in  moving  his  army  to  the  field,  or  even  expressing  a  desire  that  he 
should  give  him  support,  he  gave  an  order  to  General  Nelson  to  march  his 
division  up  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  and,  taking  a  steamer,  hastened  towards  the 
noise  of  battle.  Tie  did,  however,  advise  General  Buell,  by  note,  that  an  at 
tack  had  been  made,  whose  occurrence  he  had  not  anticipated  before  Monday 
or  Tuesday;  apologized  for  not  meeting  him,  as  he  had  contemplated,  and 
mentioned  the  fact  that  he  had  ordered  General  Nelson  to  move  with  his  di 
vision  'to  opposite  Pittsburg  Landing.'  The  omission  to  request  him  to  take 
any  other  divisions  to  the  field,  or  even  to  hasten  their  march  to  Savannah, 
must  be  accepted  as  conclusive  that  General  Grant  did  not  at  the  time  antici 
pate  such  a  battle  as  would  require  the  assistance  of  other  portions  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio.  ...  lie  [General  Buell]  subsequently  received  a  note  from 
General  Grant,  addressed  to  the  commanding  officer,  advanced  forces,  near 
Pittsburg,  Tennessee,  advising  him  that  his  forces  had  been  engaged  since 
early  morning,  contending  against  an  army  estimated  at  a  hundred  thousand 
men,  and  that  the  introduction  of  fresh  troops  upon  the  field  would  inspire 
his  men  and  dishearten  the  enemy/' 

General  Shermnirs  vain  effort  to  show  that  he  was  ready  for 
the  Confederate  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  Gth  contradicts  his 


336  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

former  statements.  It  certainly  weakens  in  nothing  the  prepon 
derance  of  evidence  offered  by  us,  nor  does  it,  in  any  way,  impair 
the  force  of  what  is  said  in  Van  Home's  "History  of  the  Array 
of  the  Cumberland."  The  discussion  of  this  point  has  made  it 
clear  that  not  only  Sherman's  division,  but  the  entire  Federal 
army,  was  taken  by  surprise.  That  General  Sherman  should  deny 
it  to-day,  with  such  bitterness  of  feeling  towards  those  who  prefer 
the  testimony  of  facts  to  his  unsubstantiated  assertions,  seems  the 
result  of  an  after-thought,  which  involves  him  in  inconsistency. 

In  Badeau's  "  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant "  we  read  as  fol 
lows  :* 

"...  On  the  4th  (April)  the  enemy  felt  Sherman's  front  in  force,  but  noth 
ing  serious  came  of  it,  and  the  opinion  of  that  commander  was  decided  that 
no  probability  of  an  immediate  engagement  existed.  Grant  rode  out  on  the 
day  after  (the  5th)  to  Sherman's  lines,  and  concurred  with  him  in  this  judg 
ment.  They  were  both  mistaken,  for  the  skirmish  was  the  reconnoissance  of 
the  enemy,  preliminary  to  the  battle  of  Shiloli.  This  affair,  however,  awoke 
attention,  and  put  both  officers  and  men  on  the  alert." 

These  are  conflicting  statements.  How  could  "  both  officers 
and  men  "  be  "  on  the  alert " — that  is  to  say,  ready  for  an  attack 
on  that  morning — when  the  commanding  general  himself  did  "not 
anticipate"  any  such  attack  ;  and  when  he  and  General  Sherman 
believed  that  no  immediate  engagement  was  likely  to  take  place? 
Were  "  the  officers  and  men  "  of  the  Federal  army  better  informed 
than  their  commanding  generals  ?  A  few  of  them  were,  and  even 
ventured  to  suggest  their  fears  to  some  of  their  commanders,  but 
they  were  rebuked  for  their  presumption. 

The  Federal  army  could  not  have  been  "on  the  alert"  and 
ready,  at  that  time,  to  meet  the  onset  of  the  Confederate  army, 
for  the  simple  and  additional  reason  that,  when  our  troops  swept 
into  the  enemy's  encampments,  most  of  the  men  off  duty  were 
found  at  their  morning  meal,  some  loitering  about  their  recri- 

O  s  O  O 

mental  grounds,  some  lying  in  their  tents,  while  others  were  busi 
ly  attending  to  the  nearly  cooked  bread  which  then  filled  their 
well-lit  ovens.  This  utter  absence  of  preparation,  obvious  to  all 
the  first  assaulting  Confederate  columns,  shows  how  secure  the 
enemy  thought  himself,  and  how  little  generals,  officers,  and  men 
dreamed  of  an  attack  on  that  day. 

*  Vol.  i.  pp.  71,  72. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  337 

General  Grant  was  evidently  much  mistaken  as  to  the  number 
of  the  Confederates;  but,  in  war,  one  is  very  apt  to  judge  of  the 
strength  of  an  adversary  by  the  severity  of  the  blows  he  inflicts. 
If  General  Grant  really  believed  that  his  enemy  was  as  strong  as 
his  despatches  of  that  period  state,  was  he  not  at  fault  in  having 
landed  his  army  on  the  exposed  side  of  a  wide  and  deep  river, 
when  that  enemy  lay  at  so  short  a  distance — only  twenty-two 
miles?  Was  he  not  to  blame  for  leaving  his  entire  front  unpro 
tected  by  field-works,  and  for  neglecting  to  throw  out  all  the  cav 
alry  at  his  disposal,  as  far  in  his  front  and  on  his  flanks  as  possi 
ble?  But  in  his  letter*  to  General  Halleck,  sent  from  Savannah, 
April  5th,  he  said  : 

"General  Nelson's  division  has  arrived.  The  other  two  of  General  Buell's 
eolumn  will  arrive  to-morrow  or  next  day.  It  is  my  present  intention  to 
send  them  to  Hamburg,  some  four  or  live  miles  above  Pittsburg,  when  they 
all  get  here.  From  that  point  to  Corinth  the  road  is  good,  and  a  junction 
can  be  formed  with  the  troops  from  Pittsburg  at  almost  any  point." 

lie  proposed  thus  to  violate  two  important  maxims  of  war: 
first,  by  dividing  his  forces  and  isolating  a  part  of  them — with  a 
broad  and  deep  stream  behind  them,  and  a  small  one  (Lick  Creek) 
separating  the  two  bodies  from  each  other — at  a  still  shorter  distance 
than  that  which  lay  between  Pittsburg  Landing  and  the  enemy  at 
Corinth,  supposed  to  be  eight)7'  thousand  strong;  secondly,  by  pro 
posing  to  form  the  junction  of  his  forces  at  a  point  even  nearer  to 
the  enemy  than  Pittsburg  Landing.  In  such  a  case  the  tempta 
tion  to  seize  the  opportunity  for  their  separate  destruction  would 
have  been  too  great  for  even  a  non-aggressive  adversary  to  re 
sist. 

If  General  Grant  had  had  time  to  carry  out  his  intention,  Gen 
erals  Johnston  and  Beauregard — guarding  well  the  crossings  of 
Lick  Creek,  on  its  south  side — would  have  concentrated  all  their 
available  forces  against  General  BuclTs  first  three  divisions,  which 
would  have  been  destroyed  before  they  could  have  been  rein 
forced,  either  by  his  other  two  divisions  or  by  troops  from  Pitts 
burg  Landing.  Then  the  Confederate  commanders  would  have 
attacked  General  Grant  himself,  with  all  the  chances  of  success  in 
their  favor,  especially  if,  meanwhile,  Van  Dorn  could  have  joined 
them  (as  already  instructed)  with  his  forces  from  Arkansas. 

*  Sec  Boynton,  "  Sherman's  Historical  Raid/'  p.  r,0. 
j 22 


338  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

Y. 

General  Beauregard  is  of  opinion  that  General  Sherman  com 
mitted  a  grave  error  by  protracting,  as  he  did,  the  defence  of  the 
position  he  held  at  the  Shiloh  meeting-house.  When,  at  8  A.M.,  he 
"  became  satisfied,  for  the  first  time,  that  the  enemy  designed  a 
determined  attack  on  his  whole  camp  " — knowing  his  unprepared 
condition  to  offer  a  long  resistance — he  should  have  "  made  a  vir 
tue  of  necessity,"  and,  instead  of  calling  on  McClernand,  in  his 
rear,  to  come  to  his  assistance,  he  should  have  ordered  or  request 
ed  him,  Wallace,  and  Hurlbut,  to  select  at  once  a  strong  defensive 
position  near  the  former's  camps  (and  there  were  many  such),  on 
which  Prentiss  and  himself  could  retire  at  the  proper  moment. 
And  when,  at  about  9  A.M.,  he  "judged  that  Prentiss  was  falling 
back,"  which  exposed  the  left  flank  of  his  own  two  remaining  bri 
gades  to  the  concentrated  attack  of  the  Confederates,  he  should 
have  retired,  fighting,  on  the  right  of  the  defensive  position  occu 
pied  by  the  three  divisions  of  McClernand,  Wallace,  and  Hurl- 
but,  behind  which  his  and  Prentiss's  shattered  troops  could  have 
rallied  as  a  reserve,  increased  by  his  fourth  brigade — Stewart's — 
which,  on  his  first  arrival  at  the  Landing,  he  had  imprudently  de 
tached,  over  two  miles  to  his  left  rear,  to  guard  a  bridge  across 
Lick  Creek.  That  bridge  might  very  well  have  been  protected  by 
a  small  force  of  cavalry  and  a  section  of  artillery.  The  Federals 
would  thus  have  presented  a  united  front,  in  a  strong  position,  as 
an  effective  barrier  to  the  headlong  and  disjointed  attacks  of  the 
Confederates,  who  would  necessarily  have  been  in  some  confusion 
from  their  march  through  the  woods  and  across  the  ravines,  and 
their  assault  on  the  first  line  of  Federal  encampments.  As  it 
was,  in  their  pursuit  of  Sherman's  and  Prentiss's  commands,  they 
caught,  uon  the  wing"  and  in  succession,  the  divisions  of  McCler 
nand,  Wallace,  and  Hurlbut,  who  offered  a  gallant  but  ineffectual 
resistance  to  the  persistent  and  determined  attacks  of  the  elated 
Confederates. 

This  error  of  General  Sherman  is,  however,  one  that  is  often 
committed  in  an  active  campaign.  Two  memorable  examples  oc 
curred  in  the  late  Franco -Prussian  war,  which  cost  France,  be 
sides  her  high  military  renown,  the  provinces  of  Alsace  and  Lor 
raine,  and  one  billion  of  dollars. 

On  the  4th  of  August,  1870,  three  Prussian  divisions,  of  the 


GENERAL  BEAUHEGARD.  339 

Crown  Prince's  army,  surprised  and  crushed,  at  "Wissembourg,  on 
the  Sarre  River,  one  division  of  McMahon's  corps  (the  1st)  of 
thirty-six  thousand  men,  which  formed  the  right  wing  of  the 
French  army,  composed  of  the  elite  of  the  French  troops.  Two 
days  afterwards  the  Crown  Prince  attacked  again,  suddenly,  the 
remainder  of  the  French  corps,  at  "Woerth,  a  few  miles  back  from 
Wissembourg.  The  other  two  corps,  5th  and  7th  of  McMahon's 
army,  were  not  quite  within  supporting  distance,  and  instead  of 
opposing  his  overpowering  adversary  in  such  a  manner  only  as  to 
give  time  to  those  two  corps  to  concentrate  on  a  good  defensive 
position  in  his  rear,  he  made  a  determined  stand  at  "Woerth,  call 
ing  on  them  to  hurry  up  to  his  assistance.  Only  two  divisions 
of  the  5th  corps  (De  FaillyV)  reached  him  in  time  to  take  part 
in  the  desperate  struggle  then  going  on.  But  his  gallant  troops 
were  nearly  annihilated,  and  he  was  compelled  to  retire  to  the 
fortified  and  distant  camp  of  Chalons,  to  recruit  and  reorganize 
another  army,  which  was  lost  shortly  afterwards  at  Sedan. 

The  left  wing  of  the  French  army  met  with  nearly  the  same 
fate.  It  consisted  of  five  corps,  scattered  along  the  frontier  in  ad 
vance  of  Mctz,  all  under  the  immediate  direction  of  the  French 
Emperor,  Napoleon  III.,  whose  headquarters  were  established  in 
that  fortified  city.  Three  Prussian  corps,  under  General  Von 
Stein metz,  suddenly  appeared  at  Sarrebruck,  on  the  Sarre  River, 
which  they  crossed  rapidly,  and,  on  the  6th,  surprised  the  2d 
French  corps  (Frossard's)  at  Spcichercn,  where  another  desperate 
engagement  ensued  while  awaiting  the  support  of  the  other  four 
French  corps.  These  arrived,  however,  in  the  vicinity  only  in 
time  to  be  caught  "on  the  wing,"  and  had  to  fall  back  in  great 
haste  towards  Metz — in  a  divergent  direction  from  McMahon's  line 
of  retreat — where  they  were  finally  surrounded,  and  compelled  to 
surrender,  with  Marshal  Bazaine,  October  29th,  1870,  after  an  he 
roic  but  useless  defense,  so  far  as  regarded  the  safety  of  France. 

General  Beauregard  is  of  opinion  that,  had  the  Confederates 
been  in  better  fighting  condition,  the  corresponding  error  of  Sher 
man  would  have  ended  the  battle  of  Shiloh  long  before  Buell 
could  have  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  Federals,  and  a  decisive 
victory  would  then  have  enabled  the  Confederates  to  take  the  of 
fensive  in  middle  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  with  far  greater  re 
sults  than  those  obtained,  at  first,  by  General  Bragg,  a  few  months 
later. 


340  MILITARY    OPERATIONS  OF 

VI. 

The  blame  for  having  withdrawn  the  Confederate  troops  too 
soon  from  the  fight,  on  the  evening  of  the  6th,  "just  as" — it  is 
alleged — "  a  last  concentrated  effort  was  about  to  be  made  by 
some  of  the  subordinate  commanders,"  has,  we  think,  been  conclu 
sively  refuted  in  the  narrative  of  the  battle.  That  charge  is  en 
tirely  disproved  by  the  reports  of  brigade  and  regimental  com 
manders.  The  cessation  of  hostilities  was  not  ordered  until  "  a 
last  concentrated  effort "  had  been  made  shortly  after  4  r.  M., 
under  General  Beauregard's  own  eyes,  and  not  until  he  was  satis 
fied,  from  the  condition  of  his  troops,  that  no  further  attack  on 
our  part  would  meet  with  success,  especially  after  the  opening  of 
Webster's  reserved  Federal  batteries,  supported  by  reinforcements, 
as  the  rolls  of  infantry  fire  clearly  indicated.  It  was  not  until  then, 
about  6  r.  M.,  shortly  before  sunset,  that  the  order  was  given  to 
cease  the  contest,  and  collect  and  reorganize  the  various  com 
mands,  before  it  should  be  too  dark  to  carry  out  the  order  effec 
tually.  But  before  these  instructions  could  be  generally  distrib 
uted,  the  fighting  had,  in  reality,  ceased  on  the  greater  part  of  the. 
field.  As  an  additional  proof  that  the  order  was  not  given  too 
soon,  it  is  a  positive  fact  that  the  brigades  and  divisions  of  the  dif 
ferent  commands,  especially  Bragg's  and  Ilardee's,  were  not  col 
lected  and  reorganized  in  time  to  meet  the  Federal  attack,  on  the 
next  morning.  The  true  reason,  besides  the  rawness  of  our  officers 
and  men,  why  we  were  not  able  to  complete  our  victory  on  the 
6th,  is  correctly  given,  by  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  Confeder 
ate  army  at  Shiloh,  in  his  "Campaigns  of  Lieutenant-General  For 
rest,"  p.  151,  as  follows  : 

"  After  the  combat  was  at  its  height,  about  meridian,  those  superior  officers 
who  should  have  been  occupied  with  the  concentration  and  continuous  pro 
jection  of  their  troops  in  heavy  masses  upon  the  shattered  Federal  divisions, 
were  at  the  very  front  and  'perilous  edge'  of  the  battle,  leading  forward  regi 
ments,  perchance  brigades,  into  action,  with  great  individual  intrepid ity,  and 
doing  a  great  deal,  no  doubt,  by  their  personal  example,  to  impel  small  bodies 
forward.  But,  meanwhile,  to  their  rear  were  left  the  masses  of  their  respective 
commands,  without  direction,  and  thus  precious  time  was  lost.  The  Confed 
erates  were  not  kept  continuously  massed  and  employed,  either  in  corps  or 
divisions ;  mere  piecemeal  onsets  were  the  general  method  of  fighting  after 
12  o'clock  (on  the  6th),  with  this  consequence :  Sherman  was  enabled  to 
make  several  obstinate,  powerful  stands,  by  which  he  protracted  the  battle 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  341 

some  hours.  Had  the  corps  been  held  well  in  hand,  massed  and  pressed  con 
tinuously  upon  the  tottering,  demoralized  foe  ;  had  general  officers  attended  to 
the  swing  and  direction  of  the  great  '  war-engine'  at  their  disposition, rather 
than,  as  it  were,  becoming  'so  many  heads  or  battering-ranis  of  that  machine,' 
the  battle  assuredly  would  have  closed  at  latest  by  mid-day.  By  that  hour,  at 
most,  the  whole  Federal  force  might  have  been  urged  back  and  penned  up, 
utterly  helpless,  in  the  angle  formed  between  the  river  and  Lick  (or  Snake) 
Creek,  or  dispersed  along  the  river  bank,  between  the  two  creeks;  we  repeat, 
that  had  the  Confederate  corps  been  kept  in  continuity,  closely  pressed  en 
masse  upon  the  enemy,  after  the  front  line  had  been  broken  and  swept  back, 
the  Federal  fragments  must  have  been  kept  in  a  downward  movement,  like 
the  loose  stones  in  the  bed  of  a  mountain  torrent.'' 

Before  leaving  this  part  of  our  subject  it  is  proper,  we  think, 
to  direct  attention  to  the  comparison,  drawn  by  Mr.  Davis,  be 
tween  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  and  Marshal  Turenne,  with 
reference  to  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  Says  Mr.  Davis :  * 

"To  take  an  example  far  from  us,  in  time  and  place,  when  Turenne  had, 
after  months  of  successful  manoeuvring,  finally  forced  his  enemy  into  a  position 
which  gave  assurance  of  victor}',  and  had  marshalled  his  forces  for  a  decisive 
battle,  he  was,  when  making  a  preliminary  reconnoissauce,  killed  by  a  chance 
shot ;  then  his  successor,  instead  of  attacking,  retreated,  and  all  which  the 
one  had  gained  for  France  the  other  lost.'' 

The  falsity  of  the  comparison  is  too  flagrant  to  need  more  than 
a  passing  notice.  First,  it  was  at  the  suggestion  of  General  Beaure- 
gard  that  General  Johnston  had  marched  his  small  army  to  Cor 
inth,  in  order  to  form  a  junction  there,  and  fight  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  not  "  after  months  of  successful  manoeuvring,'1  as  was  the 
case  with  Marshal  Turenne,  but,  on  the  contrary,  after  months  of 
irreparable  disasters,  which  had  brought  the  country  to  the  brink 
of  despair,  and  led  General  Johnston  to  believe  that  he  had  lost 
the  confidence  of  both  the  people  and  the  army.  Second,  it  was 
General  Beauregard — not  General  Johnston — who  "had  marshalled 
our  forces  for  a  decisive  battle"  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  as  has  been 
already  fully  and  clearly  established.  Third,  when  the  commanding 
general  fell,  the  battle  had  been  in  progress  fully  eight  hours.  His 
"  successor"  continued  the  attack,  with  all  the  vigor  and  energy 
possible,  as  long  as  daylight  and  the  physical  condition  of  his  men 
allowed  him  to  do  so.  He  renewed  the  attack  the  next  day ;  and 
only  began  his  masterly  retreat  because  the  enemy  in  his  front  had 
been  reinforced  with  overwhelming  numbers.  Fourth,  the  victory 

*  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,''  vol.  ii.  p.  G8. 


342  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

was  by  no  means  assured  at  the  hour  of  GeneralJolmston's  death. 
All  that  can  be  said  is,  that  our  right  was  then  in  the  act  of  driv 
ing  back  the  enemy's  left ;  but  there  still  remained  his  right  and 
centre,  which,  though  hard  pressed,  had  not  yet  been  routed,  and 
only  began  to  give  way  in  confusion  after  General  Beauregard 
had  assumed  command.  "  It  was  after  G  p.  M."  he  says,  "  when 
the  enemy's  last  position  was  carried,  and  his  force  finally  broke 
and  sought  refuge  behind  a  commanding  eminence  covering  Pitts- 
burg  Landing."  * 

To  a  careless  or  superficial  reader,  this  comparison,  coming  from 
such  a  source,  might  have  a  certain  weight,  but  when  sifted  and 
closely  analyzed,  it  is  seen  to  be  the  far-fetched  and  idle  fancy  of 
prejudice. 

VII. 

General  Beauregard  says  that  the  hardest  lighting  the  Confeder 
ates  encountered  on  the  7th  was  with  Buell's  splendidly  organized 
and  well- disciplined  divisions,  numbering  at  least  twenty  thou 
sand  f  before  the  arrival  of  Wood's  two  brigades  in  the  afternoon 
of  that  day.  According  to  Sherman's  "  Memoirs,"  J  General 
Grant's  own  forces,  on  the  7th,  amounted  to  nearly  twenty-five 
thousand  men  (including  Lew.  "Wallace's  division  of  fresh  troops), 
but  they  did  not  fight  with  the  animation  and  spirit  of  the  pre 
ceding  day.  Until  about  10.30  A.  M.,  General  Beauregard  had,  in 
the  centre  and  on  the  right,  as  stated  in  the  narrative  of  the 
battle,  only  about  ten  thousand  infantry  and  artillery,  under  Gen 
erals  Breckinridge  and  ITardee,  to  oppose  Buell's  three  fresh  divis 
ions,  supported  by  a  part  of  General  Grant's  forces  of  the  preced 
ing  day,  under  Ilurlbut,  while  General  Bragg  had  only  about  seven 
thousand  five  hundred  infantry  and  artillery,  on  the  left,  with  which 
to  oppose  General  Grant's  force  of  more  than  twenty  thousand  men. 
By  11.30  A.M.,  General  Beauregard  had  withdrawn  from  General 
Bragg  two  brigades  and  a  regiment,  to  reinforce  the  centre  and 
right,  and  he  had  made  him  extend  another  brigade  (Russell's)  to  his 
right,  to  cover  the  space  between  him  and  Breckinridge,  left  open  by 
the  unfortunate  absence  of  Cheatham's  division,  of  General  Folk's 
corps.  General  Bragg  had,  therefore,  at  that  time  (11.30  A.  M.), 

*  See  General  BeauregarcTs  Report. 

t  "History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.  p.  115. 

J  Page  245. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  343 

only  about  five  thousand  men  with  whom  to  confront  General 
Grant's  forces,  and  he  was  reinforced  during  the  day  by  only  two 
straggling  regiments  under  General  J.  K.  Jackson,  and  by  a  small 
disjointed  brigade  under  Colonel  Pond,  at  about  1  p.  M.  With 
those  forces  General  Bragg  not  only  held  at  bay  those  opposed  to 
him,  but  took  the  offensive  several  times,  and,  on  the  arrival  of 
Cheatham's  division  in  its  proper  place,  compelled  Wallace,  Sher 
man,  and  McClernand  to  call  earnestly  on  McCook,  of  BuelFs 
army,  for  support.  General  Beauregard,  therefore,  felt  not  much 
concerned  about  his  left;  and  he  directed  all  his  attention  and 
most  of  his  available  troops  to  holding  in  check  or  driving  back, 
at  times,  BuelPs  forces,  which  showed  considerable  boldness,  and 
seemed  to  be  well  handled. 

The  result  of  that  day's  battle  shows  conclusively  what  would 
have  been  the  consequences  had  General  Grant  carried  out  his 
intention  —  according  to  a  statement  to  that  effect  in  General 
Sherman's  "Memoirs"  —of  attacking  the  Confederates  on  the 
morning  of  the  7th,  without  awaiting  the  assistance  of  General 
BuelTs  forces.  His  disaster  would  undoubtedly  have  been  irrepa 
rable. 

With  regard  to  the  claim  of  victory  raised  by  both  sides,  after 
the  battle  of  Shiloh,  it  is  thus  clearly  and,  we  believe,  fairly  stated 
by  General  Jordan  :* 

'•  The  Confederates  found  their  pretension  upon  the  facts  of  the  heavy  capt 
ures  of  men,  artillery,  and  colors  which  they  carried  from  the  field,  the  com 
plete  rout  inflicted  on  the  Federals  on  Sunday,  and  their  ability,  on  Monday, 
to  hold  the  ground  upon  which  they  had  concentrated  and  made  the  battle 
until  2  r.  M.,f  when  General  Beauregard  withdrew  from  an  unprofitable  combat 
— withdrew  in  admitted  good  order,  taking  with  him  all  the  captured  guns 
for  which  there  was  transportation.  Moreover,  his  enemy  was  left  so  com 
pletely  battered  and  stunned  as  to  be  unable  to  pursue.  The  Federals  claimed 
the  victory  upon  the  grounds  that,  on  Monday  evening,  they  had  recovered 
their  encampments  and  possession  of  the  field  of  battle,  from  which  the  Con 
federates  had  retired,  leaving  behind  their  dead  and  a  number  of  wounded. 
In  this  discussion  it  should  be  remembered  that  after  the  Confederates  concen 
trated  on  Monday,  or  from  at  least  as  late  as  9  A.  M.  up  to  the  time  of  their 
retreat,  they  uniformly  took  the  offensive  and  were  the  assailants.  All  sub 
stantially  claimed  in  reports  of  Federal  subordinate  generals  is  that,  after 
having  been  worsted  between  9  A.  M.  and  2  r.  M.,  they  were  then  able  to  hold 


*  "  Campaigns  of  Lieutenant-General  Forrest,"  p.  150. 
t  It  was  after  two  o'clock  r.  M. 


34:4:  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

their  own  and  check  their  antagonists.*  After  that,  manifestly,  there  was  a 
complete  lull  in  the  battle  until  about  4  p.  M.,  when,  and  no  sooner,  do  the 
Federals  appear  to  have  advanced. 

"  General  Beauregard  has  been  blamed,  unjustly,  for  withdrawing  his  troops 
just  as  they  were  being  launched,  on  Sunday  evening,  against  the  last  Fed 
eral  position,  with  such  numbers  and  impetus,  by  generals  on  the  spot,  as  must 
have  insured  complete  success.  The  reports  of  brigade  and  regimental  com 
manders  entirely  disprove  this  allegation.!  His  order,  really,  was  not  distrib 
uted  before  the  greater  part  of  the  Confederate  troops  had  already  given  up 
the  attempt,  for  that  day,  to  carry  the  ridge  at  the  Landing." 

For  further  particulars  as  to  the  hour  when  General  Beaure- 
gard's  order  to  cease  firing  was  given  and  received,  we  refer  the 
reader  to  the  Appendices  to  the  present  and  the  two  preceding 
chapters. 

VIII. 

When  error  and  falsehood  have  taken  hold  of  public  credulity, 
their  eradication  is  an  arduous  and  unpleasant  task.  The  experi 
ence  of  life  teaches  this  lesson  to  most  men.  And  it  often  hap 
pens  that  even  the  fair-minded  are  slow  to  discard  a  conviction 
which  has  grown  upon  them  and  is  strengthened  by  the  assertions 
of  those  who  are,  or  have  been,  high  in  authority.  There  seerns 
to  be.a  fatal  attraction  about  the  propagation  of  evil  reports,  which 
the  preponderance  of  truth  itself  but  tardily  counterbalances  and 
destroys.  "  Listeners,"  says  Hare,  "  do  seldom  refrain  from  evil 
hearing." 

This  applies  to  the  unaccountable  and  malicious  story,  to  which 
additional  notoriety  has  recently  been  given,  that  General  Beau- 
regard,  during  the  first  day  of  the  battle  of  Shilob,  up  to  the  time 
when  he  was  informed  of  General  Johnston's  death,  was  lying  in 
his  ambulance,  taking  no  part  whatever  in  the  fight,  and,  that  even 
after  the  fall  of  the  commanding  general,  he  "  quietly  remained 
where  he  was,  waiting  the  issue  of  events." 

To  listen  to  such  a  statement,  and  see  credence  given  to  it,  must 
have  been  pleasing  to  those — fortunately  few  in  number — whose 
object  has  always  been  to  misrepresent  General  Beauregard,  to 
ignore  his  merit  as  a  commander,  and  rob  him  of  the  renown  he 
acquired  despite  their  jealous  efforts. 

*  See  Reports  of  Generals  Wallace,  Nelson,  Crittendcn,  etc.,  and  Correspond 
ence  of  "  Agate,"  in  "  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  Doc.  114. 
t  Sec  Appendix. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  345 

On  page  67  of  the  second  volume  of  Mr.  Davis's  "Rise  and 
Full  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  the  following  passage  will 
be  found : 

"General  Bcaurcgard  had  told  General  Johnston  that  morning,  as  he  rode 
off,  that  if  it  should  be  necessary  to  communicate  with  him  or  for  him  to  do 
anything,  he  would  be  found  in  his  ambulance  in  bed.  Governor  Harris, 
knowing  this,  and  how  feeble  General  Beauregard's  health  wras,  wrcnt  first  to 
his  headquarters,  just  in  the  rear  of  where  the  army  had  deployed  into  lino 
the  evening  before.  Beaurcgard  and  his  staff  were  gone  on  horseback  in  the 
direction  of  Shiloh  church.  He  found  them  there.  The  Governor  told  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  that  General  Johnston  had  been  killed.  Beaurcgard  ex 
pressed  regret,  and  then  remarked, '  Everything  else  seems  to  be  going  on  well 
on  the  right.'  Governor  Harris  assented.  'Then,'  said  Beaurcgard, '  the  bat 
tle  may  as  well  go  on.'  The  Governor  replied  that  he  certainly  thought  it 
ought.  He  offered  his  services  to  Beauregard,  and  they  were  courteously  ac 
cepted.  General  Beaurcgard  then  remained  where  he  was,  waiting  the  issue 
of  events." 

It  is  to  be  regretted,  on  Mr.  Davis's  own  account,  that  he  has 
given  to  the  world  as  history  so  baseless  a  fiction. 

A  passage  similar  to  this  appears  in  Colonel  W.  P.  Johnston's 
"Life  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,"  but  it  had  been  de 
termined,  after  due  reflection,  to  pass  it  by  in  silence  in  this 
work.  General  Beauregard,  it  was  thought,  could  afford  to  over 
look  a  charge  so  palpably  absurd.  But  Mr.  Davis  having  thought 
proper  to  reproduce  the  statement,  with  the  evident  purpose  of 
giving  it  the  additional  weight  of  his  name  and  authority,  we 
now  feel  impelled,  though  reluctantly,  to  refute  the  statement 
and  set  the  matter  finally  at  rest. 

That  General  Beauregard's  health  was  not  good  at  the  time  of 
the  battle  is  an  admitted  fact;  but  that,  nevertheless,  he  displayed 
the  most  untiring  activity  and  energy,  and,  within  less  than  two 
months  after  his  arrival  in  the  West,  mastered  the  minutest  details 
of  the  military  situation,  and  changed  its  whole  aspect,  by  inspir 
ing  new  hope  and  confidence  in  the  public  mind,  then  so  much  de 
pressed,  is  no  less  certain,  and  has  been  proved  beyond  dispute, 
by  the  facts  and  documents  already  given  to  the  reader  in  the 
preceding  chapters. 

With  the  clear  perception  resulting  from  his  remarkable  stra 
tegic  powers,  his  ill-health  had  not  prevented  him  from  advising 
and  effecting  the  evacuation  of  Columbus,  until  then  errone 
ously  considered  the  "  Gibraltar  of  the  West ;"  fortifying  and 


310  MILITARY  OPERATIONS    OF 

strengthening  Fort  Pillow,  New  Madrid  Bend,  and  Island  No. 
10;  urging  General  Johnston  to  abandon  his  retreat  towards 
Stevenson,  and  march  to  Decatur,  so  as  to  facilitate  a  junction  of 
the  two  armies ;  and,  finally,  despatching  most  of  his  staff,  with 
special  messages,  to  the  governors  of  four  States,  and  to  Gen 
erals  Van  Dorn,  Bragg,  and  Lovell,  in  one  earnest  and  almost 
desperate  effort  to  obtain  and  concentrate  an  army  of  about 
forty  thousand  men  at  or  near  Corinth,  and  thus  prepare  the 
way  for  the  great  battle  which  was  fought  on  the  6th  and  7th  of 
April. 

Nor  had  his  ill-health  prevented  him  from  organizing  and  dis 
ciplining,  as  well  as  could  be  done,  the  heterogeneous  army  he  had 
thus  collected,  to  the  concentration  of  which  the  government  had 
merely  given  a  silent,  not  to  say  unwilling,  assent.  For  the  read 
er  must  not  forget  that  General  Beauregard's  letter  to  General 
Cooper,  dated  February  23d,"x"  detailing  his  course  as  to  the  tem 
porary  enlistment  of  State  troops,  had  met  with  no  response;  and 
that,  to  his  question  addressed  to  General  Johnston  as  to  whether 
the  War  Department  sanctioned  his  action  in  the  matter,  the  an 
swer,  dated  February  26th,  was  :  "  Government  neither  sanctioned 
nor  disapproved."  f 

The  War  Department  had  adopted  the  same  irresponsible  pol 
icy  with  regard  to  the  troops  at  Pensacola,  asked  for  by  General 
Beauregard  of  General  Bragg;  the  bald  truth  of  the  matter  be 
ing,  that  General  Bragg,  having  referred  General  Beauregard's 
call  upon  him  to  the  government  at  Richmond,  was  left  to  his  own 
discretion  as  to  his  compliance  with  it.  lie  was  never  ordered  at 
all,  despite  Mr.  Davis' s  assertions  to  that  effect;  ^  but  came  of  his 
own  accord,  thereby  assuming  the  full  responsibility  of  the  move 
ment.  That  the  government  did  not  prevent  the  transfer  de 
manded  is  all  that  can  be  claimed  for  it. 

Not  only  had  General  Beauregard  suggested  and  brought 
about  the  concentration  of  our  forces  at  Corinth,  but,  after  declin 
ing  the  command-in-chief,  which  was  offered  him  by  General 
Johnston,  he  had  also,  at  the  request  of  the  latter,  drawn  up  the 
General  Orders,  the  seventh  clause  of  which  read  as  follows :  "All 
general  orders  touching  matters  of  organization,  discipline,  and 

*  See  Appendix  to  Chapter  XVI.  t  Ibid. 

1  "Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government/'  vol.  ii.p.  54. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  317 

conduct  of  the  troops,  published  by  General  G.  T.  Beauregard  to 
the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  will  continue  in  force  in  the  whole 
army  until  otherwise  directed,  and  copies  thereof  will  be  furnished 
to  the  3d  Army  Corps  and  the  reserve."  : 

When,  at  the  suggestion  of  General  Beauregard,  it  was  deter 
mined  that  we  should  advance  on  the  3d  of  April,  to  strike  the 
enemy  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  it  was  he  again  who,  despite  his  ill- 
health,  prepared  and  delivered  to  the  Adjutant-General  of  our 
united  forces  all  the  notes  from  which  was  written  General  Order 
No.  8,  directing  and  regulating  the  inarch  of  the  army  from  Cor 
inth,  and  the  order  in  which  the  enemy  should  be  attacked. 

General  Beauregard  left  Corinth  with  the  army,  and  reached, 
simultaneously  with  General  Johnston,  the  ground  whereon  was 
formed  the  Confederate  line  of  battle.  lie  was  then  on  horse 
back,  as  was  General  Johnston  himself. 

To  bring  before  the  reader  some  of  the  incidents  which  occurred 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  the  following  passage  is  taken  from 
MajorWaddelFs  statement  of  facts  relative  to  the  battle  of  Sliiloh  :f 

"ST.  Louis,  Notcmlcr  8th,  1878. 
"  General  G.  T.  BEAUKEGAKD  : 

*  *  *  *  *  :!•-  *  * 

"  I  joined  you  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  at  Monterey,  and  rode  with  you 
to  Headquarters  No.  1.  Judging  of  time  by  what  I  had  done  that  morning,  I 
am  of  opinion  that  it  was  afternoon  before  you  and  General  Johnston  reached 
the  ridge  where  the  front  line  was  formed  and  Headquarters  No.  1  was  estab 
lished. 

"  After  a  conference  of  the  general  officers  was  held  at  a  point  in  the  road, 
at  which  I  witnessed  a  very  marked  deference  on  the  part  of  General  A.  S. 
Johnston  for  your  opinions  and  plans  of  conducting  the  battle,  it  was  suggest 
ed  by  General  Hardec  that  you  should  ride  in  front  of  his  line  of  battle  to 
show  yourself  to  his  men,  giving  them  the  encouragement  which  nothing  but 
your  presence  could  do.  I  well  remember  your  modest  hesitation  at  the  prop 
osition  ;  your  plea  of  sickness  was  urged  (a  more  delicate  reason  existed,  no 
doubt — your  esteem  of  the  chief  in  command),  but  when  the  request  was  made 
unanimous,  General  Johnston  urging,  you  consented,  on  condition  that  the 
men  should  not  cheer  as  you  passed,  as  cheering  might  discover  our  position 
to  the  enemy.  An  order  was  sent  quickly  along  the  lines,  informing  the  men 
that  you  should  ride  in  front  of  them  and  that  no  cheering  should  be  indulged 

*  In  other  words,  copies  of  orders  already  issued  by  General  Beauregard  to 
his  troops  were  to  be  sent  to  General  Johnston's  army. 

t  Major  Waddell  was  one  of  General  Bcaurcgard's  volunteer  aids.  For  the 
whole  of  his  statement,  see  Appendix  to  Chapter  XX. 


3-1S  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

in.  You  passed  in  front  of  the  lines,  and  never  was  an  order  so  reluctantly 
obeyed  as  was  this  order,  'No  cheer  ing,  men  T  which  had  to  be  repeated  at 
every  breath,  and  enforced  by  continuous  gesture. 

"  General  Johnston's  prestige  was  great,  but  the  hearts  of  the  soldiers  were 
with  you,  and  your  presence  awakened  an  enthusiasm  and  confidence  magical 
in  its  effect." 

In  corroboration  of  this  we  now  give  an  extract  from  Colonel 
Jacob  Thompson's  report  of  the  battle.  Colonel  Thompson  was 
also  one  of  General  Beauregard's  volunteer  aids.* 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
CORINTH,  April  Uth,  1862. 

"  To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

********* 

"  Soon  after  this,  General  Hardee,  accompanied  by  his  staff,  came  forward 
and  pressed  you  to  ride  along  his  line  and  show  yourself  to  his  men.  He  be 
lieved  it  would  revive  and  cheer  their  spirits  to  know  that  you  were  actually 
in  the  field  with  them.  You  accepted  the  invitation,  though  then  complain 
ing  of  feebleness,  on  condition  there  should  be  no  cheering."  f 

These  are  high  testimonials  of  the  estimation  in  which  General 
Beauregard  was  held  by  the  corps  commanders  and  by  General 
Johnston  himself.  They  illustrate  and  explain  the  power  and  in 
fluence  he  exercised  over  the  troops.  Neither  officers  nor  men,  to 
whom  his  very  presence  was  encouragement  and  comfort,  supposed, 
for  an  instant,  as  he  rode  slowly  down  their  lines,  that  he  was  of 
too  feeble  health  to  lead  them  on  to  victory  the  next  day. 

In  the  hurry  and  absorption  of  the  occasion,  General  Beaure 
gard  had  not  given  orders  for  the  establishment  of  his  night  quar 
ters  :  he  therefore  slept  in  his  ambulance.  Then — that  is  to  say, 
between  eleven  o'clock  P.M.,  on  the  5th  of  April,  and  half -past 
four  o'clock  A.M.,  on  the  Gtli — had  any  officer  of  General  John 
ston's  staff  been  sent  to  General  Beauregard,  the  latter  would  have 

O  ' 

been  found  "  in  his  ambulance  in  bed  ;"  then,  but  only  then  ;  for, 
"  the  next  morning,  about  dawn  of  day,"  according  to  a  statement 
prepared  by  General  Bragg  for  Colonel  "W.  P.  Johnston's  book, 
General  Beauregard  was  present  "at  the  camp-fire  of  the  general 
in  chief.";):  lie  had  arrived  there  on  horseback.  From  the  time 

*  Colonel  Jacob  Thompson,  of  Mississippi,  had  been  Secretary  of  the  Inte 
rior  under  President  Buchanan, 
t  See  Appendix  to  Chapter  XX. 
|  "Life  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,"  p.  5C9. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  349 

when  he  left  his  ambulance  that  morning  he  did  not  see  it  again 
until  his  return  to  Corinth,  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 

In  support  of  this  statement  the  reader  is  referred  to  General 
Beauregard's  letter  to  Governor  Harris,  dated  March  9th,  1880, 
written  after  the  appearance  of  Colonel  W.  P.  Johnston's  book."- 
The  following  is  an  extract  from  that  letter : 

a  You  will  observe  tins  text  imputes  to  you  a  knowledge,  and  also  implies 
that  it  is  upon  your  authority,  that  Colonel  "W.  P.  Johnston  asserts  my  having 
said  that  I  would  be  found  in  bed  in  my  ambulance ;  whereas  the  fact  is,  that 
I  had  ridden  with  General  Johnston  from  Monterey,  on  the  preceding  day,  to 
the  field.  I  only  slept  in  my  ambulance  that  night,  as  I  had  no  tent,  and  did 
not  sec  it  again  until  my  return  to  Corinth.  I  was  again  on  horseback  short 
ly  after  daybreak  on  the  Cth — earlier,  for  that  matter,  than  General  Johnston, 
whom  I  found  at  his  headquarters  taking  his  coffee.  We  parted  in  advance 
of  his  headquarters,  when  he  went  to  the  front,  with  the  understanding  that 
I  was  to  follow  the  movements  of  the  field  and  direct  the  reserves;  in  which 
connection  I  call  your  attention  to  Colonel  Jacob  Thompson's  statement,  at 
page  570  of  W.  P.  Johnston's  book  :  'General  Johnston  determined  to  lead  the 
attack  in  person,  and  leave  General  Beauregard  to  direct  the  movements  of 
troops  in  the  rear.'  I  may  add,  that  I  was  on  horseback  all  that  day,  with 
very  few  intervals,  until  you  rejoined  me  at  my  headquarters,  near  Shiloh  meet 
ing-house,  about  sundown,  after  my  return  from  the  front;  and  I  was  again  on 
horseback  all  the  next  day  from  about  seven  o'clock,  with  few  intervals,  until 
my  arrival  at  Corinth,  late  that  night/' 

This  is  clear  and  unambiguous.     It  utterly  disproves  and  re 
duces  to  naught  the  groundless  story  chronicled  by  Mr.  Davis. 
In  reply  to  that  letter  (April  13th,  1SSO)  Governor  Harris  wrote  : 

"...  But  my  recollection  is,  and  I  have  so  stated  upon  several  occasions, 
that  the  last  words  you  spoke  to  General  Johnston,  as  lie  was  starting  to  the 
front  on  Sunday  morning  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  were, t  General,  if  you  wish  to 
communicate  with  me,  send  to  my  ambulance,' "  ctc.f 

Here  the  words  "in  bed"  are  entirely  omitted.  They  are  in 
Colonel  Johnston's  and  Mr.  Davis' s  books,  but  not  in  Governor 
Harris's  letter  to  General  Beauregard.  We  know  that  Governor 
Harris  is  sincere  in  his  belief  that  these  were  General  Beauregard's 
words,  but  his  impression  about  them,  however  strong  it  may  be, 
is  none  the  less  erroneous.  "Where  that  ambulance  was,  or  would 
be  a  few  hours  later,  General  Beauregard  knew  no  more  than 


*  Sec  Appendix  to  Chapter  XXII. 

t  The  whole  letter  is  in  Appendix  to  Chapter  XXII. 


350  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

Governor  Harris,  or  any  other  member  of  General  Johnston's 
staff :  how,  then,  could  he  have  directed  any  one  to  it  ?  This,  how 
ever,  is  of  small  importance.  Whatever  may  be  the  recollection 
of  Governor  Harris,  and  even  admitting  its  correctness,  it  still 
remains  an  incontrovertible  fact  that  no  one  saw,  or  professed  to 
have  seen,  General  Beauregard  in  his  ambulance  on  either  day  of 
the  battle ;  for  the  very  simple  reason  that  he  was  not  near  it  him 
self,  and  hardly  knew  what  had  become  of  it. 

As  early  as  half-past  six  o'clock  A.  M.,  on  the  6th,  he  was  busily  en 
gaged  issuing  orders,  first,  to  General  Breckinridge,  then  to  General 
Polk,  then  to  General  Bragg;  and  at  twenty  minutes  after  nine, 
when  the  last  reserves  passed  Headquarters  No.  1,  \vhere  he  had 
been  left  by  General  Johnston,  he  again  mounted  his  horse  and 
followed  them  to  the  front,  where  he  remained  as  long  as  the 
battle  raged,  devoting  his  whole  energy  to  the  movements  of  our 
left  and  centre,  while  General  Johnston  was  directing  the  attack 
on  our  right.  This  is  conclusively  established  by  the  report  of 
General  Beauregard  himself,  and  by  those  of  Colonels  Thompson, 
Augustin,  Brent,  Major  Waddell,  and  Captains  Ferguson,  Chisolm, 
and  Smith,  who  were  General  Beauregard's  aids,  or  acting  aids,  at 
the  time.* 

Reverting  now  to  what  Mr.  Davis  insinuates  was  General  Beau- 
regard's  attitude  when  informed  of  General  Johnston's  death,  we 
have  only  to  say,  that  the  very  source  whence  Colonel  Johnston 
and  Mr.  Davis  seem  to  have  derived  their  information — namely, 
Governor  Harris,  in  his  letter  of  April  13th,  1880,  already  referred 
to — in  nowise  confirms  what  is  said  to  have  been  his  language 
on  that  occasion.  Questioned  by  General  Beauregard  to  that  ef 
fect,  he  says: 

"  I  reported  to  you  the  death  of  General  Johnston,  when  you  expressed  re 
gret,  inquired  as  to  the  circumstances  under  which,  he  fell,  and  inquired  also 
of  me  if  the  battle  was  going  on  well  on  the  right.  I  answered,  it  was ;  when 
you  said,  '  We  will  push  on  the  attack,'  or  *  continue  to  press  forward ;'  the 
exact  words  employed  I  cannot  with  confidence  repeat ;  but  this  is  the  sub 
stance  and  meaning  of  what  was  said." 

Mr.  Davis's  account  of  the  matter  would  lead  the  public  to  be 
lieve  that  General  Beauregard  was  indifferent  as  to  whether  the 

O 

battle  should  continue  or  not ;  nay,  more,  that  he  would  have  or- 
*  See  their  reports,  in  Appendix  to  Chapter  XX. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  351 

dered  a  cessation  of  hostilities  had  not  Governor  Harris  suggested 
that  the  fight  had  better  go  on.  AVho  could  give  credence  to  this, 
even  if  Governor  Harris  had  not  given  the  counter-statement  al 
ready  submitted  to  the  reader?  But  Mr. Davis  reaches  the  culmi- 
nating-point  when,  speaking  through  Colonel  Johnston's  book,  he 
describes  General  Eeauregard  as  a  sickly,  broken-down,  indiffer 
ent  commander,  who  was  disposed  to  trust  to  chance  for  a  favora 
ble  turn  of  events,  and  who  listlessly  remained  where  he  was, 
unable,  if  not  unwilling,  to  take  the  helm  and  conduct  the  move 
ments  of  the  army. 

This  is  trifling  with  public  credulity.  Mr.  Davis  certainly  trusts 
too  presumptuously  to  the  consideration  accorded  to  him  on  ac 
count  of  his  former  high  position. 

The  entire  country  knows  that  General  Beauregard,  the  trained 
soldier,  is  a  man  of  quick  temperament,  who,  without  being  rash. 
has  never  flinched  under  responsibility;  that  the  salient  traits  of 
his  character  are  boldness  and  energy.  To  assert  that  such  a  man 
remained  quiet  and  inactive,  when  the  chief  command  of  the 
army  devolved  upon  him — when  the  boom  of  the  cannon  was  in 
his  ear,  and  the  clash  and  fury  of  the  battle  were  around  him  : 
when  news  from  the  right  told  that  victory  on  that  part  of  the 
line  was  almost  within  our  grasp — is  to  put  too  great  a  strain 
upon  the  credulity  of  even  the  simple.  Words  are  not  necessarv 
to  refute  this  slander,  or  to  establish  the  fact  that  General  Beau- 
regard  acted,  under  the  circumstances,  as  his  education,  his  nature, 
his  duty,  and  his  will  prompted  him.  The  preceding  chapters 
have  sufficiently  shown  the  difficult  and  masterly  work  he  accom 
plished,  after  the  sad  event  which  left  in  his  hands  the  command 
of  the  army.  Here,  again,  truth  forces  the  statement  that  Mr. 
Davis,  in  his  effort  to  detract  from  the  merits  of  one  against  whom 
he  has  not  scrupled  to  exhibit  his  persistent  animosity,  has  over 
reached  his  aim,  and,  far  from  accomplishing  his  purpose,  has  only 
succeeded  in  impairing  the  historical  value  of  his  own  book. 


352  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

General  Beauregard's  Insistance  on  the  Evacuation  of  Columbus. — Docu 
ments  Relating  to  the  Matter. — General  McGown  to  be  put  in  Command 
of  Madrid  Bend. — He  is  Called  by  General  Beauregard  to  Jackson  for 
Instructions. — He  Repairs  to  Madrid  Bend.  —  Dispositions  Made  for 
its  Defence.  —  Commodore  Hollins  to  Co-operate  with  Land  Forces. — 
Number  of  Troops  under  General  McCown. — Arrival  of  General  Pope  on 
the  2 8 tli  of  February  in  Front  of  New  Madrid. — Colonel  Plummer  Estab 
lishes  a  Battery  on  the  River. — Apprehensions  of  General  McCown. — Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  Despatch  to  General  Cooper. — General  McCown  Exhib 
its  still  Greater  Anxiety. — General  Beauregard  Doubts  General  McCown's 
Capacity. — Successful  Evacuation  of  Columbus. — Attack  Commenced  on 
New  Madrid  March  12th. — Conference  of  General  McCown  with  Commo 
dore  Hollins  on  the  13th,  and  Evacuation  of  Forts. — General  Beauregard 
Applies  for  General  Mackall. — Garrison  of  New  Madrid  Transferred  to 
Opposite  Bank  of  River  and  Island  No.  10. — General  Beauregard  Orders 
all  Surplus  Guns,  Supplies,  and  Boats  to  Fort  Pillow. — Fall  of  Island  No. 
10  on  the  7th  of  April. — General  Pope's  Forces  Transported  to  Vicinity 
of  Fort  Pillow. — General  Pope  Ordered  to  Pittsburg  Landing. — Want  of 
Capacity  of  Commodore  Hollins. — General  Beauregard's  Various  Tele 
grams  and  Orders. — He  Detains  General  Villcpigue  in  Command  of  Fort 
Pillow. — Instructions  to  Captain  Harris. — Surrender  of  New  Orleans. — 
Bombardment  of  Fort  Pillow. — The  Montgomery  Rams. — General  Beau- 
regard  has  Steam  Ram  Arkansas  Completed,  Equipped,  and  Manned. — 
History  of  the  Arkansas. — Tribute  to  Captain  Isaac  Brown  and  Crew. — 
Prisoners  with  Smallpox  Sent  to  Fort  Pillow. — What  Became  of  Them. — 
Letter  to  General  Villepigue,  May  28th.  —  He  is  Directed  by  General 
Beauregard  to  Prepare  for  Withdrawing  his  Troops  from  Fort  Pillow. — 
Fort  Evacuated  1st  of  June. — Responsibility  of  Various  Movements  Left 
to  General  Beauregard. 

IT  must  not  be  forgotten  that  General  Beauregard,  in  his  con 
ference  with  General  Polk,  a  few  days  after  his  arrival  at  Jackson, 
Tennessee,  suggested  and  even  urged  the  evacuation  of  Columbus 
at  the  earliest  moment  practicable  ;  that  is  to  say,  as  soon  as  Madrid 
Bend,  Island  No.  10,  and  New  Madrid  could  be  fortified  and  suffi 
ciently  prepared  for  temporary  occupation;  the  object  being  to 
give  time  for  the  completion  of  the  work  of  armament  then  going 
on  at  Fort  Pillow,  fifty -nine  miles  above  Memphis,  which  was 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  353 

represented  to  be  a  strong  natural  position,  but  in  a  more  unfin 
ished  state  than  any  other  around  Madrid  Bend.  Some  field- 
works  were  also  in  process  of  construction  at  the  points  above 
named,  though  little  progress  had  yet  been  made  upon  them,  as 
was  represented  to  General  Beauregard  by  his  Chief -Engineer, 
Captain  Harris. 

The  reader  is  referred  to  the  several  chapters  preceding  the  ac 
count  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,*  wherein  many  of  the  arrangements 
made  by  General  Beauregard  with  regard  to  Columbus,  and  for 
the  defence  of  Xew  Madrid,  Island  No.  10,  and  Madrid  Bend, 
including  the  incidents  connected  therewith,  are  mentioned  at 
length,  and  carefully  reviewed  in  the  order  of  their  actual  occur- 

O  •/ 

rence.  We  allude  to  the  memorandum  of  February  7th,  prepared 
at  Bowling  Green  by  General  Beauregard,  exhibiting  the  general 
plans  of  operations  adopted  by  General  A.  S.  Johnston  at  that 
time;f  to  General  Beauregard's  letter  to  General  Johnston,  dated 
February  12th,  1802  ;:|:  to  the  telegram  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
dated  February  19th,  authorizing  the  evacuation  of  Columbus,  as 
suggested  by  General  Beauregard  ;§  to  the  latter's  communication 
of  February  21st  to  General  Cooper;]  to  his  circular  of  same  date 
to  the  governors  of  Tennessee,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Louisi 
ana  ;*[  and  also  to  his  letter  of  February  23d  to  Lieutenant-General 
Polk.*''  These  papers,  documents,  and  outside  details  give  an  out 
line  of  the  dispositions  General  Beauregard  considered  it  judicious 
to  make  for  the  security  of  the  defensive  works  on  the  Mississippi 
River.  They  show  that  although  his  attention  was  engrossed  bv 
the  movements  of  concentration  which  he  was  then  preparing,  he 
could,  nevertheless,  spare  time  and  thought  for  distant  points,  fore 
seeing  what  the  probable  plans  of  the  enemy  would  be,  and  sug 
gesting  the  means  necessary  to  defeat  them. 

It  had  been  agreed  between  Generals  Beauregard  and  Polk 
that  Brigadier-General  McCown,  with  some  seven  thousand  men, 
should  be  sent  to  the  positions  about  Madrid  Bend  as  soon  as  the 
works  in  process  of  construction  there  should  have  reached  a  suffi 
cient  state  of  completion  to  be  properly  armed  and  manned.  The 
surplus  ammunition  removed  from  Columbus  was  to  be  sent  to 


*  Chapters  XV.-XVIII.  t  Chapter  XV.  p.  220. 

I  Ibid.  p.  221.  §  Appendix  to  Chapter  XVI.  ||  Ibid. 

1  Chapter  XVI.  p.  240.  **  Appendix  to  Chapter  XVI. 

I.— 23 


354:  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

Fort  Pillow,  and  also  the  surplus  guns,  which  were  to  be  mounted 
with  the  greatest  possible  celerity. 

General  McCown,  according  to  a  telegram  forwarded  to  that  ef 
fect,  repaired  to  Jackson,  Tennessee,  to  receive  personal  instructions 
from  General  Beauregard.  He  was  accompanied  by  General  Tru- 
deau,  of  Louisiana,  acting  Chief  of  Artillery  on  General  Folk's  staff. 
The  line  of  conduct  to  be  adopted  and  the  mode  and  manner  of 
defence  were  minutely  traced  out  for  him.  He  was  told  by  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  that  he  must  not  count  upon  reinforcements,  for 
all  available  troops  were  now  being  collected  in  or  about  western 
Tennessee,  to  oppose  the  Federals,  should  they  attempt  to  cross 
the  Tennessee  River;  that  he  must  therefore  make  up  his  mind 
to  do  his  utmost  with  the  troops  he  would  take  with  him  ;  that  he 
would  find  two  regiments  at  New  Madrid,  under  Colonel  Gantt, 
and  possibly  two  others,  under  Colonel  L.  M.  Walker,  at  Fort  Pil 
low.  As  an  additional  assistance,  Captain  Harris,  Chief-Engineer, 
was  to  be  put  in  charge  of  the  construction  of  all  the  field-works 
required,  under  specific  verbal  and  written  instructions  from  Gen 
eral  Beauregard.  This  was  a  system  adopted  and  invariably  fol 
lowed  by  him  throughout  the  course  of  the  war.  He  knew  that 
subordinate  commanders,  however  able  in  other  respects,  could 
not,  with  justice,  be  expected  to  possess  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
engineering. 

General  McCown  inspected  the  river  defences  at  and  about 
Madrid  Bend  on  the  25th  of  February,  when,  on  his  application, 
Colonel  L.  M.  Walker,  with  his  two  regiments  from  Fort  Pillow, 
was  ordered  to  reinforce  Colonel  Gantt,  at  New  Madrid.  Shortly 
afterwards  General  McCown's  own  troops  arrived  from  Columbus, 
at  Island  No.  10,  and  at  Madrid  Bend,  where  he  established  his 
headquarters,  lie  was  followed,  on  the  1st  of  March,  by  Stewart's 
brigade,  which  was  sent  to  reinforce  the  troops  at  New  Madrid, 
where  General  Stewart,  being  the  senior  officer  at  that  point,  as 
sumed  command  of  the  post  under  General  McCown,  who  ranked 
him.  Commodore  Hollins,  C.  S.  N.,  with  eight  river  gunboats, 
which  General  Beauregard  had  obtained  from  New  Orleans, 
soon  came  up  with  his  fleet  to  assist  in  the  defence  of  the  up 
per  Mississippi,  until  Fort  Pillow,  with  the  obstructions  then  in 
process  of  construction  somewhat  higher  up,  could  be  made  strong 
enough  to  prevent  the  Federal  gunboats  and  transports  from  pass 
ing  down  the  river.  Thus,  in  the  early  part  of  March,  General 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  355 

McCown's  forces  at  Xew  Madrid  were  increased  to  six  regiments 

O 

of  infantry,  and  a  few  companies  of  heavy  artillery,  in  two  field- 
works,  one  of  which — Fort  Thompson,  a  bastioned  redoubt,  south 
of  the  town — had  fourteen  heavy  guns,  while  the  other  —  Fort 
Bankhcad,  a  battery  north  of  the  town — was  armed  with  seven 
heavy  guns.  He  also  had  a  field  battery,  originally  of  six  guns, 
afterwards  of  seven.  The  two  works  were  more  or  less  connected 
by  rifle-pits. 

The  river  was  high  at  that  season  of  the  year,  and  the  eight 
Confederate  gunboats,  under  Commodore  Ilollins,  could  easily 
rake  the  approaches  to  the  above-named  forts.* 

On  or  about  the  12th  of  March,  General  McCown's  forces,  ex 
clusive  of  the  gunboats — which  were  not  under  his  orders,  but  had 
come  to  co-operate  with  him — consisted  of  twelve  regiments  and 
one  battalion  of  infantry,  five  field-batteries  of  six  pieces  each,  and 
three  companies  of  cavalry;  added  to  which  was  the  equivalent  of 
one  regiment  of  heavy  (foot)  artillery,  making  an  aggregate  of 
about  eight  thousand  five  hundred  men  of  all  arms. 

Ilis  opponent,  Major-General  Pope,  who  had  left  Commerce,  on 
the  Mississippi,  above  Columbus,  Kentucky,  on  the  2Sth  of  Feb 
ruary,  arrived  in  front  of  Xew  Madrid  on  the  morning  of  the  3d 
of  March.  His  force  numbered  five  small  infantry  divisions,  with 
one  light  battery  to  each,  besides  nine  companies  organized  into  a 
division  of  light  artillery;  about  three  regiments  of  cavalry,  and 
two  of  infantry  acting  as  engineer  troops — in  all,  some  twenty-five 
thousand  men. 

General  Pope  had  no  sooner  ascertained  the  nature  and  arma 
ment  of  the  Confederate  works  in  his  front  than  he  sent  for  and 
obtained,  from  Cairo,  with  great  labor  and  difficult}',  three  rifled 
24-poundcrs  and  one  8-inch  howitzer,  which  were  all  the  siege- 
guns  he  could  bring  to  his  assistance. 

On  March  5th  he  detached  Colonel  Plummer,  from  near  Xew 
Madrid,  with  three  regiments  of  infantry,  four  light  rifled  pieces 
of  artillery,  two  companies  of  cavalry,  and  one  of  engineer  troops, 
to  act  as  an  outpost  at  Point  Pleasant,  some  ten  miles  below  Xcw 
Madrid,  and  to  attempt,  with  their  rifled  field-pieces,  to  stop  the 
passage  of  transports  up  and  down  the  river.  P>y  morning  of  the 
7th  the  enemy's  four  guns  were  in  position,  in  separate  sunken 

*  General  Force,  "  From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth/'  pp.  G8,  C9. 


356  MILITARY   OPERATIONS    OF 

batteries,  along  the  river  bank,  connected  together  by  rifle-pits ; 
and  so  accurate  was  the  fire  of  the  sharpshooters  there  stationed 
that  the  gunners  on  the  Confederate  gunboats  could  no  longer 
keep  their  posts.  This  compelled  the  fleet  to  retire,  and  the  trans 
ports  to  stop  at  Tiptonville,  some  eight  miles  farther  down  the  river. 
General  McCown  must  have  considered  himself  in  a  critical 
condition  from  the  very  outset,  for  on  the  6th  General  Beaure- 
gard  received  from  him  the  following  telegram: 

"  NEW  MADRID,  March  5th,  1862, 

Via  MEMPHIS,  Qth. 
"  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  The  force  in  my  front  is,  say  fifteen  thousand ;  between  here  and  Sykes- 
ton  fifteen  thousand,  and  large  number  of  guns.  Sigel  is  inarching  on  Point 
Pleasant  with  ten  thousand.  My  position  is  eminently  dangerous. 

"  J.  P.  Me  GOWN, 
"  Comdg.  New  Madrid." 

This  somewhat  alarmed  General  Beauregard,  although  lie  could 
not  well  believe  that  the  forces  under  General  Pope  amounted  to 
more  than  twenty  or  twenty-five  thousand  men ;  and  he  had  good 
reason  to  know  that  General  Sigel  was  then  operating  in  south 
western  Missouri,  against  Yan  Dorn's  army.  It  was  clear  to  him, 
however,  that  he  could  not  place  much  reliance  in  a  subordinate 
commander  who  was  thus  timorous  under  responsibility,  and  who 
apparently  gave  way  to  nervous  apprehension  as  to  the  strength  of 
his  adversary.  This  was  another  and  still  stronger  proof  of  the 
absolute  need  of  trustworthy  commanders  in  General  Beanregard's 
military  district.  Acting  under  that  impression,  he,  on  the  same 
day,  telegraphed  General  Cooper  as  follows : 

"JACKSON,  TENN.,  MarcJi  6th,  1862. 

"  For  the  sake  of  our  cause  and  country,  send  at  once  Mackall  as  Major- 
General,  and  three  brigadier-generals  recommended  by  me.  Colonel  Ransom 
to  command  cavalry.  Organization  here  much  needed.1' 

On  the  9th  came  another  despatch  from  General  McCown, 
dated  the  clay  previous.  In  it  he  said  that  he  had  not  yet  placed 
the  salient  ordered  by  General  Beauregard,  in  advance  of  the 
works,  as  the  position  it  was  to  occupy  would  be  raked  by  our 
gunboats,  and  that  he  had  no  force  to  place  there ;  that  he  would 
erect  it  as  soon  as  possible.  [This,  however,  he  never  did.]  In 
the  same  telegram,  which  was  a  long  one,  he  also  said  : 

';  The  least  estimate  of  the  force  of  the  enemy  on  Madrid  plain  is  thirty 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  357 

thousand,  with  sixty  guns.  .  .  .  How  long  can  I  hold  New  Madrid  with  my 
small  force  against  such  odds,  is  a  question.  I  believe  the  enemy  will  soon  be 
fifty  thousand  strong.  ...  I  am  determined  to  hold  my  position  at  every  haz 
ard.  Shall  engage  in  no  field  risks ;  I  see  my  danger ;  my  men  are  confident 
and  in  good  spirit." 

This  communication  aroused  the  greatest  apprehension  in  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  mind,  as  it  confirmed  his  belief  in  General  Mc- 
Cown's  exaggerated  fears  of  the  dangers  threatening  his  position. 
Clearly,  Xapoleon's  axiom — "  Confidence  is  half  the  battle  " — was 
not  known  to  the  commander  at  Madrid  Bend.  General  Beaure- 
gard  began  to  think  it  would  be  necessary  to  send  a  steadier  officer 
to  relieve  him.  Having  but  recently  arrived  in  that  military  dis 
trict,  however,  the  direct  command  of  which  lie  had  assumed  only 
four  days  previously,*  and  being,  as  yet,  unacquainted  with  the 
subordinate  commanders  serving  there,  General  Beauregard,  who, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  still  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  officers  so 
urgently  asked  f  of  the  War  Department,  concluded  to  await 
further  developments  before  taking  final  action  in  the  matter. 
lie  did  not  doubt  the  personal  bravery  of  General  McCown, 
though  his  timorousness  as  a  commander  and  fear  of  responsibility 
were  most  apparent.  He  therefore  wrote  him  an  earnest  letter  of 
encouragement,  of  which  the  closing  words  were:  "The  country 
expects  us  all  to  do  our  duty  with  a  fearless  heart,  and  we  must 
do  it  or  die  in  the  attempt. VJ 

Columbus  had  been  successfully  evacuated.  Part  of  its  troops 
and  most  of  its  guns  and  other  armament  had  been  transferred  to 
the  different  defences  about  Madrid  IVnd,  the  enemy  offering  no 
interference  to  delay  the  movement.  There  was  additional  cause 
of  gratification  in  the  fact  that  the  governors  of  the  southwestern 
States  had  all  favorably  answered  General  Beauregard's  call  on 
them,  through  his  circular  of  February  2ist.  We  need  not  repeat 
what  we  have  already  written  about  his  efforts  to  organize  and 
concentrate  an  army  under  the  most  trying  circumstances,  and.  the 
noteworthy  manner  in  which  it  was  effected. § 

The  real  attack  on  New  Madrid  commenced  March  12th,  but 


*  March  5th.     Sec  order  to  that  effect,  as  given  in  Chapter  XVII.  p.  249. 
t  See  General  Beauregard's  letter  of  February  24th,  to  General  Cooper,  in 
Chapter  XVI.     See  all  his  telegrams  to  same  purpose. 

|  The  letter  appears  in  the  Appendix  to  the  present  chapter. 
§  Sec  Chapters  XVI.-XVIII. 


358  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

the  four  siege-guns  of  the  Federals  were  not  in  position,  nor  were 
their  batteries  completed,  until  3  A.  M.  on  the  13th.  The  firing 
opened  at  daybreak  and  ended  at  dusk,  with  very  little  injury  on 
either  side ;  yet,  that  very  evening,  after  a  defence  of  less  than 
twelve  hours,  General  McCown,  although  the  vital  importance  of 
holding  his  post  to  the  last  extremity  had  been  repeatedly  im 
pressed  upon  him  by  General  Beauregard,  held  an  informal  con 
ference  with  Commodore  llollins,  on  board  the  hitter's  flagship, 
at  which  General  Stewart  only  was  present,  and  it  was  agreed 
that  the  forts  must  be  immediately  evacuated.  This  was  done  dur 
ing  the  night  of  the  13th,  in  a  heavy  rain  storm,  and  in  a  manner 
far  from  creditable  to  the  general  commanding.  The  evacuation 
was  conducted  with  so  much  confusion  indeed  as  almost  to  amount 
to  a  stampede.  The  Confederate  forces  there  engaged  numbered 
some  three  thousand  five  hundred  men  of  all  arms,  with  twenty- 
one  heavy  guns,  and  two  light  batteries  of  six  pieces,  opposed  to 
which  were  only  four  siege-guns,  as  we  have  already  stated.  All 
our  artillery,  except  the  guns  of  one  of  the  two  light  batteries, 
together  with  ammunition,  animals,  and  stores,  were  left  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  Not  one  of  General  Beauregard's  impor 
tant  instructions  had  been  carried  out.  This  was  the  poorest  de 
fence  made  of  any  fortified  post  during  the  whole  course  of  the 
war ;  and  the  responsibility  for  the  disasters  it  entailed  must  neces 
sarily  rest  on  the  immediate  commander  and  not  on  the  troops; 
for  they  were  formed  of  the  same  material  as  those  who  manned 
and  made  glorious  the  defences  of  Island  jSTo.  10,  Fort  Pillow, 
Vicksburg,  Charleston  Harbor,  Petersburg,  Fort  Fisher,  and  Span 
ish  Fort. 

The  hasty  and  unnecessary  evacuation  of  Xew  Madrid  destroyed 
the  little  confidence  General  Beauregard  had  felt  in  the  com 
mander  of  that  sub-district.  It  is  but  fair  to  add  that  the  enemy 
had  displayed  activity,  enterprise,  and  determination  in  his  attack 
upon  the  Confederate  works,  though,  as  appears  from  the  Federal 
reports,  no  such  easy  victory  had  been  anticipated. 

General  Beauregard  now  concluded  to  apply  at  once  for  Briga 
dier-General  W.W.  Mackall,  then  Chief  of  Staff  to  General  A.  S. 
Johnston,  whose  promotion  he  had  long  been  urging,  and  who,  he 
knew,  would  have  fulfilled  all  his  expectations,  had  it  been  possi 
ble  sooner  to  secure  his  services. 

General  Johnston  sustained  the  application,  but  could  not  spare 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  359 

Brigadier- General  Mackall,  until  liis  own  and  General  Beaure- 
gard's  forces  were  united  at  Corinth,  which  only  occurred  on  March 
27th.  The  hurried  course  of  events  and  consequent  dangerous 
outlook  on  the  Mississippi,  from  and  after  the  14th  of  March, 
rendered  it  doubtful  whether  it  was  not  too  late,  on  the  31st,  when 
General  Mackall  assumed  command,  to  accomplish  any  good  re 
sult,  or  provide  for  the  emergencies  of  the  situation.  At  his  last 
interview  with  General  Bcauregard  before  entering  upon  his  new 
duties,  and  in  answer  to  the  remark  that  he  would  probably  com 
mand  only  a  forlorn  hope,  but  that  the  fate  of  the  Mississippi 
Valley  depended,  just  then,  on  the  possession  of  Island  Xo.  10  and 
the  surrounding  works,  if  only  fur  twelve  days  more,  he,  true 
soldier  as  he  was,  said  :  "  The  post  of  danger  is  the  post  of  honor. 
I  will  do  my  duty  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  and,  I  hope,  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  country  and  of  yourself.'' 

It  has  already  been  shown,  in  Chapter  XVIII.,  how  the  garrison 
of  New  Madrid  was  transferred  to  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river, 
and  how  a  portion  of  it  was  sent  to  reinforce  the  troops  supporting 
the  works  at  and  about  Island  Xo.  10. 

General  McCown,  having  succeeded  in  reaching  Fort  Pillow 
with  a  portion  of  his  forces,  was  authorized  by  General  Polk  to 
assume  command  there ;  but  General  Beauregard,  though  approv 
ing  the  main  dispositions  taken  for  the  defence  of  Madrid  Bend 
and  Island  Xo.  10,  insisted  upon  General  McCown's  return  to  his 
former  headquarters,  to  resume  the  direction  of  operations;  which 
he  did,  on  the  iMst,  leaving  General  A.  P.  Stewart,  a  good  artillery 
officer,  in  charge  of  the  fort  and  its  immediate  surroundings. 

The  abandonment  of  Xew  Madrid  insured  the  fall,  ere  long,  of 
Island  Xo.  10,  and,  therefore,  of  Madrid  Bend.  Hence  General 
Beauregard's  immediate  order  to  send  at  once  all  unmounted  guns, 
surplus  supplies,  and  boats  to  Fort  Pillow — thus  reducing  to  a 
minimum  the  forces  necessary  to  hold  those  two  now  much  en 
dangered  posts.""  His  order  was  lirst  delayed  on  account  of  an 
earnest  appeal  made  to  him  by  General  McCown,  but  was  renewed 
and  carried  out  on  the  18th,  the  need  being  absolute  for  a  garrison 
at  Fort  Pillow,  and  no  other  troops  being  then  available.  The 
force  thus  transferred  thither  consisted  of  five  regiments  of  in 
fantry,  two  light  batteries  of  six  guns  each,  and  Captain  Xeely's 

*  General  Beauregard's  letter  to  General  Bragg,  of  March  loth,  see  Appendix. 


360  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

squadron  of  cavalry,  which  was  soon  to  follow ;  leaving,  under 
General  Walker,  for  the  defence  of  Island  No.  10  and  Madrid 
Bend,  some  companies  of  heavy  artillery,  forming  about  the  equiv 
alent  of  a  regiment;  seven  regiments  and  one  battalion  of  infantry; 
one  company  of  Stewart's  light  battery,  with  six  guns ;  and  two 
companies  of  Mississippi  cavalry  —  an  aggregate  of  about  four 
thousand  four  hundred  men. 

General  McCown's  telegrams  to  General  Beauregard  now  again 
exhibited  the  same  anxiety  and  discouragement  so  discernible  in 
those  previously  forwarded;  and  such  continued  to  be  his  course, 
until  he  was  finally  relieved  by  General  Mac-kail,  on  the  31st,  as 
already  explained.  He  was  sent  to  Memphis,  out  of  command, 
and  ordered  to  write  the  report  of  his  operations,  especially  such 
as  referred  to  the  evacuation  of  New  Madrid. 

After  a  stout  and  soldierly  resistance  at  Island  No.  10,  our 
troops  displaying  the  unflinching  spirit  that  distinguished  them 
during  the  war,  the  work  at  last  succumbed  on  the  7th  of  April, 
and  surrendered  to  the  Federal  fleet,  under  Commodore  A.  II. 
Foote,  two  or  three  hours  after  the  retreat  of  the  Confederate 
forces  from  Shiloh  had  been  ordered.  The  shattered  condition 
of  the  works  proved  to  what  extremity  their  defenders  had  been 
reduced.  A  Federal  writer  says :  u  The  earth  is  ploughed  and 
furrowed  as  with  an  earthquake.  Small  caverns  were  excavated 
by  the  tremendous  explosions,"  *  etc.  And  General  Force,  a  fair 
narrator  of  this  period  of  the  war,  speaking  of  the  first  or  second 
day  of  the  bombardment  (what  must  it  not  have  been  on  the  last!), 
uses  this  language  :  "  Thirteen-inch  shells  exploding  in  the  ground 
made  caverns  in  the  soil.  Water  stood  on  the  ground  within,  and 
the  artillerists  waded  in  mud  and  water."  f  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Cook,  of  the  12th  Arkansas,  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the 
Island  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  by  order  of  General  Mackall. 
Having  had  news,  on  the  evening  of  that  day,  that  General  Pope's 
forces  had  effected  a  landing  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  and 
that  the  Confederate  troops  had  already  fallen  back,  he  ordered 
and  effected  the  evacuation  of  the  work,  leaving  it  in  charge  of 
Captain  Ilawes,  of  the  artillery.  Colonel  Cook,  that  night,  re 
treated  with  his  regiment  (about  four  hundred  men)  along  the 

*  "Record  of  tlie  Rebellion"  (Documents),  1862,  vol.  iv.  p.  440. 
t  "From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth,"  p.  80. 


GENERAL  BEAUHEGAKD.  361 

western  shore  of  Reelfoot  Lake,  until  he  reached  a  ferry  landing, 
near  Tiptonville,  where  General  Beauregard  had  had  collected, 
through  the  activity  and  energy  of  Colonel  Pickett,  commanding 
at  Union  City,  quite  a  number  of  canoes,  skiffs,  and  other  small 
boats,  for  such  an  emergency.  With  these  Colonel  Cook  succeeded 
in  saving,  not  only  his  own  command,  but  several  hundred  strag 
glers  who  had  gathered  there  during  the  night.  Meanwhile,  towards 
midnight  on  the  7th,  General  Pope's  entire  army  had  crossed  the 
river  and  was  advancing  on  Tiptonville,  General  Paine's  division 
leading  the  march.  With  such  overwhelming  odds  against  him, 
General  Mackall  was  compelled  to  surrender  with  his  small  force, 
aggregating  about  three  thousand  men.  It  follows,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  that  General  Pope's  official  report  of  the  number  of  Con 
federate  prisoners  taken  on  that  occasion,  namely,  "six  thousand 
seven  hundred,"  was  a  greatly  exaggerated  statement. 

The  enemy  had  now  full  control  of  the  river  as  far  down  as 
Fort  Pillow,  one  hundred  and  ten  miles  below  Island  Xo.  10. 

That  fort,  contrary  to  the  general  opinion  about  it,  was  not  so 
strong  as  its  natural  position  indicated,  nor  as  it  had  been  repre 
sented  to  be  to  General  Beauregard.  It  was  situated  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  river,  near  the  mouth  of  Coal  Creek,  and  some  ten 
miles  above  the  Hate-hie  River.  A  little  over  three  miles  east  of 
it,  the  two  streams  just  mentioned,  with  their  banks  partially  over 
flowed  and,  therefore,  almost  impracticable,  came  within  a  mile 
and  a  half  of  each  other.  Yet  the  engineers  who  planned  the 
works  before  General  Beau  regard's  arrival  in  the  West  had  not 
availed  themselves  of  this  natural  advantage,  and,  strangely 
enough,  instead  of  erecting  the  land  defences  at  the  point  men 
tioned,  had  placed  them  nearer  the  fort,  thereby  lengthening 
their  lines  more  than  three  miles,  and  necessitating  a  garrison  of 
nearly  ten  thousand  men.  A  similar  error,  as  we  have  already 
pointed  out,  had  been  committed  at  Columbus.  General  Beaure 
gard,  upon  assuming  command  of  his  new  military  district,  and, 
in  fact,  before  he  had  done  so,  used  every  endeavor  to  introduce 
a  new  and  entirely  different  system,  in  the  defensive  works  of  the 
Mississippi  lliver.  lie  caused  them  to  be  almost  entirely  recon 
structed  for  minimum  garrisons,  which  he  knew  would  be  amply 
adequate,  under  efficient  commanders,  to  resist  a  siege  of  several 
weeks,  or  until  assistance  could  be  afforded  them,  thus  increasing, 
to  a  maximum,  the  troops  available  for  operations  in  the  field. 


362  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

So  far  as  circumstances  would  permit,  this  plan  had  been  carried 
out  in  regard  to  all  the  river  defences.  But,  in  order  the  sooner 
to  complete  the  works  at  New  Madrid,  Island  No.  10,  and  Mad 
rid  Bend,  which  had  first  to  be  prepared  against  attack,  only  the 
surplus  guns  of  Columbus  had  been  sent  to  Fort  Pillow. 

The  recent  loss  of  so  much  armament  and  ammunition  had  in 
creased  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  not  to  speak  of  the  additional 
loss  of  General  Mackall's  forces  at  Island  No.  10.  We  were  in 
one  of  those  unfortunate  positions  in  war  where  it  becomes  nec 
essary  to  sacrifice  a  fractional  command  to  save  the  other  and  larg 
er  portion.  Here  the  sacrifice  had  become  ail  the  more  impera 
tive,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  Fort  Pillow  was  now  our  only  re 
liance,  for  the  safety  of  the  Mississippi  Yalley ;  except,  perhaps, 
Randolph,  fifteen  miles  farther  down,  where  some  light  works  had 
been  thrown  up,  with  as  little  regard  to  a  minimum  garrison  as  at 
Forts  Pillow  and  Columbus. 

Less  than  a  week  after  the  surrender  of  Island  No.  10,  trans 
ports  were  filled  with  General  Pope's  forces,  and,  thus  loaded,  de 
scended  the  stream,  reaching  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Pillow  on  or 
about  the  14th  of  April.  And  here  began  a  new  phase  of  the 
stirring  drama  of  this  period  of  the  war  ;  for,  before  any  active 
operations  were  undertaken  by  General  Pope  against  Fort  Pillow, 
he  was  suddenly  ordered  to  Pittsburg  Landing  by  General  Ilal- 
leck,  who  had  arrived  there  on  the  llth,  and  had  officially  assumed 
command.  This  order  was  carried  out ;  and  on  the  21st,  General 
Pope's  army  was  encamped  at  Hamburg,  on  the  Tennessee  River, 
some  twelve  miles  below  the  celebrated  "Landing;"'  thus  increas 
ing  the  Federal  forces  at  and  around  the  battle-field  of  Shiloh,  to 
an  aggregate  of  at  least  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men.* 
This  was  an  error  on  the  part  of  General  Halleck ;  for  he  certain 
ly  had  no  need  of  reinforcements  at  that  time,  his  army  being  in 
a  state  of  complete  inactivity.  General  Pope  should  have  been 
allowed  to  continue  his  operations  against  Fort  Pillow,  as  he  had 
already  successfully  done  against  New  Madrid,  Island  No.  10,  and 
Madrid  Bend.  The  probabilities  are  that,  with  their  immense  re 
sources  in  men  and  materials,  and  in  view  of  the  unfinished  con- 

*  General  Halleck  puts  the  number  at  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thou 
sand.  General  Force,  in  his  book,  often  quoted  by  us,  says  one  hundred 
thousand.  General  Sherman,  in  his  "Memoirs,"  vol.  i.  p.  251,  says  that  the 
army  "  must  have  numbered  nearly  one  hundred  thousand  men.1' 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  363 

dition  of  the  works  at  Fort  Pillow,  the  Federals  would,  in  a  short 
time,  have  succeeded  in  forcing  its  evacuation,  when  the  whole 
Mississippi  River  would  have  been  opened  to  them  down  to  Xew 
Orleans. 

A  respite  of  many  months  was  thus  unintentionally  given,  by  the 
commander  of  the  Federal  forces,  to  the  Confederacy,  then  hard 
pressed  in  the  Southwest. 

During  the  operations  thus  recorded,  and  judging  from  the  dif 
ferent  telegrams  he  had  received  frum  Commodore  Iloliins,  and 
Generals  Folk  and  McCown,  General  Beauregard  was  under  the 
impression  that  our  gunboats  had  done  all  that  could  have  been 
expected  of  them.  A  careful  reading  of  other  telegrams,  letters, 
and  reports,  Confederate  as  well  as  Federal,  have,  since  that  time, 
compelled  him  to  modify  his  opinion.  ]Ie  now  thinks  that  the 
Confederate  flotilla,  under  Commodore  Iloliins,  did  not  display 
the  energy,  resoluteness,  and  daring  afterwards  evinced  by  many 
an  officer  in  the  Confederate  States  navy,  most  conspicuous  among 
whom  were  the  heroic  Admiral  Semmes,  Commodore  Maffitt,  and 
Captain  Brown  of  the  Arkansas. 

Among  the  gunboats  brought  from  Xew  Orleans  by  Commo 
dore  Iloliins,  or  sent  to  him  after  he  had  left,  was  the  celebrated 
ram  Manassas,  which,  however,  could  not  then  be  used  to  any  ad 
vantage,  for  the  reason,  as  it  appears,  that  there  was  no  Federal 
craft  of  any  description  south  of  Island  Xo.  10,  against  which  her 
ramming  equalities  might  be  brought  into  play.  Later,  and  just  as 
she  could  have  been  of  much  use,  General  Lovell  insisted  upon  her 
being  sent  back  to  him,  which,  after  several  remonstrances  from 
General  Beauregard  and  from  Commodore  Iloliins,  was  reluctant 
ly  done.  Had  the  Manassas  been  with  the  flotilla,  on  the  5th  of 
April,  when  the  Federal  transports  passed  through  the  recently 
excavated  canal  at  Xcw  Madrid,  and  two  of  the  enemy's  gunboats 
ran  the  gauntlet  before  Island  Xo.  10  and  the  Madrid  Bend  bat 
teries,  it  is  more  than  probable  that  they  would  have  been  de 
stroyed  by  the  Confederate  ram  ;  and  that  no  other  Federal  trans 
port  or  gunboat  would  have  made  a  like  attempt.  In  that  case 
General  Pope  would  not  have  been  able  to  cross  his  troops  to  the 
Tennessee  shore,  and  could  not  have  taken  in  rear  the  forces  hold 
ing  the  works  at  Madrid  Bend.  Had  a  signal  repulse  been  met  with 
by  the  first  Federal  boats  entering  that  part  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  General  Pope's  operations  around 


364  MILITAKY  OPERATIONS  OF 

New  Madrid  would  have  been  abandoned  ;  for  twice,  already,  bad 
General  Halleck  been  on  the  point  of  recalling  his  expedition. 

Far  as  he  was  from  the  scene  of  action,  General  Beauregard's 
telegrams  and  instructions  to  Generals  Polk.  Withers,  Stewart, 
Rust,  and  Villepigue,  to  Captains  Harris  and  Lynch,  to  Lieuten 
ant  Meriwether,  and  other  officers  of  the  engineer  corps,  show 
how  extreme  was  his  vigilance,  and  what  minute  precision  marked 
his  different  orders. 

We  submit  the  following  examples:* 

1.  "JACKSON,  TENX.,  March  8th,  18G2. 
"  Captain  M.  LYNCH,  Corps  Engineers,  Fort  Pillow  : 

"  Your  traverses  •would  do  against  field-guns,  but  not  against  heavy  ones. 
Dismount  every  third  gun  when  sufficient  force  arrives.  Surmount  present 
parapet  in  rifle-battery  with  sand-bags. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

2.  "  JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  llth,  1862. 
"  Brigadier-General  YV^ITHERS,  Fort  Pillow,  Tenn.  : 

"  Select  shortest  line  ;  construct  detached  works  first,  then  connect  with 
cremaillere.  Get  all  negroes  possible.  Reconnoitre  opposite  shore  also. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

3.  "JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  17th,  18G2. 
"Major-General  L.  POLK,  Humboldt : 

"  What  does  McCown  mean  by  his  doubt  ?  Would  it  not  be  well  to  leave 
to  his  judgment  when  to  execute  the  movement  decided  upon  ?  Have  you 
given  orders  to  provision  Fort  Pillow  for  two  or  three  months  for  five  thou 
sand  men  ? 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

4.  "  JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  21st,  1SG2. 
"  Captain  D.  B.  HARRIS,  Engineers,  Fort  Pillow  : 

"Look  as  soon  as  practicable  to  land  defences  of  fort.  Construct  detached 
works  first,  then  cremaillere.  Total  garrison  about  three  thousand  men  ;  defen 
sive  lines  must  not  be  too  extensive. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

o.  "  JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  21st,  18G2. 

"  Brigadier-General  A.  P.  STEWART,  Commanding  Fort  Pillow  : 

"  Is  water  battery  unserviceable  from  high  water  ?  If  so,  remove  guns  im 
mediately  to  better  position.  Put  all  river  batteries  in  immediate  serviceable 
condition.  How  many  negroes  have  you?  If  not  enough,  call  on  Captain 
Adams,  Memphis,  for  more  forthwith,  also  for  tools.  How  are  batteries  off 
for  ammunition?  Look  to  this. 

"  THOMAS  JORDAN,  Acting  Adjutant-General." 

*  Other  telegrams  of  equal  importance  are  given  in  the  Appendix. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  3G5 

G.  "  JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  22d,  1862. 

"  Captain  J.  ADAMS,  Comclg.  Memphis  : 

"Send  Captain  Owen's  Arkansas  company  to  Fort  Pillow,  to  report  for 
heavy  artillery  service. 

"G.T.  BEAUREGARD.'' 

7.  "  JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  24^,  1862. 
"  Brigadier-General  A.  P.  STEWART,  Comdg.  Fort  Pillow  : 

"  The  General  wishes  his  instructions  to  engineers  and  commanding  officers 
at  Fort  PillowT  collected  and  copied  in  a  book,  for  information  of  command 
ing  officer  of  that  post.  The  land  front  defences  must  be  shortened,  for  a  total 
garrison  of  but  three  thousand  men,  as  he  has  repeatedly  stated  before. 

"  TIIOS.  JORDAN,  A.  Adj-Gcn." 

8.  "JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  31tf,  1SG2. 
'•  Brigadier-General  J.  B.  VILLEPIGUE,  Comdg.  Fort  Pillow  : 

'•Furnish  'Mississippi  Defence  Expedition'  all  requisite  armament  and  am 
munition  for  immediate  service,  and  report. 

''  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.'' 

0.  "ConiNTir,  April  14M,  1862. 

"Brigadier-General  RUST, Fort  Pillow: 

"  No  arms  here,  or  available  at  present.  Employ  unarmed  men  to  construct 
bridge  over  Ilatchic  on  roads  to  Covington  and  Randolph,  and  repair  roads. 
Impress  negroes  also  for  same  purpose.  Show  to  General  Villepigue.  Ample 
additional  forces  ordered  to  \our  assistance. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

10.  "  ComxTii,  April  UtJi,  1862. 

"  General  SAM.  COOPER,  Adjutant  and  Inspector  General,  Richmond,  Va. : 

"Cannot  a  more  active  and  efficient  officer  be  put  in  command  of  gunboats 
at  Fort  Pillow  ?  It  is  important  to  do  so  at  once.  I  am  informed  garrison 
at  Madrid  Bend  capitulated  ;  part  got  off.  Xo  official  report  yet.  I  am  rein 
forcing  garrison  of  Fort  Pillow  for  a  strong  and  long  defence.  When  will 
Memphis  gunboats  be  ready  ?  Are  much  needed. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.'' 

On  the  13th  of  April,  General  Tlnst,  of  General  Price's  division 
of  Van  Dorirs  Trans-Mississippi  Department,  was  sent  to  Fort  Pil 
low  with  three  regiments  and  a  battalion  of  infantry,  most  of  them 
badly  armed  and  equipped.  On  the  following  day  lie  informed 
General  Beaurcgard  of  his  arrival ;  spoke  of  the  imminence  of  an 
attack  by  the  enemy's  land  forces ;  and  called  for  additional  arms 
for  his  men. 

General  Villepigue  had  asked  for  reinforcements  as  soon  as  he 
no  longer  doubted  the  truth  of  the  report  of  the  fall  of  Island  Ko. 


366  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

10  ;  but,  though  expecting  troops  from  Memphis,  he  had  not  been 
apprised  of  the  name  or  rank  of  the  officer  who  was  to  accompany 
them.  Tie  soon  learned,  however,  that  General  Rust  ranked  him, 
and  wrote  for  instructions  to  army  headquarters.  General  Beau- 
regard  authorized  him  to  retain  the  immediate  command  of  the 
works  until  the  arrival  of  Major-General  Samuel  Jones,  spoken  of 
as  the  next  commander  of  the  fort,  but  who  never  came,  his  ser 
vices  being  required  at  Mobile.  On  the  2-itli,  the  whole  of  Gen 
eral  Rust's  command — less  one  regiment  left  at  Randolph — was 
ordered  to  Corinth  via  Memphis.  The  object  was  to  counteract, 
as  much  as  possible,  by  additional  forces,  whatever  movement  was 
planned  by  the  enemy,  in  consequence  of  the  withdrawal  of  Gen 
eral  Pope's  forces  from  the  Mississippi  River. 

A  fe\v  days  before,  General  Beauregard  being  of  opinion  that 
the  services  of  Captain  Harris  could  then  be  dispensed  with  at 
Fort  PillowT,  and  appreciating  the  necessity  of  defending  the  river 
at  some  other  point  farther  down,  telegraphed  General  Villepigue 
as  follows : 

"  CORINTH,  April  Wth,  1862. 
"  Brigadier-General  J.  B.  VILLEPIGUE,  Comdg.  works  at  Fort  Pillow  : 

"  Release  Captain  D.  B.  Harris,  and  instruct  him  to  repair  to  Vicksburg, 
where  he  will  find  orders  in  post-office. 

"  By  command  of  General  Beauregard. 

"  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj. -Gen." 

These  orders  ran  thus: 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  Zlst,  18G2. 
"  Captain  D.  B.  HARRIS,  Chief-Engineer,  Vicksburg,  Miss. : 

u  Captain, — Understanding  that  there  are  no  points  sufficiently  high  on  the 
river,  between  Memphis  and  Vicksburg,  which  could  be  fortified  for  the  de 
fence  of  the  Mississippi,  I  have  concluded  to  construct  some  defensive  works 
on  the  bluffs  at  or  about  Vicksburg,  for  which  purpose  you  will  make  a  care 
ful  reconnoissance  of  that  locality.  From  what  I  am  told,  I  should  think  the 
bluffs  immediately  above  that  city,  not  far  from  where  a  small  stream  empties 
into  the  river,  would  be  a  proper  point  for  said  works,  provided  it  is  not  com 
manded  by  surrounding  heights  within  two  miles.  A  lower  battery,  with  four 
or  five  guns,  might  be  so  located  as  to  defend  the  entrance  of  the  Yazoo  River 
and  the  small  stream  above  mentioned,  provided  said  battery  can  be  protect 
ed  by  the  guns  of  the  upper  works ;  otherwise  the  entrances  into  these  two 
branches  of  the  Mississippi  must  be  obstructed  by  rafts,  piling,  or  other 
wise. 

"Another  important  consideration  is,  that  the  peninsula  opposite  Vicksburg 
should  not  be  susceptible  of  being  canalled  across,  from  the  river  above  to  the 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  3G7 

river  below,  for  the  passage  of  the  enemy's  boats  beyond  the  reach  of  the  guns 
of  the  fort. 

"Should  the  locality  admit  of  such  a  canal,  beyond  the  range  of  said  guns, 
another  enclosed  battery,  of  four  or  five  gur;s,  will  have  to  be  constructed  be 
low  Vicksburg,  to  command  the  ground  over  which  said  canal  might  be 
made. 

"Tho  plans  and  profiles  of  these  works  must  be  left  to  your  own  judgment, 
and  to  the  nature  of  the  ground  on  which  they  are  to  be  located.  Their  ar 
mament  will  consist  often  or  twelve  8-inch  and  10-inch  guns,  fifteen  42-pound- 
crs,  three  24-pounders,  and  several  mortars,  with  a  dozen  field  rilled  guns,  and 
half  a  dozen  24-pounder  howitzers;  those  being  all  the  guns  we  can  spare  at 
present  for  the  defence  of  the  river  at  that  point. 

"  The  total  garrison  will  consist  of  about  three  thousand  men.  There  should 
be  ample  space  in  those  works  for  magazines — traverses  in  every  direction, 
field  bomb-proofs,  and  a  few  storehouses  and  cisterns. 

"Acting  Captains  John  M.  Reid  and  PuUison.  also  Acting  Lieutenant  John 
II.  Reid,  have  been  ordered  to  report  to  you  for  the  construction  of  these 
works.  The  two  Reids  (father  and  son)  I  am  well  acquainted  with  ;  they 
were  for  years  employed  l>y  me  in  the  construction  of  my  forts  in  Louisiana. 
They  arc  very  reliable,  practical  men,  and  will  be  of  much  assistance  to  you; 
the  other  gentleman  I  am  not  personally  acquainted  with.  Colonel  Aubrey, 
military  commander  of  Vicksburg.  has  been  ordered  to  afford  you  all  the  as 
sistance  in  his  power,  in  the  collection  of  men  and  materials  for  the  construc 
tion  of  said  works.  About  one  thousand  negroes  have  been  ordered  to  report 
to  you  with  their  tools,  etc.,  immediately;  but,  should  you  not  be  able  to  pro 
cure  them  otherwise,  you  will  impress  them  at  once.  You  must  put  forth  all 
your  energy  to  complete  those  works  as  soon  as  practicable,  and  report  their 
progress  every  week. 

v%  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"Ci.  T.  BEAUIU:GAI;D,  Gen.  Comdg.'' 

Nor  was  General  I  Jean  regard  unmindful  of  the  importance  of 
strengthening  and  increasing  the  armament  of  Randolph,  as  ap 
pears  by  his  letter  to  Commodore  Pinckney,  under  date  of  April 
24tli,  1862.* 

On  the  27th  Captain  Harris  answered  that  no  batteries  could 
be  placed  on  the  Mississippi  banks  to  command  the  mouth  of  the 
Yazoo  River,  which  is  twelve  miles  above  Vicksburg.  lie  said  it 
was  proposed  to  pass  into  the  Yazoo  much  valuable  property,  and 
obstruct  the  passage  of  the  enemy's  boats  by  booms,  rafts,  piling, 
and  batteries,  at  a  point  eighteen  miles  above  its  mouth,  and  twelve 
miles  from  Vicksburg,  where  the  highlands  reach  that  stream  ; 
and  he  added,  "  Shall  I  order  this  work  ?  I  am  now  constructing 

*  Sec  letter  in  Appendix. 


3G8  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

batteries  below  this  city."  His  object  was,  in  the  event  of  New 
Orleans  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Federals,  to  prevent  their 
passage  up  the  river.  General  Beanregard  approved  at  once  his 
proposed  plans,  and  notified  him  to  that  effect.  lie  had  previously 
written  to  Dr.  E.  K.  Marshall,  a  very  influential  citizen  of  Vicks- 
bnrg,  asking  him  "  to  give  Captain  Harris  all  the  aid  in  his  power, 
and  to  arouse  his  people  to  a  sense  of  their  duty  to  furnish  the  nec 
essary  labor  in  such  measure  that  the  work  will  go  on  with  prop 
er  celerity." 

On  the  very  day  upon  which  Captain  Harris's  answer  was 
penned  New  Orleans  surrendered  to  the  Federal  fleet  under  Ad 
miral  Farragut,  after  a  short  and  inglorious  resistance  on  the  part 
of  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip.  There  had  been  no  adequate 
assistance  from  the  Confederate  gunboats  and  rains  ordered  to  co 
operate  with  them;  nor  did  the  armed  vessels  known  as  the  "Mont 
gomery  fleet,"  with  one  or  two  exceptions,  show  any  efficiency 
whatever.  Such  a  disaster,  resulting  from  so  weak  a  defence, 
took  the  whole  country  by  surprise — the  North  as  well  as  the 
South ;  and  it  is  grievous  to  make  even  a  passing  mention  of  it. 
Want  of  foresight  and  discipline  caused  this  irreparable  calamity. 
It  affords  us  some  consolation,  however,  to  be  able  to  state  that 
the  Hon.  J.  T.  Monroe,  mayor  of  the  unfortunate  city,  evinced 
more  than  ordinary  firmness  and  patriotism  in  his  refusal  to  com 
ply  with  the  demand  made  upon  him,  to  strike  the  Confederate 
flag  floating  over  the  city  hall. 

On  the  28th  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Pillow  was  fairly  begun. 
No  "mutineers"  were  there,  as  there  were  in  Fort  Jackson,  to  force 
a  surrender  upon  the  officers.  The  whole  command,  men  and  offi 
cers,  vied  with  each  other  in  a  determined  and  resolute  resistance, 
and  troops  were  even  withdrawn  from  the  fort  to  reinforce  other 
points  needing  assistance,  without  a  sign  of  despondency,  still  less 
of  mutiny,  among  the  men.  Troops  act  differently  in  different 
forts.  Their  conduct  depends  on  the  conduct  of  their  officers. 
As  these  prove  themselves  to  be,  so,  invariably,  are  the  men  under 
them. 

We  were  now  in  May,  and  no  material  change  had  been  noticed 
at  General  Villepigue's  post.  The  bombardment  was  continued 
day  after  day,  and  frequently  throughout  the  nights,  but  with  no 
visible  result.  Now  and  then  a  man  was  killed,  and  one  or  two 
wounded.  The  commander's  spirit,  however,  and  the  spirit  of  his 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD. 

troops,  remained  the  same.  A  diversion  occurred  on  the  10th  of 
May. 

The  "  Montgomery  Earns,"  of  which  four  out  of  eight  were 
fully  armed  and  equipped,  were  induced  by  General  Jeff.  Thomp 
son  and  his  "  jay  -  hawkers  "  —as  the  enemy  called  his  men  —  to 
run  into  the  Federal  fleet,  then  besieging  Fort  Pillow.  General 
Thompson  took  personal  command  of  the  movement — a  decided 
and  bold  one — which  would  have  resulted  in  the  dispersion  of  the 
Federal  fleet,  had  Commodore  Pinckney,  who  now  commanded  the 
Confederate  gunboats,  co-operated  in  the  attack,  as  it  was  his  plain 
duty  to  do.  Two  of  the  enemy's  gunboats,  the  Mound  City  and 
the  Carondclct,  were  seriously  crippled,  and  compelled  to  seek 
safety  in  shoal  water.  The  mortar-boats — of  which  one  was  re 
ported  sunk — were  towed  out  of  range. 

This  is  proof  of  what  could  be  accomplished  by  our  fleet,  such 
as  it  was,  when  managed  with  determination  and  energy;  and 
caused  General  Beauregard  to  regret  still  more  the  supineness  of 
the  naval  commanders  charged  with  the  protection  of  that  part  of 
the  Mississippi  Kiver.  Small  hope,  however,  could  be  entertained 
of  a  change  for  the  better  in  these  matters.  For,  on  May  13th, 
and  despite  strenuous  efforts  on  the  part  of  General  Beauregard, 
the  two  iron-clads  on  the  stocks  at  Memphis  were  far  from  being 
iinished.  On  that  day  (loth)  he  was  informed  by  General  Villc- 
pigue  that  Mr.  Ellerson,  of  Memphis,  offered  to  complete  at  once 
either  of  the  two  gunboats,  if  officially  authorized,  and  properly 
assisted  in  doing  so.  General  Beauregard  immediately  forwarded 
instructions  to  that  effect,  as  is  shown  by  the  following  telegrams: 

I-  " CORINTH,  May  TMi,  18G2. 

"  Brigadier-General  J.  B.  VILLEPKIUE,  Fort  Pillow,  Term. : 
"  Yes,  let  him  work  day  and  night  until  finished. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGAHD." 

"  CORINTH,  May  Utti,  1802. 
•'  General  S.  COOPER,  A.  and  I.  G.,  Richmond,  Va. : 

"I  have  ordered  the  Memphis  ram  to  the  Yazoo  for  safe  -  keeping  until 
finished.  Have  ordered  every  exertion  made  to  finish  it  forthwith.  It  will 
be  done  in  one  week.  May  I  request  proper  officers,  crew,  armament,  and  am 
munition  to  be  provided  for  it  at  once  ?  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD/' 

3.  "  CORIXTII,  May  Uth,  1862. 

"Brigadier-General  M.  L.  SMITH,  Comdg.  Yicksburg: 

"  See  that  steam-ram  be  properly  guarded,  and  use  every  exertion  to  finish 
it  forthwith.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

I.— 24 


370  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

On  the  following  day,  with  a  view  to  protect  the  river  near  Vicks- 
burg  until  the  works  in  process  of  construction  there  could  Lc 
sufficiently  completed,  he  ordered  the  heaviest  steam-rains  down 
from  Fort  Pillow.  His  telegram  to  General  Villepigne  to  that 
effect  speaks  for  itself : 

"  COHINTH,  May  15th,  18G2. 
"  Brigadier-General  J.  B.  VILLEPIGUE,  Comdg.  Fort  Pillow : 

"  Have  those  heaviest  steam-rams  been  sent  to  Vicksburg  ?  If  not,  send 
them  forthwith.  Otherwise,  may  lose  the  river  from  below.  We  want  a  few 
days  longer  to  finish  the  Arkansas.  G.  T.  BEAUHEGAKD." 

On  the  19th  he  asks  General  Smith,  at  Vicksburg,  if  it  is  true 
that  more  iron  is  needed  for  the  Arkansas,  and  if  "  no  work  is  be 
ing  done  on  her,"  and  on  the  21st  he  telegraphs  Hon.  S.  E.  Mal- 
lory,  as  follows : 

"  I  want  a  general  order  to  get  what  rope  is  necessary  for  this  army.  Steam- 
ram  Arkansas  reported, '  cannot  be  got  ready  for  one  month.'  Is  it  not  possi 
ble  to  expedite  its  construction  ?  Safety  of  the  river  depends  on  it  now." 

These  despatches  invite  us  to  give  here  the  after-history  of  the 
Confederate  iron-clad  whose  name  has  just  been  mentioned.  The 
manner  in  which  she  was  saved  from  destruction,  completed,  and 
officered  has  already  been  described.  The  feats  she  performed 
under  her  dauntless  commander,  Captain  Isaac  N.  Brown,  who, 
upon  General  Beauregard's  demand  for  an  able  officer,  was  ju 
diciously  selected  by  the  Hon.  Mr.  Mai  lory,  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  are  deserving  of  enthusiastic  praise ;  the  more  so,  since 
Commodore  Lynch,  after  inspection,  said  of  her,  she  is  "  very 
inferior  to  the  Merrimac  in  every  particular;  the  iron  with  which 
she  is  covered  is  worn  and  indifferent,  taken  from  a  railroad  track, 
and  is  poorly  secured  to  the  vessel;  boiler  iron  on  stern  and  coun 
ter;  her  smoke-stack  of  sheet  iron."* 

Nevertheless,  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  of  July,  1862,  that 
Confederate  iron-clad,  the  Arkansas,  mounting  ten  guns,  with  a 
crew  of  two  hundred  men,  descended  the  Yazoo  River  to  attack, 
not  one  or  two  Federal  gunboats,  but  the  fleets  of  Admirals  Far- 
ragut  and  Davis,  then  near  Vicksburg.  She  was  met  at  sunrise, 

*  See  Captain  C.  W.  Reid's  "  Reminiscences  of  the  Confederate  States  Navy," 
vol.  i.  No.  5  of  the  "  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,"  for  May,  1876.  Cap 
tain  Reid  was  one  of  the  officers  of  the  Arkansas,  and  it  was  he  who,  by  order 
of  Commodore  Lynch,  forwarded  to  the  Secretary  of  War  the  despatch  above, 
pronouncing  the  vessel  inadequate  for  the  service  required  of  her. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  371 

in  Old  Itiver,  ten  miles  from  the  Federal  anchorage,  by  the 
United  States  iron-clad  Carondelet,  the  gunboat  Tyler,  and  the 
ram  Monarch.  The  Caronddet  alone  was  superior  in  guns, 
armor,  and  speed  to  the  Arkansas.  Captain  Brown  promptly  as 
sailed  this  advance  squadron,  and,  after  an  hour  of  close  combat, 
disabled  and  silenced  the -iron-clad  and  drove  the  other  two  ves 
sels  to  the  shelter  of  the  fleets,  in  the  main  river.  Losing  no 
time  with  the  disabled  Carondelct,  the  Confederate  iron-clad  pro 
ceeded  down  stream,  and  attacked  the  combined  fleet  of  more 
than  twenty  men-of-war.  She  pushed  through  their  double  line 
of  heavy  ships,  rams,  mortar-boats,  and  six  iron-clads,  each  one  of 
which  last,  like  her  late  antagonist,  in  Old  River,  was  of  greater 
force  than  herself.  She  received  the  flre  of  three  hundred  guns, 
which,  at  half  cable's  length,  the  lone  Confederate  ship  returned 
with  destructive  effect,  from  bow,  stern,  and  both  broadside  bat 
teries.  Fur  more  than  an  hour  the  combat  of  one  to  thirty  lasted, 
until  the  Arkansas,  cutting  her  way  through  the  enemy's  line  of 
massive  ships,  destroying  some  and  disabling  others,  passed,  shat 
tered,  but  nnconquered,  on  her  way  to  Yicksburg,  virtually  raising 
the  siege  of  that  hitherto  closely  blockaded  city. 

This  combat,  in  its  odds  and  results  without  a  parallel  in  naval 
warfare,  was  attended  with  great  loss  to  the  Confederates  in  killed 
and  wounded.  The  commander  of  the  Arkansas,  exposed  on  the 
shield  deck,  was  three  times  wounded :  once  by  a  Minie-ball, 
touching  him  over  the  left  temple;  then  by  a  contusion  on  the 
head  and  slight  wound  in  the  hand  and  shoulder ;  then,  struck  from 
the  deck  insensible,  he  was,  for  the  moment,  supposed  to  be  killed, 
but  he  regained  consciousness,  and,  dr.nntless  as  ever,  resumed  his 
place  and  command  till  the  end  of  the  battle.  Among  the 
wounded  was  Lieutenant  G.  "VV.  Gift,  who,  with  Grimball  of  South 
Carolina,  the  second  lieutenant,  ably  commanded  the  bow-guns. 
Lieutenant  Stevens,  the  executive  officer,  discharged  with  honor, 
both  in  preparation  for  and  during  the  action,  every  duty  of  his 
responsible  position.  Barbot,  Charles  Reid,  Wharton,  and  Dabney 
Scales,  lieutenants  wrho,  like  their  commander,  were  recently  from 
the  United  States  navy,  were  alike  distinguished  for  the  bravery 
and  precision  with  which  they  served  their  guns.  Captains  Har 
ris  and  McDonald,  of  a  Missouri  regiment,  with  sixty  of  their 
men,  volunteered  for  the  naval  service,  and  though  they  went  on 
board  only  forty-eight  hours  before  the  battle,  and  were  entirely 


372  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

unused  to  the  exercise  of  great  guns,  formed  an  effective  portion 
of  the  Arkansas' s  crew.  It  is  but  a  just  tribute  to  the  brave  men 
who  figured  in  this  engagement  to  add,  that  they  did  so,  knowing 
the  odds  against  them,  and  with  the  resolution,  inspired  by  a  short 
address  of  their  commander,  as  the  fight  was  about  to  begin,  to 
succeed  in  their  work  or  perish. 

The  conflict  here  so  briefly  sketched  took  place  in  close  prox 
imity  to  the  Federal  army  encamped  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
river,  but  not  in  view  of  the  city  of  Vicksburg.  The  solitary 
Confederate  ship  was  thus  within  hearing,  but  not  within  reach  of 
aid  from  her  friends. 

The  subsequent  history  of  the  Arkansas  may  be  given  in  a  few 
words.  On  the  evening  of  the  15th  (July),  the  day  of  the  double 
battle  above  Vicksburg,  she  engaged  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Farra- 
gut,  passing  Vicksburg,  and,  in  the  latter  action,  had  both  her  ar 
mor  and  machinery  further  damaged,  suffering  also  severely  in 
killed  and  wounded  among  men  and  officers.  A  week  later,  when 
the  crew  of  the  Arkansas  had  been  reduced  to  twenty-eight  men,  by 
sickness  and  the  detachment  of  the  Missouri  volunteers,  the  iron 
clad  Essex,  aided  by  the  strongest  ram  of  the  Federal  fleet,  attacked 
her.  Both  assailing  vessels,  though  running  into  the  Arkansas, 
were  repulsed,  but  with  a  loss  to  the  latter  of  half  her  crew,  killed 
by  the  cannon-shot  of  the  Essex.  Not  daring  to  make  another 
attack,  the  Union  forces  abandoned  the  blockade,  some  going  down 
and  others  up  the  river.  Unfortunately  the  damaged  condition 
of  the  Arkansas  would  not  allow  pursuit. 

Of  admirals  and  naval  commanders  who  have  achieved  exalted 
fame,  none  accomplished  a  more  fearless  feat,  with  a  better  result, 
than  the  commander  of  the  Confederate  iron-clad  Arkansas.  His 
name,  and,  coupled  with  it,  the  names  of  his  brave  officers,  merit 
lasting  honor  at  the  hands  of  the  South.  Nor  are  the  men  who 
formed  that  matchless  crew,  because  their  names  are  unchronicled, 
entitled  to  less  applause. 

On  the  20th  and  22d  of  May,  General  Villepigue  informed 
General  Beauregard  that  the  enemy  had  sent  to  Fort  Pillow  two 
hundred  prisoners,  most  of  whom  were  sick  with  smallpox,  and 
who  had  been  received,  without  his  authority,  by  the  second  offi 
cer  in  command.  Believing,  as  did  also  General  Villepigue,  that 
this  would  result  in  communicating  that  terrible  disease  to  the 
garrison,  and  thereby  destroy  its  effectiveness,  General  Beauregard 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  373 

at  once  telegraphed,  "return  them  forthwith."  But  Commodore 
Davis,  of  the  United  States  navy,  peremptorily  refused  to  take 
them  back.  They  were  then  cared  for  by  General  Yillepigue, 
and  placed,  with  great  difficulty,  in  separate  quarters,  under  the 
intelligent  and  devoted  supervision  of  Doctor  C.  II.  Tcbault,  of 
Louisiana,  then  a  surgeon  in  the  Confederate  army.  He  wrote  an 
interesting  paper  on  the  subject,  detailing  all  its  circumstances : 
but  this  document,  to  our  regret,  is  not  in  our  possession. 

Foreseeing  the  necessity  of  withdrawing  his  forces  from  Corinth, 
and  having,  in  fact,  resolved  to  adopt  that  course  within  a  short 
time,  General  Beauregard  began  to  prepare  General  Villepigue 
for  the  event;  not  that  Fort  Pillow  was  then  in  any  immediate 
danger,  for  the  enemy  had  no  land  forces  to  spare  for  operations 
against  it,  but  because  a  retrograde  movement  from  Corinth  neces 
sarily  involved  the  evacuation  of  the  fort.  lie,  therefore,  on  the 
25th,  telegraphed  to  General  Villepigue  that  "  whenever  the  place, 
in  his  judgment,  should  become  untenable,  he  must  destroy  the 
works  and  armaments,  and  evacuate  it,  as  already  instructed  ;  re 
pairing  to  Grenada,  by  the  shortest  route,  for  the  protection  of 
the  depot;  giving  timely  notice  of  the  same  to  Fort  Randolph  and 
to  Memphis." 

Three  days  afterwards,  and  when  the  precise  moment  of  the  re 
treat  from  Corinth  had  been  decided  upon  (as  will  be,  hereafter, 
more  fully  developed),  General  Beauregard  forwarded  the  follow- 
iii"1  instructions  to  General  Villepigue: 

f>  1C? 

"  IIi-:.\i>Qr.\uTi-:ns  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

CORINTH,  May  28M,  18G2. 
"  Brigadier-General  J.  B.  YII.LEPIGUE,  Comdg.  at  Fort  Pillow,  Tcnn.  : 

41  General, — Wishing  to  take  the  enemy  further  into  the  interior,  where  I 
hope  to  be  able  to  strike  him  a  severe  blow,  which  cannot  be  done  here,  where 
he  is  so  close  to  his  supplies,  I  have  concluded  to  withdraw  on  the  30th  instant 
from  this  place  for  the  present,  before  he  compels  me  to  do  so  by  his  superi 
ority  of  numbers.  The  evacuation  of  this  place  necessarily  involves  that  of 
your  present  position,  which  you  have  so  long  and  gallantly  defended.  Hence, 
I  have  this  day  telegraphed  you  that,  whenever  the  enemy  shall  have  crossed 
the  Ilatchic  River,  at  Pocahontas  or  elsewhere,  on  his  way  westward,  you  will 
immediately  evacuate  Fort  Pillow  for  Grenada,  by  the  best  and  shortest  route. 

"  Should  you,  however,  consider  it  necessary  for  the  safety  of  your  command 
to  evacuate  Fort  Pillow  before  the  enemy  shall  have  crossed  the  Hatchie,  you 
lire  left  at  liberty  to  do  so,  having  entire  confidence  in  your  judgment  and 
ability,  not  being  able  to  judge  from  here  of  your  facilities  for  reaching  Ore- 


374  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

nada.  I  am  of  opinion,  however,  that  he  will  venture  slowly  and  cautiously 
westward,  so  long  as  I  shall  remain  within  striking  distance  of  him,  on  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  at  or  about  Baldwin.  It  may  be  well  for  you 
to  know  that  the  telegraph  communication  from  there  to  Memphis  will  be 
completed  before  a  week  or  ten  days. 

"  Whenever  you  shall  be  about  to  abandon  the  fort,  you  will  telegraph  the 
commanding  officer  at  Memphis  to  burn  all  the  cotton,  sugar,  etc.,  in  the  vicin 
ity  of  that  city,  as  per  my  instructions  already  communicated  to  him. 

"  You  will  necessarily  destroy  all  government  property,  arms,  guns,  etc., 
that  you  will  not  be  able  to  carry  off  with  you ;  and  on  arriving  at  Grenada, 
you  will  assume  immediate  command  of  all  troops  there  assembled,  to  organize 
and  discipline  them.  You  might  also  throw  up  some  light  wrorks  (batteries 
and  rifle-pits),  for  the  defence  of  that  important  position  against  a  small  force 
of  the  enemy.  I  have  thought  it  advisable  to  give  you  the  above  instructions 
in  view  of  the  probability  that  I  may  not  be  able  shortly  to  communicate 
with  you. 

u  Hoping  you  may  continue  to  meet  with  success  in  the  defence  of  our  cause 
and  country, 

"  I  remain,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gen.  Comdg/' 

The  telegram  referred  to  above,  as  being  forwarded  on  the 
same  date,  read  thus  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

CORINTH,  May  2Sth,  1862. 
'•  Brigadier-General  J.  B.  VILLEPIGUE,  Comdg.  Fort  Pillow : 

"We  are  to  retire  from  here  south.  Make  preparations  to  abandon  Fort 
Pillow  when  forces  at  Grand  Junction  retire  from  there,  which  commandant  is 
ordered  to  communicate  to  you  and  to  execute  when  the  enemy  crosses  Hat- 
chic  River  from  here,  at  Pocahontas  or  elsewhere. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

To  complete  the  record  of  this  episode  of  the  southwestern  cam 
paign — although  by  so  doing  the  course  of  this  narrative  is  an 
ticipated — it  must  be  stated  here  that  Fort  Pillow  was  successfully 
evacuated  about  the  1st  of  June,  and  that  its  gallant  commander, 
after  complying,  so  far  as  he  could,  with  the  instructions  given 
him,  was  subsequently  sent  to  Port  Hudson,  where,  not  long  after 
wards,  he  unfortunately  died — not  in  battle,  as  he  would  have 
wished  —  but  of  fever,  the  result  of  too  great  exposure  to  the 
weather,  and  over-fatigue  in  the  performance  of  his  laborious 
duties.  He  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  and  an  officer  of  great 
intelligence,  perseverance,  and  bravery;  never  despondent  under 
difficulties ;  never  shrinking  from  responsibility.  He  had  many 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  375 

traits  of  resemblance  to  General  Bee,  who,  like  himself,  was  a 
South  Carolinian.  Both  of  them  would,  no  doubt,  have  attained 
the  highest  rank  in  the  Confederate  service,  had  their  lives  been 
spared  to  the  end  of  the  war. 

During  the  occurrence  of  events  of  so  momentous  a  character, 
between  the  middle  of  February  and  the  Cth  of  April,  and  upon 
which  hung  the  fate  of  the  entire  southwestern  part  of  the  Con 
federacy,  it  was — and  is — to  some  a  matter  of  no  small  surprise 
that  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  the  commander  of  the  whole  depart 
ment,  interposed  neither  advice  nor  authority,  nor  even  made  in 
quiry  as  to  the  enemy's  designs,  or  our  plans  to  foil  them.  Such 
silence,  on  the  part  of  one  whose  love  of  the  cause  precludes  all 
idea  of  indifference,  omission,  or  neglect,  can  only  be  explained  by 
the  fact  that  he  placed  implicit  reliance  upon  General  Beaure- 
gaixTs  ability  to  cope,  unassisted,  with  the  difficulties  of  the  situa 
tion,  and  successfully  direct  any  and  all  movements  originating 
within  the  limits  of  his  military  district.  The  telegrams  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  dated  February  10th  and  ISth,  confirm  this  inter 
pretation.  "  You  must  do  as  your  judgment  dictates."  And 
ngain  :  "  You  must  now  act  as  seems  best  to  yon.  The  separation 
of  our  armies  is,  for  the  present,  complete." 


376  MILITARY    OPERATIONS   OF 


CHAPTEE  XXIV. 

Troops  Resume  their  Former  Positions  after  the  Battle  of  Shiloh. — General 
Breckinridge  Forms  the  Rear  Guard. — General  Beauregard  Recommends 
General  Bragg  for  Promotion. — Preliminary  Report  Sent  by  General  Beau- 
regard,  April  llth,  to  the  War  Department. — Difficulty  of  Obtaining  Re 
ports  of  Corps  Commanders. — Their  Reports  sent  Directly  to  the  War  De 
partment. — Inaccuracies  Resulting  Therefrom. — General  Beauregard  Pro 
poses  an  Exchange  of  Prisoners. — General  Pope  Gives  no  Satisfactory  An 
swer. — General  Van  Dorn's  Forces  Reach  Memphis  on  the  llth. — Despatch 
of  the  12th  to  General  Smith. — A  Diversion  Movement  Determined  upon 
by  General  Beauregard. — Captain  John  Morgan. — He  is  Sent  by  General 
Beauregard  into  Middle  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. —  Efforts  to  Force 
Bucll's  Return  to  those  States. — Location  of  General  Van  Dorn's  Forces 
at  Corinth ;  of  Generals  Bragg's,  Folk's,  and  Breckinridge's. — Bad  Wa 
ter. — Mismanagement  of  Commissary  Department. — Necessity  of  With 
drawing  from  Corinth. — Tupelo  Selected  for  next  Defensive  Position. — 
General  Beauregard  Resolves  to  Construct  Defensive  Works  Around 
Vicksburg. — General  Pope  Takes  Farmiugtou. — Confederate  Attack. — 
Federal  Retreat. — On  the  25th  General  Beauregard  Calls  a  Council  of 
War.— Evacuation  of  Corinth  Resolved  Upon. — General  Beauregard's  In 
structions  to  his  Corps  Commanders. — Dispositions  Taken  to  Deceive  the 
Enemy. —  Retreat  Successfully  Accomplished. — False  Despatches  of  the 
Enemy. — Correct  Account  by  Correspondents. — General  Force  in  Error. — 
Retreat  Considered  Masterly. — Dissatisfaction  of  the  War  Department. — 
Interrogatories  Sent  by  President  Davis. — General  BeauregaixTs  Answer. 

AFTER  the  battle  of  Shiloh  the  Confederate  troops  resumed 
their  former  positions,  except  the  forces  under  General  Breckin 
ridge,  composing  the  rear  guard,  which  for  several  days  remained 
at  Mickey's  house,*  some  three  or  four  miles  from  the  battle 
field,  until  proper  dispositions  of  the  cavalry  could  be  made  for 
their  withdrawal.  Chalmers's  brigade,  at  Monterey,  was  also  with 
drawn  at  that  time  to  a  position  nearer  to  Corinth. 

On  the  day  following  the  retreat,  General  Beauregard  madeap- 

*  General  Force,  in  his  book,  "  From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth,"  p.  182,  says  : 
"  .  .  .  Breckinridge  remained  at  Mickey's  three  days,  guarding  the  rear,  and 
by  the  end  of  the  week  Beauregard's  army  was  again  in  Corinth.  The  battle 
sobered  both  armies." 


GENERAL  BEAUHEGARD.  377 

plication  to  the  War  Department  for  two  additional  major-gen 
erals,  four  brigadier-generals,  and  a  competent  chief  of  artillery. 
lie  also,  in  the  same  despatch,  urgently  recommended  Major- 
General  Bragg  for  promotion.  His  gallant  behavior  on  the  battle 
field  had  justified  General  Beauregard  in  the  hope  that,  as  an 
army  commander,  lie  would  show  more  than  ordinary  ability. 
That  he  was  a  conscientious  officer  and  a  hard  fighter,  though  too 
rigid  a  disciplinarian  at  times,  is  known  to  all,  especially  to  those 
who  served  directly  under  him. 

Under  the  same  date  (April  Sth)  a  telegram  was  forwarded  bv 
General  Beauregard  to  the  Adjutant-General's  office  at  Ilichmond, 
giving  an  account  of  the  second  day's  battle  ;  and  shortly  after 
wards  (April  llth)  a  preliminary  report*  was  likewise  sent  by  him, 
for  the  immediate  use  of  the  War  Department.  It  was  incomplete, 
and,  in  many  respects,  imperfect,  as  it  was  written  on  the  spur  of 
the  moment,  for  the  instant  information  of  the  government,  and 
before  any  of  the  reports  of  the  corps  commanders  had  yet  reached 
army  headquarters.  General  Beaurcgard's  intention  was  to  write 
a  full  and  final  narrative  of  the  battle  (as  he  had  done  of  the  bat 
tle  of  Manassas),  for  the  files  of  the  "War  Department,  as  soon  as 
these  reports  should  be  forwarded  to  him  ;  but,  for  reasons  still 
unexplained,  he  never  saw  them  until  the  winter  of  lSG3-64,f 
when  the  rapid  and  exciting  events  we  were  then  passing  through 
prevented  him  from  devoting  any  time  to  the  preparation  of  that  im 
portant  document.  It  may  not  be  useless  briefly  to  notice  here,  what 
there  is  of  marked  significance  in  the  incident  just  touched  upon. 

From  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  until  General  Beauregard 
was  relieved  of  the  command  of  the  army  at  Tupelo,  in  June1, 
18G2,  he  frequently  called  on  Generals  Polk,  Brngg,  Ilardee,  and 
Brcckinridge,  for  their  reports  of  the  battle,  but  always  in  vain  ; 
their  constant  answer  being  that  they  had  been  unable,  as  yet,  to 
get  official  detailed  information  from  the  regiment,  brigade,  and 
division  commanders  under  them.  The  consequence  was,  that  the 
reports  we  refer  to  were  not  transmitted  until  many  months  after 
the  battle,  and  one  of  them — General  Folk's — was  delayed  until 
nearly  a  year  had  elapsed.  They  were  all  addressed  to  the  War 


*  This  Report  is  ijiven  in  full  in  the  Appendix  to  Chapter  XX. 
t  General  Be  an  regard  has  never  seen  General  Brcckinridge's  Report,  not- 
Avithstanding  repeated  efforts  to  procure  it,  both  during  and  after  the  war. 


378  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

Department,  without  passing  through  the  regular  channel;  in  other 
words,  without  being  first  submitted  to  General  Beauregard,  who 
was  thus  deprived  of  his  unquestionable  right  of  correction,  ap 
proval,  or  disapproval.  And  we  will  further  state  that  General 
Bragg's  report,  though  transmitted,  as  were  the  others,  without  the 
commanding  general's  endorsement,  bore  date  April  30th,  1862, 
as  if  regularly  made  to  General  Beauregard,  through  Colonel 
Thomas  Jordan,  his  Chief  of  Staff,  when,  in  reality,  it  was  not  com 
pleted  and  despatched  from  army  headquarters  until  the  25th  of 
July,  1862.*  None  of  the  general  officers  who  thus  openly  violated 
the  well-established  rule  of  military  etiquette  were  ignorant  of  its 
acknowledged  necessity.  From  the  Adjutant-General  at  Rich 
mond,  who  received  the  documents  thus  irregularly  transmitted, 
to  the  very  corps  commanders  who  forwarded  them,  all  were 
trained  soldiers,  all,  except  General  Breckinridge,  had  belonged  to 
the  Regular  army  before  the  war,  where  "  red-tape  "  routine,  in 
every  military  bureau,  had  ever  been  strictly  insisted  upon  and  in 
variably  practised.  It  was  by  the  act  of  a  friend  f  that  General 
Beauregard's  attention  was  attracted  to  the  singular  manner  in 

O  O 

which  these  reports  had  been  written  and  sent  to  the  War  Depart 
ment.  And  he  had  cognizance  of  them  only  after  repeatedly  ap 
plying  for  copies,  which  were  finally  furnished  him  from  Rich 
mond,  but  unaccompanied  by  any  of  the  subordinate  reports  pur 
porting  to  substantiate  them.  The  result  is,  that  the  official 
reports  of  the  corps  commanders  at  Shiloh  (with  the  exception  of 
General  Breckin ridge's,  which  we  have  never  seen),  instead  of 
serving  as  a  basis  for  history,  are,  on  the  contrary,  erroneous  in 
many  important  particulars,  and  differ  widely  from  those  of  the 
other  generals  and  subordinate  officers  who  participated  in  the 
battle,  as  we  have  already  conclusively  shown.J 

Commodore  Hollins,  on  duty  near  Fort  Pillow,  was  requested, 
on  the  8th,  to  propose  an  exchange  of  prisoners  in  General  Beau- 
regard's  name.  Most  of  those  wre  had  taken  immediately  before 
and  since  the  battle  of  Shiloh  had  been  sent  temporarily  to  Mem- 

*  "  Campaigns  of  Lieutenant-General  Forrest,"'  p.  134,  note. 

f  That  friend  was  General  Breckinridge,  who,  in  a  letter  to  General  Beaure 
gard,  stated  that  the  corps  commanders  had  been  instructed  to  address  their 
reports  directly  to  the  War  Department,  and  that  General  Beauregard  had 
better  ascertain  the  contents  of  those  documents. 

I  See  Chapters  XX.  and  XXII.,  and  their  Appendices. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGAKD.  379 

phis,  to  be  forwarded  thence  to  Tuscaloosa,  Alabama,  where  it  was 
thought  they  might  find  better  accommodations.  General  Pope 
made  an  evasive  answer  to  General  Beauregard's  overture,  and 
nothing  satisfactory  was  effected.'5'"  It  was  about  the  same  time 
that  General  Beauregard  wrote  to  General  Grant  concerning  the 
burial  of  the  Confederate  dead  on  the  field  of  Shiloh,  and  sent  to 
him,  under  flag  of  truce,  a  mounted  party,  accompanied  by  several 
citizens,  especially  from  Louisiana,  who  were  anxious  to  recover 
and  give  proper  interment  to  the  remains  of  near  relatives  known 
to  have  fallen  during  the  battle.  General  Grant  denied  the  priv 
ilege  thus  requested,  and  said  that  he  had  already  performed  that 
sad  duty  to  our  dead,  and  was  taking  all  necessary  care  of  the 
wounded. 

On  the  llth,  that  is  to  say,  four  days  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh, 
General  Van  Dorn's  forces  began  to  enter  Memphis,  Major-Gen 
eral  Price's  division  arriving  first.  General  llust's  brigade  was 
immediately  sent  to  Fort  Pillow,  as  already  explained,  and  General 
Little's  command  ordered  to  Eicnzi,  some  twelve  miles  from  Cor 
inth,  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  for  the  purpose  of  making 
a  reconnoissance  and  securing  a  good  encampment  and  suitable 
defensive  positions  in  case  of  a  retrograde  movement  in  that  di 
rection. 

On  the  day  following,  Major-General  E.  K.  Smith,  then  com 
manding  in  east  Tennessee,  received  from  General  Beauregard  a 
despatch,  in  these  terms: 

"  CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  12^,  18G2. 
'•  Major-General  E.  K.  SMITH,  Comdcf.  Knoxvillc,  Term. : 

"  Six  regiments  on  way  from  General  Pembertou,  South  Carolina,  to  join 
me.  Three  of  yours  failed  to  get  by  Iluntsvillc.  Could  you  not  gather  the 
nine,  add  artillery,  and  push  on  Iluntsvillc,  taking  enemy  in  reverse  ?  All 
quiet  in  front. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

The  South  Carolina  regiments  above  mentioned  were  being  sent 
by  the  War  Department,  at  the  request  of  General  Beauregard, 
to  reinforce  him  at  or  near  Corinth.  The  burning  of  a  bridge  on 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  prevented  the  execution  of 
this  plan,  and  different  orders  were  issued  in  regard  to  them. 

*  Sec  General  Yillcpigue's  telegram  to  General  Bcauregurd,  in  Appendix  to 
Chapter  XXIII. 


380  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

The  thread  of  our  narrative  would  be  too  disconnected  and  its 
interest  impaired  were  we  to  follow  too  closely,  in  their  order, 
the  various  events  that  occurred  daring  the  first  two  weeks  af 
ter  the  retreat  of  the  Confederate  forces  to  Corinth.  But  the  Ap 
pendix  to  this  chapter  will  impart  all  such  additional  information 
as  cannot  be  appropriately  inserted  within  the  limits  of  the  text. 
Reference  is  here  made  particularly  to  General  Beauregard's 
instructions  to  Generals  Breckinridge  and  Chalmers,  at  Mickey's 
house  and  Monterey;  to  the  list  of  officers  forwarded  to  the  Presi 
dent  for  promotion ;  to  his  further  correspondence  with  General 
Grant  relative  to  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  and  the  distinction 
to  be  made  between  colonels  commanding  brigades  and  brigadier- 
generals  duly  commissioned  as  such ;  also,  to  the  difference  to  be 
established  between  medical  officers  and  other  officers  of  the  Con 
federate  and  Federal  armies. 

Perhaps  the  most  difficult  feat  to  accomplish  in  war  is  to  com 
pel  an  adversary  to  abandon  the  movement  upon  which  he  is  en 
gaged  and  adopt  another  by  which  his  plans  may  be  eventually 
frustrated.  Such  a  diversion,  even  with  a  well-trained  army,  pos 
sessing  every  requisite  for  rapid  motion,  requires  more  than  ordi 
nary  skill  on  the  part  of  the  general  devising  it.  Greater  still  is 
the  hazard  of  the  undertaking,  when  that  army  is,  as  compared  to 
the  one  confronting  it,  weaker  in  numbers,  reduced  by  disease, 
and  wanting  in  the  necessary  means  of  transportation. 

An  effort  of  this  kind,  however,  was  determined  upon  by 
General  Beaureirard,  as  soon  as  it  became  evident  to  him  that 

O  ? 

his  inferior  forces  were  no  match  for  the  too  powerful  and 
daily  increasing  army  under  General  Halleck.  "With  a  view  to 
this,  Generals  Van  Dorn  and  Price  were  invited  to  a  conference 
at  Corinth,  ahead  of  their  troops,  then  hourly  arriving  in  Mem 
phis. 

A  promising  cavalry  officer,  Captain  John  II.  Morgan,  com 
manding  two  Kentucky  companies  belonging  to  General  A.  S. 
Johnston's  army,  with  which  he  had  arrived  from  Bowling  Green, 
had  highly  distinguished  himself,  during  the  retreat  to  Corinth, 
by  his  great  energy  and  efficiency.  lie  had  kept  the  command 
ing  general  thoroughly  advised  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy, 
and  had  performed  many  acts  indicating  high  military  ability. 
Having  thus  had  occasion  to  judge  of  his  capacity  and  resources, 
General  Beauregard  resolved  to  send  him,  with  four  companies  of 


GENERAL   BEAUKEGARD.  381 

cavalry,*  into  middle  Tennessee  and  Kentucky;  there  to  cause  as 
much  damage  as  possible  to  the  enemy's  railroads,  bridges,  and 
telegraph  lines,  lie  was  authorized  to  raise  his  battalion  to  a 
regiment  and  even  to  a  brigade,  if  he  could.  General  Beauregard 
supplied  him.  with  a  sum  of  fifteen  thousand  dollars,  f  to  start 
with,  and  carry  him  into  Kentucky,  where  he  was,  eventually,  to 
live  on  the  enemy.  This  was  the  beginning  of  the  brilliant  career 
of  that  intrepid  partisan  officer.  His  usefulness  was  afterwards 
greatly  impaired  when  General  Bragg  attempted  to  make  of  him 
and  his  renowned  brigade  part  of  a  regular  command  of  cavalry. 
Upon  the  recommendation  of  General  Beauregard,  he  was  pro 
moted  to  the  rank  of  colonel  before  he  had  organized  his  regi 
ment  ;  and  when  he  left,  with  his  four  companies,  upon  his 
hazardous  expedition,  he  was  furnished  by  General  Beauregard 
with  one  of  the  ablest  telegraph  operators  in  the  service — Mr. 
Ellsworth — in  order  that  he  might  bewilder  the  enemy — as  he 
so  effectually  did  —  by  sending  false  despatches  from  the  vari 
ous  telegraph  stations  during  his  raids  into  Tennessee  and  Ken 
tucky. 

General  Beauregard  hoped  that  this  expedition  under  Colonel 
Morgan,  together  with  the  operations  in  Kentucky  suggested  by 
General  E.  Kirby  Smith,  and  strongly  urged  by  General  Beaure 
gard  on  the  War  Department,}  would  force  General  llalleck,  who 
was  plodding  away  slowly  in  his  advance  on  Corinth,  to  send  back 
a  part,  if  not  all,  of  General  Buell's  army  into  Tennessee  and  Ken 
tucky.  A  third  expedition  of  two  regiments  of  cavalry,  under 
Colonels  Claiborne  and  Jackson,  was  also  thought  of  and  organ 
ized  against  Paducah,  western  Kentucky,  to  aid  in  the  same  pur 
pose,  and  would  have  been  a  great  success  but  for  the  notorious 
incapacity  of  the  officer  in  command. §  However,  General  Beau- 
regard  was  not  wholly  disappointed  in  his  expectations  with  re 
gard  to  his  diversion  movements,  for,  immediately  after  the  evac 
uation  of  Corinth  by  the  Confederate  army  (May  30th),  General 

*  Two  of  which  were  his  own,  and  the  two  others  under  Captain,  afterwards 
Colonel,  Robert  T.  Wood,  of  New  Orleans,  a  grandson  of  General  Zachary 
Taylor. 

t  Sec,  in  Appendix,  letter  of  General  Beauregard  to  Major  McLean,  dated 
April  24th,  18C2. 

I  See  his  telegrams  of  April  14th,  to  Generals  Cooper  and  E.  K.  Smith. 

§  See,  in  Appendix,  General  Beauregard's  instructions  to  Colonel  Claiborne. 


382  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

Btiell's  entire  force  was  ordered  into  middle  Tennessee  and  Ken 
tucky. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  rest  of  General  Yan  Dorn's  forces  at  Cor 
inth  they  were  located — including  General  Little's  brigade  from 
Rienzi — on  the  right  and  rear  of  the  defensive  lines,  along  the 
south  side  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Eailroad,  on  several 
small  heights  which  commanded  the  approaches  to  the  lines,  and 
afforded  a  good  position  for  taking  in  flank  any  attack  of  the 
Federals  in  that  direction.  Those  lines  extended  about  three 
miles  in  advance  of  Corinth,  from  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Railroad,  on  the  right,  to  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  on  the 
left,  and  were  situated  on  rather  high  grounds  immediately  in  rear 
of  a  small  creek,  forming  the  head-waters  of  Bridge  Creek,  with 
somewhat  swampy  sides.  They  had  been  located  by  General 
Bragg  and  his  engineers,  before  General  Beauregard  reached  Cor 
inth,  and  were  defective  on  the  left,  near  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
Railroad  ;  thereby  giving  decided  advantage  to  the  enemy  at  that 
point.  They  were  subsequently  corrected  by  General  Beauregard, 
but,  in  view  of  the  time  and  labor  already  bestowed  on  them, 
were  not  sufficiently  altered  entirely  to  remedy  their  original  de 
fect* 

General  Hardce's  corps  extended  along  and  from  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Railroad,  in  front  of  General  Yan  Dorn's  position, 
to  the  left,  where  it  rested  on  the  right  of  General  Bragg,  whose 
left  in  turn  rested  on  the  right  of  General  Folk's  corps,  stretching 
across  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad.  The  left  of  this  command 
occupied  some  woods  protected  by  abatis  and  rifle-pits :  each  corps 
holding  a  few  brigades  in  reserve. 

General  Breckinridge's  division  formed  a  general  reserve,  and 
was  posted  at  first  on  or  near  the  seminary  hill  (if  we  may  so  call 
it)  immediately  in  rear  of  Corinth,  which  is  situated  at  the  inter 
section  of  the  two  railroads  already  mentioned. 

Our  small  force  of  cavalry  was  stationed  on  the  flanks  of  the 
lines,  with  part  of  it  in  front,  to  guard  the  approaches  to  Corinth. 

General  Ilalleck,  notwithstanding  his  large  superiority  in  num 
bers,  was  too  cautious  to  bring  about  an  immediate  conflict  be 
tween  the  two  opposing  forces.  lie  preferred  advancing  slowly 

*  The  lines  referred  to  were  mostly  armed  with  42-,  32-,  and  24-pounders, 
brought  from  Pensacola  and  Mobile. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  383 

and  gradually ;  a  method  which  might  have  answered  against  a 
well-fortified  position,  held  by  a  correspondingly  strong  garrison, 
but  which,  under  the  circumstances,  exhibited,  on  his  part,  most 
extraordinary  prudence,  and  even  timidity. 

Meanwhile,  the  deficiency  in  good  water,  and  the  natural  un- 
healthfulness  of  the  place,  began  to  tell  sadly  on  the  Confederate 
officers  and  men.  They  were,  moreover,  but  scantily  supplied 
with  food,  and  that  of  an  inferior  quality.  This  was  owing  to  the 
chronic  mismanagement  of  the  Chief  Commissary  at  Richmond, 
a  fact  which  General  Beauregard  had  more  than  once  pointed  out 
to  the  War  Department,  and  which  he  again  brought  home  to  it 
by  the  following  despatch  :* 

'•CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  24M,  18G2. 
"  General  S.  COOPER,  Adjutant-General,  Richmond  : 

"  The  false  views  of  administration — to  say  the  least — of  Colonel  Northrop 
will  starve  out  this  army  unless  I  make  other  arrangements,  which  I  have 
done.  I  trust  it  may  not  be  altogether  too  late,  and  that  the  government  will 
sustain  me  with  means. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gen.  Conulg." 

The  truth  is,  it  was  almost  impossible  to  have  regular  issues  of 
fresh  provisions  made  to  the  Confederate  troops  at  that  time,  until 
General  Beauregard  took  the  matter  into  his  own  hands,  and  sent 
agents  to  northern  Texas  and  Arkansas,  where  he  bought  large  herds 
of  cattle,  which  soon  relieved  the  pressing  necessities  of  his  army. 
Part  of  these  supplies,  however,  he  was  afterwards  compelled  to 
transfer  to  the  General  Subsistence  Department,  for  other  armies 
in  the  field. 

It  soon  became  apparent  to  General  Beauregard  that  the  insa 
lubrity  of  Corinth  would  increase  as  the  season  advanced,  and  that, 
apart  from  the  danger  of  being  overwhelmed  by  a  steadily  grow 
ing  army  in  his  front,  he  would  have  to  select  another  strategic 
position,  by  which  he  could  hold  the  enemy  in  check  and  protect 
the  country  in  his  rear  as  well  as  Fort  Pillow,  which  still  closed 
the  passage  of  the  river.  The  idea  of  moving  westward,  to  Grand 
Junction, f  had  at  first  been  entertained;  but  the  lack  of  good  wa 
ter  there,  and  the  fear  of  losing  Fort  Pillow,  fifty-nine  miles  above 


*  See  also,  in  Appendix,  letter  of  General  Beauregard  to  General  Cooper, 
dated  April  IGth,  18G2. 

t  At  the  intersection  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  with  the  Mis 
sissippi  Central,  fifty  miles  west  of  Corinth. 


384:  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

Memphis,  led  to  a  change  of  plan.  E"or  must  it  be  forgotten  that 
the  defences  and  river  batteries  at  Vicksburg  were  then  just  be 
gun,  as  we  have  already  shown, *  and  that,  Fort  Pillow  falling,  noth 
ing  could  prevent  the  enemy  from  enjoying  the  free  use  of  the 
Mississippi  as  far  down  as  New  Orleans,  where  a  base  of  abun 
dant  supplies  would,  no  doubt,  soon  be  established.  These  consid 
erations  impelled  General  Beauregard  to  hold  on  to  his  position  at 
Corinth  until  forced  from  it  by  his  adversary. 

Meanwhile,  he  caused  thorough  reconnoissances  to  be  made 
along  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  for  a  good  defensive  position, 
well  supplied  with  pure  water,  and  occupying  a  healthy  region  of 
country.  None  could  be  found  nearer  than  Tupelo,  where  begins 
the  fertile  and  salubrious  "black-land"  region  of  Mississippi. 

There  were  not  many  running  springs  at  Tupelo,  but  excellent 
water  could  be  had  by  digging  wTells  from  ten  to  fifteen  feet  deep. 
He  ordered  them  dug  at  once,  where  it  was  probable  the  troops 
would  take  up  their  positions,  in  rear  of  some  low  lands,  easily 
defended  and  of  difficult  passage  to  an  army  on  the  offensive. 

It  was  during  these  reconnoissances  and  preparations  that  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  first  turned  his  attention  to  the  necessity  of  de 
fending  Vicksburg,  as  has  already  been  shown  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  by  the  telegrams  and  letters  contained  in  it  and  its  Ap 
pendix.  That  to  him,  and  neither  to  General  Lovell  nor  to  Gov 
ernor  Pettus,  is  due  the  credit  of  having  originated  the  idea  of 
this  defence,  is  further  proved  by  the  following  telegrams: 

1.  "  CORINTH,  April  18th,  1862, 
"  Major-General  M.  LOVELL,  New  Orleans,  La. : 

"  Have  seen  Lieutenant  Brown.  Have  ordered  a  work  at  Vicksburg.  Please 
hold  ready  to  send  there  sand -bags,  guns,  carriages,  platforms,  etc.,  when 
called  for  by  Chief-Engineer,  Captain  D.  B.  Harris. 

u  Have  you  constructed  traverses  and  blindages  at  your  forts  ? 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

2.  «  CORINTH,  April  23t/,  1802. 
"  General  S.  COOPER,  Adjutant-General,  Richmond,  Va. : 

"  Services  of  General  Sam.  Jones  are  absolutely  required  here  as  soon  as 
practicable.  Having  obtained  guns  for  Vicksburg,  am  going  to  fortify  it.  But 
require  engineers.  I  recommend  John  M.  Reid,  Louisiana,  as  captain,  and  J. 
II.  Reid,  Louisiana,  as  lieutenant.  Am  well  acquainted  with  them,  they  hav 
ing  worked  many  years  under  my  orders. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 


!.Sce  Chapter  XXIII. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  385 

3.  "  CORINTH,  April  24^,  1862. 
"  Major-General  M.  LOVELL,  New  Orleans,  La. : 

"  T\vo  10-inch  and  four  rifled  guns  are  under  orders  to  you  from  Mobile. 
Do  you  want  tlieui  ?  If  not,  say  so  to  General  S.  Jones,  and  order  them  to 
Vicksburg. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

4.  "  CORINTH,  April  25f/<,  18G2. 
"  Captain  D.  B.  HARRIS  : 

"  In  consequence  of  news  from  Louisiana,  put  works  Jjelow  Vicksburg,  to 
prevent  passage  of  river  from  New  Orleans.  Put  guns  in  position  first,  then 
construct  works.  System  preferred  is  one  main  work,  and  detached  batteries, 
not  too  far  from  each  other.  Should  you  not  have  time,  send  guns  to  Jack 
son,  Mississippi,  and  be  ready  to  destroy  railroad  between  two  places,  when 
necessary. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

5.  "  CORINTH,  April  2CM,  18G2. 
"  Governor  J.  J.  PETTUS,  Jackson,  Miss. : 

"Please  send  immediately  to  Vicksburg,  to  report  to  commanding  officer 
there,  one  regiment  of  unarmed  or  partially  armed  volunteers.  Also,  one  to 
Columbus,  Mississippi.  They  will  be  armed  as  soon  as  possible. 

UG.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

It  is  needless  to  accumulate  further  evidence.  Other  telegrams 
and  letters  to  the  same  effect  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix  to 
this  chapter. 

On  his  arrival  near  Pittsburg  Landing,  General  Pope  established 
himself  behind  Seven  Miles  Creek,  a  stream  that  lies  seven  miles 
from  the  Tennessee  River.  The  Federal  forces,  as  then  reorgan 
ized,  subdivided,  and  located,  amounted,  as  we  have  already 
stated,  to  about  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  men,  with 
General  Ilalleck,  as  first,  and  General  Grant,  as  second,  in  com 
mand.*  The  Confederate  army,  under  General  Beau  regard,  with 
the  reinforcement  of  Van  Dorn's  seventeen  thousand  men,  num 
bered  about  fifty  thousand,  but  was  daily  decreasing  on  account 
of  sickness. 

General  Pope's  recent  successes  on  the  Mississippi  River  had 
given  him  an  overweening  opinion  of  his  capacities  as  a  com 
mander,  lie  was  an  officer  of  intelligence  and  activity,  but  in 
clined  to  "undertake  almost  any  movement  without  sufficiently 
considering  the  consequences  that  might  follow.  The  expression 


*  Sec  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  by  Van  Home,  vol.  i.  pp. 
126-130. 
I.— 25 


386  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

used  by  him  in  his  first  order,  upon  taking  command  in  Virginia 
—"Headquarters  in  the  Saddle" — which  is  even  more  than  a 
boastful  cavalry  officer  might  venture  to  announce,  is  indicative 
of  the  undue  self-esteem  characterizing  the  man. 

O 

Hardly  had  he  taken  up  his  new  position  in  front  of  Hamburg, 
when,  in  order,  no  doubt,  to  hurry  on  and  anticipate  General 
Ilalleck's  advance  against  our  forces,  he  determined  to  make  an 
offensive  movement  towards  Corinth.  Four  miles  from  the  latter 
place  was  an  elevated  position,  where  stood  the  small  village  of 
Farmington,  then  occupied  by  an  insignificant  force  of  Confeder 
ate  infantry  and  cavalry,  with  one  battery  of  artillery.  That  force 
was  suddenly  attacked  on  the  3d  of  May,  by  one  or  two  Federal 
divisions,  and  driven  back  across  a  narrow  creek,  west,  and  in  the 
near  vicinity,  of  Farmington. 

General  Pope,  ambitious  now  to  accomplish  something  worthy 
of  the  reputation  he  had  acquired  at  New  Madrid  and  Madrid 
Bend,  moved  on  the  8th,  with  his  whole  force,  on  the  above-men 
tioned  village.  As  he  was  entirely  separated  from  General  Buell, 
on  his  right,  by  the  head  of  Seven  Miles  Creek,  which  was  lined 
with  low,  swampy  grounds,  rendered  difficult  to  cross  by  recent 
rains,  General  Beauregard  determined,  by  a  sudden  and  rapid  at 
tack  in  heavy  force,  to  cut  him  off  from  his  base,  before  he  could 
fortify  his  position  at  Farmington. 

The  Confederate  corps  and  reserve  commanders  were,  accord 
ingly,  called  together  at  army  headquarters,  wThere  special  and 
specific  instructions  were  given  them  by  General  Beauregard,  rel 
ative  to  the  movement  about  to  be  executed. 

All  our  troops  were  to  be  held  ready  for  battle.  General  Van 
Dorn,  on  the  right,  was  to  move  before  daylight,  by  his  right 
flank,  until  his  centre  should  be  opposite  General  Pope's  left 
flank,  at  Farmington,  where  he  was  facing  in  the  direction  of  Cor 
inth.  At  dawn  of  day  General  Van  Dorn,  with  his  left  and  cen 
tre,  wras  to  attack  vigorously  whatever  force  might  be  in  his  front, 
and,  with  his  right  overlapping  General  Pope's  left,  take  it  in 
rear  and  cut  off  the  Federal  line  of  retreat  to  Farmington. 

At  the  same  hour,  General  Bragg,  with  two  divisions,  was  to  ad 
vance  on  the  Farmington  road,  which  crossed  his  line  of  defences, 
and,  by  a  front  attack,  co-operate  with  General  Van  Dorn,  but 
only  after  the  latter  should  have  taken  up  his  position  and  should 
be  prepared  to  execute  the  movement  intrusted  to  him. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  387 

General  Ilardee  was  to  guard  the  partly  vacated  lines  of  Gen 
erals  Van  Dorn  and  Bragg,  by  extending  his  command  to  the 
right  and  left,  and  be  ready  to  support  the  attack  if  necessary. 

General  Polk  was  to  take  a  position  in  advance  of  his  lines,  and 
attack  any  Federal  troops  attempting  to  pass  in  his  front.  And 
General  Breckinridge's  reserve  was  to  occupy,  temporarily,  a  cen 
tral  position  within  the  Confederate  lines,  and  support  any  part  of 
the  Held  of  battle  which  might  require  his  assistance. 

Through  the  inefficiency  of  his  leading  guide,  and  the  slowness 
of  one  of  his  major-generals,  General  Van  Dorn  did  not  get  his 
troops  in  position  at  the  time  prescribed.  The  result  was  that 
when  the  Federals  discovered  the  flanking  movement  threatening 

O  £? 

them,  they  began  retiring  hastily  to  their  position  behind  Seven 
Miles  Creek.  General  Van  Dorn  threw  what  forces  he  had  in  hand 
against  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and,  aided  by  the  simultaneous  at 
tack  of  General  Ruggles  (Bragg' s  corps),  very  nearly  captured  two 
brigades  forming  the  rear  of  General  Pope's  command.  The  en 
emy  lost  quite  a  number  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  a  consider 
able  amount  of  camp  equipage,  arms,  and  equipments.  Our  loss 
was  insignificant,  and  consisted  of  some  two  hundred  killed  and 
wounded,  in  both  commands.  The  Confederate  troops  behaved 
with  great  spirit,  and  appeared  anxious  to  punish  the  enemy  for 
compelling  them  to  prolong  their  sojourn  at  Corinth,  which  all 
were  eager  to  leave.* 

General  Beauregard  was  disappointed  in  the  result  of  the  expedi 
tion,  and  thought  the  enemy  would  soon  attempt  to  reoecupv  the 
prominent  position  from  which  we  had  driven  him ;  that  a  large 
Confederate  force  would  then  be  necessary  to  hold  it ;  and  that, 
strong  as  such  a  force  might  be,  it  could  be  cut  off  by  superior 
numbers  before  assistance  could  be  brought  up  from  other  points 
of  our  weak  and  extended  lines,  lie  therefore  instructed  his  sub 
ordinate  commanders  to  be  prepared  to  renew  the  attack  at  any 
moment ;  for  he  was  anxious  to  strike  another  blow  on  the  enemy, 
if  only  to  blind  him  as  to  the  future  movements  he  now  had  in 
contemplation. 

None  more  than  he  appreciated  the  strategic  value  of  Corinth. 
Its  local  features  for  defence  and  the  fact  of  its  being  at  the  inter- 

*  For  further  particulars  of  the  Farmington  affair,  sec  Report  of  General 
I).  Kuggles,  u  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers/'  vol.  vii.  pp.  330-33. 


388  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

section  of  two  important  railroads  made  it  a  very  desirable  point 
to  hold,  as  long  as  it  was  safe  to  do  so.  But  the  great  odds  in  his 
front  and  the  persistent  though  over-cautious  advance  of  General 
Halleck,  convinced  General  Beauregard  that  his  withdrawal  from 
Corinth  would,  ere  long,  become  a  necessity. 

General  Pope  having  again,  on  the  18th,  advanced  towards 
Farmington,  and  our  scouts  reporting  all  the  creeks  and  their 
swampy  sides  overflowed  from  late  heavy  rains,  another  concerted 
movement  was  prepared  by  General  Beauregard,  wherein  the 
corps  and  reserve  commanders  were  all,  more  or  less,  to  partici 
pate.  The  object  was,  as  previously,  to  attack  General  Pope's 
forces  and  cut  off  their  line  of  retreat  upon  the  main  body  of  the 
Federal  army.  Steady  and  continuous  bad  weather,  however,  de 
layed  the  execution  of  the  plan  from  day  to  day,  and,  on  the  22d 
of  May,  finding  that  General  Van  Dorn  could  not  accomplish  his 
part  of  the  proposed  plan,  General  Beauregard,  after  a  conference 
with  him,  ordered  the  troops  back  to  their  former  positions. 

From  General  Van  Dorn's  statement  to  him  after  the  failure  of 
this  movement,  General  Beauregard  concluded  that  any  further 
idea  of  the  offensive  must  be  abandoned,  and  that  he  must  now 
rest  content  with  holding  our  lines,  while  he  made  arrangements 

O  J  O 

for  an  orderly  retreat. 

Meantime,  General  Halleck  had  not  ceased  advancing  his  suc 
cessive  lines,  from  his  left  to  his  right,  notwithstanding  the  oppo 
sition  we  offered  him. 

On  the  25th,  General  Beauregard  called  his  subordinate  com 
manders  together — namely,  Generals  Bragg,  Van  Dorn,  Polk,  liar- 
dee,  Breckinridge,  and,  by  request,  Major-General  Price — to  dis 
cuss  the  necessity  of  evacuating  Corinth,  and  determine  the  time 
and  method  of  so  doing.  He  gave  an  elaborate  exposition  of  his 
views,  and  said  that,  situated  as  he  was  at  Corinth,  with  the  advan 
tages  it  afforded  for  defence,  and  the  communication  it  kept  open 
to  us,  he  had  considered  it  a  duty  to  hold  his  position  as  long  as 
possible,  without  clanger  of  being  overwhelmed  ;  but  that,  besides 
the  rapid  decrease  of  our  forces  from  sickness,  the  increase  of  the 
enemy's  strength  in  our  front — not  to  speak  of  General  Halleck's 
persistent  advance  upo.n  i>s — had  led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  it 
would  be  unwise  to  endeavor  further  to  maintain  our  ground,  with 
such  manifest  odds  against  us.  The  result  of  a  battle,  at  this 
juncture,  and  even  of  a  siege,  would,  he  feared,  amount  to  more 


GENERAL   BEAUREGAED.  3S9 

than  defeat  on  our  part,  and  might  bring  about  the  annihilation  of 
our  forces.  By  a  retreat  we  would,  no  doubt,  lose  a  strategic  po 
sition  of  uncommon  value,  but  by  persisting  in  holding  it  we 
might  suffer  a  still  greater  loss. 

The  important  question  submitted  at  this  council  of  war,  if  we 
may  so  consider  it,  was  freely  and  exhaustively  examined  by  the 
different  generals  present.  But  one  opinion  prevailed  among 
them  :  the  evacuation  of  Corinth  had  now  become  imperative.* 

After  carefully  listening  to  the  views  expressed  by  his  subordi 
nate  commanders,  General  Beauregard  requested  them  to  get 
ready  for  the  movement  as  if  it  were  already  ordered,  but  to  avoid 
all  mention  of  it  except  to  their  respective  Chiefs  of  Staff.  lie 
told  them  to  state  publicly  that  we  were  about  to  take  the  offen 
sive  against  the  enemy  and  bring  on  a  general  engagement  with 
him,  and  to  begin  at  once  sending  off,  to  different  points  in  our 
rear,  such  as  Baldwin,  Tupelo,  and  others,  their  sick,  their  heavy 
baggage,  and  such  additional  camp  equipage  as  might  encumber 
the  projected  retreat.  Immediate  orders  were  issued  to  that  effect 
from  army  headquarters,  and  all  things  were  prepared  for  remov 
ing  the  heavy  guns  and  ammunition  to  those  places,  and  even 
farther,  at  a  moment's  notice. 

When  General  Beauregard's  orders  and  instructions  were  com 
pleted,  he  once  more  summoned  his  corps  commanders  to  army 
headquarters,  and  there  carefully  explained  to  each  one  individual 
ly  the  part  he  would  be  called  upon  to  perform  in  the  designed 
movement,  which  was  to  commence  with  General  Van  Dorn,  on 
the  right,  and  end  with  General  Polk,  on  the  left — General  Brcck- 
inridge  being  in  reserve,  and  occupying  a  more  or  less  central  po 
sition,  in  rear  of  the  other  commands.  Each  sub-commander  was 
made,  by  General  Beauregard,  to  go  over  and  repeat  what  he  and 
the  others  were  expected  to  do,  until  they  became  perfectly  famil 
iar  with  every  detail  of  the  plan  adopted.  They  were  thus  thor 
oughly  drilled,  as  it  were,  and  prepared  for  anv  emergency.  The 
result  showed  that  General  Beauregard  had  not  taken  this  trouble 
in  vain.  Ko  other  retreat  during  the  war  was  conducted  in  so 
systematic  and  masterly  a  manner,  especially  when  we  consider  the 


*  Sec,  in  Appendix,  General  Hardec's  views  of  the  situation,  as  given  in 
a  letter  to  General  Beauregard  (May  23th),  and  the  lattcr's  endorsement 
thereon. 


390  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

comparative  rawness  of  some  of  our  troops,  and  the  disparity  of 
numbers  and  resources  between  the  two  confronting  armies. 

The  time  fixed  for  the  evacuation  was  3  o'clock  A.  M.  on  the 
29th.  Delays  occurred,  however,  which  caused  it  to  be  postponed 
until  1  o'clock  A.  M.  on  the  30th.  The  wagon -trains  and  rear 
most  troops  had  been  started  about  11  p.  M.  on  the  29th,  so  as  to 
clear  the  wray. 

To  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  our  intentions,  General  Beauregard 
ordered  that  an  empty  train  should  be  run  occasionally  during  the 
night,  towards  the  right,  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad, 
and  another,  towards  the  left,  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad, 
as  far  as  they  could  safely  go ;  and  that  whenever  they  reached 
that  point,  the  troops  stationed  there  should  cheer  loudly  and  vig 
orously,  as  though  to  welcome  reinforcements.  This  stratagem 
was  carried  out  to  the  letter,  and  proved  very  successful ;  for  Gen 
eral  Pope,  notwithstanding  his  false  despatches  forwarded  after 
the  event,  telegraphed  General  Halleck  on  the  30th  of  May,  at 
1  o'clock  A.  M.,  as  follows : 

"The  enemy  are  reinforcing  heavily  in  my  front  and  left.  The  cars  arc 
running  constantly,  and  the  cheering  is  immense  every  time  they  unload  in 
front  of  me.  I  have  no  doubt,  from  all  appearances,  that  I  shall  be  attacked 
in  heavy  force  at  daylight."  * 

At  the  very  moment  when  the  foregoing  despatch  was  penned 
by  General  Pope  the  Confederate  forces  were  actively  evacuating 
their  lines,  leaving  skirmishers  only  in  them,  and  some  cavalry  in 
front,  to  hold  the  enemy  at  bay  until  the  entire  movement  should 
be  completed. 

The  retreat  was  effected  with  great  order  and  precision,  the 
enemy  remaining  in  utter  ignorance  of  it.  The  troops  were  halted 
temporarily  behind  the  Tuscumbia  River,  some  six  miles  from 
Corinth,  to  concentrate  and  give  battle  if  pursued ;  but  no  pursuit 
being  attempted,  the  movement  was  quietly  continued  to  Rienzi 
and  Booneville,  where  another  halt  was  made  for  the  same  pur 
pose,  and  with  a  like  result.  The  march  was  then  resumed  and 
the  army  soon  reached  Baldwin,  thirty  miles  from  Corinth,  where 
another  position  was  taken,  and  held  until  the  7th  of  June,  to 
await  an  advance  of  the  enemy.  It  being  apparent  that  no  attack 
would  be  made,  General  Beauregard  again  put  his  army  in  motion, 

*  Report  of  the  Congressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGABD.  391 

the  main  portion  of  it  arriving  at  Tupelo,  fifty-two  miles  from 
Corinth,  on  the  9th  of  June.  There  was  found,  as  expected,  a 
salubrious  region,  pure  water,  and  all  the  requirements  of  a  good 
defensive  position. 

The  following  extracts  are  from  General  Beauregard's  official 
report*  of  the  evacuation  of  Corinth.  After  giving  his  reasons 
for  withdrawing  his  army,  and  explaining  his  various  orders  to 
that  effect,  he  says : 

"...  At  the  tune  finally  prescribed  the  movement  commenced,  and  was  ac 
complished  -without  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy,  who  only  began  to  suspect 
the  evacuation  after  broad  daylight  on  the  morning  of  May  30th,  when,  having 
opened  on  our  lines  from  his  formidable  batteries  of  heavy  and  long-range 
guns,  erected  the  night  previous,  he  received  no  answer  from  any  direction ; 
but,  as  our  cavalry  pickets  still  maintained  their  positions  of  the  preceding 
day,  he  was  not  apparently  fully  satisfied  of  our  movements,  until  some 
stores,  of  little  value,  in  the  town,  were  burned,  which  could  not  be  moved. 
It  was  then,  to  his  surprise,  the  enemy  became  satisfied  that  a  large  army, 
approached  and  invested  with  such  extraordinary  preparations,  expense, 
labor,  and  timidity,  had  disappeared  from  his  front  with  all  its  munitions 
and  heavy  guns,  leaving  him  without  knowledge,  as  I  am  assured,  whither 
it  had  gone,  for  his  scouts  were  scattered  everywhere,  as  I  have  since  as 
certained,  to  inquire  what  directions  our  forces  had  taken.  .  .  .  The  troops 
moved  off  in  good  spirits  and  order,  prepared  to  give  battle  if  pursued,  but 
no  serious  pursuit  was  attempted.  .  .  .  While  at  Rienzi,  half-way  to  Bald 
win,  I  was  informed  that  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  ultimo  a  detachment  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry  had  penetrated  to  Booneville,  eight  miles  south  of  Rienzi, 
and  had  captured  and  burned  a  railroad  train  of  ammunition,  baggage,  and 
subsistence,  delayed  there  some  forty-eight  hours  by  mismanagement.  I  re 
gret  to  add  that  the  enemy  also  burned  the  railroad  depot,  in  which  were  at 
the  moment  a  number  of  dead  bodies  and  at  least  four  sick  soldiers  of  this 
army,  who  were  consumed — an  act  of  barbarism  scarcely  credible,  and  with 
out  a  precedent,  to  my  knowledge,  in  civilized  warfare.  Upon  the  opportune 
appearance,  in  a  short  time,  however,  of  an  inferior  force  of  our  cavalry,  the 
enemy  left  in  great  haste  and  confusion,  after  having  received  one  volley. 
Only  one  of  our  men  was  carried  away  by  him.  Quite  a  number  of  stragglers, 
and  of  our  sick  and  convalescents,  en  route  to  Southern  hospitals,  who  for  a 
few  moments  had  fallen  into  the  enemy's  hands,  were  rescued.  These  are  the 
two  thousand  men  untruthfully  reported  by  Generals  Pope  and  Halleck  to 
their  "War  Department,  as  captured  and  paroled  on  that  occasion.  .  .  .  Equally 
inaccurate,  reckless,  and  unworthy  arc  the  statements  of  these  Federal  com 
manders  in  their  several  official  reports  by  telegraph,  bearing  dates  of  May 
30th  and  31st,  and  June  1st,  2d,  and  4th,  as  published  in  Cincinnati  and  Chi- 

*The  entire  report,  dated  June  13th,  1802,  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix 
to  this  chapter. 


392  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

cago  journals,  touching  the  amount  of  property  and  stores  destroyed  by  us  at 
Corinth,  and  General  Pope's  alleged  pressing  pursuit.  Major -General  Hal- 
leek's  despatch  of  June  4th  may  particularly  be  characterized  as  disgracefully 
untrue.  Possibly,  however,  lie  was  duped  by  his  subordinate.  Nothing,  for 
example,  can  be  wider  from  the  truth  than  that  ten  thousand  men  and  fifteen 
thousand  small  arms  of  this  army  were  captured  or  lost  in  addition  to  those 
destroyed  at  Booneville.  Some  five  hundred  inferior  small  arms  were  acci 
dentally  left  by  convalescents  in  a  camp  four  miles  south  of  Corinth.  No 
artillery  of  any  description  was  lost,  no  clothing,  no  tents  worth  removal  were 
left  standing.  In  fine,  the  letters  of  newspaper  correspondents,  enclosed,  give 
a  correct  statement  both  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  retreat,  the  scanty  spoils  of 
war  left  behind,  the  actual  barrenness  of  substantial  results  to  the  enemy,  and 
exhibit  his  doubt,  perplexity,  and  ignorance  concerning  the  movements  of  this 


"  I  feel  authorized  to  say,  by  the  evacuation  the  plan  of  campaign  of  the 
enemy  was  utterly  foiled,  his  delay  of  seven  weeks  and  vast  expenditures 
were  of  little  value,  and  he  has  reached  Corinth  to  find  it  a  barren  locality, 
which  he  must  abandon  as  wholly  worthless  for  his  purposes." 

We  now  refer  the  reader  to  the  following  extract  from  the  let 
ter  of  a  correspondent  to  a  Northern  newspaper — the  Chicago 
Tribune — written  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  May  30th,  1862,  wherein 
are  correctly  described  some  of  the  most  important  events  relative 
to  the  evacuation  of  Corinth  :* 

"...  The  retreat  of  the  enemy  was  conducted  in  the  best  of  order.  Before 
our  men  had  entered  the  place  all  had  got  off  safely.  General  Halleck  has  thus 
achieved  one  of  the  most  barren  triumphs  of  the  war.  In  fact,  it  is  tantamount 
to  a  defeat.  It  gives  the  enemy  an  opportunity  to  select  a  new  position  as 
formidable  as  that  at  Corinth,  and  in  which  it  will  be  far  more  difficult  for  us 
to  attack  him,  on  account  of  the  distance  our  army  wrill  have  to  transport  its 
supplies.  Supposing  the  enemy  take  up  their  second  position  of  defense  at 
Grand  Junction,  about  sixty  miles  from  here,  four  thousand  additional  wagons 
will  be  required.  .  .  .  Then  there  is  the  fatigue  of  our  men,  the  attacks  of  gue 
rilla  parties  in  our  rear,  etc.  I  look  upon  the  evacuation  there  as  a  victory 
for  Beauregard,  or,  at  least,  as  one  of  the  most  masterly  pieces  of  strategy  that 
has  been  displayed  during  this  war.  It  prolongs  the  contest  in  the  Southwest 
for  at  least  six  months.  .  .  .  Up  to  last  night  the  enemy  kept  up  a  display  of 
force  along  his  whole  line,  thus  completely  deceiving  our  generals.  .  .  . 

"  General  Halleck  must  feel  deeply  mortified  at  the  evacuation.  It  clearly 
shows  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  position  and  strength  of  the  enemy  and 
of  his  ulterior  designs." 

*  The  entire  letter,  a  very  interesting  one,  is  to  be  found  in  the  "  Confeder 
ate  Military  Reports,"  18GO-18G5— as  compiled  by  order  of  Congress— vol.  iii. 
part  2,  pp.  739,  740. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGAKD.  393 

From  "Kappa,"  the  correspondent  of  the  Cincinnati  Commer 
cial,  we  have  the  following  letter,  dated  at  Corinth,  Mississippi, 
May  30th,  1SG2  :* 

"...  On  the  day  the  second  division  moved  out,  advances,  with 
heavy  cannonading,  were  made  by  Thomas  and  Pope  on  the  left,  but  not  a  re 
sponse  in  kind  was  elicited  from  the  enemy.  During  that  night  we  could  hear 
teams  being  driven  oft' and  boxes  being  nailed  in  the  rebel  camp.  Deserters, 
however,  I  understand,  reported  that  they  were  making  a  stand  and  would 
fight  the  next  day.  Considerable  cannonading  was  done  by  our  forces,  and  yet 
no  response,  and  yesterday  the  same.  Last  night  the  same  band  sounded  re 
treat,  tattoo,  and  taps  all  along  the  rebel  lines,  moving  from  place  to  place,  and 
this  morning  suspicion  was  ripened  into  certainty  when  we  saw  dense  vol 
umes  of  smoke  arise  in  the  direction  of  Corinth,  and  heard  the  report  of  an  ex 
ploding  magazine.  Corinth  was  evacuated,  and  Bcauregarcl  had  achieved 
another  triumph. 

"I  do  not  know  how  the  matter  strikes  abler  military  men,  but  I  think  we 
have  been  fooled,"  etc. 

Van  Home,  in  his  "History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  "f 
speaks  of  General  llalleck's  superior  numbers  at  Corinth,  and  of 
his  gradual  approaches,  step  by  step,  to  his  objective.  He  also 
describes  several  heavy  skirmishes  and  other  sharp  fighting,  by 
strong  lines  of  the  contending  forces,  in  which  the  Federals,  he 
adds,  were  not  always  the  aggressors.  Referring  afterwards  to 
the  evacuation,  he  says  : 

"This  seeming  boldness  in  aggression  was  only  a  feint  to  cover  the  retreat 
of  General  Beau  regard's  whole  army  from  Corinth.  .  .  .  The  explosions  at 
Corinth,  early  in  the  morning  of  May  30th,  revealed  General  Beauregard's  pur 
pose  and  its  accomplishment.  For  several  days  he  had  been  sending  off  his 
munitions  and  stores,  and  during  the  night  of  the  29th  he  had  so  quietly  and 
secretly  withdrawn  his  army  that  his  own  pickets  did  not  know  that  they  had 
been  left  a  sacrifice  for  the  safety  of  their  comrades." 

It  is  surprising  that  General  Force,  whose  fairness  of  apprecia 
tion  we  have  noticed  on  several  previous  occasions,  should  appar 
ently  have  founded  his  version  of  these  events  upon  the  incorrect 
despatches  forwarded  by  Generals  Hallcck  and  Pope.  Had  he 
sifted  the  matter  with  greater  care,  he  would  undoubtedly  have 
avoided  all  mention  of  the  imaginary  pursuit  by  General  Pope's 
army,  first  to  Ricnzi,  then  to  Baldwin,  then  to  Blackland,  where, 

*  "  Confederate  Military  Reports,  1860-1865,''  vol.  iii.  part  2,  p.  741. 
tVol.  i.  pp.  128,  120. 


394:  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

he  says,  an  order  to  attack  had  already  been  issued,  when  General 
Bucll  arrived  at  the  front  and  suspended  it.*  But  General  Force 
himself  must  have  been  aware  of  the  weakness  of  his  authority, 
for  after  endorsing,  to  some  extent,  the  report  about  the  "  ten 
thousand  prisoners"  and  "fifteen  thousand  stand  of  arms"  capt 
ured  by  General  Pope's  forty  thousand  men,  he  makes  the  follow 
ing  remarks :  "  The  prisoners  taken  were  few,  and  Pope  was  cen 
sured  for  making  a  statement  of  fact  which  he  neither  made  nor 
authorized."t 

General  Badeau,  after  speaking  of  the  evacuation  of  Corinth 
and  the  "ineffectual  pursuit"  by  the  Federal  army,  terminating,  on 
the  10th  of  June,  by  the  withdrawal  of  General  BuelPs  forces  tow 
ards  Chattanooga,  uses  the  following  language : 

"  And  thus  the  great  and  tangible  success,  which  was  thrown  so  directly  in 
General  Halleck's  path  that  it  seemed  impossible  for  any  one  even  to  avoid  a 
victory,  was  allowed,  nay,  compelled,  in  Ms  unskilful  grasp  to  dissolve  away,  like 
a  sluidow  in  the  hands  of  him  who  stretches  out  to  embrace  icliat  is  not.  Even  after 
the  rebels  had  eluded  him  at  Corinth,  it  was  possible,  with  Halleck's  immense 
preponderance  of  force,  to  follow  up  and  destroy  the  retreating  enemy;  and 
when  this  opportunity  was  also  lost,  by  his  subordinate  and  counterpart,  the 
army  that  had  been  concentrated  with  so  much  care  and  labor  was  still  avail 
able  for  a  concentrated  campaign."}: 

Whoever  considers  the  retreat  from  Corinth  with  a  disinterested 
and  unbiassed  mind,  is  forced  to  acknowledge  that  it  amounted,  in 
realit}^  to  a  decided  Confederate  victory.  It  was  so  looked  upon 
both  in  Europe  and  in  this  country.  It  was  effected,  from  the  be 
ginning  to  the  end,  as  it  had  been  planned.  It  deceived  the  en 
emy  to  the  last,  and  so  completely  that,  while  the  evacuation  had 
already  begun,  and  was,  in  fact,  all  but  accomplished,  General  Hal- 
leck  himself  is  known  to  have  forwarded  this  information  to  his 
command :  "  There  is  every  indication  that  the  enemy  will  attack 
our  left  this  morning,  as  troops  have  been  moving  in  that  direc 
tion  for  some  time."  And,  says  General  Badeau, "  the  largest  army 
ever  assembled  west  of  the  Alleglianies  was  drawn  out  in  line  of 
battle,  awaiting  an  assault"§  An  army  of  nearly  fifty  thousand,! 

-;•-  u  ]?rom  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth,"  by  General  Force,  p.  190. 

t  Ibid.  p.  101. 

I "  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant,"  vol.  i.  p.  106.     The  italics  are  ours. 

§  "  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant,"  vol.  i.  p.  102.     The  italics  are  ours. 

1  General  Beauregard  says  forty-five  thousand  effective,  exclusive  of  cavalry. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  395 

invested  by  an  army  of  fully  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thou 
sand,*  disappeared  from  the  front  of  the  latter  quietly,  noiselessly, 
successfully,  frustrating  the  plans  of  its  adversary,  carrying  with  it 
all  its  munitions  of  war,  and  suffering  in  its  retreat  no  material 
loss  whatever.  And  yet,  so  little  was  this  result  appreciated  by  the 
War  Department,  that  hardly  had  General  Beauregard  marched 
his  forces  to  Tupelo  when  a  despatch  from  Richmond,  indicative 
rather  of  censure  than  of  commendation,  was  forwarded  to  him, 
requiring  an  immediate  explanation  of  his  movement. 
It  read  as  follows : 

"  Jane  12^,1863. 
"  To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

"The  President  has  been  expecting  a  communication  explaining  your  last 
movement.  It  has  not  yet  arrived. 

4t  S.  COOPER.'' 

To  this  the  following  answer  was  sent : 

"  TUPELO,  June  12th. 
"  General  SAM.  COOPER,  Richmond,  Va. : 

"  Have  had  no  time  to  write  report.  Busy  organizing  and  preparing  for 
battle  if  pursued.  Will  write  it  soon,  however.  Ilalleck's  despatch  nearly  all 
false.  Retreat  was  a  most  brilliant  and  successful  one. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

It  is  proper  here  to  state  that  the  evacuation  had  not  taken 
place  without  notification  to  the  government,  for  a  telegram  of 
the  2Stli  of  May  had  been  forwarded  to  General  Cooper,  in  these 
words : 

"  Circumstances  compel  me  to  retire  from  this  place  to  a  position  fhrther  in 
the  interior,  on  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  about  thirty-five  miles.  I  shall 
leave  here  as  soou  as  possible.  I  hope  there  to  be  able  to  beat  the  enemy  in 
detail.! 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

But  this  was  not  the  only  information  General  Beauregard  had 
given  of  his  movement.  On  the  3d  of  June,  from  Baldwin,  he  had 
also  telegraphed  to  General  Cooper : 

*  General  Badcau  puts  the  number  at  "one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand 
bayonets,''  and  refers  to  the  field  returns  of  General  Halleck's  forces  at  Corinth. 

t  This  telegram  was  in  cipher ;  General  Cooper  being  referred  to  a  letter  of 
May  25th  for  the  key. 


396  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

"We  evacuated  Corinth  successfully  on  30th  ultimo.  A  complete  surprise 
to  the  enemy.  Rear  guards  arrived  here,  unmolested,  last  night.  We  brought 
away  all  our  heavy  guns,  tents,  etc.,  49  -2-  30 -a- 133-1  -126-309-1-35- 
87  . 1 .  22  -  223  . 1.  29  .  50  . 1 . 10  -  154  . 1 .  8  -  207  .  2  .  14  -  171 .  2  .  5  -  getting  -  307 
-1.22-a.4G.2.G.* 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGAED." 

These  telegrams,  together  with  General  Beau  regard's  letter  of 
May  19th,  and  General  Lee's  authorized  answer  to  the  same,f  ap 
proving  the  line  of  retreat  suggested,  should  have  sufficed  the 
authorities  at  Richmond,  and  caused  Mr.  Davis  to  refrain  from  all 
further  questioning,  until  General  Beauregard  could  command 
leisure  from  the  important  duties  then  engrossing  his  mind. 

To  show  that  there  is  no  mistake  in  ascribing  to  the  govern 
ment  an  unfriendly  feeling  towards  General  Beauregard,  about 
this  matter,  a  list  of  interrogatories  intrusted  by  Mr.  Davis  to 
Colonel  AV.  P.  Johnston,  his  aide-de-camp,  is  given,  with  General 
Beauregard's  answers  appended  to  the  several  questions.  It  was 
dated  Richmond,  June  14th,  and  was  presented,  in  the  President's 
name,  to  General  Beauregard,  after  his  departure  from  Tupelo. 
We  may  add  that  no  such  inquiries  were  ever  addressed  to  Gen 
erals  A.  S.  Johnston,  Lee,  Bragg,  Hood,  Pemberton,  and  other  Con 
federate  generals,  even  after  they  had  met  with  serious  disasters. 

"  Question  No.  1.— I  desire  to  know  what  were  the  circumstances  and  pur 
poses  of  the  retreat  from  the  Charleston  and  Memphis  Railroad  to  the  position 
now  occupied  ?" 

"  Answer  No.  1. — My  detailed  report  of  the  evacuation  of  Corinth  wras  sent  by 
special  messenger  to  the  War  Department  on  the  13th  instant  (about  one  week 
since).  The  retreat  was  not  of  choice,  but  of  necessity.  The  position  had 
been  held,  as  long  as  prudence  and  the  necessity  of  the  case  required.  We  had 
received  our  last  available  reinforcements.  Our  force  was  reduced  by  sickness 
and  other  causes  to  about  forty-five  thousand  effective  men  of  all  arms,  ex 
clusive  of  the  cavalry  scattered  over  a  large  extent  of  country  to  watch  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  and  protect  our  railroad  communications,  while  his 
force  was  known  to  be  at  least  twice  as  strong  as  ours,  better  disciplined,  and 
more  amply  supplied  in  every  respect. 

"But  before  adopting  so  important  a  measure,  it  was  submitted  to  a  meeting 
of  general  officers,  composed  of  Generals  Bragg,  Polk,  Van  Dorn,  Hardee,  Price, 
and  Breckinridgc,  who  unanimously  approved  of  the  movement. 

"  In  retiring  towards  Tupelo,  it  was  hoped  the  enemy  would  have  followed 

*  The  key  to  this  ciphered  telegram  is  not  in  our  possession. 
t  The  two  letters  referred  to  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  397 

the  movement  -with  a  part  of  his  forces,  affording  me  the  opportunity  of  taking 
the  offensive  with  a  lesser  disparity  of  numbers,  and  offered  me  the  chances 
of  cutting  off  his  line  of  communication. 

"The  retrograde  movement  was  made  in  preference  along  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  Railroad,  because  it  was  the  true  line  of  retreat,  covering  our  main  de 
pots  and  lines  of  communication  with  the  East,  and  was  approved  by  General 
R  E.  Lee,  Acting  General-in-Chief,  in  his  letter  of  the  2Gth  ultimo." 

"  Question  No.  2. — What  is  the  plan  of  future  operations  and  whether  an  ad 
vance  of  the  army  is  contemplated,  and  what  prospect  there  is  of  a  recovery 
of  the  territory  which  has  been  yielded?" 

"Answer  No.  2. — The  plan  of  future  operations  must  depend  to  a  great  extent 
on  the  movements  of  the  enemy ;  should  he  divide  his  forces,  the  offensive 
must  be  taken  as  soon  as  the  condition  of  our  troops  and  our  means  of  trans 
portation  will  permit ;  but  should  he  keep  his  forces  together  he  must  be  made 
to  divide  them  by  demonstrations  on  his  right  or  left,  and  false  reports  in  the 
newspapers." 

"  Question  No.  3. — Why  was  it  not  deemed  advisable  to  occupy  the  hills 
north  and  east  of  Corinth,  and  could  not  a  stronger  line  than  that  around 
Corinth  have  been  selected  ?" 

"Answer  No.  3. — The  defensive  lines  at  Corinth  were  selected  by  General 
Bragg  and  his  engineer,  and  were  approved  by  General  A.  S.  Johnston  and  my 
self  when  we  arrived  there.  They  consisted  of  a  scries  of  elevated  ridges, 
protected  in  front  and  flank  by  extensive  forests  and  two  creeks  and  'bot 
toms,'  which  the  enemy  had  to  cross  immediately  under  the  guns  and  mus 
ketry  of  the  lines.  The  best  proof  of  the  judgment  shown  in  their  selection 
is,  that  they  compelled  him  to  advance  by  a  system  approximating  to  regular 
approaches,  against  a  force  only  half  as  strong  as  his  own,  and  much  inferior  in 
discipline  and  all  the  appurtenances  of  war.  These  lines  were  mere  rifle-pits 
with  slightly  constructed  batteries,  enfilading  the  roads  from  the  front.  Hills 
are  not  per  se  defensive  lines,  especially  when  nothing  more  than  '  elevated  posi 
tions,'  isolated  by  ravines,  thick  woods,  and  underbrush,  and  situated  in  a 
country  made  easily  passable  in  every  direction  with  a  little  labor.  They  are 
also  badly  supplied  with  water  for  a  large  force.  Whereas,  in  the  lines  adopted, 
the  defensive  forces  were  more  concentrated  around  the  intersection  of  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  with  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  within  easy 
supporting  distance  of  each  other;  they  were  also  nearer  to  the  Tuscumbia 
Creek,  which  afforded  a  good  line  to  retire  behind,  whenever  it  should  become 
necessary  to  abandon  Corinth.  If  a  stronger  line  could  have  been  taken  in 
the  vicinity  of  Corinth,  answering  the  same  purposes,  Generals  Johnston, 
Bragg,  and  myself  were  unable  to  discover  it." 

u  Question  No.  4. — What  was  the  cause  of  the  sickness  at  Camp  Corinth  ? 
Would  it  have  been  avoided  by  occupying  the  higher  grounds  in  front  ?  lias 
it  been  avoided  by  retiring  to  the  present  position  ?" 

"  Answer  No.  4.— There  were  several  causes  for  this  sickness.  First,  the  want 
of  good  water.  Second,  the  want  of  proper  food  (the  salt  meat  furnished  to 
the  troops  being  often  not  fit  to  eat),  also  the  almost  total  want  of  fresh  beef 
and  vegetables,  beef  having  been  furnished  once  a  week  or  every  ten  days,  in- 


398  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

stead  of  five  times  a  week  as  ordered.  The  Commissary-General  assured  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  a  few  days  before  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  that  he  had  made  am 
ple  provisions  for  the  supply  of  fresh  beef  to  this  army,  requested  that  the 
matter  should  be  left  solely  to  his  own  (Colonel  Northrop's)  agents;  this  sup 
ply  has  since  been  ascertained  to  have  been  about  sixteen  thousand  head  of 
poor  cattle,  collected  in  the  parish  of  Calcasieu,  Louisiana,  for  the  purpose  of 
fattening,  and  now  substantially  cut  off,  by  the  fall  of  the  Mississippi  River 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Every  effort  is  now  being  made,  by  the  Com 
missary  of  Department  No.  2,  to  relieve  the  wants  of  the  troops.  I  will  men 
tion  here  that  some  of  our  troops  were  affected  with  the  commencement  of 
scurvy.  It  is  doubtful  in  my  mind  whether  the  health  of  the  army  would 
have  been  much  benefited  by  the  occupation  of  the  hills  referred  to,  even  had 
it  been  practicable  in  a  military  point  of  view ;  General  Van  Dora's  army 
corps  occupied  the  hills  three  or  four  miles  southeast  of  Corinth— a  beautiful 
location  to  look  at  —  but  was  as  sickly  as  the  troops  located  nearer  the 
depot. 

u  The  present  position  at  Tupelo,  on  the  verge  of  the  prairies,  is  considered 
very  healthy ;  the  water  appears  very  good  ;  a  greater  quantity  of  cattle  are  be 
ing  obtained  from  the  vicinity  ;  and  a  marked  improvement  seemed  to  have  al 
ready  taken  place  in  the  condition  of  the  troops,  when  I  left  there  on  the  17th 
instant." 

"  Question  No.  5. — Was  it  at  no  time  practicable  to  have  cut  the  enemy's  line 
of  communication,  so  as  to  compel  him  to  abandon  the  Tennessee  River,  or  to 
permit  us  to  reoccupy  Nashville  ?" 

"  Answer  No.  5. — If  it  had  been  possible  to  effect  either  object  I  would  not 
have  been  slow  in  attempting  it.  I  shall  never  be  accused  of  being  too  slow 
in  taking  the  offensive  or  in  carrying  the  *  war  into  Africa,'  whenever  practica 
ble  with  any  prospect  of  success.  Several  attempts  were  made  by  me  about 
the  beginning  of  May  (especially  on  the  9th  and  19th  to  22d)  to  draw  the  en 
emy  out  of  his  intrenched  positions,  and  separate  his  closed  masses  for  a  bat 
tle  ;  but  he  was  too  prudent  to  separate  from  his  heavy  guns,  and  his  adopted 
system  of  '  regular  approaches ;'  he  steadily  declined  coming  to  an  engagement 
until  he  had  accumulated  all  his  available  forces  in  front  of  Corinth." 

"  Question  No.  G. — What  means  were  employed,  after  the  fall  of  Island  No.  10, 
to  prevent  the  descent  of  the  Mississippi  River  by  the  enemy's  gunboats  ? 
What  dispositions  were  made  to  defend  Memphis,  and  what  was  the  cause  of  a 
failure  to  preserve  that  most  important  of  our  lines  of  communication  ?" 

"  Answer  No.  C. — By  fortifying  Fort  Pillow,  as  was  done,  and  sending  there 
the  best  troops  and  most  energetic  young  officer  at  my  command — Brigadier- 
General  Villepigue — who  with  open  batteries  effectually  defied  and  held  at 
bay  the  enemy's  gun  and  mortar  boats  as  long  as  the  operations  of  the  cam 
paign  permitted  him  to  hold  that  position. 

"  The  best  way  to  defend  Memphis,  having  no  forces  or  guns  to  send  there, 
was  to  hold  Fort  Pillow  and  Corinth ;  its  fate  had  necessarily  to  follow  that 
of  those  two  places,  which  fell,  like  so  many  other  most  important  positions, 
from  the  want  of  sufficient  means  (men  and  materials)  to  hold  them  longer 
than  was  done." 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  399 

"  Question  No.  7. — What  loss  of  troops,  stores,  or  arms  occurred  at  the  time  of 
the  retreat  from  Corinth  ?" 

"Answer  No.  7. — This  loss  is  slight  and  trifling  in  comparison  to  the  impor 
tance  of  the  object  effected.  My  Inspectors  General  have  been  engaged  in  de 
termining  the  facts  called  for;  as  soon  as  ascertained  they  shall  be  communi 
cated  to  the  War  Department.  I  suppose  about  two  hundred  stragglers  and 
deserters,  about  fifteen  hundred  arms  burned  at  Booneville,  and  about  five 
hundred  left  in  the  dark  at  a  convalescent  camp  four  miles  south  of  Corinth, 
will  cover  those  two  items  of  losses.  With  regard  to  the  ordnance  stores  and 
provisions,  I  could  obtain  no  return  from  the  respective  chiefs  of  those  depart 
ments,  although  repeatedly  called  for  by  me,  before  leaving  Tupelo. 

"I  firmly  believe  that  all  we  lost  at  Corinth  and  during  the  retreat  would 
amount  to  much  less  than  one  day's  expenses  of  the  enemy's  army  in  this 
quarter. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gen.  Comdg.  Dept.  Xo.  2." 


4:00  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

General  Beauregard  is  at  Tupelo  on  the  7th  of  June. — The  Main  Body  of  liis 
Army  Arrives  on  the  9th. — Telegrams  Sent  by  him  to  Various  Points. — His 
Communication  to  General  Cooper. — He  Places  Colonel  Forrest  in  Com 
mand  of  the  Cavalry  Regiments  in  Middle  Tennessee. — General  Bcaure- 
gard's  Ill-health. — He  is  urged  by  his  Physicians  to  Take  a  Short  Rest. — He 
Finally  Consents. — Order  Sent  to  General  Bragg  from.  Richmond. — General 
Beauregard's  Despatch  to  General  Cooper,  June  14th. — His  Letter  to  the 
War  Department,  June  15th. — General  Beauregard  gives  Temporary  Com 
mand  of  his  Department  to  General  Bragg,  and  Leaves  Tupelo  on  the 
17th. — General  Bragg  Notifies  the  Government  of  the  Fact. — President 
Davis  Removes  General  Beauregard,  and  Gives  Permanent  Command  of 
his  Army  and  Department  to  General  Bragg. — Comments  on  President 
Davis. — General  Bragg's  Despatch  to  General  Beauregard. — His  Reply. — 
Mr.  Randolph's  Telegram. — General  Beauregard's  Letter  to  General  Coop 
er. — Misstatements  Contained  in  President  Davis's  Book. — Public  Sympa 
thy  with  General  Beauregard. — General  Bragg's  Letter  to  Mr.  Forsyth. — 
His  Letter  to  General  Beauregard. — Answer  to  the  Same. — General  Beau- 
regard's  Plan  of  Operations  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. — Interview  of 
the  Hon.  Thomas  J.  Seinmes  and  Edward  Sparrow  with  President  Davis, 
September  13th. — Petition  of  Senators  and  Representatives  for  General 
Beauregard's  Restoration  to  his  Command. — President  Davis's  Refusal. — 
Notes  of  the  Interview,  by  Mr.  Semmes. — Comments  upon  President  Davis 
in  Connection  with  these  Events. — Successful  Result  of  Military  Opera 
tions  from  Bowling  Green  to  the  Retreat  to  Tupelo. 

GENERAL  BEATJEEGABD  arrived  at  Tupelo  on  the  7th  of  June. 
The  main  body  of  the  army  reached  there  on  the  9th.  The  position 
had  been  previously  reconnoitred,  and  no  difficulty  was  encoun 
tered  in  the  selection  of  the  grounds  whereon  the  different  corps 
were  to  be  encamped.  Many  orders  and  telegrams,  forwarded 
and  received  from  different  parts,  far  and  near,  show  the  watchful 
supervision  exercised  by  General  Beauregard  to  complete  the 
movement  he  had  thus  far  successfully  accomplished.  Although 
paying  little  heed  to  the  rumors  circulated  by  his  foiled  adver- 
,  sary,  still  he  used  all  necessary  precaution  to  meet  any  advance 
that  might  be  attempted  against  him.  He  hoped  that,  once  con 
centrated  and  reorganized  in  his  new  position,  the  enemy  would 


GENERAL   BEAUREGAUD.  401 

soon  be  compelled  to  divide  his  ponderous  forces,  thereby  mate 
rially  improving  our  condition,  and  demonstrating  the  judicious 
ness  of  the  diversion  previously  undertaken  in  middle  Tennessee. 

As  soon  as  it  became  evident  that  the  enemy  did  not  intend  to 
attack  our  forces  at  Tupelo,  and  that  two  of  his  divisions — Mc- 
Cook's  and  Crittendeifs,'"  and,  as  reported,  others  alsof  —  were 
moving  eastward,  General  Beau  regard,  relieved  from  the  harass 
ing  duties  that  had  so  absorbed  him  of  late,  was  able  to  attend 
more  directly  to  the  recuperation,  discipline,  and  comfort  of  his 
command. 

On  the  Oth  he  addressed  a  communication  to  General  Cooper, 
calling  his  attention  to  the  necessity  of  furnishing  funds  for  the 
payment  of  his  men,  who  were  growing  dissatisfied — and  justly  so 
— on  this  score,  suggesting  that  the  War  Department,  through  the 
Assistant  Treasurer  at  Jackson,  Mississippi,  should  make  use  of 
several  millions  of  dollars  withdrawn  from  the  banks  of  Xcw  Or 
leans,  and  seized  by  his  (General  Beauregard's)  orders,  when  in 
formed  that  these  funds  were  about  to  be  sent  back  to  that  city 
in  obedience  to  instructions  from  General  Benjamin  F.  Butler. 
The  bank  agents  who  had  the  money  in  charge  had  often  ex 
pressed  their  willingness  to  see  it  applied  to  the  wants  of  our 
army,  provided  the  government  made  itself  responsible  for  the 
same.;}:  lie  also  urged  the  department  to  appoint  an  additional 
Chief  Commissary  to  the  army,  and  stated  that  there  was  no  less 
need  of  a  good  and  energetic  Chief  Quartermaster,  lie  recom 
mended  several  officers  and  citizens  for  the  important  positions 
referred  to.  "  These  are  times,''  he  wrote,  "  when  the  man  best 
fitted  for  an  office  should  be  appointed,  regardless  of  all  other 
considerations." 

At  or  about  that  time  Colonel  X.  B.  Forrest,  who  had  been 
wounded  on  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  reported  for  duty  at 
Tupelo.  He  was  hardly  convalescent,  but  thought  himself  able, 
nevertheless,  to  resume  command  of  his  regiment.  lie  had  ex 
hibited  so  much  coolness  and  daring  near  Pittsburg  Landing 
during  the  night  of  the  Tth  of  April  and  the  day  following,  while 
charging  a  strong  reconnoitring  party  of  the  enemy,  that  General 


*  Van  Home's  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.  p.  142. 
t  Captain  L.  E.  Hill's  telegram  to  General  Bcaurcgard. 
J  The  communication  spoken  of  is  in  the  Appendix  to  this  chapter. 
L— 26 


402  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

Beauregard  determined  to  do  all  he  could  to  increase,  if  possible, 
his  sphere  of  usefulness. 

The  reader  is  aware  that  three  regiments  of  cavalry — Colonels 
Scott's,  Wharton's,  and  Adams's  —  had  been  sent,  nearly  two 
months  before,  to  assist  General  E.  Kirby  Smith  in  an  offensive 
movement  into  middle  Tennessee  from  Chattanooga.  This  force, 
instead  of  operating  together  against  the  common  enemy,  as  or 
dered,  kept  separated,  because  of  some  trivial  misunderstanding 
about  rank  among  its  officers,  and  was  unable  to  accomplish  any 
valuable  result.  General  Beauregard,  troubled  at  such  a  state  of 

O  J 

affairs,  so  clearly  prejudicial  to  good  order  and  discipline,  resolved 
to  put  a  stop  to  it  by  placing  Colonel  Forrest  in  command  of  those 
regiments,  with  special  instructions  to  afford  their  officers  no  time 
for  further  disputes.  Forrest  hesitated  at  first,  modestly  alleging 
his  inability  to  assume  such  a  responsibility ;  but  yielded,  finally, 
when  again  urged  by  General  Beauregard,  and  after  receiving  the 
promise  that  his  old  regiment  should  be  sent  to  -him  as  soon  as  it 
could  be  spared  from  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi.  The  following 
order  was  thereupon  written  and  immediately  handed  to  him : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

TUPELO,  Miss.,  June  Wi,  1862. 
"  Colonel  N.  B.  FORREST,  Coindg.  Cavalry  : 

"  Colonel, — The  general  commanding  directs  that  3-011  will,  with  as  little  de 
lay  as  practicable,  repair  to  north  Alabama  and  middle  Tennessee,  and  assume 
command  of  the  cavalry  regiments  in  that  section,  commanded  respectively 
by  Colonels  Scott,  Wharton,  and  Adams. 

"You  will  carry  into  effect  the  verbal  instructions  communicated  to  you  by 
the  general  commanding.* 

"  I  am,  Colonel,  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"  GEO.  WM.  BRENT,  Acting  Chief  of  Stuff." 

Thus  began  the  brilliant  military  career  of  this  remarkable 
man.  He  was  a  born  soldier,  and  had  he  received  a  military 
education,  would  have  ranked  among  the  greatest  commanders  of 

o  o 

the  late  war.  Even  as  it  was,  he  should,  perhaps,  be  counted  as 
one  of  the  first. 

It  was  shown  in  the  preceding  chapter  with  what  persistence 
Mr.  Davis  demanded  of  General  Beauregard  his  reasons  for  aban- 

*  Copies  of  the  order  were  furnished  for  the  information  of  Colonels  Scott, 
Wharton,  and  Adams. 


GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD.  403 

doning  Corinth,  as  though  the  possibility  of  such  a  movement  had 
never  occurred  to  the  President,  and  as  though  no  communication 
upon  the  subject  had,  up  to  that  time,  been  addressed  to  the  War 
Department.  General  Beauregard  wrote  his  report  three  days 
later,  and  forwarded  it  to  Richmond.*  He  counted  upon  no 
congratulatory  reply.  The  government  had  not  habituated  him 
to  such  favors  ;  but,  knowing  how  fully  he  had  performed  his  duty 
to  the  cause,  he  anticipated  no  reproof  or  censure  on  the  part  of 
the  Chief  Executive  of  the  Confederacy.  The  sequel  will  show 
how  much  he  erred  in  that  respect. 

General  Beau  regard's  infirm  health,  which,  however,  had  never 
proved  an  obstacle  to  the  discharge  of  the  arduous  duties  devolv 
ing  upon  him,  had  been  severely  tried  by  the  wear  and  care  of  the 
march  from  Corinth  to  Tupelo.  He  was,  as  usual,  uncomplaining, 
but  his  impaired  physical  condition  had  nut  escaped  the  observa 
tion  of  his  two  physicians,  Doctors  Brodie  and  Choppin — the  for 
mer  the  Medical  Director,  the  latter  the  Medical  Inspector,  of  the 
army,  and  both  esteemed  members  of  his  military  family.  They 
now  urged  him  (for  the  third  time  since  his  departure  from  Vir 
ginia)  to  take  advantage  of  the  partial  lull  in  military  operations 
at  and  around  Tupelo,  and  seek  a  brief  rest  from  the  incessant 
labors  incident  to  his  immediate  presence  with  the  troops.  lie 
finally  agreed  to  follow  their  advice  ;  and  they,  gratified  at  this 
result,  but  fearing  he  might  let  the  opportune  moment  slip  by, 
wrote  out  and  handed  him  the  following  certiiicate,  which  they 
endeavored  to  make  as  impressive  as  possible  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

TUPELO,  June  Uth,  1802. 

"We  hereby  certify  that,  after  attendance  upon  General  Beauregard  for  the 
past  four  months,  and  treatment  of  his  case.t  in  our  professional  opinion,  he  is 
incapacitated  physically  for  the  arduous  duties  of  his  present  command,  and 
we  urgently  recommend  rest  and  recreation. 

"  R.  L.  BRODIE,  Surgeon  P.  A.  C.  S. 
"  SAM.  CHOPPIN,  Surgeon  P.  A.  C.  S.1' 

On  the  very  day  on  which  the  foregoing  certificate  was  de 
livered  to  General  Beauregard,  the  following  telegram  was  di 
rectly  forwarded  to  General  Bragg  from  Richmond.  The  word 
"  directly"  is  here  intentionally  used,  because,  strange  to  say,  this 

*  Sec  Appendix  to  Chapter  XXIV. 
t  A  severe  attack  of  laryngitis. 


404  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

telegram  reached  General  Bragg  without  having  first  been  sent  to 
General  Beauregard,  as  was  clearly  required  by  all  rules  of  pro 
priety  and  of  military  usage.  None  will  deny  that,  at  that  time 
(1-ith  of  June),  General  Beauregard  was  still  in  command  of  De 
partment  No.  2,  and  of  the  Confederate  army  encamped  at  Tupe 
lo.  The  full  text  of  the  telegram  referred  to  is  not  in  our  posses 
sion.  It  was  an  order  addressed  to  General  Bragg,  and  sending 
him  to  Mississippi,  to  relieve  General  Lovell.  Mr.  Davis,  in  his 
book,  gives  its  concluding  part,  as  follows : 

"After  General  Magruder  joins,  your  further  services  there  may  be  dispensed 
with.  The  necessity  is  urgent.  J.  DAVIS." 

General  Bragg  referred  this  communication,  so  irregularly  for 
warded,  to  General  Beauregard,  who,  immediately  after  reading 
it,  telegraphed  General  Cooper,  in  these  words: 

"  TUPELO,  June  14*7*,  1862. 

"  General  Bragg  has  just  communicated  to  me  a  telegram  sending  him  to 
relieve,  temporarily,  General  Lovell.  His  presence  here  I  consider  indispen 
sable  at  this  moment,  especially  as  I  am  leaving  for  a  while  on  surgeon's  cer 
tificate.  For  four  months  I  have  delayed  obeying  their  urgent  recommenda 
tions  in  that  respect.  I  desire  to  be  back  here  to  retake  the  offensive  as  soon 
as  our  forces  shall  have  been  sufficiently  reorganized.  I  must  have  a  short  rest. 

"  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

There  was  nothing  improper  or  discourteous  in  the  foregoing 
despatch.  Ko  one  could  have  interpreted  it  to  involve  disobedi 
ence  of  the  President's  order.  That  it  wras  laconic  we  readily  con 
cede,  but  telegraphic  despatches  are  never  otherwise.  We  ask  the 
reader  to  examine  its  phraseology  carefully,  and  say  whether  it 
could  be  so  construed  as  to  convey  the  idea  that  General  Beaure 
gard  was  about  "  to  leave,  on  surgeon's  certificate,  for  four  months." 
Knowing,  however,  that  he  had  not  sufficiently  explained  himself, 
and  wishing  to  create  no  false  impression  as  to  his  intentions,  Gen 
eral  Beauregard.  on  the  succeeding  day,  wrote  the  following  letter : 

O  O  i/  /  £3 

"  HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

TUPELO,  Miss.,  June  15th,  1862. 
"General  S.  COOPER,  Adjutant  and  Inspector  General,  Richmond,  Va. : 

"  General, — After  delaying,  as  long  as  possible,  to  obey  the  oft-repeated  rec 
ommendations  of  my  physicians  to  take  some  rest,  for  the  restoration  of  my 
health,  I  have  concluded  to  take  advantage  of  the  present  lull  in  the  opera 
tions  of  this  army,  due  to  the  necessity  of  attending  to  its  organization  and 
discipline,  and  to  the  uncertain  movements  of  the  enemy,  for  absenting  my- 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  405 

self  for  a  short  while  from  here,  hoping  to  be  back  to  assume  the  offensive  at 
the  earliest  moment  practicable.  Meanwhile,  I  will  transfer  the  command  of 
the  forces  and  of  this  department  to  the  next  officer  in  rank,  General  B.  Bragg, 
furnishing  him  with  such  instructions  as  will  enable  him  to  give  all  orders  re 
quired  during  my  absence.  I  propose  leaving  here  to-morrow,  at  12  M.,  for 
Mobile,  where  I  will  remain  a  day  or  two,  inspecting  the  condition  of  its  de 
fences,  and  will  offer  to  Brigadier-General  Forney  such  advice  as,  in  my  judg 
ment,  may  be  necessary,  and  he  may  be  willing  to  accept.  I  will  then  repair 
to  Bladon  Springs,  on  the  Tombigbce  River,  about  seventy-five  miles  north  of 
Mobile,  where  I  will  remain  about  one  week  or  ten  days,  or  long  enough  to 
restore  my  shattered  health, 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

'•  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gen.  Coindg.'' 

General  Beauregard,  after  a  conference  with  General  Bragg,  left 
the  latter  in  temporary  command  of  the  army  and  of  the  entire 
department,  and  started,  not  hurriedly,  as  Mr.  Davis,  in  his  book, 
indicates,  but  on  the  17th  of  June,  after  all  his  arrangements  had 
been  leisurely  completed.  Knowing  that  there  was  no  danger, 
just  then,  in  absenting  himself  from  his  forces,  and  believing, 
in  all  honesty,  that  no  other  answer  than  a  favorable  one  could 
possibly  come  from  the  War  Department — for  he  knew  of  no  army 
regulation  denying  a  commanding  general  the  right,  for  reasons 
of  health,  to  move  even  beyond  the  boundaries  of  his  own  depart 
ment — he  proceeded  quietly  on  his  journey,  never  suspecting  the 
result  awaiting  him,  nor  anticipating  President  Davis's  resentment 
at  so  simple  an  act. 

Mr.  Davis  quotes  the  answer  made  by  General  Beauregard  when 
General  Bragg  presented  him  the  first  despatch  received  from  Rich 
mond  ;  but  without  prefixing  any  date  to  it.*  It  is  not  denied 
that  that  answer  contains  the  substance  of  General  Beauregard's 
telegram  and  letter — the  first,  of  June  14th,  the  second,  of  June 
15th — but  it  remains  none  the  less  a  fact,  that  it  was  not  General 
Beauregard's  real  answer  to  Mr.  Davis  or  to  the  War  Department : 
it  was  nothing  more  than  the  statement  of  General  Bragg's  inter 
pretation  of  General  Beauregard's  remarks  to  him.  Mr.  Davis  had 
also  before  him  General  Beauregard's  own  telegram,  as  forwarded 
by  himself,  when  informed  of  the  President's  action  with  regard 
to  General  Bragg's  departure  for  Vicksburg.  That  despatch  has 
already  been  submitted  to  the  reader,  and  is,  undoubtedly,  the  best 
evidence  to  be  offered  in  the  case. 

"  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  vol.  i.  p.  74. 


406  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 

General  Bragg,  after  General  Beauregard  had  left  for  Mobile, 
on  the  17th,  informed  the  President  of  the  fact,  and,  doubtful  as 
to  what  course  to  pursue,  asked  for  further  instructions. 

And  here  it  is  but  fair  to  assert  that,  on  the  17th  of  June,  the 
War  Department,  and  Mr.  Davis  likewise,  had  already  received 
General  Beauregard's  telegram  of  June  14th;  for  if  the  Pres 
ident's  telegram,  forwarded  from  Richmond,  at  that  date,  to  Gen 
eral  Bragg,  had  taken  but  one  day  to  traverse  the  wires — and  the 
proof  is  there,  none  can  deny  it — it  is  certain  that  no  greater  time 
was  required  for  General  Beauregard's  despatch  to  travel  the  same 
distance  over  the  same  line.  And  it  should  be  stated  further, 
that,  on  the  20th  of  June,  when  the  President  sent  his  order,  as 
signing  General  Bragg  to  the  permanent  command  of  the  West 
ern  Department  and  of  the  Army  at  Tupelo,  he  had  not  only  full 
cognizance  of  General  Beauregard's  telegram  of  the  14th,  but  also 
of  his  explanatory  letter  of  the  15th.  The  true  motive  actuat 
ing  General  Beauregard  in  temporarily  leaving  his  command,  was, 
therefore,  perfectly  brought  home  to  the  President,  before  he 
penned  the  peremptory  order,  so  uncalled  for  and  so  arbitrary,  by 
which — judging  from  appearances — he  sought  to  humiliate  and 
cast  aside  one  of  the  most  prominent  generals  of  the  South,  who  en 
joyed  then,  as  always  during  the  war,  the  full  confidence  and  af 
fection  of  the  people — if  not  of  the  President — and  whose  influence 
with  the  army  was  undoubted.  If  Mr.  Davis  had  been  animated, 
at  that  time,  by  other  feelings  than  those  of  personal  dislike  tow 
ards  General  Beauregard,  he  would,  with  a  view  to  the  public 
weal  and  to  the  eminent  services  of  the  latter,  have  simply  sent 
General  Van  Dorn — as  he  actually  did — to  relieve  General  Lovell 
at  Vicksburg,  and  would  have  ordered  General  Bragg  to  remain 
with  the  forces  at  Tupelo  until  General  Beauregard's  return.  It 
is  claimed,  on  behalf  of  Mr.  Davis,  that  had  such  a  course  been 
adopted,  General  Beauregard,  though  absent,  would  still  have  re 
tained  command  of  the  department,  and  orders  to  General  Bragg 
would  have  had  to  pass  through  General  Beauregard's  hands  be 
fore  finally  reaching  the  actual  commander  of  the  forces ;  which 
wrould  have  entailed  much  delay,  if  nothing  worse.  This  objection 
is  utterly  futile,  inasmuch  as  General  Beauregard  had  transferred 
to  General  Bragg  the  temporary  command  of  the  department  as 
well  as  of  the  army  proper.""  But  even  admitting  that  such  a 

*Sec  his  letter  of  June  15th  to  General  Cooper. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  407 

transfer  had  not  been  effected,  is  it  not  a  fact  —  well  known  to 
Mr.  Davis — that,  while  in  command  of  a  mere  military  district,* 
under  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  commanding  the  Department 
of  Northern  Virginia,  General  Beauregard  corresponded  directly 
with  the  Secretary  of  War,  with  the  Adjutant-General,  and  with 
the  President  himself,  without  incurring  the  displeasure,  or  in  any 
way  interfering  with  the  red -tape  routine,  of  the  War  Depart 
ment?  General  Beauregard  did  the  same  thing  again  when  he 
commanded  an  army  in  Western  Tennessee,  under  General  A.  S. 
Johnston.  The  President  and  the  War  Department  had  never 
been  known  to  be  so  punctilious  as  to  the  observance  of  military 
etiquette  in  matters  of  this  kind,  and  Mr.  Davis  had  clearly  vio 
lated  it  before  General  Beaurcgard's  departure  from  Tupelo. 
The  order  removing  General  Beauregard  read  as  follows: 

"  RICHMOND,  June  £0//<,  18C2. 
u  General  BRAXTOX  BRAGG,  Tupelo,  Mississippi: 

"Your  despatch,  informing  me  that  General  Beauregard  had  turned  over 
the  command  to  you  and  left  for  Mobile,  on  surgeons1  certificate,  \vas  duly  re 
ceived.  You  arc  assigned  permanently  to  the  command  of  the  department, 
as  will  be  more  formally  notified  to  you  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  You  will 
correspond  directly,  and  receive  orders  and  instructions  from  the  government 
in  relation  to  your  future  operations. 

"  JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

The  opportunity  was  seized  upon,  and,  under  the  transparent 
pretense  of  affronted  dignity,  President  Davis  worked  his  will. 
Thus  was  consummated  an  act  of  grossest  injustice,  one  of  the 
most  inexcusable  abuses  of  power  perpetrated  by  him  during  the 
war.  This  was  not  all.  Jlis  irritation  at  an  assumed  slight  to 
his  authority  induced  him  to  go  still  further.  He  prepared  the 
list  of  interrogatories  contained  in  a  letter  of  instructions  to 
Colonel  W.  P.  Johnston,  A.  D.  C.,  dated  Richmond,  June  14th, 
the  day  General  Beauregard's  first  despatch  was  received.  This 
reached  General  Beauregard  in  Mobile,  on  the  20th,  and  shows  the 
searching  ingenuity  used  to  find  him  at  fault,  not  only  with  re 
gard  to  the  evacuation  of  Corinth,  but  also  as  to  all  orders  and 
instructions  issued  or  given  by  him,  for  the  defence  of  the  Missis 
sippi  Ilivcr.  These  interrogatories  and  General  Beauregard's 

*  The  "Potomac  District,"  created  in  October,  18G1.  See  General  Orders 
No.  15,  Adjutant  and  Inspector  General's  office,  in  Appendix  to  Chapter 
XIII. 


408  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

answers  to  them  were  given  at  the  end  of  the  preceding  chapter. 
Nothing  more,  therefore,  need  be  said  about  them  here. 

General  Bragg  informed  General  Beauregard  of  the  President's 
last  order  to  him.  lie  telegraphed  as  follows : 

"  TUPELO,  June  21s*,  18G2. 
"  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

"I  have  a  despatch, from  the  President  direct,  to  relieve  you  permanently  in 
command  of  this  department.  I  envy  you,  and  am  almost  in  despair. 

"  BRAXTON  BRAGG." 

This  was  the  first  intimation  General  Beanregard  received  of 

O 

the  arbitrary  decree  throwing  him  out  of  service.  He  felt  it 
keenly,  as  it  was  natural  that  lie  should.  lie  knew  he  had  done 
nothing  to  merit  such  treatment,  but  understood  the  implied  dis 
grace  intended  by  the  President.  The  consciousness  of  his  worth, 
however,  and  his  devotion  to  the  cause,  lent  him  a  dignity  and 
forbearance  deserving  of  high  praise.  His  answer  to  General 
Bragg  exhibited  no  irritation  whatever.  It  was  a  quiet,  uncom 
plaining  acquiescence  in  the  government's  action,  and  read  thus: 

"  MOBILE,  June  22d,  1802, 
"  General  B.  BRAGG,  Tupelo,  Mississippi : 

"  I  cannot  congratulate  you,  but  am  happy  for  the  change.  It  will  take  me 
some  time  to  recuperate.  I  will  leave  my  Staff  with  you  until  required  by  me. 
You  will  find  it  very  useful." 

On  the  next  day,  the  lion.  George  "W.  Randolph,  Secretary  of 
War,  confirmed  General  Bragg' s  despatch,  as  follows  : 

"  RICHMOND,  Jum  23d,  18G2. 
"  General  G.  T.  BEATJREGARD,  Mobile,  Alabama: 

"General, — I  enclose  copies  of  a  telegram  from  the  President  to  General 
Bragg,  and  a  letter  which  I  have  addressed  to  him.* 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"GEORGE  W.  RANDOLPH,  Sec.  of  War." 

Not  a  word  of  explanation,  not  an  expression  of  regret  at  the 
abrupt  change,  are  to  be  found  in  the  few  lines  given  above.  An 
act  of  greater  official  discourtesy  could  hardly  have  been  com 
mitted.  A  delinquent  second  lieutenant  could  riot  have  been 
more  summarily  dealt  with. 

General  Beauregard  made  no  direct  answer  to  the  Secretary  of 

*  The  telegram  has  already  been  given  in  our  text.  The  letter  referred  to 
is  in  the  Appendix  to  this  chapter. 


GENERAL  BEACHEGARD.  409 

War;  but,  on  the  25th,  from  Mobile,  where  he  still  was,  advising 
General  Forney,  as  he  had  said  he  would  do,  he  wrote  this  letter 
to  General  Cooper : 

"General, — Enclosed  please  find  the  certificate*  of  ruy  physicians,  members 
of  my  general  staff  as  inspectors,  recommending  that  I  should  withdraw  for 
a  while  from  the  command  of  Department  Xo.  2.  This  is  the  third  certificate 
to  the  same  effect  I  have  received  from  them  since  my  arrival  at  Jackson,  Ten 
nessee;  but  finding,  or  believing,  that  my  presence  until  now  was  absolutely 
necessary,  with  the  forces  under  my  command,  I  persistently  refused  to  avail 
myself  of  their  recommendation  until  the  present  moment,  when  I  feel  that  in 
justice  to  myself  and  to  the  cause  I  am  endeavoring  to  defend  I  must  take  a 
little  rest,  and  retire  for  a  while  from  the  active  scenes  of  life  to  which  I  have 
been  accustomed  for  the  last  sixteen  months.  I  will,  for  the  present,  repair  to 
Bladon  Springs,  Alabama,  where  I  will  be  always  ready  to  obey  any  orders  of 
the  department  (regardless  of  my  health)  to  resume  the  active  duties  of  the 
field,  whenever  circumstances  will  require  that  I  should  be  so  ordered. 
"  Kespectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  T.  BF..UKKGAKD,  General  C.  S.  A/' 

AVe  have  now  to  refer  to  what  Mr.  Davis  says  in  his  book  upon 
this  unfortunate  incident  of  his  administration,  and  to  disclose  the 
errors  he  commits  while  relating  it. 

O 

After  giving  his  own  version  of  what  occurred  at  the  time  of 
General  Beauregard's  departure  from  Tupelo,  and  producing  such 
evidence  as  might  best  support  the  conclusions  he  intended  to 
draw,  Mr.  Davis  says : 

"From  this  statement  it  appears:  First,  that  General  Beaurcgarcl  iras  not, 
as  has  been  alleged,  harshly  deprived  of  his  command,  but  that  he  voluntarily  sur 
rendered  if,  after  being  furnished  with  medical  certificates  of  his  physical  inca 
pacity  for  its  arduous  duties.  Second,  that  he  did  not  even  notify  his  gov 
ernment,  still  less  ask  permission  to  retire.  Third,  that  the  order,  assigning 
another  to  the  command  he  had  abandoned,  could  not  l>c  sent  through  Jiim,icJtcn  he 
had  departed  and  none  to  a  place  ichcre  there  icas  no  telegraph,  and  rarely  a  mail. 
Fourth,  that  it  is  neither  customary  nor  proper  to  send  orders  to  the  com 
mander  of  an  army  through  a  general  on  sick-leave ;  and  in  this  case  it  would 
have  been  very  objectionable,  as  a  similar  order  had  just  Itccn  sent  and  dis 
obeyed.  "  t 

The  mere  recital  of  the  facts,  as  already  given,  clearly  disproves 
the  foregoing  statement : 


*  It  has  already  been  given  to  the  reader. 

f'Risc  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,''  vol.  ii.  p.  73.     The  italics 
arc  ours. 


410  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

I.  It  would  be  as  true  to  allege  that  General  Beau  regard  was 
never  relieved  of  his  command  at  all,  as  to  state  that  he  was  not 
"harshly  deprived"  of  it.     Mr.  Davis,  who  had  before  him,  or  at 
his  disposal,  every  telegram  and  letter  inserted  in  this  text,  could 
not  have  believed  that  General  Beauregard  had  "  voluntarily  aban 
doned"  his  command  —  in  other  words,  permanently  withdrawn 
from  it,  of  his  own  free  W7ill — when  it  was  so  evident  that  the  ab 
sence  spoken  of  would  only  be  for  a  short  time,  and  that,  "mean 
while,"  the  command  of  the  army  would  be  intrusted  to  General 
Bragg.     No  better  proof  could  be  offered  to  show  that  both  Gen 
eral  Beauregard's  intention  and  desire  were  to  resume  his  com 
mand  as  soon  as  he  could. 

II.  If  Mr.  Davis  is  correct  in  his  second  point,  what  becomes  of 
General  Beauregard's  telegram  of  June  14th,  where  he  says:  "I 
am  leaving  for  a  while,  on  surgeon's  certificate.     I  must  have  a 
short  rest  "  ?    lie  had  certainly  not  left  Tupelo  when  that  despatch 
was  forwarded.   He  had  therefore  "  notified  his  government,"  in  the 
telegram  and  in  the  letter.     His  "government,"  therefore,  knew, 
before  his  departure,  that  his  intention  was  to  leave.     True,  no 
"permission" — in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term — was  askel  of  the 
War  Department.     But  it  was  clearly  with  no  thought  of  ignor 
ing — still  less  of  overriding — the  authority  of  the  War  Depart 
ment  or  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.     No  formal  permission  was 
asked,  because  General  Beauregard  believed  that,  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  he  could  freely  transport  himself  to  any  place  in  the 
Confederacy,  even  outside   of  his   territorial  command,  without 
special  leave  from  Richmond — all  the  more  so,  that  he  clearly  in 
dicated  the  precise  localities  to  which  he  was  going,  the  reasons 
for  which  he  was  leaving,  and  the  length  of  time  he  proposed  be 
ing  absent. 

III.  Mr.  Davis' s  assertion  that  "  the  order  assigning  another  to 
the  command  he  had  abandoned  could  not  be  sent  through  him 
(General  Beauregard),  when  he  had  departed  and  gone  to  a  place 
where  there   was  no  telegraph   and    rarely  a  mail,"  is,  indeed, 
extraordinary,  to  say  the  least  of  it.     "  Mobile  "  was  not  an  inac 
cessible  place,  nor  was  "  Bladon  Springs"  an  unknown  locality. 
General  Bragg  found  no   difficulty  in  notifying  General  Beaure 
gard  of  the  order  superseding  him  ;  and  the  curt,  unceremonious, 
official  note  of   Mr.  Randolph,  dated    Richmond,  June  23d,  also 
reached  General  Beauregard  without  difficulty  or  delay. 


GENERAL   BEAUREGARD.  411 

IV.  If,  as  Mr.  Davis  lias  it,  General  Beauregard  Lad  abandoned 
his  command  without  "permission" — that  is  to  say,  in  violation 
of  army  regulations — he  was  not  absent  on  "  sick-leave,''  or  any 
other  "  leave;"  he  had  simply  deserted  his  post.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  as  Mr.  Davis  plainly  states,  he  was  "on  sick-leave,"  the 
temporary  arrangement  made  at  and  before  his  departure  should 
have  been  acquiesced  in  ;  fur  he  was  clearly  not  at  fault,  if  on 
"  sick-leave." 

But  it  is  an  undeniable  fact  that,  when  the  government's  de 
spatch  of  June  1-ith  was  sent  directly  to  General  Bragg,  General 
Beauregard  was  still  in  full  command  at  Tupelo,  and  had  not, 
then,  even  intimated  his  intention  of  going  to  the  inaccessible 
place  Mr.  Davis  objects  to.  He  only  disclosed  that  intention  af 
ter  the  President's  order  had  reached  General  Bragg;  and  this 
is  the  "similar  order,"  which,  Mr.  Davis  states,  was  sent  through 
General  Beauregard  and  disobeyed.  Scarcely  over  three  weeks 
after  he  left  Tupelo,  General  Beauregard — had  he  not  been,  at 
that  time,  tacitly  "shelved" — could  have  resumed  his  active  du 
ties  in  the  iield  or  elsewhere.  His  health  was  sufficiently  restored 
by  the  rest,  quiet,  and  salubrious  air  he  had  enjoyed  at  Bladon 
Springs.  But,  as  is  now  apparent,  the  current  of  succeeding  events 
did  not  require  his  presence  with  the  army,  even  a  fortnight  after 
his  sufficient  restoration  to  health.  And  this  had  been  clearly  fore 
seen  by  him  before  he  left  Tupelo.  Xor  was  the  hurried  depart 
ure  of  General  Bragg,  so  much  insisted  upon  by  President  Davis, 
at  all  indispensable.  General  Van  Dorn,  when  sent  to  relieve 
General  Lovell,  did  just  as  well ;  and  we  have  yet  to  learn  that 
he  took  even  a  company  with  him  to  reinforce  a  place  which,  Mr. 
Davis  said,  was  so  imminently  threatened. 

Days,  and  even  weeks,  passed  by.  General  Beauregard  was  still 
in  retirement  at  Bladon  Springs.  Letters  of  sympathy  and  regret 
reached  him  from  all  points  of  the  Confederacy,  and  proved  what 
a  high  place  he  occupied  in  the  public  esteem.  Yet  some  injudi 
cious  friends,  or  "mischief-makers" — as  the  lion.  John  Forsyth, 
who  had  been  one  of  our  three  Peace  Commissioners  to  Washing 
ton,  so  aptly  called  them — strove  hard  to  create  feelings  of  suspicion 
and  animosity  between  our  leading  men,  and,  what  was  worse,  be 
tween  Generals  Beauregard  and  Bragg.  The  former  did  his  utmost, 
incessantly,  not  only  to  screen  his  successor  from  all  imputation  of 
blame  concerning  the  action  of  the  Executive  in  placing  him  in 


412  MILITARY   OPERATIONS  OF 

command  of  Department  ~No.  2,  but  made  it  a  point  (except  when 
speaking  to  a  limited  circle  of  tried  friends)  to  approve  of  all  that 
had  been  done  in  that  respect.  We  give  here  a  few  passages  from 
a  letter  from  General  Bragg  to  the  Hon.  John  Forsyth,  dated 
Tupelo,  July  17th,  written  in  acknowledgment  of  a  very  remark 
able  article  printed  by  the  latter  in  the  Mobile  Evening  News. 
In  the  Appendix  will  also  be  found  a  letter  of  General  Beaure- 
gard  on  the  same  subject. 

After  speaking  of  his  determination  ever  to  avoid  discussions  in 
the  public  press,  and  thanking  Mr.  Forsyth  for  the  sentiments  he 
had  expressed  concerning  the  positions,  "  personal  and  official,"  of 
General  Beauregard  and  himself,  General  Bragg  said  : 

"  No  two  men  living  ever  served  together  more  harmoniously,  or  parted 
with  more  regret.  None  of  us  are  free  from  our  faults  and  weaknesses,  but 
among  mine  will  never  be  found  a  jealousy  which  would  detract  from  so  pure 
a  man  and  eminent  a  general  as  Beauregard. 

"  No  one  could  have  been  more  surprised  at  the  order  assigning  me  to  his 
command  than  myself;  and  certainly  the  idea  of  my  being  a  '  pet '  with  any 
part  of  the  administration  is  laughable.  .  .  .  Upon  the  urgent  appeal  of  his 
physicians,  after  arriving  here,  where  it  was  supposed  we  should  not  be  as 
sailed  by  the  enemy  for  a  few  weeks,  he  retired  to  seek  some  relief  from  the 
toils  which  have  made  him  an  old  man  in  the  short  space  of  one  year.  If  it 
be  his  friends  who  have  started  this  discussion,  they  are  doing  him  great  in 
justice,  and  so  far  as  I  am  concerned  I  can  only  say  to  them,  the  records  here 
will  show  with  what  regret  I  parted  with  their  chief,  and  how  ardently  I 
hoped  for  his  restoration,  that  he  might  resume  the  position  lie  had  filled  so 
honorably."* 

On  the  22d  of  July,  from  Tupelo,  where  no  incident  of  note 
had  thus  far  happened,  General  Bragg  addressed  an  interesting 
communication  to  General  Beauregard,  setting  forth  a  plan  of 
active  operations  which  he  had  prepared,  and  asking  his  opinion 
and  advice  thereon. f  General  Beauregard  answered  as  follows: 

"  CULLUM  SPRINGS,  BLADON,  ALA.,  July  2Sth,  1862. 
"  General  BRAXTON  BRAGG,  Commanding  Department  No.  2,  Mobile,  Ala. : 

"Jfy  dear  General, —  Your  letter  of  the  22d  instant  was  received  only 
last  night.  I  give  you  with  pleasure  the  following  views  on  your  proposed 
operations  from  Tupelo,  for  I  wish  you  the  amplest  success,  both  on  your  own 
and  the  country's  account. 

"  You  have  evidently  but  one  of  four  things  to  do.     First,  to  attack  Hallcck 

*  The  entire  letter  is  in  the  Appendix  to  this  Chapter. 
t  This  communication  is  to  be  found  in  Appendix. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  413 

at  Corinth;  second,  to  attack  Buell  at  or  about  Chattanooga;  third,  to  at 
tack  Grant  at  or  about  Memphis  ;  fourth,  to  remain  idle  at  Tupelo. 

"From  what  you  state  the  first  is  evidently  inadmissible,  and  the  last  can 
not  be  entertained  for  one  moment,  for  action,  action,  is  what  we  require. 

"  Now,  with  regard  to  the  other  two  propositions,  it  is  evident  that  unless 
you  reinforce  General  E.  K.  Smith,  at  Chattanooga,  he  will  be  overpowered 
by  Buell,  and  that  our  communication  with  the  East,  and  our  supplies  at  At 
lanta,  Augusta,  etc.,  will  be  cut  off;  also  that  a  partial  reinforcement  would 
so  weaken  you  at  Tupelo  as  to  paralyze  you  for  any  other  movements  from 
there  ;  hence  you  have  adopted  the  wisest  course  in  sending  to  Smith  all  your 
available  forces,  except  just  enough  to  guard  your  depots,  etc.,  to  the  rear  of 
your  present  position  at  Tupelo. 

u  The  third  proposition  would  have  afforded  you  some  success,  but  not  as 
brilliant  and  important  in  its  results  as  the  second  one,  if  the  newspapers  will 
permit  you  to  carry  it  successfully  into  effect;  for  Ilallcck  and  Buell,  occupy 
ing  the  base  of  a  long  isosceles  triangle,  of  which  Mobile  is  the  apex,  could 
get  to  Chattanooga  before  you  if  they  should  become  aware  of  your  move 
ments,  and  then  you  would  have  to  contend  again  with  superior  forces,  as  usu 
al  to  us.  The  moment  you  get  to  Chattanooga  you  ought  to  take  the  offen 
sive,  keeping  in  mind  the  following  grand  principles  of  the  art  of  war:  First, 
always  bring  the  masses  of  your  army  in  contact  with  the  fractions  of  the  en 
emy  ;  second,  operate  as  much  as  possible  on  his  communications  without  ex 
posing  your  own;  third, operate  always  on  interior  or  shorter  lines.  I  have 
no  doubt  that  with  anything  like  equal  numbers  you  will  always  meet  with 
success. 

"  I  am  happy  to  see  that  my  two  lieutenants,  Morgan  and  Forrest,  are  doing 
such  good  service  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  When  I  appointed  them  I 
thought  they  would  leave  their  mark  wherever  they  passed. 

********* 

"  Sincerely  your  friend, 

4>  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

General  Bragg,  fur  reasons  we  cannot  explain,  did  not  follow 
the  advice  given  ;  and  his  campaign  into  middle  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky  ended  almost  in  disaster. 

General  Beaurcgard,  it  seems,  had  not  given  up  all  hope  of 
again  assuming  command  of  his  army,  lie  followed  its  every 
movement  with  the  greatest  interest  and  anxiety;  and  during  the 
leisure  now  afforded  him,  drew  up  an  extensive  plan  for  its 
further  success,  which  he  finally  forwarded  to  the  AVar  Depart 
ment.  In  the  meantime — namely,  on  the  25th  of  August — he  had 
officially  reported  "  for  duty  in  the  field.''  The  plan  we  here  re 
fer  to  was  addressed  to  General  Cooper,  whose  relations  with  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  had  not  ceased  to  be  of  an  agreeable  character. 
It  was  marked  "  Confidential,"  and  read  thus: 


414  MILITARY  OPERATIONS   OF 

"  MOBILE,  ALA.,  September  5th,  18G2. 

"  General, — Under  the  supposition  that  on  the  restoration  of  my  health  I 
would  be  returned  to  the  command  of  Department  No.  2, 1  had  prepared  while  at 
Bladon,  Alabama,  a  plan  of  operations  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  based  on  my 
knowledge  of  that  part  of  the  theatre  of  war;  but  hearing  that  my  just  ex 
pectations  are  to  be  disappointed,  I  have  the  honor  to  communicate  it  to  the 
War  Department,  in  the  hope  that  it  may  be  of  service  to  our  arms  and  to  our 
cause.  It  was  submitted  by  me  to  General  Bragg  on  the  3d  instant.  By  look 
ing  at  the  map  it  will  be  seen  that  the  forces  operating  in  that  section  of 
country  will  be  separated  at  first  by  one  river  (the  Tennessee),  and  afterwards 
by  two  (the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland),  hence  they  will  be  unable  to  support 
each  other,  being  unprovided  with  pontoon  trains ;  but  their  operations  must 
be  more  or  less  dependent  on  or  connected  with  each  other.  I  will  first  refer 
to  those  in  East  Tennessee  and  then  to  those  west  of  it. 

"  In  the  first  case,  our  objective  points  must  be,  first,  Louisville,  and  then  Cin 
cinnati.  How  best  to  reach  them  from  Chattanooga,  with  Buell  at  Iluntsville 
and  Stevenson,  is  the  question.  It  is  evident  he  has  the  advantage  of  two 
bases  of  operations,  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  rivers,  and  that  if  we  ad 
vance  towards  our  objective  points  without  getting  rid  of  him,  we  would  ex 
pose  our  lines  of  communication  with  Chattanooga.  We  must,  then,  give  him 
battle  first,  or  compel  him  to  retire  before  us. 

"  Should  he  retire  on  Nashville  (as  the  newspapers  say  lie  is  now  doing),  we 
will  be  advancing  towards  Louisville ;  but  should  he  venture  on  Florence  or 
Savannah,  to  unite  his  forces  with  Rosecraus  and  Grant,  we  will  have  to  con 
centrate  enough  of  our  forces  from  Mobile  and  East  Tennessee  to  follow  him 
rapidly  and  defeat  him  in  a  grand  battle,  when  we  would  be  able  to  resume 
our  march  as  before  indicated.  We  must,  however,  as  soon  as  practicable,  con 
struct  strong  works  to  command  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers,  for 
otherwise  our  communication  would  be  cut  off  by  the  enemy  as  soon  as  those 
two  rivers  shall  have  risen  sufficiently  to  admit  the  entrance  of  their  gunboats 
and  transports. 

"  The  best  positions  for  said  works  are  about  forty  miles  below  forts  Donel- 
son  and  Henry,  not  far  from  Eddysville,  where  those  two  rivers  come  within 
one  and  a  half  miles  of  each  other.  I  am  informed  there  is  at  that  point  a 
commanding  elevation  where  a  strong  field-work  could  be  constructed  for  a 
garrison  of  about  twenty-five  hundred  or  three  thousand  men,  who  could  hold 
out  (with  ample  provisions  and  ammunition)  against  a  large  army.  Under 
the  guns  of  this  work,  and  along  the  bank  of  each  river,  a  series  of  batteries, 
armed  with  the  heaviest  guns  (eight,  nine,  ten  inch,  and  rifled  guns),  could 
be  constructed,  bearing  directly  on  obstructions  placed  in  each  of  said  rivers. 

"  When  Louisville  shall  have  fallen  into  our  possession,  I  would  construct  a 
work  there  for  the  command  of  the  Ohio  and  the  canal,  and  I  would  destroy 
the  latter  as  soon  as  possible,  so  completely  that  future  travellers  would  hardly 
know  where  it  was.  This  I  would  do  as  a  return  for  the  Yankee  vandalism  in 
attempting  to  obstruct  forever  the  harbors  of  Charleston  and  Savannah.  A 
detachment  of  our  army  could,  I  think,  take  Louisville,  while  the  main  body 
would  be  marching  to  Cincinnati ;  but  if  we  could  get  boats  enough  it  would 


GENERAL  BEAUBEGABD.  415 

be  shorter  to  go  up  the  Ohio  in  them.     To  keep  the  command  of  Cincinnati, 
I  would  construct  a  strong  work,  heavily  armed,  at  Covington. 

"Now,  for  the  operation  of  Western  Tennessee.  The  object  should  be  to 
drive  the  enemy  from  there  and  resume  the  command  of  the  Mississippi  River. 
For  these  purposes  I  would  concentrate  rapidly  at  Grand  Junction  Price's 
army,  and  all  that  could  be  spared  from  Vicksburg  of  Van  Dora's.  From 
there  I  would  make  a  forced  march  to  Fort  Pillow,  which  I  would  take  with 
probably  only  a  very  small  loss.  It  is  evident  that  the  forces  at  Memphis  and 
Yazoo  River  would  then  have  their  line  of  communication  by  the  river  with 
the  North  cut  off,  and  they  would  have  cither  to  surrender  or  cross  without 
resources  into  Arkansas,  where  General  Holmes  would  take  good  care  of  them. 
From  Fort  Pillow  I  would  compel  the  forces  at  Corinth  and  Jackson,  Tennessee, 
to  fall  back  precipitately  to  Ilumboldt  and  Columbus,  or  their  lines  of  commu 
nication  would  be  cut  off  also.  We  would  then  pursue  them  vigorously  beyond 
the  Mississippi  at  Columbus,  or  the  Ohio  at  Paducah.  We  would  thus  compel 
the  enemy  to  evacuate  the  State  of  Mississippi  and  Western  Tennessee,  with 
probably  the  loss  on  our  part  of  only  a  few  hundred  men.  General  Price  could 
then  be  detached  into  Missouri  to  support  his  friends,  where  his  presence  alone 
would  be  worth  an  army  to  the  Confederacy. 

k'  The  armament  and  ammunition  of  the  works  referred  to  should  be  collected, 
as  soon  as  possible,  at  Meridian  and  Chattanooga.  Such  are  the  operations 
which  I  would  carry  into  effect,  with  such  modifications  as  circumstances  might 
require,  if  the  President  had  judged  proper  to  order  me  back  to  the  command 
of  that  army  which  I  had,  with  General  Brngg's  assistance,  collected  together 
and  organized,  and  which  I  had  only  left  to  recover  my  shattered  health,  while 
my  presence  could  be  spared  from  it,  and  until  he  informed  me  that  it  was 
ready  to  take  the  offensive. 

"  Hoping  for  its  entire  success,  I  remain,  yen*  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  T.  BEAUHEGAKD,  General  C.  S.  A." 

Hardly  a  week  had  elapsed  after  the  foregoing  communication 
was  forwarded  to  Richmond,  when  the  Hon.  Thomas  J.  Semmes 
and  the  Hon.  Edward  Sparrow,  Members  of  Congress  from  Louisi 
ana,  called  by  agreement,  with  their  colleagues,  on  President 
Davis,  to  present  to  him  a  petition,  signed  by  nearly  sixty  Sena 
tors  and  Representatives  from  different  States  of  the  Confederacy. 
It  is  a  paper  of  great  interest,  giving  additional  information  upon 
the  subject  which  occupies  our  attention  : 

"To  the  PRESIDENT  of  the  Confederate  States: 

u  Sir, — The  undersigned  Senators  and  Representatives  in  Congress  from  the 
Western  and  Southwestern  States  have  learned  with  pleasure  that  General 
Bcauregard,  restored  in  health,  has  reported  for  duty,  and  that  he  has  been  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  They  have  also  been 
reliably  informed  that  the  General  is  anxious  and  eager  to  return  to  the  com- 


41G 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 


mand  of  the  Army  of  the  West.  Without  in  any  manner  desiring  to  interfere 
with  the  military  dispositions  of  the  government,  or  with  the  prerogatives  of 
the  President  as  Commandcr-in-Chief  of  all  the  forces,  they  would  respectfully 
submit  that  a  due  regard,  consistent  with  the  best  interests  of  the  country, 
should  be  paid  to  the  wishes  of  one  who  has  given  such  proofs  of  disinterested 
devotion  to  our  cause,  and  who  has  contributed  so  much  by  his  generalship  to 
insure  the  success  of  our  arms.  Compelled  by  the  exigencies  of  the  country  to 
separate  himself  from  his  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  go  West  in  a  new  field,  at 
a  most  gloomy  period  of  our  revolution  ;  then,  with  scanty  resources,  to  form 
a  new  army,  under  every  possible  disadvantage,  consequent  upon  the  unex 
pected  fall  of  forts  Henry  and  Done] son,  he  was  found  equal  to  every  emer 
gency  ;  and  then  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  and  in  the  masterly  retreat  from  Cor 
inth,  saved  that  army.  We  know  the  enthusiasm  with  which  his  return  would 
inspire  our  noble  army,  who  long  to  see  him,  and  that  the  worthy  general 
commanding  would  be  rejoiced  and  gladdened  by  his  presence.  As  represen 
tatives  aforesaid,  knowing  well  the  sentiments  and  wishes  of  the  people  we 
represent,  we  unhesitatingly  say  that  the  restoration  of  General  Beauregard  to 
the  Army  of  the  West  would  be  hailed  with  great  joy  by  them  ;  and  without 
detracting  from  the  acknowledged  merit  and  well-earned  reputation  of  the 
present  commander,  we  respectfully  submit  that  a  new  guarantee  for  the  suc 
cess  of  our  arms  would  be  given.  For  these  reasons  we  earnestly  ask  the 
President  to  duly  consider  the  expressed  desire  of  General  Beauregard,  ere  lie 
be  definitely  assigned  to  any  position.  Understanding  that  the  assignment  of 
General  Beauregard  to  Charleston  has  been  pressed  upon  the  government  by 
the  Governor  and  Council  of  South  Carolina,  we  tender  herewith  the  names  of 
the  representatives  of  that  State,  as  expressive  of  their  assent  to  our  petition. 

"  It  is  but  justice  to  General  Beauregard  to  say  that  this  step  is  taken  with 
out  his  knowledge  or  consent. 


"Ed.  Sparrow, 
T.  J.  Semmes, 
W.  L.  Yanccy, 
L.  C.  Ilaynes, 
II.  C.  Burnet, 
J.  B.  Clark, 

-  Peyton, 
G.  A.  Henry, 
L.T.Wigfall, 

—  Menccs, 
C.  W.  Bell, 
C.  J.  Villere, 
G.  D.  Royston, 
J.  M.  Elliott, 
David  Clopton, 
G.  W.  Ewing, 
W.  N.  Cooke, 
F.  S.  Lyon, 


La. 
it 

Ala. 
Tenn. 
Ky. 
Mo. 

u 

Tenn. 
Texas. 

u 

Mo. 
La. 

Ark. 

Ky. 

Ark. 

Ky. 

Mo. 

Ala. 


J.  Perkins,  Jr., 

C.  M.  Conrad, 
J.  Wilcox, 

P.  W.  Gray, 

T.  B.  Ccxton, 

J.  C.  Atkins, 

W.  G.  Swan, 

II.  S.  Footc, 

T.  B.  Haudley, 

H.  W.  Bruce, 

II.  J.  Breckinridge, 

W.  R.  Smith, 

E.  L.  Gardeushire, 

J.  W.  Moore, 

D.  F.  Kenncr, 
L.  C.  Dupre, 

E.  S.  Dargan, 

F.  J.  Batson, 


La. 


Texas. 


Tenn. 

u 
it 

Ark. 
Ky. 

u 

Ala. 
Tenn. 
Ky. 
La. 

a 

Ala. 
Ark. 


GENERAL  BEAUEEGARD. 


J.  B.  Hciskell, 

Ten  n. 

T.  A.  Harris, 

Mo. 

C.  C.  Herbert, 

Texas. 

F.  J.  Foster, 

Ala. 

E.  M.  Bruce, 

Ky. 

A.  II.  Garland, 

Ark. 

G.  G.  Vest, 

Mo. 

J.  I).  Crocket, 

Ky. 

W.  R.  Machen, 

" 

II.  R.  Wright, 

Ga. 

M.  D.  Graham, 

Texas. 

I).  -VI.  Currin, 

Twin. 

Ky. 

u 

Tenn. 

Ala. 

Mo. 

u 

S.C. 


u  A  true  copy. 


G.  B.  Hodge, 
II.  E.  Reid, 
Win.  II.  Tibbs, 
J.  L.  M.  Curry, 
A.  W.  Con  row, 
F.  W.  Freeman, 
Wm.  Porcher  Miles, 
M.  L.  Bonhani, 
W.  AY.  Boyce, 
F.  Farrow, 
J.  McQueen, 


CHARLES  J.  VILLKKE,  Representative  in  Congress. 


President  Davis'  s  answer  to  this  earnest  appeal,  supported  by  such 
an  imposing  array  of  representative  names,  was  truly  characteristic. 
The  reader  will  judge  of  it  after  reading  the  following  paper: 

Notes  of  an  Interview  icith  the  President  relative  to  Transferring  General  Bcaure- 
gard  to  the  Command  of  Department  No.  2. 


"RICHMOND,  frjitcmter  \3tli,  18G2. 

"  General  Sparrow  and  myself  this  day  called  on  the  President,  and  deliv 
ered  to  him  a  petition,  signed  by  about  fifty  members  and  senators  from  the 
Western  and  Southwestern  States,  in  which  the  restoration  of  Beaurcgard 
to  the  command  of  the  army  now  under  Bragg  was  solicited,  it  being  stated 
in  the  petition  that  it  was  known  that  Bragg  would  welcome  the  restoration 
of  Beauregard.  The  President  received  it  politely,  and  immediately  read  it 
aloud  in  our  presence,  making,  en  passant,  some  running  comments  on  tho 
correctness  of  some  of  the  facts  stated  in  the  petition.  lie  then  calmly  and 
dispassionately  read  aloud  all  the  signatures  attached  to  the  petition.  Hav 
ing  sent  to  an  adjoining  office  for  five  or  six  despatches,  he  read  them  aloud 
in  the  order  they  were  sent  or  received,  according  to  date,  and  accompanied 
them  in  a  calm  manner  with  the  following  explanation,  prefacing  it  with  the 
remark  that  he  supposed  we  had  not  a  correct  and  faithful  apprehension  of 
the  facts.  lie  stated  that  on  the  day  preceding  his  first  despatch  command 
ing  Bragg  to  proceed  to  Vicksburg  (14th  June,  I  think),  he  received  a  de 
spatch  from  Governor  Pickens,  of  South  Carolina,  informing  him  that  Beaure 
gard  (to  whom  Pickens  had  previously  sent  a  despatch  requesting  him  to 
come  to  Charleston  and  take  command  there)  had  replied  that  his  presence 
was  ulMotutfli/  necessary  to  the  army  at  Tupelo,  and  that  he  could  not  leave  it. 
lie  (the  President)  further  stated  the  following  condition  of  things  existed  at 
that  time  :  Columbus  and  Island  No.  10  had  surrendered  ;  Fort  Pillow  was 
evacuated,  Memphis  was  abandoned,  the  enemy  were  taking  possession  of  the 
line  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  and  threatening  a  descent 
through  Mississippi  ;  that  Xew  Orleans  had  fallen,  and  the  disposition  seemed 

I.-27 


418  MILITARY   OPERATIONS   OF 

to  be  to  give  up  everything;  that  he  had  just  received  a  despatch  from  Lov- 
ell,  stating,  unless  reinforced,  he  would  abandon  Yicksburg ;  besides  all  this,  he 
knew  the  people  had  no  confidence  in  Lovell,  and  would  not  serve  under 
him.  lie  at  once  determined  to  send  Bragg  to  Vicksburg,  and  on  the  loth 
June,  I  think,  telegraphed  to  Bragg  to  proceed  at  once  to  Vicksburg,  as  the 
danger  was  pressing  and  imminent,  and  that  the  assignment  of  him  to  Vicks 
burg  was  but  temporary.  Bragg  immediately  replied  by  telegraph  (16th  or 
17th,  I  do  not  remember)  that  Beaurcgard,  being  in  bad  health,  desired  tem 
porary  repose,  and  intended  to  leave  the  army  for  a  short  period,  and  con 
cluded  by  saying  he  would  await  further  orders.  When  this  despatch  arrived 
in  Richmond,  the  President  was  at  Raleigh  ;  as  soon  as  he  received  it  from  the 
Adjutant-General,  he  telegraphed  Bragg  to  go  at  once  to  Vicksburg,  the  danger 
was  pressing  and  imminent,  and  he  was  sorry  he  had  permitted  anything  to 
interfere  with  his  orders.  Bragg  replied  on  the  18th  or  19th,  that  Beauregard 
Jiad  left  on  a  surgeon's  certificate  of  four  months,  stating,  however,  that  Beau- 
regard  would  return  in  a  short  time,  and  as  soon  as  the  army  was  reorgan 
ized.  I  forget  the  exact  terms  of  the  despatch.  It  conveyed  the  idea  of  Beau- 
regard's  absence  being  temporary,  and  of  no  very  long  duration  ;  but  how 
long  was  uncertain,  and  where  he  had  gone  was  not  stated*  Bragg  informed  the 
President  his  presence  had  now  become  absolutely  necessary  to  the  army,  and 
that  he  awaited  further  orders.  The  President  replied,  giving  Bragg  the  com 
mand  of  the  department,  and  ordered  Van  Dora  to  Vicksburg  through  Bragg. 
The  President  stated  that  under  these  circumstances  every  military  man  will  say 
that  Beaurcgard  should  have  remained  at  Tupelo,  even  if  lie  had  to  ~be  carried  aliout 
•in  a  Utter.*  He  knew  that  Bragg's  assignment  to  Vicksburg  was  but  tempo 
rary,  and  he  ought  to  have  waited  at  least  two  or  three  weeks  ;  that  he  left  the 
army  under  these  circumstances  without  permission,  and  that  he  had  no  right 
to  leave  on  a  surgeon's  certificate  without  permission,  and  he  had  not  stated 
where  he  had  gone ;  that  so  long  as  Beauregard  remained  invested  with  the 
command  of  the  department,  Bragg  was  only  the  commander  of  that  army  at 
Tupelo  ;  that  Bragg  could  not  correspond  with  the  War  Department  except 
through  Beauregard,  and  no  orders  could  be  issued  to  other  forces  in  the  de 
partment  at  Vicksburg  or  elsewhere,  except  through  Beauregard  as  head  of 
the  department,  and  therefore,  under  the  circumstances,  a  change  of  the  head 
of  the  department  was  absolutely  necessary  for  the  public  interest.  The 
President,  though  stating  the  irregularities  of  Beanregard's  conduct  in  leaving 
the  army,  said  he  had  overlooked  all  that,  and  disavowed  its  influence  on  his 
conduct,  and  based  his  action  exclusively  on  the  public  interests  at  that 
time. 

"  That  so  far  as  giving  Beauregard  command  of  Brngg's  army  is  concerned, 
that  was  out  of  the  question.  Bragg  had  arranged  all  his  plans,  and  had  co- 
intelligence  with  the  department,  with  Kirby  Smith,  and  Humphrey  Marshall, 
and  to  put  a  new  commander*  at  the  head  of  the  army,  would  be  so  prejudicial 
to  the  public  interests,  he  would  not  do  it  if  the  whole  world  united  in  the  peti 
tion*  He  further  stated  that  Charleston  was  no  unimportant  command,  that 

*  The  italics  are  ours. 


GENERAL  BEAUREGARD.  419 

Charleston  and  Savannah  were  of  vast  consequence  to  the  Confederacy,  and 
as  he  believed  General  Bcauregard's  qualifications  peculiarly  fitted  him  for  its 
defence,  he  had  selected  him  on  that  account  as  the  best  man  in  the  army  for 
the  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  Department.  The  President  read  aloud  to  us 
all  the  despatches  spoken  of  above.  I  may  not  therefore  give  their  tenor  ac 
curately;  he  promised  us  copies,  and,  moreover,  authorized  us  to  repeat  what 
passed  in  conversation.  The  above,  however,  is  substantially  what  passed,  as 
far  as  I  can  recollect ;  it  is  not  all  that  passed,  nor  do  I  pretend  to  give  the 
exact  language. 

"  THOMAS  J.  SEMMES." 

A  few  words  more,  and  we  have  done  with  this  subject.  We  have 
furnished  the  whole  of  the  evidence  relating  to  it ;  and,  in  order 
to  make  the  chain  more  complete,  we  now  refer  the  reader  to  the 
despatch  of  Governor  Pickens,  and  General  Beauregard's  answer 
to  it,  to  be  found  in  the  Appendix  to  this  chapter.  Let  the  read 
er  carefully  compare  the  facts  composing  that  evidence  with  what 
Mr.  Davis  writes  in  his  book,  and  with  what  he  said  to  the  com 
mittee  of  Congressmen  who  called  on  him  to  petition  for  General 
Beauregard's  restoration  to  his  army.  lie  will  need  no  further 
enlightenment  in  order  to  draw  a  just  conclusion.  We  do  not  in- 

r^  J 

tend  to  scrutinize  the  motives  which  actuated  Mr.  Davis  in  his 
conduct  at  that  time  towards  General  Beauregard  ;  but,  that  he 
was  not  moved  by  a  spirit  of  patriotism,  or  influenced  only  by  a 
pure  desire  to  advance  the  interests  of  the  cause,  is  shown  by  the 
expressions  used  by  him  on  that  occasion  :  "  lie  would  not  do  it, 
if  the  whole  world  united  in  the  petition"  Here  was  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  Confederacy,  the  first  and  most  prominent  servant  of 
its  people,  ready  to  oppose  his  will,  his  rule,  not  only  to  the  desire 
of  the  majority  of  that  people,  but — if  need  be — to  the  declared 
opinion  of  **  the  whole  world:"  the  plain  meaning  of  which  was 
that  should  he  and  the  rest  of  mankind,  including  the  whole  pop 
ulation  of  the  South,  differ  as  to  the  wisdom  of  any  measure  of 
public  interest,  he  would  be  right,  and  the  li -whole  world"  wrong. 
What  monarch,  in  this  or  in  any  former  age,  could  have  regarded 
his  power  as  more  absolute? 

Taken  as  a  whole,  the  military  operations  in  Department  No. 
2,  from  Bowling  Green  to  the  evacuation  of  Corinth,  including 
the  stand  made  at  Tupelo,  presented  some  of  the  most  difficult 
problems  of  war.  Without  the  wish  to  claim  undue  credit  for  the 
manner  in  which  these  were  solved,  in  view  of  the  desperate  begin 
ning,  the  wretched  want  of  preparation,  the  deficiency  of  men  and 


420        MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF  GENERAL  BEAUREGARD. 

arms,  the  raw  and  incomplete  materials,  collected  by  such  strenu 
ous  efforts,  the  friends  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston  and  of  General 
Beauregard  may  be  proud  of  the  results ;  of  the  skill  with  which 
they  met  every  emergency,  and,  with  heavy  odds  against  them, 
balked  the  plans  of  the  enemy. 


APPENDICES  TO  VOL.  I. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER   I. 

ENGINEER  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  Jan.  24th,  18G1. 
Bvt.  Miijor  P.  G.  T.  BEAUREGAUD,  Corps  of  Engineers,  West  Point,  X.  Y. : 

Major, — The  Secretary  of  War  directs  that  Special  Orders  No.  238,  of  Xov. 
8th,  18(>0,  appointing  you  to  the  post  of  Superintendent  of  the  Military  Acad 
emy,  be  revoked,  and  that  you  return  to  your  former  station  at  Xe\v  Orleans. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Jos.  G.  TOTTEN,  Bvt.  Brig.-Genl.,  Chief  Eng. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  Jan.  25th,  18G1. 
SjKcial  Order  Xo.  19. 

Special  Order  Xo.  238,  Adjutant-General's  Oflice,  of  Xovember,  1800,  appoint 
ing  Bvt.  Major  Peter  G.  T.  Beauregard,  Captain  Corps  of  Engineers,  to  be  the 
Superintendent  of  the  Military  Academy,  is  hereby  revoked,  and  Major  Beau- 
regard  will  return  to  his  former  station  at  Xew  Orleans,  La. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  S.  COOPER,  Adj.-Genl. 

Major  BEAUREGARD,  through  Engineers. 

XEW  ORLEANS,  Feb.  12th,  18G1. 
Hon.  Rd.  TAYLOR,  Xew  Orleans,  La. : 

Dear  Sir, — Upon  rellcction  and  consultation  with  my  friends,  I  have  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  I  ought  not  and  cannot  accept  that  Colonelcy  of  Engi 
neers  and  Artillery  in  the  State  army — but  my  professional  knowledge,  expe 
rience,  and  services,  without  military  rank,  are  at  the  command  of  the  State,  even 
unto  death.  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


XEW  ORLEANS,  Feb.  12th,  18G1. 
Major  G.  T.  BEAUREGAKD  : 

Dear  Sir, — I  regret  most  sincerely  that  anything  should  have  occurred  to 
induce  you  to  change  the  determination  in  which  I  left  you  on  yesterday.  A 
great  deal  of  apprehension  has  been  felt  for  the  safety  of  our  forts  commanding 
the  river,  and  the  attention  of  the  whole  community  has  been  directed  to  you 
as  the  one  upon  whom  the  State  must  rely  in  the  hour  of  danger. 


422  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  I. 

I  cannot  presume  to  intrude  ray  advice  and  opinions  upon  you.  again,  and 
will  only  repeat  that  your  decision  will  be  a  source  of  great  regret  and  disap 
pointment  to  the  whole  country,  as  well  as  to  your  friends,  among  whom,  my 
dear  sir,  I  hope  yon  will  permit  me  to  include  myself. 

With  high  respect,  your  obedient  servant,  R.  TAYLOR. 

NEW  ORLEANS,  Feb.  13  tf,  1861. 

Gentlemen, — As  time  presses,  and  it  may  soon  become  urgent  to  be  prepared 
for  the  worst,  permit  me  to  make  a  few  suggestions  which  may  lead  to  our 
successful  preparation. 

In  the  iirst  place,  we  must  look  to  our  most  vulnerable  point,  the  Mississippi 
River;  for  one  single  steamer,  with  only  two  or  three  guns,  coming  into  the 
port  of  New  Orleans,  would  in  a  few  hours  destroy  millions'  worth  of  property, 
or  lay  the  city  under  a  forced  contribution  of  millions  of  dollars. 

It  is  an  undeniable  fact  that,  in  the  present  condition  of  Forts  Jackson  and 
St.  Philip,  any  steamer  can  pass  them  in  broad  daylight;  and  that  even  when 
in.  a  proper  condition  for  defence,  they  could  not  prevent  the  passage  of  one 
or  more  steamers  during  a  dark  or  stormy  night,  without  the  assistance  of  a 
properly  constructed  raft  or  strong  wire  rope  across  the  river  between  the 
two  forts,  so  as  to  arrest  the  course  of  said  steamers,  even  only  for  half  an 
hour,  under  the  severe  cross-fire  of  said  forts. 

The  first  thing  to  be  done,  then,  is  to  commence  the  construction  of  (or  pre 
pare  at  least  the  materials  for)  said  obstacles ;  then  the  guns  of  the  land  fronts  of 
Fort  Jackson  ought  to  be  mounted  at  once  on  the  river  fronts  ;  the  guns,  chassis, 
and  carriages  at  Baton  Rouge,  Forts  Pike,  Wood,  Battery  Bienvcnu,  etc.,  where 
they  are  not  required  at  present,  ought  to  be  sent  at  once  to  these  two  forts  on 
the  river,  to  be  put  in  position  as  advantageously  as  possible  on  their  river 
fronts — not  overlooking,  however,  the  flank  guns  of  the  other  fronts;  all  said 
chassis  and  carriages  ought  to  be  tried  forthwith  by  double  charges  of  powder 
and  shot;  ample  supplies  of  ammunition  ought  to  be  sent  there  forthwith. 
The  trees  along  the  river,  masking  the  fires  of  those  two  forts,  up  and  down 
the  river,  ought  to  be  cut  down  at  once,  particularly  those  on  the  Fort  Jackson 
side.  In  a  few  words,  no  expenses  ought  to  be  spared  to  put  those  two  works 
in  a  most  efficient  state  of  defence  ;  for  $50,000  or  $100,000  spent  thus,  might,  a 
few  weeks  hence,  save  millions  of  dollars  to  the  State  and  city  of  New  Orleans. 

A  rough  calculation  shows  me  that  the  raft  spoken  of  would  cost  about 
$40,000,  and  three  wire  cables  probably  $60,000.  I  prefer  the  first.  Mr.  John 
Roy,  my  former  assistant  architect  on  the  New  Orleans  custom-house,  would  be 
of  great  assistance  in  the  construction  of  either  of  said  obstacles. 

In  haste,  I  remain,  gentlemen,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUUEGARD. 
To  the  Military  Board  of  the  State  of  Louisiana,  New  Orleans,  La. 

EXECUTIVE  OFFICE, 
BATON  ROUGE,  La.,  Feb.  17th,  1861. 
Col.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Dear  Sir,— A.  copy  of  yours  of  the  13th  instant,  to  the  "Military  Board/' 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  I.  423 

relative  to  the  condition  of  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  was  received  two  days 
since.  For  the  information  I  thank  yon,  also  for  the  valuable  suggestions 
offered.  I  have  written  the  members  of  the  Board  on  the  subject,  and  urged 
their  immediate  attention  to  the  whole  matter.  I  am  aware  of  its  importance, 
but  am  compelled  to  leave  all  such  matters  (military)  to  those  who  have  a 
knowledge  of  them.  I  only  regret,  with  all  of  our  friends,  that  you  could  not 
accept  the  post  tendered  you,  Colonel  of  Artillery  and  Chief  of  Engineers. 

With  the  highest  regards,  your  obedient  servant, 
In  haste.  TIIOS.  O.  MOOIIE. 


NEW  ORLEANS,  Feb.  Wth,  1861. 

Dear  Sir, — Your  favor  of  the  17th  instant  has  just  been  received.  I  thank 
you  for  regretting  that  I  could  not  accept  the  military  position  tendered  me. 
Although  not  in  service,  I  wish  it  distinctly  understood  that  my  professional 
knowledge  and  experience  are  at  the  command  of  my  native  State,  even  unto 
death,  whenever  required — but  without  military  rank;  not,  however,  through 
any  jealousy  of  General  Bragg's  appointment,  for  I  am  happy  to  state  that  it  is 
a  most  excellent  choice;  and  I  should  have  been  very  happy  to  serve  with  him 
or  under  his  orders,  in  the  defence  of  our  rights  and  firesides,  if  I  could  have 
accepted  the  Colonel  and  Chief  of  Engineers  and  Artillery  position  tendered  me. 
I  remain,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAT/REGARD. 
To  his  Excellency,  Gov.  T.  O.  MOORE,  Baton  Rouge,  La. 


ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 
WASHINGTON,  Feb.  23J,  1861. 

Sir, — Your  resignation  has  been  accepted  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  to  take  effect  the  20th  instant. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Asst.  Adj.-Geul. 
To  Bvt.  Major  P.  G.  T.  Bi:  ACRI-GAIID, 

Captain  Corps  of  Engineers,  Xe\v  Orleans,  La. 


Telegram  of  L.  1\  Waller,  Secretary  of  War,  to  Governor  Pickcns,  of  South  Carolina. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  C.  S.  A., 
MONTGOMERY,  March  1st,  1801. 
Gov.  F.  W.  PICK  HNS,  Charleston,  8.  C. : 

Your  letter  to  President  received.  This  government  assumes  control  of 
military  operations  at  Charleston,  and  will  make  demand  of  the  fort  when  fully 
advised.  An  officer  goes  to-night  to  take  charge. 

L.  P.  WALKER.  See.  of  War. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
MONTGOMERY,  March  1st,  1861. 
His  Excellency  F.  Wr.  PICKENS,  Governor,  etc. : 

Sir, — Your  letter  of  the  '27th  ultimo,  addressed  to  the  President,  has  been 
referred  by  him  to  this  department.     In   controlling  the  military  operations 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  I. 

in  the  Larbor  of  Charleston,  the  President  directs  me  to  say  that  everything 
will  be  done  that  may  be  due  to  the  honor  and  rights  of  South  Carolina. 

The  President  shares  the  feeling  expressed  by  you,  that  Fort  Sumter  should 
be  in  our  possession  at  the  earliest  moment  possible.  But  this  feeling,  natural 
and  just  as  it  is  admitted  to  be,  must  yield  to  the  necessity  of  the  case. 
Thorough  preparation  must  be  made  before  an  attack  is  attempted,  for  tbe 
first  blow  must  be  successful,  both  for  its  moral  and  physical  consequences, 
or  otherwise  the  result  might  be  disastrous  to  your  State  in  the  loss  of  many 
of  those  whom  we  can  least  afford  to  spare.  A  failure  would  demoralize  our 
people,  and  injuriously  affect  us  in  the  opinion  of  the  world,  as  reckless  and 
precipitate.  .  .  .  Under  the  fourth  section  of  an  Act  of  Congress  to  raise  Pro 
visional  Forces  for  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  and  for  other  purposes, 
a  copy  of  which  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  in  another  communication  of  this 
date,  the  President  has  appointed  Peter  G.  T.  Beauregard  Brigadier-General,  to 
command  the  Provisional  Forces  of  this  government  in  tbe  harbor  of  Charles 
ton.  General  Beauregard  will  be  accompanied  by  an  Adjutant,  whose  duty  it 
will  be  to  receive  into  the  Provisional  army,  with  their  officers,  under  the 
provisions  of  the  act  aforesaid,  the  forces  of  your  State  now  in  Charleston. 

General  Beauregard  has  the  entire  confidence  of  the  President  and  of  this 
department,  and  I  beg  to  commend  him  as  possessing  every  soldierly  quality. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  high  regard,  your  obedient  servant, 

L.  P.  WALKER,  Sec.  of  War. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  C.  S.  A., 
MONTGOMERY,  March  1st,  1861. 
Brig.-Genl.  P.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Sir, — You  will  proceed  without  delay  to  Charleston,  and  report  to  Governor 
Pickens  for  military  duty  in  that  State. 

You  are  authorized,  by  your  appointment  as  Brigadier-General,  under  the 
provisions  of  the  third  section  of  an  Act  of  the  Congress  to  raise  Provisional 
Forces  for  the  Confederate  States,  to  receive  into  the  service  of  this  govern 
ment  such  forces  as  may  be  tendered  or  may  volunteer,  not  to  exceed  five  thou 
sand  men,  as  you  may  require,  or  for  whom  you  can  make  suitable  provision. 
A  copy  of  the  Act  referred  to  has  been  this  day  transmitted  to  Governor  Pick- 
ens. 

You  will  report  to  this  department  your  arrival  at  Charleston,  and  give  such 
information,  with  respect  to  the  defences  of  that  harbor,  as  you  may  consider 
important.     You  will  also  secure,  if  possible,  the  services  of  a  competent  Adju 
tant,  and  report  your  action,  in  that  behalf,  to  this  department. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

L.  P.  WALKER,  Sec.  of  War. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  III.  425 

APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  III. 

Captain  Fox  to  Lieutenant- General  Scott. 

Feb.  8th,  1861. 
Lieut. -Genl.  WINFIELD  SCOTT,  U.  S.  A. : 

Sir, — Tho  proposition  which  I  have  had  the  honor  to  submit  to  you  fully,  in 
person,  is  herewith  presented  in  writing.  Lieutenant  Hall  and  myself  have  had 
several  free  conferences  ;  and  if  he  is  permitted  by  the  South  Carolina  authori 
ties  to  re-enter  Fort  Suinter,  Major  Anderson  will  comprehend  the  plan  for  his 
relief.  I  consider  myself  very  fortunate  in  having  proposed  a  project  which 
meets  the  approval  of  the  general-in-chief ;  and  I  ask  no  reward  but  the  entire 
conduct  of  the  post,  exclusive  of  the  armed  vessels.  The  commander  of  these 
should  be  ordered  to  co-operate  with  me,  by  affording  me  protection  and  destroy 
ing  their  naval  preparations  near  the  bar,  leaving  to  mo,  as  the  author  of  the  plan, 
the  actual  operations  of  relief.  I  suggest  that  the  Pawnee  be  immediately  sent 
to  the  Delaware  Breakwater  to  await  orders,  the  Harriet  Lane  to  be  ready  for 
sea,  and  some  arrangement  entered  into  by  which  the  requisite  steamer  and 
tugs  should  be  engaged — at  leant,  so  far  as  not  to  excite  suspicion.  I  should  prefer 
one  of  the  Collins  steamers.  They  are  now  being  prepared  for  sea,  and  arc  of 
such  a  size  and  power  as  to  be  able,  fearlessly,  to  run  down  any  vessel  which 
might  attempt  to  capture  us  outside  by  coup  dc  main.  I  could  quietly  engage 
one,  and  have  her  ready  to  start  on  twenty-four  hours'  notice,  without  exciting 
suspicion.  I  shall  leave  for  New  York  at  \\  r.  M.,  and  any  communication  will 
find  mo  at  Judge  Blair's.  If  the  Pawnees  pivot-gun  is  landed,  it  should  cer 
tainly  be  remounted.  Very  respectfully,  etc.,  G.  V.  Fox. 

General  Scott  to  Captain  Fox. 

IlEAlHjrAKTEHS  OF  TIIK  AlJMY,  WASHINGTON, 

March  19//I,  IbCl. 

Dear  Sir, — In  accordance  with  the  request  contained  in  a  note  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  to  me,  of  which  I  annex  a  copy,  I  request  that  you  will  have  the 
goodness  to  proceed  to  Charleston,  S.  C.,  and  obtain  permission,  if  necessary,  to 
visit  Fort  Sumter,  in  order  to  enable  you  to  comply  with  the  wish  expressed  in 
the  secretary's  note.  Very  respectfully,  etc.,  WINFIELD  SCOTT. 


Secretary  Cameron's  Instructions  to  Captain  Fox. 

WAII  DEPARTMENT.  WASHINGTON,  April  Gin,  18C1. 

Sir, — It  having  been  decided  to  succor  Fort  Sumter,  you  have  been  selected 
for  this  important  duty.  Accordingly,  you  will  take  charge  of  the  transports 
in  New  York,  having  the  troops  and  supplies  on  board,  to  the  port  of  Charles 
ton  harbor,  and  endeavor,  in  the  first  instance,  to  deliver  the  subsistence.  If 
you  are  opposed  in  this,  you  are  directed  to  report  the  fact  to  the  senior  naval 
officer  of  the  harbor,  who  will  be  instructed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  use 
his  entire  force  to  open  a  passage,  when  you  will,  if  possible,  effect  an  eu- 
trance,  and  place  both  the  troops  and  supplies  in  Fort  Sumter. 

I  am,  sir,  etc.,  SIMON  CAMEHOX,  Sec.  of  War. 


420  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  III. 

President  Lincoln  io  Captain  Fox. 

WASHINGTON,  May  1st,  1861. 
Capt.  G.  V.  Fox: 

My  Dear  Sir, — I  sincerely  regret  that  the  failure  of  the  late  attempt  to  pro 
vision  Fort  Sumter  should  be  the  source  of  any  annoyance  to  you.  The  prac 
ticability  of  your  plan  was  not,  in  fact,  brought  to  a  test.  By  reason  of  a  gale, 
well  known  in  advance  to  be  possible,  and  not  improbable,  the  tugs,  an  essen 
tial  part  of  the  plan,  never  reached  the  ground  ;  while,  by  an  accident,  for  which 
you  were  in  nowise  responsible,  and  possibly  I,  to  some  extent,  was,  you  were  de 
prived  of  a  war-vessel,  with  her  men,  which  you  deemed  of  great  importance  to 
the  enterprise. 

I  most  cheerfully  and  truthfully  declare  that  the  failure  of  the  undertaking 
has  not  lowered  you  a  particle,  while  the  qualities  you  developed  in  the  effort 
have  greatly  heightened  you  in  my  estimation.  For  a  daring  and  dangerous 
enterprise  of  a  similar  character,  you  would,  to-day,  be  the  man  of  all  my  ac 
quaintances  whom  I  would  select.  You  and  I  both  anticipated  that  the  cause 
of  the  country  would  be  advanced  by  making  the  attempt  to  provision  Fort 
Sumter,  even  if  it  should  fail;  and  it  is  no  small  consolation  now  to  feel  that 
our  anticipation  is  justified  by  the  result. 

Very  truly  your  friend,  A.  LINCOLN. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

MONTGOMERY,  April  2d,  1861. 
Brig.-Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Comdg.  Charleston  Harbor,  Charleston,  S.  C.: 

Sir, — This  government  has  at  no  time  placed  any  reliance  on  assurances  by 
the  government  at  Washington,  in  respect  to  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter,  or 
entertained  any  confidence  in  the  disposition  of  the  latter  to  make  any  conces 
sion,  or  yield  any  point  to  which  it  is  not  driven  by  an  absolute  necessity.  And 
I  desire  that  you  will  govern  yourself  generally  with  reference  to  this,  as  the- 
key  to  the  policy  of  the  government  of  the  Confederate  States. 

You  are  specially  instructed  to  remit,  in  no  degree,  your  efforts  to  prevent  tho 
reinforcement  of  Fort  Sumter;  and  to  keep  yourself  in  a  state  of  the  amplest 
preparation  and  most  perfect  readiness  to  repel  invasion  ;  acting  in  all  respects 
— save  only  in  commencing  an  assault  or  attack  (except  to  repel  an  invading  or 
reinforcing  force) — precisely  as  if  you  were  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  con 
templating  to  surprise  you. 

The  delays  and  apparent  vacillations  of  the  Washington  government  make 
it  imperative  that  the  further  concession  of  courtesies  such  as  have  been  ac 
corded  to  Mnjor  Anderson  and  his  command,  in  supplies  from  the  city,  must 
cease.  And,  in  general  terms,  the  status  which  you  must  at  once  re-establish 
and  rigidly  enforce  is  that  of  hostile  forces  in  the  presence  of  each  other,  and 
who  may  at  any  moment  be  in  actual  conflict. 

But  as  past  conditions  have  allowed  this  government  to  continue  thus  far 
courtesies  of  personal  convenience  to  Major  Anderson  and  his  officers,  it  is 
proper  now,  as  those  courtesies  are  required  to  be  determined  by  the  necessities 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IV.  427 

of  your  position,  that  you  signify  in  respectful  terras  to  Major  Anderson  that 
all  communication  with  the  city  from  the  fort,  and  with  the  fort  from  the  city, 
for  any  purpose  of  supply,  is  absolutely  inhibited.  And  after  Laving  so  notified 
that  gentleman,  at  the  very  earliest  moment  practicable,  you  will  make  your 
surveillance  of  the  harbor,  and  the  enforcement  of  the  rule  of  instruction  indi 
cated  in  the  notice  to  the  commander  of  Fort  Sumter,  as  rigid  as  all  the  means 
at  your  command,  in  the  most  watchful  vigilance,  can  secure. 

Until  the  withdrawal  of  the  commissioners  of  this  government  from  Wash 
ington — an  event  which  may  occur  at  any  moment — no  operations,  beyond  what 
is  indicated  in  the  foregoing,  would  be  admissible.  Promptly,  however,  on  the 
receipt,  by  this  government,  of  the  intelligence  of  such  withdrawal,  the  depart 
ment  will  transmit  to  you  specific  instructions  for  your  guidance. 
Kespectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

L.  P.  WALKER,  Sec.  of  War. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IV. 

HEADQUARTERS  PROVISIONAL  ARMY  C.  S. 

CHARLESTON,  S.  C.,  April  27th,  1SGI. 
Hon.  L.  P.  WALKER,  Sec.  of  War,  Montgomery,  Ala. : 

Sir, — I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  the  department  my  detailed  report  of 
the  operations  during  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter,  accompanied  by  copies 
of  the  reports  sent  in  to  this  oflice  by  the  commanders  of  the  batteries,  together 
with  a  series  of  photographs,  twenty-two  in  number,  showing  the  condition  of 
Forts  Sumter  and  Moultrie,  and  of  the  floating  battery,  after  the  surrender  of 
the  former  fort. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  HEAUREGARD,  Ikig.-Genl.  Comdg. 


IlE.MKjrARTERS  PROVISIONAL  ARMY  C.  S. 

CHARLESTON,  S.  C.,  April  27th,  IbGl. 
Brig.-Genl.  COOPER,  Adj.-Genl.  C.  S.  A. : 

jX'iV, — I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  detailed  report  of  the  bom 
bardment  and  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  the  incidents  connected  therewith. 
Having  completed  my  channel-defences  and  batteries  in  the  harbor,  necessary 
for  the  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter,  I  despatched  two  of  my  aids  at  2.20  P.  M.,  on 
Thursday,  the  llth  of  April,  with  a  communication  to  Major  Anderson,  in  com 
mand  of  the  fort,  demanding  its  evacuation.  I  offered  to  transport  himself  and 
command  to  any  port  in  the  United  States  he  might  select;  to  allow  him  to 
move  out  of  the  fort  with  company-anus  and  property,  and  all  private  property, 
and  to  salute  his  flag  on  lowering  it.  lie  refused  to  accede  to  this  demand. 
As  my  aids  were  about  leaving,  Major  Anderson  remarked,  "that  if  \vo  did  not 
batter  him  to  pieces  he  would  be  starved  out  in  a  fe\v  days,"  or  words  to  that 
effect. 


428  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IV. 

This  being  reported  to  me  by  my  aids,  on  their  return  with  his  refusal,  at 
5.10  P.M.,  I  deemed  it  proper  to  telegraph  the  purport  of  his  remark  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  War.  I  received  by  telegraph  the  following  instruction  at  9.10  P.M.  : 
"Do  not  desire  needlessly  to  bombard  Fort  Sumter ;  if  Major  Anderson  will 
state  the  time  at  which,  as  indicated  by  him,  he  will  evacuate,  and  agree  that 
in  the  meantime  he  will  not  use  his  guns  against  us,  unless  ours  should  be  em 
ployed  against  Fort  Sumter,  you  are  authorized  thus  to  avoid  effusion  of  blood. 
If  this,  or  its  equivalent,  be  refused,  reduce  the  fort  as  your  judgment  decides  to 
be  most  practicable."  At  11  P.  M.  I  sent  my  aids  •with,  a  communication  to 
Major  Anderson,  based  upon  these  instructions.  It  was  placed  in  his  hands  at 
12.45  A.  M.  ,  on  the  12th  instant.  He  expressed  his  willingness  to  evacuate  the 
fort  on  Monday  afternoon,  "if  furnished  with  the  necessary  means  of  transpor 
tation,  and  he  should  not  receive  contradictory  instructions  from  his  govern 
ment,  or  additional  supplies."  But  he  declined  to  agree  "not  to  open  his  guns 
upon  us  in  the  event  of  any  hostile  demonstration,  on  our  part,  against  his  flag." 
This  reply,  which  was  open,  and  shown  to  my  aids,  plainly  indicated  that,  if  in 
structions  should  be  received  contrary  to  his  purpose  to  evacuate,  or  he  should 
receive  his  supplies,  or  the  Confederate  troops  should  fire  on  hostile  troops  of 
the  United  States,  or  upon  transports  bearing  the  United  States  flag,  containing 
men,  munitions,  and  supplies  designed  for  hostile  operations  against  us,  he  would 
feel  bound  to  fire  upon  us,  and  to  hold  possession  of  the  fort.  As,  in  consequence 
of  a  communication  from  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  the  Governor  of 
South  Carolina,  we  were  in  momentary  expectation  of  an  attempt  to  reinforce 
Fort  Sumter,  or  of  a  descent  upon  our  coast  to  that  end  from  the  United  States 
fleet  lying  oif  the  entrance  of  the  harbor,  it  was  manifestly  an  apparent  necessity 
to  reduce  the  fort  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  not  to  await  until  the  ships  and 
the  fort  should  unite  in  a  combined  attack  upon  us.  Accordingly,  my  aids,  car 
rying  out  my  instructions,  promptly  refused  to  accede  to  the  terms  proposed 
by  Major  Anderson,  and  notified  him,  in  writing,  that  our  batteries  would  open 
upon  Fort  Sumter  in  one  hour.  This  notification  was  given  at  3.20  A.  M.,  on  Fri 
day  the  12th  instant.  The  signal-shell  was  fired  from  Fort  Johnson  at  4.30 
A.  M.,  and,  at  about  5  o'clock,  the  fire  from  our  batteries  became  general.  Fort 
Sumter  did  not  open  until  7  o'clock,  when  it  commenced  with  a  vigorous  fire 
upon  the  Cumrnings's  Point  Iron  Battery.  The  enemy  next  directed  his  fire  upon 
the  enfilade  battery  on  Sullivan's  Island,  constructed  to  sweep  the  parapet  of 
Fort  Sumter,  to  prevent  the  working  of  the  barbette  guns,  and  to  dismount 
them.  This  was  also  the  aim  of  the  floating  battery,  the  Dahlgreu  battery, 
and  the  gun-batteries  at  Cummings's  Point.  The  enemy  next  opened  fire  on  Fort 
Moultrie,  between  which  and  Fort  Sumter  a  steady  and  almost  constant  fire 
was  kept  up  throughout  the  day.  These  three  points,  Fort  Moultrie,  Cummings's 
Point,  and  the  end  of  Sullivan's  Island,  where  the  floating  battery,  Dahlgreu 
Battery,  and  the  enfilade  battery  were  placed,  were  the  points  to  which  the 
enemy  seemed  almost  to  confine  his  attention,  although  a  number  of  shots  were 
directed  at  Captain  Butler's  mortar  battery,  situated  eastward  of  Fort  Moultrie, 
and  a  few  at  Captain  James's  mortar  batteries  at  Fort  Johnson.  During  the 
day  (12th  instant)  the  fire  of  our  batteries  was  kept  up  most  spiritedly,  the 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IV.  420 

guns  and  mortars  being  worked  in  the  coolest  manner,  preserving  the  prescribed 
intervals  of  firing.  Towards  evening  it  became  evident  that  our  fire  was  very 
effective,  as  the  enemy  was  driven  from  his  barbette  guns,  which  he  had  at 
tempted  to  work  in  the  morning,  and  his  fire  was  confined  to  his  casemated 
guns,  but  in  a  less  active  manner  than  in  the  morning,  and  it  was  observed  that 
several  of  his  guns  a  larbcttc  were  disabled. 

During  the  whole  of  Friday  night  our  mortar  batteries  continued  to  throw 
shells,  but,  in  obedience  to  orders,  at  longer  intervals.  The  night  was  rainy 
and  dark,  and  as  it  was  confidently  expected  that  the  United  States  fleet  would 
attempt  to  land  troops  upon  the  islands,  or  throw  men  into  Fort  Sumter  by 
means  of  boats,  the  greatest  vigilance  was  observed  at  all  our  channel  batteries, 
and  by  our  troops  on  both  Morris  and  Sullivan's  islands.  Early  on  Saturday 
morning  all  our  batteries  reopened  on  Fort  Sumter,  which  responded  vigorously 
for  a  while,  directing  its  fire  specially  against  Fort  Moultrie.  About  8  A.  M. 
smoke  was  seen  issuing  from  the  quarters  of  Fort  Sumter ;  the  fire  of  our  bat 
teries  was  then  increased,  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the  enemy  to  terms  as 
speedily  as  possible,  inasmuch  as  his  flag  was  still  floating  defiantly.  Fort 
Sumter  continued  to  lire  from  time  to  time,  but  at  long  and  irregular  intervals, 
amid  the  dense  smoke.  Our  brave  troops,  carried  away  by  their  enthusiasm, 
mounted  the  different  batteries,  and,  at  every  discharge  from  the  fort,  cheered 
the  garrison  for  its  pluck  and  gallantry,  and  hooted  at  the  fleet  lying  inactive 
just  outside  the  bar.  About  OO  P.  M.,  it  being  reported  to  me  that  the  Federal 
ling  was  down  (it  was  afterwards  ascertained  that  the  flagstaff  had  been  shot 
away),  and  the  conflagration  from  the  large  volume  of  smoke  appearing  to  in 
crease,  I  sent  three  of  my  aids  with  a  message  to  Major  Anderson  to  the  effect 
that,  "  seeing  his  flag  no  longer  flying,  his  quarters  in  flames,  and  supposing  him 
to  be  in  distress,  I  desired  to  offer  him  any  assistance  he  might  stand  in  need 
of."  lie  fore  my  aids  reached  the  fort  the  United  States  flag  was  displayed  on 
the  parapets,  but  remained  there  only  a  short  time  when  it  was  hauled  down 
and  a  white  flag  substituted  in  its  place.  When  the  United  States  flag  first 
disappeared  the  firing  from  our  batteries  almost  entirely  ceased,  but  reopened 
with  increased  vigor  when  it  reappeared  on  the  parapet,  and  was  continued 
until  the  white  flag  was  raised,  when  the  firing  ceased  entirely.  Upon  the  ar 
rival  of  my  aids  at  Fort  Sumter  they  delivered  their  message  to  Major  Ander 
son,  who  replied  "  that  he  thanked  General  Beauregard  for  his  offer,  but  desired 
no  assistance."  Just  previous  to  their  arrival  at  the  fort,  Colonel  Wigfall,  one 
of  my  volunteer  aids,  who  had  been  detached  for  special  duty  on  Morris  Island, 
had,  by  order  of  Brigadier-General  Simons,  crossed  over  to  Fort  Sumter  from 
Cummings's  Point  in  an  open  boat,  with  private  William  Gourdin  Young,  amid  a 
heavy  fire  of  shots  and  shells,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  from  Major  Ander 
son  whether  his  intention  was  to  surrender,  his  flag  being  down  and  his  quarters 
in  flames.  On  reaching  the  fort  the  colonel  had  an  interview'  with  Major  An 
derson,  the  result  of  which  was  that  Major  Anderson  understood  him  as  offering 
the  same  conditions  on  the  part  of  General  Beauregard  as  had  been  tendered  to 
him  on  the  llth  instant,  while  Colonel  "Wigfall's  impression  was  that  Major 
Anderson  unconditionally  surrendered,  trusting  to  the  generosity  of  General 


430  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IV. 

Beauregard  to  offer  sucli  terms  as  •would  bo  honorable  and  acceptable  to  both 
parties ;  meanwhile,  before  these  circumstances  had  been  reported  to  me,  and, 
in  fact,  soon  after  the  aids  I  had  despatched  with  the  offer  of  assistance  had  set 
out  on  their  mission,  hearing  that  a  white  flag  was  flying  over  the  fort,  I  sent 
Major  Jones,  chief  of  iny  staff,  and  some  other  aids,  with  substantially  the  same 
proposition  I  had  made  to  Major  Anderson  on  the  llth  instant,  excepting  the 
privilege  of  saluting  his  flag.  Major  Anderson  replied  that  "it  would  be  ex 
ceedingly  gratifying  to  him,  as  well  as  to  his  command,  to  be  permitted  to  salute 
their  flag,  having  so  gallantly  defended  the  fort  under  such  trying  circum 
stances,  and  hoped  that  General  Beauregard  would  not  refuse  it,  as  such  a  priv 
ilege  was  not  unusual."  He  furthermore  said,  "  he  would  not  urge  the  point, 
but  would  prefer  to  refer  the  matter  again  to  General  Beauregard." 

The  point  was,  therefore,  left  open  until  the  matter  was  submitted  to  me. 
Previous  to  the  return  of  Major  Jones  I  had  sent  a  fire-engine,  under  Mr.  M.  II. 
Nathan,  Chief  of  the  Fire  Department,  and  Surgeon-General  Gibbs,  of  South 
Carolina,  with  several  of  my  aids,  to  offer  further  assistance  to  the  garrison  of 
Fort  Sumter,  w^hich  was  declined.  I  very  cheerfully  agreed  to  allow  the  salute, 
as  an  honorable  testimony  to  the  gallantry  and  fortitude  with  which  Major 
Anderson  and  his  command  had  defended  their  post,  and  I  informed  Major  Ander 
son  of  my  decision  about  half-past  seven  o'clock,  through  Major  Jones,  rny  chief 
of  staff.  The  arrangements  being  completed,  Major  Anderson  embarked,  with 
his  command,  on  the  transport  prepared  to  convey  them  to  the  United  States 
fleet  still  lying  outside  of  the  bar,  and  our  troops  immediately  garrisoned  the 
fort;  before  sunset  the  flag  of  the  Confederate  States  floated  over  the  ramparts 
of  Sumter. 

I  commend  in  the  highest  terms  the  gallantly  of  the  troops  under  my  com 
mand,  and  where  all  have  done  their  duty  well  it  is  difficult  to  discriminate. 
Although  the  troops  outside  of  the  batteries  bearing  on  Fort  Sumter  were  not 
so  fortunate  as  their  comrades  working  the  guns  and  mortars,  still  their  ser 
vices  were  equally  valuable  and  commendable ;  for  they  were  on  their  arms  at 
the  channel  batteries,  and  at  their  posts  and  bivouacs,  exposed  to  severe  weath 
er  and  constant  watchfulness,  expecting  every  moment  to  have  to  repel  rein 
forcements  from  the  powerful  fleet  off  the  bar.  To  all  these  troops  I  award 
much  praise  for  the  cheerfulness  with  which  they  met  the  duties  required  of 
them.  I  feel  much  indebted  to  Generals  R.  G.  M.  Dunovant  and  James  Simons 
(commanding  on  Sullivan's  and  Morris  islands),  and  their  staffs,  especially  Ma 
jors  Evans  and  Do  Saussurc,  S.  C.  A.,  for  their  valuable  and  gallant  services,  and 
the  discretion  they  displayed  in  executing  the  duties  devolving  on  their  respon 
sible  positions.  Of  Lieutenant -Colonel  R.  S.  Ripley,  1st  Artillery  Battalion, 
commandant  of  batteries  on  Sullivan's  Island,  I  cannot  speak  too  highly,  and 
join  with  General  Duuovant,  his  immediate  commander  since  January  last,  in 
commending  in  the  highest  terms  his  sagacity,  experience,  and  unflagging  zeal. 
I  would  also  mention  in  the  highest  terms  of  praise  Captains  Calhoun  and 
Hallouquist,  assistant  commandants  of  batteries  to  Colonel  Ripley,  and  the  fol 
lowing  commanders  of  batteries  on  Sullivan's  Island:  Captain  J.  R.  Hamilton, 
commanding  the  floating  battery  and  Dahlgren  gun;  Captains  Butler,  S.  C.  A., 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IV.  431 

and  Bruns,  aide-de-camp  to  General  Dunovant ;  and  Lieutenants  Wagner,  Rbett, 
Yates,  Valentine,  and  Parker. 

To  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  G.  De  Saussure,  2d  Artillery  Battalion,  comman 
dant  of  batteries  on  Morris  Island,  too  much  praise  cannot  bo  given.  He 
displayed  the  most  untiring  energy;  and  his  judicious  arrangements,  in  the 
good  management  of  his  batteries,  contributed  much  to  the  reduction  of  Fort 
Slimier. 

To  Major  Stevens,  of  the  Citadel  Academy,  in  charge  of  the  Curnmings's  Point 
batteries,  I  feel  much  indebted  for  his  valuable  and  scientific  assistance  and  the 
efficient  working  of  the  batteries  under  his  immediate  charge.  The  Cumuiings's 
Point  batteries  (iron  42-pounders  and  mortars)  were  manned  by  the  Palmetto 
Guards,  Captain  Cuthbert;  and  I  take  pleasure-  in  expressing  iny  admiration 
of  the  service  of  the  gallant  captain  and  his  distinguished  company  during 
tin;  action.  I  would  also  mention  in  terms  of  praise  the  following  commanders 
of  batteries  at  the  Point,  viz. :  Lieutenants  Armstrong,  of  the  Citadel  Academy, 
and  Brownfield,  of  the  Palmetto  Guards;  also  Captain  Thomas,  of  the  Citadel 
Academy,  who  had  charge  of  the  rilled  cannon  and  had  the  honor  of  using  this 
valuable  weapon — a  gift  of  one  of  South  Carolina's  sons  to  his  native  State — 
with  peculiar  effect.  Captain  J.  G.  King,  with  his  company,  the  Marion  Artil 
lery,  commanded  the  mortar  battery  in  rear  of  the  Cnnmiings's  Point  batteries; 
and  the  accuracy  of  his  shell  practice  was  the  theme  of  general  admiration. 
Captain  George  S.  James,  commanding  at  Fort  Johnson,  had  the  honor  of  firing 
the  first  shell  at  Fort  Siunter;  his  conduct  and  that  of  those  under  him  was 
commendable  during  the  action.  Captain  Martin,  S.  C.  A.,  commanded  the 
Mount  Pleasant  mortar  battery,  and,  with  assistants,  did  good  service.  For  a 
more  detailed  account  of  the  gallantly  of  the  attack  on  Sumtcr,  I  would  re 
spectfully  invite  your  attention  to  the  copies  of  the-  reports  of  the  different 
officers  under  my  command,  herewith  enclosed.  I  cannot  close  this  report  with 
out  referring  to  the  following  gentlemen  :  To  his  Excellency, Governor  Pickens, 
and  staff' — especially  Colonels  Lamar  and  Dearing,  who  were  so  active  and  effi 
cient  in  the  construction  of  the  channel  batteries;  Colonels  Lucas  and  Moore, 
for  assistance  on  various  occasions;  and  Colonel  Duryea  and  Mr.  Nathan,  Chief 
of  the  Fire  Department,  for  their  gallant  assistance  in  putting  out  the  fire  at 
Fort  Snmter  when  the  magazine-  of  the  latter  was  in  imminent  danger  of  explo 
sion  ;  General  Jamieson,  Secretary  of  War,  and  General  S.  K.  Gist,  Adjutant-Gen 
eral,  for  their  valuable  assistance  in  obtaining  and  despatching  the  troops  for 
the  attack  on  Snmter  and  defence  of  the  batteries;  Quartermaster's  and  Com 
missary-General's  Departments,  Colonels  Hatch  and  Walker;  and  the  Ord 
nance  Board,  especially  Colonel  Manigault,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  whose  zeal  and 
activity  were  untiring;  the  Medical  Department,  whose  preparations  had  been 
judiciously  and  amply  made,  but  which  a  kind  Providence  rendered  unnecessa 
ry  ;  the  Engineers,  Majors  Whiting  and  Gwynn,  Captains  Trapiers  and  Lee,  and 
Lieutenants  McCrady,  Earle,  and  Gregorie — on  whom  too  much  praise  cannot 
bo  bestowed  for  their  untiring  zeal,  energy,  and  gallantry,  and  to  whoso  labors 
is  greatly  due  the  unprecedented  example  of  taking  such  an  important  work, 
after  thirty-three  hours  firing,  without  having  to  report  the  loss  of  a  single  life, 


432  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  VI. 

and  but  four  persons  slightly  wounded  ;  from  Major  W.H.  C.  Whiting  I  derived 
also  much  assistance,  not  only  as  au  engineer,  in  selecting  the  sites  and  laying 
out  the  channel  Latteries  on  Morris  Island,  hut  as  Acting  Assistant- Adjutant 
and  Inspector-General,  in  arranging  and  stationing  the  troops  on  said  island ; 
the  Naval  Department,  especially  Captain  Hartstein,  one  of  my  volunteer  aids, 
who  was  indefatigable  in  guarding  the  entrance  into  the  harbor  and  in  trans 
mitting  my  orders. 

Lieutenant  T.  B.  linger  was  also  of  much  service,  first  as  ordnance-inspecting 
officer  of  batteries,  then  in  charge  of  the  batteries  on  the  south  end  of  Morris 
Island.  Lieutenant  Warley,  wTho  commanded  the  Dahlgren  channel  battery 
and  the  school-ship,  which  was  kindly  offered  by  the  Board  of  Directors,  was  of 
much  service.  Lieutenant  Rutledge  was  Acting  Inspector-General  of  Ordnance 
of  the  batteries,  in  which  capacity,  assisted  by  Lieutenant  Williams,  C.  S.  A.,  on 
Morris  Island,  he  was  very  useful  in  organizing  and  distributing  ammunition. 
Captains  Childs  and  Jones,  assistant  commandants  of  batteries  to  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  De  Saussure,  Captains  Winder  and  Allston,  Acting  Assistant- Adjutant 
and  Inspector-Generals  to  General  Simons's  brigade ;  Captain  Manigault  of  my 
staff,  attached  to  General  Simons's  staff,  did  efficient  and  gallant  services  on 
Morris  Island  during  the  fight.  Professor  Lewis  R.  Gibbes,  of  the  Charleston 
College,  and  his  aids,  deserve  much  praise  for  their  valuable  services  in  operat 
ing  the  Drurnmond  lights,  established  at  the  extremities  of  Sullivan's  and  Mor 
ris  Islands.  The  venerable  and  gallant  Edmund  Baffin,  of  Virginia,  was  at  the 
Iron  Battery  and  fired  many  guns,  undergoing  every  fatigue  and  sharing  the 
hardships  at  the  battery  with  the  youngest  of  the  Palmettos.  To  my  regular 
staff — Major  D.  R.  Jones,  C.  S.  A.,  Captains  Lee  and  Ferguson,  C.  S.  A.,  and  Lieu 
tenant  Legai-d,  S.  C.  A. ;  and  my  volunteer  staff,  Messrs.  Chisolm,  Wigfall,  Chest 
nut,  Manning,  Miles,  Gonzales,  and  Pryor — I  am  much  indebted  for  their  inde 
fatigable  and  valuable  assistance,  night  and  day,  during  the  attack,  transmit 
ting  my  orders  in  open  boats  with  alacrity  and  cheerfulness  to  the  different  bat 
teries,  amid  falling  balls  and  bursting  shells.  Captain  Wigfall  was  the  first  in 
Fort  Sumter  to  receive  its  surrender. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Brig.-Geul.  Comdg. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  VI. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  ALEXANDRIA,  Va. 

MANASSAS  JUNCTION,  June  16th,  1861. 
Sir,—  *  *  *  *  *  * 

Can  I  be  informed  why  it  is  that  none  of  my  communications  to  the  War 
Department  through  the  Adjutant-General's  Department  are  answered?  They 
are  not  even  acknowledged.  I  refer  more  particularly  to  my  letters  of  the  5th, 
9th,  and  12th  instant. 

Ought  my  communications  (reports,  etc.)  to  be  sent  through  General  Lee  or 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  VI..  433 

not?     lie  is  the  only  one  from  whom  I  receive  any  official  orders  of  any  im 
portance. 

I  beg  to  call  your  attention  particularly  to  my  letter  of  the  5th  instant,  re 
ferring  to  the  immediate  necessity  of  furnishing  my  command  with  belts  (of 
any  material)  three  (3)  inches  wide,  red  on  one  side  and  yellow  on  the  other,  to 
be  worn  with  either  color  on  the  outside,  and  from  over  the  right  shoulder 
buttoned  under  the  left  arm,  or  from  left  to  right,  as  the  officer  in  command 
shall  direct,  for  the  time  being.  Many  of  my  regiments  are  not  furnished  with 
the  Confederate  colors;  how  are  they  to  be  distinguished  in  battle  from  the 
enemy?  especially  it' we  attack  them  in  flank  or  rear,  as  we  ought  to  do  when 
ever  practicable.  I  feel  very  much  concerned  about  these  two  matters.  I 
have  no  doubt  that,  if  the  ladies  of  Richmond  were  called  upon,  belts  and 
colors  could  be  made  in  a  few  days. 

Many  <>f  my  companies  are  entirely  unprovided  with  cartridge  and  cap  boxes ; 
what  are  they  to  do,  especially  in  wet  weather?  We  have  no  ammunition  to 
waste.  I  have  thought  it  advisable  to  call  these  facts  to  your  Excellency's 
attention,  as  they  arc  going  to  play  a  very  important  part  in  our  battles  with 
the  enemy.  I  remain,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.T.  HKAUREdAitn,  Brig.-Gcnl.  Coindg. 
To  his  Excellency  President  JKFF.  DAVIS,  Kiehmond,  Va. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  ALEXANDRIA, 

('AMI-  PICKK.NS,  June  "2(1, 1H(51. 

Colonel, — I  enclose  a  brief  note  just  received  from  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ewell, 
commanding  our  advanced  forces  at  Fairfax  Court-House,  as  affording  the  latest 
information  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

I  must  urge  the  importance  of  giving  all  possible  strength  to  this  command 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  as  this  section  of  country  is  difficult  to  defend 
with  a  small  force  ;  and  I  trust  that  any  South  Carolina,  or  other  good  and  well- 
armed,  troops  that  may  reach  Virginia  will  be  sent  hi; her  with  despatch. 

I  tind  that  many  of  the  troops  here  are  badly  armed  and  unprovided  with 
means  of  transportation  and  camp  equipage. 

Respectfully,  Colonel,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREUARD,  Brig.-Genl.  Comdg. 
To  Col.  U.  S.  GA::\::TT,  Adj.-Onl. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  ALEXANDRIA, 

CAMP  PICKENS,  June  (ith,  18G1. 
Special  Order*,  No.  9. 

I.  Colonel  J.  L.  Kemper  is  assigned  to  temporary  special  service,  being  charged 
with  the  duty  of  procuring  the  necessary  means  of  transportation  for  this  com 
mand,  lie  is  authorized  to  employ  the  necessary  agents,  and  will  be  further 
assisted  by  such  officers  and  men  from  this  department  as  he  may  select,  not 
to  exceed  four  officers  and  twenty  men.  He  is  further  authorized  to  require 
of  all  officers  or  agents,  acting  in  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  at  any  post 
in  the  department,  efficient  assistance  in  the  prompt  execution  and  accom 
plishment  of  the  purposes  of  these  orders. 

I.— 28 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  VI. 

II.  It  is  desirable  that,  in  all  cases  AY  lien  practicable,  teams  should  be  hired  by 
the  month ;  hired  with  wagon,  four  horses,  or  five  mules  to  the  team,  harness 
complete,  and  the  driver,  when  practicable.     Two  hundred  such  hired  teams 
are  required ;  but  if  they  cannot  be  procured,  Colonel  Kemper,  in  the  exercise 
of  a  sound  discretion,  is  authorized  to  purchase  horses  or  mules  for  one  hundred 
teams,  with  the  necessary  wagons  and  harness. 

III.  Colonel  Kemper  is  further  authorized  to  purchase  a  full  supply  of  forage 
for  the  teams  he  may  secure. 

IV.  Colonel  Kemper  is  authorized  to  transport  himself  and  his  agents,  or  any 
individual  of  them,  at  the  expense  of  the  State,  over  any  railroad  in  the  State, 
or  by  other  public  means  of  conveyance. 

V.  Colonel  Kemper  will,  if  necessary,  communicate  by  telegraph  with  these 
headquarters,  and  with  his  agents,  Avhen  reliance  in  the  usual  mail  facilities 
will  be  to  the  public  prejudice. 

VI.  The  general  commanding  confidently  relies  on  the  patriotism  and  public 
spirit  of  the  people  of  Virginia,  and  cannot  doubt  they  will  cheerfully  come  for 
ward  with  their  supplies,  teams,  and  means  of  transportation,  at  this  juncture, 
for  the  service  of  the  State,  the  general  weal,  and  their  own  safety  and  liberties. 

By  order  of  Brig.-Genl.  Beauregard, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  Act.  Asst.  Adj.-Genl. 


REAL-QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  ALEXANDRIA, 

CAMP  PICKENS,  June  Gth,  1861. 

In  consequence  of  the  urgent  necessity  of  completing  the  works  already 
commenced  for  the  defence  of  this  important  point  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and 
of  the  fact  that  the  troops  here  stationed  cannot  be  employed  continuously  on 
said  works  without  serious  interruption  to  the  drills  and  military  instruction 
so  essential  to  the  young  soldier,  I  am  compelled  to  request  the  patriotic  citi 
zens  of  this  and  the  neighboring  counties  to  send  hero  such  of  their  negro  men 
as  they  can  spare,  with  or  without  rations,  and  with  spades  and  pickaxes,  con 
fident  that  they  will  cheerfully  contribute  this  labor  to  assist  in  the  defence 
of  our  country  and  cause.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Brig.-Genl.  Comdg. 

Official : 

S.  \V.  FERGUSON,  Lt.  and  A.  D.  C. 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  ALEXANDRIA,  VA., 
MANASSAS  JUNCTION,  June  9th,  1801. 

Sir, — On  assuming  the  command  here,  I  found  Dr.  Gastin,  South  Carolina 
Volunteers,  acting  as  medical  director,  and  I  have  continued  him  in  that  posi 
tion,  as  I  believe  him  to  be  fully  competent  to  fulfil  its  duties;  but  as  ho  has 
no  Confederate  States  commission,  the  assistant  surgeons  of  this  command  might 
object  to  receiving  orders  from  him  ;  I  have,  then,  to  request,  either  that  he 
•should  bo  confirmed  in  his  present  position,  or  that  another  surgeon  should  be 
ordered  here  in  his  place. 

Brigadier-General  Bonham  has  applied  for  an  officer  of  the  Confederate  Army 
(who  has  seen  some  service)  as  Acting  Adjutant-General  of  his  command,  and  I 
fully  approve  of  that  application.  He  suggests  the  namo  of  Captain  J.  L.  Corley. 


A1TENDIX  TO   CIIAPTEIJ  VII.  435 

I  applied  a  few  days  ago  for  a  certain  number  of  colored  belts  (red  oa  one 
side  and  yellow  on  Ilie  other)  for  the  purpose  of  distinguishing  the  soldiers  of 
my  command  from  those  of  the  enemy.  I  earnestly  call  the  attention  of  the 
War  Department  to  my  letter  on  that  subject. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Brig.-Genl.  Comdg. 
JIou.  L.  P.  WALKER,  Sec.  of  War,  Richmond,  Va. 


RICHMOND,  June  I~th,  1861. 

J///  dear  General, — I  have  yours  of  15th  instant ;  all  you  ask  for  has  been  at 
tended  to  so  far  as  in  my  power.  The  Zouaves  have  gone  some  days  to  York- 
town.  The  5th  Regiment  Alabama  Volunteers,  a  fine  regiment,  has  been  or 
dered  to  you.  I  shall  try  for  Colonel  Jenkins's  South  Carolina  regiment  to  bo 
sent  also.  No  bunting  here.  Have  sent  to  Norfolk  for  some.  Hope  it  can  bo 
had.  Nothing  here  for  llags.  Cartridge-boxes  Gorgas  will  see  to,  and  Major 
Smith  will  send  you  pay-rolls. 

In  reference  to  the  badges,  immense  numbers  arc  being  made — but  I  under 
stand  the  President  thinks  them  too  conspicuous — so  do  I.  A  small  rosette  of 
the  same  stuff  pinned  or  attached  on  the  arm  or  breast  will  be  less  notable,  and 
quite  enough  distinguishable,  I  think.  I  wish  I  were  with  you  in  the  conflict. 
May  God  give  you  his  protection:  your  battle  is  righteous,  and  your  victory 
undoubted.  Yours  truly,  A.  C.  MYERS. 

Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREOARI). 


APPENDIX  To  CIIA1TEU  VII. 

HEAIHJI-AKTEKS  DEPARTMENT  OF  FREDERICKSBURG, 

Fi<Ei>ERicKsm:R(;,  VA.,  June  15//<,  ldo'1. 

dcncral, — Since  my  arrival  here  I  have  made  careful  rcconnoissance  of  tho 
coast,  and  sought  in  every  way  possible  to  possess  myself  of  the  enemy's  move 
ments  and  intentions;  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  disposition  on  his  part  to  land 
in  this  vicinity,  and  I  am  obliged  to  think  the  force  here  is  unnecessarily  large. 
To  all  appearances  the  Federal  forces  will  bo  directed  against  Manassas  and 
Harper's  Terry  ;  if  those  places  fall,  this  position  will  bo  unnecessary,  as  he  will 
have  opened  for  himself  a  more  direct  road  to  Richmond.  I  beg,  therefore,  re 
spectfully  to  suggest  that,  after  leaving  a  sufficient  guard  for  tho  batteries,  say 
five  hundred  men,  it  will  be  better  for  me  to  march  with  tho  great  body  of  my 
command  to  Manassas,  or  some  other  point,  where  they  can  be  made  available 
to  resist  the  first  great  onslaught  of  the  enemy.  It  may  be  tho  time  for  this 
move  has  not  yet  arrived,  but  my  only  object  now  is  to  inform  you  that  if  you 
agree  with  my  opinion  as  to  the  enemy's  intentions,  I  can,  at  very  short  notice, 
march  from  here  with  three  regiments  of  volunteers  and  two  batteries  of  artil 
lery.  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  H.  HOLMES,  Brig-Gcnl.  Provisional  Army. 
To  Genl.  S.  COOPER,  Adj. -Genl.  C.  S.  A.,  Richmond. 


436  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  VII. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  FREDERICKSUURG, 

BROOKS  STATION,  June  18th,  1861. 

General, — Herewith  enclosed  you  will  please  find  a  copy  of  a  letter  addressed 
to  the  Adjutant-General  by  me,  and  which  was  answered  by  General  Lee,  stating 
that  the  enemy's  plans  were  not  yet  sufficiently  developed  to  justify  the  adop 
tion  of  my  suggestions,  and  recommending,  if  my  force  could  be  divided,  that  I 
should  erect  a  battery  at  Mathias  Point,  some  thirty  miles  below  here ;  from  this 
you  will  see  how  utterly  out  of  the  question  it  is  for  me  to  send  a  regiment  to 
your  neighborhood,  as  all  the  force  I  have  would  scarcely  be  sufficient  to  resist 
an  effort  by  the  enemy  to  land,  with  a  view  to  invade. 

I  need  not  say  it  will  give  me  the  greatest  satisfaction  to  co-operate  with 
you,  and,  if  you  will  keep  me  advised  of  your  wishes,  they  shall  receive  the  most 
respectful  consideration,  and,  as  far  as  I  can,  consistently  with  my  other  obliga- 
tions,  be  complied  with. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  II.  HOLMES,  Brig-Genl.  Comdg.  Dept. 
Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Comdg.  Mauassas. 

A  true  copy.  S.  "VV.  FERGUSON,  Aide-de-Camp. 


CAMP  JACKSON,  June  22d,  1861. 
General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD: 

Sir, — I  received,  and  read,  your  communication  to  me  with  a  great  deal  of 
pleasure.  I  presented  it  to  General  Holmes,  as  you  requested,  and  forwarded  ifc  to 
the  "War  Department.  General  Holmes,  in  his  endorsement  on  the  back  of  tho 
communication,  evidently  admits  the  force  of  your  suggestions,  hut  objects  to 
having  any  portion  of  his  command  taken  from  him.  I  desire  to  take  tho 
"  Walter  Legion  "  to  the  column  which  is  to  advance  on  Alexandria,  if  such  ad 
vance  is  made  ;  anyhow,  I  desire  to  co-operate  with  the  main  body  of  the  armjr. 
We  are  getting  very  well  drilled,  and  could  be  of  efficient  service,  if  in  tlte  right 
place.  It  is  no  disposition  in  me  to  get  my  regiment  from  under  General  Holmes 
which  prompts  these  suggestions,  for  we  are  well  pleased  with  him,  but  aro 
satisfied  there  is  no  necessity  for  us  here.  There  could  be  twenty-five  hun 
dred  efficient  men  and  two  batteries  of  artillery  (four  rifled  cannon)  transferred 
to  Manassas,  or  within  supporting  distance,  and  have  sufficient  forces  here  to 
guard  this  place.  It  is  certainly  manifest  injury  to  the  service,  that  so  efficient 
a  force  should  be  kept  inactive  at  this  place.  I  think,  by  the  proper  represen 
tation  to  the  War  Department,  this  force  can  be  united  with  yours.  Suppose 
you  make  application  immediately.  I  will  co-operate  with  you  in  the  matter. 

I  send  this  by  Mr.  Mhoon,  of  Mississippi,  my  relative,  and  my  brother,  Lieu 
tenant  Bate.  I  will  be  obliged  if  you  will  extend  to  them  the  privilege  of  pass 
ing  through  your  camps  during  their  stay,  which  will  be  but  a  day  or  two. 

Yours,  W.  B.  BATE,  Col.  Comdg. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
MANASSAS  JUNCTION,  VA.,  June  24M,  1861. 

My  dear  General, — Your  two  letters  of  the  23d  instant  have  just  been  delivered 
to  me.     I  regret  much  the  change  you  have  been  compelled  to  make  in  your 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  VIII.  437 

arrangements,  but  I  can  well  appreciate  them,  although  I  do  not  believe  in  tho 
hostile  advance  of  General  Patterson,  for  I  am  informed,  on  what  I  consider  good 
authority,  that  they  have  quite  a  stampede  in  Washington — thinking  we  are 
going  to  unite  our  forces  for  its  attack,  or  that  you  are  going  to  cross  the  Poto 
mac  at  or  about  Edwards's  Ferry  to  attack  it  in  rear,  while  I  attack  it  in  front 
— hence,  probably,  the  proposed  movement  of  Patterson  to  keep  you  at  bay.  .  .  . 
Not  being  able  to  obtain  a  full  supply  of  cartridges  for  my  increased  forces, 
I  am  going  to  establish  a  manufactory  of  them  here.  Whenever  you  can  spare 
a  few  guns  for  Leesburg,  pray  send  them.  Yours  very  truly, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 
To  Geul.  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  Winchester,  Va. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  VIII. 

General  Sam.  Jones's  statement  concerning  strategic  portion  of  General  Beauregarffs 
report  of  (he  battle  of  Manassa*. 

CAMP  AT  C'ENTKEVILLE,  Xov.  9//<,  18C1. 

General,—!  have  examined  the  extract  which  you  handed  to  me,  from  your 
report  giving  tho  strategy  of  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and  find  it,  so  far  as  my 
memory  serves  me,  substantially  the  same  as  that  dictated  by  you  to  me  on  the 
night  of  the  lltth  July  last  as  a  memorandum  for  the  use  of  Colonel  James  Chest 
nut,  who  was  the  next  morning  to  repair  to  Richmond  to  urge  upon  the  govern 
ment  tho  importance  of  adopting  its  recommendations;  not  much  importance 
being  attached  to  the  joint  action  of  General  Holmes,  who  was  supposed  to  have 
but  few  troops  to  dispose  of,  he,  I  think,  was  not  mentioned  in  the  memoran 
dum,  but  only  referred  to  incidentally  in  your  verbal  instructions  to  Colonel 
Chestnut. 

I  have  a  very  clear  recollection  of  your  instructions  to  Colonel  Chestnut,  as  I 
wrote  the  memorandum  myself  under  your  dictation,  and  after  a  long  and  freo 
conversation  with  you  on  the  general  plan  of  campaign,  and  especially  of  the 
then  impending  battle.  Very  faithfully  yours, 

SAM.  JONES,  Brig.-Genl. 
Genl.  0.  T.  BF.AURKC.AHD,  C.  S.  A.       

CENTKEVILLE,  VA.,  Xov.  9/ft,  18C1. 

Tho  above  statement  of  General  Sam.  Jones  agrees  perfectly  well  with  my 
recollections  of  the  matter  referred  to.  G.  T.  BEAUHEGAKD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 


1.  Telegram  from  Colonel  John  S.  Preston  to  General  ficaurcgarci,  about  concentra 
tion  of  Generals  Johnston  a)id  Holmcx's  forces  u'ilh  army  at  Manassas. 

RICHMOND,  July  15//J,  1SG1. 
GENERAL  BEAUKEGARD  : 

Matter  under  deliberation.     Have  had  two  interviews.     Await  an  answer. 
Troops  will  be  sent  and  some  equipment  for  militia. 

J.  S.  PRESTON. 


438  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  VIII. 

2.  Telegram  from  Colonel  James  Chestnut  to  General  Beauregard,  as  to  concentration 
of  Generals  Johnston  and  Iloltncs's  forces  with  our  army  at  Manassas. 

RICHMOND,  July  15th,  1861. 
GENERAL  BEAUREGARI;  : 

Matter  seriously  debuted.     Will  await  tliis  morning  for  conclusion. 

JAMES  CHESTNUT,  Jr. 

Telegram. 

MANASSAS,  July  17th,  1861. 
To  Genl.  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  Winchester,  Ya. : 

War  Department  lias  ordered  you  to  join  me  ;  do  so  immediately,  if  possible, 
and  we  will  crush  the  enemy.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


Telegram. 

WINCHESTER.  Va.,  July  17th,  1861. 
Genl.  BEAUREGARD,  Manassas: 

Is  the  enemy  upon  you  in  force  ?  JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON. 


Telegram. 

RICHMOND,  July  18th,  1861. 
Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Manassas,  Va. : 

McRae's  regiment,  N.  C.,  goes  to  you  this  evening.  Barksdale's  Mississippi 
regiment  goes  to  you  from  Lynchburg.  Further  reinforcements  have  promise 
of  transportation  in  the  morning.  Hampton's  Legion  arid  others  will  go  as 
soon  as  possible.  God  be  praised  for  your  successful  beginning.  I  have  tried 
to  join  you,  but  remain  to  serve  you  here  as  most  useful  to  the  times. 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

Telegram. 

RICHMOND,  July  19th,  1861. 
Genl.  BEAUREGARD,  Manassas,  Va. : 

We  have  no  intelligence  from  General  Johnston.  If  the  enemy  in  front  of 
you  has  abandoned  an  immediate  attack,  and  General  Johnston  has  not  moved, 
you  had  better  withdraw  the  call  upon  him  so  that  he  may  be  left  to  his  full 
discretion.  All  the  troops  arriving  at  Lynchburg  are  ordered  to  join  you. 
From  this  place  we  will  send  as  fast  as  transportation  permits.  The  enemy  is 
advised  at  Washington  of  the  projected  movement  of  Generals  Johnston  and 
Holmes,  and  may  vary  his  plans  in  conformity  thereto. 

S.  COOPER,  Adj.-Genl. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS  JUNCTION,  July  17th,  1861. 
General  Orders,  No.  41. 

I.  The  general  commanding  the  army  of  the  Potomac  announces  to  his  com 
mand  that,  at  length,  the  enemy  have  advanced  to  subjugate  a  sovereign  State, 
and  to  impose  upon  a  free  people  an  odious  government. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  VIII.  439 

Notwithstanding  their  numerical  superiority,  they  can  be  repelled ;  and  the 
general  commanding  relies  confidently  on  his  command  to  do  it,  and  to  drive 
the  invader  back  beyond  his  intrenched  lines.  But,  to  do  this,  the  highest 
order  of  coolness,  individual  intelligence,  and  obedience  on  the  part  of  each 
officer  and  man  are  essential.  Great  reliance  -will  be  placed  on  the  bayonet  at 
the  proper  juncture  ;  but,  above  all,  it  is  enjoined  on  officers  and  men  to  with 
hold  their  fire  until  directed. 

The  superior  intelligence  of  the  individual  members  of  this  command  should, 
in  this  respect,  compensate  for  the  want  of  a  veteran,  long-trained  soldiery. 

In  firing  each  man  should  take  aim  and  never  discharge  his  piece  without  a 
distinct  object  in  full  view. 

II.  The  following  are  announced  as  the  general  and  personal  staff  of  the  gen 
eral  commanding;  and  any  written  or  verbal  orders  conveyed  through  them,  or 
either  of  them,  will  be  obeyed  : 

Col.  THOMAS  JORDAN,  Provisional  Army  of  the  Confederate  States,  A.  A.  Adj.- 
Genl. 

Capt.  CLIFTON  II.  SMITH,  Provisional  Army  of  Virginia,  A.  Adj.-Geul. 

Capt.  S.  W.  Fr.K(;rsox,  C.  S.  A.,  Aide-de-Camp. 

Lieut.-Col.  THOMAS  II.  WILLIAMSON,  Virginia  Army,  Chief-Engineer. 

Capt.  E.  P.  ALEXANDER,  Engineer  Corps  C.  S.  A. 

Col.  R.  B.  LEE,  C.  S.  A.,  Chief  Commissary  of  Subsistence. 

Maj.  WILLIAM  L.  CARELL,  C.  S.  A.,  Chief  Quartermaster. 

Surgeon  T.  II.  WILLIAMS,  Medical  Director. 

Col.  SAMUEL  JONES,  C.  S.  A.,  Chief  of  Artillery  and  Ordnance. 

Vuhtntccj'  Aid*. 

Colonel  JAMES  CHESTNUT,  Jr.,  South. Carolina. 
"       J.  L.  MANNING, 
"       W.  PORCHEU  MILES, 
"       JOHN  S.  PRESTON, 
"       A.  R.  CHISOLM, 
"       JOSEPH  HEYWARD, 
By  command  of  Brig.-Genl.  BEAUREGARD. 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  Adj.-Genl. 

Hcport  of  the  Itattlc  of  Lull  Run, 
HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS,  Aug.  25M,  1861. 

(I.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg.,  to  Genl.  S.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Geul.,  Rich 
mond,  Va. : 

General, — With  the  general  results  of  the  engagement  between  several  bri 
gades  of  my  command,  and  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy,  in  the  vicinity  of 
Mitchell's  and  Blackburn's  fords  of  Bull  Run,  on  the  18th  ultimo,  you  were  made 
duly  acquainted  at  the  time  by  telegraph  ;  but  it  is  my  place  now  to  submit,  in 
detail,  the  operations  of  that  day. 

Opportunely  informed  of  the  determination  of  the  enemy  to  advance  on  Ma- 


44:0  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  VIII. 

nassas,  my  advanced  brigades,  on  the  night  of  the  IGth  of  July,  were  made  aware, 
from  these  headquarters,  of  the  impending  movement;  and  in  exact  accordance 
with  my  instructions,  a  copy  of  which  is  appended,  marked  "A,"  their  with 
drawal  within  the  lines  of  Bull  Run  was  effected  with  complete  success  during 
the  day  and  night  of  the  17th  ultimo,  in  face  of,  and  in  immediate  proximity  to, 
a  largely  superior  force,  despite  a  well-planned,  well-executed  effort  to  cut  off 
the  retreat  of  Bouham's  brigade,  first  at  Germantown,  and  subsequently  at  Cen- 
treville,  whence  he  withdrew  by  my  direction,  after  midnight,  without  collision, 
although  enveloped  on  three  sides  by  their  lines.  This  movement  had  the  in 
tended  effect  of  deceiving  the  enemy  as  to  my  ulterior  designs,  and  led  him  to 
anticipate  an  unresisted  passage  of  Bull  Run. 

As  prescribed  in  the  first  and  second  sections  of  the  paper  herewith,  marked 
"A,"  011  the  morning  of  the  18th  of  July,  my  troops,  resting  on  Bull  Run  from 
Union  Mills  Ford  to  the  stone  bridge,  a  distance  of  about  eight  (8)  miles,  were 
posted  as  follows : 

E\vell's  brigade  occupied  a  position  in  vicinity  of  Union  Mills  Ford.  It  con 
sisted  of  Rodes's  5th  and  Seibel's  6th  regiments  of  Alabama,  and  Seymour's 
6th  regiment  Louisiana  Volunteers,  with  four  12-pounder  howitzers,  of  Wal 
ton's  battery;  and  Harrison's,  Cabell's,  and  Green's  companies  of  Virginia  cav- 
airy. 

D.  R.  Jones's  brigade  was  in  position  in  rear  of  McLean's  Ford,  and  consisted 
of  Jenkins's  5th  South  Carolina  and  Burt's  17th  and  Featherstone's  18th  regi 
ments  of  Mississippi  Volunteers,  with  two  brass  6-pounder  guns  of  Walton's 
battery,  and  one  company  of  cavalry. 

Longstreet's  brigade  covered  Blackburn's  Ford,  and  consisted  of  Moore's  1st. 
Garland's  llth,  and  Corse's  17th  regiments  Virginia  Volunteers,  with  two 
6-ponnder  brass  guns  of  Walton's  battery. 

Bouham's  brigade  held  the  approaches  to  Mitchell's  Ford.  It  was  composed  of 
Kershaw's  2d,  Williams's  3d,  Bacon's  7th,  and  Cash's  8th  regiments  South  Caro 
lina  Volunteers;  of  Shields's  and  Del.  Kemper's  batteries,  and  of  Flood's,  Rad- 
ford's,  Payne's,  Ball's,  Wickham's,  and  Powell's  companies  of  Virginia  Cavalry, 
under  Colonel  Radford. 

Cocke's  brigade  held  the  fords  below  and  in  vicinity  of  the  stone  bridge,  and 
consisted  of  Withers's  18th,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Strange's  19th,  and  R.  T.  Preston's 
28th  regiments,  with  Latham's  battery,  and  one  company  of  cavalry,  Virginia 
Volunteers. 

Evans  held  my  left  flank  and  protected  the  stone  bridge  crossing,  with  Sloan's 
4th  regiment  South  Carolina  Volunteers,  Wheat's  special  battalion  Louisiana 
Volunteers,  four  6-pounder  guns,  and  two  companies  of  Virginia  cavalry. 

Early's  brigade,  consisting  of  Kemper's  7th,  six  companies  of  Early's  24th  reg 
iments  of  Virginia  Volunteers,  Hays's  7th  regiment  Louisiana  Volunteers,  and 
three  rifled  pieces  of  Walton's  battery,  Lieutenant  Squires,  at  first  were  held  in 
position  in  the  rear  of,  and  as  a  support  to,  Ewcll's  brigade,  until  after  the  de 
velopment  of  the  enemy,  in  heavy  offensive  force,  in  front  of  Mitchell's  and 
Blackburn's  fords,  when  it  was  placed  in  rear  of,  and  nearly  equidistant  be 
tween,  McLean's,  Blackburn's,  and  Mitchell's  fords. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER   VIII. 

Pending  the  development  of  the  enemy's  purpose,  about  ten  (10)  o'clock  A.M. 
I  established  my  headquarters  at  a  central  point,  McLean's  farm-house,  near  to 
McLean's  and  Blackburn's  fords,  where  two  G-ponnders  of  Walton's  battery 
were  in  reserve;  but  subsequently,  during  the  engagement,  I  took  post  to  the 
left  of  my  reserve. 

Of  the  topographical  features  of  the  coilntry  thus  occupied  it  must  suffice  to 
say,  that  Bull  Rnn  is  a  small  stream  running  in  this  locality,  nearly  from  west 
to  east,  to  its  confluence  with  the  Occoqnan  River,  about  twelve  miles  from  the 
Potomac,  and  draining  a  considerable  scope  of  country,  from  its  source  in  Bull 
Run  Mountain,  to  a  short  distance  of  the  Potomac,  at  Occoquan.  At  this  sea 
son  habitually  low  and  sluggish,  it  is,  however,  rapidly  and  frequently  swollen 
by  the  summer  rains  until  unfordable.  The  banks,  for  the  most  part,  are  rocky 
and  steep,  but  abound  in  long-used  fords.  The  country  on  either  side,  much 
broken  and  thickly  wooded,  becomes  gently  rolling  and  open  as  it  recedes  from 
the  stream.  On  the  northern  side  the  ground  is  much  the  highest,  and  com 
mands  the  other  bank  completely.  Roads  traverse  and  intersect  the  sur 
rounding  country  in  almost  every  direction.  Finally,  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  the 
stream  is  about  equidistant  from  Centreville  and  Manassas,  some  six  miles 
apart. 

On  the  morning  of  the  I'-'th,  finding  that  the  enemy  was  assuming  a  threat 
ening  attitude,  in  addition  to  the  regiments  whose  positions  have  been  already 
stated,  I  ordered  up  from  Camp  Pit-kens,  as  a  reserve,  in  rear  of  Bonham's  bri 
gade,  the  effective  men  of  six  companies  of  Kelly's  8th  regiment  Louisiana  Vol 
unteers,  and  Kirkland's  llth  regiment  North  Carolina  Volunteers,  which,  hav 
ing  arrived  the  night  before  en  route  for  Winchester,  I  had  halted,  in  view  of 
the  existing  necessities  of  the  service.  Subsequently  the  latter  was  placed  in 
position  to  the  left  of  Bonham's  brigade. 

Appearing  in  heavy  force  in  front  of  Bonham's  position,  the  enemy,  about 
meridian,  opened  fire  with  several  20-pounder  rilled  guns  from  a  hill,  over  one 
and  a  half  miles  from  Bull  Run.  At  the  same  time  Kemper,  supported  by 
two  companies  of  light  infantry,  occupied  a  ridge  on  the  left  of  the  Centreville 
road,  about  six  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  the  ford,  with  two  G-pounder 
(smooth)  guns.  At  first  the  firing  of  the  enemy  was  at  random;  but  by  half- 
past  12  P.  M.  he  had  obtained  the  range  of  our  position,  and  poured  into  the 
brigade  a  shower  of  shot,  but  without  injury  to  us  in  men,  horses,  or  gnus. 
From  the  distance,  however,  our  guns  could  not  reply  with  effect,  and  we  did 
not  attempt  it,  patiently  awaiting  an  opportune  movement. 

Meanwhile,  a  light  battery  was  pushed  forward  by  the  enemy,  whereupon 
Kemper  threw  only  six  solid  shot,  with  the  effect  of  driving  back  both  the  bat 
tery  and  its  supporting  force.  This  is  understood  to  have  been  Ayres's  battery, 
and  the  damage  must  have  been  considerable,  to  have  obliged  such  a  retrograde 
movement  on  the  part  of  that  officer. 

The  purposes  of  Kemper's  position  having  now  been  fully  served,  his  pieces 
and  support  were  withdrawn  across  Mitchell's  Ford,  to  a  point  previously  des 
ignated,  and  which  commanded  the  direct  approaches  to  the  ford. 

About  half-past  11  o'clock  A.  M.  the  enemy  was  also  discovered  by  the  pick- 


442  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  VIII. 

ets  of  Longstreet's  brigade,  advancing  in  strong  columns  of  infantry,  with  ar 
tillery  and  cavalry,  on  Blackburn's  Ford. 

At  meridian  these  pickets  fell  back  silently  before  the  advancing  foe,  across 
the  ford,  which,  as  well  as  the  entire  southern  bank  of  the  stream  for  the  whole 
front  of  Longstreet's  brigade,  was  covered  at  the  water's  edge  by  an  extended 
lino  of  skirmishers,  while  two  6-pounders  of  Walton's  battery,  under  Lieuten 
ant  Garnett,  were  advantageously  placed  to  command  the  direct  approach  to 
the  ford,  but  with  orders  to  retire  to  the  rear  as  soon  as  commanded  by  the  enemy. 

The  northern  bank  of  the  stream,  in  front  of  Longstreet's  position,  rises,  with 
a  steep  slope,  at  least  fifty  feet  above  the  level  of  the  water,  leaving  a  narrow 
berme  in  front  of  the  ford,  of  some  twenty  yards.  This  ridge  formed  for  them 
an  admirable  natural  parapet,  behind  which  they  could  and  did  approach,  un 
der  shelter,  in  heavy  force,  within  less  than  one  hundred  yards  of  our  skirmish 
ers.  The  southern  shore  was  almost  a  plain,  raised  but  a  few  feet  above  the 
water,  for  several  hundred  yards  ;  then  rising  with  a  very  gradual,  gentle  slope, 
and  undulating  back  to  Manassas.  On  the  immediate  bank  there  was  a  fringe 
of  trees,  but  with  little,  if  any,  undergrowth  or  shelter;  while  on  the  other  shore 
there  was  timber  and  much  thick  brush  and  covering.  The  ground  in  rear  of 
our  skirmishers,  and  occupied  by  our  artillery,  was  an  old  field,  extending  along 
the  stream  about  one  mile,  and  immediately  back  for  about  half  a  mile,  to  a  bor 
der  or  skirting  of  dense,  second-growth  pines.  The  whole  of  this  ground  was 
commanded  at  all  points  by  the  ridge  occupied  by  the  enemy's  musketry,  as  was 
also  the  country  to  the  rear,  for  a  distance  much  beyond  the  range  of  20-pouud- 
er  rifled  guns,  by  the  range  of  hills  on  which  their  batteries  were  planted ;  and 
which,  it  may  be  further  noted,  commanded  also  all  our  approaches  from  this 
direction  to  the  three  threatened  fords. 

Before  advancing  his  infantry,  the  enemy  maintained  a  fire  of  rifle  artillery 
from  the  batteries  just  mentioned,  for  half  an  hour;  then  he  pushed  forward  a 
column  of  over  three  thousand  infantry  to  the  assault,  with  such  weight  of  num 
bers  as  to  be  repelled  with  difficulty  by  the  comparatively  small  force  of  not 
more  than  twelve  hundred  bayonets,  with  which  Brigadier-General  Longstreet 
met  him  with  characteristic  vigor  and  intrepidity.  Our  troops  engaged  at  this 
time  were  the  1st  and  17th  and  four  companies  of  the  llth  regiments  Virginia 
Volunteers.  Their  resistance  was  resolute,  and  maintained  with  a  steadiness 
worthy  of  all  praise ;  it  was  successful,  and  the  enemy  was  repulsed.  In  a  short 
time,  however,  he  returned  to  the  contest  with  increased  force  and  determina 
tion,  but  was  again  foiled  and  driven  back  by  our  skirmishers  and  Longstrcet's 
reserve  companies,  which  were  brought  up  and  employed  at  the  most  vigorous 
ly  assailed  points  at  the  critical  moment. 

It  was  now  that  Brigadier-General  Longstreet  sent  for  reinforcements  from 
Early's  brigade,  which  I  had  anticipated,  by  directing  the  advance  of  General 
Early,  with  two  regiments  of  infantry  and  two  pieces  of  artillery.  As  these 
came  upon  the  field  the  enemy  had  advanced  a  third  time,  Avith  heavy  num 
bers,  to  force  Longstrcet's  position.  Hays's  regiment,  7th  Louisiana  Volunteers, 
which  was  in  advance,  was  placed  on  the  bank  of  the  stream,  under  some  cover, 
to  the  immediate  right  and  left  of  the  ford,  relieving  Corse's  regiment,  17th 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  VIII.  443 

Virginia  Volunteers  ;  this  was  done  under  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry,  with  prom 
ising  steadiness.  The  7th  Virginia,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Williams,  was 
then  formed  to  tho  right,  also  under  heavy  fire,  and  pushed  forward  to  the 
stream,  relieving  the  1st  regiment  Virginia  Volunteers.  At  the  same  time  two 
rilled  guns,  brought  up  with  Early's  brigade,  were  moved  down  in  the  field  to 
the  right  of  tho  road,  so  as  to  be  concealed  from  the  enemy's  artillery  by  tho 
girth  of  timber  on  the  immediate  bank  of  the  stream,  and  then  opened  fire, 
directed  only  by  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  musketry.  Unable  to  effect  a  pass 
age,  the  enemy  kept  up  a  scattering  fire  for  some  time.  Some  of  our  troops 
had  pushed  across  tho  stream,  and  several  small  parties  of  Corse's  regiment, 
under  command  of  Captain  Marye,  met  and  drove  the  enemy  with  the  bayonet, 
but  as  the  roadway  from  the  ford  was  too  narrow  for  a  combined  movement 
in  force,  General  Longstreet  recalled  them  to  the  south  bank.  Meanwhile,  tho 
remainder  of  Early's  infantry  and  artillery  had  been  called  up;  that  is,  six 
companies  of  the  24th  regiment  Virginia  Volunteers,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hairston,  and  five  pieces  of  artillery,  one  rilled  gun,  and  four  6-pounder  brass 
guns,  under  Lieutenant  Garnett,  which  had  been  previously  sent  to  the  rear  of 
General  Longstreet.  This  infantry  was  at  once  placed  in  position  to  the  left 
of  the  ford,  in  a  space  unoccupied  by  Hays,  and  the  artillery  was  unlimbered 
in  battery  to  the  right  of  the  road,  in  a  lino  with  the  two  rifled  guns  already 
in  action.  A  scattering  lire  of  musketry  was  still  kept  up  by  tho  enemy  for 
a  short  time,  but  that  was  soon  silenced. 

It  was  at  this  stage  of  the  affair  that  a  remarkable  artillery  duel  was  com 
menced  and  maintained  on  our  side,  with  a  long-trained,  professional  opponent, 
superior  in  the  character  as  well  as  in  the  number  of  his  weapons,  provided 
with  improved  munitions  and  every  artillery  appliance,  and  at  the  same  time 
occupying  the  commanding  position.  Tho  results  were  marvellous,  and  fitting 
precursors  to  the  artillery  achievements  of  the  21st  of  July. 

In  the  outset  our  fire  was  directed  against  tho  enemy's  infantry,  whose  bay 
onets,  gleaming  above  tho  tree-tops,  alono  indicated  their  presence  and  force. 
This  drew  the  attention  of  a  battery  placed  on  a  high,  commanding  ridge,  and 
tho  duel  b;-gan  in  earnest.  For  a  time  tho  aim  of  tho  adversary  was  inaccu 
rate;  but  this  was  quickly  corrected,  and  shot  fell  and  shells  burst  thick  and 
fast  in  tho  very  midst  of  our  battery,  wounding,  in  tho  course  of  the  combat, 
Captain  Eschelman,  five  privates,  and  tho  horse  of  Lieutenant  Kichardson. 
From  the  position  of  our  pieces  and  the  nature  of  the  ground,  their  aim  could 
only  bo  directed  at  tho  smoke  of  the  enemy's  artillery;  how  skilfully  and  with 
what  execution  this  was  done  can  only  be  fully  realized  by  an  eye-witness.  For 
a  few  moments  their  guns  were  silenced,  but  were  soon  reopened.  By  direction 
of  General  Longstreet,  his  battery  was  then  advanced  by  hand  out  of  the  range, 
now  ascertained  by  the  enemy,  and  a  shower  of  shell,  case,  and  round  shot  flew 
over  the  heads  of  our  gunners,  but  one  of  our  pieces  had  become  hors  de  combat 
from  an  enlarged  vent.  From  tho  now  position,  our  guns,  fired  as  before,  with 
no  other  aim  than  the  smoke  and  flash  of  their  adversaries'  pieces,  renewed  and 
urged  tho  conflict  with  such  signal  vigor  and  effect,  that  gradually  the  firo  of 
the  enemy  slackened,  the  intervals  between  their  discharges  grew  longer  and 


444:  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  VIII. 

longer,  finally  to  cease ;  and  we  fired  a  last  gun  at  a  flying,  baffled  foe,  whose 
heavy  masses,  in  the  distance,  were  plainly  seen  to  break  and  scatter  in  wild 
confusion  and  utter  rout,  strewing  the  ground  with  cast -away  guns,  hats, 
blankets,  and  knapsacks,  as  our  parting  shell  was  thrown  among  them.  In 
their  retreat  one  of  their  pieces  was  abandoned,  but,  from  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  it  was  not  sent  for  that  night,  and,  under  cover  of  darkness,  the  enemy 
recovered  it. 

The  guns  engaged  in  this  singular  conflict  on  our  side  were  three  G-pouuder 
rifled  pieces,  and  four  ordinary  C-pounders,  all  of  Walton's  battery,  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery  of  New  Orleans;  the  officers  immediately  attached  were  Cap 
tain  Eschelman,  Lieutenants  C.  W.  Squires,  Richardson,  Garnett,  and  Whitting- 
tou.  At  the  same  time  our  infantry  held  the  bank  of  the  stream,  in  advance 
of  our  guns,  and  the  missiles  of  the  combatants  flew  to  and  fro  above  them,  as, 
cool  and  veteran-like,  for  more  than  an  hour  they  steadily  awaited  the  moment 
and  signal  for  the  advance. 

While  the  conflict  was  at  its  height,  before  Blackburn's  Ford,  about  four 
o'clock  P.M.,  the  enemy  again  displayed  himself  in  force  before  Bonham's  posi 
tion.  At  this  Colonel  Kershaw,  with  four  companies  of  his  regiment,  2d  South 
Carolina,  and  one  piece  of  Kemper's  battery,  were  thrown  across  Mitchell's 
Ford  to  the  ridge  which  Kemper  Lad  occupied  that  morning.  Two  solid  shot 
and  three  spherical  case  thrown  among  them,  with  a  precision  inaugurated  by 
that  artillerist  at  Vienna,  effected  their  discomfiture  and  disappearance,  and 
our  troops  in  that  quarter  were  again  withdrawn  within  our  lines,  having  dis 
charged  the  duty  assigned. 

At  the  close  of  the  engagement  before  Blackburn's  Ford  I  directed  General 
Longstreet  to  withdraw  the  1st  and  17th  regiments,  which  had  borne  the  brunt; 
of  the  action,  to  a  position  in  reserve,  leaving  Colonel  Early  to  occupy  the  field 
with  his  brigade  and  Garland's  regiment. 

As  part  of  the  history  of  this  engagement,  I  desire  to  place  on  record  that, 
on  the  18th  of  July,  not  one  yard  of  intreuchments  nor  one  rifle-pit  sheltered 
the  men  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  who,  officers  and  men,  with  rare  exceptions,  wero 
on  that  day  for  the  first  time  under  fire,  and  wrho,  taking  and  maintaining 
every  position  ordered,  cannot  be  too  much  commended  for  their  soldierly  be 
havior. 

Our  artillery  was  manned  and  officered  by  those  who  but  yesterday  wero 
called  from  the  civil  avocations  of  a  busy  city.  They  were  matched  with  the 
picked  light  artillery  of  the  Federal  Regular  army — Company  E,  3d  Artillery, 
under  Captain  Ayres — with  an  armament,  as  their  own  Chief  of  Artillery  admits, 
of  two  10 -pounder  Parrott  rifled  guns,  two  12 -pounder  howitzers,  and  two 
6-ponnder  pieces,  aided  by  two  20-pounder  Parrott  rifled  guns,  of  Company  G, 
5th  Artillery,  under  Lieutenant  Benjamin  ;  thus  matched,  they  drove  their  vet 
eran  adversaries  from  the  field,  giving  confidence  in  and  promise  of  the  coming 
efficiency  of  that  brilliant  arm  of  our  service. 

Having  thus  related  the  main  or  general  results  and  events  of  the  action  of 
Bull  Run,  in  conclusion,  it  is  proper  to  signalize  some  of  those  who  contributed 
the  most  to  the  satisfactory  results  of  that  day. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  VIII.  445 

Thanks  arc  due  to  Brigadier-Generals  Bonliam  and  Ewell,  and  to  Colonel 
Cocke,  and  the  officers  under  them,  for  the  ability  shown  in  conducting  and  ex 
ecuting  the  retrograde  movements  on  Bull  Run,  directed  in  my  orders  of  the  8th 
July — movements  on  which  hung  the  fortunes  of  this  army. 

Brigadier-General  Longstreet,  who  commanded  immediately  the  troops  en 
gaged  at  Blackburn's  Ford  on  the  18th,  equalled  my  confident  expectations,  and 
I  may  fitly  say  that,  by  his  presence  at  the  right  place,  at  the  right  moment, 
among  his  men,  by  the  exhibition  of  characteristic  coolness,  and  by  his  words 
of  encouragement  to  the  men  of  his  command,  he  infused  a  confidence  and  a 
spirit  that  contributed  largely  to  the  success  of  our  arms  on  that  day. 

Colonel  Early  brought  his  brigade  into  position,  and  subsequently  into  action, 
with  judgment,  and  at  the  proper  moment  he  displayed  capacity  for  command 
and  personal  gallantry. 

Colonel  Moore,  commanding  the  1st  Virginia  Volunteers,  was  severely  wounded 
at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  the  command  of  which,  subsequently,  devolved  upon 
Major  Skinner — Lieutenant-Colonel  Fry  having  been  obliged  to  leave  the  field 
in  consequence  of  a  sunstroke. 

An  accomplished,  promising  officer,  Major  Carter  II.  Harrison,  llth  regiment 
Virginia  Volunteers,  was  lost  to  the  service  ;  while  leading  two  companies  of  his 
regiment  against  the  enemy,  he  fell,  twice  shot,  mortally  wounded. 

Brigadier-General  Longstreet,  while  finding  on  all  sides  alacrity,  order,  and 
intelligence,  mentions  his  special  obligations  to  Colonels  Moore,  Garland,  and 
Corse,  commanding  severally  regiments  of  his  brigade,  and  to  their  field  officers, 
Lieutenant-Colonels  Fry,  Funsten,  and  Mini  ford;  and  Majors  Brent  and  Skin 
ner,  of  whom  he  says,  "  they  displayed  more  coolness  and  energy  than  is  usual 
among  veterans  of  the  old  service."  General  Longstreet  also  mentions  the  con 
duct  of  Captain  Marye  of  the  17th  regiment  Virginia  Volunteers,  as  especially 
gallant  on  one  occasion  in  advance  of  the  ford. 

The  regiments  of  Early's  brigade  were  commanded  by  Colonel  Harry  Hays 
and  Lieutenant-Colonels  Williams  and  Hairston,  who  handled  their  commands 
in  action  with  satisfactory  coolness  and  skill,  supported  by  their  field-officers, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  de  Choiseul  and  Major  Penn  of  the  7th  Louisiana,  and  Major 
Pattou  of  the  7th  Virginia  Volunteers. 

The  skill,  the  conduct,  and  the  soldierly  qualities  of  the  Washington  Artillery 
engaged  were  all  that  could  be  desired.  The  officers  and  men  attached  to  the 
seven  pieces  already  specified  won  for  their  battalion  a  distinction  which,  I 
feel  assured,  will  never  bo  tarnished,  and  which  will  ever  serve  to  urge  them 
and  their  corps  to  high  endeavor.  Lieutenant  Squires  worthily  commanded  tho 
pieces  in  action.  The  commander  of  the  battalion  was  necessarily  absent  from 
tho  immediate  field,  under  orders  ill  the  sphere  of  his  duties,  but  tho  fruits  of 
his  discipline,  zeal,  and  instruction,  and  capacity  as  an  artillery  commander, 
were  present,  and  must  redound  to  his  reputation. 

On  tho  left,  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  while  no  serious  engagement  occurred,  tho 
conduct  of  all  was  eminently  satisfactory  to  the  general  officer  in  command. 

It  is  due,  however,  to  Colonel  J.  L.  Kemper,  Virginia  forces,  to  express  my 
sense  of  the  value  of  his  services  in  the  preparation  for,  and  execution  of,  tho 


44G  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  VIII. 

retreat  from  Fairfax  Court-House,  on  Bull  Run.  Called  from  the  Lead  of  his 
regiment,  by  what  appeared  to  me  an  imperative  need  of  the  service,  to  take 
charge  of  the  superior  duties  of  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  with  the  ad 
vance  at  that  critical  juncture,  lie  accepted  the  responsibilities  involved,  and 
was  eminently  efficient.  For  further  information  touching  officers  and  individ 
uals  of  the  1st  Brigade,  and  the  details  of  the  retrograde  movement,  I  have  to 
refer  particularly  to  the  report  of  Brigadier-General  Bonham  herewith. 

It  is  proper  here  to  state,  that  while,  from  the  outset,  it  had  been  determined, 
on  the  approach  of  the  enemy  in  force,  to  fall  back  and  fight  him  on  the  line  of 
Bull  Run,  yet  the  position  occupied  by  General  E well's  brigade,  if  necessary, 
could  have  been  maintained  against  a  largely  superior  force.  This  was  espe 
cially  the  case  with  the  position  of  the  5th  Alabama  Volunteers,  Colonel  Eodes, 
which  that  excellent  officer  had  made  capable  of  a  resolute,  protracted  defence 
against  heavy  odds.  Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  ultimo,  when  the 
enemy  appeared  before  that  position,  they  were  checked  and  held  at  bay,  with 
some  confessed  loss,  in  a  skirmish  in  advance  of  the  works,  in  which  Major 
Morgan  and  Captain  Shelly,  5th  regiment  Alabama  Volunteers,  acted  with  intel 
ligent  gallantry,  and  the  post  was  only  abandoned  under  general,  but  specific, 
imperative  orders,  in  conformity  with  a  long-conceived,  established  plan  of  ac 
tion  and  battle. 

Captain  E.  P.  Alexander,  Confederate  States  Engineers,  fortunately  joined  my 
headquarters  in  time  to  introduce  the  system  of  new  field-signals,  which,  under 
his  skilful  management,  rendered  me  the  most  important  service  preceding  and 
during  the  engagement. 

The  medical  officers  serving  with  the  regiments  engaged  were  at  their  proper 
posts,  and  discharged  their  duties  with  satisfactory  skill  and  zeal ;  and,  on  one 
occasion,  at  least,  under  an  annoying  fire — when  Surgeon  Cnlleu,  1st  Regiment 
Virginia  Volunteers,  Avas  obliged  to  remove  our  wounded  from  the  hospital, 
which  had  become  the  special  target  of  the  enemy's  rifled  guns,  notwithstanding 
it  was  surmounted  by  the  usual  yellow  hospital  flag  j  but  which,  however,  I 
hope,  for  the  sake  of  past  associations,  was  ignorantly  mistaken  for  a  Confeder 
ate  flag.  The  name  of  each  individual  medical  officer  I  cannot  mention. 

On  the  day  of  the  engagement  I  was  attended  by  my  personal  staff,  Lieuten 
ant  S.  W.  Ferguson,  A.  D.  C.,  and  my  volunteer  aides-de-camp,  Colonels  Preston, 
Manning,  Chestnut,  Miles,  Chisolm,  and  Hey  ward,  of  South  Carolina,  to  all  of 
whom  I  am  greatly  indebted  for  manifold  essential  services  in  the  transmission 
of  orders  on  the  field,  and  in  the  preliminary  arrangements  for  the  occupation 
and  maintenance  of  the  line  of  Bull  Run. 

Colonel  Thomas  Jordan,  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  Captain  C.  H.  Smith, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General,  Colonel  S.  Jones,  Chief  of  Artillery  and  Ordnance, 
Major  Cabell,  Chief  Quartermaster,  Captain  \V.  H.  Fowle,  Chief  of  Subsistence 
Department,  Surgeon  Thomas  II.  Williams,  Medical  Director,  and  Assistant- 
Surgeon  Brodie,  Medical  Purveyor,  of  the  general  staff  attached  to  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  were  necessarily  engaged  severally  with  their  responsible  duties, 
at  my  headquarters  at  Camp  Pickens,  which  they  discharged  with  an  energy  and 
intelligence  for  which  I  have  to  tender  my  sincere  thanks. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER   IX.  447 

Messrs.  McLean,  Wilcoxen,  Kinchcloe,  and  Brainier,  citizens  of  this  immediate 
vicinity,  it  is  their  due  to  say,  have  placed  me  and  the  country  under  great  obli 
gations  for  the  information  relative  to  this  region,  which  has  enabled  me  to  avail 
myself  of  its  defensive  features  and  resources.  They  were  found  ever  ready  to 
give  me  their  time,  without  stint  or  reward. 

Our  casualties,  in  all  sixty -eight  killed  and  wounded,  were  —  -  killed, 
and  —  —  wounded,  several  of  whom  have  since  died.  The  loss  of  the  enemy 
can  only  be  conjectured;  it  was  unquestionably  heavy.  In  the  cursory  exam 
ination,  which  was  made  by  details  from  Long.street's  and  Early's  brigades  oil 
the  18th  of  July,  of  that  part  of  the  iield  immediately  contested,  and  near 
Blackburn's  Ford,  some  sixty -four  corpses  were  found  and  buried,  some  few 
wounded,  and  at  least  twenty  prisoners  were  also  picked  up,  besides  one  hundred 
and  seventy-live  stands  of  arms,  a  large  quantity  of  accoutrements  and  blankets, 
and  quite  one  hundred  and  fifty  hats. 

The  effect  of  this  day's  conflict  was  to  satisfy  the  enemy  he  could  not  force  a 
passage  across  Bull  Run  iu  face  of  our  troops,  and  led  him  into  the  Hank  move 
ment  of  the  21st  July,  and  the  battle  of  Manassas,  the  details  of  which  will  be 
related  in  another  paper. 

Herewith  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  the  reports  of  the  several  brigade  com 
manders  engaged,  and  of  the  artillery  ;  also  a  map  of  the  field  of  battle. 

The  rendition  of  this  report,  it  is  proper  to  say,  in  conclusion,  has  been  un 
avoidably  delayed  by  the  constantly  engrossing  administrative  duties  of  the 
commander  of  an  army  corps  composed  wholly  of  volunteers — duties  virtually 
essential  to  its  well-being  and  future  elhciency,  and  which  I  could  not  set  aside 
or  postpone  on  any  account. 

I  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAURKGARD,  Genl.  Comelg. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX. 

CAMP  PICKF.NS,  July  2lst,  1661. 

General, — General  Jones's  Adjutant  comes  in  to  report  that  the  Federal  troops 
are  between  us  and  General  Jones,  and  approaching. 

Tnos.  G.  RIIKTT,  A.  Adj.-Genl. 
(Received  at  about  f>^  o'clock  P.  M.) 


MAXASSAS  JUNCTION,  YA.,  July  21s/,  1SG1. 

Sent  atoih.  A.  M. 

General, — You  will  hold  yourself  in  readiness  to  take  the  offensive  on  Centrc- 
villo  at  a  moment's  notice,  to  make  a  diversion  against  the  enemy's  intended 
attack  on  Mitchell's  Ford  and,  probably,  Stone  Bridge.      You  will  protect  well 
your  right  tlank  against  any  attack  from  the  eastward. 
General  Holmes's  brigade  will  support  your  movement. 
If  the  enemy  be  prepared  to  attack  in  front  of  your  left,  leave  it  (said  brigade) 


448  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX. 

in  proper  position,  with  orders  to  take  the  offensive  when  it  hears  your  engage 
ment  on  the  other  side  of  the  Run.  I  intend  to  take  the  offensive  throughout 
my  front  as  soon  as  possible. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Brig.-Genl.  Comdg. 
Genl.  R.  S.  EWELL,  Union  Mills,  Ya. 


Report  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas. 

Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Comdg.  1st  Corps  Army  of  the  Potomac,  to  Geul.  S. 
COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Genl.,  Richmond,  Ya. : 

General, — Before  entering  upon  a  narration  of  the  general  military  operations 
in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  on  the  21st  of  July,  I  propose — I  hope  not  unsea 
sonably — first,  to  recite  certain  events  which  belong  to  the  strategy  of  the  cam 
paign,  and  consequently  form  an  essential  part  of  the  history  of  the  battle. 

Having  become  satisfied  that  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  with  a  decidedly  su 
perior  force,  both  as  to  numbers  and  war  equipage,  to  attack  or  turn  my  posi 
tion  in  this  quarter,  was  immediately  impending,  I  despatched,  on  13th  July, 
one  of  my  staff,  Colonel  James  Chestnut,  of  South  Carolina,  to  submit  for  the 
consideration  of  the  President  a  plan  of  operations,  substantially  as  follows: 

I  proposed  that  General  Johnston  should  unite,  as  soon  as  possible,  the  bulk 
of  the  "Army  of  the  Shenandoah"  with  that  of  the  Potomac,  then  under  my 
command,  leaving  only  sufficient  forces  to  garrison  his  strong  works  at  Winches 
ter,  and  to  guard  the  five  defensive  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  thus  hold 
Patterson  in  check. 

At  the  same  time  Brigadier-General  Holmes  was  to  march  hither,  with  all  of 
his  command  not  essential  for  the  defense  of  the  position  of  Aquia  Creek. 
These  junctions  having  been  effected  at  Manassas,  an  immediate,  impetuous 
attack  of  our  combined  armies  upon  General  McDowell  was  to  follow,  as  soon 
as  he  approached  my  advanced  positions  at  and  around  Fairfax  Court-House, 
with  the  inevitable  result,  as  I  submitted,  of  his  complete  defeat,  and  the  de 
struction  or  capture  of  his  army.  This  accomplished,  the  Army  of  the  Shenan- 
doah,  under  General  Johnston,  increased  with  a  part  of  my  forces,  and  rejoined, 
as  he  returned,  by  the  detachment  left  to  hold  the  mountain  passes,  was  to 
march  back  rapidly  into  the  valley,  fall  upon  and  crush  Patterson,  with  a  supe 
rior  force,  wheresoever  he  might  be  found.  This,  I  confidently  estimated,  could 
be  achieved  within  fifteen  days  after  General  Johnston  should  march  from  Win 
chester  for  Manassas.  Meanwhile,  I  was  to  occupy  the  enemy's  works  on  this 
side  of  the  Potomac,  if,  as  I  anticipated,  he  had  been  so  routed  as  to  enable  mo 
to  enter  them  with  him  ;  or,  if  not,  to  retire  again  for  a  time  within  the  lines  of 
Bull  Run  with  my  main  force.  Patterson  having  been  virtually  destroyed,  then 
General  Johnston  would  reinforce  General  Garnett  sufficiently  to  make  him  su 
perior  to  his  opponent,  General  McClellan,  and  able  to  defeat  that  officer. 

This  done,  General  Garnett  was  to  form  an  immediate  junction  with  General 
Johnston,  who  was  forthwith  to  cross  the  Potomac  into  Maryland  with  his  whole 
force,  arouse  the  people,  as  he  advanced,  to  the  recovery  of  their  political  rights 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX.  449 

and  the  defence  of  their  homes  and  families  from  an  offensive  invader,  and  then 
march  to  the  investment  of  Washington  in  the  rear,  while  I  resumed  the  offen 
sive  in  front. 

This  plan  of  operations,  yon  are  aware,  was  not  accepted  at  the  time,  from 
considerations  which  appeared  so  weighty  as  to  more  than  counterbalance  its 
proposed  advantages. 

Informed  of  these  views,  and  of  the  decision  of  the  War  Department,  I  then 
made  my  preparations  for  the  stoutest  practicable  defence  of  the  line  of  Bull 
Kun,  the  enemy  having  now  developed  his  purposes  by  the  advance  on,  and  oc 
cupation  of,  Fairfax  Court-House,  from  which  my  advanced  brigade  had  been 
withdrawn.* 

The  War  Department  having  been  informed  by  me,  by  telegraph,  on  the  17th 
July,  of  the  movement  of  General  McDowell,  General  Johnston  was  immedi 
ately  ordered  to  form  a  junction  of  his  army  corps  with  mine,  should  the  move 
ment,  in  his  judgment,  be  deemed  advisable.  General  Holmes  was  also  directed 
to  push  forward  with  two  regiments,  a  battery,  and  one  company  of  cavalry. 

In  view  of  these  propitious  approaching  reinforcements,  modifying  my  plan 
of  operations  so  far  as  to  determine  on  attacking  the  enemy  at  Centreville,  as 
soon  as  I  should  hear  of  the  near  approach  of  the  two  reinforcing  columns,  I 
sent  one  of  my  aids,  Colonel  Chisolm,  of  South  Carolina,  to  meet  and  communi 
cate  my  plans  to  General  Johnston,  and  my  wish  that  one  portion  of  his  forces 
should  march  by  the  way  of  Aldie  and  take  the  enemy  on  his  right  flank,  and  in 
reverse  at  Centreville.  Dilliculties,  however,  of  an  insuperable  character,  in 
connection  with  means  of  transportation  and  the-  marching  condition  of  his 
troops,  made  this  impracticable;  and  it  was  determined  our  forces  should  be 
united  within  the  lines  of  Bull  Run,  and  thence  advance  to  the  attack  of  the 
enemy. 

General  Johnston  arrived  here  about  noon  on  the  20th  of  July,  and  being  my 
senior  in  rank,  he  necessarily  assumed  command  of  all  the  forces  of  the  Confed 
erate  States  then  concentrating  at  this  point.  Made  acquainted  with  my  plan 
of  operation  and  disposition  to  meet  the  enemy,  he  gave  them  his  entire  ap 
proval,  and  generously  directed  their  execution  under  my  command,  t 

In  consequence-  of  the  untoward  detention,  however,  of  some  five  thousand  of 
General  Johnston's  army  corps,  resulting  from  the  inadequate-  and  imperfect 
means  of  transportation  for  so  many  troops,  at  the  disposition  of  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad,  it  became  necessary,  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  before  daylight,  to 
modify  the  plan  accepted,  to  suit  the  contingency  of  an  immediate  attack  on  our 
lines  by  the  main  force  of  the  enemy,  then  plainly  at  hand. 

The  enemy's  forces,  reported  by  their  best-informed  journals  to  be  fifty-five 
thousand  strong,  I  had  learned  from  reliable  sources,  on  the  night  of  the  20th, 
were  being  concentrated  in  and  around  Centreville,  and  along  the  Warrcnton 
turnpike  road  to  Bull  Run,  near  which  our  respective  pickets  were  in  immedi 
ate  proximity.  Tins  fact,  with  the  conviction  that,  after  his  signal  discomfiture 


*  See  papers  herewith  marked  "  A"  and  "  B." 
t  See  papers  herewith  marked  "  C  "  and  "  D." 

I.— 29 


450  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX. 

on  the  18th  of  July  before  Blackburn's  Ford,  the  centre  of  my  lines,  he  would 
not  renew  the  attack  in  that  quarter,  induced  ine  at  once  to  look  for  an  attempt 
on  my  left  flank  resting  on  the  stone  bridge,  which  was  but  weakly  guarded  by 
men,  as  well  as  but  slightly  provided  with  artificial  defensive  appliances  and 
artillery. 

In  view  of  these  palpably  military  conditions,  by  half-past  four  A.  M.  on  the 
21st  of  July  I  had  prepared  and  despatched  orders  directing  the  whole  of  the 
Confederate  forces  within  the  lines  of  Bull  Run,  including  the  brigades  and  reg 
iments  of  General  Johnston  which  had  arrived  at  that  time,  to  bo  held  in  readi 
ness  to  march  at  a  moment's  notice. 

At  that  time  the  following  was  the  disposition  of  our  forces : 

Ewell's  brigade,  constituted  as  on  the  18th  of  July,  remained  in  position  at 
Union  Mills  Ford,  its  left  extending  along  Bull  Run,  in  the  direction  of  McLean's 
Ford,  and  supported  by  Holmes's  brigade,  2d  Tennessee,  and  1st  Arkansas  regi 
ments,  a  short  distance  to  the  rear — that  is,  at  and  near  Camp  Wigfall. 

D.  R.  Jones's  brigade,  from  Ewell's  left  in  front  of  McLean's  Ford,  and  along 
the  stream  to  Longstreet's  position.  It  was  unchanged  in  organization,  and  was 
supported  by  Early's  brigade,  also  unchanged,  placed  behind  a  thicket  of  young 
pines,  a  short  distance  in  rear  of  McLean's  Ford. 

Longstreet's  brigade  held  its  former  ground  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  from  Jones's 
left  to  Bonham's  right  at  Mitchell's  ford,  and  was  supported  by  Jackson's  bri 
gade,  consisting  of  Colonel  James  F.  Preston's  4th,  Harper's  5th,  Allen's  2d,  the 
27th,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Echolls,  and  the  33d,  Cummings's  Virginia  regiments, 
twenty-six  hundred  and  eleven  strong,  which  were  posted  behind  the  skirting 
of  pines,  to  the  rear  of  Blackburn's  and  Mitchell's  fords  j  and  in  rear  of  this  sup 
port  was  also  Barksdale's  13th  regiment  Mississippi  Volunteers,  which  had  lately 
arrived  from  Lynchburg. 

Along  the  edge  of  a  pine  thicket  in  rear  of  and  equidistant  from  McLean's 
and  Blackburn's  fords,  ready  to  support  either  position,  I  had  also  placed  all 
of  Bee's  and  Bartow's  brigades  that  had  arrived,  namely :  two  companies  of  the 
llth  Mississippi,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Liddell,  the  2d  Mississippi,  Colonel  Falkuer, 
and  the  4th  Alabama,  with  7th  and  8th  Georgia  regiments,  Colonel  Gartrell  and 
Lieutenant -Colonel  Gardner,  in  all  twenty -seven  hundred  and  thirty -two 
bayonets. 

Bonham's  brigade,  as  before,  held  Mitchell's  Ford,  its  right  near  Longstreet's 
left,  its  left  extending  in  the  direction  of  Cocke's  right.  It  was  organized,  as 
at  the  end  of  the  18th  of  July,  with  Jackson's  brigade,  as  before  said,  as  a 
support. 

Cocke's  brigade,  increased  by  seven  companies  of  the  8th,  Hunton's,  three 
companies  of  the  49th,  Smith's,  Virginia  regiments,  two  companies  of  cavalry, 
and  a  battery,  under  Rogers,  of  four  C-pounders,  occupied  the  line  in  front  and 
rear  of  Bull  Run,  extending  from  the  direction  of  Bonham's  left,  and  guarding 
Island,  Ball's,  and  Lewis's  fords,  to  the  right  of  Evans's  demi-brigade,  near  the 
stone  bridge,  also  under  General  Cocke's  command. 

The  latter  held  the  stone  bridge,  and  its  left  covered  a  farm-ford  about  one 
mile  above  the  bridge. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX. 

Stuart's  cavalry,  some  three  hundred  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenaudoah, 
guarded  the  level  ground,  extending  in  rear  from  Bouham's  left  to  Cocke's 
right. 

Two  companies  of  Radford's  cavalry  were  held  in  reserve  a  short  distance  in 
rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  his  left  extending  in  the  direction  of  Stuart's  right. 

Colonel  Peudletou's  reserve  battery  of  eight  pieces  was  temporarily  placed  in 
rear  of  Bonhani's  extreme  left. 

Major  Walton's  reserve  Lattery  of  five  guns  was  in  position  on  McLean's 
farm,  in  a  piece  of  woods  in  rear  of  Bee's  right. 

Hampton's  Legion,  of  six  companies  of  infantry,  six  hundred  strong,  having 
arrived  that  morning  by  the  cars  from  Richmond,  was  subsequently,  as  soon  as 
it  arrived,  ordered  forward  to  a  position  in  immediate  vicinity  of  the  Lewis 
House,  as  a  support  for  any  troops  engaged  in  that  quarter. 

The  effective  force  of  all  arms  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  that  eventful 
morning,  including  the  garrison  of  Camp  Pickens,  did  not  exceed  21,833  and 
twenty-nine  guns. 

The  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  ready  for  action  on  the  field,  may  be  set  at 
COOO  men  and  twenty  guns.* 

The  brigade  of  General  Holmes  mustered  about  twelve  hundred  and  sixty-five 
bayonets,  six  guns,  and  a  company  of  cavalry  about  ninety  strong. 

Informed,  at  5.30  A.M.,  by  Colonel  Evans,  that  the  enemy  had  deployed  some 
twelve  hundred  men  t  with  several  pieces  of  artillery  in  his  immediate  front,  I 
at  once  ordered  him,  as  also  General  Cocke,  if  attacked,  to  maintain  their  posi 
tion  to  the  last  extremity. 

In  my  opinion,  the  most  effective  method  of  relieving  that  flank  was  by  a 
rapid,  determined  attack,  with  my  right  wing  and  centre,  on  tho  enemy's  flank 
and  rear  at  Centreville,  with  due  precautions  against  the  advance  of  his  reserves 
from  the  direction  of  Washington.  By  such  a  movement  I  confidently  expected 
to  achieve  a  complete  victory  for  my  country  by  12  meridian. 

These  new  dispositions  were  submitted  to  General  Johnston,  who  fully  ap 
proved  them,  and  the  orders  for  their  immediate  execution  were  at  once  issued. 

Brigadier-General  Ewell  was  directed  to  begin  the  movement,  to  be  followed 
and  supported  successively  by  Generals  D.  R.  Jones,  Longstreet,  and  Bonham, 
respectively  supported  by  their  several  appointed  reserves. 

The  cavalry,  under  Stuart  and  Radford,  were  to  be  held  in  hand,  subject  to 
future  orders,  and  ready  for  employment,  as  might  be  required  by  the  exigencies 
of  the  bat  tie. 

*  That  is,  when  the  battle  began ;  Smith's  brigade  and  Fisher's  North  Carolina  came  up 
later  and  made  total  of  Army  of  Shenandoah  engaged,  of  all  arms,  eight  thousand  three 
hundred  and  thirty-four.  Hill's  Virginia  regiment,  five  hundred  and  fifty,  also  arrived, 
but  was  posted  as  reserve  to  ri«;ht  flank. 

t  These  were  what  Colonel  Evans  saw  of  General  Schcnck's  brigade  of  General  Tyler's 
division,  and  two  other  heavy  brigades,  in  all,  over  nine  thousand  men,  and  thirteen 
pieces  of  artillery,  Carlisle's  and  Ayrcs's  batteries.  That  is,  nine  hundred  men  and  two 
G-pounders,  confronted  by  nine  thousand  men  and  thirteen  pieces  of  artillery,  mostly 
rifled. 


452  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX. 

About  8.30  A.  M.  General  Johnston  and  myself  transferred  our  headquarters 
to  a  central  position,  about  half  a  mile  in  rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  whence  we 
might  watch  the  course  of  events. 

Previously,  as  early  as  5.30,  the  Federalists  in  front  of  Evans's  position,  Stone 
Bridge,  had  opened  with  a  large  30-pounder  Parrott  rilled  gun,  and,  thirty  min 
utes  later,  with  a  moderate,  apparently  tentative,  fire  from  a  battery  of  rifled 
pieces,  directed,  first  in  front,  at  Evans,  and  then  in  the  direction  of  Cocke's 
position,  but  without  drawing  a  return  fire  and  discovery  of  our  positions; 
chiefly  because,  in  that  quarter,  we  had  nothing  but  eight  6-pouuder  pieces, 
which  could  not  reach  the  distant  enemy. 

As  the  Federalists  had  advanced  with  an  extended  line  of  skirmishers  in  front 
of  Evans,  that  officer  promptly  threw  forward  the  two  flank  companies  of  the 
4th  South  Carolina  regiment,  and  one  company  of  Wheat's  Louisiana  battalion, 
deployed  as  skirmishers  to  cover  his  small  front.  An  occasional  scattering  fire 
resulted,  and  thus  stood  the  two  armies  in  that  quarter  for  more  than  an  hour, 
while  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  was  marching  his  devious  way  through  the 
"Big  Forest"  to  take  our  forces  in  flank  and  rear. 

By  8.30  A.  M.,  Colonel  Evans  having  become  satisfied  of  the  counterfeit  char 
acter  of  the  movement  on  his  front,  and  persuaded  of  an  attempt  to  turn  his 
left  flank,  decided  to  change  his  position  to  meet  the  enemy,  and,  for  this  pur 
pose,  immediately  put  in  motion  to  his  left  and  rear  six  companies  of  Sloan's  4th 
South  Carolina  regiment,  Wheat's  Louisiana  battalion  (live  companies),  and  two 
6-pounders  of  Latham's  battery,  leaving  four  companies  of  Sloan's  regiment 
under  cover,  as  the  sole,  immediate  defence  of  the  stone  bridge,  but  giving  in 
formation  to  General  Cocke  of  his  change  of  position  and  the  reasons  that  im 
pelled  it. 

Following  a  road  leading  to  the  old  Pittsylvauia  (Carter)  Mansion,  Colonel 
Evans  formed  in  line  of  battle,  some  four  hundred  yards  in  rear,  as  he  advanced, 
of  that  house,  his  guns  to  the  front  and  in  position,  properly  supported  to  its 
immediate  right.  Finding,  however,  that  the  enemy  did  not  appear  on  that 
road,  which  was  a  branch  of  one  leading  by  Sudley's  Springs  Ford  to  Brents- 
yille  and  Dumfries,  ho  turned  abruptly  to  the  left,  and,  marching  across  the 
fields  for  three  quarters  of  a  mile,  about  9.30  A.  M.  took  position  in  line  of  battle, 
his  left,  Sloan's  companies,  resting  on  the  main  Brcntsville  road,  in  a  shallow 
ravine,  the  Louisiana  battalion  to  the  right,  in  advance  two  hundred  yards,  a 
rectangular  copse  of  wood  separating  them — one  piece  of  his  artillery  planted 
on  an  eminence  some  seven  hundred  yards  to  the  rear  of  Wheat's  battalion,  and 
the  other  on  a  ridge  near,  and  in  rear  of  Sloan's  position,  commanding  a  reach 
of  the  road  just  in  front  of  the  line  of  battle.  In  this  order  he  awaited  the 
coming  of  the  masses  of  the  enemy,  now  drawing  near. 

In  the  meantime,  about  7  o'clock  A.  M.,  Jackson's  brigade,  with  Imboden's  and 
five  pieces  of  Walton's  battery,  had  been  sent  to  take  up  a  position  along  Bull 
Run,  to  guard  the  interval  between  Cocke's  right  and  Bouham's  left,  with  orders 
to  support  either  in  case  of  need,  the  character  and  topographical  features  of 
the  ground  having  been  shown  to  General  Jackson  by  Captain  D.  B.  Harris  of 
the  Engineers  of  this  army  corps. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX.  453 

So  much  of  Bee's  and  Bartow's  brigades,  now  united,  as  had  arrived,  sorao 
twenty-eight  hundred  muskets,  had  also  "been  sent  forward  to  the  support  of  the 
position  of  the  stone  bridge. 

The  enemy,  beginning  his  detour  from  the  turnpike  at  a  point  nearly  half-way 
between  Stone  Bridge  and  Centreville.  had  pursued  a  tortuous,  narrow  trace  of  a 
rarely  used  road,  through  a  dense  wood,  the  greater  part  of  his  way,  until  near 
the  Sudley  road.  A  division,  under  Colonel  Hunter,  of  the  Federal  Regular 
army,  of  two  strong  brigades,  was  in  the  advance,  followed  immediately  by  an 
other  division  under  Colonel  Heintzclman,  of  three  brigades  and  seven  companies 
of  Regular  cavalry,  and  twenty-four  pieces  of  artillery,  eighteen  of  which  were 
rifled  guns.  This  column,  as  it  crossed  Bull  Run,  numbered  over  sixteen  thou 
sand  men  of  all  arms,  by  their  own  accounts. 

Burnside's  brigade,  which  here,  as  at  Fairfax  Court-House,  led  the  advance, 
at  about  9.45  A.  M.  debouched  from  a  wood  in  sight  of  Evans's  position,  some  five 
hundred  yards  distant  from  Wheat's  battalion. 

Ho  immediately  threw  forward  his  skirmishers  in  force,  and  they  became  en 
gaged  with  Wheat's  command,  and  the  G-pounder  gun  under  Lieutenant  Left- 
witch. 

The  Federalists  at  once  advanced,  as  they  report  officially,  the  2d  regiment 
Rhode  Island  Volunteers,  with  its  vaunted  battery  of  six  13-pounder  rilled  guns. 
Sloan's  companies  were  then  brought  into  action,  having  been  pushed  forward 
through  the  woods.  The  enemy,  soon  galled,  staggered  by  the  fire,  and  pressed 
by  the  determined  valor  with  which  Wheat  handled  his  battalion,  until  he  was 
desperately  wounded,  hastened  up  three  other  regiments  of  the  brigade  and  two 
Dahlgren  howitzers,  making  in  all  quite  three  thousand  live  hundred  bayonets 
and  eight  pieces  of  artillery,  opposed  to  less  than  eight  hundred  men  and  two 
G-pounder  guns. 

Despite  this  odds,  this  intrepid  command  of  but  eleven  weak  companies  main 
tained  its  front  to  the  enemy  for  quite  an  hour,  and  until  General  Bee  came  to 
their  aid  with  his  command.  The  heroic  Bee,  with  a  soldier's  eye  and  reco<nii- 
tion  of  the  situation,  had  previously  disposed  his  command  with  skill,  Imboden's 
battery  having  been  admirably  placed  between  the  two  brigades,  under  shelter 
behind  the  undulations  of  a  hill  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  north  of  the 
now  famous  Henry  house,  and  very  near  where  ho  subsequently  fell,  mortally 
wounded,  to  the  great  misfortune  of  his  country,  but  after  deeds  of  deliberate 
and  ever-memorable  courage. 

Meanwhile,  the  enemy  pushed  forward  a  battalion  of  eight  companies  of  Re^1- 
ular  infantry,  and  one  of  their  best  batteries  of  six  pieces  (four  rilled),  supported 
by  four  companies  of  marines,  to  increase  the  desperate  odds  against  which  Evans 
and  his  men  had  maintained  their  stand  with  an  almost  matchless  tenacity. 

General  Bee,  now  finding  Evans  sorely  pressed  under  the  crushing  weight  of 
the  masses  of  the  enemy,  at  the  call  of  Colonel  Evans,  threw  forward  his  whole 
force  to  his  aid,  across  a  small  stream,  Young's  Branch,  and  valley,  and  engaged 
the  Federalists  with  impetuosity,  Imboden's  battery,  at  the  time,  playing  from 
his  well-chosen  position  with  brilliant  eftcct,  with  spherical  c:ise,  the  enemy 
having  first  opened  ou  him  from  a  rifled  battery,  probably  Griffin's,  with  clou- 


454  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX. 

gated  cylindrical  shells,  which  flew  a  few  feet  above  the  Leads  of  our  men,  aiid 
exploded  m  tlic  crest  of  a  hill  immediately  in  rear. 

As  Bee  advanced  under  a  severe  fire,  lie  placed  the  7tli  and  8tli  Georgia  regi 
ments,  under  the  chivalrous  Bartow,  at  about  11  A.  M.,  in  a  wood  of  second- 
growth  pines,  to  the  right  and  front  of,  and  nearly  perpendicular  to,  Evans's 
line  of  battle,  the  4th  Alabama  to  the  left  of  them,  along  a  fence  connecting  the 
position  of  the  Georgia  regiments  with  the  rectangular  copse  in  which  Sloan's 
South  Carolina  companies  were  engaged,  and  into  which  he  also  threw  the  2d 
Mississippi.  A  fierce  and  destructive  conflict  now  ensued ;  the  fire  was  wither 
ing  on  both  sides,  while  the  enemy  swept  our  short,  thin  lines  with  their  numer 
ous  artillery,  which,  according  to  their  official  reports,  at  this  time  consisted  of 
at  least  ten  rifled  guns  and  four  howitzers.  For  an  hour  did  these  stout-hearted 
men  of  the  blended  commands  of  Bee,  Evans,  and  Bartow  breast  an  uniutermit- 
ting  battle-storm,  animated,  surely,  by  something  more  than  the  ordinary  courage 
of  even  the  bravest  men  under  fire;  it  must  have  been,  indeed,  the  inspiration 
of  the  cause  and  consciousness  of  the  great  stake  in  issue  which  thus  nerved 
and  animated  one  and  all  to  stand  unawed  and  unshrinking  in  such  extremity. 

The  Federal  brigades  of  Heintzelrnan's  division  were  now  brought  into  action, 
led  by  Pickett's  superb  light  battery  of  six  10-pounder  rifled  guns,  which,  post 
ed  on  an  eminence  to  the  right  of  the  Sudley  road,  opened  fire  on  Imboden's 
battery,  about  this  time  increased  by  two  rifled  pieces  of  the  Washington  Ar 
tillery,  under  Lieutenant  Richardson,  and  already  the  mark  of  two  batteries 
which  divided  their  fire  with  Imboden  and  two  guns,  under  Lieutenants  David- 
sou  and  Lef  twitch,  of  Latham's  battery,  posted  as  before  mentioned. 

At  this  time,  confronting  the  enemy,  we  had  still  but  Evans's  eleven  compa 
nies  and  two  guns,  Bee's  and  Bartow's  four  regiments,  the  two  companies  llth 
Mississippi,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Liddell,  and  the  six  pieces  under  Imboden 
and  Richardson.  The  enemy  had  two  divisions  of  four  strong  brigades,  in 
cluding  seventeen  companies  of  Regular  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  four 
companies  of  marines,  and  twenty  pieces  of  artillery.*  Against  this  odds,  scarce 
ly  credible,  our  advance  position  was  still  for  a  while  maintained,  and  the  ene 
my's  ranks  constantly  broken  and  shattered  by  the  scorching  fire  of  our  men  ; 
but  fresh  regiments  of  Federalists  came  upon  the  field.  Sherman's  and  Keyes's 
brigades  of  Tyler's  division,  as  is  stated  in  their  reports,  numbered  over  six  thou 
sand  bayonets,  which  had  found  a  passage  across  the  Run  about  eight  hundred 
yards  above  the  stone  bridge,  threatened  our  right. 

Heavy  losses  had  now  been  sustained  on  our  side,  both  in  numbers  and  in 
the  personal  worth  of  the  slain.  The  8th  Georgia  regiment  had  suffered  heavily, 
being  exposed,  as  it  took  and  maintained  its  position,  to  a  fire  from  the  enemy, 
already  posted  within  a  hundred  yards  of  their  front  and  right,  sheltered  by 
fences  and  other  cover.  It  was  at  this  time  that  Lieutenant-Colonel  Gardner 
was  severely  wounded,  as  also  several  other  valuable  officers  ;  the  Adjutant  of 
the  regiment,  Lieutenant  Branch,  was  killed,  and  the  horse  of  the  regretted  Bar- 
tow  was  shot  under  him.  The  4th  Alabama  also  suffered  severely  from  deadly 

*  See  official  reports  of  Colonels  Heintzelman,  Porter,  and  Burnside. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX.  455 

fire  of  the  thousands  of  muskets  which  they  so  dauntlessly  confronted  under 
the  immediate  leadership  of  Bee  himself.  Its  brave  colonel,  E.  J.  Jones,  was 
dangerously  wounded,  and  many  gallant  officers  fell,  slain  or  hors  dc  combat. 

Now,  however,  with  the  surging  mass  of  over  fourteen  thousand  Federal  in 
fantry  pressing  on  their  front,  and  under  the  incessant  fire  of  at  least  twenty 
pieces  of  artillery,  with  the  fresh  brigades  of  Sherman  and  Keyes  approaching, 
the  latter  already  in  musket  range,  our  lines  gave  back,  but  under  orders  from 
General  Bee. 

The  enemy,  maintaining  their  fire,  pressed  their  swelling  masses  onward  as 
our  shattered  battalions  retired  ;  the  slaughter,  for  the  moment,  was  deplorable, 
and  has  filled  many  a  Southern  home  with  life-long  sorrow. 

Under  this  inexorable  stress  the  retreat  was  continued,  until  arrested  by  the 
energy  and  resolution  of  General  Bee,  supported  by  Bartow  and  Evans,  just  in 
rear  of  the  Robinson  house  and  Hampton's  Legion,  which  had  been  already  ad 
vanced,  and  was  in  position  near  it. 

Imbodeu's  battery,  which  had  been  handled  with  marked  skill,  but  whose  men 
were  almost  exhausted,  and  the  two  pieces  of  Walton's  battery,  under  Lieuten 
ant  Richardson,  being  threatened  by  the  enemy's  infantry  on  the  left  and  front, 
were  also  obliged  to  fall  back  ;  Imboden,  leaving  a  disabled  piece  on  the  ground, 
retired  until  he  met  Jackson's  brigade,  while  Richardson  joined  the  main  body 
of  his  battery  near  the  Lewis  house. 

As  our  infantry  retired  from  the  extreme  front,  the  two  fi-pounders  of  Latham's 
battery,  before  mentioned,  fell  back  with  excellent  judgment  to  suitable  posi 
tions  in  the  rear,  whence  an  effective  fire  was  maintained  upon  the  still  ad 
vancing  lines  of  the  Federalists,  with  damaging  eflect,  until  their  ammunition 
was  nearly  exhausted,  when  they,  too,  were  withdrawn  in  the  near  presence  of 
the  enemy  and  rejoined  their  captain. 

From  the  point  previously  indicated,  where  General  Johnston  and  myself  had 
established  our  headquarters,  we  heard  the  continuous  roll  of  musketry  and 
the  sustained  din  of  the  artillery,  which  announced  the  serious  outburst  of  the 
battle  on  our  left  Hank  ;  and  we  anxiously,  but  confidently,  awaited  similar 
sounds  of  conflict  from  our  front  at  Centreville,  resulting  from  the  prescribed 
attack  in  that  quarter  by  our  right  wing. 

At  half-past  ten  A.M.,  however,  this  expectation  was  dissipated  by  a  despatch 
from  Brigadier-General  Ewell,  informing  me,  to  my  profound  disappointment, 
that  my  orders  for  his  advance  had  miscarried ;  but  that,  in  consequence  of  a 
communication  from  General  D.  R.  Jones,  he  had  just  thrown  his  brigade  across 
the  stream  at  Union  Mills.  But,  in  my  judgment,  it  was  now  too  late  for  the 
effective  execution  of  the  contemplated  movement,  which  must  have  required 
quite  three  hours  for  the  troops  to  get  into  position  for  the  attack.  Therefore 
it  became  immediately  necessary  to  depend  on  new  combinations  and  other  dis 
positions  suited  to  the  now  pressing  exigency.  The  movement  of  the  right  and 
centre,  already  begun  by  Jones  and  Longstrect,  was  at  once  countermanded,  with 
the  sanction  of  General  Johnston,  and  we  arranged  to  meet  the  enemy  on  the 
field  upon  which  ho  had  chosen  to  give  us  battle.  Under  these  circumstances, 
our  reserves  not  already  in  movement  were  immediately  ordered  up  to  support 


456  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX. 

our  left  flank,  namely  :  Holmes's  two  regiments,  and  battery  of  artillery,  under 
Captain  Lindsey  Walker,  of  six  guns,  and  Early's  brigade.  Two  regiments 
from  Bonham's  brigade,  with  Kemper's  four  6-pouuders,  were  also  called  for; 
and  with  the  sanction  of  General  Johnston,  Generals  Ewell,  Jones  (D.  R.),  Long- 
street,  and  Bouham  were  directed  to  make  a  demonstration  to  their  several 
fronts,  to  retain  and  engross  the  enemy's  reserves,  and  any  forces  in  their  flank, 
and  at  and  around  Centreville.  Previously  our  respective  Chiefs  of  Staff,  Major 
Rhett  and  Colonel  Jordan,  had  been  left  at  my  headquarters  to  hasten  up  and 
give  directions  to  any  troops  that  might  arrive  at  Mauassas. 

These  orders  having  been  duly  despatched  by  staff  officers,  at  11.30  A.  M.,  Gen 
eral  Johnston  and  myself  set  out  for  the  immediate  field  of  action,  which  we 
reached,  in  rear  of  Robinson's  and  Widow  Henry's  houses,  at  about  12  meridian, 
and  just  as  the  commands  of  Bee,  Bartow,  and  Evans  had  taken  shelter  in  a 
wooded  ravine  behind  the  former,  stoutly  held,  at  the  time,  by  Hampton,  with 
his  Legion,  which  had  made  a  stand  there  after  having  previously  been  as  far 
forward  as  the  turnpike,  where  Lieutenant-Colonel  Johnston,  an  officer  of  brill 
iant  promise,  was  killed,  and  other  severe  losses  were  sustained. 

Before  our  arrival  on  the  scene,  General  Jackson  had  moved  forward  with  his 
brigade  of  five  Virginia  regiments,  from  his  position  in  reserve,  and  had  judi 
ciously  taken  post  below  the  brim  of  the  plateau,  nearly  east  of  the  Henry 
house,  and  to  the  left  of  the  ravine  and  woods  occupied  by  the  mingled  rem 
nants  of  Bee's,  Bartow's,  and  Evans's  command,  with  Imboden's  battery  and  two 
of  Stanard's  pieces  placed  so  as  to  play  upon  the  oncoming  enemy,  supported 
in  the  immediate  rear  by  Colonel  J.  L.  Preston's  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Echoll's 
regiments,  on  the  right  by  Harper's,  and  on  the  left  by  Allen's  and  Cuinrnings's 
regiments. 

As  soon  as  General  Johnston  and  myself  reached  the  field  we  were  occupied 
with  the  organization  of  the  heroic  troops,  whoso  previous  stand,  with  scarce  a 
parallel,  has  nothing  more  valiant  in  all  the  pages  of  history,  and  whose  losses 
fitly  tell  why  at  length  their  ranks  had  lost  their  cohesion.  It  was  now  that 
General  Johnston  impressively  and  gallantly  charged  to  the  front,  with  the 
colors  of  the  4th  Alabama  regiment  by  his  side,  all  the  field-officers  of  the  regi 
ment  having  been  previously  disabled.  Shortly  afterwards  I  placed  S.  R.  Gist, 
Adjutant  and  Inspector-General  of  South  Carolina,  a  Volunteer  Aid  of  General 
Bee,  in  command  of  this  regiment,  and  who  led  it  again  to  the  front,  as  became 
its  previous  behavior,  and  remained  with  it  for  the  rest  of  the  day. 

As  soon  as  we  had  thus  rallied  and  disposed  our  forces,  I  urged  General  John 
ston  to  leave  the  immediate  conduct  of  the  field  to  me,  while  he,  repairing  to 
Portici  (the  Lewis  house),  should  urge  reinforcements  forward.  At  first  he  was 
unwilling,  but,  reminded  that  one  of  us  must  do  so,  and  that  properly  it  was 
his  place,  ho  reluctantly,  but  fortunately,  complied ;  fortunately,  because  from 
that  position,  by  his  energy  and  sagacity,  his  keen  perception  and  anticipations 
of  my  needs,  he  so  directed  the  reserves  as  to  insure  the  success  of  the  day. 

As  General  Johnston  departed  for  Portici,  Colonel  Bartow  reported  to  mo 
with  the  remains  of  the  7th  Georgia  Volunteers,  Gartrell's,  which  I  ordered  him 
to  post  on  the  left  of  Jackson's  lines,  in  the  edge  of  the  belt  of  pines  bordering 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX.  457 

the  southeastern  rim  of  the  plateau,  ou  which  the  battle  was  now  to  rage  so 
long  and  so  fiercely. 

Colonel  William  Smith's  battalion  of  the  49th  Virginia  Volunteers  having 
also  come  up  by  my  orders,  I  placed  it  on  the  left  of  Gartrell's,  as  ray  extreme 
left  at  the  time.  Repairing  then  to  the  right,  I  placed  Hampton's  Legion,  which 
had  suffered  greatly,  on  that  flank,  somewhat  to  the  rear  of  Harper's  regiment, 
and  also  the  seven  companies  of  the  8th  (Hunton's)  Virginia  regiment,  which, 
detached  from  Cocke's  brigade  by  my  orders  and  those  of  General  Johnston,  had 
opportunely  reached  the  ground.  These,  with  Harper's  regiment,  constituted  a 
reserve  to  protect  our  right  flank  from  an  advance  of  the  enemy  from  the  quar 
ter  of  the  stone  bridge,  and  served  as  a  support  for  the  line  of  battle,  which  was 
formed  on  the  right  of  Bee's  and  Evans's  commands,  in  the  centre  by  four  regi 
ments  of  Jackson's  brigade,  with  Imboden's  four  G-pounders,  Walton's  five  guns — 
two  rilled,  two  guns — one  piece  rifled — of  Stanard's,  and  two  G-pounders  of  Rog- 
ers's  batteries,  the  latter  under  Lieutenant  Heaton  ;  and  on  the  left  by  Gartrell's 
reduced  ranks  and  Colonel  Smith's  battalion,  subsequently  reinforced  by  Faulk 
ner's  2d  Mississippi  regiment,  and  by  another  regiment  of  the  Army  of  the  Shcn- 
andoah,  just  arrived  upon  the  field,  the  Gth,  Fisher's,  North  Carolina.  Confront 
ing  the  enemy  at  this  time,  my  forces  numbered,  at  most,  not  more  than  six 
thousand  five  hundred  infantry  and  artillerists,  with  but  thirteen  pieces  of  artil 
lery  and  two  companies  (Carter's  and  Iloge's)  of  Stuart's  cavalry. 

The  enemy's  force,  now  bearing  hotly  and  confidently  down  on  our  position, 
regiment  after  regiment  of  the  best-equipped  men  that  ever  took  the  field,  ac 
cording  to  their  own  official  history  of  the  day,  was  formed  of  Colonels  Hunter's 
and  Heintzelman's  divisions,  Sherman's  and  Keyes's  brigades  of  Tyler's  division, 
and  of  the  formidable  batteries  of  Ricketts,  Griflin,  and  Arnold,  Regulars,  and 
the  2d  Rhode  Island,  and  two  Dahlgren  howitzers,  a  force  of  over  twenty  thou 
sand  infantry,  seven  companies  of  Regular  cavalry,  and  twenty-four  pieces  of 
improved  artillery.  At  the  same  time,  perilous,  heavy  reserves  of  infantry  and 
artillery  hung  in  the  distance  around  the  stone  bridge,  Mitchell's,  Blackburn's, 
and  Union  Mills'  fords,  visibly  ready  to  fall  upon  us  at  any  moment;  and  I  was 
also  assured  of  the  existence  of  other  heavy  corps  at  and  around  Centreville, 
and  elsewhere  within  convenient  supporting  distances. 

Fully  conscious  of  this  portentous  disparity  of  force,  as  I  posted  the  lines  for 
the  encounter,  I  sought  to  infuse  into  the  hearts  of  my  officers  and  men  the  con 
fidence  and  determined  spirit  of  resistance  to  this  wicked  invasion  of  the  homes 
of  a  free  people,  which  I  felt.  I  informed  them  that  reinforcements  would  rap 
idly  come  up  to  their  support,  and  that  we  must,  at  all  hazards,  hold  our  posts 
until  reinforced.  I  reminded  them  that  we  fought  for  our  homes,  our  firesides, 
and  for  the  independence  of  our  country.  I  urged  them  to  the  resolution  of 
victory  or  death  on  that  field.  These  sentiments  were  loudly,  eagerly,  cheered 
wheresoever  proclaimed,  and  I  then  felt  reassured  of  the  unconquerable  spirit  of 
that  army,  which  would  enable  us  to  wrench  victory  from  the  host  then  threat 
ening  us  with  destruction. 

Oh,  my  country!  I  would  readily  have  sacrificed  my  life  and  those  of  all  the 
brave  men  around  me,  to  save  your  honor,  and  to  maintain  your  independence 


458  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX. 

from  the  degrading  yoke  which  these  ruthless  invaders  had  come  to  impose 
aud  render  perpetual,  and  the  day's  issue  has  assured  mo  that  such  emotions 
must  have  also  animated  all  under  my  command. 

In  the  meantime  the  enemy  had  seized  upon  the  plateau  on  which  Robinson's 
and  the  Henry  houses  are  situated,  the  position  first  occupied  in  the  morning 
by  General  Bee,  before  advancing  to  the  support  of  Evans.  Ricketts's  battery 
of  six  rifled  guns — the  pride  of  the  Federalists,  the  object  of  their  unstinted  ex 
penditure  in  outfit — aud  the  equally  powerful  Regular  light  battery  of  Griffin 
were  brought  forward  and  placed  in  immediate  action,  after  having,  conjointly 
with  the  batteries  already  mentioned,  played  from  former  positions  with  destruc 
tive  effect  upon  our  forward  battalions. 

The  topographical  features  of  the  plateau,  now  become  the  stage  of  the  con 
tending  armies,  must  be  described  in  outline. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  it  is  enclosed  on  three  sides  by  two  small 
watercourses,  which  empty  into  Bull  Run  within  a  few  yards  of  each  other,  a 
half  mile  to  the  south  of  the  stone  bridge.  Rising  to  an  elevation  of  quite  one 
hundred  feet  above  the  level  of  Bull  Run,  at  the  bridge,  it  falls  off  on  three  sides 
to  the  level  of  the  enclosing  streams,  in  gentle  slopes,  but  which  are  furrowed 
by  ravines  of  irregular  directions  and  length,  and  studded  with  clumps  and 
patches  of  young  pines  and  oaks.  The  general  direction  of  the  crest  of  the  pla 
teau  is  oblique  to  the  course  of  Bull  Run  in  that  quarter,  and  to  the  Breutsville 
and  turnpike  roads,  which  intersect  each  other  at  right  angles.  Immediately 
surrounding  the  two  houses  before  mentioned  are  small,  open  fields  of  irregular 
outline,  not  exceeding  one  hundred  and  fifty  acres  in  extent.  The  houses,  oc 
cupied  at  the  time,  the  one  by  the  Widow  Henry,  and  the  other  by  the  free 
negro,  Robinson,  are  small  wooden  buildings,  the  latter  densely  embowered  in 
trees,  and  environed  by  a  double  row  of  fences  on  two  sides.  Around  the  eastern 
and  southern  brow  of  the  plateau  an  almost  unbroken  fringe  of  second-growth 
pines  gave  excellent  shelter  for  our  marksmen,  who  availed  themselves  of  it 
with  the  most  satisfactory  skill.  To  the  west,  adjoining  the  fields,  a  broad  belt 
of  oaks  extends  directly  across  the  crest  on  both  sides  of  the  Sudley  Road,  in 
which,  during  the  battle,  regiments  of  both  armies  met  and  contended  for  the 
mastery. 

From  the  open  ground  of  this  plateau  the  view  embraces  a  wide  expanse  of 
woods,  and  gently  undulating,  open  country,  of  broad  grass  and  grain  fields,  in 
all  directions,  including  the  scene  of  Evans's  and  Bee's  recent  encounter  with  the 
enemy,  some  twelve  hundred  yards  to  the  northward. 

In  reply  to  the  play  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  our  own  artillery,  had  not  been 
either  idle  or  unskilful.  The  ground  occupied  by  our  guns,  on  a  level  with  that 
held  by  the  batteries  of  the  enemy,  was  an  open  space  of  limited  extent,  behind 
a  low  undulation,  just  at  the  eastern  verge  of  the  plateau,  some  five  or  six  hun 
dred  yards  from  the  Henry  house.  Here,  as  before  said,  thirteen  pieces,  mostly 
G-pounders,  were  maintained  in  action.  The  several  batteries  of  Irnboden,  Stan- 
ard,  Pcndleton  (Rockbridge  Artillery),  and  Alburtis,  of  the  Army  of  the  Shcnan- 
doah,  and  five  guns  of  Walton's  and  Heaton's  section  of  Rogers's  battery,  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  alternating,  to  some  extent,  with  each  other,  and  taking 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX.  459 

part  as  needed ;  all,  from  tlio  outset,  displaying  that  marvellous  capacity  of  our 
people  as  artillerists,  which  has  made  them,  it  would  appear,  at  once  the  terror 
and  the  admiration  of  the  enemy. 

As  was  soon  apparent,  the  Federalists  had  suffered  severely  from  our  artillery, 
and  from  the  fire  of  our  musketry  on  the  right,  and  especially  from  the  left  flank, 
placed  under  close  cover,  within  whose  galling  range  they  had  been  advanced. 
And  wo  are  told  in  their  official  reports  how  regiment  after  regiment,  thrown 
forward  to  dislodge  us,  was  broken,  never  to  recover  its  entire  organization  on 
that  field. 

In  the  meantime,  also,  two  companies  of  Stuart's  cavalry  (Carter's  and  Hoge's) 
made  a  dashing  charge  down  the  Brentsville  and  Sudley  road  upon  the  Fire  Zou 
aves,  then  the  enemy's  right  on  the  plateau,  which  added  to  their  disorder 
wrought  by  our  musketry  on  that  flank.  But  still  the  press  of  the  enemy  was 
heavy  in  that  quarter  of  the  field,  as  fresh  troops  were  thrown  forward  there  to 
outflank  us;  and  some  three  guns  of  a  battery,  in  an  attempt  to  obtain  a  posi 
tion,  apparently  to  enfilade  our  batteries,  were  thrown  so  close  to  the  33d  regi 
ment,  Jackson's  brigade,  that  that  regiment,  springing  forward,  seized  them, 
but  with  severe  loss,  and  was  subsequently  driven  back  by  an  overpowering 
force  of  Federal  musketry. 

Now,  full  2  o'clock  P.  M.,  I  gave  the  order  for  the  right  of  my  line,  except  my 
reserves,  to  advance  to  recover  the  plateau.  It  was  done  with  uncommon  reso 
lution  and  vigor,  and  at  the  same  time  Jackson's  brigade  pierced  the  enemy's 
centre,  with  the  determination  of  veterans  and  the  spirit  of  men  who  fight  for  a 
sacred  cause ;  but  it  suffered,  seriously.  With  equal  spirit  the  other  parts  of  the 
lino  made  the  onset,  and  the  Federal  lines  were  broken  and  swept  back  at  all 
points  from  the  open  ground  of  the  plateau.  Rallying  soon,  however,  as  they 
were  strongly  reinforced  by  fresh  regiments,  the  Federalists  returned  ;  and,  by 
weight  of  numbers,  pressed  our  lines  back,  recovered  their  ground  and  guns, 
and  renewed  the  offensive. 

By  this  time,  between  half-past  2  and  3  o'clock  P.  M.,  our  reinforcements 
pushed  forward,  and,  directed  by  General  Johnston  to  the  required  quarter, 
were  at  hand  just  as  I  had  ordered  forward  to  a  second  effort  for  the  recovery 
of  the  disputed  plateau,  the  whole  line,  including  my  reserve,  which,  at  this  cri 
sis  of  the  battle,  I  felt  called  upon  to  lead  in  person.  This  attack  was  general, 
and  was  shared  in  by  every  regiment  then  in  the  field,  including  the  Oth,  Fisher's, 
North  Carolina  regiment,  which  had  just  come  up,  and  taken  position  on  the 
immediate  left  of  the  4(Jth  Virginia  regiment.  The  whole  open  ground  was 
again  swept  clear  of  the  enemy,  and  the  plateau  around  the  Henry  and  Robin 
son  houses  remained  finally  in  our  possession,  with  the  greater  part  of  the  Rick- 
etts  and  Griffin  batteries,  and  a  flag  of  the  1st  Michigan  regiment,  captured  by 
the  2?th  Virginia  regiment  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Echolls),  of  Jackson's  brigade. 
This  part  of  the  day  was  rich  with  deeds  of  individual  coolness  and  dauntless 
conduct,  as  well  as  well-directed,  embodied  resolution  and  bravery,  but  fraught 
with  the  loss  to  the  service  of  the  country  of  lives  of  inestimable  preciousness 
at  this  juncture.  The  brave  Bee  was  mortally  wounded  at  the  head  of  the  4th 
Alabama  and  some  Mississinpians,  in  the  open  field  near  the  Henry  house  j  and, 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX. 

a  few  yards  distant,  the  promising  life  of  Bartow,  while  leading  tlie  7tli  Geor 
gia  regiment,  was  queuclied  in  blood.  Colonel  F.  I.  Thomas,  Acting  Chief  of 
Ordnance  of  General  Johnston's  staff,  after  gallant  conduct  and  most  efficient 
service,  was  also  slain.  Colonel  Fisher,  Cth  North  Carolina,  likewise  fell, 
after  soldierly  behavior,  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  with  ranks  greatly 
thinned. 

Withers's  18th  regiment,  of  Cocke's  brigade,  had  come  up  in  time  to  follow 
this  charge,  and,  in  conjunction  with  Hampton's  Legion,  captured  several  rifled 
pieces,  which  may  have  fallen  previously  in  possession  of  some  of  our  troops,  but 
if  so,  had  been  recovered  by  the  enemy.  These  pieces  were  immediately  turned, 
and  effectively  served  on  distant  masses  of  the  enemy  by  the  hands  of  some  of 
our  officers. 

While  the  enemy  had  thus  been  driven  back  on  our  right,  entirely  across  the 
turnpike,  and  beyond  Young's  Branch  on  our  left,  the  woods  yet  swarmed  with 
them,  when  our  reinforcements  opportunely  arrived  in  quick  succession  and  took 
position  in  that  portion  of  the  field.  Kershaw's  2d  and  Cash's  8th  South  Carolina 
regiments,  which  had  arrived  soon  after  Withers's,  were  led  through  the  oaks 
just  east  of  the  Brentsville-Sudley  road,  brushing  some  of  the  enemy  before  them, 
and,  taking  an  advantageous  position  along  and  west  of  that  road,  opened  with 
much  skill  and  effect  on  bodies  of  the  enemy  that  had  been  rallied  under  cover 
of  a  strong  Federal  brigade,  posted  on  a  plateau  in  the  southwest  angle,  formed 
by  intersection  of  the  turnpike  with  the  Sudley-Brentsville  road.  Among  the 
troops  thus  engaged  were  the  Federal  Regular  infantry. 

At  the  same  time,  Kenipcr's  battery,  passing  northward  by  the  Sudley-Brents- 
villo  road,  took  position  in  the  open  space,  under  orders  of  Colonel  Kershaw, 
near  where  an  enemy's  battery  had  been  captured,  and  was  opened  with  effec 
tive  results  upon  the  Federal  right,  then  the  mark,  also,  of  Kershaw's  and  Cash's 
regiments. 

Preston's  28th  regiment,  of  Cocke's  brigade,  had,  by  that  time,  entered  the 
same  body  of  oaks  and  encountered  some  Michigan  troops,  capturing  their  bri 
gade  commander,  Colonel  Wilcox. 

Another  important  accession  to  our  forces  had  also  occurred  about  the  same 
time — 3  o'clock  p.  M.  Brigadier-General  E.  K.  Smith,  with  some  seventeen  hun 
dred  infantry  of  Elzey's  brigade  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  Beckham's 
battery,  came  upon  the  field,  from  Camp  Pickeus,  Mauassas,  where  they  had  ar 
rived,  by  railroad,  at  noon.  Directed  by  a  staff  officer,  sent  in  person  by  General 
Johnston,  to  the  left,  then  so  much  endangered,  on  reaching  a  position  in  rear  of 
the  oak  woods  south  of  the  Henry  house,  and  immediately  east  of  the  Stulley  road, 
General  Smith  was  disabled  by  a  severe  wound,  and  his  valuable  services  were 
lost  at  that  critical  juncture.  But  the  command  devolved  upon  a  meritorious 
officer  of  experience,  Colonel  Elzey,  who  led  his  infantry  at  once  somewhat  far 
ther  to  the  left  in  the  direction  of  the  Chinn  house,  across  the  road,  through 
the  oaks  skirting  the  west  side  of  the  road,  and  around  which  ho  sent  the  bat 
tery  under  Lieutenant  Beckham.  This  officer  took  up  a  most  favorable  position 
near  that  house,  whence,  with  a  clear  view  of  the  Federal  right  and  centre  fill 
ing  the  open  fields  to  the  west  of  the  Brentsville-Sudley  road  and  gently  sloping 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX.  401 

southward,  he  opened  fire  with  his  battery  upon  them  with  deadly  and  dismay 
ing  effect. 

Colonel  Early,  who  by  some  mischance  did  not  receive  orders  until  2  o'clock, 
which  had  been  sent  him  at  noon,  came  on  the  ground  immediately  after  Elzey, 
with  Kcmper's  7th  Virginia,  Hays's  7th  Louisiana,  and  Barksdale's  13th  Missis 
sippi  regiments.  This  brigade,  by  the  personal  direction  of  General  Johnston, 
was  marched  by  the  Holkham  house  across  the  fields  to  the  left,  entirely  around 
the  woods  through  which  Elzey  had  passed,  and,  under  a  severe  fire,  into  a  posi 
tion  in  line  of  battle,  near  Chinn's  house,  outflanking  the  enemy's  right. 

At  this  time,  about  3.30  r.  M.,  the  enemy,  driven  back  on  the  left  and  centre, 
and  brushed  from  the  woods  bordering  the  Sudley  road  south  and  west  of  the 
Henry  house,  had  formed  a  line  of  battle  of  truly  formidable  proportions,  of 
crescent  outline,  reaching,  on  their  left,  from  vicinity  of  Pittsylvania,  the  old 
Carter  mansion,  by  Matthcws's  and  in  rear  of  Dogan's,  across  the  turnpike  near 
to  Chinn's  house.  The  wowls  and  fields  were  filled  Avith  their  masses  of  infan 
try  and  their  carefully  preserved  cavalry.  It  was  a  truly  magnificent,  though 
redoubtable,  spectacle,  as  they  threw  forward,  in  fine  style,  on  the  broad,  gentle 
slopes  of  the  ridge  occupied  by  their  main  lines,  a  cloud  of  skirmishers  prepara 
tory  for  another  attack. 

But  as  Early  formed  his  line  and  Beckhain's  pieces  played  upon  the  right  of  the 
enemy,  El/ey's  brigade,  Gibbons's  10th  Virginia,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Stuart's  1st 
Maryland,  and  Vaughn's  3d  Tennessee  regiments,  Cash's  8th  and  Kcrshaw's  2d 
South  Carolina,  AYithers's  18th  and  Preston's  26th  Virginia  regiments  advanced 
in  an  irregular  line,  almost  simultaneously,  with  great  spirit,  from  their  several 
positions  upon  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  enemy  in  their  quarter  of  the  field. 
At  the  same  time,  too,  Early  resolutely  assailed  their  right  flank  and  rear.  Un 
der  this  combined  attack  the  enemy  was  soon  forced,  first,  over  the  narrow  pla 
teau  in  tho  southern  angle  made  by  the  two  roads  so  often  mentioned,  into  a 
patch  of  woods  on  its  western  slope,  thence  back  over  Young's  Branch  and  the 
turnpike  into  the  fields  of  the  Dogan  farm,  and  rearward,  in  extreme  disorder, 
across  the  country  in  all  available  directions,  towards  Bull  Run.  The  rout  had 
now  become  general  and  complete. 

About  the  time  that  Elzey  and  Early  were  entering  into  action,  a  column  of 
tho  enemy,  Reyes's  brigade,  of  Tyler's  division,  made  its  way  across  the  turnpike 
between  Bull  Run  and  the  Robinson  house,  under  cover  of  a  wood  and  brow  of 
the  ridges,  apparently  to  turn  my  right ;  but  was  easily  repulsed  by  a  few  shot 
from  Latham's  battery — now  united  and  placed  in  position  by  Captain  D.  B.  Har 
ris  of  tho  Virginia  Engineers,  whose  services  during  tho  day  became  his  charac 
ter  as  an  able,  cool,  and  skilful  ofticer — and  from  Alburtis's  battery,  opportunely 
ordered  by  General  Jackson  to  a  position  to  tho  right  of  Latham's,  on  a  hill 
commanding  the  lino  of  approach  of  tho  enemy,  and  supported  by  portions  of 
regiments  collected  together  by  the  staff  officers  of  General  Johnston  and  my 
self. 

Elzey 's  brigade,  meanwhile,  joined  by  the  19th  Virginia  regiment,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Strange,  of  Cocke's  brigade,  pursued  the  now  panic-stricken,  fugitive 
enemy.  Stuart,  with  his  cavalry,  and  Bcckhani,  had  also  taken  up  tho  pursuit 


462  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX. 

along  the  road  by  which  the  enemy  had  come  upon  the  field  that  morning,  but, 
soon  cumbered  by  prisoners  who  thronged  his  way,  the  former  was  unable  to 
attack  the  mass  of  the  fast-fleeing,  frantic  Federalists. 

Withers's,  R.  T.  Preston's,  Cash's,  and  Kershaw's  regiments,  Hampton's  Legion, 
and  Kemper's  battery,  also  pursued  along  the  Warreuton  road  by  the  stone 
bridge ;  the  enemy  having  opportunely  opened  a  way  for  them  through  the 
heavy  abattis  which  my  troops  had  made  on  the  west  side  of  the  bridge  several 
days  before.  But  this  pursuit  was  soon  recalled  in  consequence  of  a  false  re 
port  which  unfortunately  reached  us,  that  the  enemy's  reserves,  known  to  be 
fresh  and  of  considerable  strength,  were  threatening  the  position  of  Union  Mills 
Ford. 

Colonel  Radford,  with  six  companies  Virginia  cavalry,  was  also  ordered  by 
General  Johnston  to  cross  Bull  Run  and  attack  the  enemy  from  the  direction 
of  Lewis's  house;  conducted  by  one  of  my  aids,  Colonel  Chisolm,  by  the  Lewis 
Ford  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  suspension  bridge,  he  charged  a  battery 
with  great  gallantry,  took  Colonel  Corcoran,  of  the  69th  regiment  New  York 
Volunteers,  a  prisoner,  and  captured  the  Federal  colors  of  that  regiment,  as  well 
as  a  number  of  the  enemy.  He  lost,  however,  a  promising  officer  of  his  regiment, 
Captain  Winston  Radford. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Muuford  also  led  some  companies  of  cavalry  in  hot  pur 
suit,  and  rendered  material  service  in  the  capture  of  prisoners,  and  of  cannon, 
horses,  ammunition,  etc.,  abandoned  by  the  enemy  in  their  flight. 

Captain  Lay's  squadron  of  the  Powhatan  Troop,  and  Utterback's  Rangers, 
Virginia  Volunteers,  attached  to  my  person,  did  material  service  under  Captain 
Lay,  in  rallying  troops  broken  for  the  time  by  the  onset  of  the  enemy's  masses. 

During  the  period  of  the  momentous  events,  fraught  with  the  weal  of  our 
country,  which  were  passing  on  the  blood-stained  plateau  along  the  Sndley  and 
Warrenton  roads,  other  portions  of  the  line  of  Bull  Run  had  not  been  void  of 
action  of  moment,  and  of  influence  upon  the  general  result. 

While  Colonel  Evans  and  his  sturdy  band  were  holding  at  bay  the  Federal 
advance  beyond  the  turnpike,  the  enemy  made  repeated  demonstrations  with 
artillery  and  infantry  upon  the  line  of  Cocke's  brigade,  with  the  serious  inten 
tion  of  forcing  the  position,  as  General  Scheuck  admits  in  his  report.  They 
were  driven  back  with  severe  loss,  by  Latham's  (a  section)  and  Rogers's  four 
6-pouuders,  and  were  so  impressed  with  the  strength  of  that  lino  as  to  be  held 
in  check  and  inactive,  even  after  it  had  been  stripped  of  all  its  troops  but  one 
company  of  the  19th  Virginia  regiment  under  Captain  Duke,  a  meritorious 
officer.  And  here  it  is  worthy  of  notice,  that  in  this  encounter  of  our  6-pounder 
guns,  handled  by  our  volunteer  artillerists,  they  had  worsted  such  a  notorious 
adversary  as  the  Ayres's,  formerly  Shermans,  battery,  which  quit  the  contest 
under  the  illusion  that  it  had  weightier  metal  than  its  own  to  contend  with. 

The  centre  brigades,  Bonham's  and  Longstreet's,  of  the  lino  of  Bull  Run,  if 
not  closely  engaged  were,  nevertheless,  exposed  for  much  of  the  day  to  an  annoy 
ing,  almost  incessant,  fire  of  artillery  of  long  range.  But  by  a  steady,  veteran- 
like  maintenance  of  their  positions,  they  held  virtually  paralyzed,  all  day,  two 
strong  brigades  of  the  enemy,  with  their  batteries  (four)  of  rifled  guns. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX.  463 

As  before  said,  two  regiments  of  Bonham's  brigade,  2d  and  8th  South  Carolina 
Volunteers,  and  Kemper's  battery,  took  a  distinguished  part  in  the  battle.  The 
remainder,  3d,  Williams's,  7th,  Bacon's,  South  Carolina  Volunteers,  llth,  Kirk- 
land's,  North  Carolina  regiment,  six  companies  8th  Louisiana  Volunteers, 
Shields's  battery,  and  one  section  of  Walton's  battery,  under  Lieutenant  Garnett, 
whether  in  holding  their  post,  or  taking  up  the  pursuit,  officers  and  men  dis 
charged  their  whole  duty  with  credit  and  promise. 

Longstreet's  brigade,  pursuant  to  orders  prescribing  his  part  of  the  opera 
tions  of  the  centre  and  right  wing,  was  thrown  across  Bull  Run  early  in  the 
morning,  and,  under  a  severe  fire  of  artillery,  was  skilfully  disposed  for  the  as 
sault  of  the  enemy's  batteries  in  that  quarter,  but  was  withdrawn  subsequently 
in  consequence  of  the  change  of  plan  already  mentioned  and  explained.  The 
troops  of  this  brigade  were  1st,  Major  Skinner,  llth,  Garland,  24th,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Hairston,  17th,  Corse,  Virginia  regiments,  5th  North  Carolina,  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Jones,  and  Whitehead's  company  Virginia  cavalry  ;  throughout  the 
day  these  troops  evinced  the  most  soldierly  spirit. 

After  the  rout,  having  been  ordered  by  General  Johnston  in  pursuit,  in  the 
direction  of  Centreville,  these  brigades  advanced  nearly  to  that  place,  when, 
night  and  darkness  intervening,  General  Bonham  thought  it  proper  to  direct 
his  own  brigade,  and  that  of  General  Longstrcet,  back  to  Bull  Run. 

General  D.  R.  Jones,  early  in  tlio  day,  crossing  Bull  Run  with  his  brigade, 
pursuant  to  orders  indicating  his  part  in  the  projected  attack  by  our  right  wing 
and  centre  on  the  enemy  at  Centreville,  took  up  a  position  on  the  Union  Mills 
and  Centreville  road,  more  than  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  Run.  Ordered  back 
in  consequence  of  the  miscarriage  of  the  orders  to  General  Ewell,  the  retrograde 
movement  was  necessarily  made  under  a  sharp  fire  of  artillery.  At  noon  this 
brigade,  in  obedience  to  new  instructions,  was  again  thrown  across  Bull  Run 
to  make  a  demonstration.  Unsupported  by  other  troops,  the  advance  was  gal 
lantly  made  until  within  musket-range  of  the  enemy's  force,  Colonel  Davies's 
brigade,  in  position  near  Rocky  Run,  and  under  the  concentrated  fire  of  their 
artillery.  In  this  aftair  the-  5th,  Jenkins's,  South  Carolina,  and  Captain  Foun 
tain's  company  of  the  18th  Mississippi  regiment,  are  mentioned  by  General 
Jones  as  having  shown  conspicuous  gallantry,  coolness,  and  discipline,  under  a 
combined  fire  of  infantry  and  artillery.  Not  only  did  the  return-lire  of  the 
brigade  drive  to  cover  the  enemy's  infantry,  but  the  movement  unquestionably 
spread  through  the  enemy's  ranks  a  sense  of  insecurity,  and  danger  from  an  at 
tack  by  that  route  on  their  rear  at  Centrcville,  which  served  to  augment  the 
extraordinary  panic  which  wo  know  disbanded  the  entire  Federal  army  for  the 
time.  This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  Colonel  Davies,  the  immediate  ad 
versary's  commander,  in  his  oflicial  report,  was  induced  to  magnify  one  small 
company  of  our  cavalry,  which  accompanied  this  brigade,  into  a  force  of  two 
thousand  men,  and  Colonel  Miles,  the  commander  of  the  Federal  reserves  at 
Centreville,  says  the  movement  "  caused  painful  apprehensions  for  the  left 
flank"  of  their  army. 

General  Ewell,  occupying  for  the  time  the  right  of  the  lines  of  Bull  Run  at 
Union  Mills  Ford,  after  the  miscarriage  of  my  orders  for  his  advance  upon  Ccu- 


464  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX. 

treville  in  the  afternoon,  was  ordered  by  General  Johnston  to  bring  up  his  bri 
gade  into  battle,  then  raging  on  the  left  flank.  Promptly  executed  as  this 
movement  was,  the  brigade,  after  a  severe  march,  reached  the  field  too  late  to 
share  the  glories,  as  they  had  the  labors,  of  the  day.  As  the  important  position 
at  the  Union  Mills  had  been  left  with  but  a  slender  guard,  General  Ewell  was 
at  once  ordered  to  retrace  his  steps  and  resume  his  position,  to  prevent  the  pos 
sibility  of  its  seizure  by  any  force  of  the  enemy  in  that  quarter. 

Brigadier-General  Holmes,  left  with  his  brigade  as  a  support  to  the  same 
position,  in  the  original  plan  of  battle,  had  also  been  called  to  the  left,  whither 
he  marched  with  the  utmost  speed,  but  not  in  time  to  join  actively  in  the  battle. 

Walker's  rifled  guns,  of  this  brigade,  however,  came  up  in  time  to  be  fired  with 
precision  and  decided  execution  at  the  retreating  enemy,  and  Scott's  cavalry, 
joining  in  the  pursuit,  assisted  in  the  capture  of  prisoners  and  war-munitions. 

This  victory,  the  details  of  which  I  have  thus  sought  to  chronicle  as  fully  as 
were  fitting  an  official  report,  it  remains  to  record,  was  dearly  won  by  the  death 
of  many  officers  and  men  of  inestimable  value,  belonging  to  all  grades  of  our 
society. 

In  the  death  of  General  Barnard  E.  Bee  the  Confederacy  has  sustained  an 
irreparable  loss,  for,  with  great  personal  bravery  and  coolness,  he  possessed  the 
qualities  of  an  accomplished  soldier,  and  an  able,  reliable  commander. 

Colonels  Bartow  and  Fisher,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Johnston  of  Hampton's 
Legion,  in  the  fearless  command  of  their  men,  gave  earnest  of  great  usefulness 
to  the  service,  had  they  been  spared  to  complete  a  career  so  brilliantly  begun. 
Besides  the  field-officers  already  mentioned  as  having  been  wounded  while  in 
the  gallant  discharge  of  their  duty,  many  others  also  received  severe  wounds 
after  equally  honorable  and  distinguished  conduct,  whether  in  leading  their 
men  forward,  or  in  rallying  them  when  overpowered  and  temporarily  shattered 
by  the  largely  superior  force  to  which  we  were  generally  opposed. 

The  subordinate  grades  were  likewise  abundantly  conspicuous  for  zeal  and 
capacity  for  the  leadership  of  men  in  arms.  To  mention  all,  who,  fighting  well, 
paid  the  lavish  forfeit  of  their  lives,  or  at  least  crippled,  mutilated  bodies,  on 
the  field  of  Manassas,  cannot  well  be  done  within  the  compass  of  this  paper,  but 
a  grateful  country  and  mourning  friends  will  not  suffer  their  names  and  services 
to  be  forgotten  and  pass  away  unhonored. 

Nor  are  those  officers  and  men  who  were  so  fortunate  as  to  escape  the  thick- 
flying,  deadly  missiles  of  the  enemy  less  worthy  of  praise  for  their  endurance, 
firmness,  and  valor  than  their  brothers-iii-arms,  whose  lives  were  closed  or  bodies 
maimed  on  that  memorable  day.  To  mention  all  who  exhibited  ability  and 
brilliant  courage,  were  impossible  in  this  report ;  nor  do  the  reports  of  brigade 
and  other  subordinate  commanders  supply  full  lists  of  all  actually  deserving  of 
distinction.  I  can  only  mention  those  whose  conduct  came  immediately  under 
my  notice,  or  the  consequence  of  whoso  actions  happened  to  be  signally  im 
portant. 

It  is  fit  that  I  should  in  this  way  commend  to  notice  the  dauntless  conduct 
and  imperturbable  coolness  of  Colonel  Evans;  and  well,  indeed,  was  he  support 
ed  by  Colonel  Sloan  and  the  officers  of  the  4th  South  Carolina  regiment,  as  also 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX.  4G5 

Major  Wheat,  than  whom  no  one  displayed  more  brilliant  courage,  until  carried 
from  the  field,  shot  through  the  lungs,  though,  happily,  not  mortally  stricken. 
But  in  the  desperate  contest  to  which  these  brave  gentlemen  were  for  a  time 
necessarily  exposed,  the  behavior  of  officers  and  men,  generally,  was  worthy  of 
the  highest  admiration;  and  assuredly,  hereafter,  all  there  may  proudly  say: 
We  were  of  that  band  who  fought  the  first  hour  of  the  battle  of  Manassas. 
Equal  honors  and  credit  must  also  be  awarded,  in  the  pages  of  history,  to  the 
gallant  officers  and  men  who,  under  Bee  and  Bartow,  subsequently  marching  to 
their  side,  saved  them  from  destruction  and  relieved  them  from,  the  brunt  of  the 
enemy's  attack. 

The  conduct  of  General  Jackson  also  requires  mention,  as  eminently  that  of 
an  able,  fearless  soldier  and  sagacious  commander — one  fit  to  lead  his  efficient 
brigade.  His  prompt,  timely  arrival  before  the  plateau  of  the  Henry  house, 
and  his  judicious  distribution  of  his  troops,  contributed  much  to  the  success  of 
the  day.  Although  painfully  wounded  in  tin;  hand,  he  remained  on  the  tield  to 
the  end  of  the  battle,  rendering  invaluable  assistance. 

Colonel  William  Smith  was  as  efficient,  as  self-possessed,  and  brave  ;  the  influ 
ence  of  his  example  and  his  words  of  encouragement  was  not  confined  to  his 
immediate  command,  the  good  conduct  of  which  is  especially  noticeable,  inas 
much  as  it  had  been  embodied  but  a  day  or  two  before  the  battle. 

Colonels  Harper,  Hunton,  and  Hampton,  commanding  regiments  of  the  re 
serve,  attracted  my  notice  by  their  soldierly  ability,  as  with  their  gallant  com 
mands  they  restored  the  fortunes  of  the  day,  at  a  time  when  the  enemy,  by  a 
last  desperate  onset,  with  heavy  odds,  had  driven  our  forces  from  the  fiercely 
contested  ground  around  the  Henry  and  Robinson  houses.  Veterans  could  not 
have  behaved  better  than  those  well-led  regiments. 

High  praise  must  also  be  given  to  Colonels  Cocke,  Early,  and  Elzey — brigade 
commanders — also  to  Colonel  Kcrshaw,  commanding,  for  the  time,  the  2d  and 
8th  South  Carolina  regiments.  Under  the  instruction  of  General  Johnston, 
these  oflicers  reached  the  field  at  an  opportune,  critical  moment,  and  disposed, 
handled,  and  fought  their  respective  commands  with  sagacity,  decision,  and 
successful  results,  which  have  been  described  in  detail. 

Colonel  J.  E.  13.  Stuart  likewise  deserves  mention  for  his  enterprise  and  abil 
ity  as  a  cavalry  commander.  Through  his  judicious  reconnoissauce  of  the  coun 
try  on  our  left  flank,  he  acquired  information  both  of  its  topographical  features 
and  of  the  positions  of  the  enemy,  of  the  utmost  importance  in  the  subsequent 
and  closing  movements  of  the  day  on  that  flank  ;  and  his  services  in  the  pursuit 
were  highly  effective. 

Captain  E.  P.  Alexander,  C.  S.  Engineers,  gave  me  seasonable  and  material  as 
sistance  early  in  the  day  with  his  system  of  signals.  Almost  the  first  shot  fired 
by  the  enemy  passed  through  the  tent  of  his  party,  at  the  stone  bridge,  where 
they  subsequently  firmly  maintained  their  position  in  the  maintenance  of  their 
duty — the  transmission  of  signal  messages  of  the  enemy's  movements — for  sev 
eral  hours  under  fire.  Later,  Captain  Alexander  acted  as  my  Aide-de-camp,  in 
the  transmission  of  orders  and  in  observation  of  the  enemy. 

I  was  most  effectively  served  throughout  the  day  by  my  volunteer  aids — 

I.— 30 


466  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX. 

Colonels  Preston,  Manning,  Chestnut,  Miles,  Rice,  Hey  ward,  and  Chisolui — to 
whom  I  tender  my  thanks  for  their  unflagging,  intelligent,  and  fearless  discharge 
of  the  laborious,  responsible  duties  intrusted  to  them.  To  Lieutenant  S.  W. 
Ferguson,  Aidc-de-Camp,  and  Colonel  Hey  ward,  who  were  habitually  at  my  side 
from  12  noon  until  the  close  of  the  battle,  my  special  acknowledgments  are  due. 
The  horse  of  the  former  was  killed  under  him  by  the  same  shell  that  wounded 
that  of  the  latter.  Both  were  eminently  useful  to  me,  and  were  distinguished 
for  coolness  and  courage,  until  the  euemy  finally  gave  way  and  fled  in  wild  dis 
order  in  every  direction — a  scene  the  President  of  the  Confederacy  had  the  high 
satisfaction  of  witnessing,  as  he  arrived  upon  the  field  at  that  exultant  moment. 

I  also  received,  from  the  time  I  readied  the  front,  such  signal  service  from  H. 
E.  Peyton,  at  the  time  a  private  in  the  London  Cavalry,  that  I  have  called  him 
to  my  personal  staff.  Similar  services  were  also  rendered  me  repeatedly,  dur 
ing  the  battle,  by  T.  J.  Randolph,  a  volunteer  Acting  Aide-de-Camp  to  Colonel 
Cocke. 

Captain  Clifton  II.  Smith,  of  the  general  staff,  was  also  present  on  the  field, 
and  rendered  efficient  service  in.  the  transmission  of  orders. 

It  must  be  permitted  me  here  to  record  my  profound  sense  of  my  obligation 
to  General  Johnston,  for  his  generous  permission  to  carry  out  my  plans,  with 
such  modifications  as  circumstances  had  required.  From  his  services  on  the 
field — as  we  entered  it  together,  already  mentioned — and  his  subsequent  watch 
ful  management  of  the  reinforcements  as  they  reached  the  vicinity  of  the  field, 
our  countrymen  may  draw  the  most  auspicious  auguries. 

To  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan,  rny  efficient  and  zealous  Assistant  Adjutant-Gen 
eral,  much  credit  is  due  for  his  able  assistance  in  the  organization  of  the  forces 
under  my  command,  and  for  the  intelligence  and  promptness  with  which  he  has 
discharged  all  the  laborious  and  important  duties  of  his  office. 

Valuable  assistance  was  given  to  me  by  Major  Cabcll,  chief  officer  of  the  Quar 
termaster's  Department,  in  the  sphere  of  his  duties;  duties  environed  by  far 
more  than  the  ordinary  difficulties  and  embarrassments  attending  the  opera 
tions  of  a  long-organized,  regular  establishment. 

Colonel  R.  B.  Lee,  Chief  of  Subsistence  Department,  had  but  just  entered  on 
his  duties;  but  his  experience  and  long  and  varied  service  in  his  department 
made  him  as  efficient  as  possible. 

Captain  W.  II.  Fowle,  whom  Colonel  Lee  had  relieved,  had  previously  exerted 
himself  to  the  utmost  to  carry  out  orders  from  these  headquarters,  to  render  his 
department,  equal  to  the  demands  of  the  service ;  that  it  was  not  entirely  so,  it 
is  due  to  justice  to  say,  was  certainly  not  his  fault. 

Deprived  by  sudden  severe  illness  of  the  services  of  the  Medical  Director,  Sur 
geon  Thomas  H.  Williams,  his  duties  were  discharged  by  Surgeon  R.  L.  Brodie 
to  my  entire  satisfaction.  And  it  is  proper  to  say  that  the  entire  medical  corps 
of  the  army  present,  embracing  gentlemen  of  distinction  in  the  profession,  who 
had  quit  lucrative  private  practice,  by  their  services  in  the  field,  and  subse 
quently,  did  high  honor  to  their  profession. 

The  vital  duties  of  the  Ordnance  Department  were  effectively  discharged  under 
the  administration  of  my  Chief  of  Artillery  and  Ordnance,  Colonel  Samuel  Jones. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  IX.  467 

At  one  time,  when  reports  of  evil  omen  and  disaster  reached  Camp  Pickens 
with  such  circumstantiality  as  to  give  reasonable  grounds  of  anxiety,  its  com 
mander,  Colonel  Territt,  the  commander  of  the  intrenched  batteries,  Captaiii 
Sterrett,  of  the  Confederate  States  Navy,  and  their  officers,  made  the  most  effi 
cient  possible  preparations  for  the  desperate  defence  of  that  position  in  exk-em- 
ity  ;  and,  in  this  connection,  1  regret  my  inability  to  mention  the  names  of  those 
patriotic  gentlemen  of  Virginia,  by  the  gratuitous  labor  of  whose  slaves  the  iu- 
trenchcd  camp  at  Manassas  had  been  mainly  constructed,  relieving  the  troops 
from  that  laborious  service,  and  giving  opportunity  for  their  military  instruction. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Thomas  II.  Williamson,  the  Engineer  of  those  works,  as 
sisted  by  Captaiii  D.  15.  Harris,  discharged  his  duties  with  untiring  energy  and 
devotion,  as  well  as  satisfactory  skill. 

Captain  W.  II.  Stevens,  Engineer  C.  S.  A.,  served  with  the  advanced  forces  at 
Fairfax  Court-House  for  some  time  before  the  battle.  He  laid  out  the  works 
there,  in  admirable  accordance  with  tins  purposes  for  which  they  were  designed  ; 
and  yet,  so  as  to  admit  of  ultimate  extension  and  adaptation  to  more  serious 
uses,  as  means  and  part  of  a  system  of  real  defence  when  determined  upon.  He 
has  shown  himself  to  be  an  officer  of  energy  and  ability. 

Major  Thomas  G.  Khett,  after  having  discharged  for  several  months  the  labo 
rious  duties  of  Adjutant-General  to  the  commanding  officer  of  Camp  Pickens, 
was  detached  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Shenaudoah,  on  the  eve  of  the  advance  of 
the  enemy;  but,  volunteering  his  services,  was  ordered  to  assist  on  the  staff  of 
General  Bonham,  joining  that  officer  at  Centreville  on  the  night  of  the  17th,  be 
fore  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  rendered  valuable  services  until  the  arrival  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  when  lie  was  called  to  the  place  of  Chief  of  Staff' of  that  officer. 

It  is  also  proper  to  acknowledge  the  signal  services  rendered  by  Colonels  B. 
F.  Terry  and  T.  Lubbock,  of  Texas,  who  had  attached  themselves  to  the  staff*  of 
General  Longstrcct.  These  gentlemen  made  daring  and  valuable  reconnois- 
Kanees  of  the  enemy's  positions ;  assisted  by  Captains  Gorec  and  Chichestcr,  they 
also  carried  orders  on  the  field.  And  on  the  following  day,  accompanying  Cap 
taiii  Whitehead's  troops,  to  take  possession  of  Fairfax  Court- House,  Colonel  Ter 
ry,  with  his  unerring  rille,  severed  the  halliard,  and  thus  lowered  the  Federal 
Hag  found  still  floating  from  the  cupola  of  the  court-house  there.  He  also  se 
cured  a  large  Federal  garrison  flag,  designed,  it  is  said,  to  be  unfurled  over  our 
intrenchments  at  Manassas. 

In  connection  with  the  unfortunate  casualty  of  the  day— that  is,  the  miscar 
riage  of  the  orders  sent  by  courier  to  Generals  Holmes  and  Ewell,  to  attack  the 
enemy  in  flank  and  reverse  at  Centreville,  through  which  the  triumph  of  our 
arms  was  prevented  from  being  still  more  decisive,  I  regard  it  in  place  to  say: 
a  divisional  organization,  with  officers  in  command  of  divisions,  with  appropri 
ate  rank,  as  in  European  services,  would  greatly  reduce  the  risk  of  such  mishaps, 
and  wonl(J  advantageously  simplify  the  communications  of  the  general  in  com 
mand  of  a  field,  with  his  troops. 

While  glorious  for  our  people,  and  crushing  in  effect  upon  the  morale  of  our 
hitherto  overweening  adversary,  as  were  the  events  of  the  battle  of  Manassas, 
the  field  was  only  won  by  stout  fighting,  and,  as  before  reported,  with  much 


468  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  IX. 

loss,  as  is  precisely  exhibited  in  the  papers  herewith  marked  "  F,"  "  G,"  and  "  H," 
and  being  lists  of  the  killed  and  wounded.  The  killed  outright  numbered  three 
hundred  aud  sixty-nine,  the  wounded  fourteen  hundred  and  eighty-three,  mak 
ing  an  aggregate  of  casualties  of  eighteen  hundred  and  fifty-two. 

The  actual  loss  of  the  enemy  will  never  be  known  ;  it  may  only  be  con 
jectured.  Their  abandoned  dead,  as  they  were  buried  by  our  people  where 
they  fell,  unfortunately,  were  not  enumerated;  many  parts  of  the  fields  were 
thick  with  their  corpses,  as  few  battle-fields  have  ever  been.  The  official  re 
ports  of  the  enemy  are  studiously  silent  on  this  point,  but  still  afford  us  data 
for  an  approximate  estimate.  Left  almost  in  the  dark,  in  respect  to  the  losses 
of  Hunter's  aud  Heintzelman's  divisions — first,  longest,  and  most  hotly  engaged — 
we  are  informed  Sherman's  brigade,  Tyler's  division,  suffered  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing,  six  hundred  and  nine,  that  is,  about  eighteen  per  cent,  of  the  bri 
gade.  A  regiment  of  Franklin's  brigade  (Gorman's)  lost  twenty-one  per  cent. 
Griffin's  (battery)  loss  was  thirty  per  cent.,  and  that  of  Reyes's  brigade,  which 
was  so  handled  by  its  commander  as  to  be  exposed  to  only  occasional  volleys 
from  our  troops,  was  at  least  feu  per  cent.  To  these  facts,  add  the  repeated 
references  in  the  reports  of  the  more  reticent  commanders  to  the  "murderous" 
fire  to  which  they  were  exposed,  the  ''pistol-range"  volleys  aud  galling  mus 
ketry  of  which  they  speak  as  scourging  their  ranks,  aud  we  are  warranted  in 
placing  the  entire  loss  of  the  Federalists  at  over  forty-five  hundred  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners.  To  this  may  be  legitimately  added,  as  a  casualty  of 
the  battle,  the  thousands  of  fugitives  from  the  field  who  have  never  rejoined 
their  regiments,  and  who  are  as  much  lost  to  the  enemy's  service  as  if  slain  or 
disabled  by  wounds.  These  may  not  be  included  under  the  head  of  "missing," 
because,  in  every  instance  of  such  report,  we  took  as  many  prisoners  of  those 
brigades  or  regiments  as  are  reported  "missing." 

A  list  appended,  marked  "I,"  exhibits  some  fourteen  hundred  and  sixty 
of  their  wounded  and  others  who  fell  into  our  bauds  and  were  sent  to  Rich 
mond  ;  some  were  sent  to  other  points,  so  that  the  number  of  prisoners,  includ 
ing  wounded,  who  did  not  die,  may  be  set  down  as  not  less  than  sixteen  hun 
dred.  Besides  these,  a  considerable  number,  who  could  not  be  removed  from 
the  field,  died  at  the  several  farm-houses  and  field-hospitals  withiu  teu  days 
following  the  battle. 

To  serve  the  future  historian  of  this  war,  I  will  notice  the  fact  that,  among 
the  captured  Federalists,  arc  officers  and  men  of  forty-seven  regiments  of  volun 
teers,  besides,  from  some  nine  different  regiments  of  Regular  troops,  detachments 
of  which  were  engaged. 

From  their  official  reports  we  learn  of  a  regiment  of  volunteers,  six  regiments 
of  Miles's  division,  and  the  five  regiments  of  Runyon's  brigade,  from  which  we 
have  neither  sound  nor  wounded  prisoners.  Making  allowances  for  mistakes,  we 
are  warranted  in  saying  that  the  Federal  army  consisted  of  at  least  fifty-five  reg 
iments  of  volunteers,  eight  companies  of  Regular  infantry,  four  of  marines,  nine 
of  Regular  cavalry,  and  twelve  batteries  (49  guns).  These  regiments,  atone  time, 
as  will  appear  from  a  published  list,*  numbered,  in  the  aggregate,  fifty-four  thou- 

*  Marked  "K." 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER   IX.  4G9 

sand  one  hundred  and  forty,  and  averaged  nine  hundred  and  sixty-four  each; 
from  an  order  of  the  enemy's  commander,  however,  dated  July  13th,  we  learn 
that  one  hundred  men  from  each  regiment  were  directed  to  remain  in  charge 
of  their  respective  camps ;  some  allowance  must  further  he  made  for  the  sick 
and  details,  which  would  reduce  the  average  to  eight  hundred  men  ;  adding  the 
Regular  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  present,  an  estimate  of  their  force  may 
be  made. 

A  paper  appended,  marked  "  L,"  exhibits,  in  part,  the  ordnance  and  supplies 
captured,  including  some  28  field-pieces,  of  the  best  character  of  arm,  with  over 
100  rounds  of  ammunition  for  each  gun,  37  caissons,  G  forges,  4  battery-wagons, 
G4  artillery-horses,  completely  equipped,  500,000  rounds  of  small-arms  ammuni 
tion,  4500  sets  of  accoutrements,  over  500  muskets,  some  9  regimental  and  gar 
rison  Hags,  with  a  number  of  pistols,  knapsacks,  swords,  canteens,  blankets,  a 
largo  store  of  axes  and  intrenching  tools,  wagons,  ambulances,  horses,  camp 
and  garrison  equipage,  hospital  stores,  and  some  subsistence  besides. 

Added  to  these  results,  may  rightly  be  noticed  here,  that  by  this  battle  an 
invading  army,  superbly  equipped,  within  twenty  miles  of  their  base  of  opera 
tions,  has  been  converted  into  one  virtually  besieged,  and  exclusively  occupied 
for  months  in  the  construction  of  a  stupendous  .series  of  fortifications,  for  the 
defence  of  its  own  capital. 

I  beg  to  call  attention  to  the  reports  of  the  several  subordinate  commanders, 
for  reference  to  the  signal  parts  played  by  individuals  of  their  respective  com 
mands.  Contradictory  statements,  found  in  these  reports,  should  not  excite 
surprise,  when  we  remember  how  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  it  is  to  reconcile 
the  narrations  of  by-standers  or  participants  in  even  the  most  inconsiderable 
affair,  much  less  the  shifting,  thrilling  scenes  of  a  battle-field. 

Accompanying  are  maps,  showing  the  positions  of  the  armies  on  the  morning 
of  21st  July,  and  of  three  several  stages  of  the  battle,  also  of  the  line  of  Bull 
Run,  north  of  Blackburn's  Ford.  These  maps,  from  actual  surveys  made  by 
Captain  D.  1J.  Harris,  assisted  by  Mr.  John  Grant,  were  drawn  by  the  latter  witU 
an  accuracy  worthy  of  high  commendation. 

In  the  conclusion  of  this  report  it  is  proper,  and,  doubtless,  expected,  that  I 
should  acquaint  my  countrymen  with  some  of  the  sufficient  causes  that  pre 
vented  the  advance  of  our  forces,  and  prolonged,  vigorous  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
to  and  beyond  the  Potomac.  The  War  Department  has  been  fully  advised, 
long  since,  of  all  those  causes,  some  of  which  only  arc  proper  to  bo  here  com 
municated.  An  army  which  had  fought  as  ours  that  day,  against  uncommon 
odds,  under  a  July  sun,  most  of  the  time  without  water,  and  without  food, 
except  a  hastily  snatched  meal  at  dawn,  was  not  in  condition  for  the  toil  of  an 
eager,  effective,  pursuit  of  an  enemy  immediately  after  the  battle.  On  the  fol 
lowing  day  an  unusually  heavy  and  unintermitting  fall  of  rain  intervened  to 
obstruct  our  advance,  with  reasonable  prospects  of  fruitful  results.  Added  to 
this,  the  want  of  a  cavalry  force  of  sufficient  numbers  made  an  efficient  pursuit 
a  military  impossibility. 

I  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BKAUKKCAKD,  Genl.  Comdfr. 


470  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  X. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  X. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS,  July  22d,  1861. 
Special  Orders,  No.  146. 

The  command  of  General  Beauregard,  as  it  stood  organized  on  the  20th  instant 
into  brigades  or  separate  commands,  will,  for  the  present,  return  to  that  organi 
zation,  with  the  following  headquarters: 

IST  BRIGADE,  Brigadier-General  M.  L.  Bonham,  at  Ccntrcville. 

SD  BRIGADE,  Brigadier-General  Ewell,  at  or  about  Union  Mills,  in  advance. 

3o  BRIGADE,  Brigadier-General  D.  R.  Jones,  at  a  position  on  Union  Mills  and 
Centreville  road,  about  half-way  between  Braddock's  road  and  Union  Mills  Ford. 

4Tii  BRIGADE,  Brigadier-General  Lougstreet,  at  or  about  the  crossing  of  the 
Centreville  and  Union  Mills  road  and  the  Braddock's  road. 

5Tii  BRIGADE,  Colonel  Cockc,  at  or  about  suspension  bridge,  over  Cub  Run. 

CTII  BRIGADE,  Colonel  Early,  in  position  on  Bull  Run,  one  mile  above  Stone 
Bridge. 

EVANS'S  command,  at  or  about  Stone  Bridge,  except  Hunton's  regiment  Vir 
ginia  Volunteers,  which  will  remain  at  these  headquarters  for  the  present. 

Colonel  RADFORD  will  concentrate  such  of  his  companies  as  are  not  specially 
detached,  at  a  point  on  Bull  Run  to  the  left  of  Mitchell's  Ford. 

The  commanders  of  all  regiments  will  take  immediate  measures  for  collecting 
stragglers  from  other  regiments,  who  will  be  then  sent  forthwith,  under  an 
officer  and  proper  guides,  to  join  the  headquarters  of  the  several  brigades  to 
which  they  belong. 

By  command  of  General  Bcanregard.     •  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  Gcul. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS,  July  22d,  1861. 
Special  Orders,  No.  147. 

I.  The  President  deeming  it  important  that  General  Holmes  shall  return  with 
his  command  to  his  former  position,  at  an  early  moment,  he  will,  accordingly, 
prepare  to  march  in  the  morning. 

II.  The  President  regrets  to  be  obliged,  at  this  juncture,  to  require  this  move 
ment  of  General  Holmes,  after  his  remarkable   march  to  the  support  of  this 
army  at  a  critical  juncture.     A  march  for  which  the  general  commanding  has 
to  express  his  sincere  thanks,  and  also  for  the  critical  services  rendered  on  tho 
field  of  battle  yesterday,  by  that  portion  of  his  brigade  which  was  called  to  tho 
immediate  scene  of  action. 

By  command  of  General  Beauregard.  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  Gcnl. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS,  July  23d,  1861. 
Special  Orders,  No.  140. 

I.  Brigadier -General  Bonham  will  advance  his   command   forthwith,  and 
occupy  Vienna  Station.      His  command  will  consist  of  the  troops  of  the  1st 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  X.  471 

brigade  of  this  army,  Hamper's  and  Shields's  batteries,  all  cavalry  at  present 
attached,  and  as  many  companies  of  Colonel  Radford's  regiment  of  cavalry  as 
are  not  assigned  to  other  brigades. 

II.  The  utmost  degree  of  military  precaution  must  be  exercised  in  the  execu 
tion  of  these  orders,  especially  in  approaching  within  several  miles  of  Vienna 
Station;  and  no  unnecessary  exposure  of  our  men  to  fire  from  intrenchmcnts 
must  occur.  The  ground  hi  advance,  therefore,  must  be  carefully  reconnoitred; 
but  at  the  same  time  celerity  of  movement  is  of  great  importance. 

By  command  of  General  Beauregard.  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  Genl. 


HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MAXASSAS,  July  25//1,  18C1. 
Special  Orders,  No.  169. 

I.  The  subdivisions  of  this  Army  Corps  will  be  organized  at  once,  as  follows 

I  ftt  Brigade. 

Genl.  M.  L.  BOXIIAM,  Commanding. 

2d  South  Carolina  regiment  Volunteers,  Col.  J.  B.  KERSHAW. 
&1  "  "  "  "    J.  II.  WILLIAMS. 

7th  "  "    THOMAS  G.  BACOX. 

8th          "  "    E.  B.  CASH. 


Genl.  R.  S.  EWELL,  Commanding. 

5th  Alabama  regiment  Volunteers,  Col.  ROBERT  E.  RODES. 
Oth         "  «    J.J.  SEIBELS. 

i:5th       "  LitMit.-Col.TiiEO.  O'NAUA. 

12th  Mississippi  '•  "  Col.  R.  GRIFFITH. 


Genl.  I").  R.  JONKS,  Commanding. 

5th  South  Carolina  regiment  Volunteers,  Col.  M.  JENKINS. 
4th  «    J.  E.B.SLOAN. 

0th  "  "  "    C.A.WIXDER. 

Oth  "    J.  D.  BLAXDING 

4//t  I>riyadc. 

Genl.  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Commanding. 
1st  Virginia  regiment  Volunteers,  Col.  P.  T.  MOORE. 
7th        "  "    J.L.  KEMPER. 

llth      "  "  "    S.  GARLAND,  Jr. 

17th      "  "  "    M.  D.  CORSE. 


Genl.  PHILIP  ST.  GEORGE  COCKE,  Commanding. 
18th  Virginia  regiment  Volunteers,  Col.  R.  E.  WITHERS. 
19th        "  «  Lieut.-Col.  J.  B.  STRANGE. 

28th        "  Col.  R.  PRESTOX. 

49th        "  "  "  «    WILLIAM  SMITH. 


472  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XL 

Gth  Brigade. 

Geiil.  J.  A.  EARLY,  Commanding. 

24th  Virginia  regiment  Volunteers,  Lieut. -Col.  HAIRSTOX. 
f>th  North  Carolina  regiment  Volunteers,  Col.  D.  K.  McRAE. 
13th  "  "  "    J.H.HoKE. 

llth  "  "  "  «     KlRKLAND. 

7th  Brigade. 

Col.  N.  G.  EVANS,  Commanding. 

7th  Mississippi  regiment  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Col.  WILLIAM  L.  BRANDON. 
13th         "  "  "          Col.  WILLIAM  BARKSD ALE. 

17th        «  "  "  «    W.  S.  FEATHERSTON. 

18th         "  "  "  "    E.  R.BURT. 

8th  Brigade. 

Col.  J.  G.  SEYMOUR,  Commanding. 

6th  Louisiana  regiment  Volunteers,  Col.  J.  G.  SEYMOUR. 
7th          "  "  "  «    HARRY  HAYS. 

8th          "  "  "  "    H.B.KELLY. 

9th          "  "  "  "    RICHARD  TAYLOR. 

1st          "         Special  Battalion,  Major  C.  R.  WHEAT. 

Separate  Commands. 

8th  Virginia  regiment  Volunteers,  Col.  EPPA  HUNTON,  LeesLurg. 
Hampton's  Legion. 

II.  The  Horse  Artillery,  for  the  present,  will  he  placed: 

KEMPER'S  Battery  with  the  1st  Brigade. 
SIIIELDS'S        "  "        4th       " 

LATHAM'S       "  "       5th       " 

WALTON'S  Battery  will  concentrate  at  or  ahout  the  left  of  Mitchell's  Ford  for 
purposes  of  instruction. 

III.  The  Cavalry,  for  the  present,  will  he  distributed  in  the  following  manner : 
Colonel  RADFORD,  with  six  companies,  will  he  on  duty  with  the  1st  Brigade 

while  in  advance. 

The  remaining  four  companies  of  Radford's  regiment,  with  Lieutenant-Col 
onel  MUNFORD,  will  report  for  service  with  the  4th  Brigade. 

IV.  Such  changes  as  are  involved  in  these  orders  will  he  made  without  delay. 
By  command  of  Gcnl.  Beauregard.  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.-Geul. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XL 

HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS,  Aug.  8th,  1861. 
Special  Orders,  No.  212. 

I.  Colonel  Evans  will  march  with  his  brigade,  with  as  little  delay  as  practica 
ble,  via  Gum  Spring  and  Ball's  Mills,  to  Lecsburg,  or  its  vicinity.     He  will  as- 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XL  473 

sume  command  of  all  the  Confederate  States  forces  in  London  County,  and  post 
them  as  may  appear  best  calculated  to  protect  that  section  from  the  incursions 
of  the  enemy,  and  for  the  repression  of  any  disaffection  among  any  class  of  the 
inhabitants. 

II.  The  officers  of  the  Quartermaster's  Department  will  provide  the  necessary 
and  ample  means  of  transportation  fur  this  movement. 

By  command  of  Genl.  Beauregard.  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.-Genl. 


MAXASSAS,  VA.,  Aug.  IltJt,  18G1. 

Dear  General, — In  order  to  prevent  any  coup  dc  main  from  McClellan,  as 
already  communicated  to  yon,  I  have  ordered  Longstreet  to  Fairfax  Court- 
I  louse,  Jonos  to  Germantown,  and  Bonham  to  fall  back  on  or  about  Flint  Hill, 
leaving  a  strong  mounted  guard  at  or  about  Vienna. 

Cockc  goes  to  Centreville. 

E  \vell  to  Sangsters  Cross-roads. 

Early  and  Hampton  to  intersection  of  Occoquan  road  with  Wolf-run  Shoals 
road. 

Evans  has  gone  to  Lccsburg. 

The  Louisiana  brigade  remains,  for  the  present,  at  or  about  Mitchell's  Ford. 

Will  you  permit  me  to  suggest  that  Elzey  should  concentrate  his  brigade  at 
or  about  Fairfax  Station,  and  Jackson  at  or  about  the  cross  of  Briuldock's  road 
with  the  Fairfax  Court-House  and  Station  road  ? 

Stuart  to  remain  where  he  is. 

From  those  advanced  positions  we  could  at  any  time  concentrate  our  forces 
for  offensive  or  defensive  purposes.  I  think,  by  a  bold  move,  we  could  capture 
the  enemy's  advance  forces  at  Annandale  ;  and,  should  he  come  out  to  their  sup 
port,  give  him  battle — with  all  the  chances  in  our  favor.  But,  for  that  object, 
we  must  have  all  our  artillery  ready  in  every  respect. 

Yours  very  truly,  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Genl.  J.  I].  JOHNSTON,  C'ouulg.  Manassas,  Va. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

RICHMOND,  Aug.  13th,  1861. 

Sir, — You  are  hereby  informed  that  the  President  has  appointed  you,  by  and 
with  the  advice  of  Congress,  a  General  (to  take  rank  July  21st,  1861)  in  the  Army 
of  the  Confederate  States.  You  are  requested  to  signify  your  acceptance  or  non- 
acceptance  of  said  appointment.  And  should  you  accept,  yon  will  sign  before 
a  magistrate  the  oath  of  office  herewith,  and  forward  the  same,  with  your  letter 
of  acceptance,  to  this  department.  L.  P.  WALKER,  Sec.  of  War. 

Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  etc.,  Mauassas. 


MANASSAS,  VA.,  Aug.  14//»,  1861. 

Dear  General,— In  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  taking  possession  of  your 
work  and  battery  at  Evausport,  before  assistance  could  be  sent  to  it,  I  would 


474  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XL 

make  it  a  strong  profile  redoubt  (closed),  with  ditch,  flanking  arrangements,  and 
the  whole  work  large  enough  to  contain  a  pretty  strong  garrison.  If  there  be  a 
height  near  by  that  commands  it,  I  would  make  it  less  strong ;  but  I  would  hold 
and  fortify  that  height.  I  do  not  think  they  would  attempt  to  storra  such  a 
work.  If  you  have  no  Engineer,  apply  for  one  from  Kichniond,  otherwise  I  may, 
before  long,  be  able  to  send  you  one ;  but  prefer  you  should  get  one  from  the 
War  Department. 

Nothing  new  here  j  we  are  still  organizing  our  forces. 

Yours  very  truly,         G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Geul.  Comdg. 

Genl.  T.  II.  HOLMES,  Comdg.  at  Fredericksburg,  Va. 

P.  S.  Apply  for  Captain  F.  D.  Lee,  Corps  of  Engineers,  South  Carolina  Volun 
teers,  now  with  Major  Trapier  at  Port  Royal.  B. 


HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS,  VA.,  Aug.  17th,  1861. 

Sir, — I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  appointment  of  "  General,"  con 
ferred  upon  me  by  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States,  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  Congress,  to  date  from  July  21st,  1861.  I  accept  with  gratitude  said 
appointment,  and  will  exert  myself  to  the  utmost  to  be  deserving  of  so  high  a 
position.  I  remain,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Geul.  C.  S.  A. 
Hon.  L.  P.  WALKER,  Sec.  of  War,  Richmond,  Va. 


HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MANASSAS,  August  19th,  1861. 
To  Col.  THOMAS  JORDAX,  Adj. -Geul.  1st  Corps  Army  of  the  Potomac : 

Sir, — Knowing  it  to  be  General  Beauregard's  desire  to  increase  his  artillery 
force  as  far  as  practicable,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following : 

Some  time  since  a  requisition  was  made  by  the  Washington  Artillery  for 
three  guns  to  complete  their  armament,  and  a  caisson  and  some  extra  boxes  to 
repair  damages  received  in  action.  After  some  trouble  and  delay,  unavoidable 
on  my  part,  Colonel  Pendleton  promised  to  iill  this  requisition  (which  had  been 
approved  at  these  headquarters),  and  set  aside,  I  believe  with  General  John 
ston's  consent,  the  necessary  articles.  On  going  to  receive  them  to-day,  I  found 
that  they  had  been  issued  yesterday,  by  direct  order  from  General  Johnston,  to 
Captain  Hamilton's  battery — a  company  recently  arrived  from  Georgia,  without 
guns. 

Two  guns  previously  assigned  to  Lee's  battery,  of  Hampton's  Legion,  have 
also  been  taken  from  another  battery. 

In  view  of  these  facts  I  have  the  honor  to  suggest  that  steps  be  taken  at  once 
to  procure  other  guns,  through  either  the  War  Department  or  the  founderies 
where-  they  are  cast.  To  make  the  increase  as  immediate^  effective  as  pos 
sible,  I  would  also  recommend  that  additional  guns  bo  given  to  all  of  our 
already  organized  batteries  capable  of  expansion,  as  follows : 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XL  475 

To  the  Washington  Artillery,  three,  making  in  all  sixteen;  to  Lee's  battery, 
of  Hampton's  Legion,  four,  making  ten;  to  Latham's  battery,  two,  making  six. 

The  officers  of  these  batteries  say  they  can  easily  receive  these  increases. 

Probably  Kemper's,  Shields's,  and  the  London  batteries  might  also  be 
strengthened,  but  I  have  not  seen  their  officers. 

Authority  has  been  obtained  for  armament,  as  light  artillery,  of  Captain  Bon- 
yer's  company  of  the  28th  Virginia  regiment,  and  Captain  Stribling's  of  the  49th 
Virginia,  but  their  equipment  must  all  be  obtained  in  Richmond,  as  the  follow 
ing  disposition  has  been  made  of  the  captured  artillery: 

Xo.  of  cans  rcc'd.     No.  of  puns  rct'd. 

By  General  Johnston's  command 18  3 

"         "        Hohnes's            "         5  0 

Ik-uuregard's     "         _4  3 

Total a?  6 

The  guns  noted  as  returned,  in  place  of  some  of  the  captured,  are  either  in 
ferior,  or  damaged,  except  two  small  G-pounders  turned  in  by  Colonel  Pcudleton 
and  re-issued  to  Captain  Hamilton. 

Of  the  remaining  four,  one  is  an  iron  G-pounder,  dismounted,  and  the  other 
three  have  been  lent  to  Captain  Cutts's  company  for  drill. 
I  am,  very  respectfully  yours, 

E.  P.  ALEXANDER,  Capt.  Eng.,  and  Chief  Ord.  and  Arty. 


MAXASSAS,  August  23rf,  1861. 

Dear  General, — Longstreet  had  better  look  into  this,  and  if  there  is  such  a 
force  unsupported,  take  possession  of  it,  or  drive  it  off. 

I  do  not  want  to  make  a  war  of  outposts,  neither  do  I  wish  that  ours  should 
be  driven  in  just  now.  I  had  rather  withdraw  after  driving  back  the  enemy. 

Yours  truly,  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  Geul. 

Genl.  BEAUREGARD,  Comdg.,  etc. 

MANASSAS,  VA.,  August  2~tli,  1861. 

Capt.,— I  desire  that  you  should  call  upon  the  Prest.  with  M;ijor  Gorgas, 
to  represent  to  him  that  I  have  but  thirty-five  pieces  of  light  artillery  for 
thirty-five  regiments  of  infantry,  or  one  piece  per  regiment,  whereas  I  think  wo 
ought  to  have  at  least  three  per  regiment.  Should  wo  not  bo  able  to  have 
additional  light  batteries,  we  must  then  supply  their  places  with  rocket  bat 
teries,  for  the  purpose  of  frightening  the  untrained  horses  of  the  enemy.  Wo 
must  also  have  an  increase  of  cavalry,  of  which  the  enemy  is  very  deficient.  Wo 
ought  to  have  here  about  four  thousand,  or  even  live  thousand,  mounted  men, 
for  the  purpose,  of  charging  on  McClellan's  batteries  and  raw  infantry,  after  our 
rockets  shall  have  put  them  in  disorder.  Colonels  Preston,  Miles,  and  Chestnut 
may  be  able  to  help  you.  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Capt.  E.  P.  ALEXANDER,  care  of  Major  J.  GORGAS,  Richmond,  Va. 


DUNCAN'S  HOUSE,  August  31s/,  18G1. 
Dear  General, —  ****** 

I  enclose  a  letter  from  Stuart,  received  this  morning.     My  apprehension  in  re- 


47G  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XI. 

gard  to  this  post,  is  (lie  being  drawn  into  a  serious  action  in  its  defence.  So 
near  them,  and  so  far  from  our  front,  such  a  thing  would  he  disadvantageous. 

Wilcox  goes  to  Winchester  first  to  see  if  an  adequate  force  can  he  raised,  and 
will  write  or  send  thence  to  Evans.  Yours  truly,  J.  E.  JOHNSTON. 

Genl .  BEAUHEGARD. 


MANASSAS,  VA.,  Sept.  6lh,  1861. 

Dear  General, — I  have  heen  reflecting  much  on  our  advanced  positions  since 
my  visit  to  them,  and  I  think,  under  the  present  circumstances,  we  can  neither 
give  them  up,  nor  allow  them  to  he  taken  from  us  by  a  coup  de  main,  or  an 
attack  in  force,  for  the  effect  on  the  morale  of  the  enemy  would  be  tremendous. 
From  what  I  saw  the  other  day,  our  reserves  at  Fairfax  Court-House,  and  Sta 
tion  (about  eight  miles  back),  are  too  far  back  to  be  able  to  come  up  in  time  to 
the  assistance  of  those  advanced  positions;  hence  we  must  make  up  our  minds, 
I  think,  to  advance  them,  for  the  present  at  any  rate,  in  which  case  I  would 
propose  the  following  arrangement  and  positions: 

One  brigade  (Bouham's)  to  or  about  old  Court-House,  near  Vienna. 

Two  brigades  (D.  R.  Jones's  and  Cocke's)  to  or  about  Falls  Church. 

One  brigade  (Longstreet's)  to  Munson's  Hill. 

One  brigade  (of  yours)  to  half-way  (about)  between  Munsou's  and  Mason's 
hills. 

One  brigade  (of  yours)  to  Mason's  Hill. 

Two  brigades  (Walker's  and  Early's)  to  or  about  Aunaudale. 

One  brigade  (Ewell's)  to  Springfield. 

Some  of  your  other  brigades  might  be  put  at  Ccntrevillo,  Fairfax  Court- 
House  and  Station,  as  a  second  reserve,  which  might  occasionally  be  moved 
towards  the  Potomac  to  keep  the  enemy  constantly  alarmed  for  the  safety  of 
Washington,  and  to  cross  into  Maryland  should  he  send  off  a  large  force  from 
Washington  to  any  point  on  the  lower  Potomac.  If  these  suggestions  are  ac 
cepted,  I  would  then  transfer  my  headquarters  to  Aunaudale,  otherwise  to  Fair 
fax  Court-House.  Yours,  very  truly,  G.  T.  BEAUREGAUD. 

Genl.  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  Duncan's  House,  Manassas,  Va. 


DUNCAN'S  HOUSE, 
MANASSAS,  VA.,  Sept*  GtJi,  18G1. 

Dear  General, — I  cannot  perceive  the  advantage  of  placing  ourselves  so  near 
the  enemy's  works  as  you  propose  (the  line  of  Munson's  and  Mason's  hills,  etc.). 
They  seem  to  me  too  strong  to  be  attacked  by  us  with  our  present  means. 

We  can  rely  upon  sufficient  supplies  neither  of  ammunition,  ordnance,  nor 
provisions. 

We  should  bring  on  a  war  of  outposts  and  continual  skirmishing,  which  would 
gradually  improve  the  United  States  troops,  and  so  diminish  the  difference  now 
existing  in  our  favor. 

The  line  of  Fairfax  Court-House  seems  to  me  sufficiently  forward  for  our  pur 
poses,  and  on  it  our  troops  are  more  easily  supplied  than  on  the  other.  An 
approach  to  Washington  must  be  by  crossing  the  Potomac  above.  For  that  we 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XL  477 

want  the  men  and  artillery  I  have  asked  for.     That  line,  even,  is  too  far  from 
Evansport,  which  we  must  be  in  position  to  assist. 

I  confess  that  I  do  not  like  the  present  arrangement  in  front,  at  Munson's 
and  Mason's  hills.  In  authorizing  their  occupation  I  did  not  mean  to  have 
such  posts — posts  of  such  magnitude — established,  and  now  nothing  but  reluc 
tance  to  withdraw — to  go  backward — prevents  me  from  abandoning  them. 

Very  truly  yours,  J.  E.  JOHNSTON. 

1  desired  Mnjor  Khett  to  say  to  you,  day  before  yesterday,  that  I  propose  to 
move  my  headquarters  forward.  J.  E.  J. 

Genl.  BEAUREGARD. 

HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
MANASSAS,  Sept.  ~th,  18G1. 

Sir, — I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  the  efficiency  of  the  Ordnance  Depart 
ment  of  this  corps  is  at  present  much  hindered  from  want  of  transportation  for 
ammunition.  In  our  present  situation  this  should  not  be  allowed  for  an  hour, 
and  yet  my  reserve  ammunition  has  been  ready,  and  only  awaiting  transporta 
tion,  for  upwards  of  a  week.  I  made  requisition,  about  the  20th  ultimo,  for  a 
suitable  train,  but  as  yet  only  a  fourth  of  it  has  been  furnished.  I  have  fur 
nished  the  Acting  Chief  Quartermaster  of  this  corps  (just  appointed)  with  a 
statement  of  what  is  requisite,  but  at  present  the  difficulty  appears  to  be  a  lack 
of  authority  on  his  part  to  purchase  where  supplies  can  be  obtained. 

Respectfully  submitting  the  case  for  the  action  of  the  General,  I  have  the 
honor  to  bo,  Your  obedient  servant, 

E.  P.  ALEXANDER,  Capt.  Eng.,  Chief  Ord.  and  Arty. 

To  Col.  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  Genl.  1st  Corps. 


HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

FAIRFAX  COURT-HOUSE,  Sept.  13M,  1861. 
To  His  Excellency  President  JEFFERSON  DAVIS,  Richmond,  Va. : 

Dear  Sir,  —  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  you,  herewith,  copy  of  information 
just  received  from  Washington,  through  a  very  good  private  channel,  and 
which,  no  doubt,  contains  a  great  deal  of  truth  mixed  up  with  some  exaggera 
tion.  There  is,  however,  little  doubt  but  that  the  enemy  is  making  Herculean 
efforts  to  increase  his  forces  in  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry,  for  a  last  effort 
in  or  about  these  quarters,  before  the  cold  weather  sets  in.  He  probably  has, 
at  present,  on  both  sides  of  the  Potomac,  and  about  Washington,  not  far  from 
seventy  thousand  men,  including  a  largo  number  of  field-guns;  but  all  in  more 
or  less  disorganized  condition,  and  still  under  the  last  impression  of  the  battle 
of  Manassas. 

On  the  11  th  instant  we  had  quite  a  brisk  affair  ffarant  postc  at  Lewinsville, 
between  about  three  hundred  men  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  on  our  part,  and 
on  that  of  the  enemy  three  regiments  and  eight  pieces  of  artillery,  which  re 
sulted  in  their  complete  rout,  with  the  known  loss  of  about  one  dozen  men 
killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  '•  Nobody  hurt"  on  our  side,  not  even  a  horse! 
But  I  suppose  General  Johnston  will  transmit  to-day  the  official  reports  of  the 
affair,  which  does  so  much  credit  to  Colonel  Stuart,  of  the  cavalry.  lie  and 


478  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XI. 

General  Longstreet  are  two  very  promising  officers.  The  latter  will  be  ordered 
to-day  to  advance  with  his  brigade  to  Falls  Church,  and  General  Ewell  to  An- 
nandale,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  support,  at  a  moment's  notice,  the  forces  at  and 
about  Munson's  and  Mason's  hills  (the  latter  is  called  also  Chestnut  Hill).  I 
transferred,  yesterday,  my  headquarters  to  this  place,  so  as  to  be  nearer  the 
scene  of  operations. 

I  am  under  the  impression,  from  all  I  can  learn,  that  the  enemy,  whenever 
ready,  will  make  a  strong  demonstration  in  our  front,  and  then  endeavor  to  turn 
this  place,  either  by  Dumfries,  on  the  lower  Potomac,  or  by  Leesburg,  on  the 
upper  Potomac;  in  either  case  we  ought  to  be  prepared  to  strike  him  from 
Camp  Pickeus  as  a  centre,  for  which  purpose  we  must  have  collected  at  that 
point  a  large  depot  of  provisions  and  ammunition.  But,  to  insure  success,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  ought  to  be  under  one  head,  with  also  one  head  to  each  of 
the  two  corps  of  said  army;  for  the  geueral-iu-chief  of  such  a  large  force  has 
too  much  to  engross  his  time  and  attention,  to  be  able  to  discharge  also  the 
important  duties  of  chief  of  a  corps  cVarmee;  and  I  take  the  liberty  of  presenting 
this  important  subject  to  your  serious  and  immediate  consideration,  as  I  believe 
no  time  is  to  be  lost  in  this  matter.  We  still  continue  to  have  a  great  deal  of 
sickness  among  the  troops,  but  less  so  than  when  they  were  all  on  the  southern 
side  of  Bull  Run. 

I  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUHEGARD. 

P.  S.  General  McClellau  is  said,  by  the  prisoners,  to  have  been  present  at 
Lewinsville.  

HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

FAIRFAX  COURT-HOUSE,  Sept.  23d,  1861. 
Special  Orders,  No.  353. 

I.  First  Lieutenant  Edmund  H.  Cummins,  Second  Lieutenant  G.  T.  Cox,  and 
Private  Walter  Bowie,  of  the  Beauregard  Rifles,  are  hereby  authorized  to  enlist 
a  company  for  the  war,  for  service  with  a  rocket  battery,  with  the  1st  Corps 
Army  of  the  Potomac. 

II.  They  are  authorized  to  open  recruiting  stations  at  Fredericksburg,  Rich 
mond,  and  Lynchburg,  and  the  assistant  quartermaster  of  this  corps  will  fur 
nish  them  with  transportation  to  these  points,  and  also  to  themselves  and  re 
cruits  back  to  these  headquarters. 

III.  The  company  will  be  mustered  into  service  on  the  enrollment  of  not  less 
than  fifty  privates. 

By  command  of  Gcnl.  Beauregard, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  Genl. 


APPENDIX   TO  CHAPTER  XII. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER   XII. 

FAIRFAX  COURT-HOUSE,  Oct.  8th,  1861. 

Dear  General, — Yours  of  the  Gth  has  just  been  received.  I  regret  I  have  not 
time  to  write  all  I  could  say  on  the  subject  of  the  defences  of  New  Orleans  and 
Louisiana.  I  will,  however,  give  you  the  main  points. 

1st.  Obstruct  the  navigation  of  the  river  up  and  doicn,  particularly  the  latter, 
by  means  of  rafts  properly  constructed,  and  anchored  under  the  guns  of  shore 
batteries.  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip  are  the  proper  ones  below  the  city. 
If  you  cannot  construct  such  rafts  as  designed  by  Mr.  John  Roy  and  myself, 
anchor  in  the  stream  several  separate  strong  rafts,  with  openings  large  enough 
for  day  navigation ;  be  careful  that  the  enemy  does  not  cut  them  loose  at  night, 
hence  they  must  be  well  guarded.  Have  hot-shot  furnaces  properly  filled,  etc., 
in  all  your  water  batteries. 

2d.  Look  to  the  defences  of  Proctor's  Landing,  Tower  Duprc's,  Battery  Bieu- 
•  vcnu,  Forts  Macomb,  Pike,  and  Livingston,  and  Berwick  Bay.     Their  arma 
ments,  provisions,  ammunition,  etc.,  must  be  complete.     Garrison,  seven  or  ten 
men  to  a  gun. 

oil.  The  land  defences  of  the  city  must  not  be  neglected  ;  they  should  be  about 
three  miles  from  the  suburbs  of  the  city,  on  both  sides  of  the  river.  I  prefer 
detached  redans,  closed  at  the  gorge,  with  strong  palisading,  or  redoubts,  espe 
cially  when  you  have  artillery  for  them,  with  here  and  there  infantry,  parapets 
between  them;  otherwise  &  cremaillere  line,  or  something  on  the  plan  ofRayni- 
art's  "System,"  as  given  in  Mahan's  field  fortifications.  The  great  points  are 
to  be  able  to  guard  your  lines  with  small  forces,  and  not  to  be  too  far  from  your 
reserve  or  reserves,  which  should  occupy  the  most  central  positions  to  the  points 
threatened  by  the  enemy. 

My  experience  here  teaches  me  that  the  weakest  profiles  will  do — a  command 
of  about  eight  feet  above  the  natural  ground  is,  I  think,  sufficient;  the  crest- 
ought  to  be  four  feet  three  inches  above  the  tread  of  the  banquette;  the  latter 
three  feet  wide  and  slope  one  upon  two. 

4th.  Whenever  you  will  ascertain  positively  that  an  expedition  is  about  to 
approach  the,  coast  of  Louisiana,  you  ought  to  have  felled  into  the  many  bayous 
which  lead  from  the  Gulf  Coast  and  Lake  Borgne  to  the  mainland,  the  trees 
which  grow  along  their  banks,  so  as  to  impede  their  navigation,  except  such 
as  you  may  require  for  use  yourself.  Fishermen  and  oystermcn  should  then  bo 
prohibited  from  going  beyond  half  a  mile  of  the  shores,  for  fear  of  their  being 
captured  and  made  to  act  as  pilots,  which  was  the  case  when  the  British  at 
tacked  New  Orleans  in  1814-15.  With  regard  to  the  persons  who  may  be  of 
use  to  you,  I  will  suggest  the  following  names: 

1.  Messrs.  I.  Freret,  Philip  Guesnon,  Norton,  McClusky ;  Corns.  Fellows, 
Thomas  B.  Lee,  W.  C.  C.  Claiborne,  Charles  Denegre,  and  I.  A.  Deblanc,  who  arc 
merchants  of  high  positions  and  means,  and  know  all  about  the  environs  and 
resources  of  Newr  Orleans. 

ii.  Messrs.  S.  R.  Proctor  (my  brothcr-iu-law),  parish  of  St.  Bernard,  Dr.  J.  B. 


480  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XIII. 

Wilkinson,  and  Charles  J.  Villerd  (another  brother-in-law),  parish  of  Plaque- 
mines,  ditto  for  their  parishes. 

3.  Mr.  S.  K.  Wharton,  Superintendent  of  the  Is".  C.  House,  is  very  competent; 
J.  M.  Roy,  assistant  architect  N.  C.  House,  a  practical  mechanic,  very  superior 
and  full  of  resources ;  J.  II.  Reid  and  son,  and  Henry  Dart,  for  many  years  over 
seers  and  superintendents  of  the  forts  already  named  by  me,  are  very  reliable  as 
military  executive  engineers;  William  Bally,  chief-engineer  Os.  Railroad;  these 
gentlemen  (of  par.  3)  can  give  you  all  the  information  you  may  require  about 
the  localities  they  have  worked  at,  and  about  the  working  men  of  New  Orleans, 
as  well  as  the  resources  of  the  place. 

Wishing  you  success,  I  remain,  yours  very  truly, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Maj.-Genl.  MANSFIELD  LOVELL,  Fairfax  Court-House. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XIII. 

ADJUTANT  AND  INSPECTOR  GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

RICHMOND,  Oct.  22d,  1861. 
General  Orders,  No.  15. 

I.  A  department  is  established,  to  be  known  and  designated  as  the  Depart 
ment  of  Northern  Virginia.     It  will  be  composed  of  the  three  following  dis 
tricts,  viz. :  the  Valley  District,  the  Potomac  District,  and  the  Aquia  District. 
The  Valley  District  will  embrace  the  section  of  country  between  the  Blue  Ridge 
and  the  Allegheny  Mountains;  the  Potomac  District  between  the  Blue  Ridge 
Mountain  and  the  left  bank  of  Powell  River;  and  the  Aquia  District  between 
Powell  River  and  the  mouth  of  the  Potomac,  including  the  Northern  Neck,  and 
embracing  the  counties  on  cither  side  of  the  Rappahaimock  River  from,  its 
mouth  to  Fredericksburg. 

II.  General  J.  E.  Johnston  is  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of 
Northern  Virginia  ;  General  P.  G.  T.  Beauregard  to  the  command  of  the  Potomac 
Division  ;  Major-General  T.  II.  Holmes  to  the  command  of  the  Aquia  District ; 
and  Major-General  T.  J.  Jackson  to  the  command  of  the  Valley  District. 

III.  The  troops  serving  in  the  Potomac  District  will  be  brigaded  and  formed 
into  divisions  as  follows  : 

First  Division,  under  command  of  Major-General  Van  Dorn  : 

First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Clark,  to  consist  of  four  Mississippi  regiments. 

Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Whiting,  to  consist  of  five  Mississippi  reg 
iments. 

Third  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Stuart,  to  consist  of  the  cavalry  of  this  dis 
trict,  to  be  united  into  one  brigade. 

Fourth,  the  Hampton  Legion,  under  Colonel . 

Second  Division,  under  command  of  Major-General  G.  W.  Smith  : 

First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Exvell,  to  consist  of  four  Virginia  regiments. 

Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  S.Jones,  to  consist  of  four  Virginia  regiments. 

Third  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Early,  to  consist  of  four  Virginia  regiments. 

Fourth  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Crittenden,  to  consist  of  two  Virginia  reg 
iments,  two  Tennessee  regiments,  and  one  Kentucky  regiment. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  XIII.  481 

Fifth  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Cocke,  to  consist  of  four  Virginia  regiments. 

Third  Division,  under  command  of  Major-General  Longstrcet : 

First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  D.  It.  Jones,  to  consist  of  four  South  Carolina 
regiments. 

Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Bonham,  to  consist  of  four  South  Carolina 
regiments. 

Third  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Wilcox,  to  consist  of  four  Alabama  regiments. 

Fourth  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Rodes,  to  consist  of  four  Alabama  regiments. 

Fifth  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Taylor,  to  consist  of  five  Louisiana  regiments. 

Fourth  Division,  under  command  of  Major-General  E.  K.  Smith  : 

First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Walker,  to  consist  of  four  Georgia  regiments. 

Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Toombs,  to  consist  of  four  Georgia  regiments. 

Third  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  El/ey,  to  consist  of  three  Georgia  regiments 
and  one  Maryland. 

Fourth  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Evans,  to  consist  of  five  North  Carolina 
regiments. 

Fifth  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Wigfull,  to  consist  of  three  Texas  regiments 
and  one  Louisiana  regiment. 

The  particular  regiments  for  these  several  brigades  will  be  designated  by  the 
commanding  general  of  the  Department  of  Northern  Virginia,  in  conformity  to 
this  programme,  according  to  States. 

The  arrangement  will  be  gradually  carried  into  effect,  as  soon  as,  in  the  judg 
ment  of  the  commanding  general,  it  can  be  safely  done  under  present  exigencies. 

By  command  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  S.  COOPKR,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Genl. 

Official. 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A. -Genl. 


IlKADqUARTKRS  1ST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  TIIK  PoTOMAC, 

NEAR  (,'KNTRKVILLK,  Aor.Sd/A,  16G1. 
General  Orders,  No.  75. 

A  new  banner  is  intrusted  to-day,  as  a  battle-flag,  to  the  safe  keeping  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  Soldiers  :  Your  mothers, your  wives,  and  your  sisters  have 
made;  it.  Consecrated  by  their  hands,  it  must  lead  you  to  substantial  victory, 
and  the  complete  triumph  of  our  cause.  It  can  never  be  surrendered,  save  to 
your  unspeakable  dishonor,  and  with  consequences  fraught  with  immeasurable 
evil.  Under  its  untarnished  folds  beat  back  the  invader,  and  find  nationality, 
everlasting  immunity  from  an  atrocious  despotism,  and  honor  and  renown  for 
yourselves — or  death. 

By  command  of  General  Beauregard. 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.-Genl. 


NAVAL' RENDEZVOUS,  BOSTON  NAVY  YARD, 

Jan.  '3d,  Id72. 
Genl.  BKAURKGARD  : 

Dear  Sir, — In  a  letter  recently  received  from  my  friend,  Edward  C.  Anderson, 
Esq.,  of  Savannah,  whom,  doubtless,  you  know,  he  says  :  "  At  the  first  battle  of 

I.— 31 


482  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XIII. 

Manassas,  the  regimental  colors  resembled,  each,  other  so  closely  that  each  party 
accused  the  other  of  displaying  its  colors.  On  that  account,  an  attempt  was 
made  by  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  to  substitute  State  colors  for  those  of  the 
Confederacy  ;  but  not  being  able  to  obtain  them,  except  for  Virginia  regiments, 
designs  were  called  for.  Most  of  these  were  designs  by  Louisianiaus,  and  were 
presented  by  General  Beauregard.  That  selected  had  a  red  ground  with  a  blue 
diagonal  cross." 

Will  you  do  me  the  favor  to  inform  me  who  was  the  designer  of  the  well- 
known  battle-flag  of  the  Confederacy  thus  introduced  by  you,  and  as  much  as 
may  be  convenient  concerning  it,  and  the  other  designs  referred  to  f  I  am  also 
very  desirous  of  ascertaining  the  exact  devices  of  the  flag  hoisted  on  the  City 
Hall  at  New  Orleans — the  flag  of  Louisiana,  when  Farragut  appeared  before  the 
city,  iu  April,  1862.  My  impression  of  it  is  that  it  had  a  blue  Union  blazoned 
with  a  single  white  star,  and  that  its  field  was  striped  horizontally  white,  red, 
blue ;  but  I  do  not  recollect  the  number  of  the  stripes  or  the  order  of  their 
arrangement. 

The  enclosed  prospectus  will  show  you  why  I  make  these  inquiries.  I  pro 
pose  giving,  as  you  see,  some  account  of  the  flags  of  the  Confederacy,  and  shall 
illustrate  the  account  with  a  page  giving  a  colored  representation  of  eighteen 
varieties  of  flags.  I  wish  to  obtain,  for  that  purpose,  a  correct  drawing  of  the 
State  flag  of  Louisiana. 

Excuse  my  trespassing  upon  you  in  this  matter,  and  I  am 
Yours,  respectfully, 

GEORGE  HENRY  FEEBLE,  Capt.  U.  S.  Navy. 


MANASSAS,  Sept.  5lh,  1861. 

Dear  General, — Colonel  Miles  informs  me  that  the  flag  committee  voted  down 
any  change  of  our  flag  by  a  vote  of  four  to  one,  ho  being  alone  in  favor  of  it.  I 
wrote  to  him  then  to  propose  that  we  should  have  two  flags — a  peace  or  parade 
flag,  and  a  war  flag,  to  be  used  onlj*  on  the  field  of  battle — but  Congress  having 
adjourned,  no  action  will  be  taken  in  the  matter.  How  would  it  do  for  us  to 
address  the  War  Department  on  the  subject  for  a  supply  of  regimental,  war,  or 
badge  flags,  made  of  red  with  two  blue  bars  crossing  each  other  diagonally,  on 
which  shall  be  introduced  the  stars — the  edge  of  the  ziag  to  be  trimmed  all 
around  with  white,  yellow,  or  gold  fringe  ?  We  would  then,  on  the  field  of  bat 
tle,  know  our  friends  from  our  enemies. 

I  send  you,  herewith,  a  letter  written  yesterday  to  General  Cooper.  It  would 
seem  that  the  small-minded  politicians  and  newsmongers  about  Richmond  can 
not  understand  that  we  should  be  able  to  get  along  harmoniously  together.  To 
prevent  any  evil  consequences  resulting  therefrom,  I  thought  it  better  to  write 
said  letter  to  Cooper.  Yours  truly,  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Genl.  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  Ceutreville,  Va. 

P.  S. — Perhaps  the  rumor  is  due  to  my  having  sent  my  ordnance  officer  to  Rich 
mond  to  hurry  up  all  the  artillery  and  war  rocket-batteries  he  could  possibly  get. 
Let  us  each  get  all  that  we  can,  of  both,  and  then  we  will  see  about  equalizing 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XIII.  483 

them  to  our  forces — the  latter  can  be  clone  so  likewise,  if  you  desire  it,  when 
re  i  ii  fore  cine  ri  ts  shall  have  stopped  coming  up.  G.  T.  B. 


MAXASSAS,  VA.,  &>pt.  4  It,  1301. 

Dear  Colonel, — Your  favor  of  the  2d  instant  was  received  last  night.  I  am 
glad  to  hear  of  the  probable  success  of  my  artillery  raid.  I  hope  the  rockets 
(war)  will  also  be  forthcoming.  I  place  much  reliance  upon  them,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  running  off  the  field  McClellan's  bipeds  and  quadrupeds. 

I  regret  to  hear  of  the  failure  about  the  change  of  flag;  but  what  can  now  1)0 
done  is,  to  authorize  commanding  generals  in  the  field  to  furnish  their  troops 
Avith  a  "  field,  or  battle-flag,"  which  shall  be  according  to  your  design,  leaving  out, 
however,  the  white  border,  or  rim,  separating  the  blue  from  the  red.  I  would 
have  it  simply  a  red  ground  with  two  blue  bars  crossing  each  other  diagonal!}', 
on  which  shall  be  the  white  stars ;  a  white  or  golden  fringe  might  go  all  around 
the  sides  of  the  flag;  we  would  then  have  two  flags— a  peace,  or  parade,  flag, 
and  a  war  flag.  This  would  obviate  all  difliculties. 

I  will  bo  most  happy  to  sec  here  your  committee.  I  hope  no  dissensions  be 
tween  "the  powers  that  be"  will  result  from  the  action  of  said  committee;  for 
what  we  require  most  is  the  harmonious  action  of  every  department  of  our  gov 
ernment.  We  have  no  time  now  for  quarrels  and  bickerings;  but  there  is  no 
doubt  it  would  bo  a  national  good  if  one  or  two  individuals  of  our  acquaint 
ance  could  be  sent  "on  a  foreign  mission,''  somewhere  about  the  Celestial  Em 
pire  or  to  Japan.  I  send  you,  herewith,  a  letter  to  General  Cooper,  which  I 
wish  you  to  read  and  then  send  to  him.  I  have  thought  it  was  best  to  stop  the 
thing  referred  to  therein,  at  once.  Head  it,  also,  to  Colonels  Chestnut  and 
Preston.  Yours  truly, 

G.  T.  BEAUKKGAKD. 

Col.  W.  POIJCHEI:  MILKS.  Member  of  Congress,  Richmond,  Va. 


SATURDAY,  Jan.  13th,  1872. 

Dear  General, — Apologizing  for  not  having  communicated  with  you  on  the 
subject  of  your  note  of  yesterday,  I  have  to  say  that  I  presented  several  designs 
(colored,  on  pasteboard)  which  were  prepared  prior  to  my  leaving  New  Orleans, 
with  my  command,  in  May,  1861. 

The  battle-flag  which  was  adopted,  as  I  remember,  was  a  square  flag  with  the 
bar  of  blue  running  diagonally  from  the  corners,  making  a  Greek  cross  of  blue, 
with  stars  white  on  a  red  field.  I  do  not  recollect  if  there  was  any  discussion 
involving  the  question  of  the  character  of  the  cross.  The  flag  was  adopted  as 
the  best  to  be  recognized  in  battle,  to  distinguish  our  troops  in  action. 

The  time  that  has  elapsed  since  we  were  at  Fairfax,  where  these  interesting 
occurrences  took  place,  will  excuse  the  absence  of  any  precise,  or  even  authori 
tative,  statement.  My  memory  is  not  as  certain  as  I  would  desire. 

I  am,  General,  very  truly  yours,  J.  13.  WALTON. 

Geul.  G.  T.  UKAUUKGAIID. 


484  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XIII. 

FRANKFORT,  KY.,  Jan.  IStJi,  1872. 

My  dear  General, — Your  kind  note  of  the  llth  instant,  enclosing  copy  of  letter 
to  Captain  Preble,  in  reference  to  Confederate  "  battle-flag,"  is  received.  Icon- 
cur  with  you  in  regard  to  your  recollections  of  the  circumstances  connected 
•with  its  adoption,  and  have  so  endorsed  upon  the  letter. 

Caramba !  what  recollection  the  sight  of  your  handwriting  and  reference  to 
"Fairfax  Court-House,"  "  battle-flags,"  etc.,  brings  swarming  in  my  mind.  But 
"What  is  done,  is  done,"  and  can't  be  undone.  My  wife  joins  me  in  kind  re 
gards  to  yourself  and  family.  As  ever,  very  truly,  your  friend, 

GUSTAVUS  W.  SMITH. 
Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  New  Orleans,  La. 


SAVANNAH,  Jan.  IGth,  1872. 

My  dear  General, — Your  letter  of  the  llth  is  received,  and,  as  you  request,  I 
write  my  "recollections"  of  the  origin  of  the  "  battle-flag." 

It  was  generally  believed  by  those  with  whom  I  was  in  the  habit  of  convers 
ing,  just  after  the  battle  of  Manassas,  that  some  of  the  Federal  regiments  bore 
Confederate  colors  in  the  action,  and  Northern  papers  contained  similar  accusa 
tions  against  us.  This  led  to  observation  of  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing 
the  colors  of  the  armies  from  each  other.  On  that  account  I  attempted  to 
procure,  from  the  different  Southern  States,  State  flags  for  their  regiments. 
Only  the-  Virginia  regiments  were  supplied  in  this  way,  however,  when,  you  and 
other  leading  officers  concurring  as  to  the  necessity,  I  determined  to  have  colors 
made  by  the  Quartermaster's  Department.  Many  designs,  drawn  by  members 
of  the  army,  were  offered — most  by  you.  All  of  them  were  oblong.  I  selected 
one  of  those  you  offered,  but  changed  the  shape  to  square,  and  fixed  the  size: 
colors  of  infantry  to  be  four  feet,  of  artillery  three,  and  standards  to  be  two  and 
a  half.  They  were  then  made  by  the  Quartermaster's  Department  as  soon  as 
practicable. 

I  had  no  conference  or  correspondence  with  the  AVar  Department  or  civilians 
on  the  subject.  My  recollection  is  that  it  was  an  army  affair,  and,  when  ques 
tioned  on  the  subject,  I  have  always  said  so.  I  was  not  a  party  to  your  consulta 
tion  with  Colonel  Miles,  but  heard  long  after,  indirectly,  from  him,  that  he  had 
corresponded  with  you  in  relation  to  a  new  design  for  colors. 

I  have  no  particular  confidence  in  my  memory,  but  this  subject  has  been  so 
often  talked  of  in  my  presence,  both  during  and  since  the  war,  that  I  believe 
that  I  am  not  far  wrong  in  my  recollection  of  my  own  agency  in  this  matter, 
such  conversations  having  prevented  me  from  forgetting  circumstances  not  im 
portant  enough  to  be  thought  of  otherwise. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  in  this  generation  Southern  troops  will  fight  better 
under  that  than  any  other  flag,  as  you  say.  Yours  truly, 

J.  E.  JOHNSTON. 

Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.  

FRANKFORT,  KY.,  Jan.  19//»,  1872. 

My  dear  General, — Yours  of  the  13th  instant  reached  me  yesterday.  I  en 
closed  and  scut  the  copy  of  letter  to  Captain  Preble  back  to  you  on  the  15th.  I 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XIII.  485 

concur  in  the  amendments  about  tlie  Latin  and  Greek  crosses,  and  general 
recollection  about  Colonel  Walton's  proposed  flag,  and  accept  your  amendments 
of  the  13th. 

With  kind  regards  fur  you  and  yours,  from  Mrs.  S.  and  myself,  I  remain  as 
ever.  Very  truly,  your  friend, 

GUSTAVUS  W.  .SMITH. 


99  NASSAU  STKEET,  NKW  YORK  CITY,  March  2lst,  1831. 
Genl.  G.  T.  BEAURECIARD,  New  Orleans,  La. : 

Dear  General, — In  reply  to  your  inquiry,  I  have  to  say,  my  recollection  of  the 
circumstances  leading  to  the  adoption  of  the  Confederate  battle-flag  is,  that  you 
took  the  initiative  in  this  matter,  and  directed  the  preparation  of  the  various 
drawings,  etc.,  which  were  submitted  to  General  Johnston.  The  design  which 
you  preferred  was  approved  by  him,  modified  at  his  suggestion,  by  making  the 
Hag  square  in  form  instead  of  rectangular,  as  originally  drawn.  In  this  shape 
it  was  acceptable  to  all  who  were  consulted  on  the  subject. 

Yours  truly,  GUSTAVUS  W.  SMITH. 


NKW  ORLEANS,  La.,  Jan.  —  1872. 

Dear  Sir, — In  answer  to  the  inquiries  contained  in  your  letter  of  the  3d  instant, 
relative  to  the  origin  of  the  Confederate  battle-flag,  and  the  devices  of  the 
Louisiana  State  flag,  flying  on  the  City  Hall  of  New  Orleans  when  Commodore 
Farragut  appeared  before  this  city  in  April,  18(52,  I  give  you,  with  pleasure,  the 
following  information. 

At  the  battle  of  Manassas,  on  the  2lst  of  July,  1801, 1  found  it  difficult  to  dis 
tinguish  our  then  Confederate  flag  from  the  United  States  flag,  especially  when 
General  Early  made  the  flank  movement  which  decided  the  fate  of  the  day,  and 
I  determined  at  that  time  to  have  adopted  a  "battle-flag"  which  would  be  en 
tirely  different  from  any  State  or  Federal  flags.  I  submitted  1113*  views  on  the 
subject  to  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  commanding,  who  approved  of  them, 
and  to  the  Confederate  States  War  Department,  who  made  at  first  some  objec 
tions  to  them,  but  finally  consented.  I  then  designed  a  diagonal  red  cross  with 
white  stars  on  a  blue  field,  but.  on  consultation  with  General  Johnston  and 
Colonel  W.  Porcher  Miles,  Chairman  of  the  House  Military  Committee,  the  latter 
gentleman  suggested  a  red  ground,  with  a  blue  cross,  and  the  former  a  square 
flag,  instead  of  the  slightly  oblong  one  devised  by  me;  these  suggestions  were 
adopted,  after  colored  drawings  of  the  two  flags  had  been  made  and  discussed, 
as  well  as  a  nearly  corresponding  one  from  Colonel  J.  B.  Walton  of  the  Louisiana 
Washington  Artillery.  It  had  the  merit  of  being  small  and  light,  and  of  being 
very  distinct  at  great  distances.  Should  we  ever  be  compelled  to  have  a  for 
eign  war,  I  trust  that  it  will  be  adopted  as  our  national  battle-flag,  to  which 
Southern  soldiers  will  always  gladly  rally  in  a  just  cause. 

The  State  flag  referred  to  by  you  contained  thirteen  stripes,  four  blue,  six 
white,  and  three  red,  commencing  at  top  with  the  colors  as  written.  The  union 


4:86  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XIII. 

was  red,  Avith  its  sides  equal  to  the  width  of  seven  stripes;  in  its  centre  was  a 
single  pale-yellow  star  with  five  points.  I  remain,  yours  very  truly, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 
Capt.  GEORGE  HEXRY  PREBLE,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Naval  Rendezvous,  Boston  Navy  Yard,  Mass. 

FRANKFORT,  KY.,  Jan.  15th,  1872. 

I  was  serving  with  the  Confederate  army,  in  front  of  Mauassas  Junction,  when 
the  Confederate  "battle-flag"  was  adopted,  and  took  part  in  the  discussions  in 
regard  to  it. 

My  recollections  on  the  subject  fully  coincide  with  those  expressed  within 
by  General  Beauregard.  GUSTAVUS  W.  SMITH. 

MEW  YORK,  Jan.  28th,  1872. 

My  dear  General, — Your  missing  note  of  the  llth  instant  has  come  to  hand 
at  last,  with  the  copy  of  your  note  to  Captain  Preble,  and,  although  I  have 
already  substantially  answered  it  in  my  own  note  of  the  other  day,  I  will  state 
now  that  I  distinctly  recollect  that  the  origin  of  our  battle-flag  was  due  to  the 
trouble  which  arose,  as  you  say,  at  the  battle  of  Manassas,  in  consequence  of 
the  similarity  between  the  Confederate  and  Federal  flngs,  on  that  occasion. 

I  remember  that  yon  at  once  set  to  work  to  find  a  guard  against  a  similar 
accident,  and  made  the  first  suggestion  which  I  heard  upon  the  subject. 

I  recollect  also  that  there  was  a  good  deal  of  discussion  touching  the  form 
and  precise  style  of  the  flag,  and  that  it  was  finally  settled  to  adopt  the  small 
square  flag  with  the  Greek  cross. 

You  will  doubtless  recollect  the  ceremony  of  presentation  of  these  flags,  first  to 
Longstreet's  division,  and  afterwards  to  Van  Dorn's  division,  at  Fairfax  Court- 
Housc,  and  the  General  Order  that  I  read  to  the  troops  on  both  occasions. 

It  is  strange  how  soon  the  details  of  such  affairs  become  vague  and  unsettled 
in  the  memory  of  men.  This  should  serve  to  show  how  uncertain  the  details 
of  history  must  be. 

You  may  recollect  that  at  Shiloh  we  had  three  battle-flags.  That  of  Bragg's 
corps  was  like  the  Virginia  one — the  model  of  which  you  furnished.  Polk's 
corps  differed  in  some  way,  although  suggested  by  it ;  or  designed  to  be,  perhaps, 
precisely  alike,  but  differing  by  accident ;  and  the  one  of  Hardce's  corps,  which 
was  of  a  blue  ground  with  a  central  white  medallion — one  that  the  corps  had 
brought  from  Kentucky. 

The  whole  idea  of  these  battle-flags,  however,  came  from  the  battle  of  Ma 
nassas,  and  was  raised  by  you  to  obviate  a  repetition  of  the  difficulty  experienced 
then.  I  recollect  myself  that,  after  the  battle  was  over,  and  I  had  ridden  in 
advance,  I  sa\v  a  flag  with  a  regiment  well  in  advance  of  me,  that  I  was  for  the 
time  confident  must  be  the  Federal  flag,  and  which  I  could  not  believe  could  bo 
ours  from  its  appearance,  even  when  very  close  to  it.  It  was  only  the  appear 
ance  of  the  men  that  gave  me  confidence  to  approach. 

IIow  much  of  the  history  of  the  most  curious  details  of  that  war  will  go  uii- 
written ! 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XIII.  487 

I  see  Early,  in  a  recent  lecture  or  address,  gives  Longstreet  a  slap  about  slow 
ness  and  unreadiness,  and  laek  of  prompt  obedience  at  Gettysburg,  and  attrib 
utes  disaster  there  to  him.  But  the  fact  is,  the  disaster  was  almost  inevitable 
from  the  character  of  the  campaign,  although,  doubtless,  all  that  Early  says  is 
true.  The  campaign  was  one  that  ought  never  to  have  been  made. 

But  will  it  ever  be  said  in  history,  that  Polk's,  and  even  Bragg's,  tardiness 
in  quitting  Corinth,  and  their  slowness  on  the  next  day,  kept  us  from  reaching 
Shiloh  in  time  to  fight  Saturday  ?  I  presume  I  have  approached  as  close  to  the 
allegation  as  will  ever  be  done,  in  my  chapter  on  the  battle,  in  the  work  on 
Forrest's  campaigns. 

Were  justice  done  Bragg  he  would  figure  very  badly  in  several  particulars, 
including  gross  duplicity  and  bad  faith,  both  to  Johnston  and  yourself.  Proof 
of  this  is  iu  a  valuable  book  called  "  Diary  of  a  Clerk  of  the  War  Department  " 
(Confederate),  of  which  I  wrote  you  once,  and  which  yon  ought  to  have  if  you 
do  not  have  it. 

The  Federal  side  of  the  history  is  having  all  its  own  way;  and  it  will  be 
more  and  more  so,  year  by  year,  until  our  great  struggle  will  almost  sink  into 
oblivion,  or  leave  little  more  trace  behind  than  that  of  a  pebble  cast  into  a 
deep  lake.  Yours  very  truly,  THOMAS  JORDAN. 


HEADQUARTERS  IST  Cours  ARMY  or  Tin:  POTOMAC, 

NKAR  CEXTRKVILLE,  Dec.  ISth,  18G1. 

General, — It  is  the  wish  of  the  general  commanding  this  corps  to  inaugurate 
a  system  by  which  leaves  of  absence  shall  be  given  to  persons  whose  families  or 
attain*  actually  need  their  early  presence  at  home.  For  the  present  he  has  de 
termined  to  grant  leaves,  to  begin  after  Christinas,  to  the  extent  of  two  captains 
and  five  lieutenants  from  a  regiment,  and  say  at  the  rate  often  men — non-com 
missioned  officers  and  privates — from  a  company  of  average  size.  But  he  is  anx 
ious  that  these  leaves  should  at  first  be  extended  to  those  in  each  regiment  to 
whom  it  will  be  of  the  most  essential  and  manifest  service.  Therefore,  I  am 
instructed  to  say,  he  desires  these  leaves  to  be  determined  by  the  recommenda 
tion  of  the  colonels  or  commanders  of  the  regiments,  after  an  examination  of 
pressing  applications  within  the  limits  just  prescribed.  Not  to  exceed  thirty 
days  will  be  granted  at  present. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN*,  A.  A.-Gcnl. 


SUMMERS  HOUSE,  Jan.  16//i,  18G2. 

Dear  General, — My  horse  is  so  smooth  shod,  and  it  is  so  slippery,  that  I  am 
afraid  of  him — -fearful  of  a  fall,  as  ho  was  near  falling  with  me  to-day. 

I  send  over  the  paper,  however,  enclosed  in  the  very  envelope  in  which  it  came 
to  this  office.  I  saw  General  Johnston,  and  explained  to  him  the  design  and 
effect  of  the  publication  of  the  order — ho  seeming  quite  satisfied. 

I  was  sorry  to  see  Hill's  note.  The  river  will  close  soon  under  such  cold  as 
this  afternoon. 


488  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XIII. 

General  Cooper  will  not  inspect.  I  asked  him  to  inspect  the  books  and  pa 
pers,  but  lie  said  lie  would  not  liave  time.  I  had  a  long  talk  with  him  on  gen 
eral  subjects.  He  was  surprised  to  find  that  but  one  copy  of  the  Order  No.  1 
had  been  received.  There  is  ail  Order  No.  2  out,  he  says,  about  sending  persons 
to  recruit  up  the  companies. 

Hoping  that  you  are  better  to-day,  I  will  ride  over  in  the  morning  for  your 
Orders.  Thanks  for  the  socks.  Yours  truly, 

THOMAS  JORDAN. 

P.  S.  The  endorsement  does  not  order  promulgation  of  Orders  No.  1.  It  directs 
you,  by  name,  to  act  in  accordance  with  that  order  in  case  of  Captain  Fowler, 
whose  company  had  re-enlisted. 


SUMMERS  HOUSE,  Jan.  I7th,  1862. 

Dear  General, — Under  cover  to  you  came  this  morning  packages  addressed  to 
all  the  colonels  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  of  both  corps  and  the  reserve,  and 
which  packages  were  severally  addressed  care  of  "General  Beauregard."  Now 
these  packages  I  knotv  to  contain  the  orders  about  re-enlistments  and  recruit 
ment.  I  found  in  the  package  a  number  of  loose  copies  of  both  orders — copies 
of  which  I  enclose  for  your  files. 

This  is  another  marked  instance  of  the  determination  at  Richmond  to  hold  you 
as  the  commander  of  the  A.  P. 

I  think  no  copies  of  these  orders  have  come  either  for  General  Johnston  or 
Smith,  G.  W.  and  Kirby.  It  might  bo  well  for  me  to  enclose  to  General  John 
ston  (unofficially)  the  two  orders,  and  state  the  circumstances  of  the  receipt  of 
these  packages  ;  or,  you  could  do  it. 

I  send  you  a  paper  for  General  Hill.  I  also  send  a  package  of  envelopes 
which  I  had  ready  done  up  to  send  you,  when  your  message  was  delivered. 

The  pencils  were  sent  at  request  of  Colonel  Chisolm. 

Yours  truly,  THOMAS  JORDAN. 


SUMMERS  HOUSE,  Dec.  27th,  1861. 

Dear  General, — It  is  so  bitter  cold  in  the  wind,  to-night,  that  I  shall  not  go 
over. 

I  would  have  gone  over  this  morning,  to  consult  your  wishes  as  to  some  office 
matters;  but,  just  as  I  was  about  to  leave,  I  was  informed  you  were  not  at 
home. 

I  submit  to  your  consideration  the  rough  note  of  a  letter  to  General  Johnston, 
on  a  subject  really  of  importance.  The  War  Department  persistently  ignore 
the  existence  of  corps  commands,  and  address  you  as  Commander  of  the  "Poto 
mac  District."  General  Johnston  does  not  give  you  the  district  command,  and 
you  cannot  assume  it ;  but  he  never,  in  orders,  gave  you  the  corps  command. 
You  took  the  designation  yourself.  In  view  of  the  action,  and  repeatedly  ex 
pressed  wishes,  of  the  War  Department,  I  submit  that  you  should  drop  the  des 
ignation  of  Headquarters  1st  Corps,  and  inform  General  Johnston  of  the  fact.  It 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XV.  489 

is  best  for  all.  I  sincerely  believe  that  this  should  be  done,  otherwise  some  dif 
ficulty  will  grow  out  of  it,  though,  as  yet,  the  speck  is  not  as  "large  as  one's 
hand."  Yours  truly,  THOMAS  JORDAN. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XV. 

RICHMOND,  Jan.  20th,  1862. 
Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

In  my  opinion  you  ought  not  to  go  to  the  Mississippi.     I  will  explain  to  you 
when  we  meet.  Your  friend,  11.  TOOMBS,  Biig.-Geul. 


CENTREVILLE,  Jan.  21s/,  18G2. 
about  12  h.  M. 

Answer. 

Very  well;  please  explain  as  soon  as  possible.  I  am  anxious  to  do  for  the 
best.  G.  T.  BEAUKEUARD. 

Genl.  R.  TOOMBS.  

RICHMOND,  Jan.  20//J,  18G2. 
Cant.  E.  P.  ALEXANDER  : 

Urge  General  Beauregard  to  decline  all  proposals  and  solicitations. 

WILLIAM  F.  ALEXANDER. 

Private  and  confidential. 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  Jan.  23rf,  18G2. 

Dear  General,— 

My  reasons  for  venturing  to  send  you  the  telegram  I  did  were  few,  but  very 
decided.  In  the  first  place,  I  think  the  line  of  the  Potomac  is  by  far  the  most 
important  in  the  contest.  It  is  at  that  point,  by  strong  and  energetic  move 
ments,  wo  will  be  compelled  to  disentangle  ourselves  from  our  present  difficul 
ties.  I  consider  your  presence  there  as  of  the  highest  possible  importance  to 
the  success  of  those  movements.  And  I  think  it  will  bo  much  easier  for  yon  to 
get  away  from  there  than  for  the  country  to  get  you  back  there.  Therefore 
you  ought  to  stand  firmly  by  it.  You  will  not  be  ordered  away ;  but,  once  away, 
you  would  not,  in  my  opinion,  be  ordered  back. 

I  am,  very  truly  yours,  etc.,  R.  TOOMBS. 

Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD.  

RICHMOND,  Jan.  24M,  1862. 
Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Don't  think  Toombs's  objections  valid.  Your  letter  not  received.  May  I  tell 
President  you  will  go?  Say  go.  ROGER  A.  PRYOR. 

[Answered  on  the  25th  at  11  A.  M.,  as  follows  :] 

Yes,  I  will  go.     May  God  protect  our  cause !  G.  T.  BEAUREGAKD. 

Col.  ROGER  A.  PRYOR. 


490  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XV. 

HEADQUARTERS  NEAR  CENTREVILLE, 
Jan.  23d,  1862. 

My  dear  Colonel, — I  need  not  assure  you  that  I  am  deeply  gratified  by  the 
mark  of  consideration  conferred  by  the  gentlemen  of  Congress  in  the  request  of 
•which  you  have  been  the  agreeable  bearer ;  a  request  made,  as  you  advise  me, 
with  the  sanction  of  his  Excellency  the  President,  who  has  been  pleased  to  ex 
press  the  desire  that  my  own  wishes  should  be  consulted  before  any  assignment 
to  command  should  be  made  which  shall  separate  me  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

I  am  a  soldier  of  the  cause  and  of  my  country,  read}',  at  this  juncture  and  dur 
ing  this  war,  to  do  duty  cheerfully  wheresoever  placed  by  the  constituted  au 
thorities;  but  I  must  admit  that  I  would  be  most  reluctant  to  disassociate  my 
fortunes  from  those  of  this  army,  and  unwilling  to  bo  permanently  separated 
from  men  to  whose  strong  personal  attachment  for  arid  confidence  in  me  I  shall 
not  affect  blindness.  In  view,  however,  of  the  season,  and  of  the  bad  condition 
of  the  country  for  military  operations,  I  should  be  happy  to  be  used  elsewhere, 
if  my  services  are  considered  at  all  necessary  for  the  public  good,  whether  on 
the  Mississippi  or  at  any  other  threatened  point  of  the  Confederate  States. 

But,  should  it  be  determined  to  employ  me  at  Columbus,  as  you  have  given 
me  to  understand  is  the  wish  of  the  President  and  Congress,  I  hope  it  will  be 
regarded  as  entirely  within  my  province  to  be  anxiously  heedful  of  the  means 
of  men  and  material  to  be  placed  at  my  disposition.  In  this  connection  I  should 
be  particularly  anxious  to  secure  all  possible  assistance,  and  should  desire  to 
take  with  me  certain  officers  of  my  command,  not  indispensable  to  this  army, 
in  addition  to  my  present  general  and  personal  staff,  to  aid  me  in  the  organiza 
tion  of  the  forces  which  may  be  intrusted  to  me.  But,  even  with  their  assist 
ance,  time  may  be  required  to  attain  that  degree  of  organization  and  discipline 
so  essential  to  military  success.  I  repeat,  however,  that  I  am  entirely  at  the 
service  of  the  country.  Yours  very  truly,  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

P.  S.  Should  I  be  ordered  to  the  Mississippi  Valley,  it  would  be  advisable,  I 
think,  to  request  the  newspapers  not  to  publish  it  at  present,  for  obvious 
reasons.  G.  T.  B. 

To  Col.  ROGER  A.  PRYOR,  Richmond,  Virginia. 


PETERSBURG,  August  15M,  1864. 

General, — In  answer  to  your  note  of  yesterday,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit 
the  following  statement : 

Some  time  in  the  winter  of  1862,  it  was  represented,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Mili 
tary  Committee  of  the  Provisional  Congress,  that  the  aspect  of  affairs  in  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee  was  discouraging  to  our  cause,  and  that  your  presence  in 
that  quarter  was  extremely  desirable,  as  well  by  reason  of  the  confidence  with 
which  the  circumstance  would  inspire  the  public,  as  the  efficiency  which  it 
would  probably  impart  to  the  operations  of  our  forces  on  that  theatre.  Yield 
ing  to  these  suggestions,  the  committee  unanimously  agreed  that  an  effort 
should  be  made  to  procure  your  transfer  to  the  Army  of  the  West.  To  that 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XV.  401 

end,  I  was  directed  to  consult  the  President  on  the  propriety  of  the  measure, 
and,  in  case  he  should  approve  it,  I  was  requested  to  solicit  your  own.  acqui 
escence  in  the  transfer. 

The  President  having  avowed  his  readiness  to  order  you  West,  on  the  condi 
tion  that  you  were  not  averse  to  the  change,  I  went  to  Centreville  to  obtain 
your  consent.  I  remember  you  evinced  the  greatest  reluctance  to  be  detached 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but,  yielding  at  last  to  my  earnest  importunities, 
urged  with  an  exclusive  reference  to  the  public  interest,  and  supported  by  the 
written  entreaties  and  arguments  of  representatives  from  the  States  chiefly 
concerned,  you  were  pleased  to  give  a  qualified  assent  to  the  proposed  transfer. 
What  your  conditions  were,  I  find  it  impossible,  after  so  long  a  lapse  of  time, 
to  recollect  with  sufficient  particularity  to  affirm  with  an  absolute  assurance 
of  correctness.  My  impression,  however,  is  that  they  were  such  as  you  repre 
sent.  Whatever  they  were,  I  understood  the  Honorable  Secretary  of  War  to 
agree  to  them,  and  I  telegraphed  you  accordingly.  In  reply  you  asked  for 
orders. 

As  well  as  I  am  able  to  recollect  the  details  of  an  affair  so  long  past,  and 
which,  until  the  present  moment,  I  have  had  no  occasion  to  recall,  this,  General, 
is  a  correct  statement  of  the  circumstances  of  your  transfer  from  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  to  the  Army  of  West  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

KOGER  A.  PRYOR. 
Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREUARD.  

CKNTREVILLE,  VA.,  Jan.  25//t,  1862. 

Dear  General, — Yours  just  received  ;  I  will  be  on  hand  as  directed. 
I  have  received  a  telegram  from  Pryor  which  says  I  must  go  temporarily  to 
Columbus.     Much  fear  is  entertained  of  the  Mississippi  Valley.     I  have  author 
ized  him  to  say  Yes.     I  will  be  back  here  as  soon  as  possible. 
I  will  not  leave  until  you  are  back. 

Yours,  etc.,  0.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Genl.  J.  E.  JOHNSTON. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

RICHMOND,  26//t  Jan.,  18G2. 

Sir, — Colonel  Pryor  has  reported  to  the  President,  as  the  result  of  his  inter 
view  with  you,  that  you  would  cheerfully  accept  the  command  of  the  defences 
at  Columbus,  Ivy.,  and  that  your  absence  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  at  the 
present  time,  would  not  seriously  impair  its  efficiency. 

He,  therefore,  desires  that  you  proceed  at  once  to  report  to  General  A.  S. 
Johnston  at  Bowling  Green,  Ky.,  and  thence  proceed,  as  promptly  as  possible,  to 
assume  your  new  command  at  Columbus,  which  is  threatened  by  a  powerful 
force,  and  the  successful  defence  of  which  is  of  vital  importance. 

You  are  authorized  to  take  with  you  your  present  staff,  or  such  members  of  it 
as  you  wish  to  accompany  you.  I  am,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Sec.  of  War. 
Geul.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Manassas. 


492  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XV. 

HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

CENTREVILLE,  VA.,  Jan.  29th,  1862. 

Sir, — I  have  this  day  received  the  War  Department  letter  of  the  26th  instant, 
ordering  me  to  assume  "command  of  the  defences"  at  Columbus,  Ky.  I  will 
leave  here,  as  soon  as  practicable,  via  Nashville  and  Bowling  Green. 

I  remain  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gcnl.  Comdg. 
lion.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Sec.  of  War,  Richmond,  Va. 


CENTREVILLE,  Jan.  29th,  1862. 

My  dear  General, — I  have  just  received  the  enclosed  letter,  much  to  my  regret. 
I  have  been  hoping  that  the  views  of  the  War  Department  might  be  changed. 

Your  transfer  from  this  army  is  a  great  loss  to  it — a  very  great  loss  to  me. 
The  troops  you  have  formed  regard  you  as  their  general,  and  my  confidence  in 
you  makes  me  feel  weakened  by  our  separation.  You  will  take  with  you  my 
best  wishes.  The  best  is  that  you  may  have  fair  opportunities;  you  know  how 
to  use  them.  Very  truly  yours,  J.  E.  JOHNSTON. 

Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

Near  CENTREVILLE,  Jan.  29th,  1862. 

General, — In  addition  to  my  staff,  it  is  essential  I  should  be  allowed  Major 
G.W.  Brent,  17th  regiment  Virginia  Volunteers,  in  Inspector-General's  Depart 
ment.  Captain  S.  W.  Presstman,  17th  Virginia,  Captain  J.  M.  Wampler,  8th 
Virginia,  as  Topographical  and  Military  Engineers,  under  the  recent  Act  of 
Congress.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Geul.  Comdg. 
SAMUEL  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Genl.,  Richmond. 


CENTREVILLE,  VA.,  Jan.  30th,  1862. 

Sir, — I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  I  shall  hurry  through  to  Bowling  Green 
to  report  to  General  A.  S.  Johnston. 

As  it  will  be  my  object  to  have  my  command  thoroughly  organized  as  soon 
after  my  arrival  at  Columbus  as  possible,  I  hope  I  shall  be  excused  for  suggest 
ing  to  the  War  Department  the  following  organization  of  the  forces  there,  if 
not  already  made,  to  wit : 

Brigades  of  four  regiments,  divisions  of  three  brigades,  with  a  light  battery, 
at  least,  for  each  brigade. 

Should  officers  of  the  proper  rank  and  capacity  be  wanting,  in  part,  for  this 
organization,  my  anxiety  for  securing  the  efficiency  of  my  command,  to  bo 
handled  in  a  field  unknown  to  me,  must  be  my  excuse,  further,  for  respectfully 
recommending  the  following  as  officers  whose  services  I  would  be  glad  to  have,  in 
case  additional  general  officers  are  needed  there,  namely :  Lieutenant-Colonel  W. 
W.  Mackall,  Adjutant  and  Inspector  General's  Department,  to  command  a  divis- 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XV.  493 

ion;  Colonels  Charles  Winder,  Ctli  South  Carolina  Volunteers,  A.  P.  Hill,  13th 
regiment  Virginia  Volunteers,  Samuel  Garland,  llth  Virginia,  John  Pegrani 
(late  'Jd  Dragoons  ),  and  George  H.  Stewart,  1st  Maryland,  as  brigade  com 
manders,  in  the  order  mentioned,  as  they  may  be  required. 

It  is  proper  for  me  to  say,  that  personally  I  am  but  slightly  acquainted  \vith 
these  officers,  and  have  been  induced  to  present  their  names  from  the  confidence 
they  have  inspired,  as  soldiers,  in  those  who  know  them  well. 

A  certain  number  of  engineer,  or  acting  engineer,  officers  are  also  absolutely 
essential  for  the  efficient  defence  of  such  a  position  as  Columbus,  as  well  as  for 
any  offensive  operations  from  that  point.  I  shall  take  Captain  D.  13.  Harris, 
Engineer  Virginia  forces,  with  me,  but  hope,  in  addition,  I  may  be  allowed  the 
assistance  of  Captain  J.  M.  "NVampler,  8th,  and  S.  W.  Presstman,  17th,  Virginia 
regiments,  and  of  Captain  -  —  Frdmeaux,  8th  regiment  Louisiana  Volunteers, 
to  be  appointed  as  officers  in  the  Provisional  Engineer  Corps. 

I  am  further  desirous  of  having  the  assistance  of  Major  G.  "W*.  Brent,  17th 
regiment  Virginia  Volunteers,  to  act  as  an  Assistant  Inspector-General  to  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Polignac,  whose  health  is  delicate.  Major  Brent  has  shown 
capacity  for  the  important  duties  of  the  place,  and  has  had  experience  that 
would  make  him  valuable  to  me. 

A  proper  signal  officer  will  be  indispensable.  The  best  I  can  do  is  to  recom 
mend,  for  appointment,  ex-Lieutenant  Cummins,  Maryland  Volunteers,  now  in 
Ilichmond,  warmly  recommended  by  Captain  E.  1*.  Alexander,  Engineers,  who 
has  trained  him  for  the  duties. 

I  trust  competent  ordnance  and  subsistence  officers  will  be  found  already  in 
place,  as  I  have  none  to  suggest  ;  and  it  is  needless  for  me  to  say  how  impor 
tant  that  such  duties  shall  be  efficiently  discharged. 

Colonel  Jordan,  my  Adjutant-General,  will  give  in  person,  to  the  War  De 
partment,  any  additional  information  that  may  be  required  in  connection  with  an 
army  of  Volunteers  in  the  field,  based  on  nine  months'  experience  with  this  army. 

I  have  the  honor  to  request  that  written  instructions,  for  my  guidance,  may 
be  sent  me  through  Colonel  Jordan,  who  will  join  me  at  Columbus  without 
delay.  IZespcct  fully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  Bi:  AUREGARD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 

SAMTEL  COOPER,  Genl.  and  Adj.  and  Insp.  Genl.,  Kichmond. 


HEADQUARTERS  DF.PAIITMEXT  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

Jan.  '30 tli,  1862. 
General  Orders,  No.  17. 

In  obedience  to  orders  received  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  assigning  him  to 
an  important  position  in  another  department,  General  Beauregard  is  relieved 
from  the  duties  of  his  present  command. 

In  losing  the  aid  of  this  distinguished  soldier,  the  commanding  general  can 
not  withhold  the  expression  of  his  sense  of  the  eminent  services  by  which  he 
has  achieved  so  much  for  our  country,  our  cause,  and  the  renown  of  our  arms. 

By  command  of  General  Johnston. 

A.  P.  MASON,  A.  A.  A.-Gcul. 


494  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XV. 

Feb.  12th,  1862. 
Col.  W.  \V.  MACKALL,  A.  A.-Geul.  C.  S.  A.,  Bowling  Green : 

£ir} — My  communication  of  the  7th  instant,  sent  from  Fort  Henry,  having  an 
nounced  the  fact  of  the  surrender  of  that  fort  to  Commodore  Foote,  of  the  Fed 
eral  navy,  on  the  6th  iust.,  I  have  now  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report 
of  the  details  of  the  action,  together  with  the  accompanying  papers,  marked 
A,  B,  containing  list  of  officers  and  men  surrendered,  together  with  casual 
ties,  etc. 

******* 

The  wretched  military  position  of  Fort  Henry,  and  the  small  force  at  my  dis 
posal,  did  not  permit  me  to  avail  myself  of  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from 
the  system  of  outworks,  built  with  the  hope  of  being  reinforced  in  time,  and 
compelled  me  to  determine  to  concentrate  my  efforts,  by  land,  within  the  rifle- 
pits  surrounding  the  10th  Tennessee  and  4th  Mississippi  regiments,  in  case  I 
deemed  it  possible  to  do  more  than  to  operate  solely  against  the  attack  by  the 
river.  Accordingly,  my  entire  command  was  paraded  and  placed  in  the  rifle- 
pits  around  the  above  camps,  and  minute  instructions  given,  not  only  to  bri 
gades,  but  to  regiments  and  companies,  as  to  the  exact  ground  each  was  to  oc 
cupy.  Seconded  by  the  able  assistance  of  Major  Gilmer,  of  the  Engineers,  of 
whose  valuable  services  I  thus  early  take  pleasure  in  speaking,  and  by  Colonels 
Heiman  and  Drake,  everything  was  arranged  to  make  a  formidable  resistance 
against  anything  like  fair  odds.  It  was  known  to  me,  on  the  day  before,  that 
the  enemy  had  reconnoitred  the  roads  leading  to  Fort  Donelson,  from  Bailey's 
Ferry,  by  way  of  Iron  Mountain  Furnace  ;  and  at  10  o'clock  A.  M.,  on  the  5th,  I 
sent  forward,  from  Fort  Henry,  a  strong  reconnoitring  party  of  cavalry.  They 
had  not  advanced  more  than  one  and  a  half  miles  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy, 
when  they  encountered  their  reconnoitring  party.  Our  cavalry  charged  them 
in  gallant  style,  upon  which  the  enemy's  cavalry  fell  back,  with  a  loss  of  only 
one  man  on  each  side. 

Very  soon  the  main  body  of  the  Federal  advance  guard,  composed  of  a  regi 
ment  of  infantry  and  a  large  force  of  cavalry,  was  met,  upon  which  our  cavalry 
retreated.  On  receipt  of  this  news  I  moved  out  in  person,  with  five  companies 
of  the  10th  Tennessee,  five  companies  of  the  4th  Mississippi,  and  fifty  cavalry, 
ordering,  at  the  same  time,  two  additional  companies  of  infantry  to  support  Cap 
tain  Red  at  the  outworks.  Upon  advancing  well  to  the  front  I  found  that  the 
enemy  had  retired.  I  returned  to  camp  at  5  P.  M.,  leaving  Captain  Red  rein 
forced  at  the  outworks.  The  enemy  were  again  reinforced  by  the  arrival  of  a, 
large  number  of  transports.  At  night  the  pickets  from  the  west  bank  reported 
the  landing  of  troops  on  that  side,  opposite  Bailey's  Ferry,  their  advance  pick 
ets  having  been  met  one  and  a  half  miles  from  the  river. 

*  *  ***** 

To  understand  properly  the  difficulties  of  my  position,  it  is  right  that  I  should 
explain  fully  the  unfortunate  location  of  Fort  Henry,  in  reference  to  resistance 
by  a  small  force  against  an  attack  by  land  co-operating  with  the  gunboats,  as 
well  as  its  disadvantages  in  even  an  engagement  with  boats  alone.  The  entire 
fort,  together  with  the  intrenched  camp  spoken  of,  is  enfiladed  from  three  or 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XV.  495 

four  points  on  the  opposite  shore,  while  three  points  on  the  eastern  bank  com 
pletely  command  them  both — all  at  easy  cannon  range.  At  the  same  time  the 
intrenched  camp,  arranged  as  it  was  ill  the  best  possible  manner  to  meet  the 
case,  was  two  thirds  of  it  completely  under  the  control  of  the  fire  of  the  gun 
boats.  The  history  of  military  engineering  records  has  no  parallel  to  this  case. 
Points  within  a  few  miles  of  it,  possessing  great  advantages  and  few  disadvan 
tages,  were  totally  neglected;  and  a  location  fixed  upon,  without  one  redeeming 
feature,  or  filling  one  of  the  many  requirements  of  a  site  for  a  work  such  as  Fort 
Henry.  The  work  itself  was  well  built;  it  was  completed  long  before  I  took 
command,  but  strengthened  greatly  by  myself  in  building  embrasures  and  epaul- 
ments  of  sand-bags.  An  enemy  had  but  to  use  their  most  common  sense  in  ob 
taining  the  advantage  of  high  water,  as  was  the  case,  to  have  complete  and  en 
tire  control  of  the  position.  I  am  guilty  of  no  act  of  injustice  in  this  frank 
avowal  of  the  opinions  entertained  by  myself,  as  well  as  by  all  other  officers  who 
have  become  familiar  with  the  location  of  Fort  Henry.  Nor  do  I  desire  the  de 
fects  of  location  to  have  an  undue  influence  in  directing  public  opinion  in  rela 
tion  to  the  battle  of  the  Gth  instant.  The  fort  was  built  when  I  took  charge, 
and  I  had  no  time  to  build  anew. 

*##**#* 
The  case  stood  thus:  I  had,  at  my  command,  a  grand  total  of  two  thousand 
six  hundred  and  ten  men,  only  one  third  of  whom  had  been  at  all  disciplined  or 
well  armed.  The  high  water  in  the  river,  filling  the  sloughs,  gave  me  but  one 
route  on  which  to  retire,  if  necessary  ;  and  that  route,  for  some  distance,  in  direc 
tion  at  right  angles  to  the  line  of  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  over  roads  well-nigh 
impassable  for  artillery,  cavalry,  or  infantry.  The  enemy  had  seven  gunboats, 

with  &n  armament  of  fifty-four  guns,  to  engage  the  eleven  guns  at  Fort  Henry. 

*****## 

I  argued  thus:  Fort  Donelson  might  possibly  be  held,  if  properly  reinforced, 
oven  though  Fort  Henry  should  fall ;  but  the  reverse  of  this  proposition  was  not 
true.  The  force  at  Fort  Henry  was  necessary  to  aid  Fort  Donelson,  either  in 
making  a  successful  defence,  or  in  holding  it  long  enough  to  answer  the  pur 
poses  of  a  new  disposition  of  the  entire  army  from  Bowling  Green  to  Columbus, 
which  would  necessarily  follow  the  breaking  of  our  centre,  resting  on  Forts 
Donelson  and  Henry.  The  latter  alternative  was  all  that  I  deemed  possible. 
I  knew  that  reinforcements  were  difficult  to  bo  had;  and  that,  unless  sent  in 
such  force  as  to  make  the  defence  certain,  which  I  did  not  believe  practicable, 
the  fate  of  our  right  wing  at  Bowling  Green  depended  upon  a  concentration  of 
my  entire  division  on  Fort  Donelson,  and  the  holding  of  that  place  as  long  as 
possible  ;  trusting  that  the  delay,  by  an  action  at  Fort  Henry,  would  give  time 
for  such  reinforcement  as  might  reasonably  be  expected  to  reach  a  point  suffi 
ciently  near  Donelson  to  co-operate  with  my  division  by  getting  to  the  rear  and 
right  Hank  of  the  enemy,  and  in  such  a  position  as  to  control  the  roads  over 
which  a  safe  retreat  might  bo  effected.  I  hesitated  not  a  moment.  My  infan 
try,  artillery,  and  cavalry,  removed,  of  necessity,  to  avoid  the  fire  of  the  gunboats, 
to  the  outworks,  could  not  meet  the  enemy  there.  My  only  chance  was  to  de 
lay  the  enemy  every  moment  possible,  and  retire  the  command,  now  outside  the 


493  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XV. 

main  work,  towards  Fort  Douelson,  resolving  to  suffer  as  little  loss  as  possible. 
I  retained  only  the  heavy  artillery  company  to  fight  the  guns,  and  gave  the  or 
der  to  commence  the  movement  at  once.  At  10^  o'clock  Lieutenant  McGavock 
sent  a  messenger  to  me,  stating  that  our  pickets  reported  General  Grant  ap 
proaching  rapidly,  and  within  half  a  mile  of  the  advance  work ;  and  movements 
on  the  west  hank  indicated  that  General  Smith  was  fast  approaching  also. 
******* 

At  11.45  A.M.  the  enemy  opened  from  their  gunboats  on  the  fort.  I  waited  a 
few  moments,  until  the  effects  of  the  first  shots  of  the  enemy  were  fully  appre 
ciated.  I  Uw>n  gave  the  order  to  return  the  fire,  which  was  gallantly  responded 
to  by  the  brave  little  band  under  my  command.  The  enemy,  with  great  delib 
eration,  steadily  closed  upon  the  fort,  firing  very  wild  until  within  twelve  hun 
dred  yards.  The  cool  deliberation  of  our  men  told  from  the  first  shot,  fired  with 
tremendous  effect.  At  twenty-five  minutes  of  1  o'clock  p.  M.  the  bursting  of 
our  24-pounder  rilled  gun  disabled  every  man  at  the  piece. 

This  great  loss  was,  to  us,  in  a  degree,  made  up  by  our  disabling  entirely  the 
Essex  gunboat,  which  immediately  floated  down  stream.  Immediately  after 
the  loss  of  this  valuable  gun  we  sustained  another  loss  still  greater,  in  the 
closing  up  of  the  vent  of  10-inch  Columbiad,  rendering  that  gun  perfectly  use 
less,  and  defying  all  efforts  to  reopen  it. 

###*#*•* 

It  was  now  plain  to  be  seen  that  the  enemy  were  breaching  the  fort  directly 
in  front  of  our  guns,  and  that  I  could  not  much  longer  sustain  their  fire  without 
an  unjustifiable  exposure  of  the  valuable  lives  of  the  men  who  had  so  nobly 
seconded  me  in  the  unequal  struggle.  Several  of  my  officers,  Major  Gilmer 
among  the  number,  now  suggested  to  me  the  propriety  of  taking  the  subject  of 
a  surrender  into  consideration. 

Every  moment,  I  knew,  was  of  vast  importance  to  those  retreating  on  Fort 
Donelson,  and  I  declined,  hoping  to  find  men  enough  at  hand  to  continue  awhile 
longer  the  fire  now  so  destructive  to  the  enemy.  In  this  I  was  disappointed. 
My  next  effort  was  to  try  the  experiment  of  a  flag  of  truce,  which  I  waved  from 
the  parapets  myself.  This  was  precisely  at  ten  minutes  before  2  o'clock  p.  M. 
The  flag  was  not  noticed,  I  presume  from  the  dense  smoke  that  enveloped  it, 
and,  leaping  again  into  the  fort,  I  continued  the  fire  for  five  minutes,  when, 
with  the  advice  of  my  brother  officers,  I  ordered  the  flag  to  be  lowered,  after 
an  engagement  of  two  hours  and  ten  minutes  with  such  an  unequal  force. 

The  surrender  was  made  to  Flag-Officer  Foote,  represented  by  Captain  Stem- 
ble,  commanding  gunboat  Cincinnati,  and  was  qualified  by  the  single  condition 
that  all  officers  should  retain  their  side  arms,  that  both  officers  and  men  should 
be  treated  with  the  highest  consideration  due  prisoners  of  war,  which  was 
promptly  and  gracefully  acceded  to  by  Commodore  Foote. 

******* 

Confident  of  having  performed  my  whole  duty  to  my  government  in  the  de 
fence  of  Fort  Henry,  with  the  totally  inadequate  means  at  my  disposal,  I  have 
but  little  to  add  in  support  of  the  views  before  expressed.  The  reasons  for  the 
line  of  policy  pursued  by  me  are,  to  my  mind,  convincing. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XV.  497 

Against  such  overwhelming  odds  as  sixteen  thousand  •well-armed  men  (ex 
clusive  of  the  force  on  the  gunboats)  to  two  thousand  six  hundred  and  ten 
badly  armed,  in  the  field,  and  fifty-four  heavy  guns  against  eleven  medium  ones, 
in  the  fort,  no  tactics  or  bravery  could  avail.  The  rapid  movements  of  the 
enemy,  with  every  facility  at  their  command,  rendered  the  defence,  from  the 
beginning,  a  hopeless  one.  I  succeeded  in  doing  even  more  than  was  to  be 
hoped  for  at  first.  I  not  only  saved  my  entire  command  outside  the  fort,  but 
damaged,  materially,  the  flotilla  of  the  enemy,  demonstrating  thoroughly  a 
problem  of  infinite  value  to  us  in  the  future.  Had  I  been  reinforced  so  as  to 
have  justified  my  meeting  the  enemy  at  the  advanced  works,  I  might  have  made 
good  the  land  defence  on  the  east  bank.  I  make  no  inquiry  as  to  why  I  was 
not,  for  I  have  entire  confidence  in  the  judgment  of  my  commanding  general. 
******* 
Kespcctfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

LLOYD  TILGHMAN,  Brig.-Geul.  Comdg. 
Official. 
Ei>.  A.  PALFREY,  A.  A.  Cenl. 

A.  and  I.  G.  Office,  Aug.  29//i,  13G2. 


CLAKKSVILLE.  TKNN.,  Feb.  12/7* ,  1802. 
General  JOHNSTON  : 

Sir, — There  is  but  little  known  satisfactorily  of  the  enemy  or  their  move 
ments.  Up  to  ten  o'clock  last  night  all  was  quiet  as  usual  at  the  fort.  General 
IJuekner  is  now  there.  I  have  thought  the  best  disposition  to  make  of  the 
troops  on  this  line  was  to  concentrate  the  main  force  at  Cumberland  City,  leav 
ing  at  Fort  Donelson  enough  to  make  all  possible  resistance  to  any  attack 
which  may  bo  made  upon  the  fort,  but  no  more.  The  character  of  the  country 
in  the  roar  and  to  the  left  of  the  fort  is  such  as  to  make  it  dangerous  to  concen 
trate  our  whole  force  there;  for,  if  their  gunboats  should  pass  the  fort  and 
command  the  river,  our  troops  would  be;  in  danger  of  being  cut  off  by  a  force 
from  the  Tennessee.  In  this  event,  their  road  would  be  open  to  Nashville  with 
out  any  obstruction  whatever.  The  position  at  Cumberland  City  is  better;  for 
there,  the  railroad  diverges  from  the  river,  which  would  afford  some  little  facility 
for  transportation  in  case  of  necessity  ;  and  from  thence  the  open  country  south 
ward  towards  Nashville  is  easily  reached.  Besides,  from  that  point  we  threaten 
the  flank  of  any  force  sent  from  the  Tennessee  against  the  fort.  I  am  making 
every  possible  effort  to  concentrate  the  forces  here  at  Cumberland  City.  I 
have  been  in  the  greatest  dread  ever  since  I  reached  this  place,  at  their  scat 
tered  condition.  The,  force  is  inadequate  to  defend  a  line  of  forty  miles  in  length, 
which  can  be  attacked  from  three  different  directions.  We  can  only  be  formi 
dable  by  concentration.  A  strong  guard  is  all  that  can  be  left  here,  and  this  no 
longer  than  your  movement  can  be  made.  I  shall  begin  to-day,  if  the  engineers 
report  favorably,  to  blockade  the  river  at  the  piers  of  the  railroad  bridge.  I 
have  taken  up  an  idea  that  a  "raft,"  secured  against  this  bridge,  can  render  the- 
river  impassable  for  the  gunb;>ats.  If  this  is  possible,  it  will  be  an  immense 

T         *>o 
1. —  oJ 


498  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVI. 

relief  to  the  movements  above.  I  am  quite  sure  this  blockade  can  be  made  at 
a  lower  stage  of  water,  but  the  present  stage  of  water  renders  this  experiment 
somewhat  doubtful;  still,  I  will  make  every  exertion  to  eifect  the  blockade,  if 
possible.  I  received  by  telegraph  your  authority  to  make  any  disposition  of 
the  troops  which,  in  my  judgment,  was  best,  and  acknowledged  it  by  despatch 
immediately.  I  am  acting  accordingly. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOHN  B.  FLOYD,  Brig.-Genl.  C.  S.  A. 

NASHVILLE,  Feb.  16th,  1862. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

At  2  A.  M.  to-day  Fort  Donelson  surrendered.     We  lost  all. 

A.  S.  JOIINSTOX. 


NASHVILLE,  Feb.  16th,  1862. 

10  o'clock  A.  M. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD,  Corinth : 

At  2  A.  M.  to-day  Fort  Douelson  surrendered.  Wo  lost  all  the  army  except 
half  of  Floyd's  brigade,  which  crossed  the  river.  The  head  of  our  column  is 
about  reaching  Nashville.  W.  W.  MACKALL,  A.  A.  Genl. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVI. 

No.  1.  MEMPHIS,  Feb.  I8tlt,  1862, 

To  General  BEAUREGARD  and  General  POLK  : 

Inform  me,  at  the  earliest  moment,  of  the  plans  adopted  and  movements  con 
templated,  that  I  may  rally  all  the  Tennessee  forces  possible.  I  will  go  with 
them  myself.  ISHAM  G.  HARRIS,  Governor,  etc. 


No.  2.  MEMPHIS,  Feb.  18th,  1862. 

To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

I  telegraphed  the  President,  Generals  Johnston  and  Pillow,  and  yourself,  this 
morning,  to  know  the  plans  and  movements  of  the  future,  stating  that,  as  soon 
as  informed,  I  would  rally  all  the  force  possible  from  Tennessee,  and  place  my 
self  with  it.  I  am  compelled  to  know  this,  and  issue  orders  accordingly,  before 
leaving  here.  If  you  do  not  feel  authorized  to  communicate  by  telegraph,  write, 
and  send  a  special  messenger.  I  will  see  you  as  soon  as  I  can. 

ISIIAM  G.  HARRIS,  Governor,  etc. 


JACKSON,  Feb.  IStli,  1862. 

5  P.  M. 
Governor  I.  G.  HARRIS  : 

I  am  anxious  to  see  you  here  with  General  Polk,  to  discuss  and  determine  tho 
matters  referred  to  by  you.     Am  still  too  unwell  to  assume  direct  command. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVI.  499 

MEMPHIS,  Feb.  19//1, 1862. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

I  have  ordered  out  every  man  in  the  State  who  is,  and  can  be,  armed.     I  re 
turn  to  Nashville  in  the  morning.     Regret  I  cannot  see  you. 

ISIIAM  G.  HARRIS. 


RICHMOND,  Feb.  19//i,  18G2. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD,  Jackson,  Tenn. : 

Your  despatch  to  General  Cooper  received.  Evacuation  decided  on.  Select 
defensive,  position  below.  Look  to  safety  of  artillery  and  munitions.  A 
fleet  of  boats  should  promptly  be  sent  from  Memphis,  or  other  points,  to  aid 
the  movement.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN*. 


MURFREESBORO,  Fel.  2lst,  18G2. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

If  not  well  enough  to  assume  command,  I  hope  that  you,  now  having  had  tiinu 
to  study  the  field,  will  advise  General  Polk  of  your  judgment  as  to  the  proper 
disposition  of  his  army,  in  accordance  with  the  views  you  entertain  in  your 
memorandum,  unless  you  have  changed  your  views.  I  can't  order  him,  not 
knowing  but  what  you  have  assumed  command,  and  your  orders  conflict. 
For  General  Johnston, 

W.  W.  MACKALL,  A.  A.  G. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  Feb.  I2lst,  18G2. 

Answer. 
To  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Murfreesboro: 

I  am  not  well  enough  to  yet  assume  command.  AY  ill  telegraph  when  I  do 
so.  Have  communicated  views  to  General  Polk;  he  is  preparing  to  execute 
them.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Tiler/ram  forwarded  to  Governors  Moore,  of  Louisiana,  Shorter,  of  Alabama,  Harris 
of  Tennessee,  and  Pettits,  of  Mississippi. 

JACKSON,  Ti: NX.,  Feb.  2l*t,  1862. 

I  shall  despatch  a  messenger  to  you  to-morrow  morning,  on  important  public 
business.  G.  T.  HEAUREGARD. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  or  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

JACKSON,  TKNN.,  Feb.  2lst,  18(52. 

Sir, — The  general  commanding  directs  that  you  will  proceed,  without  delay, 
to  Montgomery,  Alabama,  ria  Atlanta,  and  deliver  to  Governor  J.  Gill  Shorter 
the  accompanying  despatches,  and  thenco  to  Mobile  with  despatches  for  General 
Bragg,  returning  to  these  headquarters  as  soon  as  practicable. 
Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  Gcul. 
Lieutenant  A.  R.  CIIISOLM,  A.  D.  0.,  Jackson,  Tenn. 

JACKSON,  TEXX.,  Fd>.  23(7,  1?G2. 

Dear  General, — I  was  informed  by  General  McCown  that  you  desired  his  bri 
gade  to  move  down  at  once  to  Island  No.  10.     I  beg  to  remark  it  mi  "lit  be  dan- 


500  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVI. 

gerous  to  divide  the  forces  under  your  command  before  the  works  at  that  island 
shall  have  been  put  in  a  defensible  condition,  and  before  we  are  ready  to  aban 
don  Columbus,  in  pursuance  of  what  has  already  been  determined  on  that  sub 
ject;  hence  the  necessity  of  hurrying  the  construction  of  the  works  at  Island 
No.  10  and  at  New  Madrid.  Meanwhile,  all  the  necessary  preparations  can  be 
made  for  the  rapid  evacuation  of  Columbus  at  the  proper  time. 

The  next  most  important  question  is,  where  shall  we  collect  the  balance  of 
the  forces  at  Columbus,  which  is  not  to  form  a  part  of  the  garrison  at  Island 
No.  10?  Shall  this  be  done  at  Union  City,  Humboldt,  or  Jackson?  or  shall  it 
be  collected  temporarily  about  that  island,  depending  on  water  transportation 
alone  as  far  as  Memphis,  to  effect  a  junction  with  Ruggles's  forces  now  at  Cor 
inth  and  Grand  Junction,  for  ulterior  operations? 

I  am  not  sufficiently  well  acquainted  with  the  nature  of  the  roads  in  western 
Tennessee,  and  with  the  means  of  transportation  at  our  command,  to  be  able 
to  answer  these  queries;  hence  I  would  be  most  happy  to  have  your  views  on 
the  subject. 

The  great  point  is,  as  I  understand  it,  to  be  able  to  support  in  time  the  garri 
son  at  Island  No.  10,  if  attacked  only  by  a  force  about  equal  to  our  own,  or  to  be 
able  to  keep  open  our  communications,  either  by  water  or  railroad,  with  the 
States  of  Mississippi  and  Alabama,  if  attacked  by  an  overwhelming  force,  which 
might  endanger,  not  only  the  safety  of  the  garrison  referred  to,  but  especially 
of  its  supporting  force — intended,  after  having  been  driven  out  of  western  Ten 
nessee,  for  the  defence,  inch  by  inch,  of  the  roads  leading  into  the  interior  of  the 
two  States  already  mentioned. 

Before  concluding,  I  must  call  your  attention  to  the  necessity  of  making  the 
works  at  Island  No.  10  and  at  New  Madrid  as  strong  as  circumstances  will  per 
mit  ;  and  to  bo  armed  with  the  heaviest  guns  that  can  be  spared  for  that 
purpose.  I  would  advise  the  gorges  of  the  works  at  New  Madrid  to  he^aZ/sadftZ 
merely,  so  that  our  gunboats  might  fire  into  them  from  the  river  if  they  were 
taken  by  the  enemy.  The  defences  must  consist  of  three  works  with  strong 
profiles,  for  about  five  hundred  men  each — two  on  the  river,  and  one  a  little 
in  advance  of  the  others.  The  crcmaiUerc  lines,  on  the  right  and  rear  of  Isl 
and  No.  10,  must  be  provided  with  small  redans  for  a  few  siege-guns,  and  the 
navigation  of  Black  Lngoon  obstructed  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy's  barges 
from  getting  into  Reelfoot  Lake,  the  shores  of  which,  between  the  two  cremail- 
Ib'e  lines,  were  to  be  well  guarded,  and,  if  need  be,  properly  defended.  The  isl 
and  opposite  Tiptonville  was  to  be  examined,  to  determine  if  it  could  be  advan 
tageously  fortified. 

I  would  advise  the  garrison  at  Fort  Pillow  (excepting  a  strong  guard)  to  be 
Bent,  for  the  present,  to  New  Madrid  or  Island  No.  10.  All  the  heav3r  ordnance, 
not  required  at  these  two  points,  should  be  sent,  when  removed,  from  Columbus 
to  Fort  Pillow,  or  to  any  other  point  on  the  river  (above,  and  not  too  far  from 
Memphis),  which  could  be  held  by  a  small  garrison. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGAKD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 

Maj.-Gcr.l.  L.  POLK,  Comdg.  1st  Division  Dept.  of  West,  Columbus,  Ky. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVI.  501 

JACKSON,  TEXX.,  Feb.  23J,  18G2. 

General,— I  have  to  submit,  herewith,  a  copy  of  a  circular  I  have  felt  called 
upon  to  address  to  the  governors  respectively  of  the  States  of  Tennessee,  Missis- 
nippi,  Louisiana,  and  Alabama,  which  I  hope  may  meet  the  sanction  of  the  War 
Department.  I  shall  be  pleased  to  receive  the  instructions  and  views  of  the 
department  as  soon  as  practicable.  It  is  presumed  that  the  troops  thus  called 
into  the  field  may  be  raised  without  difficulty  or  much  delay,  especially  if  I  am 
authorized  at  ouce  to  receive  them  as  parts  of  the  quotas  due  from  the  several 
States  mentioned. 

In  connection  with  the  letter  to  Major-General  Van  Doru,  I  beg  to  submit, 
that  all  operations  in  States  bordering  on  the  Mississippi  River  should  bo  made 
subordinate  to  the  secure  possession  of  that  river,  which,  if  lost,  would  involve 
the  complete  isolation  and  destruction  of  any  army  west  of  it. 
Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  REAL-REGARD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 

SAMUEL  COOPER,  Gcnl.  and  Adj.  and  I.  Genl.,  Richmond,  Va. 


JACKSON-,  TEXX.,  Feb.  23rf,  1862. 

Dear  Ucneral, — You  will  remember  it  was  agreed  that  certain  subsistence 
stores,  at  Trenton  and  Jackson,  should  be  sent  as  soon  as  possible  to  Columbus 
and  Grenada,  Mississippi.  All  at  Trenton,  and  one  half  of  the  supplies  here,  to 
be  stored  at  the  former  place,  and  the  other  half  to  be  scut  to  Grenada. 

It  seems  that  the  railroad  officers,  as  yet,  have  received  no  orders  in  the 
premises. 

On  reflection,  however,  it  would  seem  advisable,  first,  to  relieve  Columbus 
(Kentucky)  of  about  one  half  of  its  subsistence  supplies,  to  be  divided  equally 
between  the  two  places  above  mentioned. 

Yours  very  truly,  G.  T.  REAL-REGARD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 

M:ij.-Genl.  L.  POLK,  Comdg.  forces,  Columbus,  Ky. 


JACKSON,  TEXX.,  Ft*.  24th,  1862. 

(letin'al, — As  I  had  anticipated,  before  leaving  Contreville,  I  find  that  the 
troops  at  Columbus  have  not  been  regularly  organized,  according  to  long-recog 
nized  military  usage  founded  on  experience  in  all  services. 

It  is  true  there  is  a  nominal  organization  into  ''divisions"  formed  of  other 
subdivisions  called  "brigades,"  but  upon  no  regular  basis.  For  example  :  Gen 
eral  McCown  commands  one  of  these  so-called  divisions,  of  but  five  regiments 
of  infantry,  that  is,  more  properly,  a  brigade. 

Another  of  these  divisions  consists  of  two  brigades  of  three  regiments  each, 
commanded  by  colonels,  Brigadier-General  Cheat  ham  commanding  the  "divis 
ion."  The  other  division,  so  called,  really  has  had  no  division  commander 
since  the  departure  of  Brigadier- General  Pillow.  It  consists  of  some  eight 
regiments,  which  form  two  brigades,  I  believe,  commanded  by  their  senior  col 
onels  respectively. 


502  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVI. 

Brigadier-General  A.  P.  Stewart  commands  an  independent  brigade  of  threo 
regiments  and  the  heavy  artillery,  and  is  in  immediate  command  of  the  works. 

In  addition,  there  are  quite  fourteen  hundred  cavalry,  over  whom  there  should 
he  some  competent  commander. 

These  twenty-two  regiments  really  ought  to  be  subdivided  into  five  brigades, 
two  of  them  of  four  regiments  and  two  of  five  regiments  each,  taking  the  weak 
est  regiments  for  the  latter.  Larger  brigades  of  Volunteers  cannot  be  well  han 
dled  in  action,  and  I  prefer,  on  that  account,  brigades  of  but  four  regiments. 

I  regard  the  divisional  organization  as  absolutely  essential  j  my  experience 
fully  confirms  the  military  practice  in  European  services  in  this  connection. 
Volunteers  need  these  subdivisions  even  more  than  regular  troops. 

As  reported  in  a  previous  communication,  I  have  called  upon  the  governors  of 
Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Tennessee,  and  Alabama  for  additional  troops.  To-day 
I  hear,  by  telegraph,  that  they  will  be  furnished  with  the  utmost  alacrity  and 
despatch.  For  their  prompt  organization,  brigade  commanders  will  be  wanted. 

At  present  the  general  officers  at  Columbus  are  Major-General  Polk,  Briga 
dier-Generals  Cheatham,  McCown,  and  A.  P.  Stewart.  Under  these  circum 
stances,  I  must  respectfully  recall  the  attention  of  the  department  to  my  letter, 
written  just  as  I  was  leaving  Centreville,  touching  the  organization  of  this 
army.  I  would,  however,  so  far  qualify  that  letter  as  to  say,  that  officers  serv 
ing  now  with  the  troops  at  Columbus,  who  may  have  been  recommended  by 
Generals  Polk  and  Johnston  for  the  command  of  brigades,  should  justly  have 
precedence  over  those  indicated  by  me  as  suitable  for  such  commands.  But 
some,  at  least,  of  those  I  recommended  for  division  and  brigade  commands,  I 
shall  need  at  an  early  day  for  the  organization  and  command  of  the  new  levies ; 
and  I  trust  the  President  may  be  pleased  to  appoint  and  send  them  to  report 
to  me  with  as  little  delay  as  practicable. 

The  services  of  Colonel  Mackall,  as  a  division  commander,  I  consider  as  in 
dispensable  at  this  critical  juncture.     My  health  is  such  as  to  make  it  essential 
for  me  to  have  as  many  trained,  experienced  officers  to  aid  me  as  practicable. 
Respectfully,  General,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 

SAMUEL  COOPER,  Geul.  and  A.  and  I.  Geul.,  Richmond. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  Feb.  25M,  1862. 
To  General  S.  COOPER,  A.  and  I.  Genl.,  Richmond : 

Am  offered  service  of  Louisiana  Legion  in  the  emergency,  under  Act  of  Con 
gress,  21st  July — August,  1861,  for  local  defence.  May  I  accept  ?  These  troops 
greatly  needed.  Time  precious.  Please  answer  in  duplicate  to  Governor 
Moore.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  Feb.  25*A,  1862. 
To  Major-General  POLK,  Columbus,  Ky. : 

Cavalry  at  Paris  best  be  distributed  on  outpost  duty  to  watch  all  important 
roads  from  about  Paris  to  as  near  south  of  May  field  as  possible.     Burn  bridges 


AITENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVI.  503 

on  advaucc  of  enemy,  whom  they  will  always  keep  iu  sight  and  hinder  from 
making  reconiioissauces.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

RICHMOND,  Feb.  26th,  1862. 
To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Certainly,  accept  services  of  the  Legion.     Duplicate  sent  Governor  Moore. 

S.  COOPER. 


JACKSON,  TENX.,  Fib.  27th,  1862. 
Major-General  BRAGG  : 

Send  the  gnus  and  ammunition  via  M.  and  O.  Railroad  to  Hickmau,  on  Mis 
sissippi  River.     Thanks  for  the  five  rcgimeuts.     The  river  shall  be  held. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENX.,  Feb.  28/7*,  1862. 
To  Governor  J.  J.  PETTUS,  Jackson,  Miss. : 

Do  not  send  troops  without  three  days'  cooked  rations  and  forty  rounds  am 
munition,  if  possible.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

[This  telegram  was  repeated  to  the  governors  of  Louisiana,  Tennessee,  and 
Alabama,  and  to  Major-General  Bragg.] 


GRAND  JUNCTION,  Feb.  2Gth,  1862. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

What  point  have  you  fixed  upon  for  rendezvous.     Answer  at  Memphis. 

ISIIAM  G.  HARRIS,  Governor,  etc. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  Feb.  2Gth,  1862. 
Governor  I.  G.  HARRIS,  Memphis,  Tenn. : 

Henderson  and  McXairy  Stations,  on  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  arc  proper 
places  of  rendezvous.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


MONTGOMERY,  ALA.,  Feb.  27th,  1862. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD: 

Prospects  for  five  regiments  old  troops  (now  in  North  Alabama),  from  General 
Bragg.  I  go  to  Mobile  immediately  with  copy  of  your  letter.  If  you  approve, 
telegraph  uie.  No  other  to  be  had  here.  A.  R.  CHISOLM,  A.  D.  C. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  Feb.  27th,  1862. 
To  Lieutenant  A.  R.  CHISOLM,  Mobile,  Ala. : 

Course  approved.     Get  troops  wherever  you  can. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


COLUMBUS,  Kv.,  Feb.  26th,  1862. 
To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD: 

I  am  carrying  out  your  views  as  rapidly  as  possible.     Some  of  the  most  im 
portant  points  you  speak  of  in  your  letters  and  despatches  it  is  difficult  to 


504  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVI. 

discuss  at  snch  a  distance,  especially  as  time  presses.     Could  you  not  come  up 
to-day  ?     I  can  make  you  comfortable  in  my  quarters. 

L.  POLK,  Mrijor-Genl.  Comdg. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  Feb.  26th,  1862. 
To  Major-General  PoiK,  Columbus,  Ky. : 

Colonel  Jordan,  A.  A.  G.,  has  gone  up  to  d-iscuss  matters  with  you.  Cannot 
telegraphic  lino  be  established  between  Humboldt  or  Union  City,  and  Island 
No  10  ?  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


NEW  ORLEANS,  Feb.  24  tf,  1862. 
To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Mississippi  three  regiments  in  six  days ;  balance  (seven)  shortly. 

A.  N.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  Feb.  24th,  1862. 
To  A.  N.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  New  Orleans: 

All  right ;  will  prepare  for  them.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


NEW  ORLEANS,  Feb.  28th,  1862. 
To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Are  you  authorized  to  take  any  troops  under  Act  21st  August  ?  Are  you  author 
ized,  under  that  Act,  to  specify  the  length  of  time  for  which  you  will  take  them  ? 
If  you  are,  please  state  shortest  time.  I  am  doing  everything  I  can.  Answer 
quickly.  It  is  useless  to  expect  war  men.  T.  O.  MOORE. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  Feb.  28lh,  1862. 
To  Governor  T.  O.  MOORE,  New  Orleans  : 

Will  accept  all  good,  equipped  troops  under  Act  21st  August,  that  will  offer 
for  ninety  days.  Let  people  of  Louisiana  understand  here  is  the  proper  place 
to  defend  Louisiana.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


MOBILE,  Feb.  28lh,  1862. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

Five  regiments,  four  cavalry  companies,  and  six  field-guns,  now  loading.  Five 
more  regiments,  heavy  guns,  and  supplies  coining  from  Pensacola.  Will  be  with 
you  myself  next  week.  BRAXTON  BRAGG. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  Feb.  28lh,  1862. 
To  Major-Ccneral  BRAGG,  Mobile,  Ala, : 

All  right.     Come  yourself  at  once;  I  wish  to  sec  you  immediately.     I  am  not 
well.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  XVI.  505 

JACKSON,  TEXN.,  Feb.  2G/7i,  18G2. 
To  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Murfrecsboro,  Term. : 

Appearance  of  early  attack  on  New  Madrid  in  force.     Position  of  absolute 
necessity  to  us.     Cannot  you  send  a  brigade  at  once  by  rail  to  assist  in  defence  f 

G.  T.  BEAUUEGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  Feb.  25M,  1862. 
To  General  JOHNSTON,  Murfrcesboro,  Tenn. : 

Did  War  Department  sanction  or  disapprove  call  for  sixty  days'  volunteers? 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


MURFREESBORO,  TENN.,  Feb.  26th,  1862. 
To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

******* 
The  government  neither  sanctioned  nor  disapproved. 

W.  W.  MACKALL,  A.  A.  G. 


NEW  ORLEANS,  March  8///,  1862. 

Dear  General, — Your  letter  by  Dr.  Choppin  came  duly  to  hand,  and  I  have 
spared  no  efforts  to  carry  out  your  wishes.  The  doctor  can  explain  to  you 
everything  that  has  transpired.  Besides  the  regiments  sent  forward  by  General 
Lovell,  you  will  get  two  or  three  thousand  men  from  me,  with  two  batteries  of 
artillery.  But  for  the  lack  of  arms  I  could  furnish  a  large  force  to  you.  Tho 
war  spirit  is  very  active  all  over  the  State,  having  extended  to  the  lower  par 
ishes,  where,  until  very  recently,  it  was  quite  quiescent.  Your  name,  and  well- 
earned  reputation,  I  have  no  doubt,  has  materially  contributed  to  rouse  the 
enthusiasm  of  our  people.  We  place  great  confidence  in  yon,  and,  when  assured 
of  your  having  the  reinforcement  asked  for,  feel  convinced  that  the  alarm 
which  has  prevailed  here  since  the  capitulation  of  our  forces  at  Donelson  will 
be  greatly  abated. 

I  enter  into  no  particulars  about  our  affairs  here,  not  only  because  Dr. 
Choppin  will  bo  able  to  tell  you  all  you  may  desire  to  know,  but  because  I  am 
euro  you  have  enough  to  occupy  your  attention,  without  troubling  you  about 
homo  matters. 

With  the  sincere  hope  and  confident  expectation  that  yon  will  win  additional 
honors  in  your  new  field  of  exertion. 

I  remain,  yours  very  truly,  THOMAS  O.  MOORE,  Governor. 

To  General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Jackson,  Tenn. 


LANGLEY,  FAIRFAX  COTNTY,  VA.,  Sept.  25tk,  1878. 

My  dear  General, — Your  two  letters  of  the  20th  and  22d  ultimo  have  reached 
me.     Business  and  indisposition  prevented  an  earlier  reply. 

******* 
I  cannot  recall  the  various  visits  of  your  aids  to  General  J.  en  route.     I  do 
remember  that  a  telegram  was  received  from  you,  urging  a  speedy  juuctiou. 


506  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVI. 

Arc  you  not,  however,  mistaken  as  to  where  the  message  which  you  think  in 
duced  J.'s  change  of  direction  reached  him  I  You  say  Mnrfreesboro. 

My  strong  impression  is,  that  as  early  as  the  night  before  we  reached  that 
point  I  was  aware  of  the  movement. 

My  impression  was  then,  that  the  idea  of  uniting  the  Bowling  Green  forces 
with  those  of  Columbus,  for  future  operations,  was  yours,  and  by  you  impressed 
upon  General  J. ;  but  I  can  give  no  proof  that  this  was  so. 

I  am  afraid  this  will  be  to  you  an  unsatisfactory  letter,  but  it  is  all  with 
which  my  memory  supplies  me. 

Fully  reciprocating  your  wish  that  we  may  meet  and  renew  our  old  acquaint 
ance,  I  am,  yours  truly,  W.  W.  MACKALL. 

General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Extracts  from  a  letter  of  ex-Governor  I.  G.  Harris,  of  Tennessee,  to  General  Beaurcgard. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  April  13M,  1880. 
General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Dear  Sir, —  ***** 

On  the  20th  or  21st,  when  I  was  prepared  to  return  to  Nashville,  I  received 
a  telegram  from  you,  asking  me  to  come  to  Jackson  to  see  you.  I  answered 
that  I  could  not,  as  I  would  leave  for  Nashville  within  an  hour  or  two.  You 
answered,  urging  me  to  take  a  special  train  to  come  to  Jackson  and  see  you, 
and  then  by  special  train  intercept  the  Nashville  train  at  Corinth.  This  I  did, 
and  at  Jackson  had  an  interview  of  about  an  hour  with  you,  in  which  you  in 
formed  me  that  you  were  concentrating  your  whole  command  on  the  line  of  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  extending  from  Jackson  to  Corinth,  the  principal 
points  of  the  concentration,  according  to  my  recollection,  being  Bethel  Station  and 
Corinth.  And  you  requested  me  to  urge  General  A.  S.  Johnston  to  concentrate, 
as  speedily  as  possible,  the  troops  under  his  command  at  Corinth.  Being  fully 
satisfied  of  the  wisdom  of  this  policy,  I  promised  to  do  so.  I  intercepted  the 
Nashville  train  that  evening  at  Corinth,  and  reached  Nashville  early  the  next 
morning.  General  Johnston  being  then  in  Murfreesboro,  I  remained  in  Nash 
ville  until  the  morning  of  the  22d  or  23d  of  February,  when  I  went  to  Murfrees 
boro,  where  I  met  General  Johnston  for  the  first  time  since  the  IGth.  I  informed 
him  fully  as  to  the  interview  that  I  had  with  you  at  Jackson,  and  your  sug 
gestion  of  the  importance  of  concentrating  the  two  armies  at  or  near  Corinth, 
when  General  Johnston  promptly  answered  that  he  was  preparing,  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  to  move  the  army  under  his  command  to  or  near  Corinth,  as  he  re 
garded  it  as  important,  if  not  absolutely  necessary,  that  the  troops  commanded 

by  you  and  himself  should  be  concentrated  in  the  country  at  or  near  Corinth. 

******* 

Respectfully,  ISIIAM  G.  HARRIS. 


GREENVILLE,  Miss.,  Jan.  24th,  1876. 
General  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Dear  General, — In  reply  to  your  letter  asking  my  recollection  of  certain  events 
that  transpired  in  the  early  part  and  Spring  of  1862,  I  submit  the  following 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVI.  507 

answers  to  the  questions,  seriatim,  -written  entirely  from  memory,  and  without 
note  or  memorandum  of  my  own  : 

1st.  On  your  arrival  in  west  Tennessee  (in  February,  1862),  the  forces  under 
command  of  General  Polk  were  not  properly  brigaded  and  organized,  and  I 
know  that  you  felt  seriously  the  want  of  suitable  experienced  brigade  and 
division  commanders.  I  cannot  recall  individual  instances  of  excellent  officers 
and  well-drilled  troops,  such  as  Bowen's  Missouri  regiment,  but  the  want  of 
organization  was  perceptible,  and  the  contrast  with  the  army  we  had  left  in 
Virginia  marked;  and  you  often  wished  for  some  of  the  officers  of  the  latter, 
whoso  merits  and  abilities  were  known  to  you,  to  aid  in  the  task  of  organizing 
the  material  at  hand. 

2d.  The  evacuation  of  Fort  Columbus  was  ordered  by  you. 

od.  As  was  also  the  concentration  of  the  forces  in  west  Tennessee  at  Corinth. 

4th.  You  called  for  the  available  forces  (including  sixty  and  ninety  days 
men)  of  the  States  of  Tennessee,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  and  Louisiana. 

5th.  You  recommended  the  concentration  of  the  forces  under  General  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  with  your  own  at  Corinth.  I  was,  as  your  aide-de-camp,  tho 
bearer  of  despatches  from  you  to  Governor  Harris  of  Tennessee,  at  Murfrecsboro 
(where  he  was  with  General  Johnston),  making  a  call  upon  him  for  all  the  State 
troops  he  could  spare  to  be  sent  to  Corinth.  At  the  same  time  I  took  a  written 
despatch,  or  verbal  message  (I  don't  now  recollect  which,  for  on  that  occasion 
I  committed  all  my  despatches  to  memory),  requesting  General  Johnston  to 
change;  his  proposed  lino  of  retreat  on  Stevenson  and  Chattanooga,  to  Hunts- 
ville  and  Decatur,  so  as  to  be  better  able  to  concentrate  with  you  when  occasion 
might  require. 

******* 

9th.  From  the  time  that  we  left  Virginia  to  come  to  Tennessee,  until  I  left 
your  stall',  after  the  affair  at  Farmington,  it  was  the  belief  among  all  your  staff 
that  the  War  Department  was  very  unfriendly  to  you,  and  their  action  on 
several  occlusions  was  such  as  to  induce  that  belief  in  those  who  knew,  as  we 
did,  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  It  was  a  source,  not  only  of  annoyance  to 
you,  but  of  deep  regret,  as  in  many  instances  your  efforts  were,  you  thought, 
paralyzed,  and  the  success  of  well-digested  measures  imperilled,  by  the  action 

of  the  War  Department,  based  upon  the  evident  hostility  felt  towards  yourself. 

*  #  *  *  *  *  * 

Yours  very  truly,  S.  W.  FERGUSON. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

JACKSON,  TENN.,  Feb.  21*/;  180J. 
General  SAMUEL  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Gcul. : 

General, — I  regret  profoundly  to  have  to  acquaint  the  War  Department  that 
iny  ill-health  has  made  it  improper  for  me  as  yet  to  assume  tho  command 
assigned  me. 

In  accordance  with  instructions,  I  repaired,  with  as  little  delay  as  practicable, 
to  Bowling  Green,  Ky.;  and  reported  to  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  commanding  tho 


508  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVI. 

department,  on  the  night  of  the  4th  instant.  After  several  interviews  with  him, 
and  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  an  informal  conference  was  held  at  my  lodging  on  the 
7th  instant,  at  which  General  Johnston,  Major-General  Hardee,  and  myself  were 
present,  for  the  consideration  of  the  military  exigencies.  On  that  occasion  it 
was  determined  that,  Fort  Henry  having  fallen,  and  Fort  Donelson  not  being 
long  tenable,  preparations  should  be  made  at  once  for  the  removal  of  the  army  on 
that  line  in  rear  of  the  Cumberland  River  at  Nashville,  while  a  strong  point  on 
that  river,  some  few  miles  below  the  city,  should  be  fortified  forthwith  against 
the  approach,  by  that  way,  of  gunboats  and  transports. 

The  troops  then  at  Clarksville  were  to  be  thrown  across  to  the  southern 
bank  of  the  Cumberland,  leaving  only  a  sufficient  force  in  the  town  to  protect 
the  manufactories  and  other  property  in  which  the  Confederate  government 
was  interested. 

In  the  event  a  further  retrograde  movement  became  inevitable,  Stevenson 
was  chosen  as  a  suitable  point  for  a  stand,  and  subsequent  movements  were  to 
be  determined  by  circumstances. 

It  was  likewise  determined  that  the  possession  of  the  Tennessee  River  by  the 
enemy,  consequent  upon  the  capitulation  of  Fort  Henry,  must  break  the  direct 
communication  between  the  army  at  Bowling  Green  and  the  one  at  Columbus, 
which,  henceforward,  must  act  independently  of  each  other,  until  they  can 
again  be  brought  together. 

Meanwhile,  the  first  must  defend  the  State  of  Tennessee  along  the  line  already 
indicated,  the  second  that  part  of  the  State  included  between  the  Tennessee 
and  Mississippi  rivers. 

But  as  the  possession  of  the  Tennessee  River  by  the  enemy  had  also  rendered 
the  communications  of  the  army  at  Columbus  liable  to  be  cut  off  at  any  time 
from  that  river,  by  an  overpowering  force  of  the  enemy,  rapidly  concentrated 
from  various  points  of  the  Ohio,  it  had  become  further  necessary  to  guard  and 
provide  against  such  a  calamity.  To  which  end  it  was  decided  that  the  main 
force  iu  occupation  of  Columbus  should  fall  back  upon  Humboldt,  and  thence, 
if  need  be,  to  Grand  Junction,  so  as  to  protect  Memphis  from  either  point,  and 
still  secure  a  line  of  retreat  to  the  latter  place  or  Grenada,  Mississippi,  or  even 
to  Jackson,  of  that  State. 

Finally,  at  Columbus,  left  with  a  sufficient  garrison  for  the  defence  of  the 
works  there,  assisted  by  Hollins's  gunboats,  a  desperate  defence  of  the  river  was 
to  be  made.  But,  at  the  same  time,  transports  were  to  be  collected  and  held 
near  by,  for  the  prompt  removal  of  the  entire  garrison,  when  the  position  was 
no  longer  tenable,  in  the  opinion  of  the  commanding  officer.  Meanwhile,  Island 
No.  10  and  Fort  Pillow  would  be  fortified  for  defence  to  the  last  extremity, 
assisted  by  the  naval  gunboats,  which,  as  a  last  resort,  would  retire  to  tho 
vicinity  of  Memphis,  when  another  resolute  stand  should  be  made. 

Five  days  later,  in  view  of  existing  conditions,  I  addressed  to  General 
Johnston  a  paper,  a  copy  of  which  I  now  transmit,  for  the  information  of  the 
War  Department. 

On  reaching  here,  I  received  information  that  confirmed  my  views,  iu  great 
part,  as  set  forth  in  that  letter,  and  satisfied  me,  that  to  attempt  to  hold  Colum- 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVII.  599 

bus  with  any  force  now  at  my  disposition  could  only  result  in  an  early  fate 
like  that  of  Fort  Donelson,  and  the  loss  of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  as  a  necessary 
consequence.  Unfit  physically  to  visit  Columbus,  I  requested  General  Polk  and 
Governor  Harris  to  meet  me  here.  They  did  so;  meantime,  your  reply  to  my 
telegraphic  despatch,  touching  the  further  occupation  of  Columbus,  had  been 
received.  Arrangements  were  made  for  the  prompt  defence  of  Island  No.  10, 
a  position  naturally  of  great  strength,  and  New  Madrid,  for  the  early  evacua 
tion  of  the  position  at  Columbus,  and  removal  of  the  largo  stores  of  supplies 
and  munitions  now  there,  in  such  a  way  as  to  avoid  publicity.  These  new  lines 
can  be  made  of  great  strength  with  a  garrison  of  about  five  thousand  men,  thus 
leaving  free  iny  main  force,  for  manoeuvre  and  defensive  active  operations 
against  the  enemy,  as  he  shall  penetrate  the  country  by  the  avenues  now  un 
fortunately  in  his  possession.  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gcul.  C.  S.  A. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVII. 

JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  4/A,  13G2. 
S.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  I.  Genl.,  Richmond,  Ya. : 

We  arc  much  in  need  of  two  able  major-generals;  also  two  brigadiers  for  Gen 
eral  Polk,  two  for  General  Bragg,  and  one  for  cavalry.  Please  order  them  to 
report  forthwith.  New  levies  will  soon  be  in  the  field. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

JACKSON,  TF.NN.,  March  Gth,  18G2. 
S.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  I.  Gcnl.,  Richmond,  Va. : 

For  the  sake  of  our  cause  and  country  send,  at  once,  Mackall  as  major-general, 
and  three  brigadier-generals  recommended  by  me.  Colonel  Ransom  to  com 
mand  cavalrv.  Organization  here  much  needed.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENX.,  March  f>/J»,  18G2. 

Dear  (lourdl, —I  received  through  Colonel  Olivier  your  letter  of  the  4th  in 
stant,  enclosing  report  of  the  gallant  repulse  of  the  enemy's  troops  and  gunboats 
at  Pittsburg,  by  a  part  of  Colonel  Mouton's  regiment,  the  18th  Louisiana.  You 
will  please  express  to  him  my  thanks,  at  this  brilliant  success  on  his  first  en 
counter  with  the  enemy.  I  hope  it  is  only  the  forerunner  of  still  more  gallant 
deeds  on  the  part  of  his  regiment. 

Being  still  unwell,  I  have  requested  General  Bragg  to  furnish  you  with  all 
necessary  instructions.  1  remain,  yours  very  truly, 

G.  T.  BKAUREGARD,  Geul.  C.  S.  A. 

Brig. -Genl.  DANIEL  RUGGLKS,  Comdg.  at  Corinth,  Miss. 


JACKSON.  TENN.,  March  ~tli,  1862. 
S.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  I.  Geul.,  Richmond  : 

1 7;;ioir  no  one  here  to  recommend.     Bragg  recommends  Ruggles  and  Sam.  Jones 
for  major-generals;  Colonels  Slaughter,  Yillepigue,  and  Shepard  for  brigadiers. 


510  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVII. 

Polk  recommends  Colonels  E.  W.  Gantt,  M.  L.  Walker,  Lieutenant-Colonel  M. 
J.  Wright.  There  is  no  cavalry  colonel  here  to  recommend.  I  consider  Ran- 
soin  indispensable.  He  should  be  sent  at  once.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  8th,  1862. 
S.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  I.  Genl.,  Richmond : 

Please  order  forthwith,  to  join  me  as  Chief  Commissary,  Colonel  Lee  or  Major 
Williams.  No  officers  here  to  select  from.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  8th,  1862. 
S.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  I.  Genl.,  Richmond : 

Will  Major  Brent  be  sent  me  or  not  ?     I  need  him  hourly. 
My  Quartermaster  is  a  Captain  Clement  Young.     He  ought  to  be  made  a  ma 
jor;  a  common  grade  in  that  department  here,  I  find. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Unofficial.  JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  8th,  1862. 

Genl.  S.  COOPER,  Richmond,  Va. : 

If  officers  applied  for  yesterday  cannot  be  ordered  to  report  immediately  to 
me,  I  can  but  foresee  most  disastrous  consequences  here ;  for  part  of  this  army  is 
in  a  state  of  chaos. 

My  health  being  still  bad,  T  am  not  able,  unaided,  to  establish  order  here,  and 
would  then  request  to  be  relieved  from  my  present  command. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  llth,  1862. 
Genl.  S.  COOPER,  Richmond,  Va. : 

Has  my  telegram  of  the  8th.  been  received,  relative  to  appointment  of  gener 
als  ?  If  so,  what  answer  ?  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  llth,  1862. 
Genl.  S.  COOPER,  Richmond,  Va. : 

We  have  called  for  ten  generals  as  indispensable ;  four  are  granted,  and  only 
two  of  these  are  present,  the  enemy  being  already  engaged  with  our  left  at  New 
Madrid.  I  do  not  hold  myself  responsible  for  the  results. 

Commissary  Department  entirely  out  of  funds.  Nothing  can  be  had  without 
them.  One  million  in  hands  of  collector  at  Mobile  can  be  had.  Will  depart 
ment  issue  necessary  orders  at  once  ?  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  6th,  1862. 

Dear  General, — Colonel  Mackall's  letter,  through  Lieutenant  Otey,  has  just 
been  received.  I  send  you,  by  the  same  officer,  information  just  obtained  through 
one  Dr.  Minturn,  just  in  from  Cairo,  on  his  way  to  Houston,  Texas.  He  was  anx 
ious,  he  said,  to  visit  your  headquarters  to  get  some  papers  left  with  Mr.  Bay 
lor  ;  but  his  manners  appearing  rather  suspicious,  I  preferred  sending  him  direct 
to  Texas.  His  information  may  be  true  or  not ;  you  will  have  to  judge  for  your- 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVII.  5H 

self.  We  believe  Iiere  there  is  a  great  deal  of  truth  in  it ;  if  so,  you  must  be 
careful  not  to  be  separated  from  us  by  the  enemy's  forces  getting  between  us, 
at  or  about  Tuscuinbia.  Hence,  you  must  spread  the  rumor  that  the  main  body 
of  your  forces  is  going  to  Chattanooga  by  railroad,  ria  Decatur,  to  deceive  the 
enemy  at  Nashville ;  for  we  must  try  to  keep  Buell  away  from  us  until  we  can 
get  through  with  Grant  and  Halleck's  other  forces. 

I  send  you,  herewith,  my  notes  of  reference,  to  give  you  a  clear  insight  into 
our  position  here.  McCown  is  at  Island  No.  10  and  New  Madrid,  with  about 
7000  effectives.  Polk  has  at  Humboldt  and  Union  City  about  7000  more.  Bragg 
will  have  soon  at  Corinth  about  10,000,  at  Grand  Junction  about  5000,  and  at 
Fort  Pillow  about  2500.  Kuggles,  at  Corinth,  about  3000;  and  Chalmers,  at 
Itika,  about  2500.  In  all,  nominally,  37,000  men,  less  9500  on  river,  leaves  for 
the  field  about  27,500,  possibly  30,000  men  ;  but  not  all  very  efficient.  /  cannot 
get  competent  brigadier-generals  from  the  department,  although  I  have  written 
and  telegraphed  four  times  on  the  subject. 

I  am  still  unwell,  but  am  doing  the  best  I  can.  I  nominally  assumed  the 
command  yesterday.  Yours  truly, 

G.  T.  HEAUUEGAiin,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 

Gcnl.  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Decatur. 

IlEADQrARTKKS  AllMY  OF  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY, 

JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  C>fh,  1802. 

Dear  Sir, — As  my  neighbor,  as  the  Senator  representing  my  State  and  section, 
I  take  the  liberty  of  addressing  you  this  note ;  and  beg,  for  the  good  of  our  com 
mon  cause  and  the  safety  of  our  country,  that  you  will  use  what  influence  you 
possess,  with  the  government  at  Richmond,  to  see  that  my  general  (General 
Beauregard)  receives  some  support  from  that  quarter. 

Before  leaving  Manassas,  by  his  dictation,  I  wrote  a  letter  which  he  afterwards 
copied  and  signed,  in  which  ho  informed  the  Secretary  of  War  that  he  would 
require  good  officers  to  be  appointed  as  brigade  commanders,  suggesting  certain 
officers  whom  ho  knew  to  be  competent;  not  one  of  whom  have  been  appointed 
or  any  others  ordered  to  report  to  him. 

Of  what  service  can  the  very  best  of  generals  be  if  he  has  not  those  under  his 
command  who  are  competent  to  carry  out  his  orders? 

The  different  brigades  of  the  division  of  the  army  under  General  Polk  are 
commanded  by  senior  colonels,  who  themselves  have  only  recently  taken  up  the 
profession  of  arms.  Those  regiments  require  all  their  time  and  attention  ;  and 
they  themselves,  in  many  instances,  do  not  feel  competent  to  the  command. 
This  has  been  strikingly  illustrated  in  the  recent  evacuation  of  Columbus.  Of 
ficers  commanding  brigades  and  regiments  have  become  entirely  separated  from 
the  main  body  of  their  commands,  and  knew  not  where  to  find  them;  they, 
themselves,  running  to  the  commanding  general  when  they  should  have  been 
with  their  men. 

The  following  officers  arc  some  of  whom  he  desired  as  brigadiers:  Colonel 
Charles  Winder,  Gth  South  Carolina  regiment;  Colonel  Samuel  Garland,  llth 
Virginia  regiment ;  Colonel  A.  P.  Hill,  13th  Virginia  regiment ;  Coloucl  ivuusom, 


512  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVII. 

1st  regiment  North  Carolina   Cavalry;   Colonel  Pegram,  1st  Maryland  regi 
ment. 

Generals  Polk  and  Bragg  have  made  the  same  efforts  to  procure  the  proper 
officers  to  command  under  them. 

It  is  with  the  utmost  difficulty,  even  with  competent  general  officers,  that  a 
volunteer  army  can  he  kept  under  proper  discipline;  and  without  those  officers 
it  hecomes  a  rahhle. 

A  fearful  responsibility  rests  upon  the  general's  shoulders  ;  and  I  honestly  be- 
lieve  that  if  he  did  not  consider  the  country  in  great  danger,  he  would  not  re 
tain  the  command  of  this  array  for  twenty-four  hours ;  hut  he  knows  the  value 
of  his  name,  and  is  willing  and  anxious  that  its  power  and  influence  should  he 
used  to  the  fullest  extent.  The  numbers  of  this  army  have  been  more  than 
doubled  since  his  arrival  here;  but  of  what  avail  is  this  immense  host  if  he  can 
not  get  the  proper  officers  to  put  it  in  a  condition  by  which  he  can  make  its 
numbers  effective,  instead  of  being  an  encumbrance.  The  only  way  he  can 
counterbalance  the  inexperience  of  the  regimental  commanders  is  to  place  com 
petent  generals  over  them. 

I  trust,  sir,  that  this  grave  subject  will  receive  your  attention  ;  and  if  you 
have  any  influence  with  the  "powers  that  be,"  that  you  will  use  it  for  the  coun 
try's  good;  for  if  we  are  defeated  in  the  rapidly  approaching  combat,  it  will  be 
difficult  for  us  again  to  rally,  and  the  Mississippi  Valley  will  be  lost  to  the  Con 
federacy,  and  the  cause  we  are  contending  for  also  lost  forever. 

I  remain,  dear  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  K.  CHISOLM. 

P.  S.  The  general  considers  the  appointment  of  Lieutenant- Colonel  Wr.  W. 
Mackall,  C.  S.  A.,  and  Brigadier-General  Daniel  Ruggles,  as  major-generals,  abso 
lutely  necessary,  and  that  the}7  should  be  ordered  by  telegraph  to  report  to  him. 
You  are  at  liberty  to  make  whatever  use  you  see  fit  of  this  letter.  A.  R.  C. 


Private.  JACKSON,  TENX.,  March  IGth,  1862. 

My  dear  Colonel, — Can  you  not  wake  up  the  authorities  to  the  great  danger 
of  our  army  here,  and  necessarily  of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  from  lack  of  proper 
organization — all  due  to  a  want  of  brigadiers  ?  I  have  been  trying  for  the  last 
month  and  over,  indeed,  before  I  left  Centreville,  to  have  a  certain  number  of 
them  appointed,  but  all  to  no  purpose.  Are  we,  for  the  sake  of  a  little  ecouomy 
in  the  pay  of  said  officers,  to  jeopardize  all  we  have  at  stake  in  this  contest? 
Why,  then,  not  authorize  generals  in  the  field  to  appoint  acting  brigadier  and 
major  generals,  when  in  their  judgment  required,  but  without  additional  pay, 
until  approved  of  by  the  President  or  Congress? 

Bragg,  Polk,  and  myself  applied,  a  few  days  ago,  for  ten  general  officers;  to 
day  we  are  informed  that  four  are  appointed,  of  whom  two  can't  be  hero  for  one 
week!  in  the  meantime  apart  of  this  army  is  in  a  state  of  chaos,  and  fifteen 
thousand  new  levies  will  soon  be  in  the  field!  What  in  the  world  shall  I  do 
with  them  ?  Will  not  Heaven  open  the  eyes  and  senses  of  our  rulers?  Where 
in  the  world  are  we  going  to,  if  not  to  destruction  ?  Time  is  all-precious  now  ; 
the  enemy  will  soon  bo  upon  us,  and,  to  cap  the  climax,  I  cannot  get  well.  I 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVII.  513 

am  Letter,  but  the  least  excitement  throws  ine  back.  We  must  cheer  up,  how 
ever.  With  good  troops  and  enough  of  them,  there  is  a  chance,  at  this  niomeut, 
of  making  a  beautiful  ten  strike,  but  it  would  be  risking  too  much  in  the  pres 
ent  condition,  of  affairs;  we  would  lose  too  much  if  I  failed.  The  problem  here 
is  very  difficult.  I  have  to  look  to  the  safety  of  this  army  and  yet  keep  the 
Mississippi  River  closed;  the  latter  a  most  difficult  undertaking  with  our  pres 
ent  means.  By-the-bye,  there  were  six  brigades  in  Polk's  army  without  brig 
adier-generals,  commanded  by  colonels  according  to  rank.  You  may  imagine 
what  kind  of  commanders  some  of  them  make,  and  what  kind  of  brigades  they 
have ! 

I  enclose  you  copy  of  a  telegram  sent  this  day  to  the  War  Department.  My 
kind  regards  to  friends.  Yours  truly,  G.  T.  I3EAUREGARD. 

Col.  W.  P.  MILKS,  Member  of  Congress,  Richmond,  Va. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  1st,  1802. 
Brig.-Genl.  RUGGLES,  Corinth,  Miss. : 

Subsequent  information  leads  mo  to  believe  Bethel  station  preferable  to  Mc- 
Xairy's.     Pittsbnrg,  on  Tennessee  River,  is  a  good  point  of  observation. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGAHD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  Man-h  l»t,  1802. 
Gov.  I.  G.  HARKIS,  Memphis,  Tenn. : 

Substitute  Bethel  for  McNairy's  station  as  rendezvous. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  2d,  1HG2. 
To  Genl.  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Stevenson,  Ala.  (or  on  road  from  Murfreesboro) : 

See  Memphis  Appeal  of  yesterday  for  movement  of  enemy's  troops  per  steam 
boats,  taken  from  Cincinnati  Enquirer.  Hurry  on  your  troops  per  railroad  to 
Corinth.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  MurcJi  2rf,  18G2. 
To  Genl.  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Stevenson,  Ala. : 

Send  9th  and  10th  Mississippi  and  5th  Georgia  regiments,  if  possible,  under 
Brigadier-General  J.  R.  Jackson,  to  Corinth,  so  as  to  reunite  the  Pensacola 
army  under  Bragg  here.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

SIIELBYVILLE,  TENN.,  March  3(7,  1832. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Telegrams  of  2<1  received.  Send  10th  Mississippi  by  rail  from  Chattanooga. 
This  army  will  move  as  rapidly  as  it  can  march.  Can't  obtain  Memphis  papers 
of  1st.  W.  W.  MACKALL,  A.  A.  Genl. 


HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

FAYETTEVILLE,  March  5M,  1802. 
General, — Your  letter  of  2d  inst.  has  been  received  by  Gcucral  Johnston.     IIo 

L— 33 


514;  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVII. 

replies:  the  army  advancing,  bad  reached  this  place;  will  move  on  to  join  you 
as  fast  as  possible ;  on  arriving  at  Decatur,  he  will  decide  on  the  promptest 
mode.  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  W.  MACKALL,  A.  A.  Genl. 


RICHMOND,  March  Gth,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Send  recommendations  for  general  officers  ont  of  your  own  forces.     Colonel 
Mackall  has  already  been  nominated  for  brigadier-general. 

S.  COOPER,  A.  and  I.  Genl. 


RICHMOND,  March  QtJi,  1862. 
(Received  at  Jackson,  Term.,  March  llth,  1862.) 
To  Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

The  following  officers  have  been  nominated  for  your  command,  viz.,  J.  P. 
McCown,  as  major-general,  and  J.  M.  Hawes,  J.  E.  Slaughter,  and  L.  M.  Walker, 
as  brigadiers — Hawes  for  cavalry.  Ransom  appointed  brigadier-general,  and 
sent  to  North  Carolina,  where  his  presence  at  this  time  is  of  the  first  importance. 
S.  Jones  is  also  nominated  as  major-general,  but  he  cannot  bo  spared  from  Mo 
bile.  S.  COOPER,  A.  and  I.  Genl. 


RICHMOND,  March  Wlh,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Major  Brent  has  been  ordered  to  report  to  you.  Captain  Clement  Young  is  ap 
pointed  assistant  quartermaster,  July  19th  ;  not  having  given  the  bond  required 
by  law,  he  was,  with  several  other  disbursing  officers,  similarly  situated,  dropped 
from  the  army  in  Special  Orders,  February  24th.  He  can  be  appointed  major 
quartermaster  when  he  furnishes  his  bond  for  thirty  thousand  dollars. 

S.  COOPER. 


RICHMOND,  March  12th,  1862. 
To  Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

I  telegraphed  you  on  the  9th  that  McCown  was  made  major-general,  and 
Hawes,  Slaughter,  and  Walker,  brigadiers.  Since  then  Cheatham  has  been 
nominated  major-general  for  your  command.  S.  COOPER. 


RICHMOND,  March  18th,  18C2. 
(Received  at  Jackson,  Tenn.,  March  21st,  1862.) 
To  Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Win.  II.  Jackson  has  been  appointed  to  temporary  rank  of  colonel,  and  ordered 
to  report  to  you  for  duty  ;  the  appointment  sent  to  you  by  this  day's  mail. 

S.  COOPER. 


RICHMOND,  March  18th,  1882. 
(Received  at  Jackson,  Tenu.,  March  21st.) 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  B.  Lee  is  this  day  ordered  to  report  to  you  at  Jackson, 
Tenn.  S.  COOPER,  A.  and  I.  Genl. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVIII.  515 

RICHMOND,  March  21sf,  1861. 
To  General  BEAUREGAUD  : 

The  following  gentlemen  Lave  been  confirmed  by  the  Senate  to  take  rank  in 
the  order  in  which  they  are  named  :  Major-Generals  B.  F.  Cheatham  and  John 
I*.  McCown ;  Brigadier-Generals  W.  W.  Mackall,  Sam.  B.  Maxey,  J.  M.  Hawes, 
J.  L.  Slaughter,  L.  M.  Walker;  not  yet  confirmed,  J.  B.  Villepigue,  John  S. 
Bowen,  and  B.  II.  Helm.  S.  COOPER. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER   XVIII. 

JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  3rf,  1R62. 

Xotcs  of  Reference. 

I.  Island  No.  10  and  New  Madrid  are  fully  prepared,  according  to  means  and 
circumstances. 

II.  Brigadier-General  Withers,  with  1st,  2d,  and  21st  Alabama  regiments,  to 
go  forthwith  to  Fort  Pillow,  with  proper  ammunition.     About  fifteen  (15)  guns 
from  Columbus  are  ordered  to  Fort  Pillow,  where  sixteen  (16)  guns  are  already 
in  position.    Said  fifteen  (15)  guns  are  not  probably  provided  with  carriages,  but 
their  platforms  are  in  position.     Ten  (10)  shell-guns  from  Pensacola,  complete, 
are  also  ordered  to  Fort  Pillow;  also  one  company  of  sappers  and  miners  from 
New  Orleans.     Troops  from  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10  to  fall  back  to  Fort 
Pillow  in  ease  of  necessity.     Fort  Pillow  can  be  reinforced  by  railroad  from 
Humholdt  to  Memphis  and  the  military  road  from  Mason's  depot  —  twenty- 
eight  miles  from  Fort  Pillow. 

III.  The  main  body  of  General  Polk's  command  is  to  be  at  Hnmboldt,  which 
is  central  to  Memphis,  Jackson,  Grand  Junction,  Henderson,  Corinth,  and  Fort 
Pillow. 

IV.  A  rear  guard  of  two  (2)  regiments  and  five  hundred  cavalry  to  be  sta 
tioned  at  Union  City. 

V.  A  battalion  of  infantry  to  be  stationed  at  Paris,  from  Ilumboldt,  with  say 
five  hundred  cavalry,  which,  together  with  the  other  cavalry,  will  guard  all 
avenues  of  approach  from  the  Tennessee  to  the  Mississippi  River,  in  front  of 
Paris  and  Union  City. 

VI.  All  the  above-named  forces  and  positions  to  be  under  the  command  of 
Major-General  Polk,  and  to  be  called  the  1st  Grand  Division. 

VII.  The  balance  of  the  cavalry,  say  two  hundred  men,  to  report  at  these 
headquarters. 

VIII.  Two   regiments    of  infantry  (4th  Louisiana  and  7th  Mississippi),  at 
present  here,  to  remain  ready  to  move. 

IX.  The  balance  of  new  troops  from  Louisiana  and  Mississippi  to  rendezvous 
at  Grand  Junction. 

X.  Rnggles's  brigade,  with  troops  from  Alabama,  to  rendezvous  at  Corinth. 

XI.  Chalmers's  to  rendezvous  at  luka. 


516  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVIII. 

XII.  Troops  from  Tennessee  (new  levies)  to  rendezvous  at  Henderson  and 
Bethel  Stations,  with  proper  advance  guards  along  Tennessee  River. 

XIII.  Columbus  and  Grenada,  Mississippi,  to  be  grand  depots  of  supplies  of 
all  kinds  for  this  army. 

XIY.  All  heavy  baggage,  etc.,  to  be  sent  to  said  depots  forthwith. 

XV.  One  regiment  of  unarmed  troops  (except  with  lances)  to  be  sent  to 
Memphis,  as  a  guard  to  that  city. 

XVI.  The  Governor  of  Mississippi  to  send  unarmed  troops  to  Columbus  and 
Grenada,  Mississippi,  as  a  rendezvous. 

XVII.  All  troops  of  this  army  not  included  in  General  Polk's  command  as 
above  named  to  be  under  the  command  of  Major -General  Bragg,  under  the 
denomination  of  2d  Grand  Division;   ho  will  resume,  in  addition  thereto,  the 
command  of  his  former  department. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 


Confidential.  JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  4tf/,  18G2. 

Notes  of  Reference. 

Provisions,  grain,  etc.,  in  western  Tennessee,  to  be  collected  as  rapidly  as 
possible  and  sent  to  Columbus  and  Grenada,  keeping  on  hand  provisions  and 
forage  as  follows,  viz. : 

At  Union  City,          for     1,500  men,         about  3  weeks. 
"   Humboldt,  "       5,000     "  "       3        " 

"   Jackson,  900  infantry      "       3        " 

"   Jackson,  400  cavalry       "       3        " 

"   Corinth,  "     15,000  men  for      4        " 

"   Henderson,  "          800    "  "       2        « 

"   luka,  "       2,500    "  "        2        " 

"    Grand  Junction,     "     10,000    "  "       4        " 

The  regiment  now  at  Trenton  to  be  ordered  forthwith,  by  General  Polk,  to 
Fort  Pillow,  via  Memphis. 

Captain  Robertson's  cavalry  to  remain  at  Henderson  ;  the  remainder  of  troops 
now  there,  viz.,  Lea's  and  Browder's  regiments,  and  stragglers  collected,  to  bo 
ordered  by  General  Polk  to  report  to  General  Ruggles  at  Corinth,  forthwith. 

The  7th  Mississippi  regiment,  now  at  Jackson,  Tennessee,  to  be  ordered  by 
Bragg  to  Henderson. 

Organization. 

Three  or  more  regiments,  or  about  twenty-five  hundred  effective  men,  to  a 
brigade. 

Two  brigades  to  a  division. 

To  each  brigade  one  battery  of  six  guns,  either  four  smooth-bore  and  two 
howitzers,  or  four  rifles  and  two  howitzers,  or  six  rifled-guns. 

Each  Grand  Division  should  have  a  reserved  battery  as  largo  as  practicable. 
There  should  be  a  chief  of  artillery  for  light  batteries  on  the  General-in-Chief  s 
staff. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVIII.  517 

Ammunition. 

Depots  to  bo  established  at  Columbus  and  Grenada,  Mississippi. 

Ammunition  for  Distribution. 

100  rounds  per  man,  for  infantry  and  cavalry  with  each  regiment. 
200  rounds  per  piece  with  each  company  of  artillery. 

The  requisite  amount,  in  the  same  ratio,  for  an  army  of  thirty-five  thousand 
men,  to  be  held  in  depot  at  Grand  Junction,  ready  for  shipment  at  a  moment's 
notice. 

Ordnance. 

One  Chief  of  Ordnance,  Captain  Oladowski. 

Ordnance  officer  at  Columbus,  Mr.  W.  R.  Hunt. 

<;  "       "  Grenada,  Captain  Gibbs. 

"  "       "  Grand  Junction,  Mr.  Tonneaii. 

Powder  manufactory  to  be  established  at  Meridian,  Mississippi,  and  sulphur, 
etc.,  to  bo  collected  there. 

Percussion-cap  manufactory  to  be  established  at  Columbus,  and,  if  possible, 
at  Grenada. 

Prisoners  of  war  now  at  Memphis  to  be  removed  to  Tuscaloosa,  Alabama. 
Troops  to  be  prepared  for  active  operations  in  the  field,  and  their  baggage  to 
be  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

Transportation  shall  be  from  ten  to  fifteen  wagons  per  regiment,  if  prac 
ticable. 

Rear-guards  must,  as  they  retire,  destroy  bridges  behind  them,  especially  on 
ordinary  roads,  by  felling  trees,  etc.,  if  practicable;  for  this  purpose  they  must 
be  provided  with  axes. 

Each  fort  and  light  battery  must  be  provided  forthwith  with  an  ample  sup 
ply  of  rat-tail  files.  General  Polk  will  please  issue  necessary  orders  to  that  effect. 
The,  1th  Louisiana  regiment,  at  Jackson,  will  report  to  Major-General  Bragg 
for  orders. 

G.  T.  BKAUIIKGAKD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 


JACKSON,  TENX.,  March  &th,  1862. 

Dear  Genera/, — I  think  it  would  be  well  to  establish  your  headquarters  at  or 
about  Humboldt  as  soon  as  possible,  so  as  to  infuse  some  order  and  discipline 
among  the  troops  assembled  there  and  at  Union  City.  Please  carry  into  effect, 
at  once,  the  instructions  contained  in  my  letter  of  the  Gth  instant,  for  I  feel  very 
anxious  at  the  condition  of  things  in  our  front,  due  greatly  to  the  want  of  the- 
general  ofticers  wo  have  applied  for. 

I  think  it  would  be  well  to  inquire  strictly  into  the  non-compliance  of  your 
first  orders  relative  to  those  cars  at  and  above  Humboldt,  and  arrest  whoever 
is  responsible  for  that  neglect.  Let  the  heavy  baggage  bo  separated  at  onco 
in  every  company,  regiment,  and  brigade,  to  be  sent  to  the  rear  as  soon  as  wo  can 
dispose  of  the  cars  for  that  object.  I  am  informed  the  enemy  has  threatened 
to  destroy  the  property  of  all  inhabitants  on  this  side  of  the  Tennessee  River 
who  should  send  away  any  cotton,  pork,  or  forage  to  prevent  the  same  from 
falling  into  his  hands.  If  so,  a  mounted  company  or  two  must  be  sent  there  to 


518  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVIII. 

compel  them,  under  written  orders,  to  send  those  articles  of  provision  and  forage 
to  the  railroad,  and  the  cotton  to  be  ready  to  be  burned  whenever  the  enemy 
shall  be  disposed  to  take  it. 

Have  the  goodness  to  detail  on  your  staff  a  corps  of  active  and  intelligent 
officers,  whose  duty  it  will  be  to  sec  that  all  your  orders  are  immediately  carried 
into  effect — that  is  the  plan  I  am  going  to  pursue. 

Yours  very  truly, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 
Maj.-Geul.  L.  POLK,  Comdg.,  etc.,  Humboldt,  Tcnn. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

JACKSON,  TENX.,  March  8th,  1862. 

Dear  Sir, — I  am  happy  to  hear,  through  the  letter  of  your  Adjutant-General, 
dated  March  6th,  and  addressed  to  Captain  Young,  of  my  staff,  that  during  the 
coming  week  a  considerable  number  of  your  state  troops  will  begin  to  assemble 
at  Henderson.  But  permit  me  to  suggest  that  instead  of  collecting  two  thou 
sand  men  at  Memphis,  you  should  assemble  there  about  five  hundred,  the  rest 
to  rendezvous  at  Bethel  Station,  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad. 

The  proper  orders  will  be  issued  for  their  equipment  and  subsistence,  to  the 
utmost  degree  within  my  power. 

I  hope  the  enemy  will  give  us  time  for  some  efficient  steps  towards  organiza 
tion  of  these  new  levies.  I  trust,  too,  that  the  people  will  be  thoroughly  aroused 
to  a  true  sense  and  appreciation  of  the  crisis  upon  us,  and  of  their  own  duties  in 
the  hour  of  trial.  If  so,  I  shall  feel  no  doubt  of  our  ability  to  rid  the  soil  of 
Tennessee,  at  no  remote  date,  of  all  invaders. 

Yours  very  truly, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  C.  S.  A. 
ISIIAM  G.  HARRIS,  Governor  of  the  State  of  Tenu.,  Memphis. 


Bcauregard 's  Order  Respecting  Bell-metal. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  8th,  1862. 
To  the  Planters  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  : 

More  than  once  a  people,  fighting  with  an  enemy  less  ruthless  than  yours, 
for  imperilled  rights  not  more  dear  and  sacred  than  yours,  for  homes  and  a 
land  not  more  worthy  of  resolute  and  unconquerable  men  than  yours,  and  for 
interests  of  far  less  magnitude  than  you  have  now  at  stake,  have  not  hesitated 
to  melt  and  mould  into  cannon  the  precious  bells  surmounting  their  houses  of 
God,  which  had  called  generations  to  prayer.  The  priesthood  have  ever  sanc 
tioned  and  consecrated  the  conversion,  in  the  hour  of  their  nation's  need,  as  one 
holy  and  acceptable  in  the  sight  of  God. 

We  want  cannon  as  greatly  as  any  people  who  ever,  as  history  tells  you, 
melted  their  church  bells  to  supply  them ;  and  I,  your  general,  intrusted  with 
the  command  of  the  army  embodied  of  your  sons,  your  kinsmen,  and  your  neigh 
bors,  do  now  call  on  you  to  send  your  plantation-bells  to  the  nearest  railroad 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVIII.  519 

depot,  subject  to  my  order,  to  be  melted  into  canuon  for  the  defence  of  your 
plantations. 

Who  will  not  cheerfully  and  promptly  send  me  Ids  bells  under  such  circum 
stances? 

Be  of  good  cheer;  but  time  is  precious. 

G.T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  10//»,  18G2. 

Dear  Sir, — You  will  remember  it  was  arranged  with  your  Excellency,  as  best 
for  the  service  and  all  concerned,  that  a  certain  portion  of  the  new  levies  from 
your  State  should  be  scut  to  fill  up  the  several  Tennessee  regiments  under  Gen 
eral  Polk,  and  to  take  the  arms  of  the  sick  or  other  non-effectives  of  those  reg 
iments.  I  have  now  to  submit  a  list  of  the  number  of  men  -wanted  under  that 
arrangement,  and  I  beg  that  you  will  cause  the  necessary  orders  to  issue,  at 
once,  so  that  the  services  of  that  number  of  men  may  be  available  at  the  earli 
est  possible  moment. 

General  McCown  will  need  740  men— that  is:  103  for  4th  Tennessee,  Colonel 
Neely,  Island  No.  10;  195  for  5th  Tennessee,  Colonel  Traverse,  New  Ma 
drid  ;  75  for  4Gth  Tennessee,  Colonel  Clark,  Island  No.  10 ;  and  227  for  31st 
Tennessee,  Colonel  Bradford,  Island  Xo.  10;  West  Tennessee  Battalion,  140 
men. 

General  Polk  will  need,  at  Humboldt,  fifteen  hundred  (1500)  men — that  is: 
C7  for      2d  Tennessee  regiment,  Colonel  Walker. 

G5  "      9th  Douglas. 

100  "      22d  Freeman. 

132  <•  154th  Sr.      "  Smith. 

220   "      Gth  Stephens. 

144   "    12th  Russell. 

1GG   "      33d  Campbell. 

At  Union  City,  Colonel  Vaughan,  13th  Tennessee  regiment,  will  need  100  men, 
and  Colonel  Picket!,  21st  Tennessee  regiment,  will  need  GO  men. 

At  Lexington,  Colonel  Carroll,  of  the  15th  Tennessee  regiment,  will  need  G5. 
At  Fort  Pillow,  for  the  40th  Tennessee  regiment,  there  are    125  needed  to 
fill  up  the  ranks,  and  at  Trenton,  the  47th  regiment  Tennessee  Volunteers  needs 
30  men. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg. 
ISIIAM  G.  HARRIS,  Governor  of  the  State  of  Tenn.,  Memphis. 

JACKSOX,  Miss.,  August  3d,  1S76. 

General, — Your  last  was  forwarded  to  me  hero.  On  reflection,  I  am  sure  that 
General  Chalmers  remembers  correctly,  and  that  the  guns  were  24-pounders. 
There  were  but  two  of  them,  and  they  were  put  in  i^osition  side  by  side  in  tho 
same  battery,  and  within  a  stone's-throw  of  the  corporate  limits  of  the  little 


520  APPENDIX    TO   CHAPTER  XVIII. 

town  of  Eastport,  ami  this  was  the  only  battery  we  had.     This  identical  bat 
tery  had  the  contest  with  the  gunboats. 

Very  respectfully, 

S.  S.  CALIIOUN. 
Gcnl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  New  Orleans,  La. 

BELEN,  Miss.,  September  28th,  1878. 
Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Dear  Sir, — Yours  of  10th  instant  received,  and  I  answer  your  questions  as  put 
by  you. 

1st.  I  was  ordered  to  luka  by  General  Sidney  Johnston  about  the  1st  of  Feb 
ruary,  1862. 

2d.  I  went  there  with  eight  companies  of  the  9th  Mississippi,  was  reinforced 
by  Colonel  R.  F.Loouey,  28th  Tennessee,  and  Colonel  (afterwards  General)  Max- 
ey,  of  9th  Texas,  and  Baskewith's  battalion  of  cavalry. 

My  infantry  was  located  at  luka,  except  two  companies  with  two  24-pounders 
located  at  old  Chickasaw  on  Tennessee,  under  Captain  S.  S.  Calhoun.  These 
companies  had  been  trained  in  heavy  artillery  at  Peusacola,  and  drove  back  the 
gunboats  that  came  up  to  burn  Bear  Creek  bridge — as  stated  by  General  Sher 
man.  The  cavalry  was  watching  the  Tennessee  River,  and  one  company,  un 
der  Captain  (afterwards  General)  Rodney,  went  across  the  Tennessee  River  to 
watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

*  #  *  *  #  :|:  :£ 

Yours  truly, 

JAS.  R.  CHALMERS. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  Wth,  1862. 
To  Governor  I.  G.  HARRIS,  Memphis,  Tenn. : 

I  consider  shot-guns,  with  bayonet  attachment  of  Memphis,  superior  to  ordi 
nary  muskets. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

This  telegram  was  repeated  to  the  Governors  of  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  and 
Alabama. 

JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  Wth,  1862. 
To  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Decatur  : 

Please  send  me  immediately  B.  Johnson  and  Mackall,  if  possible.  Do  not 
collect  more  cars  and  engines  from  western  part  of  road  than  absolutely  neces 
sary,  lest  they  be  cut  off  at  Tuscumbia. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  llth,  1862. 

General, — Knowing  the  importance  of  having  all  our  orders  faithfully  and 
promptly  executed  at  this  critical  juncture,  I  have  to  request  that  you  will 
mark  on  my  "notes  of  reference  "  of  the  3d  and  4th  instants,  and  my  instruc- 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVIII.  521 

tions  of  the  Cth  instant,  all  the  items  and  orders  referring  to  your  command, 
which  you  have  reason  to  believe  have  not  yet  been  executed,  and  then  select; 
one  or  more  officers  to  see  that  they  are  forthwith  carried  into  effect.  My  ex 
perience  with  volunteers  teaches  me  that,  with  the  best  intention  imaginable, 
they  seldom  execute  one  half  of  the  orders  they  receive  ;  hence  it  becomes  our 
imperative  duty  to  see  that  all  orders  given  are  complied  with.  Your  special 
attention  is  called  to  this  fact. 

Have  you  called  yet  for  those  new  flags  from  General  Lovell?  Remember 
there  are  three  sizes,  for  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry. 

Have  you  distributed  those  printed  orders  for  advanced  guards,  etc.,  to  your 
several  brigades?  If  not,  please  do  so  at  once.  I  think  it  advisable  to  send 
back,  as  soon  as  possible,  all  your  heavy  baggage  to  Columbus  or  Grenada — the 
latter  would  probably  be  preferable  at  present,  on  account  of  means  of  trans 
portation,  but  decide  for  yourself,  after  proper  inquiry.  I  believe  all  the  neces 
sary  arrangements  are  being  made  for  the  sick  at  Okalona.  Your  despatch  on 
the  subject  has  been  referred  to  General  Bragg.  I  send  you  the  copy  of  a  tele 
gram  from  General  Withers  at  Fort  Pillow.  I  am  disappointed  at  the  informa 
tion  it  contained.  I  have  ordered  him  to  commence  forthwith  a  system  of  de 
tached  works  to  protect  his  rear.  The  intelligence  from  General  McCown  is 
also  quite  sad,  but  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  reinforce  him  at  present ;  our  forces 
have  not  yet  half  arrived  from  the  South,  and  then  we  must  guard  our  rear, 
threatened  from  the  Tennessee  River.  With  the  small  force  at  our  command,  we 
cannot  present  a  strong  front  everywhere. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BKAUREGARD,  Gonl.  Comdg. 

Maj.-Gcnl.  L.  POLK,  Comdg.  1st  G.  Division,  at  Ilumboldt,  Tenn. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  14//i,  18G2. 
To  Gcul.  S.  COOPER,  Richmond,  Va. : 

Enemy  has  landed  in  force  about  twenty  thousand  at  Crump's  Landing,  op 
posite  Savannah.  My  forces  preparing  to  meet  him.  Am  much  in  need  of 
generals. 

G.T.  BEAUREGARD. 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  1G//J,  18G2. 
To  Genl.  S.  COOPER,  Richmond,  Va. : 

Must  again  apply  for  a  Chief  Commissary  of  experience,  such  as  Colonel  R. 
B.  Lee,  or  Major  Blair,  or  Williams,  otherwise  millions'  worth  of  property,  not 
to  be  replaced,  will  be  lost. 

G.  T.  BEAUIIEGARD. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  17th,  1862. 
To  Maj.-Genl.  BRAGO,  Corinth  : 

Have  requested  Mr.  Fleming  to  inform  you  of  the  transportation  capacity  of 
adjoining  railroads,  so  that  you  can  determine  and  order  up  the  means  (as  far 


522  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVIII.  . 

as  practicable)  called  for  by  General  Johnston .     Please  let  General  Johnston 
know  what  can  be  done  to  meet  his  wishes,  and  how. 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  G. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  I~th,  1862. 
To  Mjij.-Gcnl.  BRAGG  : 

General  Johnston  wants  four  hundred  cars,  with  locomotives,  at  Decatur. 
What  can  be  done  from  Corinth  ? 

THOMAS  JORDAX,  A.  A.  Genl. 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  18th  t  1862. 
L.  J.  FLEMING,  Corinth  : 

What  chance  to  get  cars  and  locomotives  from  Memphis,  Mississippi  Central, 
or  other  roads  ?  Where  are  the  cars,  etc.,  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston,  and 
those  from  the  Nashville  Road?  General  Johnston  asks  for  cars.  How  are 
they  to  be  got  for  him  ? 

THOMAS  JORDAX,  A.  A.  Genl. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  IStJi,  1862. 
To  Genl.  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Decatur : 

General  Bragg  at  Corinth.  Have  asked  him  to  answer  your  question  about 
cars.  Very  large  supply  there.  Enemy  threw  six  hundred  shells  at  Island  No. 
10,  without  damage  to  any  one,  or  anything,  yesterday. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSOX,  TENX.,  March  IStJi,  1862. 
To  General  L.  POLK  : 

What  number  of  your  troops  remain  at  Humboldt?     Troops  must  be  sent  as 
fast  as  practicable,  with  means  of  transportation,  to  Corinth. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  18t1i,  1862. 
General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Decatur: 

One  hundred  and  sixty  cars  with  locomotives  will  be  sent  you  from  Mississippi 
Central  Railroad ;  more  will  be  quickly  sent  from  other  roads. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  21st. 
Maj.-Genl.  BRAGG,  Corinth : 

The  General  wishes  an  armed  reconnoissance  made,  of  say  (3)  three  regiments 
infantry,  some  cavalry  and  artillery,  to  feel  the  enemy.  Must  be  cautiously 
made  with  advance  guards,  and  all  due  military  precautions. 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  G. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XVII I.  523 

JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  22rf,  1832. 
A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Genl.  Comclg.,  Courtland  : 

Following  despatch  just  received  from  Van  Dorn  : 

"  VAN  BUREN,  ARK.,  March  21st,  1862. 

"  I  march  my  first  brigade  to-morrow  towards  Jacksonport,  Arkansas.  All 
the  troops  here  will  march  in  a  few  days  to  the  same  point.  I  will  probably 
have,  on  White  Kiver,  by  10th  or  12th  April,  twenty  thousand  men  or  more, 
and  about  seventy  pieces  of  artillery.  It  was  my  intention  to  attack  the  forces 
near  New  Madrid  and  Point  Pleasant  from  the  north  by  Greenville.  What  do 
you  now  advise?  There  is  an  army  of  about  twenty  thousand.  Enemy  north 
of  this  in  Arkansas,  but  they  cannot  subsist  there;  nor  do  I  think  they  can  do 
much  harm  in  the  West.  We  cannot  subsist  here.  I  think  it  more  important 
to  save  the  Mississippi  liiver.  Answer  me  at  once.  I  start  for  Little  Kock  day 
after  to-morrow.  EARL  VAN  DORN." 

I  shall  try  to  sec  you  to-morrow,  unless  you  prefer  to  come  here. 

G.  T.  BEAT-REGARD. 


JACKSON.  March  r>2</,  9  h.  r.  M. 
Major-General  E.  VAN  DORN,  Little  Kock,  Ark.  : 

Despatch  received.  'Tis  important  to  join  our  forces  for  defence  of  valley 
by  shortest  route.  Could  yon  not  come  to  Memphis,  via  river?  There  we  will 
operate  to  best  advantage.  I  will  send  you  all  the  boats  yon  may  require. 
Sidney  Johnston  will  be  with  us.  Yon  might  come  ahead  for  conference.  We 
still  hold  Island  No.  10  and  Fort  Pillow.  G.  T.  BEAVREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TI:NN.,  March  21s/,  18G2. 
D.  B.  HARRIS,  Engineers,  Fort  Pillow: 

Look,  as  soon  as  practicable,  to  land  defence  of  fort.  Construct  detached 
works  first,  then  cremaillere.  Total  garrison  about  three  thousand  men;  de 
fensive  lines  must  not  be  too  extensive.  G.  T.  BEAVREGARU. 


JACKSON,  March  22J.  1802. 
Major-General  J.  P.  McCowN,  Comdg.  Madrid  Bend.       Care  Colonel  PICKETT, 

Union  City : 

Van  Dorn  proposes  to  attack  enemy  in  reverse  at  New  Madrid.     Be  of  good 
cheer  and  hold  out.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  22J. 
General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Decatur,  or  wherever  he  may  be  : 

I  consider  presence  of  Major  Gilmer  indispensable  at  Fort  Pillow  for  a  few 
days.     Safety  of  the  place  and  Mississippi  Valley  may  depend  upon  it. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  22d. 
Major-Gcncral  B.  BRAGG,  Corinth,  Miss. : 

When  can  you  spare  Oladowski  to  attend  to  the  making  of  guns  from  bells. 

G.  T.  BEAUKEGAIID. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  XX. 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  March  27th,  1862. 
General  S.  COOPER,  Richmond,  Va. : 

Headquarters  established  here  (on  26th).  Want  officers  Quartermaster's  De 
partment  greatly ;  recommend  Thomas  Clark,  W.  R.  Bennett,  J.  W.  Crocker,  and 
Addison  Piles,  as  Assistant  Quartermasters.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  Miss.,  March  28th,  1862. 
General  S.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Genl.,  Richmond,  Va. : 

Where  are  Generals  Hawes  and  Brown,  Colonel  R.  B.  Lee,  and  Captain  Wam- 
pler?  All  greatly  wanted.  Spare  me  General  Lawtoii  \vith  one  brigade  from 
Georgia,  if  possible,  for  here  a  great  battle  is  certain.  I  greatly  want  a  general 
of  artillery.  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  R.  Calhoun  very  competent. 

G.  T.  BEAU  REGARD. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XX. 

Extracts  from  Lieutenant  A.  E.  Chisolnis  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  14th,  1862. 

General, — In  accordance  with  your  order,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  fol 
lowing  report  of  orders  conveyed  by  me  on  the  6th  and  7th  instants,  during  the 
battle  of  Shiloh  ;  also  a  few  of  my  observations  during  those  two  days. 

A  few  minutes  before  5  o'clock,  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  instant,  the  move 
ment  was  commenced  by  General  Hardee's  command.  At  6^  h.  I  inquired  of 
General  Bragg  where  his  ammunition  wagons  were  stationed ;  he  informed  me, 
at  a  convenient  distance  on  the  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  roads.  6^-  A.  M.  firing 
ceased.  5  m.  of  7  h.  General  Polk's  command  moved  past  Headquarters  No. 
1,  at  intersection  of  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  roads.  7  h.  5  m.  the  first  can 
non  was  fired  on  our  left.  From  7  to  7£  A.  M.  heavy  musketry  at  intervals.  30 
min.  of  8  h.  rear  of  General  Polk's  command  passed  headquarters  and  commenced 
moving  forward.  8  A.  M.  ordered  General  Polk  to  throw  two  brigades  on  tho 
left  of  the  one  moving  along  the  road,  so  as  to  strengthen  the  left  and  rear  of 
General  Bragg.  In  conveying  this  order  I  was  accompanied  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Ferguson.  I  then  proceeded  on  to  General  Bragg  and  communicated 
the  same  order  to  him,  in  order  that  he  would  understand  the  movement.  Re 
turned,  and  while  on  the  way  requested  General  Polk  to  place  himself  in  com 
munication  with  General  Bragg.  General  Bragg  directed  me  to  say  to  you  that 
he  was  ready  to  support  General  Hardee  when  he  should  require  it;  that  ho 
was  in  line,  but  not  engaged,  except  with  his  artillery,  which  was  shelling  tho 
enemy's  camps.  Returned  and  reported  at  8£  A.  M.  9^  A.  M.  a  surgeon  of  Gen 
eral  Hardee's  corps  reported  to  me  that  the  General's  command  wras  within  (50) 
fifty  yards  of  the  enemy's  camps.  Reported  this  to  you. 

#*•**#  *  * 

12£  P.  M.,  delivered  order  to  Colonel  Pond  to  advance  and  attack  the  enemy. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX.  525 

I  found  Colonel  Hill  with  his  former  command  near  him.  I  requested  Colonel 
Pond  to  take  command  of  the  whole  force.  I  made  a  reconnoissance  \vith  Colonel 
Pond  ;  he  discovered  the  position  of  the,  enemy  near  a  log-house  on  the  left  of 
General  Hardee's  command.  Colonel  Pond,  wishing  some  cavalry  to  protect 
his  left,  I  ordered  a  squadron  I  found  near  by  to  support  him.  Colonel  Pond 
had  under  his  command  the  Orleans  Battalion,  16th  and  18th  Louisiana,  besides 
Colonel  Hill's  command  (two  regiments).  I  requested  these  two  officers  to  act 
in  concert,  which  they  said  they  would  do,  and  it  was  agreed  that  Colonel  Pond 
should  command  the  whole.  Keturned  and  reported  to  you. 

******* 

5J-,  was  ordered  by  you  from  in  front  to  find  General  Ilardee,  and  see  how  he 
was  getting  along,  but  to  return  and  report  to  you  before  dark.  I  found  his 
command  engaging  the-  enemy — the  General  with  his  men,  cheering  them  on. 
Nothing  could  exceed  his  coolness  and  gallantry.  He  was  always  in  the  thickest 
of  the  tight.  It  was  useless  to  look  for  him  elsewhere.  His  answer,  to  my 
question  if  he  wished  anything,  was,  "Tell  the  General  we  are  getting  along 
very  well,  but  they  are  putting  it  to  us  very  severely.''  Not  once  did  he  ask 
for  assistance. 

None  of  his  staff  being  then  with  him,  I  offered  to  act  as  his  aide-de-camp,  and 
to  bring  up  two  regiments  which  were  in  rear  of  him  and  place  them  on  his 
left.  This  I  accomplished  with  one  of  them,  and  was  bringing  up  the  second, 
when  a  tremendous  lire  was  opened  upon  us  from,  I  think,  two  field-pieces  and 
the  heavy  guns  of  th'?  gunboats.  The  Tennessee  regiment,  which  I  was  bring 
ing  into  position,  broke  in  disorder  and  fell  back.  Major  White  (formerly  of 
General  Hardee's  staff,  now  commanding  cavalry)  assisted  me  in  rallying  them 
and  inducing  them  to  lay  down  behind  the  crest  of  a  hill.  After  sundown  Gen 
eral  Ilardee  withdrew  his  command  beyond  the  range  of  the  guns  of  the  gun 
boats.  There  were  many  orders  which  I  bore  from  you  during  the  day  which 
it  is  impossible  for  me  now  to  recall  to  mind. 

******* 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  K.  CIIISOLM,  1st  Lieut,  and  A.  D.  C.,  C.  S.  A. 


Extracts  from  Colonel  Hrcnt's  Report  of  the  Lattlc  of  Slilloli. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  MISSISSIPPI, 

COIUXTII,  April  13th,  1862. 
General  G.  T.  HEAUREGARD  : 

General, — In  pursuance  of  your  instructions,  to  give  you  a  statement  of  the 
several  orders  borne  by  me  in  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  on  the  6th  and  7th  instant, 
I  beg  leave  respectfully  to  submit  the  following  report : 

After  assuming  your  position  with  your  staff  in  the  angle  formed  by  the  in 
tersection  of  the  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  roads,  I  was,  at  45  minutes  past  5 
o'clock  A.M.,  directed  to  order  the  1st  Tennessee  regiment,  which  was  then 
moving  towards  the  rear  on  the  Pittsburg  road,  to  countermarch,  and,  with 
right  in  front,  to  form  along  the  Hamburg  road,  its  left  resting  thereon,  which 
was  executed. 


526  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XX. 


At  twenty-three  minutes  past  7  o'clock  was  directed,  in  conjunction  with 
Colonel  Augustin,  to  move  on  the  Hamburg  road  towards  our  right,  and  as 
certain  the  condition  of  affairs  in  that  quarter. 

********* 

About  this  time,  fifteen  minutes  to  8,  the  sharp  rattle  of  musketry  was  heard 
along  the  centre  and  left,  and  in  a  minute  the  enemy,  on  General  Gladden's 
right,  and  at  a  distance  of  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards,  opened  a  heavy 
fire.  Colonel  Adams  behaved  with  coolness  and  gallantry,  our  right  pressed 
on,  and  the  second  line  of  battle  was  moving  rapidly  up  to  the  support  of  the 
first.  At  twenty-five  minutes  past  8  o'clock  I  reached  your  headquarters  and 
reported.  At  twenty  minutes  past  9  wo  moved  from  Headquarters  No.  1,  and 
I  was  directed  to  advise  Drs.  Choppin  and  Brodie  thereof,  and  where  you  could 
be  found.  At  five  minutes  past  10  was  ordered  to  direct  General  Trabue  to  send 
forward  two  regiments  of  his  brigade  to  the  centre,  which  was  executed  at  thir 
teen  minutes  past  10.  I  having  reported,  was  then  directed  to  General  Trabue 
to  have  an  additional  regiment  sent  forward  to  the  same  point.  At  twenty 
minutes  to  11  o'clock,  it  having  been  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had  planted  a 
battery  on  our  left,  I  was  directed  to  ascertain  its  position,  and  have  established 
a  counter-battery. 

********* 

At  fifteen  minutes  past  11  there  was  another  report  of  an  enemy's  battery 
threatening  us  011  the  left.  I  was  directed  to  go  forward,  and,  if  additional 
support  wrere  needed,  to  order  forward  two  regiments,  wrhich  wrere  supposed  to  be 
in  reserve.  I  immediately  went  forward,  and,  at  11^  o'clock,  found  that  while 
our  line  was  engaged,  yet  it  was  not  hotly  pressed.  I  found  Colonel  Hill  in  his 
old  position,  and  immediately  directed  him  to  advance  to  this  position,  which 
he  immediately  did. 

********* 

At  12|-  o'clock  I  was  ordered  by  you  to  collect  all  stragglers,  and  organize 
them  into  a  battalion  and  send  them  forward,  and  that  a  company  of  cavalry 
would  report  to  assist  me.  No  company  of  cavalry  reported,  but,  with  the  as 
sistance  of  Majors  Haines  and  Juge,  I  succeeded  in  organizing  a  battalion  of 
two  hundred  and  seventy  men.  with  a  complement  of  officers,  and  reported  with 
them  to  you  at  the  cross-roads  (I  suppose  your  Headquarters  No.  2),  some  dis 
tance  to  the  left  and  in  advance  of  Shiloh  church ;  under  your  direction,  it 
marched  to  the  front,  under  Majors  Haiues  and  Jngc. 

At  2|-  o'clock  another  battalion  was  formed,  under  Major  Moore,  and  I  was 
ordered  to  march  it  to  the  front  to  put  it  under  the  command  of  General  Bragg. 
I  proceeded  immediately  to  General  Bragg's  command,  but  could  not  find  him; 
but  saw  Colonel  Gardner.  I  moved  this  battalion  to  the  right  and  formed  it 
on  the  left  of  two  regiments  which  had  been  ordered  forward  a  few  minutes  be 
fore,  and  the  whole  placed  under  Colonel  Gibson. 

At  this  point  I  saw  the  staff  of  our  brave  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  and  was  ad 
vised  for  the  first  time  of  his  death,  and  was  requested  by  Colonel  O'Hara  to 
communicate  it  to  you.  I  returned  and  did  so,  but  found  it  had  alreadj'  been 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XX.  527 

communicated  to  yon.  At  fifteen  minutes  to  4  was  directed  to  accompany 
Colonel  Jordan  to  the  left  front,  and  at  4^  o'clock  found  the  enemy  in  full  re 
treat.  On  my  return  (to  Headquarters  No.  4)  was  directed  to  establish  a  police 
guard  to  protect  the  property,  aided  by  Captain  Curamiugs,  as  well  as  to  prevent 
stragglers,  whom  we  arrested.  Although  aided  by  the  assiduous  efforts  of  Cap 
tain  Cummings  to  accomplish  this,  I  am  afraid  that  not  much  was  effected. 
******* 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  WM.  BRENT,  Acting  Insp.-Gen. 


Extracts  from  the  Report  of  Colonel  Ferguson,  A.  I).  ('.  to  General  Beanreganl. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OK  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  April  9//j,  18G2. 

General, — In  obedience  to  your  instructions,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the 
following  report  of  the  orders  conveyed  by  me,  and  of  the  operations  of  our 
troops  on  the  Gth  instant,  as  far  as  my  observation  enables  me. 

At  4  h.  55  m.  A.  M.,  firing  along  our  front  commenced. 

At  G  h.  A.  M.,  conveyed  order  to  General  Polk  to  advance  the  centre  of  his  lead 
ing  brigade  to  intersection  of  Hamburg  and  Pittsburg  roads. 

At  G  h.  40  m.,  General  Johnston  and  staff  advanced  from  Headquarters  Xo.  1 
to  the  front. 

At  7  h.  4  m.,  Polk's  advance  brigade  passed  Headquarters  No.  1. 

At  7  h.  9  m.,  first  cannon  fired  on  our  left. 

At  7  h.  33  m.,  General  Cheatham's  advance  brigade  passed  Headquarters 
No.  1. 

At  7  h.  35  m.,  ordered  General  Breckinridge  to  deploy,  in  column  of  brigades, 
centre  of  leading  brigade  near  cross-roads. 

At  7  h.  52  m.,  ordered  General  Polk  to  advance  his  3d  and  4th  brigades  to  loft 
and  front,  to  strengthen  Bragg's  left. 

At  9.10,  ordered  General  Polk  to  send  one  brigade  by  flank  to  support  our  ex 
treme  right ;  accompanied  the  brigade  detailed,  that  of  General  Bnshrod  John 
son,  part  of  the  way,  and  returned  to  Headquarters  No.  1  at  9  h.  30  A.  M. 

At  9  h.  35  m.,  loft  Headquarters  No.  1  with  yourself  and  staff  for  more  ad 
vanced  position.  Between  time  of  arrival  at  Headquarters  No.  2  and  11  h.  A.  M., 
carried  orders  to  infantry  on  our  loft  and  front,  to  advance  two  regiments  to 
front  and  right  as  a  support  to  our  batteries  there  massed.  Order  to  Captain 
Hodgson,  of  Washington  Artillery,  to  make  a  recounoissance  to  front  and  left, 
where  a  four-gun  battery  of  the  enemy  was  reported  in  position;  and,  if  the 
ground  admitted  it,  to  advance  his  battery  in  that  direction  and  silence  them. 
Visited  one  of  the  captured  camps  and  then  reported  to  you  the  straggling 
there  going  on  for  the  purpose  of  plunder.  You  then  ordered  Captain  Dreux, 
of  your  escort,  witli  part  of  his  company,  to  clear  the  camps.  Was  employed 
collecting  stragglers,  and  men  leaving  field  with  wounded,  and  sending  them 
back  to  the  front. 

At  11  h.  10  m.,  by  your  order,  took  command  of  the  27th  Tennessee  rc^i- 


523  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX. 

meut,  reported  without  a  field-officer  and  without  ammunition.  Reorganized 
the  regiment,  and,  while  trying  to  procure  ammunition,  caused  them  to  rest  and 
refresh  themselves  with  coffee,  etc.  Having  distributed  ammunition,  and  find 
ing  the  major  lit  for  duty,  with  your  consent  I  turned  over  the  command  of  tho 
regiment  to  him  and  resumed  my  staff  duties,  about  1  h.  P.  M.  Continued  with 
yon,  placing  troops  and  hurrying  forward  reserves,  etc.  Carried  an  order  to  Cap 
tain  Bankhead  to  advance  his  battery  to  the  front.  This  he  executed  by  tho 
Pittsburg  road.  At  the  time  the  enemy  were  being  rapidly  driven  to  the  river 
along  our  centre  and  right  flank.  Soon  afterwards,  part  of  General  Anderson's 
brigade,  and  then  a  Louisiana  brigade — I  think  that  of  Colonel  Gibson — were 
advanced  in  the  same  direction. 

Some  time  after  this,  a  staff  officer  having  reported  a  brigade  without  a  com 
mander,  you  directed  me  to  assume  command  of  and  lead  it  into  action.  Pro 
ceeding  with  said  officer  to  the  point  designated,  I  met  General  Hardee,  who 
commanded  that  portion  of  the  field,  and  reported  my  orders  to  him.  He  di 
rected  me  to  lead  the  brigade  by  the  left  flank  as  far  as  possible  to  the  rear  of  a 
camp  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  our  left,  and,  if  possible,  to  take  it  in  reverse. 
At  tho  same  time  he  placed  under  my  command  Captain  Hodgson's  battery, 
Washington  Artillery  of  New  Orleans,  already  in  position,  to  shell  the  said 
camp,  and  reply  to  a  battery  of  the  enemy  there  in  position.  After  assuming 
command  of  the  brigade,  which  I  found  to  consist  of  the  ICth  and  18th  regiments 
Louisiana  Volunteers,  and  tho  battalion  of  Orleans  Guards,  all  under  the  com 
mand  of  Colonel  Pond,  I  made  a  recounoissauce  by  which  I  found  that  the 
camp  I  was  ordered  to  carry  was  in  a  strong  position,  separated  from  the 
ground  we  had  already  gained  by  a  deep  ravine,  a  branch  of  which  extended  to 
our  front,  along  our  left  of  said  camp.  A  considerable  extent  of  open  ground 
to  the  left  of  this  ravine  contained  another  camp  of  the  enemy,  who  could  be 
seen  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  in  large  force,  at  the  edge  of  the  woods  still 
farther  to  the  left  and  front. 

******* 

In  this  connection,  while  noticing  the  general  gallantry  of  the  officers  and 
men  I  had  the  honor  to  command,  I  wish  to  call  particular  notice  to  the  bravo 
and  efficient  services  of  Lieutenant  E.  Puech,  Adjutant  of  the  Orleans  Guards, 
and  of  Lieutenant  C.  M.  Sheppard,  Acting  Adjutant  of  the  18th  regiment  Louis 
iana  volunteers,  who  acted  as  my  staff;  also  of  Major  F.  Dumonteil,  a  volun 
teer  with  the  Orleans  Guards  ;  and  of  Father  E.  Turgis,  who,  in  the  performance 
of  his  holy  offices,  freely  exposed  himself  to  the  balls  of  the  enemy. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  F.  FERGUSON,  Lieut.-Col.  and  A.  D.  C. 

Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  comdg.  Army  of  the  Mississippi. 


Extracts  from  Colonel  JV.  Augustirfs  He-port  of  tJtc  Battle  of  Sliiloh. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  10th,  18(52. 
General, —  I  have  the  honor  to  report,  in  obedience  to  your  orders,  the  follow- 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX.  52'J 

ing  notes  and  orders  as  taken  by  me  during  the  engagements  with  the  enemy 
of  the  Gth  and  7th  instant. 

Headquarters  No.  1.  At  five  minutes  of  5  o'clock  A.  M.,  on  the  Gth,  we  heard 
the  first  lire  from  skirmishing  on  our  right  towards  Lick  Creek  ;  at  half-past  5 
we  heard  a  volley  of  musketry ;  at  G  o'clock  A.  M.,  the  engagement  appeared  to 
be  becoming  general;  at  half-past  G  the  lire  slackened,  and  ceased  at  a,  quar 
ter  of  7. 

At  twenty  minutes  of  8  I  went,  by  your  order,  to  the  right,  and  reported,  at 
twenty  minutes  of  9,  a  brisk  engagement  on  the  right,  and  recommended  send 
ing  troops  to  the  right  to  support  and  extend  our  lino  in  that  direction;  re 
marked  that  our  men  fired  at  too  long  a  distance,  and  too  high ;  danger  of  the 
enemy  flanking  our  right.  At  twenty  minutes  of  9  received  your  order  to  ac 
company  General  Breckinridge's  division  to  reinforce  the  right  and  to  follow 
the  movement  of  the  right  in  front,  extending  as  much  as  possible  his  own 
right  towards  Lick  Creek,  and  to  follow  the  general  movement  forward. 

At  10  o'clock,  reported  that  the  preceding  order  had  been  executed,  and  that 
General  Breckinridge  and  division  had  arrived  in  position  in  good  time,  at  about 
four  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  General  Dan.  Adams's  command.  General  Beaure- 
gurd  moved  to  Headquarters  No.  2;  went  to  meet  him. 

********* 

From  3  to  4  o'clock  was  occupied  in  collecting  together  and  organizing  strag 
glers,  to  march  them  as  reinforcements  to  General  Bragg;  placed  one  battalion 
thus  formed  under  command  of  W.  W.  Wood  of  Mississippi. 

At  dusk,  about  G,  sent  by  General  Beauregard  to  the  front,  to  order  "  to  arrest 
the  conflict  and  fall  back  to  the  camps  of  the  enemy  for  the  night.''  Transmit 
ted  this  order  to  Generals  Bragg,  Polk,  and  Ilardcc  ;  returned,  and  was  happy  to 
congratulate  the  general  upon  the  success  of  our  army  on  that  day.  Encamped 
in  one  of  the  enemy's  tents  near  Shiloh. 

******* 

Yours  very  respectfully,  N.  AUUUSTIN,  V.  A.  D.  C. 


Extracts  from  the  statement  of  facts  relative  to  the  first  and  second  days  of  (he  battle  of 
*V/u7o//,7>;vpamZ  by  Major  J>.  B.  ll'addcll,  volunteer  A.  D.  C.  of  General  Lcaurcyard. 

ST.  Louis,  Nov.  &th,  1878. 
Geiil.  G.  T.  BEAUKEGAKD  : 

******* 

On  the  night  of  the  3d  of  April  I  received  an  order  from  you  to  select  such 
guides  from  my  escort  as  I  desired,  and  report  to  General  Hardec,  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  4th,  and  to  go  with  General  Hardec,  via  the  Bark  road,  to  a  ridge 
in  front  of  the  enemy  at  Pittsburg,  at  or  near  the  junction  of  the  Hamburg  and 
Pittsburg  roads. 

I  reported  early  to  General  Ilardee ;  but  one  cause  and  another  prevented 
his  movement  as  early  as  had  been  ordered,  and  it  was  near  noon  before  his  en 
tire  command  was  in  motion. 

We  moved  out  to  the  Monterey  road,  taking  the  Bark  road  at  the  fork,  and  at 

L— 34 


530  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX. 

nightfall  bivouacked  at  a  spring  to  the  right  of  tho  Bark  road.  To  reach  tho 
spring  the  command  \vas  moved  off  of  tho  Bark  road,  on  a  blind  road  which 
made  a  cut-off  across  the  head-waters  of  a  creek,  while  the  Bark  road  followed 
the  ridge  around  the  spring  and  small  "branches  of  the  creek. 

Late  at  night  General  Polk's  command  came  along,  following  his  order,  the 
command  of  General  Hardee,  and,  the  Bark  road  being  unoccupied,  moved  on  it 
until  he  reached  a  picket  which  I  had  posted,  over  a  mile  in  advance  of  General 
Hardee's  bivouac.  Ou  the  morning  of  the  5th  General  Hardee  moved  on  early  ; 
and  when  we  got  back  into  the  Bark  road  we  found  it  occupied  by  General 
Polk's  command,  which  was  in  our  front.  The  road  was  too  narrow  to  admit 
of  a  passage  of  Hardee's  train,  so  it  became  necessary  to  lift  General  Polk's  train 
to  one  side  of  the  road,  which  was  effected  by  the  aid  of  soldiers  and  teamsters. 
This  accident  occasioned  some  delay  and  confusion,  and  may,  to  some  extent, 
account  for  a  tardiness  in  General  Polk's  arrival  at  the  point  designated  for  the 
formation  of  the  lines  of  battle. 

In  justice  to  General  Polk,  I  will  say  that  I  do  not  think  he  discovered  that 
General  Hardee  had  gone  out  of  the  Bark  road  until  he  had  passed  General  Har 
dee's  command.  Knowing  that  he  was  in  its  rear,  he  naturally  enough  had  no 
advance  guard  out,  and  no  means  of  discovering  the  condition  of  affairs.  I 
joined  you  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  at  Monterey,  and  rode  with  you  to  Head 
quarters  No.  1.  Judging  of  time  by  what  I  had  done  that  morning,  I  am  of 
opinion  that  it  was  after  noon  before  you  and  General  Johnston  reached  tho 
ridge  where  the  front  line  was  formed  and  Headquarters  No.  1  was  established. 

After  a  conference  of  the  general  officers  was  held,  at  a  point  in  the  road,  at 
which  I  witnessed  a  very  marked  deference  on  the  part  of  General  A.  S.  John 
ston  for  your  opinions  and  plans  of  conducting  the  battle,  it  was  suggested 
by  General  Hardee  that  you  should  ride  in  front  of  his  line  of  battle  to  show 
yourself  to  his  men,  giving  them  the  encouragement  which  nothing  but  your 
presence  could  do.  I  well  remember  your  modest  hesitation  at  tho  proposi 
tion;  your  plea  of  sickness  was  urged  (a  more  delicate  reason  existed,  no  doubt 
— your  esteem  for  tho  chief  in  command);  but  when  the  request  was  made 
unanimous,  General  Johnston  urging,  you  consented,  on  condition  that  the  men 
should  not  cheer  as  you  passed,  as  cheering  might  discover  our  position  to  the 
enemy.  An  order  was  sent  quickly  along  the  lines,  informing  tho  men  that 
you  would  ride  in  front  of  them,  and  that  no  cheering  should  bo  indulged  in. 
You  passed  in  front  of  the  lines,  and  never  was  an  order  so  reluctantly  obeyed 
as  was  this  order  —  "No  cheering,  men"  —  which  had  to  bo  repeated  at  every 
breath,  and  enforced  by  continuous  gesture. 

General  Johnston's  prestige  was  great,  but  the  hearts  of  the  soldiers  were 
with  you ;  and  your  presence  awakened  an  enthusiasm  and  confidence  magical 
in  its  effect. 

The  formation  in  proper  line  was  later  than  the  original  calculation;  but  I 
heard  no  complaint  except  of  a  tardiness  on  the  part  of  General  Polk. 

The  determination  was  to  strike  the  enemy  at  daybreak  on  the  6th;  and  the 
general  commanders  received  instructions  for  the  attack.  Officers  and  soldiers 
slept  on  their  arms  in  hearing  of  the  enemy,  who,  unconscious  of  our  presence, 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX.  531 

were  cooking  supper  only  a  short  distance  beyond  common  range  of  our  lines 
of  battle. 

At  daylight  on  tho  morning  of  the  fith  of  April,  1862,  our  lines  moved  in  good 
order,  and,  like  an  avalanche,  struck  the  enemy  left,  right,  and  centre,  so  nearly 
simultaneously  as  to  surprise  his  entire  camp. 

My  first  order  received  from  you  was  early  in  the  morning,  after  the  firing  on 
the  right  had  indicated  tho  propriety  of  directing  Colonel  Maury,  I  think  (who 
had  been  located  with  a  small  regiment  on  a  road  leading  to  a  ford  on  Lick 
Creek),  to  leave  that  position  and  go  to  tho  heaviest  firing,  and  to  inform  Gen 
eral  Forrest  (then  Colonel),  who  was  guarding  a  ford  on  Lick  Creek,  of  the  re 
moval  of  Colonel  Maury 's  force.  This  order  was  promptly  delivered,  and  I  re 
turned  to  yon  at  Headquarters  No.  2,  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  advance  of 
Shiloh  meeting-house;  time  required  to  make  this  trip,  judging  from  distance, 
two  hours.  I  found  you  there,  and  received  an  order  to  go  into  an  encamp 
ment  which  had  been  captured,  stop  the  pillaging  which  was  going  on,  and  or 
ganize  stragglers  and  send  them  forward  into  line.  I  executed  the  order  by 
clearing  the  camps,  placing  a  guard  over  them,  and  mustering  into  line  forty  or 
fifty  stragglers,  and  went  with  them  to  the  nearest  line. 

******* 

I  rode  rapidly  on  by  your  Headquarters  No.  2,  where  I  had  left  you,  as  near 
as  I  can  now  estimate,  about  12  M.  I  found  you  had  gone,  or  moved  your  head 
quarters.  I  searched  some  time  for  you,  and  in  tho  search,  as  near  as  I  can  now 
estimate,  went  to  your  right  and  somewhat  in  advance  of  tho  point  at  which  I 
found  you.  My  recollection  is  that  I  saw  or  met  General  Bragg  not  far  from 
you  ;  and,  learning  that  ho  was  going  to  you,  went  with  him,  or  after  him,  to  you. 
at  what  I  understand  was  Headquarters  No.  3,  in  advance  of  General  Wallace's 
captured  camps.  The  sun  was  above  tho  trees;  heavy,  broken  clouds  were 
passing  in  tho  west;  and  I  would  say  it  was  not  far  from  5  o'clock  p.  M.  Tho 
battle  was  raging  in  front  at  a  terrible  rate,  and  I  was  hopeful,  which  was  bor 
rowed,  no  doubt,  from  the  hope  which  your  face  expressed,  that  we  were  rushing 
on  them  to  complete  the  victory  of  the  day.  My  recollection  is  that  at  this  time 
General  Bragg  expressed  a  difficulty  he  experienced  in  forcing  his  men  across  a- 
depression  by  which  gunboats  were  firing  shells;  it  was  regarded  as  important 
that  tho  desired  point  should  bo  carried.  Ho  left  you  with  the  order  to  press 
forward,  using  his  discretion  as  to  the  possibility  of  carrying  tho  point,  and  as 
to  the  sacrifice  of  men  in  tho  effort.  He  left  you  to  make  this  important  effort. 
******* 

At  that  time  the  struggle  seemed  to  be  an  artillery  duel,  at  least,  tho  artillery 
predominated  over  tho  firing  of  musketry. 

Although  the  great  confusion  of  our  own  forces  was  and  had  been,  for  some 
time,  plainly  apparent,  as  indicated  in  front  and  the  great  number  of  stragglers 
in  rear,  yet  tho  hope  was  justified  that  the  enemy  was  more  confused. 

Two  contingencies  were  looked  for,  at  this  critical  period,  with  great  caro  and 
anxiety.  It  was  known  that  Buell,  with  a  largo  force  of  fresh  troops,  had  had 
time  to  reach,  at  least,  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River ;  and  you  had 
had  no  positive  proof  that  Lew.  Wallace,  whoso  command  was  at  a  point  on  the 


532  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XX. 

river  several  miles  below  Pittsburg  Lauding,  Lad  readied  the  battle-field.  Our 
left  Lad  advanced  beyond  the  point  at  whicL  General  Wallace  would  Lave  been 
expected  to  cross  Owl  Creek,  in  a  marcL  by  tLe  west  side  of  tLe  Tennessee,  leav 
ing  our  army  and  position  sadly  exposed  in  tLe  event  of  sucL  a  movement  on 
Lis  part.  I  stated  to  you  my  fears  tliat  Buell  Lad  arrived ;  tLat  I  Lad  been  able 
to  see,  from  an  elevated  point,  on  my  trip  from  Lick  Creek,  wLat  I  believed  to 
be  tLe  smoke  of  transport  boats  crossing  or  coming  up  tlie  river. 

Every  resource  and  eifort  on  your  part  was  exerted  at  tLat  critical  point  witL 
tLe  sLattered  forces  at  your  command. 

TLe  word  was  "  Onward,  onward!  a  few  more  minutes,  men,  and  tLe  field  is 
ours." 

TLe  struggle  was,  for  a  wliile,  furious;  but  niglit  came,  and  tLo  weary,  worn- 
out  soldiers  wLo  Lad  been  in  line  for  the  past  tLirty  Lours,  and  under  incessant 
lire  for  the  past  twelve  hours,  without  food  or  water  (many  of  whom  had  seen 
their  'brothers  or  comrades  fall  on  that  bloody  field),  with  coming  darkness 
ceased  their  efforts,  and  the  rattle  of  musketry  ended. 

I  was  engaged  with  the  removal  to  the  rear  of  a  large  number  of  prisoners, 
captured  with  General  Prcntiss,  until  about  sunset  or  after,  and  until  late  at 
night,  giving  the  best  direction  I  could  to  soldiers  who  had  lost  their  respective 
commands. 

I  saw  you  at  Headquarters  No.  4,  near  the  Shiloh  meeting-house,  about  dark, 
from  which  time  I  did  not  see  you  until  early  Monday  morning;  but  I  have  al 
ways  be«n  under  the  impression  that  I  heard  you  come  to  tLe  tent  in  wLicL  you 
slept,  if  you  slept  at  all,  late  at  night.  It  rained  torrents  during  tLe  nigLt. 

Monday,  the  lili. — I  was  awakened  early  in  tLe  morning  by  tlie  rattle  of  mus 
ketry.  TLe  enemy  was  advancing  steadily  on  our  forces  in  front.  I  was  soon 
in  tlie  saddle,  and  you  directed  me  to  go  to  tLe  rear  and  find  General  Polk,  and 
order  Lim  to  come  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Captain  Clifton  Smith,  I 
tliink,  accompanied  me. 

For  some  reason,  I  did  not  meet  General  Polk  until  I  Lad  gone  to  or  near  tlie 
place  to  wLicL  Le  Lad  fallen  back  tLe  previous  nigLt.  He  Lad  gone  to  tLo 
front ;  and  wLen  I  found  Lim  ho  was  in  line  and  under  fire,  executing  in  a  most 
beautiful  manner  the  order  I  had  for  him.  I  reported  to  you  the  fact,  and  was 
then  sent  to  the  rear  to  arrest  and  organize  iu  companies  and  squads  the  strag 
glers  and  men  who  had  lost  their  commands.  At  this  I  was  engaged,  I  tliink, 
until  noon  or  later. 

I  tlien  went  forward,  found  a  number  of  your  staff  under  sLelter  at  tLe  meet 
ing-house  (a  log-house)  near  Headquarters  No.  4.  I  learned  afterwards  you 
Lad  ordered  your  staff  to  that  shelter,  and  had  gone  forward.  Keeping  as  well 
us  I  could  under  shelter  of  the  elevation  in  front,  until  I  got  near  you,  I  joined 
you  on  the  hill,  where  you  were  giving  direction  to  troops  which  were,  I  think, 
lying  down,  with  a  view  to  reserving  their  fire  for  the  enemy,  then  in  full  view. 

After  remaining  Avith  you  in  this  exposed  condition  a  short  time,  we  rode  to 
gether  down  the  hill,  not  far  from  the  log-house,  probably  crossing  the  depres 
sion,  about  which  time,  say  1  o'clock  r.  M.,  you  directed  me  to  Lave  the  muskets 
and  arms  about  the  camps  in  rear  loaded  into  wagons  and  taken  to  the  rear. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XX.  533 

I  put  wagons  and  men  at  this  work  and  returned  to  yon.  Yon  then  directed 
me,  about  2  r.  M.,  to  find  and  locate  a  field  battery  at  a  point  in  rear,  near 
the  corner  of  a  field  on  the  west  side.  I  did  so,  under  the  fire  of  which  and 
other  batteries  our  troops  retired  deliberately,  the  enemy  not  advancing. 

I  was  more  or  less  engaged,  gathering  guns  and  other  property  into  wagons, 
until  you  were  ready  to  start  back  to  Corinth,  when  I  accompanied  yon,  with 
Governor  Harris,  by  the  shortest  road  to  Corinth,  where  we  arrived  late  at 
night.  Very  truly, 

B.  13.  WADDELL,  ex- Vol.  A.  D.  C. 


Extracts  from  Colonel  Jacob  Thompson's  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  April  Uth,  18G2. 
To  Cenl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

General, — In  pursuance  of  your  directions,  I  beg  leave  to  submit  this  as  my 
report  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 

******* 

Soon  after  this,  General  Hardee,  accompanied  by  his  staff,  came  forward  and 
pressed  you  to  ride  along  his  line  and  show  yourself  to  his  men.  Ho  believed  it 
would  revive  and  cheer  their  spirits  to  know  that  you  were  actually  in  the  field 
with  them.  You  accepted  the  invitation,  though  then  complaining  of  feeble 
ness,  on  condition  there  should  be  no  cheering.  On  your  return  from  the  review, 
with  your  staff,  every  ono  was  stopped  for  the  coming  np  of  General  Folk's 
corps.  The  whole  army  was  not  in  position  until  about  three  o'clock,  and  then, 
upon  consultation,  it  was  decided  to  postpone  any  further  movement  until  morn 
ing.  The  troops  slept  on  their  arms,  and  the  front  lines  were  allowed  no  fires, 
although  the  night  was  quito  chilly. 

Next  morning,  Sunday,  Gth,  the  sky  was  without  a  cloml,  and  the  sun  arose1 
with  cheering  brilliancy.  About  five  o'clock  the  first  firing  was  heard  in  tho 
centre  down  the  Pittsburg  road.  In  less  than  three  minutes  firing  was  heard 
on  the  left.  Intermittent  firing  in  the  centre  and  on  tho  right  of  our  lines  was 
continued  until  five  minutes  after  six  o'clock.  At  half  after  six  I  bore  order 
from  you  to  General  Brcckinridge,  who  commanded  the  reserve,  that  ho  must 
hurry  forward  his  troops,  inasmuch  as  General  Polk  was  in  motion.  This  order 
was  promptly  delivered.  Soon  after  this  General  Johnston  called  on  you  and 
expressed  himself  satisfied  with  tho  manner  in  which  tho  battle  had  been  opened. 
The  greatest  enthusiasm  prevailed  both  with  officers  and  men.  When  you 
established  your  headquarters  on  the  high  point  between  the  Pittsburg  and 
Hamburg  roads,  heavy  firing  was  heard  on  our  right.  The  first  cannon  was 
discharged  on  our  left  at  seven  o'clock,  which  was  followed  by  a  rapid  discharge 
of  musketry.  About  half-past  seven  I  rode  forward  with  Colonel  Jordan  to  the 
front,  to  find  General  Johnston,  and  ascertain  how  the  battle  was  going.  There 
I  was  informed,  by  General  Johnston,  that  General  Ilardec's  lino  was  within 
half  a  mile  of  the  enemy's  camps,  and  bore  from  him  a  message  to  you  that  he 
advised  tho  sending  forward  strong  reinforcements  to  our  left,  as  he  had  just 


534  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX. 

then  learned  that  the  enemy  -was  there  in  great  force.  Under  this  advice,  two 
of  General  Breckinridge's  brigades  were  started  to  the  support  of  the  left,  but 
before  he  proceeded  far  I  bore  a  message  to  General  Breckiuridge  to  send  but 
oue  to  the  left,  and  to  order  two  brigades  to  the  right,  on  Lick  Creek.  This 
change  was  made  in  consequence  of  information  brought  by  a  courier  that  the 
enemy  was  not  strong  on  our  left,  and  had  fallen  back.  From  eight  to  half- 
past  eight  the  cannonading  was  very  heavy  along  the  whole  line,  but  especially 
in  the  centre,  which  was  in  the  line  of  their  camps.  It  was  about  this  time 
General  Breckinridge  and  staff  moved  by  your  headquarters  with  two  brigades. 
When  his  troops  had  passed,  you  broke  up  your  headquarters  at  this  point  and 
moved  forward  with  your  staff,  and  halted  on  the  Pittsburg  road,  about  half  n 
mile  west  of  the  enemy's  camps.  Here  we  met  large  numbers  of  wounded  men 
and  stragglers  from  our  ranks.  Immediately  your  whole  staff  was  ordered  to 
rally  the  stragglers  and  send  them  forward  to  their  regiments.  I  was  charged 
with  the  duty  of  hurrying  forward  the  ammunition  wagons  to  a  point  of  safety 
in  the  rear  of  our  lines.  Several  loads  of  ammunition  were  conducted  to  a  point 
of  safety  beyond  the  first  encampment,  to  a  point  just  outside  of  the  firing. 
After  passing  over  the  second  ridge,  where  the  conflict  was  maintained  with  the 
greatest  intensity,  and  remaining  till  I  observed  the  enemy  give  back  before  our 
troops,  I  returned  to  your  quarters,  which  had  then  been  moved  up  to  the  old 
house  on  the  ridge,  where  we  first  entered  the  enemy's  encampment. 

******* 
With  high  respect  and  esteem,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  THOMPSON. 


Extract  from  General  Hardens  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh. 

HEADQUARTERS  HARDEE'S  CORPS, 

February,  1863. 

General, —  *  *  *  *  * 

The  order  was  given  to  advance  at  daylight  on  Sunday,  the  Cth  of  April. 
The  morning  was  bright  and  bracing.  At  early  dawn  the  enemy  attacked  the 
skirmishers  in  front  of  my  line,  commanded  by  Major,  now  Colonel,  Hardcastle, 
which  was  resisted  handsomely  by  that  promising  young  officer,  and  the  battle, 
in  half  an  hour,  became  fierce ;  my  command  advanced.  Ilindinau's  brigade 
engaged  the  enemy  with  great  vigor,  on  the  edge  of  a  wood,  and  drove  him 
rapidly  back  over  the  field  towards  Pittsburg,  while  Gladden's  brigade  on  the 
right,  about  eight  o'clock,  dashed  upon  the  encampments  of  a  division  under 
the  command  of  General  Preutiss.  At  the  same  time,  Cleburue's  brigade,  with 
the  15th  Arkansas  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  the  2d  Tennessee  en  echelon, 
on  the  left,  moved  quickly  through  the  fields,  and,  though  far  outflanked  by  the 
enemy  on  our  left,  rushed  forward  under  a  terrific  fire  from  the  serried  ranks 
drawn  up  in  front  of  the  camp.  A  morass  covered  his  front,  and,  being  difficult 
to  pass,  caused  a  break  in  the  brigade.  Deadly  volleys  were  poured  upon  the 
men  from  behind  bales  of  hay  and  other  defences  as  they  advanced,  and,  after  a 
series  of  desperate  charges,  the  brigade  was  compelled  to  fall  back.  In  this 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX.  535 

charge  the  Gth  Mississippi,  under  Colonel  Thornton,  lost  more  than  three  hundred 
killed  and  wounded  out  of  an  effective  force  of  four  hundred  and  twenty-five. 
******* 
I  remain,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  J.  HARDEE,  Lieut.-Genl. 
To  General  S.  COOPER,  Adj.-Geul. 


Extract  from  Dr.  NotCs  lettei'  to  General  Beauregard,  relative  to  the  withdrawal  of 
troops  on  the  first  day  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh. 

NEW  YORK,  Xorember  6th,  1869. 

Afy  dear  General, — Your  letter  of  30th  October,  enclosing  a  copy  of  one  from 
G.  Humphries,  Esq.,  of  Mobile,  relative  to  a  conversation  of  his  with  mo 
touching  a  point  in  the  history  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  has  just  been  received, 
and  I  reply  without  a  moment's  delay. 

I  must  commence  by  saying  that,  although  I  rode  by  the  side  of  General 
Bragg  through  the  greater  part  of  that  day,  carried  several  of  his  orders  myself 
to  different  parts  of  the  field  (all  the  other  members  of  the  staff  being  absent  on 
duty),  was  with  him  up  to  the  close  of  the  battle,  and  rode  off  with  him  to  his 
tent  after  the  order  to  recall  the  troops  was  given,  the  General  never  said  to 
mo  by  whose  authority  the  order  was  given. 

I  can  only  say  that,  at  the  close  of  the  day,  when  beside  him  on  horseback,  I 
heard  him  give  an  order  to  withdraw  the  troops  from  the  field,  and  also  for  their 
disposition  for  the  night.  My  impression  at  the  time  was,  that  General  Bragg 
gave  the  order  on  his  own  responsibility.  "We  were  immediately  in  the  rear  of 
our  line,  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  to  Pittsbnrg  Landing,  and  their  gunboats 
were  keeping  a  furious  shelling.  Our  men,  immediately  in  front  of  where  we 
were  standing,  were  much  demoralized,  and  indisposed  to  advance  in  the  face 
of  the  shells  which  were  bursting  over  us  in  every  direction  ;  and  my  impression 
was  (this  was  also  the  conclusion  of  General  Bragg),  that  our  troops  had  done 
all  that  they  would  do  and  had  better  bo  withdrawn. 

The  scene  in  front  of  General  Bragg  and  myself  (in  the  direction  of  the 
enemy's  lire)  was  one  of  considerable  confusion,  and  up  to  the  time  he  gave  the 
order  I  had  seen  1:0  messenger  from  you,  and  believed  that  it  emanated  from 
him.  I  heard  him  give  it,  and  I  rode  with  him  from  the  battle-field,  some  two 
miles,  to  his  camp  for  the  night.  If  he  had  received  and  disapproved  such  an 
order,  it  is  probable  that  something  would  have  been  said  about  it. 

******* 

Very  respectfully  and  truly  yours,  J.  C.  NOTT,  M.  D.* 


Infracts  from  a  letter  of  Colonel  Jacob  Thompson,  Volunteer  A.  D.  C.  to  General 
Beauregard,  relative  to  the  Battle  of  Shiloh. 

MEMPHIS,  TKXX.,  July  20th,  1880. 
To  Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD: 

My  dear  General, — I  have  been  absent  from  home  for  more  than  three  months, 

*  Dr.  Nott  was  Medical  Director  of  General  Bragg1  s  corps,  and  stood  at  the  head  of 
his  profession  in  Mobile.     He  ranked  among  the  first  surgeons  of  the  United  States. 


536  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX. 

and  have  but  lately  returned.     On  my  arrival  I  find  your  letter,  which  had 
been  duly  received. 

I  shall  answer  the  several  points  to  which  you  call  my  attention,  with  readiness. 

On  the  evening  and  night  of  the  Cth  April,  the  first  day  of  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  after  the  order  had  been  given  to  cease  firing,  and  all  was  quiet  along 
our  lines,  all,  or  nearly  all,  of  the  general  officers  came  to  headquarters,  where  I 
mingled  freely  among  them  ;  heard  from  them  accounts  of  the  many  moving  in 
cidents  of  the  day,  the  death  of  many  good  and  brave  men,  the  capture  and 
ilight  of  the  enemy.  But  on  that  evening,  although  all  admitted  the  victory 
was  not  complete,  yet  I  heard  no  one  express  the  slightest  discontent  with  your 
order  to  cease  firing.  On  the  contrary,  the  impression  left  on  my  mind,  of  which 
I  have  a  vivid  recollection,  by  their  conversation,  was,  that  our  troops  had  all 
done  Avell,  and  had  accomplished  all  that  could  have  been  expected,  and  that  we 
were  masters  of  the  field.  I  certainly  heard  no  one  say  that  if  he  had  not  been 
called  off  he  could  have  won  for  himself  and  his  troops  any  additional  laurels. 
On  that  evening  I  heard  no  criticism  of  the  order  to  cease  firing,  and  I  feel  con 
fident  there  was  none  in  any  quarter.  I  am  further  satisfied  now,  and  always 
have  been,  that  all  complaints  of  your  drawing  off  the  troops  on  theevening  of  the 
Gth  were  after-thoughts,  and  especially  with  the  general  officers.  Because,  until 
the  fact  was  well  established  that  the  enemy,  during  that  night,  received  an 
additional  aid  of  more  than  twenty  thousand  fresh  troops,  no  such  thought 
seemed  to  have  occurred  to  any  one.  After  that,  however,  many  began  to  say 
it  would  have  been  far  better  for  us  to  have  attempted  to  complete  our  work 
on  the  day  before.  Some  of  the  general  officers  began  to  say  wo  could  have 
done  more.  But  I  have  never  thought  that  such  was  their  opinion  the  day  be 
fore.  The  exhausted  condition  of  our  troops,  their  disorganization,  derangement, 
and  straggling  were  fearfully  great,  and  I  have  never  believed  that  their  wor 
ried,  hungry,  and  disorganized  bands,  though  flushed  with  victory,  could  have 
silenced  General  BuelPs  batteries,  wThich  were  brought  into  the  action  on  the 
evening  of  the  Gth,  and  I  do  not  think  any  of  our  generals  thought  so  then. 
*  *  *  *  *  #  sjs 

My  object  in  this  letter  has  been  to  give  you  as  frank  and  direct  replies  as 
possible  to  your  inquiries. 

I  shall  be  happy  to  hear  from  you  at  all  times. 

Very  truly,  your  obedient  servant,  J.  THOMPSON. 

Extract  from  a  Letter  of  ex- Governor  I.  G.  Harris  of  Tennessee  to  General  Bcaurcgard, 
relative  to  the  death  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 

MEMPHIS,  April  13th,  1370. 
Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  New  Orleans : 

My  dear  Sir, — Your  letter  of  5th  instant  came  to  hand  a  few  days  since.  In 
answer  to  which  I  beg  to  say  that  your  letter  of  last  autumn  did  not  reach  me. 
or  it  should  have  been  promptly  answered. 

About  1^  h.,  an  hour  before  his  fall,  General  Johnston  moved  around  to  about 
the  centre  of  General  Breckinridge's  division,  upon  our  extreme  right,  and  for 
about  three  quarters  of  an  hour  occupied  a  position  immediately  in  rear  of  Gen- 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX.  537 

oral  Breckinridge's  line,  where  a  very  hard  fight  was  going  on.  Exposed  to  a 
galling  lire,  our  lino  held  its  position  steadily,  but  at  very  considerable  cost, 
until  finally  General  Johnston  decided  to  order  and  lead  a  charge  from  that  po 
sition  upon  the  line  of  the  enemy  that  confronted  us.  He  rode  to  the  front, 
talked  to  the  troops  a  moment  or  two,  ordered  and  led  the  charge.  The  ene 
my's  line  gave  away  before  us,  and  we  advanced,  I  should  think,  three  quarters 
of  a  mile,  and  established  our  lino  on  a  ridge  parallel  to  the  one  we  had  left, 
meeting  a  galling  fire  from  the  enemy  while  thus  re-establishing  our  line. 

Just  as  our  lino  had  been  established  and  dressed,  General  Johnston  called 
my  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  sole  of  one  of  his  boots  had  been  cut  by  a  ball. 
I  asked  him,  somewhat  eagerly,  "Are  yon  wounded;  did  the  ball  touch  your 
foot?"  He  said,  "Xo;"  and  was  proceeding  to  make  an  additional  remark, 
when  a  battery  of  the  enemy  opened  fire  from  a  position  to  our  left,  which 
enfiladed  our  line  in  its  then  position,  when  ho  said  to  me,  "Order  Colonel 
Statham  to  wheel  his  regiment  to  the  left,  charge,  and  take  that  battery."  I 
galloped  immediately  to  Colonel  Statham,  about  two  hundred  yards  distant. 
and  gave  the  order,  and  galloped  immediately  back  to  General  Johnston,  who 
was  sitting  upon  his  horso  where  I  had  left  him,  a  few  feet  in  rear  of  our  line 
of  battle.  Riding  up  to  his  right  side,  I  said,  "  General,  your  order  is  delivered, 
and  Colonel  Statham  is  in  motion."  As  I  was  saying  this,  ho  leaned  from  me 
in  a  manner  that  impressed  me  with  the  idea  that  ho  was  falling  from  his 
horse.  I  instantly  extended  my  left  arm  around  his  neck,  grasping  his  coat- 
collar,  and  pulling  him  towards  me  until  I  righted  him  up  in  the  saddle  ;  and. 
stooping  forward  so  that  I  could  look  him  in  the  face,  I  asked  him,  "General, 
are  yon  wounded  ?"  He  said,  "  Yes,  and  I  fear  seriously."  At  this  moment  his 
rein  dropped  from  his  hand.  Holding  him  with  my  left  hand,  I  caught  up  his 
rein  with  my  right,  in  which  I  held  my  own,  and  guided  both  horses  to  a  de 
pression  about  one  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  line,  where  I  took  him  off  his 
horse,  having  asked  Captain  Wickham,  just  as  I  was  leaving  the  line,  to  bring 
mo  a  surgeon  at  the  earliest  moment  possible.  I  am  satisfied  that  General 
Johnston  did  not  live  exceeding  thirty  minutes  after  he  was  taken  from  his 
horse.  I  did  not  look  at  my  watch  at  the  time, but  my  best  impression  is  that 
it  was  2i  or  'A  o'clock  P.M.  when  he  died. 

******* 

Just  as  he  was  breathing  his  last,  and  when  ho  was  unconscious,  General 
Win.  Preston  joined  me,  and  General  Preston  and  I  agreed  that  General  Preston 
should  remain  with  the  remains  and  attend  them  back  to  headquarters,  and  that 
I  should  go  immediately  to  yon  and  report  the  fact  of  his  death.  My  own  horse 
having  run  oft' when  I  dismounted,  I  took  one  of  General  Johnston's  horses  from 
his  orderly,  who  was  near  by,  and  galloped  to  yon  near  Xorth  Shiloh  church, 
and  reported  to  you  the  fact  of  his  death.  Having  reported  to  you  the  fact,  I 
rode  on",  but  returned  in  a  few  moments  and  said  to  you,  "I  came  here  as  a  vol 
unteer  aid  to  General  Johnston  ;  as  he  has  fallen,  I  no  longer  have  any  duties 
to  perform.  I  intend  to  remain  until  the  battle  is  over,  and  would  like  to  be 
useful,  if  there  are  duties  that  you  can  assign  me  to."  You  answered,  "  I  shall 
be  pleased  to  have  you  with  me,"  and  from  that  time  I  reported  to  you. 


538  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XX. 

From  this  somewhat  detailed,  but  hurried,  statement,  you  will  see  what  my 
recollection  is  of  the  time  and  place  of  his  fall. 

Very  truly,  your  friend,  ISHAM  G.  HARRIS. 


Extracts  from  a  Letter  of  Captain  Clifton  H.  Smith,  A.  A.  G.  Confederate  Army,  to 
General  Bcaurcgard,  relative  to  the  Battle  of  Sldloh. 

My  dear  General, — Replying  to  the  questions  contained  in  your  note  of  the 
30th  ultimo,  I  beg  to  state,  1st.  The  order  which  you.  sent  to  General  Bragg,  on 
the  afternoon  of  Suuday,  April  Cth,  1862,  through  me,  was  couched  in  the  fol 
lowing  language,  namely  :  "  Ride  to  the  front  and  instruct  General  Bragg  to  ar 
rest  the  conflict  and  reform  his  lines."  2d.  I  found  General  Bragg  in  a  slight 
ravine  in  the  immediate  rear  of  Rnggles's  division,  accompanied  by  his  staff  and 
escort.  The  distance  from  Shiloh  church,  where  I  left  yon,  I  should  judge  was 
between  one  and  two  miles.  He  had  evidently  but  just  retired  from  some  por 
tion  of  his  line  of  battle.  General  Ruggles  himself  was  immediately  at  hand. 
My  impression  is  that  they  were,  or  had  been,  conferring  about  the  disposition 
of  the  troops  when  I  rode  up  and  joined  them. 

I  cannot  say  what  brigade  of  Ruggles's  division  was  in  our  immediate  front, 
but  I  am  confident  none  of  the  troops  in  that  immediate  quarter  were  in  offen 
sive  action  at  that  moment;  for  I  only  remember  hearing  a  dropping  fire  of 
musketry,  and  not  the  regular  roll  of  a  line  of  battle  in  action — which,  once 
heard,  is  ever  after  easily  recognized. 

I  communicated  your  order  to  General  Bragg  in  the  exact  words  I  had  re 
ceived  it.  Without  one  syllable  of  comment,  he  transmitted  same  to  his  divis 
ion  commanders,  Withers  and  Ruggles ;  to  the  first  through  his  aide-de-camp, 
and  possibly  in  person  to  General  Ruggles,  who  was  only  a  few  yards  off.  After 
the  order  had  been  thus  communicated  to  the  division  commanders,  General 
Bragg,  turning  to  me,  asked, "  Can  you  conduct  mo  to  the  place  where  General 
Beauregard  is  at  present  ?"  I  replied  in  the  affirmative,  and  we  left  the  front, 
riding  towards  the  point  where  I  had  parted  with  you,  and  where  I  had  left 
you  in  conversation  with  General  Prentiss  (Federal  prisoner,  lately  captured)  be 
side  the  rivulet  which  flowed  at  the  base  of  the  hill,  in  rear  of  Shiloh  chapel. 
##*#### 

After  giving  him  the  order,  as  before  remarked,  I  remained  by  his  side  until 
we  started  together  to  join  you.  I  met  some  broken  bodies  of  troops  retiring 
from  the  conflict,  as  I  went  forward ;  one  I  remember  especially,  which  some  of 
the  men  informed  me  was  a  Kentucky  regiment,  without  ammunition,  and  its 
organization  almost  lost.  When  I  reached  General  Bragg,  the  troops  appeared 
to  me  to  be  substantially  at  a  standstill,  judging  from  the  character  of  the  firing 
and  the  condition  of  things  presented  to  my  view. 

******* 

After  transmitting  your  order  to  his  division  commanders,  wo  left  the  front 
together.  From  some  cause  or  other,  which  I  cannot  at  present  call  to  mind,  I 
became  detached  from  General  Bragg  during  our  ride  ;  but  I  have  a  distinct 
recollection  of  again  joining  him  before  ho  met  you,  for  I  perfectly  remember 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  XX.  539 

walking  with  him,  after  dismounting,  to  the  spot  where  you  were  standing,  and 
culling  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  he  was  in  your  presence.  It  was  quite 
dark,  and  he  was  at  first  unable  to  distinguish  you.  The  darkness  settles  in 
my  mind  the  time  of  our  return  to  your  headquarters. 

******* 

The  distance  from  Shiloh  chapel  to  the  point  where  I  joined  General  Bragg 
(as  stated)  must  have  been  between  one  and  two  miles.  I  recollect,  in  carry 
ing  the  order  to  him,  that  I  crossed  the  line  of  fire  of  the  Federal  gunboats,  both 
going  and  returning.  They  were  shelling  the  woods  at  the  points  where  they 
supposed  our  people  were  engaged  with  their  comrades.  I  should  judge  that 
our  front  must  have  been  quite  a  half  a  mile  in  advance  of  this  line  of  fire, 
which  seemed  to  me  harmless,  and  doing  no  hurt  beyond  scaring  horses  and 
unsteady  ing  a  few  men  unaccustomed  to  heavy  artillery  fire. 

Ceaseless  comment  has  turned  upon  the  execution  and  propriety  of  this  mo 
mentous  order.  Were  it  necessary,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  show  that,  at 
that  particular  juncture,  a  proper  alignment  of  our  own  disordered  columns  was 
essential,  yea,  of  vital  necessity  to  the  existence  of  that  army;  and  that  the 
strictures  and  innuendoes  which  have  for  years  been  spread  broadcast  through 
out  this  land,  blaming  you  for  the  lo?s  of  that  battle,  are  unjust  and  without 
any  real  foundation. 

Hut  why  speculate  upon  the  probable  result?  It  is  in  evidence,  from  the  re 
ports  of  division,  brigade,  and  regimental  commanders,  that  every  effort  to  dis 
lodge  the  enemy  from  their  last  stronghold,  defended  by  fort}'  guns,  placed  in 
position  by  Colonel  Wrbsfi-r,  of  the  Regular  (Federal)  army,  and  fought  under 
his  immediate  eye,  proved  abortive. 

******* 

I  remain,  my  dear  General, 

Ever  sincerely  your  friend  and  well- wisher, 

CLIFTON  H.  SMITH,  Capt.  and  A.  Adj. -Gen. 
in  the  late  Confederate  Army. 


Preliminary  Report  of  the  Ilattle  of  Shiloh. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  IWt,  1862. 

General, — On  the  2d  ultimo,  having  ascertained  conclusively,  from  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy  on  the  Tennessee  River,  and  from  reliable  sources  of  infor 
mation,  that  his  aim  would  bo  to  cut  off  my  communications  in  West  Tennessee 
with  the  Eastern  and  Southern  States,  by  operating  from  the  Tennessee  River 
between  Crump's  Landing  and  Eastport,  as  a  base,  I  determined  to  foil  his  de 
signs  by  concentrating  all  my  available  forces  at  and  around  Corinth. 

Meanwhile,  having  called  on  the  governors  of  the  States  of  Tennessee,  Mis 
sissippi,  Alabama,  and  Louisiana,  to  furnish  additional  troops,  some  of  them, 
chielly  regiments  from  Louisiana,  soon  reached  this  vicinity;  and,  with  two 
divisions  of  General  Folk's  command  from  Columbus,  and  a  fine  corps  of  troops 
from  Mobile  and  Peusacola,  under  Major-General  Bragg,  constituted  the  Army 


5-iO  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX. 

of  the  Mississippi.  At  the  same  time,  General  Johnston,  being  at  Murfreeshoro', 
on  the  march  to  form  junction  of  his  forces  with  mine,  was  called  on  to  send 
at  least  a  brigade  by  railroad,  so  that  we  might  hope  to  fall  on  and  crush  the 
enemy  should  he  attempt  an  advance  from  under  his  gunboats. 

The  call  on  General  Johnston  was  promptly  complied  with.  His  entire  force- 
was  also  hastened  in  this  direction,  and,  by  the  1st  of  April,  our  united  forces 
were  concentrated  along  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  from  Bethel  to  Corinth, 
and  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  from  Corinth  to  luka. 

It  was  then  determined  to  assume  the  offensive  and  strike  a  sudden  blow  at 
the  enemy,  in  position  under  General  Grant,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee 
at  Pittsburg,  and  in  the  direction  of  Savannah,  before  he  was  reinforced  by  the 
army  under  General  Buell,  then  known  to  be  advancing  for  that  purpose  by 
rapid  marches  from  Nashville  via  Columbia.  About  the  same  time,  General 
Johnston  was  advised  that  such  an  operation  conformed  to  the  expectations  of 
the  President. 

By  a  rapid  and  vigorous  attack  on  General  Grant  it  was  expected  ho  would 
be  beaten  back  into  his  transports  and  the  river,  or  captured,  in  time  to  enable 
us  to  profit  by  the  victory,  and  remove  to  the  rear  all  the  stores  and  munitions 
that  would  fall  into  our  hands  in  such  an  event,  before  the  arrival  of  General 
Buell's  army  on  the  scene.  It  was  never  contemplated,  however,  to  retain  the 
position  thus  gained  and  abandon  Corinth,  the  strategic  point  of  the  campaign. 

Want  of  general  officers,  needful  for  the  proper  organization  of  divisions  and 
brigades  of  an  army  brought  thus  suddenly  together,  and  other  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  an  effective  organization,  delayed  the  movement  until  the  night  of 
the  2d  instant;  when  it  was  heard  from  a  reliable  quarter  that  the  junction  of 
the  enemy's  armies  was  near  at  hand.  It  was  then,  at  a  late  hour,  determined 
that  the  attack  should  be  attempted  at  once,  incomplete  and  imperfect  as  were 
our  preparations  for  such  a  grave  and  momentous  adventure.  Accordingly,  that 
night,  at  one  o'clock  A.  M.,  the  preliminary  orders  to  the  commanders  of  corps 
were  issued  for  the  movement. 

On  the  following  morning  the  detailed  orders  of  movement,  a  copy  of  which 
is  herewith  annexed,  marked  "A,"  were  issued,  and  the  movement,  after  some 
delay,  commenced,  the  troops  being  in  admirable  spirit.  It  was  expected  we 
should  be  able  to  reach  the  enemy's  lines  in  time  to  attack  him  early  on  the  5th 
instant.  The  men,  however,  for  the  most  part  were  unused  to  marching,  the 
roads,  narrow,  and  traversing  a  densely  wooded  country,  became  almost  impas 
sable  after  a  severe  rain-storm  on  the  night  of  the  4th,  which  drenched  the 
troops  in  bivouac ;  hence  our  forces  did  not  reach  the  intersection  of  the  roads 
from  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  until  late 
Saturday  afternoon. 

It  was  then  decided  that  the  attack  should  be  made  on  the  next  morning  at 
the  earliest  hour  practicable,  in  accordance  with  the  orders  of  movement.  That 
is,  in  three  lines  of  battle,  the  first  and  second  extending  from  Owl  Creek,  on  the 
left,  to  Lick  Creek,  on  the  right,  a  distance  of  about  three  miles,  supported  by 
the  third  and  the  reserves.  The  first  line,  under  Mnjor-General  Hardee,  was  con 
stituted  of  his  corps,  augmented  on  his  right  by  Gladden's  brigade,  of  Major- 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX.  541 

General  Bragg's  corps,  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  with  their  respective  artillery 
following  immediately  by  the  main  road  to  Pittsbnrg,  and  the  cavalry  in  rear 
of  the  wings.  The  second  line,  composed  of  the  other  troops  of  Bragg's  corps, 
followed  the  first  at  a  distance  of  five  hundred  yards,  in  the  same  order  as  the 
first.  The  army  corps  under  General  Polk  followed  the  second  line  at  the  dis 
tance  of  about  eight  hundred  yards,  in  lines  of  brigades,  deployed  with  their 
batteries  in  rear  of  each  brigade,  moving  by  the  Pittsburg  road,  the  left  wing 
supported  by  cavalry ;  the  reserve,  under  Brigadier-General  Breckiuridge,  fol 
lowed  closely  the  third  line,  in  the  same  order,  its  right  wing  supported  by 
cavalry. 

These  two  corps  constituted  the  reserve,  and  were  to  support  the  front  lines 
of  battle,  by  being  deployed,  when  required,  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  Pitts- 
burg  road,  or  otherwise,  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  battle. 

At  5  A.  M.  on  the  Gth  instant,  a  reconnoitring  party  of  the  enemy  having 
become  engaged  with  our  advanced  pickets,  the  commander  of  the  forces  gave 
orders  to  begin  the  movement  and  attack  as  determined  upon ;  except  that 
Trabuc's  brigade  of  Breckinridge's  division  was  detached  to  support  the  left  of 
Bragg's  corps  and  line  of  battle  when  menaced  by  the  enemy,  and  the  other  two 
brigades  were  directed  to  advance  by  the  road  to  Hamburg,  to  support  Bragg's 
right,  and  at  tho  same  time  Manuey's  regiment  of  Polk's  corps  was  advanced 
by  tho  same  road  to  reinforce  the  regiment  of  cavalry  and  battery  of  four  pieces, 
already  thrown  forward  to  watch  and  guard  Grier's,  Tanner's,  and  Borland's 
fords  of  Lick  Creek. 

Thirty  minutes  after  f>  o'clock  A.  M.  our  lines  and  columns  were  in  motion, 
all  animated,  evidently,  by  a  promising  spirit.  The  front  line  was  engaged  at 
once,  but  advanced  steadily,  followed,  in  duo  order,  with  equal  resolution  and 
steadiness,  by  the  other  lines,  which  were  brought  successively  into  action  with 
rare  skill,  judgment,  and  gallantry,  by  the  several  corps  commanders,  as  the  ene 
my  made  a  stand  with  his  masses  rallied  for  the  struggle  for  his  encampments. 
Like  an  alpine  avalanche  our  troops  moved  forward,  despite  the  determined 
resistance  of  the  enemy,  until  after  0  o'clock  p.  M.,  when  wo  were  in  possession 
of  all  his  encampments  between  Owl  and  Lick  Creeks  but  one,  nearly  all  of  his 
field  artillery,  about  thirty  (30)  Hags,  colors,  and  standards,  over  three  thousand 
prisoners,  including  a  division  commander,  General  Prcutiss,  and  several  bri 
gade  commanders,  thousands  of  small  arms,  an  immense  supply  of  subsistence, 
forage,  and  munitions  of  war,  and  a  large  amount  of  means  of  transportation — 
all  tho  substantial  fruits  of  a  complete  victory,  such,  indeed,  as  rarely  have  fol 
lowed  the  most  successful  battles,  for  never  was  an  army  so  well  provided  as 
that  of  our  enemy. 

The  remnant  of  his  army  had  been  driven  in  utter  disorder  to  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  Pittsburg,  under  tho  shelter  of  the  heavy  guns  of  his  iron-clad  gun 
boats,  and  wo  remained  undisputed  masters  of  his  well-selected,  admirably  pro 
vided  cantonments,  after  over  twelve  hours  of  obstinate  conflict  with  his  forces, 
who  had  been  beaten  from  them  and  the  contiguous  covert,  but  only  by  a  sus 
tained  onset  of  all  the  men  we  could  bring  into  action. 

Onr  loss  was  heavy,  as  will  appear  from  the  accompanying  return,  marked 


542  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX. 

"B;"  our  Commander-iu-Chief,  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  fell,  mortally  wounded, 
and  died  on  the  field  at  2.30  p.  M.,  after  having  shown  the  highest  qualities  of 
the  commander,  and  a  personal  intrepidity  that  inspired  all  around  him  and 
gave  resistless  impulsion  to  his  columns  at  critical  moments. 

The  chief  command  then  devolved  upon  me,  though  at  the  time  I  was  greatly 
prostrated,  and  suffering  from  the  prolonged  sickness  with  which  I  had  been 
afflicted  since  early  in  February.  The  responsibility  was  one  which  in  my  phys 
ical  condition  I  would  have  gladly  avoided,  though  cast  upon  me  when  our 
forces  were  successfully  pushing  the  enemy  back  upon  the  Tennessee  River, 
and  though  supported  on  the  immediate  field  by  such  corps  commanders  as 
Major-Generals  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  and  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge 
commanding  the  reserve. 

It  was  after  6  o'clock  p.  M.,  as  before  said,  when  the  enemy's  last  position  was 
carried,  and  his  forces  finally  broke  and  sought  refuge  behind  a  commanding 
eminence  covering  the  Pittsburg  Landings,  not  more  than  half  a  mile  distant, 
and  under  the  guns  of  the  gunboats,  which  opened  on  our  eager  columns  a  fierce 
and  annoying  fire,  with  shot  and  shell  of  the  heaviest  description.  Darkness 
was  close  at  hand,  officers  and  men  were-  exhausted  by  a  combat  of  over  twelve 
hours  without  food,  and  jaded  by  the  inarch  of  the  preceding  day  through  mud 
and  water;  it  was  therefore  impossible  to  collect  the  rich  and  opportune  spoils 
of  war  scattered  broadcast  on  the  field  left  in  our  possession,  and  impracticable 
to  make  any  effective  disposition  for  their  removal  to  the  rear. 

I  accordingly  established  my  headquarters  at  the  church  of  Shiloh,  in  the 
enemy's  encampments,  with  Major-General  Bragg,  and  directed  our  troops  to 
sleep  on  their  arms,  in  such  positions  in  advance  and  rear  as  corps  commanders 
ehould  determine  ;  hoping,  from  news  received  by  a  special  despatch,  that  delays 
had  been  encountered  by  General  Buell  in  his  march  from  Columbia,  and  that 
his  main  force,  therefore,  could  not  reach  the  field  of  battle  in  time  to  save  Gen 
eral  Grant's  shattered,  fugitive  forces  from  capture  or  destruction  on  the  follow 
ing  day. 

During  the  night  the  rain  fell  in  torrents,  adding  to  the  discomforts  and  har 
assed  condition  of  the  men ;  the  enemy,  moreover,  had  broken  their  rest  by  a 
discharge,  at  measured  intervals,  of  heavy  shell  thrown  from  the  gunboats ; 
therefore,  on  the  following  morning  the  troops  under  my  command  were  not  in 
condition  to  cope  with  an  equal  force  of  fresh  troops,  armed  and  equipped  like 
our  adversary,  in  the  immediate  possession  of  his  depots,  and  sheltered  by  such 
an  auxiliary  as  the  enemy's  gunboats. 

About  G  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  April,  however,  a  hot  fire  of 
musketry  and  artillery,  opened  from  the  enemy's  quarter  on  our  advanced  line, 
assured  me  of  the  junction  of  his  forces,  and  soon  the  battle  raged  with  a  fury 
which  satisfied  me  I  Avas  attacked  by  a  largely  superior  force.  But  from  the 
onset  our  troops,  notwithstanding  our  fatigue  and  losses  from  the  battle  of 
the  day  before,  exhibited  the  most  cheering,  veteran-liko  steadiness.  On  the 
right  and  centre  the  enemy  was  repulsed  in  every  attempt  he  made  with  his 
heavy  columns  in  that  quarter  of  the  field.  On  the  left,  however,  and  nearest 
to  the  points  of  arrival  of  his  reinforcements,  he  drove  forward  line  after  line  of 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XX.  543 

his  fresh  troops, -which  were  met  by  a  courage  and  resolution  of  which  our 
country  may  be  proudly  hopeful.  Again  and  again  our  troops  were  brought  to 
the  charge,  invariably  to  win  the  position  already  in  issue,  invariably  to  drive 
back  this  foe.  But  hour  by  hour,  thus  opposed  to  an  enemy  constantly  rein 
forced,  our  ranks  were  perceptibly  thinned  under  the  increasing  withering  fire 
of  the  enemy,  and  at  12  meridian,  eighteen  hours  of  hard  fighting  had  sensibly 
exhausted  a  large  number,  my  last  reserves  had  necessarily  been  disposed  of, 
and  the  enemy  was  evidently  receiving  fresh  reinforcements  after  each  repulse. 
Accordingly,  after  1  p.  M.,  I  determined  to  withdraw  from  so  unequal  a  conflict, so- 
curing  such  of  the  results  of  the  victory  of  the  day  before  as  was  then  practicable. 

Officers  of  my  staff  were  immediately  despatched  with  the  necessary  orders 
to  make  the  best  disposition  for  a  deliberate,  orderly  withdrawal  from  the  field, 
and  to  collect,  and  post,  a  reserve  to  meet  the  enemy,  should  he  attempt  to  push 
after  us.  In  this  connection  I  will  particularly  mention  my  Adjutant-General, 
Colonel  Jordan,  who  was  of  much  assistance  to  me  on  this  occasion  ;  as  he  had 
already  been  on  the  field  of  battle,  on  that  and  the  preceding  day. 

About  2  o'clock  P.  M.  the  lines  in  advance,  which  had  repulsed  the  enemy  in 
their  last  fierce  assault  on  our  left  and  centre,  received  the  orders  to  retire.  This 
was  done  with  uncommon  steadiness,  and  the  enemy  made  no  attempt  to  follow. 

The  lines  of  troops  established  to  cover  this  movement  had  been  disposed  on 
a  favorable  ridge,  commanding  the  ground  of  Shiloh  church  ;  from  this  position 
our  artillery  played  upon  the  woods  beyond  for  a  while,  but  upon  no  visible 
enemy,  and  without  a  reply.  Soon  satisfied  that  no  serious  pursuit  was,  or 
would  be,  attempted,  this  last  lino  was  withdrawn,  and  never  did  troops  leave 
battle-field  in  better  order;  even  the  stragglers  fell  into  the  ranks,  and  marched 
off  with  those  who  had  stood  more  steadily  to  their  colors.  A  second  strong 
position  was  taken  up  about  a  mile  in  rear,  where  the  approach  of  the  enemy 
was  waited  for  more  than  one  hour,  but  no  effort  to  follow  was  made,  and  only 
a  small  detachment  of  horsemen  could  be  seen  at  a  distance  from  this  last  po 
sition,  merely  observing  our  movements. 

Arranging  through  my  staff  officers  for  the  completion  of  the  movements  thus 
begun,  Brigadier-General  Breckiuridgo  was  left  with  his  command,  as  a  rear 
guard,  to  hold  the  ground  we  had  occupied  the  night  preceding  the  first  battle, 
just  in  front  of  the  intersection  of  the  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  roads,  about  four 
miles  from  the  former  place,  while  the  rest  of  the  army  passed  in  the  rear,  in  ex 
cellent  order. 

On  the  following  day  General  Breckinridge  fell  back  about  three  miles,  to 
Mackie's,  which  position  wo  continue  to  hold,  with  our  cavalry  thrown  consid 
erably  forward,  in  immediate  proximity  to  the  battle-field. 

Unfortunately,  towards  night,  on  the  7th  instant,  it  began  to  rain  heavily: 
this  continued  throughout  the  night.  The  roads  became  almost  impassable  in 
many  places,  and  much  hardship  and  suffering  here  ensued,  before  all  the  regi 
ments  reached  their  encampments. 

But,  despite  the  heavy  losses  and  casualties  of  the  two  eventful  days  of  the 
6th  and  7th  of  April,  this  army  is  more  confident  of  ultimate  success  than  before 
its  encounter  with  the  enemy. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XX. 

To  Major-Generals  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  commanding  corps,  and  to  Briga 
dier-General  Breckinridge,  commanding  the  reserve,  the  country  is  greatly  in 
debted  for  the  zeal,  intelligence,  and  energy  with  which  all  orders  were  exe 
cuted  ;  for  the  foresight  and  military  ability  they  displayed  in  the  absence  of 
instruction  in  the  many  exigencies  of  the  battle,  on  a  field  so  densely  wooded 
and  broken ;  and  for  their  fearless  deportment  as  they  repeatedly  led  their  com 
mands  personally  to  the  outset  upon  their  powerful  adversary.  It  was  under  these 
circumstances  that  General  Bragg  had  two  horses  shot  under  him,  that  Major- 
General  Hardee  was  slightly  wounded,  his  coat  cut  with  balls,  and  his  horse  dis 
abled,  and  that  Major-General  Breckiuridge  was  twice  struck  with  spent  balls. 

For  the  services  of  their  gallant  subordinate  commanders,  and  their  officers 
under  them,  as  well  as  for  the  details  of  the  battle-field,  I  must  refer  to  the  re 
ports  of  corps,  division,  and  brigade  commanders,  which  shall  be  forwarded  as 
soon  as  received. 

To  give  more  in  detail  the  operations  of  the  two  battles  resulting  from  the 
movement  on  Pittsburg,  than  now  attempted,  must  have  delayed  this  report  for 
weeks,  and  interfered  with  the  important  duties  of  my  position;  but  I  may  be 
permitted  to  say,  that  not  only  did  the  obstinate  conflict  of  Sunday  leave  the 
Confederates  masters  of  the  battle-field  and  our  adversaries  beaten,  but  we  left 
that  field  on  the  next  day,  only  after  eight  hours'  successive  battle  with  a  su 
perior  army  of  fresh  troops,  whom  we  had  repulsed  in  every  attack  upon  onr 
lines ;  so  repulsed  and  crippled,  indeed,  as  to  leave  it  unable  to  take  the  field  for 
the  campaign  for  which  it  was  collected  and  equipped  at  such  enormous  ex 
pense,  and  with  such  profusion  of  all  the  appliances  of  war.  These  successful 
results  were  not  achieved,  however,  as  before  said,  without  severe  loss ;  a  loss 
not  to  be  measured  by  the  number  of  the  slain  or  wounded,  but  by  the  high 
social  and  personal  position  of  so  large  a  number  of  those  who  were  killed  or 
disabled,  including  the  commander  of  the  forces,  whose  high  qualities  will  be 
greatly  missed  in  the  momentous  campaign  impending. 

I  deeply  regret  to  record,  also,  the  death  of  the  Hon.  George  Johnson,  Pro 
visional  Governor  of  Kentucky,  who  went  into  action  with  the  Kentucky  troops, 
and  continually  inspired  them  by  his  words  and  example.  Having  his  horse 
shot  under  him  Sunday,  he  entered  the  ranks  of  a  Kentucky  regiment  on  Mon 
day,  and  fell  mortally  Avouuded  towards  the  close  of  the  day.  Not  his  State 
alone,  but  the  whole  Confederacy,  will  mourn  the  death  of  this  brave,  upright, 
and  noble  man. 

Another  gallant  and  able  soldier  and  captain  was  lost  to  the  service  of  the 
country  when  Brigadier  -  General  Gladden,  commanding  1st  brigade  "YVithers's 
division,  second  army  corps,  died  from  a  severe  wound,  received  on  the  Cth  in 
stant,  after  having  been  conspicuous  to  his  whole  command  and  army  for  cour 
age  and  capacity. 

Major -General  Cheathani,  commanding  1st  division  1st  corps,  was  slightly 
wounded,  and  had  threj  horses  shot  under  him. 

Brigadier-General  Clark,  commanding  2d  division  of  the  1st  corps,  received  a 
severe  wound,  also,  on  the  first  day,  which  will  deprive  the  army  of  his  valuable 
services  for  some  time. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XX.  545 

Brigadier-General  Ilindman,  engaged  in  the  onset  of  the  battle,  was  conspicu 
ous  for  a  cool  courage  in  leading  his  men,  even  in  the  thickest  of  the  fray,  until 
his  horse  was  shot  under  him,  and  he  was  so  severely  injured  by  the  fall  that 
the  army  was  deprived  the  following  day  of  his  chivalric  example. 

Brigadier-Generals  B.  K.  Johnson  and  Bowen,  most  meritorious  officers,  were 
also  severely  wounded  in  the  first  combat,  but  it  is  hoped  will  soon  be  able  to 
return  to  duty  with  their  brigades. 

To  mention  the  many  field  officers  who  died  or  were  wounded,  while  gallantly 
leading  their  commands  into  action,  and  the  many  instances  of  brilliant  indi 
vidual  courage  displayed  by  officers  and  men  in  the  twenty  hours  of  battle,  is 
impossible  at  this  time  ;  but  their  names  will  be  made  known  to  their  country 
men. 

Tin;  immediate  staff  of  the  lamented  Commander-in-Chief,  who  accompanied 
him  to  the  field,  rendered  efficient  service,  and,  either  by  his  side,  or  in  carrying 
his  orders,  shared  his  exposure  to  the  casualties  of  a  well-contested  battle-field. 
I  beg  to  commend  their  names  to  the  notice  of  the  War  Department,  namely: 
of  Captains  II.  P.  Brewster  and  A.  Wickliffe,  of  the  Adjutant  and  Inspector 
General's  Department;  Captain  Theodore  O'Hara,  Acting  Inspector-General, 
Lieutenants  George  Baylor  and  Thomas  M.  Jack,  Aides-de-camp  ;  Volunteer 
Aides-de-camp  Colonel  William  Preston,  Major  D.  M.  Hayden,  E.  W.  Munford, 
and  Calhoun  Beuham  ;  Major  Albert  J.  Smith  and  Captain  -  — ,  C^uaiter- 
master's  Department. 

To  these  gentlemen  was  assigned  the  last  sad  duty  of  accompanying  the  re 
mains  of  their  lamented  chief  from  the  field,  except  Captains  Brewster  and 
Wickliffe,  who  remained,  and  rendered  valuable  service  as  stati'  officers,  on  the 
7th  of  April. 

Governor  Isham  G.  Harris,  of  Tennessee,  went  into  the  field  with  General 
Johnston,  was  by  his  side  when  ho  was  shot,  aided  him  from  his  horse,  and  re 
ceived  him  in  his  arms  when  he  died.  Subsequently  the  Governor  joined  my 
stall',  and  remained  with  me  throughout  the  next  day,  except  when  carrying  or 
ders,  or  employed  in  encouraging  the  troops  of  his  own  State,  to  whom  he  gave 
a  conspicuous  example  of  coolness,  zeal,  and  intrepidity. 

I  am  also  under  many  obligations  to  my  own  general,  personal,  and  volunteer 
stall',  many  of  whom  have  been  so  long  associated  with  me.  I  append  a  list  of 
those  present  on  the  field  on  both  days,  and  whose  duties  carried  them  con 
stantly  under  fire;  namely,  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan,  Captain  Clifton  II.  Smith, 
and  Lieutenant  John  M.  Otey,  Adjutant-General's  Department ;  Major  George 
W.  Brent,  Acting  Inspector-General ;  Colonel  II.  B.  Lee,  Chief  of  Subsistence, 
whose  horse  was  wounded;  Lieutenant-Colonel  S.W.Ferguson  and  Lieuten 
ant  A.  II.  Chisolm,  Aides-de-camp;  Volunteer  Aides-de-camp,  Colonel  Jacob 
Thompson,  Major  Numa  Augustin,  Major  II.  E.  Peyton,  Captain  Albert  Ferry, 
B.  B.  Waddell.  Captain  W.  W.  Porter,  of  Major-General  Crittenden's  staff,  also 
reported  for  duty,  and  shared  the  duties  of  my  volunteer  staff  on  Monday. 

Brigadier-General  Trndeau,  of  Louisiana  Volunteers,  also,  for  part  of  the  first 
conflict,  was  with  me  as  volunteer  aid. 

Captain  E.  II.  Cummins,  signal  officer,  also  was  actively  employed  as  a  stafT 
I.— 35 


546  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XX. 

officer  both  days.  Nor  mast  I  fail  to  mention  that  Private  W.  E.  Goolsby,  llth 
regiment  Virginia  Volunteers,  orderly  to  my  headquarters  since  last  June,  re 
peatedly  employed  to  carry  my  verbal  orders  to  the  field,  discharged  the  duty 
with  great  zeal  and  intelligence. 

Other  members  of  my  staff  were  necessarily  absent  from  the  immediate  field 
of  battle,  intrusted  with  respective  duties  at  their  headquarters,  viz. :  Major  Eu 
gene  E.  McLean,  Chief  Quartermaster ;  Captain  E.  Deslondes,  Quartermaster's 
Department.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ferguson,  A.  D.  C.,  early  on  Monday,  was  as 
signed  to  command  and  direct  the  movements  of  a  brigade  of  the  2d  corps. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Gilnier,  Chief-Engineer,  after  having  performed  the  im 
portant  and  varied  duties  of  his  place,  with  distinction  to  himself  and  material 
benefit  to  the  country,  was  wounded,  late  on  Monday.  I  trust,  however,  I  shall 
not  long  be  deprived  of  his  essential  services. 

Captain  Lockett,  Engineer  Corps,  Chief  Assistant  to  Colonel  Gilmer,  after 
having  been  employed  in  the  duties  of  his  corps  on  Sunday,  was  placed  by  me, 
on  Monday,  in  command  of  a  battalion,  without  field  officers.  Captain  Fre- 
ineaux,  Provisional  Engineer,  and  Lieutenants  Steel  and  Helm,  also  rendered 
material  and  even  dangerous  service  in  the  line  of  their  duty.  Major-General 
(now  General)  Braxton  Bragg,  in  addition  to  his  duties  as  Chief  of  Staff,  as  has 
been  before  stated,  commanded  his  corps,  much  the  largest  in  the  field,  on  both 
days,  with  signal  capacity  and  soldiership. 

Surgeon  Foard,  Medical  Director,  Surgeon  R.L.Brodie,  and  Surgeon  D.W.Tan- 
dal,  Medical  Director  of  the  Western  Department,  with  General  Johnston,  were 
present  in  the  discharge  of  their  arduous  and  high  duties,  which  they  performed 
with  honor  to  their  profession.  Captain  Thomas  Saunders,  Messrs.  Scales  and 
Medcalf,  and  Mr.  Tully  of  New  Orleans,  were  of  material  aid  on  both  days,  ready 
to  give  news  of  the  enemy's  positions  and  movements,  regardless  of  exposure. 

While  thus  partially  making  mention  of  some  of  those  who  rendered  brilliant, 
gallant,  and  meritorious  service  on  the  field,  I  have  aimed  merely  to  notice  those 
whose  position  would  most  probably  exclude  their  services  from  the  reports  of 
corps  or  subordinate  commanders. 

From  this  agreeable  duty  I  turn  to  one  in  the  highest  degree  unpleasant ;  one 
due,  however,  to  the  brave  men  under  me.  As  a  contrast  to  the  behavior  of 
most  of  the  army,  who  fought  so  honorably,  I  allude  to  the  fact  that  some  of 
ficers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and  men,  abandoned  their  colors  on  the  first 
day,  to  pillage  the  captured  encampments,  others  retired  shamefully  from  the 
field  on  both  days  while  the  thunder  of  cannon  and  the  roar  and  rattle  of  mus 
ketry  told  them  that  their  brothers  \yere  being  slaughtered  by  the  fresh  legions 
of  the  enemy.  I  have  ordered  the  names  of  the  most  conspicuous  of  these  cow 
ards  and  laggards  to  be  published  in  orders. 

It  remains  to  state  that  our  loss  in  the  two  days,  in  killed  outright,  was  1728; 
wounded  8012,  missing  957;  making  an  aggregate  of  casualties  10,691).  This 
sad  list  tells  in  simple  language  of  the  stout  fight  made  by  our  countrymen,  in 
front  of  the  rude  log  chapel  at  Shiloh,  especially  when  it  is  known  that  on 
Monday,  from  exhaustion  and  other  causes,  not  twenty  thousand  men  on  our 
side  could  be  brought  into  action. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXII.  547 

Of  the  losses  of  the  enemy  I  have  MO  exact  knowledge.  Their  newspaper 
report  is  very  heavy.  Unquestionably  it  was  greater,  even  in  proportion,  than 
our  own,  on  both  days,  for  it  was  apparent  to  all  that  their  dead  left  on  the 
field  outnumbered  ours  two  to  one.  Their  casualties,  therefore,  cannot  havo 
fallen  many  short  of  20,000,  in  killed,  wounded,  prisoners,  and  missing. 

Through  information  derived  from  many  sources,  including  the  newspapers 
of  the  enemy,  wo  engaged,  on  Sunday,  the  divisions  of  Generals  Prentiss,  Sher 
man,  Hurlbut,  McClernand,  and  Smith,  of  9000  men  each,  or  at  least  45,000  men. 
This  force  was  reinforced  Sunday  night  by  the  divisions  of  Generals  Nelson, 
McCook,  Crittenden,  and  Thomas,  of  Major-General  Buell's  army,  some  25,000 
strong,  including  all  arms;  also  General  L.  Wallace's  division  of  General  Grant's 
army,  making  at  least  33,000  fresh  troops;  which,  added  to  the  remnant  of 
General  Grant's  forces  on  Monday  morning,  amounting  to  20,000,  made  an  ag 
gregate  force  of  at  least  53,000  men  arrayed  against  us  on  that  day. 

In  connection  with  the  results  of  the  battle,  I  should  state  that  most  of  our 
men  who  had  inferior  arms  exchanged  them  for  the  superior  arms  of  the  enemy  ; 
also,  that  most  of  the  property,  public  and  personal,  of  the  camps  from  which 
the  enemy  were  driven  on  Sunday,  was  rendered  useless,  or  greatly  damaged, 
except  some  of  the  tents. 

With  this  are  transmitted  certain  papers,  to  wit  : 

Order  of  movements,  marked  "A." 

A  list  of  the  killed  and  wounded,  marked  ''  B." 

A  list  of  captured  Hags,  marked  "  C." 

A  map  of  the  fit-Id  of  battle,  marked  "  P.'' 

All  of  which  is  respectfully  submitted  through  my  volunteer  Aide-de-camp, 
Colonel  Jacob  Thompson,  of  Mississippi,  who  has  the  Hags  in  charge;  also  the 
standards  and  colors  captured  from  the  enemy. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be.  General,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  HEAUKEGAKD,  Genl.  Comdg. 

To  General  S.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Genl.,  Richmond. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXII. 

1.  Colonel  Joseph  Wheeler,  in  his  Report,  to  be  found  in  "Confederate  Re 
ports  of  Battles,"  p.  27G,  says: 

"  But  after  passing  through  the  deep  ravine  below  the  lowest  camps,  we 
were  halted  within  about  four  hundred  yards  of  the  river,  and  remained  ready 
to  move  forward  for  about  half  an  hour,  when  niylit  came  o»,  and  we  were  or 
dered  to  the  rear,  and  were  assigned  to  bivouac  by  General  Withers.  During 
all  this  movement,  the  regiment  was  under  a  heavy  lire  from  their  gunboats 
and  other  artillery." 

2.  General  Ruggles,  in  his  Report,  p.  2H3  of  the  same  work,  says : 

"  I  received  from  Colonel  Augustin  notice  of  General  Beauregard's  orders  to 
withdraw  from  the  further  pursuit,  and  finding,  soon  afterwards,  that  the  forces 


548  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXII. 

were  falling  back,  I  retired  with  them,  just  as  night  set  in,  to  the  open  field  in 
rear  j"  etc. 

3.  Colonel  Hodge,  19th  Louisiana,  in  his  Report,  same  book,  p.  288,  says  : 

"  After  the  enemy  were  driven  from  this  stronghold,  we,  with  several  bri 
gades,  moved  towards  the  river.  It  \vas  then  nigh  sunset.  In  accordance  with 
your  order  [Colonel  Gibson's]  we  commenced  falling  lack  about  dusk,  and  being  sep 
arated  from  the  brigade,  I  conducted  the  regiment  to  the  camp  of  the  enemy, 
where  I  had  established  a  temporary  hospital  in  the  day." 

4.  Colonel  Fagan,  1st  Arkansas,  in  his  Report,  p.  294  (same  book),  says  : 

"  It  was  late  in  the  afternoon  wTheii  the  enemy  were  repulsed,  and  were  fol 
lowed  up  in  the  direction  of  the  river.  That  night  we  slept  in  the  enemy's 
tents,  worn  with  fatigue,  decimated  in  numbers,  but  elated  that  such  a  hard- 
fought  day  had  such  a  glorious  close." 

5.  General  Patton  Anderson's  Report,  p.  305  of  the  same  work,  says : 

"  ...  It  was  now  twilight.  As  soon  as  we  had  placed  a  hill  between  us  and 
the  gunboats,  the  troops  moved  slowly,  and  apparently  with  reluctance,  from 
the  direction  of  the  river.  It  was  eight  o'clock  at  night  before  ive  had  reached  a  biv 
ouac  near  General  Bragg's  headquarters,  and  in  the  darkness  of  the  night  the  20th  Lou 
isiana,  and  portions  of  the  17th  and  Confederate  Guards,  got  separated  from  that 
portion  of  the  command  in  which  I  was,  and  encamped  on  other  ground." 

G.  Colonel  \V.  A.  Stanley,  9th  Texas,  in  his  Report,  p.  312  of  the  same  work,  says : 

"At  this  point,  niglit  put  a  close  to  the  action  for  the  day  of  the  Gth.    We  retired 

from  this  point  to  form  our  encampment  for  the  night,  our  troops  being  more 

or  less  scattered,  some  having  been  completely  exhausted  from  the  fatigues  of 

the  day." 

7.  Colonel  Augustus  Reichard,  20th  Louisiana,  in  his  Report,  p.  320  of  the  same 
work,  says : 

".  .  .  My  regiment  was  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  brigade,  and,  as  night 
set  in,  I  led  the  remnants  of  the  regiment  to  our  hospital,  where  we  bivouacked." 

8.  Colonel  Pond,  commanding   brigade,  Ruggles's  division,  in   his   Report, 
(same  work),  p.  330,  says: 

"At  night,  after  the  battle  ceased,  acting  in  obedience  to  orders  received  through 
the  day  from  a  great  variety  of  sources,  I  formed  my  infantry  line  considerably 
in  advance  of  our  general  front." 

9.  General  Chalmers's  Report  (same  work),  p.  260,  says : 

".  .  .  Our  men  struggled  vainly  to  ascend  the  hill,  which  was  very  steep, 
making  charge  after  charge  without  success,  but  continued  the  fight  until  night 
closed  the  hostilities  on  both  sides." 

10.  Colonel  Z.  C.  Deas  (commanding  Gladden's  brigade  after  Colonel  Adams 
was  wounded),  in  his  Report,  p.  245  of  the  same  work,  says : 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXII.  549 

"Here,  in  the  hot  pursuit, the  21st  and  25th  Alabama  became  separated  from 
me  in  the  woods,  and,  before  I  had  time  to  find  them,  I  received  an  order  from 
General  Withers  to  form  on  the  extreme  left,  where  I  remained  until  niyht  came 
on,  and  then  attempted  to  get  back  to  the  camp  I  had  left,  but  got  into  a  differ 
ent  one." 

11.  General  Withers,  commanding  division,  in  his  Report, -p.  239  of  the  same 
work,  says  : 

"...  The  cavalry  was  thrown  to  our  front.  Thus  we  remained  until  dark,  the 
entire  army,  with  the  exception  of  the  cavalry,  having  retired  from  the  field, 
when  we  received  an  order  from  General  Bragg  that,  holding  the  command  in 
readiness  to  form  line  of  battle  at  any  moment,  we  would  fall  back  to  Mickey's." 

12.  In  his  Report,  Colonel  John  D.  Martin,  commanding  2d  Confederate  regi 
ment,  and  Bowen's  brigade,  of  General  Breckinridge's  division,  says: 

"  When  within  three  hundred  or  four  hundred,  yards  of  the  river  the  ene 
my  opened  on  us  with  their  gunboats  and  two  batteries,  in  position  near 
the  bank  of  the  river,  which  sounded  trouble  and  looked  ugly  and  hurt  but 
few.  Our  men  began  to  discover  this  fact.  Being  now  nearly  niyht,  I  fell  back, 
by  order  of  General  Bragg,  to  the  first  encampment  in  the  tents  farthest  from  the 
river,  where  we  stayed  all  night,  feasting  upon  stores  of  the  enemy,  visited  oc 
casionally  by  a  shell  from  their  gunboats.  Major-General  Hardee  and  General 
Withers  came  to  our  encampment,  where  they  remained  all  night." 

13.  Colonel  R.  P.  Trabue,  commanding  1st  Kentucky  brigade,  Breckinridge's 
division,  in  his  Report,  says: 

"From  this  position,  when  it  teas  nearly  dark,  we  were  ordered  to  the  rear  to 
encamp,  which  movement  was  effected  in  good  order.  I  followed,  in  the  darkness 
of  (he  niyht,  the  Purdy  Road,  after  having  reunited  to  my  command  Byrne's 
battery  and  the  others  of  my  troops  who  had  been  detached  to  the  right,  not 
including,  however,  Cobb's  battery." 

14.  Colonel  John  C.  Moore,  2d  Texas  regiment,  says  (''Confederate  Reports  of 
Bat  tics,"  p.  271): 

"Seeing  this  state  of  things,  wo  made  a  rapid  retreat  from  our  unpleasant 
position,  and  proceeded  back  to  the  camp  last  taken,  having  been  told  that  wo 
would  hero  receive  further  orders.  It  was  dark  when  we  readied  the  eamp,  and  af 
ter  waiting  an  hour  or  so,  we  bivouacked  near  the  encampment,  in  a  drenching 
rain." 

!.">.  General  J.  K.  Jackson,  commanding  3d  brigade,  Withers's  division,  in  his 
Report  (same  work),  p.  260,  says  : 

"...  I  proceeded  to  obtain  orders  from  General  Withers;  but,  before  seeing 
him,  was  ordered  by  a  staff  oflicer  to  retire.  This  order  was  announced  to  me 
as  coming  from  General  Bean  regard,  and  was  promptly  communicated  to  my 
cotnnnnd.  In  the  darkness  of  the  niyht,  tchich  had  then  fallen  upon  us,  my  regiments 
became  separated  from  each  other,"  etc. 


550  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXII. 

16.  General  Chcatham,  in  his  Report,  says  : 

" .  .  .  My  command  and  other  commands  came  rapidly  forward,  but  many 
regiments  Laving  exhausted  their  ammunition,  a  halt  of  some  time  was  neces 
sary  for  the  purpose  of  replenishing.  The  day  was  now  far  advanced,  and  be 
fore  proper  preparations  were  made,  darkness  prevented  further  operations  that 
day,  and  all  commands  were  withdrawn  for  the  riight,  out  of  range  of  the  shells 
from  the  enemy's  gunboats." 

17.  General  Grant,  in  his  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  published  in  the 
"  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  356,  says  : 

l(  The  battle  soon  waxed  warm  on  the  left  and  centre,  varying  at  times  to 
all  parts  of  the  line.  There  was  the  most  continuous  firing  of  musketry  and 
artillery  ever  heard  on  this  continent,  kept  up  until  nightfall." 

18.  General  Buell,  in  his  Report  ("  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  410), 
says : 

"  General  Nelson  arrived  with  Colonel  Ammen's  brigade  at  this  opportune  mo 
ment.  It  was  immediately  posted  to  meet  the  attack  at  that  point,  and,  with 
a  battery  of  artillery,  which  happened  to  be  on  the  ground  and  was  brought 
into  action,  opened  fire  on  the  enemy  and  repulsed  him.  The  action  of  the 
gunboats  also  contributed  very  much  to  that  result.  The  attack  at  that  point 
was  not  renewed.  Night  having  come  on,  the  firing  ceased  on  loth  sides" 

19.  General  Nelson  ("  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  413),  in  his  Report, 
says: 

"  The  gallantry  of  the  36th  Indiana,  supported  by  the  6th  Ohio,  under  the 
able  conduct  of  Colonel  Ammen,  commanding  the  10th  brigade,  drove  back  the 
enemy  and  restored  the  line  of  battle.  This  ivas  at  half -past  six  p.  M.,  and  soon 
after  Hie  enemy  withdrew,  owing,  I  suppose,  to  the  darkness." 

20.  From  a  narrative  of  the  battle  of  Sliiloh,  entitled  "Account  by  a  Partici 
pant,"  to  be  found  in  the  "  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  415,  we  take  the 
following  passage : 

"  On  the  top  of  the  bank  we  were  cheered  by  a  sight  of  Nelson,  with  his  well- 
known  overcoat  and  feathered  hat.  '  Sixth  Ohio,  I  expect  a  good  account  from 
you !'  '  Yes !  Yes !  Hurrah !'  and  without  an  order  our  walking  pace  was  changed 
into  a  double  quick.  We  only  went  a  few  yards,  and  were  ordered  to  support 
a  battery.  Darkness  soon  dosed  in,  and  compelled  the  belligerents  to  cease  hostilities 
for  the  night." 

21.  Colonel  Tattle,  commanding  1st  brigade,  2d  division  (W.  H.  L.  Wallace's), 
in  his  Report  ("  Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  406),  says  : 

"  .  .  .  I  assumed  command  of  the  division,  and  rallied  what  was  left  of  my 
brigade,  and  was  joined  by  the  13th  Iowa,  Colonel  Crocker  ;  9th  Illinois,  Colonel 
Mersey  ;  12th  Illinois,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Chottain,  and  several  other  fragments 
of  regiments,  and  formed  in  line  on  the  road,  and  held  the  enemy  in  check  un 
til  the  lino  was  formed  that  resisted  the  last  charge  just  before  dark  of  that  day." 


APPENDIX   TO    CHAPTER    XXII.  551 

22.  Colonel  M.  M.  Crocker,  loth  Iowa,  commanding  brigade,  in  Lis  Report,  says 
("Record  of  the  Rebellion,"  vol.  iv.  p.  379): 

"  The  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns  ceased  at  dark,  and  during  the  night  we  remained 
under  arms  in  that  position." 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Colonel  David  Urqnhart,  of  General  Bray  (fit  staff,  to  Gener 
al  Thomas  Jordan,  late  A.  A,  G.  of  the  united  Confederate  forces  at  and  around 
Corinth. 

NAHRAGAXSETT,  R.  I.,  August  25//J,  1SSO. 

Dear  General, —  *  *  * 

During  the  first  day  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  I  was  with  you  a  good  deal  of 
the  time,  and  repeatedly  helped  you  to  bring  up  and  put  the  troops  into  action, 
particularly,  as  I  remember,  those  of  Polk.  I  remember,  further,  that  in  conse 
quence  of  an  obstinate  resistance  made  to  General  Bragg's  advance  by  some 
Federal  batteries,  he, having  been  told  by  me  that  you  were  near  by,  sent  mo  to 
ask  you  to  find  and  push  forward  a  strong  force  to  Hank  those  batteries  on  our 
right ;  further,  that  meeting  you  (Colonel  Win.  Preston,  A.  D.  C.  to  General 
Johnston,  being  with  you),  I  made  known  to  you  General  Bragg's  desire,  and 
that  after  some  little  conversation  on  your  part  with  Colonel  Preston  as  to  the 
propriety  of  putting  the  reserves  into  action,  you  gave  the  order  to  General 
Breckinridgc  to  advance  and  turn  the  batteries  in  question.  Immediately  after 
you  gave  this  order,  and  while  General  Breckinridgo  was  proceeding  to  execute 
it,  you,  accompanied  by  Colonel  Preston  and  mj'self,  withdrew  rearward  into  n 
narrow  ravine,  which  separated  the  ground  upon  which  we  found  General 
Breckinridgo  from  a  higher  ground,  to  which  we  went  for  the  purpose  of  over 
looking  the  movement.  In  tlio  ravine,  however,  Colonel  Preston  concluded  to 
attempt  to  find  General  Johnston,  and  left  us,  and,  as  you  will  remember,  a  few 
moments  later,  found  General  Johnston. 

The  hill  to  which  you  and  I  went,  as  you  will  recollect,  had  been  occupied 
as  an  encampment  by  the  Federals,  whose  tents  were  standing  full  of  baggage, 
and  there  was  a  fine  Federal  battery  of  six  pieces  abandoned  there.  From  this 
ground  we  saw  General  Breckinridgo  advance,  engage,  and  drive  the  Federal 
forces  in  his  front,  whoso  bullets  reached  the  ground  we  occupied.  I  should 
have  mentioned  that  the  order  to  Breckinridgo  was  given  by  you  about  half- 
p«st  2  o'clock. 

Subsequently  I  rejoined  General  Bragg,  whom  I  found  engaged  with  the 
Federal  troops,  who  were  now  disputing  every  inch.  At  about  sunset,  an  or 
der  came  from  General  Beauregard  to  withdraw,  collect,  and  reorganize  the 
troops,  all  of  which  had  become  greatly  broken  and  intermixed.  This  order 
reached  the  division  commanders.  At  the  time  this  order  was  given,  the  plain 
truth  must  be  told,  that  our  troops  at  the  front  were  a  thin  line  of  exhausted 
men,  who  were  making  no  further  headway,  and  were  glad  to  receive  ordeis  to 
fall  back.  At  tho  same  time,  as  I  had  myself  previously  reported  to  General 
Bragg,  over  one  third  of  tho  army  were  scattered  in  different  parts  of  the  field, 
loading  themselves  with  plunder  from  the  abandoned  Federal  encampments. 
Nobody  can  realize  the  condition  our  army  was  in,  after  4  o'clock  P.M.  on  Sim- 


552  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIII. 

day,  "without  having  been  an  eye-witness.  Brigades,  regiments,  and  companies 
began  to  disperse  at  that  hour  and  move  more  or  less  distantly  to  the  rear. 
Several  years  of  subsequent  service  have  impressed  me  that  General  Beaure- 
gard's  order  for  withdrawing  the  troops  was  most  timely;  otherwise  the  collec 
tion  and  reorganization  of  troops  that  took  place  that  night  could  not  have 
been  made,  and  the  array  would  not  have  been  in  condition  to  make  the  obsti 
nate  head  which  it  did  on  the  next  day,  against  Grant's  and  Bu ell's  combined 
armies,  up  to  the  moment  in  the  afternoon  when  it  was  withdrawn,  carrying 
off  so  considerable  a  part  of  the  enemy's  captured  artillery,  and  in  such  good  or 
der  that  Buell's  and  Grant's  armies  did  not  venture  to  follow. 

Yours  truly,  DAVID  UKQUIIART. 

To  Genl.  THOMAS  JORDAN,  New  York. 

For  Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  New  Orleans,  La. 

THOMAS  JORDAN. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Telegram. 

JACKSON,  TEXX.,  Feb.  21st,  18G2. 
General  L.  POLK,  Columbus  : 

Can  you  spare  General  McCown  for  one  day  to  come  here  ?  Let  him  bring 
Trudeau's  drawing  of  Island  No.  10  and  vicinity,  taken  back  by  Captain  Harris. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

HEADQUARTERS  MADRID  BEXD,  March  8th,  1882, 

via  UNION  CITY. 
To  General  BEAURECARD  : 

Your  telegrams  of  5th  and  7th  noted.  Every  effort  is  being  made  to  remedy 
the  Battery  No.  1.  Ordnance  was  sent  here  from  Columbus  in  such  confusion 
that  I  don't  know  what  I  can  spare.  I  shall  exercise  my  best  judgment  in  all 
masters.  Peremptory  orders  to  save  a  battery  from  overflow  might  require  all 
my  force  for  weeks.  The  enemy  is  erecting  a  battery  at  Point  Pleasant.  A  gun 
boat  went  down  to  shell  them  out.  I  have  not  heard  the  result.  I  have  not 
yet  placed  the  salient  in  advance  of  the  works  at  New  Madrid;  the  position  it 
would  occupy  is  raked  by  the  gunboats.  I  have  not  force  enough  to  occupy  it. 
I  shall  erect  it  as  soon  as  I  can.  From  what  I  learn,  I  fear  the  enemy  can  get 
guns  down  as  low  as  Tiptouville,  on  the  Missouri  shore.  The  railroad  to  Sykes- 
ton  is  being  rapidly  repaired.  Can  soon  be  laid  to  New  Madrid,  as  no  grading 
is  required.  The  least  estimate  of  the  force  of  the  enemy  on  Madrid  plain  is 
thirty  thousand,  with  sixty  guns. 

You  express  confidence  in  my  holding  the  place.  With  my  present  force  I 
can  only  hold  Island  No.  10  and  the  Bend  by  holding  New  Madrid.  How  long  I 
can  hold  New  Madrid  with  my  small  force  against  such  odds  is  a  question.  I  be 
lieve  the  enemy  will  soon  be  fifty  thousand  strong.  He  occupies  position  from 
where  lie  can't  retreat.  In  iny  humble  opinion,  it  is  the  place  to  inflict  a  great 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIII.  553 

overthrow  npon  the  enemy.  If  this  falls,  the  river  is  open.  I  place  the  facts 
before  you.  I  am  determined  to  hold  my  position  at  every  hazard.  Shall  en 
gage  in  no  field  risks.  I  see  my  danger.  My  men  are  confident  and  in  good 
spirits.  We  have  fifty  guns,  all  told,  mounted.  Some  of  our  best  guns  have  no 
carriages.  I  will  despatch  as  often  as  practicable. 

Yours,  etc.,  J.  P.  McCowx,  Brig.-Gen.  Comdg. 

Telegram. 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  9//<,  18G2. 
HUMBOLDT,  March  9th,  1862. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

I  send  you  the  following  despatch  received  from  General  McCown. 

L.  POLK. 

"Houses  burned  and  torn  down  as  necessity  required.  Captain  Hallum,  5th 
Tennessee  regiment,  wounded  yesterday;  also  three  men  on  the  Polk  (steamer), 
and  one  scout.  A  lively  skirmish  yesterday.  During  a  heavy  demonstration 
this  afternoon,  on  New  Madrid,  they  were  driven  back  by  Captain  Baukhead's 
guns  and  the,  gunboats.  The  enemy  have  established  a  battery  at  Point  Pleas 
ant,  of  small  rilled  guns.  The  river  would  be  closed  if  New  Madrid  was  aban 
doned.  A  large  force  would  be  required  to  hold  Island  No.  10  if  New  Madrid 
was  in  tho  hands  of  the  enemy.  It  is  necessary  to  hold  the  place  until  forces 
are  thrown  hero  to  defeat  the  enemy — the  quicker  the  better.  I  see  no  other 
course  to  pursue..  If  I  had  twenty  thousand  more  men,  such  would  be  my 
course.  McCowx. 

"  P.  S.  Shall  I  look  for  reinforcements  ?  I  want  commanders  Trudeau,  March, 
Walker,  and  Gantt.  It  is  important." 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  Tiir  MISSISSIPPI, 
JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  Jfarrh  9//»,  18G2. 

General,--!  send  you  herewith  enclosed  a  slip  from  the  X.  Y.  Herald,  to  show 
you  that  the  enemy's  gunboats  are  not  invulnerable  to  our  heavy  guns,  so  that 
I  have  strong  hopes  now  you  will  be  able  to  keep  them  out  of  Madrid  Bend. 
I  think  they  themselves  have  lost  all  confidence  in  them.  They  will  hardly  at 
tack  you  on  the  water  before  their  mortar-boats  are  ready.  This  is  a  very  un 
certain  mode  of  firing  against  small  works  at  long  ranges.  Small  traverses 
in  every  direction  there  and  at  New  Madrid  will  guard  your  garrisons  against  any 
bad  effects,  the  main  forces  being  kept,  as  much  as  practicable,  away  from  their 
ranges,  but  still  within  supporting  distance. 

Without  the  enemy's  gunboats,  I  consider  New  Madrid  impregnable  in  daylight, 
having  our  gunboats  to  sweep  the  ground  in  front  and  around  them.  At  night 
you  must  guard  against  surprises  by  strong  advance  guards  and  pickets,  and 
piles  of  wood,  to  which  you  can  set  fire  on  tho  approach  of  the  enemy,  to  assist 
the  fire  of  the  fort  and  gunboats.  If  you  can  get  tar-barrels  and  light-balls,  do 
so  by  all  means.  I  have  just  ordered  Captain  Adams  to  send  you  some  from 
Memphis. 

Should  the  enemy  endeavor  to  command  the  river  below  you  with  their'light 


554:  APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  XXIII. 

artillery,  gunboats  must  drive  them  away,  winch  they  can  easily  do.  But  by 
all  means  do  not  waste  your  ammunition,  for  we  have  to  bo  careful  with  it. 
Should  circumstances  compel  you  to  abandon  New  Madrid,  be  careful  to  take 
away  all  the  heavy  guns,  spike  them,  or  destroy  them  ;  and  destroy  the  gorge  of 
your  works,  to  allow  our  gunboats  to  play  into  them  night  and  day  occasional 
ly,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  using  them  to  command  the  river  below 
Island  No.  10. 

I  am  having  Fort  Pillow  put  in  order,  under  General  Withers,  and  about  two 
thousand  five  hundred  men  for  the  present,  to  fall  back  upon  in  case  of  neces 
sity.  In  a  few  days  it  will  be  ready.  Should  we  be  forced  to  give  up  Island  No. 
10,  we  will  have  to  save  from  there,  or  destroy,  as  many  of  our  heavy  guns  as 
practicable. 

Under  the  present  circumstances,  it  is  impossible  to  send  reinforcements,  as 
the  enemy  is  threatening  our  rear  in  great  force  along  the  Tennessee  River; 
and  to  diminish  any  more  our  forces  here  would  be  total  annihilation  every 
where.  But  if,  by  combining  with  General  Johnston's  army,  we  can  defeat 
them,  then  we  can  come  and  treat  as  you  desire  those  in  your  front.  I  have 
ordered  gun-spikes  or  rat-tail  files  to  be  sent  you  from  Memphis.  Be  of  good 
cheer,  and  do  for  the  best,  is  all  I  and  the  country  can  ask  or  expect  from  you. 
In  case  of  any  retrograde  movement,  do  so  with  system  and  order,  saving  what 
can  be  saved  and  destroying  the  rest;  but  leave  no  guns  behind  without  being 
spiked  or  permanently  injured  by  knocking  off  the  trunnions,  bursting,  or  throw 
ing  into  the  river,  etc.  But,  by  all  means,  endeavor  to  save  the  largest  and 
best  guns  for  Fort  Pillow. 

The  country  expects  us  all  to  do  our  duty  with  a  fearless  heart,  and  we  must 
do  it  or  die  in  the  attempt. 

Yours  truly,  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gcnl.  Comdg. 

Brig.-Genl.  J.  P.  McCowx,  New  Madrid  Bend,  Tenn. 


Telegram. 

JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  10th,  1862. 
Maj.-Genl.  M.  LOVELL,  New  Orleans: 

Ram  Manassas  indispensable  at  present,  but  will  send  her  if  you  need  her  ab 
solutely.     I  think  blockaders  won't  try  the  forts. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  Wth,  1862. 
Brig.-Genl.  WITHERS,  Fort  Pillow,  Tenn. : 

Reconnoitre   road  from  Fort  Pillow  to  Mason   Station,  Memphis  and  Ohio 
Road,  and  other  features  of  country,  and  send  report. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  or  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  Wth,  1852. 
General, — I  am  instructed,  by  the  general  commanding,  to  inform  you  that  he 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIII.  555 

•wishes  you  to  despatch  to  Fort  Pillow,  as  soon  as  possible,  all  guns  now  at  Mad 
rid  Bend  for  which  you  chance  to  have  no  carriages.  It  is  hoped  that  the  gun 
boats  will  be  able  to  convoy  any  transport  safely  beyond  that  part  of  the  river 
which  can  be  approached  by  the  enemy. 

In  connection  with  any  effort  to  save  Battery  No.  1,  at  Madrid  Bend,  from  the 
encroachments  of  the  river,  the  General  expects  you  to  exercise  your  own  judg 
ment  in  the  face  of  the  exigency.  You  must  determine  what  may  bo  best  to  be 
done. 

He  instructs  me,  however,  to  suggest,  if  practicable  at  the  time  this  may 
reach  you,  that  you  should  construct  some  rille-pits  in  front  of  your  position  at 
New  Madrid,  and  as  far  in  advance  as  may  be  practicable. 

Transports  must  always  bo  held  convenient  for  the  certain,  prompt  removal 
of  your  troops,  if  driven  to  that  extremity  by  an  overwhelming  force,  which  the 
gunboats,  at  any  time,  shall  prove  unable  to  keep  from  an  assault  of  your  posi 
tions. 

Reinforcements  cannot  be  sent  you  without  the  risk  of  fatal  consequences  in 
this  quarter.  Our  dependence,  as  long  as  possible,  must  be  mainly  on  the  gun 
boats  and  their  ability  to  hold  the  enemy  at  bay  and  hinder  any  effective  onset 
upon  your  forces.  When  that  shall  be  no  longer  possible,  in  your  judgment, and 
in  that  of  Flag-Officer  Hull  ins,  you  must  evacuate,  in  accordance  with  the  Gen 
eral's  instructions  of  the  9th  instant. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN*.  A.  Adj.-Genl. 

Brig.-Genl.  JOHN  P.  McCowx,  Comdg.  C.  S.  Forces,  Madrid  Bend. 


MADRID  BE  xi>,  March  13/A,  18G2. 
To  Col.  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  G. : 

Colonel, — Commodore  Hollins  says  that  he  cannot  dispense  with  the  Manassas. 
Let  General  Lovell  know  it.  Batteries  were  planted  last  night,  and  opened  at 
daylight  against  the  lower  fort.  Dr.  W.  8.  Bell,  Medical  Director,  both  legs 
shot  off,  one  man  killed,  and  one  wounded,  when  I  left.  As  far  as  I  know,  I 
think  the  object  is  regular  approach.  J.  P.  McCowx,  Brig.-Genl. 


JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  l-Wt,  1662. 
Maj.-Genl.  M.  LOVKLL,  New  Orleans : 

Commodore  Hollins  says  he  cannot  dispense  with  Manama*. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  1-Wi,  18f>2. 
Capt.  D.  B.  HARRIS,  Corps  of  Engineers,  Madrid  Bend  : 

Captain, — Your  letter  of  the  9th  instant  was  this  day  received  and  laid  before 
the  general  commanding,  who  directs  me  to  write,  in  reply,  as  follows  : 

lie  approves  of  your  suggestion  to  postpone  construction  of  redoubts  at  Mad 
rid  Bend.  You  will  first  complete  the  crfaiaillere  line  of  which  you  speak,  and 
place  that  line  in  defensive  condition  ;  of  course,  however,  first  making  the  river 


556  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIII. 

front  as  nearly  impregnable  as  your  means  will  permit,  and  looking  carefully 
to  timely  provision  for  the  caving  in  of  the  river  shore,  so  as  to  avoid,  if  possi 
ble,  either  loss  of  guns,  or  a  substantial  diminution,  at  any  time,  of  our  powers 
of  defence  on  that  line  or  front. 

Erect  substantial  traverses  in  abundance.  The  General  is  particularly  anx 
ious  that  this  shall  be  done. 

You  may  dispense  with  any  abatis  on  the  Missouri  shore  at  present. 

The  lunette,  at  a  salient  work  at  New  Madrid,  may  also  be  relinquished,  as 
the  gunboats  appear  able  to  cover  the  front  effectively,  and  to  keep  off  the 
enemy. 

A  special  messenger  will  be  sent  to  Memphis  to  procure  the  tools  you  call  for, 
and  additional  laborers  Avill  be  sent  you,  if  practicable. 

Our  forces  are  being  concentrated  rapidly  to  meet  the  enemy  landing  from 
the  Tennessee  River,  nearly  opposite  Savannah  ;  and  we  hope  to  throw  there  a 
force  competent  to  beat  them  decisively.  If  so,  then  a  relief  force  will  be  thrown 
into  New  Madrid  with  the  utmost  celerity,  and  the  enemy  may  find  himself  in 
our  toils.  Meantime,  the  General  confidently  relies  on  your  sagacity,  industry, 
and  energy  to  render  the  position  of  Island  No.  10,  and  the  mainland,  impregna 
ble  to  any  means  of  attack  the  enemy  may  be  able  to  wield  against  us. 

Show  this  communication  to  General  McCown. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Aclj.-Genl. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  15th,  1862. 
Brig.-Gcnl.  JOHN  P.  McCowx,  Comdg.  Madrid  Bend : 

General, — The  general  commanding  fully  approves  the  projected  evacuation 
of  your  position  of  New  Madrid,  and  trusts  that  it  has  already  been  safely  ac 
complished,  if  determined  upon. 

That  step  determines  an  immediate  reduction  of  your  force  to  the  artillery 
necessary  to  the  efficient  service  of  the  batteries  at  Island  No.  10  and  Madrid 
Bend,  with  an  infantry  support  and  reserve  of  three  regiments,  under  the  com 
mand  of  Brigadier-General  Walker,  to  whom  you  will  assign  the  command  and 
honor  of  defending  that  Thermopylae  of  the  Mississippi  Valley.  You  Avill  also 
leave  a  light  battery  of  six  guns.  It  is  suggested  that  one  of  the  infantry  regi 
ments  shall  be  stationed  on  Island  No.  10,  the  other  two  on  the  mainland;  two 
of  the  light  gnus,  also,  to  be  with  the  troops  on  the  island. 

General  Trndeau  will  remain  writh  General  Walker  in  charge  of  the  batteries, 
as  Chief  of  Artillery ;  and,  from  his  past  distinguished  services  and  skill,  the  Gen 
eral  confidently  expects  the  guns  will  be  served  with  all  possible  efficiency  and 
honor  to  the  country. 

The  remainder  of  your  command  you  will  withdraw  to  Fort  Pillow,  with  all 
possible  celerity,  by  water,  from  Tiptonville,  where  ample  transportation  will  bo 
sent  you.  Should  an  unforeseen  casualty,  however,  leave  you  unprovided  with 
sufficient  transports  for  all  your  troops  at  once,  you  will  send  as  many  as  prac 
ticable  to  Fort  Pillow,  with  orders  that  the  transports  shall  return  for  the  re- 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIIL  557 

maimler  with  the  least  possible  delay.  Leaving  sixty  days'  provision  for  the 
garrison,  and  an  ample  supply  of  ammunition  for  a  prolonged,  desperate  defence, 
including  about  three  hundred  rounds  of  small-arms  ammunition  for  each  infan 
try  soldier,  you  will  remove  the  remainder  of  your  supplies,  if  practicable ;  oth 
erwise  destroy  what  cannot  be  removed,  in  the  most  effective  way  practicable. 

Transports,  at  all  times,  will  be  left  at  Tiptonville  for  the  removal  of  the  gar 
rison  just  prescribed,  should  General  Walker,  or  officer  in  command  at  any  sub 
sequent  time,  determine  further  defence  of  his  position  fruitless,  or  without  pos 
sible  beneficial  issue. 

Should  this  final  evacuation  become  plainly  proper  and  necessary,  before  tho 
troops  retire  all  the  guns  must  be  either  burst  or  thrown  into  the  river,  if  prac 
ticable  ;  if  not,  they  must  be  spiked. 

Should  it  be  deemed  of  service,  you  ore  authorized  to  leave  with  General 
Walker  one  company  of  cavalry ;  the  other  companies,  including  the  squadron 
of  Logwood's  battalion,  will  be  sent  to  Fort  Pillow. 

A  copy  of  this  letter  will  be  left  with  General  Walker. 

Captain  Harris  will  be  sent  to  Fort  Pillow  forthwith;  and  if  you  deem  the 
services  of  the  other  engineers  not  required,  you  will  detach  them  also. 
Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj.-Genl. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  TIIK  MISSISSIPPI, 

JACKSON,  TEX.V.,  March  15M,  16G2. 
Maj.-Genl.  BRAXTOX  BRAGG,  Comdg.  forces  A.  M.,  Bethel,  Trim. : 

(icncral, — Your  despatch  of  this  date,  11  A.  M.,  duly  received.  Was  laid  be 
fore  the  General,  who  directs  me  to  say,  that  ho  entirely  accords  with  your 
views  as  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  approves  your  arrangements  in  tho 
premises,  as  he  would  have  written  you  personally  but  for  his  continued  indis 
position,  especially  since  a  prolonged  interview  to-day  with  Major-General  Polk. 

The  movement  of  General  Polk's  command  will  be  hastened  as  much  as  may 
be  practicable  with  troops  of  that  character.  As  his  brigades  come  under  your 
command,  of  course*  you  will  be  able  to  give  them  such  directions  as  you  may 
find  best. 

The  General  confidently  relies  on  your  judgment,  sagacity,  and  skill ;  and 
your  presence  in  tho  field  is  a  great  comfort  to  him  at  this  time.  Should  his 
health  debar  him  from  being  with  you,  he  will  take  care  that  the  command  shall 
effectually  rest  in  your  hands,  as  was  agreed  upon  with  General  Polk. 

New  Madrid  has  been  evacuated.  This  was  done  under  the  belief  that  an 
overwhelming  force  had  been  collected,  which,  aided  by  heavy  guns,  must  make 
the  early  fall  of  the  place  inevitable.  Most  of  the  ammunition  is  said  to  have 
been  saved,  but  all  guns  in  position  were  lost.  The  General  awaits  the  official 
report  of  the  affair.  This  step,  of  course,  made  another  a  military  consequence 
— that  is,  the  immediate  reduction  of  the  force  at  Island  No.  10  and  Madrid  Bend 
to  the  artillery  to  servo  the  guns  in  position,  and  enough  infantry  to  support 
them  with  a  reserve.  Hence,  the  General,  to-day,  directed  all  the  forces  in  that 
quarter  to  be  withdrawn,  save  the  foot  artillery,  three  regiments  of  infantry,  a 


558  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIII. 

company  of  cavalry,  and  a  battery  of  six  pieces  of  light  artillery.  The  troops 
•withdrawn  will  be  first  assembled  at  Fort  Pillow.  Dou't  you  think  they  might 
"be  most  needed  for  the  impending  conflict  in  your  quarter? 

I  shall  keep  you  thoroughly  advised  of  all  that  may  be  done  or  directed  on 
the  river,  as  well  as  all  the  General's  views  or  notions. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj. -Genl. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  15/A,  1862. 
Mnj.-Geul.  J.  P.  McCoWN,  care  of  Col.  PICKETT,  Union  City : 

Send  down  immediately  to  Fort  Pillow  all  the  negro  force  not  required  by 
yon,  with  all  extra  tools,  and  also  Captain  Harris,  of  Engineers. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

HUMBOLDT,  March  IGth,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

The  attack  on  the  island  commenced  this  morning  early,  and  has  continued 
up  to  this  hour,  12  M.  L.  POLK. 


To  Genl.  BBACBEQAHD  :  HUMBOLDT,  Jtfon*  16(7,,  1862. 

The  following  just  received: 

•"MADRID  BEND,  March  16th. 

"General, — I  received  your  despatch  \vith  Colonel  Jordan's  letter.  I  •will,  if 
possible,  execute  your  instructions.  My  experience  makes  me  tremble  for  the 
result.  The  gunboats  are  now  off  the  point,  dropping  down. 

"  J.  P.  McCoWN." 
L.  POLK. 

JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  IGth,  1862. 
To  Brig.-Genl.  McCowx,  Madrid  Bend : 

Prepare  fire-rafts  to  anchor  mid-channel  and  lighten  up  at  night. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  17th,  1862. 
To  Brig.-Geul.  McCowx : 

In  face  of  exigencies  you  must  exercise  your  own  judgment  as  to  reduction 
offeree  hitherto  directed;  but  cannot  understand  why  you  should  tremble  for 
result.  What  obstacles  intervene  to  withdrawal  as  instructed? 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

HUMBOLDT,  MarcJi  17th,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

The  following  just  received  from  Colonel  Pickett,  8.45  P.  M.,  March  17th,  Union 
City: 

"General  McCown  writes,  dated  7  A.  M.,  over  six  hundred  shot  and  shell 
thrown  at  us  yesterday.  Nobody  hurt.  They  will  soon  open  fire  to-day. 

"  ED.  PICKETT,  Comdg.  Post." 

L.  POLK. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIII.  559 

JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  17/fc,  1862. 
Col.  W.  R.  HUNT,  Ordnance  Officer,  Corinth  : 

General  wishes  twelve  rifled  guns  yon  mention  sent  to  Fort  Pillow  in  haste. 
Have  they  carriages  ?     If  not,  make  them  with  all  possihle  despatch. 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj.-Gcnl. 


Telegram, 

HUMBOLDT,  March  IStli,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

The  following  just  received  from  General  McCown  : 

"  FOIIT  PILLOW,  March  l&h,  1862. 
"  General  POLK  : 

'•In  olM'dience  to  orders,  I  am  here  with  six  guns  of  Bankhead's  battery,  six 
guns  Captain  Stuart's  battery;  Colonel  Neilly  Mark's,  Colonel  Scott's,  Colonel 
Kennedy's,  Colonel  Bradford's,  and  Colonel  Travis's  regiments.  I  directed 
Captain  Neilly's  squadron  to  be  sent  down  as  soon  as  they  could  be  withdrawn 
from  the  position  they  occupied.  I  left  with  Colonel  Walker  the  artillery, 
heavy;  Colonel  Steadman's,  Colonel  Gantt's,  Colonel  Baker's,  Colonel  Hender 
son  Walker's,  Colonel  Clark's,  and  Colonel  Terry's  battalion.  Also  one  coin- 
pan}'  of  Captain  Stuart's  battery,  the  least  force  that  I  think  he  can  maintain 
his  position  with,  and  also  two  companies  Mississippi  cavalry.  Terry's,  Clark's, 
and  Brown's  regiments  are  small  and  badly  armed.  Should  you  desire  a  further 
removal  of  troops  from  Island  No.  10,  you  can  direct  General  Walker  what  troops 
to  send.  J.  P.  McCowx/' 

L.  POLK,  M:ij.-Genl. 


Telegram. 

IlL'MBOLPT,  March  ISUt,  18C2. 
To  Genl.  BEAVREGARD: 

I  have  received  the  accompanying  despatch,  and  have  replied  and  given  him 
the  following  instructions  : 
"To  Maj.-Genl.  McCowx,  Cotndg.  Fort  Pillow  : 

"Your  despatch  of  this  morning,  informing  mo  of  your  removal,  received. 

"  I  am  gratified  to  know  you  have  retired  your  troops  so  successfully.  You 
will  assume  command  at  Fort  Pillow,  and  take  immediate  measures  for  putting 
it  in  the  most  effective  condition  of  defence.  Please  furnish  me  immediately 
a  report  of  its  condition  in  every  department,  and  what  you  need.  I  am  prom 
ised,  by  General  Bragg,  ten  heavy  shell-guns  for  your  use  there.  They  are  now 
on  the  way.  Is  it  possible  for  yon  to  obtain  any  heavy  gnus  from  above  (Island 
10,  etc.)  ?  Furnish  me  immediately  a  detailed  report  of  your  evacuation  of 
New  Madrid,  and  the  retirement  of  your  troops  from  the  Bend,  with  such  general 
information  in  regard  to  the  condition  of  that  post  as  will  put  me  in  possession 
of  all  important  particulars,  and  send  it  to  me  by  an  intelligent  officer. 

"L.  POLK/' 


560  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIIL 

JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  18th,  18G2. 
Brig.-Geul.  McCowx : 

If  driven  from  your  post,  guns  will  be  spiked;  also  a  shot  driven  in  each,  or 
load  and  wedge  in  shell,  fuse  down,  so  that  gun  will  burst. 

Even  if  Federal  gunboats  pass  your  batteries,  transports  cannot,  so  long  as 
batteries  are  held  and  bravely  worked.  Nor  can  enemy's  army  cross  river; 
but  few  would  be  crossed  by  gunboats;  those  can  be  easily  repulsed  by  resolute 
attack.  Post  must  be  held,  if  possible  for  men  to  do  it. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  18th,  1832. 
Brig.-Genl.  McCowx : 

The  General  approves  your  dispositions  for  defence  of  Madrid  Bend  and  Island 
No.  10,  but  wishes  you  to  resume  the  command  there.  It  is  said  some  of  your 
transports  were  left  at  Madrid  Bend  ;  if  so,  how  many  ?  They  must  never  fall 
in  enemy's  hands.  Some  of  them  might  be  sunk  to  obstruct  channel  near  Mis 
souri  shore.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  March  19th. 
Msij.-Genl.  B.  BRAGG,  Corinth : 

May  not  enemy  really  mean  to  operate  on  Purdy  and  Bethel.  We  must  draw 
him  into  an  engagement  before  he  can  bring  up  more  of  his  forces.  Must  get 
accurate  hourly  information  of  his  movements.  Three  regiments  from  Madrid 
Bend  will  be  with  yon  in  season,  if  transportation  meets  them  at  Bethel.  Keep 
sharp  lookout  on  Bethel  and  Purdy.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TEXX.,  March  19th. 
Maj.-Genl.  E.  VAX  DORX,  on  his  way  to  Pocahoutas,  care  of  Captain  I.  ADAMS, 

Memphis : 

Too  late  for  movement  on  New  Madrid,  which  is  in  possession  of  enemy  ;  but 
if,  at  any  time,  you  can  join  your  forces  with  mine,  it  will  be  best  to  do  so. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


Steamer  Prince,  six  miles  below  TIPTOXVILLE,  March  20///,  1  p.  >i. 
Col.  T.  JORDAX  : 

Colonel, — I  could  not  get  to  Tipton  by  the  route  I  tried  this  morning.  I  shall 
try  the  swamp  in  the  morning.  I  shall  try  to  open  communication  by  laud; 
have  not  heard  from  General  Walker  to-day.  I  shall  also  try  to  put  boats  at 
the  ford  or  fords  on  the  lake.  I  fear  the  result.  Put  Fort  Pillow  to  fighting 
order  and  reinforce  me  if  you  can.  J.  P.  McCowx. 

JACKSOX,  TEXX.,  March  21st. 
Brig.-Genl.  J.  P.  McCowx,  care  Col.  PICKETT,  Union  City: 

Even  if  enemy  effect  crossing — scarcely  probable — you  can  still  defend  posi 
tion  of  batteries  for  many  days  with  proper  detached  field-works  in  their  rear. 
The  country  looks  to  you  for  a  determined  defence  of  your  position.  Mean- 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIII.  5G1 

while,  Fort  Pillow  will  l»e  made  ready.     Glean   the  country  for  provisions. 
Husband  ammunition.  G.  T.  BEAUHEGARD. 


MADRID  BEND,  March  21*f,  1832, 

via  UNION  CITY,  22d. 
"To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD: 

11  General, — This  command  could  not  be  withdrawn  in  any  event.  If  llic 
enemy  effects  a  landing  it  will  be  below  this  place,  which  would  cut  us  off. 
The  gunboats  expected  (eight)  may  assist  in  preventing  a  crossing.  Hurry 
them  up ;  we  have  to  fight  it  out.  The  transports  at  No.  10  shall  not  fall  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy;  we  must  bo  reinforced.  I  regret  any  troops  were 
removed  from  here.  General  Walker  coincides  with  me  in  this. 

"  J.  P.  McCowN." 
The  above  received  here  just  now,  11  o'clock  A.  M. 

ED.  PICKKTT,  Jr.,  Comdg.  Post. 


Telegram. 

MADRID  BK xn,  March  20/A,  1862, 

via  UNION  CITY,  22d. 
To  Col.  T.  JORDAN  : 

Colonel, — I  arrived  here  this  morning;  found  all  going  on  well.  General 
Walker's  arrangements  are  satisfactory  —  as  good  as  can  be  made  with  his 
force.  I  have  left  General  Walker  in  immediate  command.  The  enemy's  forces 
on  the  other  side  are  much  scattered;  if  a  force  was  sent  to  their  rear  via  Gur- 
nieville,  Ark.,  it  would  relieve  the  pressure  on  this  command,  and,  if  strong 
enough,  capture  the  forces  south  of  St.  John's  bayou.  Read  my  last  despatch. 

J.  P.  McCowN,  Maj.-Genl. 


JACKSON,  March  22d,  1S(V2. 
M:ij.-Genl.  J.  P.  McCowN,  Comdg.  Madrid   Bend,  care   Col.   PICKKTT,  Union 

City. 

Van  Dorn  proposes  to  attack  enemy  in  reverse  at  New  Madrid.  Be  of  good 
cheer  and  hold  out.  G.  T.  BEAURKGARD. 

JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  22rf,  1362. 
Ma.j.-Genl.  J.  P.  McCowN,  Madrid  Bend  : 

You  must  be  aware  that  you  cannot,  at  this  moment,  be  reinforced.  Your 
command  forms  the  garrison  of  that  key  to  Mississippi  Valley.  Country  ex 
pects  yon  to  defend  that  post  of  honor  to  the  last,  or  until  we  can  relieve  you 
by  a  victory  here  ;  then  to  attack,  in  force,  your  adversary.  Meanwhile,  Pillow 
is  being  put  in  fighting  order,  for  another  stand,  if  need  be.  Send  names  of  our 
boats  above  New  Madrid;  use  them,  if  necessary,  to  obstruct  channels  in  front 
of  Island  No.  10.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


UNION  CITY,  March  22d,  1862. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD  : 

Twenty-five  or  thirty  canoes,  three  skiffs,  and  one  ferry-flat  on  the   lake. 

I.— 3G 


5G2  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Have  ordered  all  to  be  collected  at  one  point  at  once,  and  advised  General  Mc- 
Cown.     Will  report  as  soon  as  they  are  ready. 

E.  PICKETT,  Jr.,  Comtlg.  Post. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  22d,  18G2. 
General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Decatur : 

I  consider  presence  of  Major  Gilmcr  indispensable  at  Fort  Pillow  for  a  few 
days.     Safety  of  the  place  and  Mississippi  Valley  may  depend  on. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  23d,  1862. 
Brig.-Genl.  A.  P.  STEWART,  Comdg.  Fort  Pillow  : 

I  want  eight  32  or  long  24  pounders  for  floating  ranis.  "Which  can  you  spare 
best,  and  are  they  with  or  without  carriages?  Have  you  any  field-battery? 
Do  you  want  field-guns  for  land  fronts  ?  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


JACKSON,  TENN.,  March  24 th,  1862. 
Brig.-Genl.  A.  P.  STEWART,  Comdg.  Fort  Pillow  : 

A  general  court-martial  will  be  ordered.  Send  worthless  mules  to  Memphis. 
Engineers  all  remain  ;  Captain  Harris  as  Chief.  Major  Gilrner,  Engineer  Corps, 
is  en  route  for  Fort  Pillow.  Send  return,  by  mail,  of  all  heavy  ordnance  and 
ammunition. 

By  order  of  General  Beauregard.  THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  A.  Genl. 

Telegram. 

UNION  CITY,  March  24th,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

The  following  received  here  at  1  A.  M.  ED.  PICKETT,  Jr. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  MADRK>  BEND, 

March  23d. 

"  General, — I  hope  Van  Dorn  will  act  promptly.  I  am  not  desponding  yet.  I 
know  my  position.  One  gunboat  has  sunk  on  a  bar  just  beyond  range.  They 
are  either  trying  to  raise  her,  or  removing  the  guns.  Fire-rafts  cannot  be  placed, 
as  our  batteries  are  under  fire.  When  we  reply  it  is  slowly,  waiting  until  they 
are  where  we  want  them.  Have  sent  to  Pillow  for  two  hundred  rifle  shots. 

"  J.  P.  McCowN,  Maj.-Genl.  Comdg." 


Telegram. 

UNION  CITY,  March  25th,  1832. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Very  heavy  firing  at  No.  10  since  5  A.  M.     Apparently  broadsides. 

ED.  PICKETT,  Jr. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  XXIII.  5G3 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  March  27th,  1862. 
Miij.-Gcul.  M.  LOVELL,  New  Orleans: 

I  telegraphed  two  days  ago  I  could  arm  eight  gunboats  at  Fort  Pillow  with 
32-pounders.     Are  these  heavy  enough  ?  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


Telegram. 

MADRID  BEND,  March  26M,  1862. 
i-ta  FORT  PILLOW,  28/7*,  4  P.  M. 
To  Gcnl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Shelling  continues  slowly.  I  believe  the  enemy  will  attempt  to  cross  at  three 
or  four  points.  I  will  do  all  I  can  to  repel  him  if  he  attempts  it.  The  negroes 
left  here  yesterday  by  order  of  General  Polk.  Additional  works  will  go  on  slowly, 
as  my  force  is  so  small  and  scattered.  I  think  they  will  save  the  injured  gun 
boat.  I  need  three  thousand  infantry  and  the  balance  of  Stewart's  battery. 

J.  P.  McCowN,  Maj.-Genl.  Conulg. 


CORINTH,  March  29//»,  1862. 
Maj.-Genl.  J.  P.  McCowN,  Madrid  Bend,  care  Col.  PICKKTT,  Union  City  : 

General  Maekall  is  ordered  to  relieve  you.  You  -\vill  then  await  orders  at 
Memphis.  Send  immediately  your  (and  subordinate)  detailed  reports  of  evac 
uation  of  New  Madrid.  G.T.  BEATREGARD. 


MADRID  BEXD,  March  29M,  1862. 

via  UNION  CITY. 
Col.  THOMAS  JORDAN  : 

'Tis  said  that  the  enemy  arc  cutting  a  way  (a  canal)  from  the  foot  of  Island 
No.  8  to  St.  John's  Bayou.  Said  to  be  progressing  rapidly  for  their  boats.  Bom 
bardment  still  slowly  continues.  One  of  our  gunboats  eame  up  to  Tiptonvillo 
last  night;  fired  at  seventeen  times. 

J.  P.  McCowN,  Mjij.-Genl.  Comdg. 


CORINTH,  Miss.,  March  31*/,  1862. 
Capt.  JOHN  ADAMS,  Comdg.  Memphis,  Tenn. : 

Bombardment  of  Island  No.  10  and  Madrid  Bend  commenced  on  15th  instant, 
continued  constantly  night  and  day.  Enemy  has  fired  several  thousand 
13-inch  and  rifle  shells.  On  the  17th  a  grand  attack  with  five  gunboats  and  four 
mortar-boats,  lasted  nine  hours.  The  result  of  bombardment  to  28th  instant, 
is,  on  our  side,  one  man  killed,  none  seriously  wounded,  and  no  damage  to  bat 
teries.  Enemy  had  one  gunboat  disabled  and  another  reported  sunk. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


Telegram. 

FORT  PILLOW,  April  8//i,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAT-REGARD: 

The  enemy  have  taken  Island  10;  this  place  should  be  reinforced  at  once. 

J.  B.  VILLEPIGUE,  Brig.  Comdg. 


564  APPENDIX  TO   CIIAPTEll  XXIII. 

Have  ordered  two  regiments  from  Memphis. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Telegram. 

FORT  PILLOW,  April  13M,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

The  gunboat  Little  Rebel,  at  New  Orleans,  is  very  small,  well  protected  against 
shot,  very  swift,  burns  very  little  coal,  and  is  much  needed  here  for  despatch 
boat,  picket  boat,  etc.  Can  she  be  ordered  up  ?  I  suggest  that  Governor  Har 
ris  be  requested  to  call  out  the  militia  in  the  four  surrounding  counties,  and 
order  them  to  report  here,  in  case  of  an  attack.  Acting  entirely  on  the  defen 
sive  alone  has  produced  the  worst  effect.  General  Pope  replies  to  the  proposi 
tion  for  an  exchange  that  he  thinks  there  will  be  no  difficulty  in  effecting  an 
exchange  at  a  more  convenient  time.  I  learn  our  men  have  been  sent  to  Colum 
bus,  Ohio,  and  other  places.  J.  B.  YILLEPIGUE,  Brig. -Genl.  Comdg. 


Telegram. 

FORT  PILLOW,  April  IStli,  1862. 
To  Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

General  Eust  has  arrived  here,  and,  being  my  senior,  will  have  to  supersede 
me  in  the  command.  He  has  no  orders  to  show.  Please  let  me  know  if  it  is 
done  by  your  direction.  J.  B.  YILLEPIGUE,  Brig.-Genl.  Comdg. 


CORINTH,  April  13tf»,  1862. 
Brig.-Genl.  J.  B.  YILLEPIGUE,  Comdg.  Fort  Pillow  : 

General  Sam.  Jones  will  take  command  at  Fort  Pillow.  Meantime  retain 
immediate  command  of  post  and  carry  on  works.  General  Eust  will  encamp 
his  troops  near  by  until  General  Jones  shall  arrive. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg. 


Telegram. 

FORT  PILLOW,  April  Uth,  1862. 
To  Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

By  order,  I  am  here  with  three  regiments  and  a  battalion  of  my  brigade.  An 
attack  by  the  gunboats  and  of  the  enemy's  land  forces  in  our  rear  imminent. 
Many  of  my  men  unarmed  totally.  Others  indifferently.  The  force  is  inade 
quate  if  it  was  well  armed.  Can  arms  be  forwarded  immediately. 

A.  EUST,  Brig.-Genl.  C.  S.  A. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  20th,  1862. 
Dr.  E.  K.  MARSHALL,  Yicksbnrg,  Miss. : 

Lear  Sir, — The  General  has  taken  steps  for  the  immediate,  effective  fortifica 
tion  of  the  river  near  Vicksburg,  and  Captain  D.  B.  Harris  of  his  staff,  an  accoin- 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIII. 

plished  engineer,  has  been  directed  to  repair  there  for  that  purpose.  The  Gen 
eral  wishes  me  to  ask  you  to  give  Captain  Harris  all  the  aid  in  your  power, 
especially  to  arouse  your  people  to  a  sense  of  their  duty  to  furnish  the  necessary 
labor  in  such  measure  that  the  work  will  go  on  with  the  proper  celerity. 

And  in  this  connection  the  General  directs  me  to  say,  he  shall  confidently 
expect  the  large  slave-owners  of  the  vicinity  to  come  forward  with  their  slaves, 
with  the  same  alacrity  and  liberality  that  has  characterized  all  other  classes 
of  our  people  during  this  war. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj.-Genl. 


CORINTH,  April  24th,  1SG2. 
Brig.-Gcnl.  A.  RUST,  at  Fort  Pillow  : 

Come  down  to  Memphis  with  your  brigade,  except  one  regiment,  to  bo  kept, 
at  Randolph,  as  before  directed.  Five  days'  cooked  subsistence,  one  hundred 
rounds  ammunition  when  you  leave  Memphis. 

THOMAS  JORDAN',  A.  A.  Genl. 

CORINTH,  April  27tJi,  1802. 
Captain  D.  B.  HARRIS,  Vicksbnrg: 

Yes,  construct  proposed  batteries  and  obstruct  Yazoo. 

G.  T.  BKAUREGARD. 


Telegram. 

FORT  PILLOW,  April  28/7*,  18G2. 
To  Genl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Three  companies  artillery  left  for  Corinth  last  night.     Bombardment  con 
tinues  day  and  night.     One  man  killed  last  night. 

J.  B.  VILLKPIC.UE,  Brig.-Gcnl.  Comdg. 


CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  5M,  18G2. 
Brig.-Genl.  J.  B.  VILLKPIGUI:,  Fort  Pillow,  Tenn. : 

You  will  judge  when  it  is  necessary  to  retire  from  Fort  Pillow,  via  Covington 
and  Somerville,  or  Ripley,  Brownsville,  Jackson,  and  Grand  Junction,  to  this 
place.  The  enemy  have  no  land  force  to  fear. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  13/7/,  1862. 
Genl.  S.  COOPER,  A.  and  I.  Genl.,  Richmond,  Va. : 

General  Villepigue  reports,  "Scouts  from  Osceola  say  enemy's  gunboats 
Man  ml  City  and  Caromlclct  run  aground  to  prevent  sinking;  another  injured; 
one  pilot  and  seventeen  men  killed.''  He  thinks  the  report  reliable.  No  firing 
from  the  enemy  since  this  morning.  Their  mortar-boats  have  all  been  towed 
out  of  range.  The  "  River  Defence  "  men  are  greatly  elated,  and  feel  great  con 
fidence  in  their  boats. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


566  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIV. 

APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIY. 

Telegram. 

CORINTH,  April  8th,  1832. 
Genl.  S.  COOPER,  A.  and  I.  Genl.,  Richmond,  Va. : 

We  are  much  iu  need  of  at  least  two  additional  major-generals,  and  four  ad 
ditional  brigadier-generals ;  also  one  competent  chief  of  artillery.  I  earnestly 
and  urgently  recommend  Major-General  Bragg  for  immediate  appointment  in 
General  A.  S.  Johnston's  place.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  or  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  8th,  1862. 
Brig.-Geul.  J.  C.  BRECKINRIDGE,  Comdg.  Rear  Guard,  Mickey's  House,  Tenn. : 

General, — Your  letter  of  this  date  has  been  referred  to  the  General  command 
ing,  who  agrees  with  yon  in  the  supposition  that  the  movement  of  the  enemy, 
reported  to  you,  is  but  that  of  a  recouuoissance,  which,  however,  cannot  be  sup 
ported  by  artillery  in  the  present  state  of  the  roads.  The  General  expects  to 
morrow  the  arrival  of  several  fresh  regiments  of  infantry,  which  will  be  scut  to 
you  at  once.  Meanwhile  every  effort  will  be  made  to  repair  the  roads  for  the 
passage  of  your  wagons  and  artillery  when  you  retire.  Two  of  the  best  guides 
available  will  be  sent  you.  General  Chalmers  is  still,  and  will  remain,  at 
Monterey  with  his  brigade,  until  you  are  prepared  to  fall  back.  Please  commu 
nicate  with  him  so  that  he  may  be  able  to  conform  his  movements  with  yours. 

The  General  regards  the  Ridge  road  as  the  only  practicable  one  at  present. 

Herewith  is  enclosed"  a  communication  for  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
Federal  forces,  which  please  have  sent  to  him  by  a  flag  of  truce.  If  the  an 
swer  is  favorable  you  will  detail  a  burial  party  from  your  cavalry  to  bury  the 
dead  as  soon  as  practicable.  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj.-Gcul. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  Slli,  1862. 
Brig.-General  J.  R.  CHALMERS,  Comdg.  Brigade,  A.  of  M. : 

General, — Unless  otherwise  ordered  by  your  immediate  commanding  officer, 
you  will  allow  your  command  to  rest  at  Monterey.  Sending  working  parties 
to  obstruct,  by  cutting  down  trees,  removing  bridges,  etc.,  the  bad  places  of  the 
roads  leading  from  Monterey  to  positions  now,  or  which  may  be,  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  and  which  might  be  used  by  him  in  attacking  you  or  in  endeavoring  to 
cut  off  your  retreat,  look  particularly  to  the  roads  leading  towards  Hamburg, 
being  careful,  however,  not  to  cut  off  our  wagons,  etc.  Your  working  parties 
should  consist  of  those  details  left  as  a  guard  to  your  encampments.  As  soon 
as  your  force  shall  have  been  sufficiently  rested,  you  will  retire  to  this  place,  on 
the  best  road  from  Monterey  to  the  Ridge  road,  passing  west  of  the  White 
House.  The  necessary  wagons  will  be  furnished  you,  if  possible;  meanwhile 
you  will  have  a  guard  to  take  care  of  and  protect  said  baggage,  or  to  destroy  it, 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  567 

whenever  the  advanced  pickets  will  give  notice  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy. 
You  will  collect  together  as  much  cavalry  as  you  shall  think  necessary,  to  act  as 
mounted  pickets  and  guards  on  tho  roads  leading  into  Monterey,  placing  them 
sufiicieutly  far  in  advance  to  give  timely  notice  of  the  approach  of  tho  enemy. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Geill.  Comdg. 


ConiXTir,  April  8th,  1802. 
Commodore  G.  X.  UOLLIXS,  Fort  Pillow,  care  Capt.  ADAMS,  Memphis : 

Propose  in  my  name  an  exchange  of  prisoners  under  flag  of  truce,  according 
to  scale  established  by  Federal  War  Department,  as  soon  as  possible.  The  ex 
change  to  be  made  by  river,  my  prisoners  being  at  Memphis,™  route  for  interior. 

G.  T.  BEAU REGARD. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

April  Hf/i,  1862. 
Maj.-Genl.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Comdg.  1T.  S.  Forces  near  Pittsburg,  Tenn. : 

Sir, — At  the  close  of  the  conflict  of  yesterday,  my  forces  being  exhausted  by 
the  extraordinary  length  of  time  during  which  they  were  engaged  with  yours 
on  that  and  tho  preceding  day,  and  it  being  apparent  that  you  had  received, 
and  were  still  receiving,  large  reinforcements,  I  ft-lt  it  my  duty  to  withdraw  my 
troops  from  the  immediate  scene  of  conflict. 

Under  these  circumstances,  in  accordance  with  the  usages  of  war,  I  shall 
transmit  this  under  a  flag  of  truce,  to  ask  permission  to  send  a  mounted  party 
to  the  battle-field  of  Shiloh,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  decent  interment  to  my 
dead. 

Certain  gentlemen  wishing  to  avail  themselves  of  this  opportunity  to  remove 
the  remains  of  their  sons  and  friends,  I  must  request  for  them  tho  privilege  of 
accompanying  the  burial  party,  and  in  this  connection  I  deem  it.  proper  to  say, 
that  I  am  asking  only  what  I  have  extended  to  your  own  countrymen,  under 
similar  circumstances.  Respectfully,  General,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  Tin:  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  8th,  1862. 
Brig.-Gcnl.  J.  R.  CHALMERS: 

General, — Tho  general  commanding  wishes  that  your  movements,  if  practi 
cable,  shall  conform  strictly  with  those  of  General  Brcckinridge  at  tho  Mickey 
House.  Respectfully,  General,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Atlj.-Gcnl. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  9//j,  1862. 
3cnl.  JOHN  C.  BRECKINRIDGE,  Comdg.  Rear  Guard,  etc. : 

General, — Your  note  of  this  morning  has  been  laid  before  the  General,  who 


568  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV. 

directs  mo  to  say  :  a  regiment,  Newman's,  will  be  sent  out  to  meet  your  com 
mand  at  the  intersection  of  the  Ridge  road  with  one  from  Monterey  to  Purdy ; 
to  which  point  you  are  authorized  to  retire  at  once.  A  number  of  men  were 
also  sent  forward  this  morning — the  guards  left  here  in  the  encampment  of  the 
several  regiments.  As  soon  as  these  troops  and  Newman's  regiment  shall  join, 
you  will  place  Colonel  Wheeler,  19th  Alabama  Volunteers,  in  command  of  the 
demi-brigade,  and  your  present  command,  except  the  cavalry,  may  then  be 
withdrawn  to  this  place  without  further  delay. 

The  General  regrets  exceedingly  to  hear  of  your  indisposition,  but  trusts  it  is 
only  a  transient  ill,  from  which  you  will  soon  recover,  so  that  he  and  the 
country  may  have  the  benefit  of  your  highest  physical  and  mental  faculties  in 
the  campaign  inaugurated. 

Enclosed  are  two  open  letters,  which  please  transmit  by  the  burial  party, 
should  the  sending  of  the  latter  be  assented  to  by  the  enemy. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj.-Genl. 

CORINTH,  April  Vtli,  1882. 
Gcnl.  S.  COOPER,  Richmond,  Va. : 

All  present  probabilities  are  that  whenever  the  enemy  moves  on  this  position, 
he  will  do  so  with  an  overwhelming  force  of  not  less  than  eighty-five  thousand 
men.  We  can  muster  only  about  thirty-five  thousand  effectives.  Van  Dorn 
may  possibly  join  us  in  a  few  days  with  fourteen  thousand  more.  Can  we  not 
be  reinforced  by  Pemberton's  army?  If  defeated  here  we  lose  the  Mississippi 
Valley,  and,  probably,  our  cause ;  whereas  we  could  even  aiford  to  lose,  for 
a  while,  Charleston  and  Savannah,  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  Buell's  army, 
which  would  not  only  insure  us  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  but  our  inde 
pendence.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  April  9th,  1862. 
Genl.  S.  COOPER,  Richmond,  Va. : 

What  shall  I  do  with  prisoners  now  on  hand  —  about  three  thousand? — 
Meanwhile,  I  have  ordered  to  Tuscaloosa,  via  Mobile.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  April  13th,  1802. 
Mnj.-Genl.  E.  K.  SMITH,  Chattanooga,  Tenn. : 

Six  regiments  from  Pemberton  on  way  to  join  yon ;  add  to  them  three  of 
yours  which  failed  to  get  by  Huntsville,  and  with  your  forces  dash  at  Mitchell 
and  take  him  in  reverse.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  13/A,  18G2. 

Maj.-Genl.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Comdg.  Forces  of  United  States,  Pittsburg,  West  Tenn. : 
General, — Your  communication  of  yesterday,  by  flag  of  truce,  enclosing  the 
application  of  Colonel  Battle  for  exchange,  has  been  received,  and  I  hasten  to 
answer  as  soon  as  my  pressing  engagements  have  permitted. 

Although  Colonel  Battle  may  be  disabled  for  active  service,  I  will  neverthe- 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  XXIV.  500 

less  exchange  him  for  an  officer  of  the  same  rank,  provided  you  will  indicate  one 
who  did  command  a  brigade  in  your  expedition. 

Bat  the  prisoners  of  war  having  been  sent  to  the  interior,  the  colonel  you 
may  desire  to  have  in  exchange  will  have  to  be  sent  for,  and  will  be  delivered 
at  some  point  to  be  arranged  hereafter.  Meantime,  I  hope  you  will  feel  author 
ized  to  permit  Colonel  Battle  to,  be  released  on  his  parole,  so  that,  as  soon  as 
practicable,  he  may  have  the  benefit  of  the  care  of  his  family  and  friends  in  his 
injured  condition. 

I  have  been  induced  to  make  this  distinction  in  connection  with  colonels 
commanding  brigades,  because  I  have  observed  that  nearly,  if  not  all,  brigades 
in  the  United  States'  service,  during  this  war,  are  in  command  of  colonels,  while 
in  the  Confederate  service  most  of  our  brigades  arc  commanded  by  brigadiers; 
consequently,  unless  some  such  distinction  shall  be  regarded,  we  may  sutler  ma 
terially  in  exchanges. 

I  propose,  also,  in  a  few  days,  either  to  permit  the  medical  officers  of  your 
army  in  my  possession  to  return  to  your  camp,  or  to  send  them,  by  the  Missis 
sippi  River,  to  General  Pope. 

Respectfully,  General,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEATRECIARI),  Genl.  Comdg. 


COHIXTII,  Miss.,  April  Utli,  1SG2. 
Genl.  S.  COOPER,  Adj. -Genl.,  Richmond,  Vn. : 

As  directed  by  President,  I  send  a  list  of  officers  for  immediate  promotion: 
Brigadier-Generals  Brcckinridgo  and  Ilindman,  for  major-generals;  Colonels 
Thos.  Jordan,  Win.  Preston,  Alfred  Mouton,  Geo.  Manney,  Preston  Smith,  J.  S. 
Marmaduke,  J.  D.  Martin,  and  Danl.  Adams,  for  brigadier-generals;  Captain 
John  Morgan,  Ky.,  to  be  colonel  of  cavalry. 

Please  answer  by  telegraph.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  April  Uih,  18G2. 
Maj.-Gcnl.  E.  K.  SMITH,  Knoxvillo,  Tenn. : 

Shall  call  the  Pemberton  regiments  here  under  the  circumstances.  But  sug 
gest  that  movement  you  indicate,  and  urge  War  Department  to  send  you  the 
troops  for  it  by  all  means,  and  without  hesitation,  and  I  will  throw  a  brigade 
of  cavalry  across  the  river  to  aid  you.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  April  Uth,  1862. 
Genl.  S.  COOPER,  Adj. -Genl.,  Richmond,  Va. : 

Pemberton's  troops  cut  off  by  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Road;  should  be 
sent  to  mo  by  way  of  Mobile.  Cannot  General  Kirby  Smith  be  furnished  from 
seaboard  with  a  division  to  make  a  diversion  on  Nashville  and  enemy's  rear,  now 
open  and  vulnerable  ?  He  proposes  such  a  movement.  With  celerity,  it  is  emi 
nently  practicable.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


570  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIV. 

CORINTH,  April  Uth,  18G2. 
Brig.-Gciil.  E.  S.  EIPLEY,  Charleston,  S.  C. : 

Troops  must  not  go  to  Kirby  Smith  now.  Circumstances  altered  by  burning 
of  railroad  bridge.  Hence  let  all  be  sent  here  at  once  via  Mobile. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  16th,  1862. 
Brig.-Gcnl.  H.  LITTLE,  Ricnzi,  Miss. : 

General, — I  am  instructed  by  the  General  to  say  that  he  wishes  you  to  exam 
ine  the  country  for  the  distance  of  five  miles  to  the  south  and  west  of  Rienzi, 
with  a  view  to  ascertaining  its  fitness  for  an  encampment  for  twenty-five  thou 
sand  men.  Look  especially  into  the  question  of  abundance  of  good  water  and 
wood.  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Tuos.  JORDAN,  A.  Adj. -Genl. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  or  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  16th,  1832. 
Geul.  SAM.  COOPER,  A.  and  I.  Genl.  C.  S.  A.,  Richmond: 

General, — 1  fear  that  Colonel  Northrop,  Chief  of  the  Subsistence  Department, 
is  disposed  or  determined  to  ignore  the  presence  with,  these  headquarters  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Lee  of  his  department,  the  officer  next  in  rank  in  it  to  him 
self,  and  one  of  the  largest  experience  in  our  service,  sent  here,  as  you  are  aware, 
on  my  application,  because  of  that  experience. 

Circumstances  convince  me  that  I  am  not  mistaken,  and,  unless  Colonel 
Northrop  is  led  to  change  his  course,  the  service  and  the  country  will  suffer. 
His  attempts  to  communicate  directly  with  subordinates  to  Colonel  Lee,  and 
not  to  communicate  at  all  with  Colonel  Lee,  are  palpably  disrespectful  to  the 
authority  that  sent  the  Colonel  to  my  staff,  as  well  as  to  me,  and  I  trust  Col 
onel  Northrop  will  be  made  to  understand  this  before  he  can  do  any  material 
mischief. 

I  trust  the  department  will  understand  that  I  have  only  noticed  this  matter 
because  I  feared  injury  to  great  public  interests  might  result  if  I  were  silent; 
and  I  beg  to  add  that  my  attention  to  this  matter  has  not  been  attracted  by  any 
complaint  from  Colonel  Lee. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant,         G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Conulg. 


CORINTH,  April  22d,  1862. 
Maj.-Genl.  VAN  DORN,  Memphis: 

You  may  as  well  begin  sending  your  troops  here  by  brigades  at  once. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  April  23d,  1862. 
Maj.-Genl.  VAN  DORN,  Memphis  : 

Information  about  Hamburg  true.     Send  on  your  troops  rapidly.     Battery 
horses,  too,  if  possible.     Rust  must  hold  himself  ready  to  move,  if  required. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIV.  571 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  24/7*,  1862. 
Msijor  E.  E.  McLEAX,  Chief  Quartermaster,  A.  of  M.  : 

Major, — Colonel  Morgan  is  about  starting  on  an  important  military  expedition 
beyond  the  Tennessee  Kiver;  and  the  general  commanding  directs  that  he  be 
furnished  with  fifteen  thousand  dollars  for  the  wants  of  his  expedition.  As 
there  may  be  no  bonded  quartermaster  with  him,  yon  are  authorized  and  in 
structed  to  take  his  official  receipts  for  the  same.  You  may  turn  over  to  him, 
as  a  part  of  said  sum,  the  sum  of  one  thousand  dollars,  turned  over  to  you  the 
other  day  by  Captain  John  Adams. 

Kespectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOS.  JORDAN,  A.  Adj.-Genl. 

CORINTH,  April  25fA,  1802. 
Capt.  D.  B.  HARRIS,  Chief-Engineer,  Vicksburg: 

Two  10-inch  guns  and  eighty-live  hundred  jxniuds  powder,  subject  to  your 
order  at  Jackson,  Miss.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  April  2G//1,  1SG2. 
Maj.-Genl.  M.  LOVELL,  Tangipaho : 

Yes,  look  out  for  Jackson  and  Vicksburg,  but  we  may  require  you  here  soon. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

CORINTH,  April  28//J,  18(52. 
8.  KIRKPATRICK,  Grenada,  Miss. : 

Send  guns  to  Vicksburg.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  April  29tf,  18C2. 
Col.  J.  L.  AUBREY,  Comdg.  Vicksburg,  Miss.  : 

Guns  have  been  ordered  to  Jackson,  Mississippi,  subject  to  order  of  Captain 
Harris.  Let  him  send  an  agent  there  to  forward  them  to  him  as  wanted.  Gov 
ernor  Pettus  has  been  ordered  to  send  one  regiment  of  Volunteers  to  report  to 
you.  They  will  be  armed  as  soon  as  possible.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  29///,  1882. 
Maj.-Genl.  M.  LOVELL,  Camp  Moore,  Tangipaho,  La. : 

Should  you  determine  not  to  return  to  New  Orleans,  can  you  not  .send  one 
regiment  to  Vicksburg  with  some  artillerists,  and  come  here  immediately  with 
balance  of  forces?  I  expect  soon  another  battle.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  April  30//i.  18C2. 
Maj.-Genl.  M.  LOVELL,  Tangipaho,  La.  : 

Send  General  Smith  as  soon  as  practicable,  with  one  regiment  and  artiller 
ists,  to  fortify  and  defend  river  below  Vicksburg.  Heavy  guns  are  at  Jackson, 
Mississippi.  Get  all  the  arms  you  can,  and  arm  new  Mississippi  regiments  to 
wend  here  immediately.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


572  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIV. 

CORINTH,  April  29th,  1862. 
Com.  R.  F.  PINCKNEY,  Fort  Pillow,  Tcun. : 

We  are  fortifying  Vickslmrg  to  guard  river  from  below.  Would  it  not  be 
preferable  to  send  the  boats  we  proposed  dismantling,  to  assist  the  defence  at 
that  point,  instead  of  fortifying  Randolph  ?  Consult  General  Villepigue. 

G.  T.  BKAUREGARD. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  April  29th,  1862. 
Col.  TIIOS.  CLAIBORXE,  Comdg.  Cavalry  : 

Colonel, — The  Commander  of  the  Forces  instructs  me  to  inform  you  that  your 
regiment  has  been  assembled  at  Trentou  for  an  important  service,  requiring 
great  vigor  and  secrecy  of  movement,  and  the  utmost  coolness  and  resolution 
on  the  part  of  officers  and  men.  Colonel  Jackson  has  also  been  ordered  to  con 
centrate  his  regiment  at  Trenton,  for  the  same  purpose. 

When  both  regiments  shall  have  arrived  and  are  ready  for  the  field,  yon  will 
assume  command  of  the  expedition,  and  march  upon  Paducah,  Kentucky,  with 
as  much  celerity  as  may  be  judicious  for  your  animals.  You  are  expected  to 
move  with  the  least  possible  baggage  and  subsistence,  and,  by  a  coup  de  main, 
enter  Paducah,  capture  its  garrison,  and  destroy  the  large  amount  of  stores  un 
derstood  to  have  been  accumulated  there. 

Any  steamboats  that  you  may  be  able  to  seize,  of  course  will  be  burned. 

Arms  captured,  if  any,  will  be  brought  away,  if  possible,  without  endangering 
your  command. 

Detailed  instructions  cannot  be  given  for  your  movements.  The  garrison  of 
the  place  is  believed  to  be  small,  much  inferior  to  the  force  you  will  be  able  to 
command;  and,  should  you  be  able  to  move  with  sufficient  celerity,  you  can 
surprise  the  place  and  effect  the  purposes  of  the  expedition,  with  brilliant  suc 
cess — that  is,  can  destroy  their  supplies,  capture  prisoners,  and  greatly  disturb 
their  communications. 

Show  this  communication  to  Colonel  Jackson. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj.-Geul. 

P.  S.  Of  course,  you  will  so  arrange  your  movements  as  to  dash  on  to  Padu 
cah  about  daybreak.  You  should  give  out  by  the  wayside  that  you  are  the  ad 
vance  guard  of  General  Van  Dorn,  en  route  to  take  possession  of  mouth  of  river, 
to  cut  off  retreat  of  enemy  while  we  take  him  in  front;  General  Price,  mean 
while,  to  cross  the  Tennessee  and  march  on  Nashville.  T.  J.,  A.  A.  G. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  Mat/  1st,  1862. 
Gcnl.  SAML.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Genl.,  Richmond,  Va. : 

General, — I  have  the  honor  to  submit  herewith  a  General  Order,  which  I  have 
published  in  connection  with,  and  regulating  the  subsistence  of,  this  army;  the 
operation  of  which,  I  am  assured,  will  be  in  the  interest  of  all  concerned,  and 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  573 

\vliicli,  I  trust,  will  receive  the  sanction  of  the  War  Department.  Jnst,  how 
ever,  as  this  order  was  ready  for  publication,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lee,  Chief  of 
Subsistence,  received  the  following  telegram  from  Colonel  Northrop,  dated  April 
29th,  18G2: 

"  By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  ration  is  reduced  to  half  pound  of  ba 
con  or  pork  and  one  pound  of  beef,  and  not  exceeding  one  and  a  half  pound  of 
Hour  or  corn-meal." 

In  the  name  of  my  men  I  most  respectfully,  but  urgently,  protest  against  such 
a  reduction  of  the  substantial  part  of  the  ration.  In  the  orders  I  have  the  hon 
or  to  submit,  the  greatest  reduction  has  been  made  that  tho  meat  ration  will 
bear;  and,  as  will  be  perceived,  this  retrenchment  is  partially  made  up  to  tho 
soldier  by  an  increase  of  tho  rico  ration.  But  for  the  disaster  at  Xew  Orleans, 
I  should  have  felt  it  my  duty  to  add,  likewise,  to  tho  sugar  ration,  as  affording 
a  cheap  and  healthy  nutritious  addition  to  tho  diet  of  the  soldiers  in  this  cli 
mate. 

I  shall  carry  out  the  orders  enclosed  until  otherwise  instructed  by  the  War 
Department.  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAVRKC.ARD. 


HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  Mai/  llth,  1^02. 
Col.  R.  B.  LEE,  Chief  of  Subsistence,  etc. : 

Colonel, — The  Commandcr-in-Chief  wishes  you  to  establish  a  sub-depot  of  sub 
sistence  at  cither  Saltillo  or  Baldwin,  on  or  near  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad, 
with  the  least  delay  practicable — say  of  one  hundred  thousand  rations.  Please 
report  execution  of  these  instructions. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj.-Genl. 


HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  llth,  1862. 
Col.  W.  G.  GILL,  Chief  of  Ordnance  : 

Colonel, — The  General  wishes  you  to  provide  an  ample  supply  of  signal  rock 
ets.  There  are  some  one  hundred  and  eighty  now  on  hand ;  possibly  some  of 
which,  however,  are  not  good.  He  expects  to  use  them  frequently  to  disturb 
the  enemy  at  night.  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  JORDAN,  A.  Adj.-Genl. 


CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  IS///,  18G2. 
Maj.-Genl.  VAN  DORN,  Danville  Road,  etc. : 

Position  '•/>'"  is  more  advantageous,  provided  enemy  would  attack;  but  I 
fear  he  is  advancing  with  gradual  approaches.  It  would  bo  well  to  have  him 
closely  reconnoitred  from  the  direction  of  Hardee's  pickets,  if  practicable ;  oth 
erwise,  from  your  own.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


574  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIV. 

CORINTH,  May  18th,  10.30  A.  M. 
Maj.-Geul.  VAX  DORN,  near  Corinth  : 

Bragg  has  recalled  his  troops  to  their  encampments,  having  ascertained  that 
the  enemy  was  not  preparing  for  battle,  but  was  out  only  to  work.  Let  me 
know  in  time  if  he  should  turn  out  again,  to  support  or  act  with  you. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Tdcgram. 

HEADQUARTERS,  CORINTH,  May  19th,  1862, 

9£  h.  P.  M. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Will  put  everything  in  complete  readiness  to-morrow.  Will  see  you  in  the 
morning.  EARL  VAN  DORN. 

Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS,  CORINTH,  May  19th,  1862, 

9  h.  P.  M. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

It  is  dark  and  rainy,  but  the  movement  is  within  possibility.  I  will  go  to 
work  again  to  reopen  the  crossing  of  Clear  Creek  to-night,  and  will  make  every 
effort  to  be  in  position  by  8  o'clock  to-morrow,  if  you  think  it  advisable  to  do 
so.  If  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance,  however,  I  must  say  that  the  promises 
are  not  so  bright  as  they  would  probably  be  by  starting  to-morrow  evening.  It 
is  extremely  dark,  and  it  will  rain  heavily,  I  think.  Men  will  not  be  cheerful, 
and  many  will  remain,  under  plea  of  sickness,  who  would  otherwise  go.  I  will 
await  your  telegram,  to  say  go  or  wait. 

Truly  and  respectfully,  EARL  VAX  DORN,  Maj.-Ccnl. 

CORINTH,  May  20M,  1862. 
Mnj.-Gcnl.  VAN  DORN  : 

Weather  being  so  threatening,  we  had  better  wait  as  you  propose. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  19th,  1862. 
Genl.  SAM.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Genl.,  Richmond,  Va. : 

Sir, — Since  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  when  I  assumed  command  of  the  Western 
Department,  and  the  fall  of  New  Orleans,  which  latter  event  has  placed  the  Mis 
sissippi  River,  from  its  mouth  to  Vicksburg,  under  the  control  of  the  enemy,  no 
instructions  from  the  War  Department,  relative  to  the  policy  of  the  government 
and  the  movements  of  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  have  been  received  by  me. 
In  the  absence  of  such  instructions,  I  deem  it  advisable  to  lay  before  the  depart 
ment,  in  as  few  words  as  practicable,  my  reasons  for  still  holding  this  position 
against  a  much  stronger  force  of  the  enemy  in  my  front,  even  at  the  risk  of  a 
defeat,  instead  of  retiring  into  the  interior  of  the  country  along  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  or  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  which  would  draw  him  after  me  and 
increase  the  obstacles  he  would  have  to  encounter  in  his  inarch. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  575 

It  is  evident  that  Corinth,  situated  at  the  intersection  of  those  two  railroads, 
presents  the  advantage,  besides  its  favorable  local  features  for  defence,  of  pos 
sessing  those  two  main  arteries  for  the  supplies  of  a  large  army.  By  its  aban 
donment,  only  one  of  those  roads  could  then  be  relied  upon  for  that  object.  If 
the  enemy  took  possession  of  this  strategic  point,  he  would  at  once  open  his 
communications,  by  railroad,  with  Columbus  and  Paducah,  in  his  rear,  and 
Iluntsville,  on  his  left  flank,  and  thus  relieve  himself  of  the  awkward  position 
in  which  he  is  about  to  find  himself  by  the  rapid  fall  of  the  Tennessee  River. 

It  is  evident,  also,  that  the  true  line  of  retreat  of  the  forces  at  this  point  is 
along  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  road  towards  Meridian,  and  thence  towards  Mont 
gomery,  so  as  to  bo  able,  as  a  last  resort,  to  unite  with  the  armies  of  the  East. 
This  lino  not  only  covers  the  railroad  and  river  lines  of  communication  to  Selma- 
and  Montgomery,  but  also,  from  a  position  along  the  Mobi'le  and  Ohio  Railroad, 
the  enemy  would  expose  his  railroad  lines  of  communication,  already  referred 
to,  if  In:  should  attempt  to  move  on  to  Memphis.  But  if  he  should  march  in 
force  on  tho  latter  place,  to  change  his  lines  of  communication,  Forts  Pillow 
and  Randolph,  on  tho  Mississippi  River,  would  have  to  bo  abandoned.  This 
would  give  the  enemy  command  of  the  Mississippi  River  from  Vieksbnrg  to  tho 
Ohio  and  Missouri  rivers,  and  enable  him  to  concentrate  a  large  force  against 
Vicksburg.  Th;>  fall  of  tho  latter  place  would  endanger  our  line  of  communi 
cation  thence  to  Meridian  and  Selma  (the  latter  portion  now  nearly  completed), 
and  the  armies  of  the;  Mississippi  and  of  the  West  would  soon  be  compelled  to 
abandon  the  whole  State  of  Mississippi  and  another  large  portion  of  Alabama, 
to  take  refuge  behind  the  Alabama  River. 

It  might  be  asked  :  Why  not  retreat  along  tlie  Memphis  and  Charleston  Rail 
road  towards  the  Mississippi  River?  The  reason  is  obvious.  Cut  oil' from  com 
munication  with  the  East,  tho  State  of  Mississippi  could  not  long  support  a 
large  army.  It  might  also  bo  asked:  Why  not  attempt  to  hold  both  the  Mem 
phis  and  Charleston  and  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  railroads  T  Because,  being  already 
inferior  in  numbers  to  the  enemy,  should  we  divide  our  forces,  it  would  not  take 
him  long  to  destroy  both  fractions. 

Thus  it  becomes  essential  to  hold  Corinth  to  tho  last  extremity,  if  tho  odds 
are  not  too  great  against  us,  even  at  the  risk  of  a  defeat.     Should  the  depart 
ment  judge  otherwise,  however,  I  stand  ready  to  carry  its  views  into  effect  as 
soon  as  practicable,  r.s  my  only  desire  is  to  save  the  cause  and  serve  the  country. 
I  remain,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

0.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg. 


HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN*  DKPARTMF.NT, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  Hay  20th,  l&Q*. 
Major-Genl.  II.  W.  ILu.LrrK.  Comdg.  V.  S.  Forces: 

General,  — I  have  this  day  been  informed  by  Brigadier-General  Villepigne, 
commanding  Confederate  forces  at  Fort  Pillow,  that  two  hundred  exchanged 
prisoners  were  sent  to  him  on  yesterday,  and  that  these  prisoners  had  the  small 
pox  among  them.  I  have  directed  General  Villepigue  to  return  them  forthwith. 


576  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIV. 

I  presume  that  all  this  lias  been  done  without  your  knowledge,  as  your  com 
munication  on  the  subject  of  the  exchange  of  prisoners  I  regarded  as  an  agree 
ment  on  fair  and  equal  terms. 

To  send  us  prisoners  afflicted  with  contagious  diseases  of  a  dangerous  and 
deadly  character,  is,  in  my  judgment,  violative  of  all  ideas  of  fairness  and  justice 
as  well  as  humanity. 

For  all  prisoners,  therefore,  surrendered  by  Confederate  officers,  I  shall  insist, 
General,  that  they  are  entitled,  by  every  claim  of  fairness  and  justice,  to  demand, 
in  exchange,  an  equal  number  of  prisoners  in  like  condition  of  those  sent  back 
to  you.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Geiil.  Corndg. 


Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS,  CORINTH,  May  20th,  1862. 
To  Geiil.  BEAUREGARD  : 

I  find  I  must  reopen  the  road  across  Clear  Creek.     I  will  march  this  evening, 
if  we  do  not  have  a  rain-storm,  which  now  seems  to  be  threatening. 

EARL  VAN  DORN,  Msij.-Genl. 


Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS,  Man  20^»  1862,  4  p.  M. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD: 

There  is  every  prospect  of  a  heavy  rain  ;  shall  I  postpone  the  movement  un 
til  morning  or  next  evening  ?  I  find,  too,  some  difficulty  in  reopening  crossings 
of  Clear  Creek.  Answer  quick.  EARL  VAN  DORN. 


CORINTH,  May  20llt,  1862. 
Miij.-Genl.  VAN  DORN,  Comdg.  A.  W. : 
Delay  the  movement  twenty-four  hours. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS,  May  20tlt,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

I  have  just  learned  that  five  hundred  cavalry  were  seen  yesterday  morning 
marching  towards  Biernsville. 

Captain  Reeves  saw  about  that  number  going  in  that  direction  to-day. 

EARL  VAN  DORN. 


CORINTH,  May  20tlt,  1862. 
Maj.-Genl.  VAN  DORN,  Comdg.  A.  W. : 

What  think  you  of  weather  and  of  making  move  in  morning?     ?Tis  impor 
tant  to  make  it  soon  as  possible.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  577 

CORINTH,  May  22(7, 1362. 
Maj.-Genl.  L.  POLK,  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad  : 

All  right,  keep  from  discovery.  Bragg  is  ready  near,  waiting  for  Van  Doru. 
Ho  will  soon  bo  ready.  I  send  you  his  message.  We  have  defeated  the  enemy 
in  Western  Virginia  and  New  Mexico.  We  may  bo  on  the  flood.  Let  pickets 
do  as  usual.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

CORINTH,  May  22(7,  1862, 2  P.  M. 
Genl.  B.  BRAGG,  Farmington  road : 

Van  Dorn  cannot  get  in  position.  Movement  delayed  to  another  time.  Re 
turn  troops  to  their  positions.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  May  22(7,  1362,  3.15  p.  M. 
Maj.-Genl.  E.  VAN  DORN,  Widow  Smith's: 

Have  ordered  all  the  troops  back  to  their  encampments  for  tho  present. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


CORINTH,  May  22(7, 1862,  2  P.  M. 
Maj.-Genl.  L.  POLK: 

Movement  is  delayed  to  future  time.     Take  back  your  commands  to  their 
usual  positions.     Van  Doru  could  not  get  into  position. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS,  May  22(7, 1862. 
Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

General, — I  \\i\l  remain  in  tho  neighborhood  of  tho  telegraph  for  an  hour  or 
two,  and  will  be  pleased  to  receive  further  orders  by  telegraph,  if  you  have  any. 

L.  POLK,  Maj.-Geul. 


Telegram. 

FOLK'S  STATION,  May  22r?,  1862,  2.30  p.  M. 
Genl.  BEAURF.GARD  : 

Your  despatch  of  2  P.  M.  received ;  tho  troops  will  bo  retired  as  you  have  or 
dered.  Five  distinct  columns  of  smoke  are  visible  in  front, extending  apparent 
ly  from  tho  Memphis  and  Charleston  to  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad. 

L.  POLK. 

Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS,  May  22(7, 1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Just  in ;  note  received;  will  come  in.  General,  don't  be  too  much  disappointed 
with  me,  you  can't  imagine  what  I  have  had  to  contend  with. 

EARL  VAN  DORN. 

Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS  IST  CORPS,  May  22(7, 1362. 
Genl.  BEAT-REGARD: 

A  prisoner  just  captured,  who  was  in  hunt  of  water,  says  there  is  a  brigade  in 

I.-37 


578  'APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  xxiv. 

front  which  lias  been  lying  on  its  arms  for  the  last  two  days ;  which  brigade  is 
on  the  Purdy  road,  one  mile  in  rear  of  its  pickets.  He  also  says  there  is  a  brigade 
on  the  right  of  his  brigade  extending  towards  the  trail  road;  also  says  that  the 
enemy  have  thrown  up  intreuchments  across  the  Purdy  road,  one  mile  in  rear 
of  his  pickets,  on  which  they  have  planted  batteries  with  abatis  in  front ;  he 
says  that  Sigel  was  in  our  front  inspecting  batteries  two  days  ago.  I  have 
sent  him  to  you.  I  hear  through  Colonel  Wirt  Adams  that  two  or  three  de 
serters  from  some  regiment,  designation  not  known,  passed  our  lines  last  night 
and  went  over  to  the  enemy.  I  will  investigate  further. 

L.  POLK,  Maj.-Genl. 


CORINTH,  Miss.,  Sunday  Night,  May  25tfi,  1862. 

Dear  General, — I  have  thought  it  proper  to  reduce  my  views  to  writing  on  the 
subject  we  were  discussing  to-day.  You  will  give  them  whatever  weight  they 
deserve ;  they  are  honestly  entertained.  I  think  our  situation  critical,  and  what 
ever  is  resolved  on  should  be  carried  promptly  into  execution.  With  best 
wishes  for  your  success  and  an  honest  desire  to  serve  you  and  our  cause, 

I  remain,  very  truly  your  friend,  \V.  J.  HARDEE. 

Genl.  BEAUREGARD,  Comdg.,  etc. 


Views. 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  25fft,  1862. 

The  situation  at  Corinth  requires  that  we  should  attack  the  enemy  at  once, 
or  await  his  attack,  or  evacuate  the  place. 

Assuming  that  we  have  fifty  thousand  men  and  the  enemy  nearly  twice  that 
number,  protected  by  iutreuchments,  I  am  clearly  of  opinion  that  no  attack 
should  be  made.  Our  forces  are  inferior,  and  the  battle  of  Shiloh  proves  that 
with  only  the  advantage  of  position  it  was  hazardous  to  contend  against  his 
superior  strength,  and  to  attack  him  in  his  intrenchments  now  would  probably 
inflict  on  ns  and  the  Confederacy  a  fatal  blow.  Neither  the  number  nor  in 
struction  of  our  troops  renders  them  equal  to  the  task. 

I  think  we  can  successfully  repel  any  attack  upon  our  camp  by  the  enemy ; 
but  it  is  manifest  no  attack  is  meditated ;  it  will  be  approached  gradually,  and 
will  be  shelled  and  bombarded  without  equal  means  to  respond.  This  will  com 
pel  us  to  make  sorties  against  his  intrenched  positions  under  most  adverse  cir 
cumstances,  or  to  evacuate  the  place.  The  latter  seems  to  me  inevitable.  If  so, 
the  only  remaining  question  is,  whether  the  place  should  be  evacuated  before, 
or  after,  or  during  its  defence. 

After  fire  is  opened,  or  the  place  is  actively  shelled  or  bombarded,  or  during 
such  an  attack,  it  will  be  difficult  to  evacuate  the  place  in  good  order.  With  a 
large  body  of  men  imperfectly  disciplined,  any  idle  rumor  may  spread  a  panic, 
and  inextricable  confusion  may  follow,  so  that  the  retreat  may  become  a  rout. 
The  same  objections  would  apply  to  any  partial  or  feeble  defence  of  the  place 
and  re-attempt  to  evacuate  it  in  the  meanwhile.  If  the  defence  be  not  deter 
mined  or  the  battle  decisive,  no  useful  result  would  follow,  but  it  would  afford 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  579 

an  opportunity  to  our  enemies  to  magnify  the  facts,  give  them  a  pretext  to 
claim  a  victory  and  to  discourage  our  friends  at  home  and  abroad,  and  diminish, 
if  not  destroy,  all  chances  of  foreign  intervention. 

Under  these  circumstances  I  think  the  evacuation,  if  it  be  determined  upon, 
should  be  made  before  the  enemy  opens  fire,  and  not  coupled  with  a  sortie 
against  his  intreuchmeuts,  or  partial  battle.  It  should  bo  done  promptly  if  at 
all.  Even  now  the  enemy  can  shell  our  camp.  It  should  be  done  in  good  order, 
BO  as  not  to  discourage  our  friends  or  give  a  pretext  for  the  triumph  of  our 
enemies. 

With  the  forces  at  our  disposition,  with  a  vast  territory  behind  us,  with  a 
patriotic  and  devoted  people  to  support  us,  the  enemy  as  ho  moves  southward, 
away  from  rivers  and  railroads,  would  find  insurmountable  obstacles  in  moving 
columns  so  heavy  that  wo  cannot  strike  them,  and  over  a  country  where  his 
mechanical  superiority  will  not  avail  him. 

If  we  resolve  to  evacuate,  every  hour  of  delay  only  serves  to  augment  our 
difficulties.  The  enemy  every  day  grows  stronger  on  our  flanks,  and  menaces 
more  and  more  our  communications.  If  ho  effects  his  designs,  wo  must  fight  at 
every  disadvantage  or  retreat  disastrously.  History  and  our  country  will  judge 
us,  not  by  the  movement,  but  its  consequences. 

Respectfully  submitted,  W.  J.  HARDEE,  Maj.-Genl. 

Gcnl.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Comdg.,  etc. 


CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  2GM,  18G2. 

I  concur  fully  in  the  above  views,  and  already  all  needful  preparations  are  be 
ing  made  for  a  proper  and  prompt  evacuation  of  this  place. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gcnl.  Comdg. 


CoRiNTir,  Miss.,  May  2G//J,  18G2. 

Dear  General, — I  fully  concur  in  the  views  contained  in  your  letter  of  the  25th 
instant,  received  last  night,  and  I  had  already  commenced  giving  orders  to  my 
chiefs  of  stair  departments  for  their  execution.  But  everything  that  is  done 
must  be  done  under  the  pica  of  the  intention  "  to  take  the  offensive"  at  the  op 
portune  moment.  Every  commander  of  corps  must  get  everything  ready  to 
move  at  a  moment's  notice,  and  must  see  to  the  proper  condition  of  the  roads 
and  bridges  his  corps  is  to  travel  upon. 

Thanking  you  for  your  kind  wishes,  I  remain,  yours  truly, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Maj.-Genl.  W.  J.  HARDEE,  near  Corinth,  Miss. 


HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  Jfay  2G//t,  1862. 
Mnj.-Cenl.  MANSFIELD  LOVELL,  Vicksburg,  Miss. : 

(Iciurdl, — Your  favors  of  25th  and  2Gth  instant  have  just  been  received.  I 
telegraphed  you  yesterday  relative  to  General  Ruggles's  position,  which  I  hope 
is  settled  for  the  present.  The  great  point  is  to  defend  the  river  at  Vicksburg. 
The  question  of  who  does  it  must  be  of  a  secondary  consideration.  The  troops 


580  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIV. 

of  your  command  are  there,  and  I  think  it  but  fair  that  you  should  direct  the 
operations  at  that  point,  and  you  have  my  warmest  wishes  for  your  success. 
By  the  copy  of  War  Department  order  which  I  ordered  to  be  enclosed  to  you  a 
few  days  ago,  you  will  perceive  that  Vicksburg  is  in  my  department  and  Jack 
son  in  yours ;  but  I  attach  only  little  importance  to  this  matter ;  all  that  I  de 
sire  is  success  to  our  arms  and  to  our  cause. 

With  regard  to  your  appeal  for  small  arms,  I  should  be  most  happy  to  send 
them  to  you  if  they  could  be  spared  from  here  at  this  critical  moment ;  but  be 
ing  on  the  eve  of  a  battle  with  a  powerful  enemy,  close  in  niy  front,  it  becomes 
impossible  to  grant  your  request,  for  a  defeat  here  would  result  in  the  loss  of 
the  whole  Mississippi  Valley,  including  your  force,  and  the  points  you  are  now 
holding.  With  regard  to  the  defence  of  the  railroads  you  refer  to,  the  best  way 
of  accomplishing  it  is  to  remove  the  cars  and  engines  and  to  destroy  a  few 
bridges ;  they  could  not  then  be  used  by  the  enemy.  As  soon,  however,  as  I 
can  return  you  some  arms  it  shall  be  done.  I  can  only  express  again  my  re 
gret  at  not  having  here  the  available  force  at  present  with  you,  for  I  care 
more  about  my  front  at  this  moment  than  1  do  for  my  rear. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg. 


HEADQUARTERS,  RICHMOND,  VA.,  May  26M,  1862. 

General, — Your  letter  of  the  19th  instant  has  just  been  received.  Although 
no  instructions  have  been  given  as  to  the  military  operations  within  your  de 
partment  since  its  command  devolved  on  you,  yet  your  condition  and  move 
ments  have  been  the  subject  of  anxious  consideration.  Full  reliance  was  felt 
in  your  judgment  and  skill  and  in  the  bravery  of  your  army,  to  maintain  the 
great  interest  of  the  country,  and  to  advance  the  general  policy  of  the  govern 
ment.  It  was  also  hoped  that  the  victory  of  Shiloh  would  have  enabled  you, 
upon  the  arrival  of  your  reinforcements,  to  reoccupy  the  country  north  of  you, 
and  to  have  re-established  the  former  communications  enjoyed  by  the  army. 
This  hope  is  still  indulged,  and  every  effort  will  be  made,  as  has  heretofore  been 
done,  to  strengthen  you  by  all  the  means  within  the  control  of  the  department. 

Should,  however,  the  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy  force  you  back,  the  lino 
of  retreat  indicated  by  you  is  considered  the  best,  and  in  that  event,  should  it 
be  inevitable,  it  is  hoped  you  will  be  able  to  strike  a  successful  blow  at  the  en 
emy  if  he  follows,  which  will  enable  you  to  regain  the  ascendency  and  drive 
him  back  to  the  Ohio. 

The  maintenance  of  your  present  position,  with  the  advantages  you  ascribe 
to  it,  so  long  as  you  can  resist  the  enemy  and  subsist  your  army,  is,  of  course, 
preferable  to  withdrawing  from  it,  and  thus  laying  open  more  of  the  country 
to  his  ravages,  unless  by  skilful  manoeuvring  you  can  entice  him  to  a  more 
favorable  position  to  attack. 

The  question  of  subsisting  your  army  for  any  length  of  time,  cut  off  from 
the  supplies  north  of  you,  may  demand  your  serious  attention,  and  was  the  sub 
ject  of  a  telegraphic  despatch  to  you  this  morning. 

The  supplies  accumulated  at  Atlanta  are  intended  as  a  reserve  for  the  army 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  531 

in  the  East  as  well  as  the  West,  and  cannot  bo  entirely  appropriated  to  either 
division.  Each  army  must  therefore  draw  its  support  as  far  as  possible  from 
the  country  it  can  control :  and  this  necessity  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  in  the 
operations  of  either,  and  may  accelerate  movements  which  otherwise  it  might 
be  deemed  prudent  to  restrain. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

R.  E.  LEE,  Geiil. 
Gcul.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Comdg.  Western  Dept. 


Memorandum  of  Movements  on  Baldwin. — For  General  Van  Dorn. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 
CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  27th,  1862. 

1st.  The  baggage  trains  of  his  army  must  leave  their  position  at  daybreak 
on  the  28th  instant,  by  the  road  on  the  east  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad, 
to  stop  temporarily  at  about  six  miles  from  his  headquarters,  but  with  secret 
orders  to  the  oflicer  in  charge  of  them  to  continue  rapidly  on  the  direct  road 
to  the  vicinity  of  Baldwin.  The  provision  trains  will  follow  the  baggage 
trains. 

2d.  The  ammunition  and  ambulance  trains  must  be  parked  at  the  most  con 
venient  point  to  their  brigades,  or  near  the  general  headquarters,  where  they 
will  remain  until  the  troops  shall  have  been  moved  to  the  front,  to  take  up 
their  line  of  battle,  when  these  trains  will  be  ordered  to  follow  the  provision 
trains.  All  of  these  trains  must  be  accompanied  by  one  pioneer  company  and 
two  infantry  companies  (properly  distributed)  per  brigade.  The  brigade  and 
regimental  quartermasters  must  accompany  and  be  responsible  for  their  trains. 
The  officers  in  charge  of  the  baggage  trains  will  receive  sealed  orders  as  to 
their  point  of  destination,  which  they  will  open  at  the  already  mentioned  stop 
ping-place. 

:M.  As  it  may  become  necessary  to  take  the  offensive,  the  troops  will  take 
their  position  in  lino  of  battle  as  soon  as  practicable  after  disposing  of  their 
baggage  in  the  wagon  trains.  These  troops  will  bivouac  in  position,  and  at  3  A.M. 
on  the  29th  instant,  if  not  attacked  by  the  enemy,  will  take  up  their  lino  of 
march  to  Baldwin  by  the  route  indicated  (Article  1),  leaving  properly  dis 
tributed  cavalry  pickets  in  front  of  their  lines,  to  guard  and  protect  this  retro 
grade  movement.  These  pickets  shall  remain  in  position  until  recalled  by  the 
chief  of  cavalry,  who  will  remain  in  Corinth  for  the  purpose  of  directing  the  ret 
rograde  movement  of  the  cavalry,  when  each  regiment  will  follow  the  route 
taken  by  tho  corps  to  Avhich  it  shall  have  been  temporarily  assigned  for  the 
protection  of  its  rear  and  Hanks. 

4th.  Underlio  circumstances  will  tho  cavalry  regiments  abandon  their  posi 
tion  in  front  of  the  lines  (unless  compelled  by  overpowering  numbers)  until  tho 
rear  of  tho  column  of  the  Army  of  tho  West  shall  have  crossed  Clear  Creek, 
whon  tho  general  commanding  shall  communicate  the  fact  to  the  chief  of  cav 
alry  for  his  information  and  guidance. 

5th.  The  cavalry  pickets  will  continue  the  usual  skirmishing  with  tho  ene 
my  in  front  of  tho  lines,  and  when  retiring  will  destroy,  as  far  as  practicable, 


582  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV. 

the  roads  aud  bridges  in  their  rear,  and,  after  having  crossed  Clear  Creek,  they 
will  guard  crossing  until  recalled  by  the  general  commanding. 

6th.  The  chief  of  cavalry  will  order,  if  practicable,  one  regiment  to  report  to 
Major-General  Polk,  one  to  Major-General  Hardee,  one  to  General  Bragg,  and 
one  to  Major-General  VauDorn,  independently  of  the  regiment  now  at  Jaciuto, 
already  ordered  to  report  to  the  latter  officer. 

7th.  After  the  departure  of  the  troops  from  the  intrenched  lines,  a  sufficient 
number  of  drums  from  each  brigade  must  be  left  to  beat  the  reveille  at  the 
usual  hour,  after  which  they  can  rejoin  their  commands. 

8th.  The  commanding  officer  of  the  Army  of  the  West  will  leave,  if  necessary, 
on  the  south  side  of  Clear  Creek,  about  five  hundred  infantry  and  two  pieces  of 
artillery,  to  defend  the  crossing  of  said  stream,  aud  to  effectually  destroy  the 
bridge  and  obstruct  the  road  after  the  passage  of  the  cavalry. 

9th.  On  arriving  in  the  vicinity  of  Guutowu,  the  best  defensive  position  will 
be  taken  in  rear  of  Twenty-mile  Creek,  due  regard  being  had  to  a  proper  and 
sufficient  supply  of  wood  and  water  for  the  troops. 

G.  T.  BEAL*REGARD,  General  Commanding. 


Memorandum  of  Orders. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 
CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  27th,  1862. 

The  following  memorandum  is  furnished  to  General  Bragg  for  the  intended 
movement  of  his  army  from  this  place  to  Baldwin,  at  the  time  hereinafter  indi 
cated  : 

1st.  Hardee's  corps  will  move  on  the  direct  road  from  his  position  to  Danville 
by  Cleburue's  camp,  which  is  on  the  east  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad  part 
of  the  way;  thence  to  Rienzi  aud  Baldwin. 

2d.  Bragg's  corps  via  the  Tennessee  pike  to  Kossuth,  until  it  reaches  the  south 
side  of  the  Tuscumbia ;  thence  by  the  Rienzi  aud  Blackland  Road  to  Carrolls- 
ville  and  Baldwin. 

3d.  Breckinridge's  corps  (or  reserve)  via  the  turnpike  to  Kossuth ;  thence  to 
Blackland,  Carrollsville,  and  Baldwin. 

4th.  Polk's  corps  via  the  turnpike  to  Kossuth ;  thence,  by  the  Western  road, 
to  Blackland,  Carrollsville,  aud  Baldwin. 

5th.  The  baggage  trains  of  these  corps  must  leave  their  position  at  12  M.  pre 
cisely  on  the  28th  instant,  and  stop  for  the  night  on  the  south  side  of  the  Tus 
cumbia,  on  the  best  available  ground.  The  provision  trains  will  follow  the  bag 
gage  trains. 

6th.  The  ammunition  and  ambulance  trains  must  be  parked  at  the  most  con 
venient  point  to  their  brigades,  and  moved  in  rear  of  the  provision  trains  to  the 
south  side  of  the  Tuscumbia,  where  they  will  await  further  orders.  All  of  these 
trains  are  to  be  accompanied  by  one  pioneer  and  two  infantry  companies,  prop 
erly  distributed  per  brigade.  The  brigade  and  regimental  quartermasters  must 
accompany  and  be  responsible  for  their  trains. 

7th.  The  officers  in  charge  of  the  baggage  trains  will  receive  sealed  orders  as 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  5S3 

to  their  point  of  destination,  and  which  they  will  open  at  the  first-mentioned 
stopping-place. 

8th.  As  it  may  become  necessary  to  take  the  offensive,  the  troops  will  take 
their  position  in  the  trenches  as  soon  as  practicable  after  disposing  of  their 
baggage  in  the  wagon  trains.  One  brigade  per  corps  will  be  put  in  line  of 
battle,  in  the  besT;  position  for  the  offensive,  in  front  of  the  trenches.  The  re 
serve  will  remain  in  position  as  already  indicated  to  its  general  commanding. 
These  troops  will  all  bivouac  in  position,  and  at  3  A.  M.  on  the  29th  instant,  if 
not  attacked  by  the  enemy,  will  take  up  their  line  of  march  to  Baldwin  by  the 
routes  indicated  in  Article  1,  leaving  properly  distributed  cavalry  pickets  in 
front  of  their  lines  to  guard  and  protect  this  retrograde  movement.  These 
pickets  will  remain  in  position  until  recalled  by  the  chief  of  cavalry,  who  will 
remain  in  Corinth  for  the  purpose  of  directing  the  retrograde  movement  of  cav 
alry,  and  when  each  regiment  must  follow  the  route  taken  by  the  corps  to 
which  it  shall  have  been  temporarily  assigned  for  the  protection  of  its  rear 
and  flanks. 

9th.  Under  no  circumstances  will  these  cavalry  regiments  abandon  their  posi* 
tions  in  front  of  the  lines  (unless  compelled  by  overpowering  numbers)  until 
the  rear  of  the  columns  of  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  shall  have  crossed  the 
Tuscumbiu,  when  the  general  commanding  each  corps  will  communicate  that 
fact  to  the  chief  of  cavalry  for  his  information  and  guidance. 

10th.  The  cavalry  pickets  will  continue  the  usual  skirmishing  with  the  ene 
my  in  front  of  the  lines,  and,  when  retiring,  they  will  destroy  the  roads  and 
bridges  in  their  rear  as  far  as  practicable,  and,  after  having  crossed  the  Tus- 
cumbia,  they  will  guard  the  crossings  until  recalled  by  the  commanding  gen 
eral. 

llth.  The  chief  of  cavalry  will  order,  if  practicable,  one  regiment  to  report 
to  Major-General  Polk,  one  to  Major-General  Hardee,  one  to  General  Bragg,  and 
one  to  Major-General  Van  Dorn,  independently  of  the  regiment  now  at  Jaciuto, 
already  ordered  to  report  to  the  latter  officer. 

12th.  After  the  departure  of  the  troops  from  the  intrenched  line,  a  sufficient 
number  of  drums  from  each  brigade  must  bo  left  to  beat  reveille  at  the  usual 
hour,  after  which  they  can  rejoin  their  commands. 

13th.  The  commanding  officer  of  the  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi 
will  leave  on  the  south  side  of  the  Tiiscumbia  five  hundred  infantry  and  two 
pieces  of  artillery,  to  guard  the  four  crossings  of  that  stream,  and  to  effectually 
destroy  the  bridges  and  obstruct  the  roads  after  the  passage  of  the  cavalry. 

14th.  On  arriving  at  Baldwin,  the  best  defensive  position  will  bo  taken  by 
the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  duo  regard  being  had  to  a  proper  and  sufficient 
supply  of  wood  and  water  for  the  troops  and  horses  of  the  different  commands. 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg. 


Telegram. 

POLK'S  STATION,  May  28/ft,  1862. 
Geul.  DEAL-REGARD  : 

The  enemy  have  pressed  my  pickets  very  hard  to-day.     They  drove  tiiem 


584:  APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXIV. 

well-nigh  back  to  the  intrenchmeuts ;  many  of  their  shells  have  been  thrown 
into  my  lines.  I  have  driven  them  back  after  a  sharp  skirmish,  and  re-estab 
lished  my  Hue.  My  trains  have  gone,  and  my  troops  that  are  not  in  advance  in 
and  near  the  trenches  are  ready  for  the  march.  I  find  I  have  some  extra  com 
missary  stores  and  some  tents,  which  I  must  have  three  or  four  cars  to  enable 
me  to  remove.  These  might  bo  had  by  being  sent  for,  so  as  to  be  added  to 
those  already  here  for  the  purpose  of  removing  the  heavy  artillery.  They  will 
be  in  time  if  here  by  10  or  12  o'clock.  Answer  soon. 

L.  POLK,  Mnj.-Gcul. 

CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  23//<,  1862. 
Major-General  E.  VAN  DORN,  Danville  Eoad,  Miss. : 

General, — I  approve  of  your  request  to  leave  at  12  o'clock  (not  11)  to-night, 
if  it  be  clear,  sending  artillery  at  sundown  two  miles  back,  so  as  to  be  beyond 
reach  of  sound  to  the  enemy.  Be  careful,  however,  not  to  send  it  too  far.  As 
Bragg's  rear-guards  will  not  leave  until  3  p.  M.,  yours  ought  not  to  leave  before 
2.30  o'clock,  for  Hardee's  left  would  then  be  uncovered  while  moving  in  rear  of 
your  present  position,  and  before  crossing  the  railroad.  Hardee  will  destroy 
the  bridges  (dirt  and  railroad)  on  the  Tuscuinbia,  provided  he  is  guarding 
them;  but  have  the  matter  clearly  understood  with  him,  so  as  to  admit  of  no 
error.  I  referred,  in  my  note,  to  the  small  bridge  on  Clear  Creek,  over  which 
you  must  pass.  You  must,  of  course,  have  out  as  few  details  as  possible.  You 
must  be  the  sole  judge  of  that. 

The  telegraph  operator  must  remain  at  his  post  as  long  as  possible — say  until 
your  main  forces  move  to  the  rear;  for  at  any  moment  we  may  be  called  upon 
to  move  forward. 

I  am  glad  to  hear  of  the  sham  balloon.  I  hope  it  is  so,  for  I  fear  that  more 
than  their  artillery  at  this  moment. 

Your  obedient  servant,  G.  T.  BEAUREGAKD,  Genl.  Comdg. 

P.  S.  You  must  not  forget  to  obstruct  thoroughly  the  road  across  Clear 
Creek,  near  General  Jones's  lines.  You  or  Hardee  must  keep  a  strong  guard  of 
infantry  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  at  the  Clear  Creek  railroad-bridge  until  the 
last  cars  shall  have  leffc  the  depot  here.  Please  arrange  the  matter  distinctly 
with  him.  Would  it  not  be  prudent  to  send  one  regiment,  two  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  and  some  cavalry  to  protect  your  train  ?  I  think  I  would  keep  Price  back, 
in  the  best  position  to  move  either  to  the  rear,  to  protect  the  trains,  if  neces 
sary,  or  to  the  front,  in  case  of  battle.  G.  T.  B. 


CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  28th,  1862. 
General  B.  BRAGG,  Corinth,  Miss. : 

General, — From  information  received,  Guntown,  four  and  a  half  miles  below 
Baldwin,  is  considered  a  better  position  for  the  defensive ;  hence  we  will  go 
there.  Please  give  the  necessary  orders.  Small  details  must  be  kept  in  or 
about  old  camps,  to  keep  up  usual  fires,  on  account  of  balloons,  with  orders  to 
join  their  commands  at  10  o'clock  on  the  march  to  the  rear,  or  in  front,  in  case 
of  battle.  Not  too  many  fires  must  be  kept  on  the  lines  to-night,  so  as  not  to 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  585 


reveal  too  clearly  our  position.  A  brigade  (the  "best  one)  from  each  corps 
be  selected  to  guard  and  bring  up  the  rear  of  each  column,  to  move  off  about 
two  hours  after  the  rest  of  the  column,  and  from  •which  a  small  detail  will  be 
left  at  each  bridge,  to  destroy  it  after  the  passage  of  cavalry  ;  detail  to  be  in 
proportion  to  importance  of  bridge.  Would  it  not  be  advisable  for  the  main 
forces  to  start  at  1  A.  M.,  and  the  rear-guards  at  3  A.  M.  ?  No  rockets  must  bo 
fired  to-night.  Your  obedient  servant, 

_          G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

(Confidential.)  CORINTH,  Miss.,  May  28M,  1862. 

General  B.  BRAGG,  Corinth,  Miss.  : 

General,  —  Considering  that  we  have  still  so  much  yet  to  be  removed  from 
this  place,  I  have  decided  that  the  retrograde  movement  shall  not  take  place 
until  the  30th  instant,  at  the  hours  appointed,  instead  of  the  29th.  You  will 
please  issue  all  necessary  orders  to  that  effect  to  the  forces  under  your  com 
mand.  It  would  bo  advisable  to  stop  at  once  the  ammunition  and  provision 
trains  at  convenient  points  to  this  place. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg. 

Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS,  May  29//J,  1862,  9.45  A.  M. 
To  Gcul.  BEAUREGARD: 

The  enemy  are  throwing  up  works  in  the  field  near  the  —  —  House,  in  the 
front  of  Corinth  lines.  Shall  I  throw  away  any  ammunition  on  them  ? 

_          EARL  VAX  DORX,  Mnj.-Geul. 

Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS,  May  29//»,  1862. 
To  Genl.  BEAUREGARD  : 

Quite  a  force  seen  to  be  forming  in  our  front,  reported  by  pickets.  A  sharp 
skirmish  just  over,  some  ten  or  twelve  reported  killed  and  wounded  ;  will  prob 
ably  have  a  light.  EARL  VAN  DORX,  Maj.-Genl. 

Telegram. 

HEADQUARTERS,  May  29th,  1862. 
Genl.  BEAUREGARD: 

Will  scud  brigade.  EARL  VAX  DORX. 


HEADQUARTERS,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

CORIXTII,  Miss.,  May  29M,  1862. 
General  B.  BRAGG  ; 
Mnjor-Ceneral  E.  VAX  DORX  ; 
Major-General  L.  POLK  ; 
Mnjor-General  W.  J.  HARDEE  : 
Mnjor-General  J.  C.  BRECKIXRIDGE  : 

General, — The  following  modifications  have  been  made  in  the  order  relative 
to  the  retrograde  movement  from  this  place : 


586  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV. 

1st.  At  sundown  the  light  "batteries  mnst  be  sent  to  about  one  mile  from  the 
intrenched  lines,  in  order  to  avoid  communicating  to  the  enemy  any  information 
of  the  movement.  These  batteries  must  be  so  placed  outside  of  the  road  as  to 
follow  their  brigades  at  night  without  any  difficulty. 

2d.  At  8  P.  M.  the  heavy  batteries  of  the  lines  must  be  removed,  without 
noise,  to  the  cars,  and  sent  to  the  central  depot. 

3d.  At  10  P.  M.  the  retrograde  movement  of  the  forces  is  to  commence,  as  al 
ready  instructed. 

4th.  At  12  P.  M.,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  possible,  the  rear-guard  is  to  follow 
the  movement. 

5th.  As  soon  as  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  shall  have  got  beyond  the  Tus- 
cumbia,  and  the  Army  of  the  West  beyond  Ridge  Creek,  General  Beall,  chief  of 
cavalry  at  Corinth,  shall  be  informed  of  the  fact,  and  the  positions  in  rear  of 
said  streams  shall  be  held  until  all  trains  shall  be  considered  beyond  the  reach 
of  the  enemy. 

6th.  Camp-fires  must  be  kept  up  all  night  by  the  troops  in  position,  and  then 
by  the  cavalry. 

7th.  Three  signal-rockets  shall  bo  sent  up  at  3  o'clock  in  the  morning  by  the 
cavalry  pickets  of  Generals  Van  Doru,  Bragg,  and  Polk. 

8th.  All  artesian  and  other  wells  must  be  destroyed  this  evening  by  a  detach 
ment  from  each  brigade.  All  artesian-well  machinery  must  be  sent  forthwith 
to  the  depot  for  transportation  to  Saltillo. 

9th.  Whenever  the  railroad  engine  whistles  during  the  night,  near  the  in- 
trenchments,  the  troops  in  the  vicinity  will  cheer  repeatedly,  as  though  rein 
forcements  had  been  received.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Geul.  Comdg. 


Memorandum  of  Orders. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 
BALDWIN,  Miss.,  June  6th,  1862,  5  p.  M. 

1st.  General  Van  Dorn's  army  will  start  at  3  A.  M.  on  the  7th  instant,  on  its 
way  to  Tupelo,  via  the  road  from  Baldwin  to  Priceville.  It  will  halt  for  the 
night  at  Sand  Creek,  a  distance  of  about  seventeen  miles  from  Baldwin.  It  will 
resume  its  line  of  march  the  next  morning  at  3  A.  M.,  and  will  take  position  for 
the  present  at  Priceville,  leaving  a  brigade  at  the  cross  of  the  road  with  the 
Ripley  and  Cotton-gin  roads,  near  Smith's  or  Brook's  house,  and  a  cavalry  force 
at  or  about  the  Hearn  sawmill.  One  brigade  will  be  sent  to  Mooresville  or 
vicinity,  and  a  force  of  cavalry  to  guard  the  Twenty-mile  Creek  ferry,  on  the 
road  from  Fulton,  with  a  strong  picket  at  the  latter  place.  The  cavalry  regi 
ment  at  Marietta  will  not  leave  that  position  until  the  8th  instant,  at  4  A.  M. 

2d.  General  Hardee's  corps  will  start  for  Tupelo  at  4  p.  M.  on  the  7th  instant, 
via  the  same  road  as  General  Van  Dorn's  army,  stopping  for  the  night  at  a. 
creek  about  nine  miles  from  its  present  position.  He  will  send,  at  4  A.  M.  on 
that  day,  one  regiment  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  to  the  cross-road  with  the 
Natchez  trail  road,  to  guard  the  Twenty-mile  Creek  crossing.  His  corps  will  re 
sume  its  line  of  march  at  4  A.  M.  on  the  8th  instant,  and  will  get  to  Tupelo  that 
night,  if  practicable.  His  rear-guard  of  cavalry  will  remain  in  its  present  posi- 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  587 

tion  until  12  P.M.  on  the  7th  instant,  and  afterwards  in  the  vicinity  of  Baldwin, 
guarding  the  rear  of  Hardee's  corps,  until  4  A.  M.  on  the  8th  instant. 

3d.  General  Breckiuridge's  corps  of  reserve  will  leave  for  Tupelo,  via  Carroll- 
villo  and  Birmingham,  at  3  A.  M.  on  the  7th  instant,  stopping  for  the  night  at 
Yanoby  Creek,  a  few  miles  beyond  the  latter  town,  and  will  resume  its  line  of 
march  at  3  A.  M.  on  the  8th  instant. 

4th.  General  Bragg's  corps  will  leave  by  the  same  road  as  General  Breckiu 
ridge's  (passing  to  the  westward  of  Carrollville)  at  2  P.M.  on  the  7th  instant, 
stopping  for  the  night  at  or  near  Birmingham,  leaving  there  at  3  A.  M.  for  Tupelo. 
His  cavalry  will  follow  (on  the  same  road)  tbe  movement  from  where  it  is  now 
posted,  at  3  A.  M.  on  the  8th  instant.  The  regiment  at  Ripley  will  move  on  the 
road  from  that  place  to  Tupelo,  and  all  said  cavalry  will  be  posted  as  already 
indicated  to  General  Bragg  on  the  map. 

5th.  General  Polk's  corps  will  conform  its  movement  to  that  of  General  Bragg, 
starting  at  2  P.  M.  on  the  7th  instant  on  the  direct  road  to  Saltillo,  west  of  the 
railroad,  halting  at  that  place  uutil  further  orders.  His  cavalry  will  remain 
where  at  present  posted,  and  will  follow  his  movement  along  the  same  road, 
guarding  his  rear,  at  3  A.  M.  on  the  8th  instant. 

Cth.  All  infantry  outposts  should  be  recalled  in  time  to  join  their  commands. 

7th.  All  lingcr-boards  and  mile-posts  should  be  taken  down  by  the  cavalry  of 
the  rear-guards.  G.  T.  BEAUUEGARD,  Geul.  Comdg. 


Report  of  Gcnl.  G.  T.  Scauregard,  commanding  Western  Department. 

TUPELO,  Miss.,  June  13/ft,  18G2. 
Gcnl.  SAMUEL  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Insp.  Gcnl.  C.  S.  Army,  Richmond,  Va. : 

General, — In  relation  to  recent  military  operations  in  this  quarter,  I  have  to 
submit  the  following  for  the  information  of  the  War  Department. 

The  purposes  and  ends  for  which  I  had  occupied  and  held  Corinth  having 
been  mainly  accomplished  by  the  last  of  May,  and  by  the  25th  of  that  month 
having  ascertained  definitely  that  the  enemy  had  received  large  accessions  to 
his  already  superior  force,  while  ours  had  been  reduced  day  by  day,  by  disease 
resulting  from  bad  water  and  inferior  food,  I  felt  it  clearly  my  duty  to  evacuate 
that  position  without  delay.  I  was  further  induced  to  this  step  by  the  fact  that 
the  enemy  had  declined  my  offer  of  battle,  twice  made  him,  outside  of  my  in 
trenched  lines,  and  sedulously  avoided  the  separation  of  his  corps,  which  ho  ad 
vanced  with  uncommon  caution  under  cover  of  heavy  guns,  strong  intreuch- 
ments,  constructed  with  unusual  labor  and  with  singular  delay, considering  his 
strength  and  our  relative  inferiority  in  numbers. 

The  transparent  object  of  the  Federal  commander  had  been  to  cut  off  my  re 
sources  by  destroying  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  and  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
railroads.  This  was  substantially  foiled  by  the  evacuation  and  withdrawal 
along  the  lino  of  the  former  road,  and,  if  followed  by  the  enemy  remote  from  his 
base,  I  confidently  anticipated  an  opportunity  for  resumption  of  the  offensive, 
with  chances  for  signal  success. 

Under  these  plain  conditions,  on  the  2Gth  ultimo,  I  issued  verbally  several 


588  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV. 

orders,  copies  of  which  are  herewith,  marked  A,  B,  and  C,  partially  modified 
subsequently,  as  will  bo  seen  by  the  papers,  etc.,  herewith,  marked  D,E,  F,  and 
G.  These  orders  were  executed,  I  am  happy  to  say,  with  singular  precision,  as 
will  be  found  fully  admitted  in  the  correspondence,  from  the  scene,  of  the  Chicago 
Tribune,  herewith  transmitted. 

At  the  time  finally  prescribed  the  movement  commenced,  and  was  accom 
plished  without  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy,  who  only  began  to  suspect  the 
evacuation  after  broad  daylight  on  the  morning  of  May  30th,  when,  having 
opened  on  our  lines  from  his  formidable  batteries  of  heavy  and  long-range  guns, 
erected  the  night  previous,  he  received  no  answer  from  any  direction;  but,  as 
our  cavalry  pickets  still  maintained  their  positions  of  the  preceding  day,  he  wras 
not  apparently  fully  satisfied  of  our  movements  until  some  stores,  of  little 
value,  in  the  town,  were  burned,  wrbich  could  not  be  moved.  It  was  then,  to  his 
surprise,  the  enemy  became  satisfied  that  a  large  army,  approached  and  invested 
with  such  extraordinary  preparations,  expense,  labor,  and  timidity,  had  disap 
peared  from  his  front  with  all  its  munitions  and  heavy  guns,  leaving  him  with 
out  knowledge,  as  I  am  assured,  whither  it  had  gone,  for  his  scouts  were 
scattered  in  all  directions,  as  I  have  since  ascertained,  to  inquire  what  direc 
tions  our  forces  had  taken.  Even  now,  indeed,  I  have  reason  to  believe  the 
Federal  commander  has  little  knowledge  of  the  position  and  disposition  of  my 
main  forces.  But  for  some  unfortunate  and  needless  delay  on  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad  of  some  five  trains  of  box  cars  (three  miscellaneously 
freighted  and  two  empty)  in  passing  beyond  the  bridges  over  the  Hatchie 
River  and  its  branches,  wrhich,  in  the  plan  of  evacuation,  had  been  directed  to  be 
destroyed  at  a  certain  hour  in  the  morning  of  the  30th  ultimo,  not  an  incident 
would  have  marred,  in  the  least,  the  success  of  the  evacuation  in  the  face  of  a 
force  so  largely  superior.  It  was,  however,  through  a  too  rigid  execution  of 
orders  that  these  bridges  were  burned,  and  we  were  obliged  to  destroy  the 
trains  as  far  as  practicable  and  burn  the  stores,  including  some  valuable  sub 
sistence;  to  what  extent  will  be  more  precisely  reported  as  soon  as  practicable. 

The  troops  moved  off  in  good  spirits  and  order,  prepared  to  give  battle  if 
pursued ;  but  no  serious  pursuit  was  attempted.  Remaining  in  rear  of  the 
Tuscumbia  and  its  affluents,  some  six  miles  from  Corinth,  long  enough  to  collect 
stragglers  incident  to  new  levies,  my  main  forces  resumed  the  march,  and  were 
concentrated  at  Baldwin,  with  rear-guards  left  to  hold  the  bridges  across  the 
Tuscumbia  and  tributaries,  which  were  not  drawn  back  until  the  evening  of 
the  2d  instant. 

While  at  Rienzi,  half-way  to  Baldwin,  I  was  informed  that  on  the  morning  of 
the  30th  ultimo  a  detachment  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  penetrated  to  Boon- 
ville,  eight  miles  south  of  Rieuzi,  and  had  captured  and  burned  a  railroad  train 
of  ammunition,  baggage,  and  subsistence,  delayed  there  some  forty-eight  hours 
by  mismanagement.  I  regret  to  add  that  the  enemy  also  burned  the  railroad 
depot,  in  which  were  at  the  moment  a  number  of  dead  bodies  and  at  least  four 
sick  soldiers  of  this  army,  who  were  consumed — an  act  of  barbarism  scarcely 
credible,  and  without  a  precedent,  to  my  knowledge,  in  civilized  warfare.  Upon 
the  opportune  appearance  in  a  short  time,  however,  of  an  inferior  force  of  our 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXIV.  5S9 

cavalry,  the  enemy  left  in  great  haste  and  confusiou,  after  having  received  one 
volley.  Only  one  of  our  men  was  carried  away  by  him.  Quito  a  considerable 
number  of  stragglers  and  of  our  sick  and  convalescents,  en  route  to  Southern  hos 
pitals,  who  for  a  few  moments  had  fallen  into  the  enemy's  hands,  were  rescued. 
These  are  the  two  thousand  men  untruthfully  reported  by  Generals  Pope  and 
Halleck  to  their  War  Department  as  captured  and  paroled  on  that  occasion. 

I  desire  to  record  that  one  Colonel  Elliott,  of  the  Federal  army,  commanded 
in  this  raid,  and  is  responsible  for  the  cruel  death  of  our  sick.  As  for  the  ten 
thousand  stands  of  small  arms  also  reported  by  those  officers  as  destroyed,  the 
truth  is,  that  not  to  exceed  fifteen  hundred,  mostly  inferior,  muskets  were  lost 
on  that  occasion. 

I  had  intimations  of  this  expedition  the  day  before  the  evacuation,  and  had 
detached  immediately  suitable  commands  of  infantry  and  cavalry  to  foil  its 
purposes  and  protect  the  bridges  on  the  line  of  my  march.  Unfortunately,  the 
infantry  passed  through  and  south  of  Boonville  but  a  little  while  before  the 
enemy  made  his  descent;  the  cavalry,  as  before  said,  reached  there  in  time  only 
to  rescue  our  men  who  had  been  captured. 

Equally  inaccurate,  reckless,  and  unworthy  are  the  statements  of  these  Fed 
eral  commanders  in  their  several  official  reports  by  telegraph,  bearing  dates 
of  May  30th  and  31st,  and  Juno  1st,  2d,  and  4th,  as  published  in  Cincinnati 
and  Chicago  journals,  touching  the  amount  of  property  and  stores  destroyed  by 
us  at  Corinth,  and  General  Pope's  alleged  pressing  pursuit.  Major-General  Hal- 
leek's  despatch  of  Juno  4th  may  particularly  be  characterized  as  disgracefully 
untrue.  Possibly,  however,  ho  was  duped  by  his  subordinate.  Nothing,  for 
example,  can  be  wider  from  the  truth  than  that  ten  thousand  men  and  fifteen 
thousand  small  arms  of  this  army  were  captured  or  lost  in  addition  to  those 
destroyed  at  Boonville.  Some  five  hundred  inferior  small  arms  were  acciden 
tally  left  by  convalescents  in  a  camp  four  miles  south  of  Corinth.  No  artillery 
of  any  description  was  lost;  no  clothing;  no  tents  worth  removal  were  left 
standing.  In  line,  the  letters  of  newspaper  correspondents,  enclosed,  give  a  cor 
rect  statement,  both  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  retreat,  the  scanty  spoils  of  war 
left  behind,  the  actual  barrenness  of  substantial  results  to  the  enemy,  and  ex 
hibit  his  doubt,  perplexity,  and  ignorance  concerning  the  movements  of  this 
army. 

Baldwin  was  found  to  offer  no  advantages  of  a  defensive  character,  and,  being 
badly  provided  with  water,  I  determined  to  fall  back  upon  this  point,  some 
twenty  miles  south,  fifty-two  miles  from  Corinth,  and  here  to  await  the  develop 
ment  of  the  enemy's  plans  and  movements.  Accordingly,  leaving  Baldwin  on 
the  7th  (see  papers  appended,  marked  II),  the  main  body  of  my  forces  was  as 
sembled  hero  on  the  9th  instant,  leaving  all  the  approaches  from  Corinth  care 
fully  guarded  by  a  competent  force  of  cavalry  under  an  efficient  officer,  who 
occupies  a  lino  fifteen  miles  north  of  this  place.  Supported  by  my  general 
officers,  I  am  doing  all  that  is  practicable  to  organize  for  offensive  operations 
whensoever  any  movement  of  the  enemy  may  give  the  opportunity,  which  I 
anticipate  as  not  remote. 

I  feel  authorized  to  say,  by  the  evacuation,  the  plan  of  campaign  of  the  enemy 


590  APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  XXV. 

was  utterly  foiled ;  his  delay  of  seven  weeks  and  vast  expenditures  were  of  little 
value,  and  ho  has  reached  Corinth  to  find  it  a  barren  locality,  which  ho  must 
abandon  as  wholly  worthless  for  his  purposes. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Genl.  Comdg. 

P.  S.  My  effective  force  on  the  morning  of  the  evacuation  (May  30th)  did  not 
exceed  forty-seven  thousand  men,  of  all  arms.  That  of  the  enemy,  obtained 
from  the  best  sources  of  information,  could  not  have  been  less  than  ninety  thou 
sand  men,  of  all  arms.  G.  T.  B. 

APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXV. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

TUPELO,  Miss.,  June  9th,  1862. 
General  SAML.  COOPER,  Adj.  and  Iiisp.  Genl.  C.  S.  A.,  Richmond,  Va.  : 

General, — I  beg  to  call  the  attention  of  the  War  Department  to  the  absolute 
necessity,  as  already  telegraphed  several  times,  of  providing  this  army  immedi 
ately  with  funds;  for  otherwise  its  wants  will  become  intolerable,  and  will 
necessarily  end  in  its  disbandment.  This  relief  can  the  more  readily  bo  ob 
tained  from  the  Assistant  Treasurer  at  Jackson,  Miss.,  who  has  in  his  charge 
several  millions  of  dollars  belonging  to  the  banks  of  New  Orleans,  La.,  seized 
by  my  orders  when  I  was  informed  those  funds  were  to  be  returned  to  those 
banks,  in  obedience  to  instructions  of  Major-General  Butler,  Federal  commander 
at  that  point.  I  am  assured  that  the  bank  agents,  who  had  that  money  in 
charge,  are  not  only  willing,  but  desirous,  it  should  be  applied  to  the  present 
wants  of  this  army,  the  government  becoming  responsible  for  the  same.  I 
would,  therefore,  request  the  department  to  give  such  orders  in  the  case  as  will 
best  secure  the  end  in  view ;  moreover,  it  would  be  advisable  to  remove  those 
funds  from  Jackson,  Miss.,  into  the  interior  as  soon  as  practicable.  I  must  also 
call  the  attention  of  the  department  to  the  absolute  necessity  of  providing  this 
army  with  an  energetic  chief  commissary,  full  of  expedients  and  resources ; 
for  it  is  becoming  more  and  more  difficult  to  supply  the  wants  of  so  large  a 
force  as  we  retire  in  front  of  an  overpowering  enemy.  I  had  the  honor  of 
recommending,  for  that  difficult  position,  several  days  ago,  Major  Moses  I.  Wicks, 
of  the  Tennessee  cavalry,  a  gentleman  of  Memphis,  in  every  way  qualified  for  it, 
according  to  the  recommendations  of  those  best  acquainted  with  him;  the  case 
is  urgent  and  pressing;  if  in  no  other  way,  he  could  be  appointed  a  lieutenant- 
colonel  of  the  Provisional  army,  and  ordered  to  report  to  me  for  duty,  when 
I  will  assign  him  to  the  position  referred  to.  Nearly  the  same  remarks  are  also 
applicable  to  the  chief  quartermaster  of  this  army,  and  I  have  the  honor  to 
recommend  Mr.  Jos.  E.  Bradley,  of  Huutsville,  Ala.,  and  Mr.  Edward  Richard 
son,  of  New  Orleans,  who  are  said  to  possess  all  the  qualities  required  for  that 
position.  These  are  times  when  the  man  best  fitted  for  an  office  should  be  ap 
pointed,  regardless  of  all  other  considerations. 

A  few  Avccks  ago  I  informed  the  department  that  Brigadier-General  Thomas 
Jordan,  Chief  of  Staff  of  this  army,  being  absent,  sick,  I  had  appointed  in  his 


APPENDIX  TO   CHAPTER  XXV.  591 

place,  temporarily,  Major  George  W.  Brent,  Virginia  Volunteers,  who  was  acting 
Assistant  Adjutant-General.  His  term  of  service  having  expired,  he  is  now  with 
out  a  commission,  but  being  an  intelligent,  gallant,  and  meritorious  officer,  who 
highly  distinguished  himself  at  Shiloh,  I  have  the  honor  to  recommend  again 
that  ho  should  be  appointed  lieutenant-colonel  in  the  Adjutant-General's  De 
partment,  if  practicable — as  was  done  in  the  case  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  S. 
Preston — or  in  the  Provisional  army  of  the  Confederate  States.  It  would  be  a 
serious  loss  to  me  and  to  this  army  if  he  were  not  retained  in  the  service. 

Hoping  that  I  may  receive  by  telegraph  a  favorable  answer  to  the  above 
requests,  I  have  the  honor  to  remain, 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Gcul.  Comdg. 

TUPELO,  June  9//i,  1862. 
Major-Genl.  L.  POLK,  Saltillo,  Miss. : 

Troops  are  arriving  and  taking  their  positions.  The  place  appears  very 
healthy.  Water  very  good,  and  obtained  at  twenty  feet  in  abundance.  Not  so 
plentiful  for  animals  except  in  town  creek.  This  is  a  strong  position.  Remain 
at  Saltillo  for  the  present.  Report  your  force  at  twenty-five  thousand.  Keep 
cavalry  well  out.  Fort  Pillow  evacuated.  Enemy  at  Memphis.  Nothing  new 
elsewhere.  Colonel  Tate  is  here.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 


TUPELO,  June  9/fi,  1862. 
Mnjor-Genl.  L.  POLK,  Saltillo,  Miss. : 

Retire  to-morrow  to  this  place  via  Priceville,  having  sent  off,  first,  everything 
from  Saltillo.  The  road  by  the  swamp  is  impassable  for  wagons.  Enemy  not 
much  to  bo  feared.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

Governor  Pickcns,  of  South  Carolina,  to  General  Beauregard. 

COLUMBIA,  S.  C.,  June  12th,  1862. 
To  General  BEAUREGARD: 

Sorry  to  hear  of  your  ill-health  and  affliction.  Sea-air  good  for  you.  We 
want  you  to  fight  our  batteries  again.  We  must  now  defend  Charleston.  Please 
come,  as  the  President  is  willing— at  least  for  the  present.  Answer. 

F.  W.  PlCKENS. 

General  BeauregarcFs  Answer. 
Governor  F.  W.PICKENS,  Columbia,  S.  C. : 

Would  be  happy  to  do  so,  but  my  presence  absolutely  required  here  at  pres 
ent.  My  health  still  bad.  No  doubt  sea-air  would  restore  it,  but  have  no  time 
to  restore  it.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA, 

RICHMOND,  June  23rf,  1862. 
General  BRAXTON  BRAGG,  Comdg.  Army  of  the  West,  Tupelo,  Miss. : 

General, — You  have  no  doubt  received  a  telegram  from  the  President  assign 
ing  you  permanently  to  the  command  turned  over  to  you  by  General  Beauregard. 
I  write  to  inform  you  officially  of  the  fact,  and  to  request  that  you  will  corre- 


592  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXV. 

spond  with  and  receive  instructions  from  tliis  department,  and  consider  your 
self  as  the  Commauder-in-Chief  of  the  forces  within  your  department.  I  do  not 
wish  to  be  understood  as  restricting  General  Lee's  functions ;  they  continue  as 
heretofore.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEO.  W.  RANDOLPH,  Secretary  of  War. 


CULLUM'S  SPRINGS,  BLADON,  ALA.,  July  IGtJi,  1862. 
To  the  Editors  of  the  Mobile  Evg.  News,  Mobile,  Ala. : 

Gentlemen, — Your  article  of  the  15th  instant,  entitled  "  Mischief  Makers,"  has 
just  been  called  to  my  attention.  I  fully  approve  your  remarks,  deprecating 
the  attempts  of  friends  or  foes  to  make  invidious  distinctions  between  generals 
now  gallantly  defending  our  cause  and  country,  or  to  excite  feuds  and  animos 
ities  among  them,  especially  between  General  Bragg  and  myself — a  personal 
friend,  of  whom  I  know  not  a  superior  in  our  service.  If  untrammelled,  rest 
assured  he  will  leave  his  mark  on  the  enemy,  and  add  several  bright  pages  to 
the  history  of  this  revolution.  I  am,  indeed,  most  happy  that  the  command 
of  the  Western  Department  has  fallen  into  such  able  hands.  As  regards  the 
action  of  the  President,  relieving  me  of  that  command,  not  having  anything  to 
say  in  justification  of  it,  I  shall  remain  silent. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant,  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD. 

P.  S.  The  above  is  not  intended  for  publication. 


HEADQUARTERS,  NEAR  TUPELO,  July  17th,  1862. 
To  JOHN  FORSYTII,  Esq.,  Mobile,  Ala. : 

My  dear  Sir, — It  has  been  a  settled  policy  of  my  life  to  allow  my  acts  to 
speak  for  themselves,  and,  so  far,  I  have  no  cause  of  complaint  at  the  position, 
public  and  private,  they  have  assigned  me,  and  especially  has  it  been  my  will 
to  avoid  discussions  in  the  public  press  ;  but  it  is  no  departure  from  that  rule 
to  return  you  my  cordial  and  heartfelt  thanks  for  the  sentiments  expressed  in 
your  article  of  the  15th  on  "  Mischief  Makers,"  so  far  as  relates  to  the  positions, 
personal  and  official,  of  General  Beauregard  and  myself.  Whoever  attempts  to 
disturb  those  cordial  relations  will  only  incur  the  contempt  of  both.  No  two 
men  living  ever  served  together  more  harmoniously  or  parted  with  more  regret, 
and  few  men  possess  my  confidence  and  esteem  to  the  same  extent,  as  a  gen 
eral  and  a  gentleman.  None  of  us  are  free  from  our  faults  and  weaknesses,  but 
among  mine  will  never  be  found  a  jealousy  which  would  detract  from  so  pure 
a  man  and  eminent  a  general  as  Beauregard.  No  one  could  have  been  more 
surprised  at  the  order  assigning  me  to  his  command  than  myself,  and  certainly 
the  idea  of  my  being  a  "pet"  with  any  part  of  the  administration  is  laughable. 
General  Beauregard  has  never  been  physically  equal  to  the  labors  of  his  posi 
tion  since  I  joined  him  in  March  last,  and  has  often  said  to  mo  he  could  not  get 
on  with  its  labors  without  the  cordial  and  earnest  assistance  I  gave  him.  Our 
intercourse  was  daily,  free,  unrestrained,  and  as  harmonious  as  if  we  had  been 
brothers.  Upon  the  urgent  appeal  of  his  physicians,  after  arriving  here,  where 
it  was  supposed  we  should  not  be  assailed  by  the  enemy  for  a  few  weeks,  he  re- 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXV.  593 

tired  to  seek  some  relief  from  the  toils  which  have  made  him  an  old  man  iu  the 
short  space  of  one  year.  If  it  be  his  friends  who  have  started  this  discussion, 
they  are  doing  him  great  injustice,  and,  so  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  can  only  say 
to  them  the  records  hero  will  show  with  what  regret  I  parted  with  their  chief, 
and  ho\v  ardently  I  hoped  for  his  restoration,  that  he  might  resume  the  posi 
tion  he  had  filled  so  honorably.  I  still  hope  that  when  his  health  is  restored 
lie  may  return  to  this  command,  for  my  poor  abilities  will  still  bo  taxed  to  the 
fullest  extent  in  rendering  him  that  aid  he  has  ever  candidly  asked  and  cor 
dially  received. 

No  less  sensible  than  others  to  the  personal  advantages  of  my  present  posi 
tion,  I  still  feel  more  for  the  success  of  our  cause  than  for  myself.  Having  so 
far,  without  a  murmur,  labored  somewhat  in  obscurity,  though  I  feel  not  with 
out  some  success,  you  will  find  me  among  the  last  to  seek  or  receive  advance 
ment  at  the  expense  of  a  brother  soldier,  especially  when  he  deserves  and  pos 
sesses  my  confidence  and  gratitude. 

Excuse  this  hasty  and  rambling  note,  but  I  could  not  pass  the  occasion 
without  thanking  you.  Truly  your  friend, 

BUAXTON  BRAGG. 

It  is  reported  Buell  is  returning  this  side  the  Tennessee,  and  that  Curtis  has 
reached  Helena  safely,  instead  of  being  captured.  If  both  be  true,  our  hands 
will  soon  be  full.  B.  B. 


TUPELO,  JuJy  22rf,  1802. 
(Jenl.  G.  T.  BKAUKEGAUD: 

My  dear  General, — As  I  am  changing  entirely,  under  altered  circumstances, 
the  plan  of  operations  here,  I  submit  to  you  what  I  propose,  and  beg  your  can 
did  criticism.  And,  in  view  of  the  cordial  and  sincere  relations  we  have  ever 
maintained,  I  trust  to  your  compliance. 

I  am  moving  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  thirty-four  thousand  effectives,  (o 
East  Tennessee,  to  join  with  Smith's  twenty  thousand  and  take  the  offensive. 
My  reasons  are,  Smith  is  so  weak  as  to  give  me  great  uneasiness  for  the  safety 
of  his  line — to  lose  which  would  be  a  great  disaster.  They  refuse  to  aid  him 
from  the  east  or  south,  and  put  the  whole  responsibility  on  me.  To  aid  him 
at  all  from  here  necessarily  renders  me  too  weak  for  the  offensive  against  Hal- 
leek,  with  ut  least  sixty  thousand  strongly  intrenched  in  my  front.  With  the 
country  between  us  reduced  almost  to  a  desert  by  two  armies  and  a  drought  of 
two  months,  neither  of  us  could  well  advance  in  the  absence  of  railroad  trans 
portation.  It  seemed  to  me  then,  I  was  reduced  to  the  defensive  altogether,  or 
to  the  move  I  am  making.  By  throwing  my  cavalry  forward  towards  Grand 
Junction  and  Tuscumbia,  the  impression  is  created  that  I  am  advancing  on 
both  places,  and  they  are  drawing  in  to  meet  me.  The  Memphis  and  Charles 
ton  Road  has  been  kept  cut,  BO  they  have  no  use  of  it,  and  have  at  length  given 
it  up.  Before  they  can  know  my  movement,  I  shall  be  in  front  of  Buell  at 
Chattanooga,  and,  by  cutting  off  his  transportation,  may  have  him  in  a  light 
place. 

I.-38 


594:  APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXV. 

Van  Dorn  will  be  able  to  hold  his  own  with  about  twenty  thousand  on  the 
Mississippi.  Price  stays  here  with  sixteen  thousand.  Thus  you  have  ray  plau. 
I  leave  to-morrow  for  Mobile,  thence  to  Chattanooga.  Our  cavalry  is  paving 
the  way  for  me  in  Middle  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  Critteudeu  is  quite  a 
prize ;  and  the  whole  affair,  in  proportion  to  numbers,  more  brilliant  than  the 
grand  battles  where  "  strategy  "  seems  to  have  been  the  staple  production  on 
both  sides;  and,  if  I  am  any  judge,  the  enemy  beat  us  at  it.  We  may  con 
gratulate  ourselves  that  McClellau  was  satisfied  with  changing  his  base,  for  it 
occurs  to  my  obtuse  mind  that  a  bold  stroke  at  Richmond,  while  we  were  hunt 
ing  for  him,  \vould  have  ruined  us. 

The  papers  seem  to  be  groping  in  the  dark  as  to  the  reasons  which  influ 
enced  the  change  here,  and  attributing  motives  to  each  of  us  never  entertained 
by  either.  Fortunately  we  know  each  other  too  well,  and  have  this  cause  too 
much  at  heart,  to  be  influenced  by  these  things.  Hoping  for  your  restoration 
and  return,  Truly  yours, 

BRAXTON  BRAGG. 


END  or  VOL.  i. 


ERRATA    FOR    VOL.  I. 

Page    42,  lino  21,  for  "J.  A.  Gon/.ak's,"  read  "  A.  .1.  Gonzales." 
"      101.    '      2;$,  for  "Liddle,"  mid  ~  Liddell." 
"     103.    '      34,  for  "  I.  L.  Preston's,"  read  "  J.  F.  Preston's." 
"     104.    "     20.  for  ••Hunter's,"  mur '  Hunton's." 
14     107.    '         1.  for  "28th.'1  rend  "18th." 
15,  for  "38th,"  read  "28th." 
"     108,    '      24,  for  "  Wilhcrs's  13th  and  28th  Virginia."  read  ""Withers's  18tb 

and  Preston's  28th  Virginia." 
"     450,    '      24,  for  "J.  L.  Preston's,"  read  ".  I.  F.  Preston's." 


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